Statistics For Management and Economics 11th Edition Keller Solutions Manual
Statistics For Management and Economics 11th Edition Keller Solutions Manual
Chapter 2
2.1 Nominal: Occupation, undergraduate major. Ordinal: Rating of university professor, Taste test ratings. Interval:
age, income
2.2 a Interval
b Interval
c Nominal
d Ordinal
2.3 a Interval
b Nominal
c Ordinal
d Interval
e Interval
2.4 a Nominal
b Interval
c Nominal
d Interval
e Ordinal
2.5 a Interval
b Interval
c Nominal
d Interval
e Nominal
2.6 a Interval
b Interval
c Nominal
d Ordinal
e Interval
2.7 a Interval
b Nominal
c. Nominal
2.8 a Interval
b Ordinal
c Nominal
d Ordinal
2.9 a Interval
b Nominal
c Nominal
2.10 a Ordinal
b Ordinal
c Ordinal
2.11 a Nominal
b Interval
c Ordinal
2.12a Nominal
b Interval
c Interval
d Interval
2.13
6
350,000,000,000
300,000,000,000
250,000,000,000
200,000,000,000
150,000,000,000
100,000,000,000
50,000,000,000
2.14
Percentage
Brazil, 1.0%
2.15
7
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
“Herr Reich Chancellor:
“1. I am an Austrian Minister, and as such I have taken an oath
of allegiance to the Austrian Constitution. I have taken an oath,
therefore, to Austria’s autonomy and independence.
“2. I am a believer and an active Catholic, and therefore, I
could not follow a course which might lead to a cultural battle.
“3. I come from a country where a totalitarian regime is out of
the question.”
DR. STEINBAUER: In spite of these views, did the Reich appoint a
new Landesleiter for the illegal NSDAP?
SKUBL: Yes. As far as is known to me, on 21 February Klausner
was appointed Landesleiter.
DR. STEINBAUER: When Dr. Schuschnigg announced the
plebiscite, did he order any special security measures?
SKUBL: The order for the plebiscite naturally had the effect of a
bombshell on the National Socialists, not only on the National Socialists
in Austria, but also in the Reich. There was feverish activity, therefore,
and preventive measures naturally had to be introduced.
This special activity can be explained by the fact that the National
Socialists were afraid that in the event of a plebiscite they would suffer a
great defeat, for the election slogans would have been accepted by the
overwhelming majority of the Austrian population.
In this connection it is most interesting to draw your attention to an
article which appeared on 11 March in the Deutsch-Österreichische
Tageszeitung, in which the fear could be read that this plebiscite would
open the way for a democratization of Austria, the formation of a
people’s front, and subsequently as a result of this, for bolshevization.
From this one could recognize the consciousness that the Austrian
National Socialists were a minority.
DR. STEINBAUER: Now we come to the memorable 11th of
March 1938. When did you, as chief of the executive authorities, learn
that German troops were marching in?
SKUBL: The 11th of March was, of course, an exceptionally
exciting and eventful day. The feeling of time was completely lost during
those hours. I know that in the evening hours a report was submitted to
me showing that German troops had crossed the border, a report which
could not be verified, however, but which was supplemented by the fact
that unusually alarming troop movements were taking place on the
Austrian border.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did not Seyss-Inquart, after Schuschnigg’s
resignation, say on the radio that in order to avoid chaos he was asking
the population to remain quiet and orderly since he was still Minister of
Security?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart did make that statement on the radio.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you make any observations to the effect
that before Schuschnigg’s resignation he, Seyss-Inquart, gave
instructions, sent telegrams, made telephone calls, or transmitted any
other information regarding the seizure of power in the State by himself?
SKUBL: What I observed was that Seyss-Inquart’s behavior until
the critical moment was certainly very passive, and as I have already said
earlier, he did in fact give more the impression of a man who was being
led rather than a man who was leading, and indeed there were clear
indications that he felt embarrassed.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did you not yourself, in the afternoon or
evening, receive an offer from President Miklas to take over the Federal
Chancellorship?
SKUBL: Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg first summoned me in
the late afternoon, and he stated to me there had been an ultimatum from
Germany—that is to say, from Hitler—to the effect that he would no
longer be satisfied with calling off the plebiscite, but was demanding
Schuschnigg’s resignation. Then Schuschnigg told me that he personally
was ready to resign, but that he could not expect his staff to accept
Seyss-Inquart’s appointment as Federal Chancellor. He had a question to
ask me, he said, and that was whether I was prepared to take over the
Chancellor’s office. He did this in agreement with the President who, a
few moments later, made me the same offer.
I refused this offer, and I refused it because I considered that my
appointment as Chancellor would, in Hitler’s eyes, mean a declaration of
war. As State Secretary for Matters of Public Security I was at the head
of the defensive front against National Socialist aggression, and
consequently was also in personal opposition to Hitler. Therefore, had I
accepted the Chancellorship, this would have offered Hitler a welcome
opportunity to have his troops march in. My acceptance of the
Chancellorship, therefore, would have meant the beginning of the
struggle against invasion, and such a struggle was probably hopeless, in
view of the superiority of the German Armed Forces compared with the
Austrian Armed Forces and Austrian executive personnel.
DR. STEINBAUER: Then Seyss-Inquart formed his Cabinet and
took you over, too, as State Secretary. Why did you join that Ministry?
SKUBL: Seyss-Inquart proposed that I retain direction of matters of
public security in the State Secretariat under his Government. I accepted
the offer, having confidence that Seyss-Inquart would remember the
conditions which he had stipulated with the Führer; that is, that he would
be Federal Chancellor of an independent Austria. Apart from that, I was
impelled by the desire and hope that I could keep the executive force in
my hands, and that in the event that Seyss-Inquart had difficulties in
representing the Austrian point of view, I could be of assistance to him.
In other words, there should be an Austrian strong point, an Austrian
enclave, in the Cabinet of the Austrian Federal Chancellor Seyss-Inquart.
DR. STEINBAUER: Did Seyss-Inquart still at that time speak in
favor of Austrian independence?
SKUBL: He did not speak about it in detail. We took that for
granted during the conference.
DR. STEINBAUER: When did you leave the Cabinet, and why?
SKUBL: During the night between March 11 and 12 I took over the
task of going to the airfield to receive the Reichsführer SS Himmler, who
had been announced from Berlin. On that occasion he did not arrive
alone, but with a whole entourage. I can no longer remember the names
of the individuals, the number was too large; one name I understood very
clearly, and that was the name of Meissner—Meissner, the Austrian
naval officer who had joined the National Socialist uprising on 25 July,
and who then, after the collapse of this uprising, had fled to the Reich
and now had returned under Himmler’s protection.
That to me was such an impossible situation that I made the firm
decision not to have any more to do with all this, and so when I entered
the Federal Chancellery at noon and received the surprising news from
Glaise-Horstenau that Himmler had demanded my resignation, I
answered, “He can have that very cheaply, because I had already decided
on that in the early hours of the morning.”
Subsequently I also informed Federal Chancellor Dr. Seyss-Inquart
that I had had knowledge of Himmler’s request, and that I had naturally
decided to resign and asked him to take official notice of my resignation.
Upon this Seyss-Inquart replied, “It is true that Himmler has
demanded your resignation, but I am not going to have anything dictated
to me from outside. At the moment the situation is such that I think it is
perhaps better for you to disappear for a few weeks, but then you must
come back because I consider your co-operation important.”
Naturally I declared that I would not do that. And the following day,
in writing, I handed in my resignation as Chief of Police and State
Secretary, after I had already on the evening of the 12th actually handed
the affairs of the office over to Kaltenbrunner, who had been attached to
me as a so-called political leader of the executive force.
DR. STEINBAUER: You were then confined and have not gone
back to Vienna to this day?
SKUBL: First of all, I was held prisoner in my official apartment
under SS and police guard and then, on 24 May, two officials of the
Kassel Gestapo conducted me to a forced residence in Kassel, where I
remained until my liberation by the Allies.
DR. STEINBAUER: I have no further questions of this witness, Mr.
President, and perhaps this would be a suitable moment for a recess.