ISLAS V PLATON, 47 PHIL 162

FACTS: It appears from the record that herein petitioners filed a petition under the Land
Registration Act for the review of a decree in a land registration case. The Court of first instance
denied the petition without permitting the petitioners to present their evidence. Upon appeal to this
court the order of denying the petition was reversed and the evidence was received but still denied
the petition for review.
The petitioners filed a motion for new trial, this was heard and denied, the notice of denial was
sent to the attorney for the petitioners. The letter containing the notification returned to the clerk
of Court and marked as "unclaimed." Bill of exception was filed but the trial court refused to
approve and certify it on the ground that at the timed for presenting it already expired.
On September 1924, an order was entered declaring the decision in the land registration case final
and a writ of possession was issued directing the Sheriff to place applicant (petitioner) for
registration. The petitioners the brought the present action of writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Judge to approve and certify the bill of exceptions.
Counsel for the petitioners argues that under section 26 of Act No. 2347 an appellant in a land
registration case has thirty days from the date the appellant receives a copy of decision, within the
meaning of said section; that as he never received a copy of the order, the thirty days period had
not begun to run at the time the bill of exceptions here in question was presented.
ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel of petitioners committed negligence for being unable to claim
the decision issued by the trial court.
RULING: Yes. The respondent judge was nevertheless, in our opinion, fully justified in declining
to certify the bill of exceptions in the present case.
There is nothing in the record to show that the postal authorities did not properly perform their
duty and we must presume that the usual notice of the arrival of the letter at the Manila post office
was delivered at the office of said counsel. He failed to claim the letter and it was returned to the
Court of First Instance marked "unclaimed." His failure to receive a copy of the order in question
was therefore entirely due to his own negligence of which he cannot now be allowed to take
advantage. As a practicing lawyer it was his duty to so arrange matters that official
communications sent by mail would reach him promptly. Having failed to do so, he and his clients
must suffer the consequences of his negligence. That he may have been absent from his office at
the time the notification here in question arrived is no excuse.
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ALBANO V COLOMA, 21 SCRA 411 (1967)
FACTS: This was a disbarment case filed by the complainant Albano against respondent Atty.
Coloma as their counsel as plaintiffs in a civil case during the Japanese occupation of his mother.
The respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they
had presented by another lawyer. The respondent herein intervened in the case to collect her
attorney's fees, it was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised to know that the
respondent presented in an exhibit a document showing that they promised to pay her a contingent
fee of a particular percentage (33-1/3%) of the recoveries from land or damages. The more serious
charge was that the signature and the writing made under the name of his mother is not made by
them.
Respondent Coloma denied the allegation that complainant was "a victim of injustice," alleging
that the same was "untrue, unfounded, and imaginary." She admited that there is contingent fee
and denied that she did nothing to expedite the hearing and termination of such civil case.
Appellee served as the plaintiff's counsel for a period of seven years. The record shows that she
was diligent in her work. She likewise denied taht she could have been removed for her failure to
comply with her obligations because she served "faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the
best and to the best of her knowledge and capacity."
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Coloma is entitled to compensation and violated the ethics of legal
profession as to her obligations as a counsel.
RULING: The Court held that Atty. Coloma is entitled for compensation. Any counsel, who is
worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting
solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any
attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth
the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get his
due.
The facts as found by the Solicitor General in so far as the services of respondent as counsel for
the complainant and his mother were concerned reveal the utmost diligence and conscientiousness
on her part. What she said in her answer was sustained in all respects.
There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: "Reputation [in the legal
profession] is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This
Court, certainly is not averse to having such a risk minimized. Where, as in this case, the good
name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard of the truth, an action
prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is called for. Thus the charge against the
respondent is hereby dismissed.
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NOCOM V CAMERINO, et al., GR NO. 182984 (Feb 10, 2009)
FACTS:
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GENATO V SILAPAN, 453 Phil. 910 (2003)
FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by William Genato against respondent Atty.
Silapan. Complainant alleged that the respondent asked if he could rent a small office space in his
building for his law practice. The respondent was introduce to Atty. Dacanay, complainant's
retained lawyer who accommodated the respondent in the building and made him handle some of
the complainant's cases. Hence, their legal relationship started.
The conflict started when the respondent borrowed P200, 000 to the complainants for his car down
payment. In return, respondent issued postdated checks to cover the six months interest on the
loan. He likewise mortgaged his house and lot but did not surrender its title. The respondent
purchased a new car however, the document of sale of the car was issued in complainant's name
and financed through City Trust Company. One Romero was introduced by respondent to
complainant and lent Romero a money. Subsequently, respondent failed to pay the amortization
on the car and financing firm sent demand letters to complainant. Complainant tried to encash
respondent's postdated check with the drawee bank but it was dishonored due to closed account.
Respondent failed to heed complainant's repeated demands for payment. Complainant then filed a
criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Respondent insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business
practices and his revelation of complainant's desire to bribe the government. He claimed to have
made these information to defend his case.
Complainant claimed that respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor. Consequently, he filed this
complaint for disbarment, praying also that an administrative sanction be meted against respondent
for his issuance of a bouncing check.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant's alleged intention to bribe government
officials in connection with a pending case.
RULING: Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to
him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve
the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection
given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change
of relation between them.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications
or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the
scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer.
Respondent defenses fails to satisfy the Court. It was improper for the respondent to use it against
the complainant in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and
respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A
lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.
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MONTANO V IBP, 358 SCRA 1 (2001)
FACTS: The complainant hired the services of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration
with Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in a case pending before the Court of Appeals docketed wherein
the complainant was the plaintiff-appellant.
The parties agreed upon attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00 fifty percent (50%) of which
was payable upon acceptance of the case and the remaining balance upon the termination of the
case. Accordingly, complainant paid respondent the amount of P7,500.00 representing 50% of the
attorney’s fee.
Thereafter, even before respondent counsel had prepared the appellant’s brief and contrary to their
agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case, Atty. Dealca
demanded an additional payment from complainant obliged by paying the amount of P4,000.00.
Prior to the filing of the appellant’s brief, respondent counsel again demanded payment of the
remaining balance of P3,500.00. When complainant was unable to do so, respondent lawyer
withdraw his appearance as complainant’s counsel without his prior knowledge and/or conformity.
Thus this complaint charging respondent with misconduct and praying that he be «sternly dealt
with administratively.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed misconduct and violated provisions of the CPR?
HELD: Yes. The Court finds respondent’s conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal
profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw
his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he
may withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under
the circumstances of the present case, Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal was unjustified as complainant
did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorney’s fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts
to fulfill his obligation. Respondent’s contemptuous conduct does not speak well of a member of
the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. rule 20.4 of Canon 20,
mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large
a sum owed to him by complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands
of the Code.
The Court, however, does not agree with complainant’s contention that the maximum penalty of
disbarment should be imposed on respondent lawyer. In the present case, reprimand is deemed
sufficient.
Respondent was REPRIMANDED.
---
OBANDO V FIGUERAS, 322 SCRA 148 (2000)

FACTS: In the settlement of the estates of spouses Don Jose and Doña Alegria
Figueras, Eduardo (stepson of Doña Alegria) assumed administration thereof.
During the settlement proceedings Eduardo was served a Petition for Probate of
what purported to be Doña Alegria’s Last Will and Testament, filed by Felizardo
S. Obando (Obando), a nephew of Doña Alegria.

The alleged Will bequeathed to Obando and several other members of the
Obando clan properties left by the Figueras couple. When the probate case was
consolidated with the intestate proceedings, Obando was appointed as
Eduardo’s co-administrator of the estates.

As Eduardo insisted that the alleged Will was a forgery, the document was
submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The NBI
found that the Will was indeed a forgery. This led to the conviction of Obando for
estafa through falsification of a public document.

Meanwhile, Eduardo filed a motion for authority to sell two parcels of land owned
by Don Jose and Doña Alegria but the probate court denied the same. Despite
such denial, Eduardo sold the lots to Amigo Realty Corporation.

Obando, in his capacity as co-administrator, filed a civil case before the RTC
against Eduardo and Amigo Realty for the nullification of the sale.

However, in the settlement proceedings, the probate court removed Obando from
his office as co-administrator of the estate of the Figueras spouses.
Consequently, in the civil case, Eduardo, thorugh Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Obando lost his legal standing to pursue
the case. The trial court granted the Motion and dismissed the civil case filed by
Obando.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, Obando raised the following issues:

The motion to dismiss should not be acted upon by the trial court since Atty.
Joaquin Yuseco was no longer the counsel of Eduardo, as shown by Eduardo’s
Manifestation and Motion dated January 8, 1998, dispensing with said counsel’s
services.

The Rules provide that a motion to dismiss may be submitted only before the
filing of a responsive pleading. Thus, Obando complain that it was already too
late for Eduardo to file a Motion to Dismiss after Obando had finished presenting
his evidence. Obando also aver that it was premature for the trial court to dismiss
the civil case because Obando’s conviction for estafa through falsification was
still on appeal.

ISSUES:

(A) Whether the trial court could act on a motion filed by a lawyer who was
allegedly no longer Eduardo’s counsel of record;

RULING:

(A) Representation continues until the court dispenses with the services of
counsel in accordance with Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Counsel
may be validly substituted only if the following requisites are complied with: (1)
new counsel files a written application for Substitution; (2) the client’s written
consent is obtained; and (3) the written consent of the lawyer to be substituted is
secured, if it can still be; if the written consent can no longer be obtained, then
the application for substitution must carry proof that notice of the motion has
been served on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the
Rules.

In this case, we are convinced that Eduardo did not dismiss Attorney Yuseco.
Besides, an attorney who has already been dismissed by the client is
allowed to intervene in a case in order to protect the client’s rights. In the
present case, had there been any irregularity, it should have been raised by the
Eduardo, not Obando.

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HORNILLA V SALUNAT, 405 SCRA 220 (2003)
FACTS: Benedicto Hornilla is a member of the Philippine Public School Teachers Association
(PPSTA). Along with several other complainants, Hornilla filed intra-corporate cases before the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against PPSTA board members for unlawful
spending and the undervalued sale of real property.
Atty. Ernesto Salunat on the other hand is a member of the ASSA Law and Associates, and a
retained legal counsel of PPSTA. As retained counsel, he represented PPSTA in the cases against
them by Hornilla and other members.
Hornilla alleged that Atty. Salunat is laboring under conflict of interests for engaging with PPSTA,
where his fees are derived from the corporate funds that its members, including himself,
contributed on.
Atty. Salunat refused to withdraw his representation despite being told by PPSTA members about
the conflict of interest. For his part, he contends that his representation was in behalf of ASSA
Law and Associates, being the retained legal counsel of PPSTA, and not under his personal
capacity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Salunat is indeed representing conflicting interests for representing
members of the same corporation in a derivative suit?
HELD: Atty. Salunat is found guilty of representing conflicting interests. There is conflict of
interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The test
is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it
is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will
be opposed by him when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter
in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
Since this is still his first offense, Atty. Salunat is admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity
in his professional practice, and is further warned that a repetition of such act will be dealt with
severely.

DOLORES C. BELLEZA, vs ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA, A.C. No. 7815, July 23, 2009
Facts:
Chua, friend of Dolores referred Atty. Macasa, for legal servicesin connection with the arrest of her son for
Violation of RA 9165. Atty. Macasa agreed to handle the case for P30,000.00. Dolores made 3 partial payments
on different occasions and P18,000 purpose of posting a bond to secure the liberty of his son, however no receipt
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was issued by Atty. Macasa. Dolores found out that Atty. Macasa did not remit the amount to the court supposed
to be intended for the provisional liberty of her son. She demanded the return of P18,000 several times but
respondent ignored her. Moreover, Atty. Macasa failed to act on the case of complainants son and complainant
was forced to avail the services of a PAO lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Macasa grossly neglected his duties for the cause of his client.
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent undertook to defend the criminal case against complainants son. A lawyer who accepts the
cause of a client commits to devote himself (particularly his time, knowledge, skills and effort) to such cause. He
must be ever mindful of the trust and con dence reposed in him, constantly striving to be worthy thereof.
Accordingly, he owes full devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
clients rights and the exertion of his utmost learning, skill and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law legally applied.
A lawyer who accepts professional employment from a client undertakes to serve his
client with competence and diligence. 47 He must conscientiously perform his duty arising from such relationship.
He must bear in mind that by accepting a retainer, he impliedly makes the following representations: that he
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possesses the requisite degree of learning, skill and ability other lawyers similarly situated possess; that he will
exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him; that he will exercise
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reasonable care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the application of his knowledge to his clients cause;
and that he will take all steps necessary to adequately safeguard his clients interest. IS
A lawyers negligence in the discharge of his obligations arising from the relationship of counsel and client may
cause delay in the administration of justice and prejudice the rights of a litigant, particularly his client. Thus, from
the perspective of the ethics of the legal profession, a lawyers lethargy in carrying out his duties to his client is
both unprofessional and unethical. L
In this case, after accepting the criminal case against complainants son and receiving his attorneys fees,
respondent did nothing that could be considered as effective and ef cient legal assistance. For all intents and
purposes, respondent abandoned the cause of his client. Indeed, on account of respondents continued inaction,
complainant was compelled to seek the services of the Public Attorneys Of ce.
Respondents lackadaisical attitude towards the case of complainants son was reprehensible. Not only did it
prejudice complainants son, it also deprived him of his constitutional right to counsel. Furthermore, in failing to
use the amount entrusted to him for posting a bond to secure the provisional liberty of his client, respondent
unduly impeded the latters constitutional right to bail.