CASE FACTS

RTC find Melecia and another person guilty

as charged and sentenced them to the
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite penalty of death. Upon motion for execution
by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC
(Art. 76 & Art. 121) ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in
the levy of real properties registered in the
names of Efren and Melecia.

petitioner Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national,

contended that the 4 subject properties were
acquired with the money he received from the
Dutch government as his disability benefit
since respondent did not have sufficient
Beumer v. Amores.
income to pay for their acquisition. CA ruled
(Art. 80) the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of
the constitutional prohibition for aliens to
acquire lands in the Philippines. Hence, he
cannot invoke equity to support his claim
for reimbursement.
 On June 30, 1988, Benjamin Taylor
(Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn
Taylor, a 17-year old Filipina.
while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn
bought a 1,294 square-meter lot in Boracay
which was allegedly financed by respondent.
Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip
Matthews as lessee, entered into an
Matthews v. Taylor Agreement of Lease involving the Boracay
(Art. 80 & Sec. 7, Art. XII property
Consti) The agreement was signed by the parties,
including Benjamin as a witness to the
contract,
Claiming that the Agreement was null and
void since it was entered into by Joselyn
without his (Benjamin’s) consent, Benjamin
instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Agreement of Lease with Damages against
Joselyn and the petitioner.
 Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, &
Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, separated
mother of two boys fell in love and live
together. They bought a house and lot and an
Absolute Deed of Sale was issued in their
names. Consequently, his name was erased
but his signature remained and the property
was issued on the name of the Respondent
Borromeo v. Descallar alone. However, their relationship did not last
long and they found new love.
(Art. 80 & Sec. 7, Art. XII
Consti) Jambrich met the petitioner &
becameindebted to the petitioner for a sum of
money and to pay his debt, he sold some of
his properties to the petitioner . However,
when the Petitioner sought to register the
deed of assignment it found out that said land
was registered in the name of Respondent.
Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property.
 Borromeo v. Descallar
long and they found new love.
(Art. 80 & Sec. 7, Art. XII
Consti) Jambrich met the petitioner &
becameindebted to the petitioner for a sum of
money and to pay his debt, he sold some of
his properties to the petitioner . However,
when the Petitioner sought to register the
deed of assignment it found out that said land
was registered in the name of Respondent.
Petitioner filed a complaint against
respondent for recovery of real property.

Estanislao Serrano is appealing the decision

of RTC for declaring the donation propter
nuptias, voluntary made by respondent as null
and void.
, respondent intended to donate all of his
exclusive properties to Miss Alejandria
Serrano v. Solomon Felician his future wife.
(Art. 82 to 87) •Few months after the marriage, Alejandria
died without issue On the donation document
state.
"if my beloved wife will die before me, one
half of all my properties and those acquired by
us will be given to those who have reared my
wife in token of my love to her"
 According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila
were lovers since they slept in the same
room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura,
another niece of Francisco claimed that the
latter told her that Cirila was his mistress.
However, Cirila defensed herself that she was
a mere helper who could enter the master’s
bedroom when Francisco asked her to and
Arcaba v. Tabancura that Francisco was too old for her. She
denied having sexual intercourse with
(Donation between
Francisco. When the nieces got married,
UNMARRIED Cirila who was then 34 year-old widow started
COHABITATION) working for Francisco who was 75 year old
widower.

few months before Francisco died, he

executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos”
together with his house to Cirila who accepted
the same. This was made in consideration of
the 10 year of faithful services of the
petitioner.
 Lourdes P. Reyes, herein respondent, is the
widow of Rodolfo A. Reyes who died on
September 12, 1981.
For years, his husband had illicit relations with
[petitioner] Milagros B. Joaquino
after retirement his husband received from
Joaquino v. Reyes said company benefits and emoluments but
(Art. 87, Art. 145 & Art. [respondent] wife was not the recipient of any
153) portion of the said amount. Properties were
named to petitioner.
Petitioner in her answer claimed that her own
money was used to purchase the subject
properties. It was petitioner’s submission that
her children are entitled to a share in the
disputed property, because they were
voluntarily acknowledged by Rodolfo as his
children.
 Rogelio and Shirley started paying for a piece
of land,on which they plan to build their future
home. They got married in 1990. Shirley sent
him money5 for the purchase of a
residential,she settled the balance for the
equity over the subject property with the
developer through SSS8 financing. She
likewise paid for the succeeding monthly
amortizations. The subject property was
issued by the Registry of Deeds
NOBLEZA vs. NUEGA
solely under the name of Rogelio.
(Articles 88 to 104) ACP Shirley heard stories that her husband had
brought home another woman. Shirley filed 2
cases against Rogelio:
(1) Concubinage; and, (2) Legal Separation
and Liquidation of Property
she learned that her husband sold their
property to Josefina V. Nobleza without her
consent. She tried to warn the buyer about
the pending case she filed, but still the sale
was consummated.
 • (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo
Ching made himself jointly answerable to the
debt as added security. Upon PBM’s failure to
pay the loan, AIDC filed a case for sum of
AYALA INVESTMENT &
DEVELOPMENT INCORP. vs CA money against PBM and respondent Ching in
(ART. 121 CPG) the CFI of Pasig.

After trial, the court rendered decision in favor

of AIDC ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to
jointly and severally pay AIDC. The spouses
contended that subject loan did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
 Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his
legs which were treated at various hospitals
on different dates. At the request of his
relatives and while already being ill, Amadeo
went to Samar where he stayed with his sister
to sign documents that needed his signature
pertaining to his Samar properties and never
returned to Estela.
Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed
of sale over the one-half undetermined portion
Costuna v. Domondon of the conjugal property in favor of Laureana
(Article 121 CPG) Domondon (respondent) without the consent
of Estela (unreasonbly witheld her
consent). Estela Costuna instituted special
proceedings claiming pro indiviso one half
share over the lots after Amadeo’s death.
The sale of the 1/2 of the conjugal properties
to Domondon was allegedly for the payment
of Amandeo’s hospital expenses, which
Estela never rebutted. Estela, however, avers
that the sale was void because her consent
was not given

When the Reyes Spouses failed to pay the

loan obligations, Philippine National Bank
foreclosed the mortgaged real properties.
Venancio assailed the validity of the real
estate mortgage and claimed that his wife
undertook the loan and the mortgage without
his consent and his signature was falsified on
PNB vs REYES
the promissory notes and the mortgage
(Article 121 & 124) . The Trial Court ordered the annulment of the
real estate mortgage and directed Lilia to
reimburse PNB.
In this petition, the PNB
argues that the real estate mortgage is valid,
that the conjugal partnership should be held
liable for the loan,
 Respondent's wife sold a conjugal property to
the petitioners. Upon inquiry of valifity of the
TOC petitioners met with Atty. Noel Zarate,
the bank’s legal counsel, who related that the
bank had asked for the court order because
the lot involved was conjugal property.

Petitioners were able to fully paid the

remaining balance for the subject property
however, Ma. Elena did not turn over the
duplicate owner’s copy. Petitioners learned
that the duplicate owner’s copy had been
in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan,
Aggabao v. Parulan Jr. who appeared to hold an SPA executed by
his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell
(Art. 124) both lots. They Atty. made an offer w/h the
couple declined, citing that they've already
made full payment to Elena.

Thus, Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan,

commenced an action praying for the
declaration of the nullity of the deed of
absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the
cancellation of the title issued to the
petitioners by virtue thereof.
RTC declared that the SPA in the hands of
Ma. Elena was a forgery, based on its finding
that Dionisio had been out of the country at
the time of the execution of the SPA
 Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille
and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife.
the spouses acquired
parcel of land
adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro
acquired when he was still single and which is
registered solely in his name
Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his
Ravina v. Abrille family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or
(ART. 124: Sale of CPG mortgage their movables to support the family
w/ knowledge but w/o and the studies of her children. By himself,
consent of other Pedro offered to sell the house and the two
spouse) lots to herein petitioners
Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners
of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold
the house and the two lots without Mary Ann’s
consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It
appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did
not sign on top of her name
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house
was built with his own money
 To satisfy the lien for attorney's fees, a parcel of
land, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay
Yamane (wife of Leonardo Yamane), was
scheduled to be sold at public auction on August
11, 1981. Spouses Josephine and Henry Go,
herein petitioners, were awarded the said land as
the highest bidders in the auction. Respondent
Leonardo Yamane filed a complaint for annulment
and cancellation of Sale to petitioners, invoking a
third-party claim. Respondent contended that the
land was a conjugal property and could not be
Go v. Yamane, held responsible for the personal obligations of
(Article 109 to 115) Muriel and the two other Pucays. RTC ruled
against respondent
reasoning that the subject parcel of land was the
paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay
Yamane -- spouse of respondent -- and was not
their conjugal property.
The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise
saying that the property acquired during marriage
is presumed to be conjugal unless the exclusive
funds of one spouse are shown to have been used
for the purpose.
 Respondents are legitimate children of
Agripino Alvarez and his first wife Alejandra
Martin. After the death of Alejandra Martin,
Agripino Alvarez married Isidra de la Cruz and
they had one child named Teodora Alvarez.
• Agripino Alvarez died intestate, survived
by his widow Isidra and his five children,
• Through an ‘Extra-judicial Partition with
Absolute Sale of Shares’ was executed by the
widow Isidra and her daughter Teodora
Alvarez wherein, after reciting that they are
‘the legal and absolute heirs they adjudicated
to themselves in equal shares then sold the
entire property in Rizal to Pacifico C. del
Del Mundo v. CA ( Mundo who registered the instrument .
The children of Agripino by his first wife sold
to Simplicio Balcos four tenths (4/10)
• undivided share in the property in
question which they claim as their share in the
estate of their father. The deed of sale has
never been registered.
They filed a complaint against Isidra and
Teodora in order to annul the sale they made
on the property. The Court dismissed the
complaint, holding that the property in
question is the paraphernal property of Isidra
de la Cruz. The CA reversed the decision
declaring the property to be conjugal and the
four children co-owners of the property
 ISSUE RULING

·       YES, Since Efren does not dispute the RTC’s

finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of her
WON, the obligation of the wife
arising from her criminal liability own, Article 122 applies. The civil indemnity that the
decision in the murder case imposed on Melecia may
is chargeable against the
be enforced against their conjugal assets after the
properties of the marriage
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered.

• The petition lacks merit

Article 80 of the Family code provides that in the
absence of contrary stipulation in marriage settlement,
Philippine law will govern the property relations of the
WON, Beumer is entitled for spouses regardless of the place where the marriage is
reimbursement of the value of celebrated.
the lots based on equity.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by
virtue of its unconstitutional purchase.
 • NO. The Court find and so hold that Benjamin has no
right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private
and public lands in the Philippines. Considering
that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the
Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired SOLE
OWNERSHIP thereto.
• WON, an alien husband can
nullify a lease contract entered
into by his Filipina wife bought • NO, in any event, he had and has no capacity
during their marriage or personality to question the subsequent
lease of the Boracay property by his wife on
• WON, Benjamin’s consent is the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the
necessary prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would countenance
indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal,
this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive
vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
 • NO, the evidence clearly shows that as between
respondent and Jambrich, it was Jambrich who
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the
properties in dispute. Jambrich was the owner
of the properties in question, but his name
was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale
because of legal constraints. Nevertheless,
his signature remained in the deed of sale
where he signed as a buyer. Thus, Jambrich has all
authority to transfer all his rights, interest and participation
over the subject properties to petitioner by virtue of Deed
of Assignment.

Furthermore, the fact that the disputed properties were

acquired during the couple’s cohabitation does not help the
respondent. The rule of co-ownership applies to
a man and a woman living exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but otherwise
capacitated to marry each other does not
apply.

At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to

another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between
the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove
his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in
•WON, Jambrich has no title to order to able to lay claim to any portion of it.
the properties in question and • NO, It is settled rule that registration is not a
may not transfer and assign any mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of
rights and interest in favor of the confirming the existence with notice to the world at
petitioner large. The mere possession of a title does not
•WON, the registration of the make one the true owner of the property. Thus,
properties in the name of the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
respondents make him the absolutely make her the owner.
owner thereof
The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to
respondent.

A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is

perfect, absolute and indefeasible. EXCEPTION to this rule is
when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not
acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.

This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not

contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor
did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then
fully supported by Jambrich.
 petitioner large. The mere possession of a title does not
•WON, the registration of the make one the true owner of the property. Thus,
properties in the name of the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed
properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and
respondents make him the absolutely make her the owner.
owner thereof
The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to
respondent.

A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and that it is

perfect, absolute and indefeasible. EXCEPTION to this rule is
when the transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not
acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration.

This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not

contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the
properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor
did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then
fully supported by Jambrich.

1. NO, the natural guardians cannot get said share.

Insofar, as said share is concerned, the alleged
donation to them cannot be valid donation propter
• WON, petitioner is entitled nuptias because said share was not given to one of the
for the one half of respondent’s spouses.
property in accordance to the
term od deed of donation propter 2. NO, because it was never accepted by the donee
nuptias either in the same instrument or donation or in a
separate document as required by law.
• WON it might be considered
a donation inter vivos 3. NO, because for a donation to take effect after the
death of the donor, is equivalent to a disposition of a
• WON, the donation be property by last will. The deed of donation did not have
regarded a donation mortis the formalities of a will, aside from the fact that the
causa, donor is still alive
 NO. The court in this case considered a sufficient
proof of common law relationship wherein donation is
not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony
of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of “Cirila Comille” such as application for
business permit, sanitary permit and the death
certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not
demand her wages is an indication that she was not
WON, the Court of Appeals simply a caregiver –employee.
correctly applied Art. 87 of the
Family Code to the Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
circumstances of this case. especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no longer be interested in sex at the very least,
cohabitation is a public assumption of men and
women holding themselves out to the public as
such.

Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of

Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
 • YES. Under Article 145 thereof, a conjugal partnership
of gains (CPG) is created upon marriage end lasts until the
legal union is dissolved by death, annulment, legal separation
or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties are
by law owned in common by the husband and wife.
As to what constitutes such properties are laid out in Article
153 of the Code, which we quote: "(1) That which is acquired
by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership,
or for only one of the spouses;

• NO, Milagros was wrong in claiming said

property.
• WON, properties in question
pertain to the conjugal The property is conjugal (owned by Rodolfo and Lourdes) or
partnership of gains exclusive (owned by Milagros) or co-owned by Rodolfo and
• WON, the petitioner has the Milagros. All told, respondents have shown that the property
right of co-ownership with the was bought during the marriage of Rodolfo and Lourdes,
deceased a fact that gives rise to the presumption that it is
conjugal.

More important, they have established that the proceeds of

the loan obtained by Rodolfo were used to pay for the
property; and that the loan was, in turn, paid from his salaries
and earnings, which were conjugal funds under the Civil
Code. Under the circumstances,

therefore, the purchase and the subsequent registration of

the realty in petitioner’s name was tantamount to a donation
by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision of Article 739(1)
of the Civil Code, such donation was void, because it was
"made between persons who were guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation."
 1.) NO, the Deed of Sale between Rogelio and
Josefina Nobleza was VOID. Rogelio sold the property in
1992, at the time when his marriage with Shirley was
subsisting and that the property was conjugal, and part of
their community property. (Art. 96)

The powers given to one spouse to administer the property

in the absence of the other does not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance of the property without the
latter’s written consent or a court order. Any disposition or
• Whether or not the Deed of encumbrance made without the said spousal consent or
Sale between Rogelio and court authority is deemed void.
Josefina Nobleza was valid
2.) YES. The property is conjugal and is part of the
• Whether or not the property community property of Rogelio and Shirley even in
is conjugal, despite the TCT it is registered only in Rogelio’s name as a single
bearing the “single” civil status of man. The property was acquired during their
Rogelio as owner
marriage and all property acquired during this time is
• Whether or not Shirley is presumed to be conjugal and part of the
liable for a share in the community property
reimbursement of the buyer’s
payment 3.) NO. Shirley is not liable for the reimbursement of
the payment issued by Nobleza to Rogelio. Under
Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community of
property shall only be “liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other
to the extent that the family may have been benefited x x x.”
There was no evidence that the payment given to
Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family and
the absolute community property or Shirley cannot be held
liable for the obligation.
 • NO. The contract of loan or services is clearly
for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. No presumption can be
inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to
establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership.

PBM has a personality which is distinct from that of Ching’s

•WON the debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone family despite their being stockholders of the said company.
is considered “for the benefit of The debt incurred by Ching is a corporate debt
the conjugal partnership.” and the right of recourse to respondent as surety
is only to the extent of his corporate stocks.

If the money or services are given to another person or

entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor,
that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.”
 1. YES. As a general rule, the husband may not validly
sell real estates belonging to the conjugal partnership
without the wife’s consent. However, the New Civil Code
provides certain exceptions. In this case, Amadeo
sought the petitioner’s consent but was adamantly
withheld by the latter from her belief that the deed of sale
was executed in fraud of her. What was sold by Amadeo
WON, the sale of conjugal without the petitioner’s consent was only an undetermined
properties by the husband may one-half share in the community properties, but he left intact
be validly made without the the other undetermined 1/2 share which should belong to
consent of the wife. Estela Cosuna. The Court concedes that the consent of
the petitioner is essential for the validity of the sale,
WON, the conjugal partnership however, the Court may relax the application of the law
should be made liable for the and consider the sale as falling within the recognized
payment of Amadeo’s hospital exceptions if consent was unreasonably withheld.
dues who allegedly abandoned
the conjugal home and his wife 2. YES. Article 121 of FC provides that the conjugal
partnership shall be liable for all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband or the wife for the benefit of
the conjugal partnership. The Court states that the benefit
required by this article need not be quantified into pesos
or square meters of real property. It is enough that the
well-being of both or either spouses would undeniably
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

• YES, the conjugal partnership can be held liable.

The lower courts may have declared the mortgage void,
but the principal obligation is not affected. It
remains valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that the loan was used as
WON, the conjugal partnership additional working capital for respondent’s printing
can be held liable for the loan
contracted unilaterally by Lilia C. business. As held in Ayala Investment, since the
Reyes loaned money is used in the husband's business,
there is a presumption that it redounded to the
benefit of the family; hence, the conjugal partnership
may be held liable for the loan amount. Since there is a
legal presumption to this effect, there is no need to
prove actual benefit to the family.
 • The petition has no merit. We sustain the CA.
Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal
properties made after the effectivity of the Family Code.
The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3,
1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to
apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
WON, Article 124 of the Family settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal
property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is
Code should apply to the sale of governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
the conjugal property executed
without the consent of Dionisio The power of administration does not include
acts of disposition or encumbrance, which
are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority
to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer,
and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by
an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil
Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878
 • NO, the presumption of the conjugal nature of
the property subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to
overcome said presumption or to prove that the
subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the
presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage
of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built
thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the
joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from
DBP to construct the house.
WON, the sale by Pedro was Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property
valid considering the absence of concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
Mary Ann’s consent. 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats
such a disposition to be void if done
(a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or
(b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.
Respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for
annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date
of sale and execution of the deed. However, her
action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal
house and lot and does not include the lot covered by
TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to
Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary
Ann’s consent.
 YES, the subject property is conjugal since it was
acquired during the susistence of the marriage.
As to the the then established conjugal property, the
contract or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and
the Pucay sisters appear[s] to have been incurred for the
exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting
privately for her exclusive interest when she joined her
two sisters in hiring the services of Atty. De Guzman to
handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses
were incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her
sisters' private and exclusive interests, are her exclusive
responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against
the contested conjugal property.
WON, the property in Muriel Pucay’s
name was a conjugal property and
should not be held responsible for the
obligations of Muriel Pucay and her
sisters.
WON, the property in question is
the conjugal property of Agripino
Alvarez and Isidra de la Cruz or
the paraphernal property of the
latter alone.
 LEGAL BASIS:
Article 76 No post modification to MS is valid unless ot
falls to the exception provided by this provision.
Article 121 allows payment of the criminal
indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia,
out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
indemnities may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding
article have been covered. No prior liquidation of
those assets is required. This is not altogether
unfair since Article 122 states that at the
time of liquidation of the partnership, such
offending spouse shall be charged for what has
been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.

SC’s ruling was based in the case of Elena

Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller.

It held that a foreigner cannot seek reimbursement on

the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly
and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine
land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which reads:

Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no

private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Article 80 of the Family code provides that in the
absence of contrary stipulation in marriage
settlement, Philippine law will govern the property
relations of the spouses regardless of the place where
the marriage is celebrated.

The rule is clear and inflexible:

aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or
private lands in the Philippines, save only in
constitutionally recognized exceptions. (Section7, Art
XII Consti)
• WON, Section 7, Article XII can be invoked
in the case at bar
While it is true that the fundamental law explicitly
prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title
to private lands, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
natural-born citizen.

However, Applying the decision in United Church

Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in
favor of petitioner, viz.:

[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase

of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] VOID
AB INITIO since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties
by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from
him, has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid.
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase
of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the
properties under litigation [were] VOID
AB INITIO since [they were] contrary to the
Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner,
yet, the acquisition of these properties
by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from
him, has cured the flaw in the original
transaction and the title of the
transferee is valid.

ARTICLE 82 (Requisites of DPN)

Donation made for the reason of marriage are
those which are:
1. Made Before its celebration, in consideration of
the same, and
2. In Favor of one or both the future spouses
NOTE:
• Non- happening of the marriage is ground for
revocation.
o It is not automatically revoked;
o There must be an ACTION FOR REVOCATION,
which is done within the prescription required.
ARTICLE 87: Every donation or grant of
gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect,
between the spouses DURING the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion
of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall
also apply to persons living together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage.
Article 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous
advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses
during the marriage shall be void, except moderate
gifts which the spouses may give each other on the
occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall
also apply to persons living together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage."

Hence, the property belongs to the conjugal

partnership of gains and that the petitioner
paramour shall not be co-owners with the married
deceased.

Article 145 - DISSOLUTION OF CPG:

1.) By death
2.) Decree of legal separation
3.) Annulment
4.) Judicial separation of property

Article 153 of the Code, which we quote:

"(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during
the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses;

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE

- is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the
rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another for
the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or
reconvey the land to him.
Article 93
PRESUMPTION: property acquired during the
marriage is presumed to belong to the
community, unless proven one of those excluded.

• Burden of proof is on the person who claims

otherwise
• On TCT/OCT issued in the name of issued in
the name of “husband married to wife” or “wife
married to husband”

RULE OF INFEASEBILITY
A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,
and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.
EXCEPTION to this rule is when the transferee is
not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the
subject properties for a valuable consideration.

ARTICLE 94 – Liabilities chargeable

to ACP

ARTICLE 96 – Joint administration &

enjoyment of ACP belong to both the
spouses; The power to administer is
separate and distinct from the authority
to dispose the community property.
ARTICLE 121 Liabilities Chargeable
to CPG
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by
either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family
may have benefited;

It only allows CPG to be liable for obligations

contracted by one spouse without the
consent of the other spouse when said
obligation redounded to the benefit of the
family.
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be
liable for:
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either
spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have benefited;

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover

the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
 ARTICLE 124:
JOINT ADMINISTRATION & ENJOYMENT OF
THE SPOUSES;

BUYERS IN GOOD FAITH MUST

observe two kinds of requisite
diligence, namely:
(a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title
covering the property; and
(b) the diligence in inquiring into the authority of the
transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf
of the other spouse.
 ARTICLE 124:
JOINT ADMINISTRATION & ENJOYMENT OF THE
SPOUSES; In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, SUBJECT
TO RECOURSE BY THE WIFE WITH THE
COURT FOR PROPER REMEDY. The
prescription is 5 YEARS from the date of the contract
implementing the husband's decision.
 Rule: The nature of a property—whether conjugal or
paraphernal—is determined by law and
not by the will of one of the spouses. Thus, no
unilateral declaration by one spouse (as well as
that of his children or heirs) can change the character
of a property. (Go v. Yamane, GR No.
160762, May 3, 2006)

Article 116 OF THE Family Code provides that "all

property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."

"As a general rule, all property acquired by the

spouses, regardless of in whose name the same is
registered, during the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.
A sale by the surviving spouse of
conjugal property cannot be declared
void by the court until liquidation is first
made of the conjugal estate.
 RATIONALE
ART. 76) Post-marriage modification of such
settlements can take place only where:
(a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership
was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal
separation;
(b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled
and agreed to revive their former property regime
(Article 67)
(c) judicial separation of property had been had on the
ground that a spouse abandons the other without just
cause or fails to comply with his obligations to the
family;
(d) there was judicial separation of property under
Article 135;
(e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary
dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains.
None of these circumstances exists in the case of
Efren and Melecia.

Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition

is to conserve the national patrimony and it is
this policy which the Court is duty-bound to
protect. Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests
no rights, creates no obligations and produces
no legal effect at all.
Equity is the principle by which
substantial justice may be
‘MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER attained in cases where the
prescribed or customary forms
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (ART.22) of ordinary law are inadequate.
No person should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.
This is true even if we sustain Benjamin’s claim
that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By
entering into such contract knowing that it was
illegal,
1.) no implied trust was created in his favor;

2.) no reimbursement for his expenses can be

allowed; and

3.) no declaration can be made that the subject

property was part of the conjugal/community
property of the spouses.
 The rule of co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but otherwise capacitated to marry each
other does not apply.

At the case at bar, respondent was still legally married to

another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an
adulterous relationship and no co-ownership exists between the
parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or
her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to
able to lay claim to any portion of it.wise capacitated to marry
each other does not apply.
The answer has to be in the negative for the reason that
this Tribunal has heretofore consistently held that a
donation to take effect after the death of the
donor, is equivalent to a disposition or bequest
of property by last will, and it should be
executed in accordance with the requisites and
strict provisions governing the execution wills;1
and Exhibit "A" does not fulfill said requirements. Moreover,
in the present case, the donor is still alive and naturally,
even if the donation were otherwise valid, still, the time and
occasion have not arrived for considering its operation and
implementation.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old
and may no longer be interested in sex at the very
least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men
and women holding themselves out to the public
as such.
The purchase and the subsequent registration of the
realty in petitioner’s name was tantamount to a
donation by Rodolfo to Milagros. By express provision
of Article 739(1) of the Civil Code, such donation was
void, because it was "made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation."
 Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with petitioner
and acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the
contract under the Deed of Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be
held accountable to petitioner for the reimbursement of her
payment for the purchase of the subject property.

Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community

of property shall only be "liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been benefited x x x." As
correctly stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence
on record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to
the benefit of the family, respondent cannot be made to
reimburse any amount to petitioner.
The Court states that the benefit required by this article need
not be quantified into pesos or square meters of real property. It
is enough that the well-being of both or either spouses would
undeniably redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
ARTICLE 124 Any alienation or encumbrance of
CPG made during the effectivity of the Family
Code shall be governed by Art. 124.

Article 124 thereof categorically requires for the consent of both

the spouses before the conjugal property may be disposed for
sale, mortgage or other mode of disposition. More so, it requires
for buyer’s diligence before buying a conjugal property.
If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what
has been given is proper. The relationship between the
parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must
always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and
fair dealing. Hence, in consonance with justice and equity and
the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s expense,
we sustain the appellate court’s order directing Pedro to return
to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot
covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon.

However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim

reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their
good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and
renovations on the house and lot at the time when the
complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing
improvements during the pendency of the action.

Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides

that, "(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity."19
 CASE FACTS

Upon the separation of the spouses, the defendant

assumed the complete management and
administration of the conjugal partnership property,
• Petitioner further contended that defendant
Garcia v. Mazano has even fictitiously transferred or alienated a
majority of property in favor of third persons.
(Art. 134 to 135) Defendant even so failed and refused to turn over
and deliver to plaintiff his rightful share and
participation in the conjugal partnership property
and its fruits. (wHICH ACCORDING TO PETITIONER
ARE SIGN OF MALADMINISTRATION)

Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz,

(ART. 135: LEGAL
ABANDONMENT)
 ISSUE RULING

• NO, the complaint does not

establish a case for separation of
property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging
a régime of separation as not in
harmony with the unity of the family and
the mutual affection and help expected
of the spouses, the Civil Codes (both
old and new) require that
WON, cause of action is sufficient for judicial separation of property shall not
separation of conjugal property
prevail unless expressly
stipulated in marriage
settlements before the union is
solemnized or by formal judicial
decree during the existence of
the marriage (ART. 134)
and in the latter case, it may only be
ordered by the court for causes
specified in ART. 135 of FC:
 LEGAL BASIS: RATIONALE

•In the event of such maladministration by the

wife (and disregarding the case of judicial
authorization to have the wife manage the
ARTICLE 135 SUFFICIENT CAUSE
FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF partnership, since such a case is not involved), the
PROPERTY IF PETITIONER’S SPOUSE remedy of the husband does not lie in
IS: a judicial separation of property but in
• Sentenced with penalty of Civil revoking the power granted to the wife
interdiction
and resume the administration of the
• Judicially declared as an
community property and the conduct
absentee
• Loss of Parental authority of the affairs of the conjugal
decreed by court partnership. He may enforce his right of
possession and control of the conjugal property
In all these cases, it is sufficient
against his wife (Perkins v. Perkins, 57 Phil., 205)
to present the final judgment and seek such ancillary remedies as may, be
which has been entered against required by the circumstances, even to the
the guilty or absent spouse. extent of annulling or rescinding any
unauthorized alienations or incumbrances,
upon proper action filed for that purpose.