Professional Documents
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PI Digest
PI Digest
SANDIGANBAYAN
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to submit
himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. He then filed a Motion to Dismiss,
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan resolved not
to take action on the Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted himself to its
jurisdiction.
On the scheduled arraignment, petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been
accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed Orders, the Sandiganbayan
rejected his claim and proceeded with the arraignment. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: 1. Whether Yusop is entitled to Preliminary Investigation
2. Whether Yusop waived his right to Preliminary Investigation?
3. Whether absence of preliminary investigation is jurisdictional that would entitle a
dismissal of the case?
RULING: 1. YES
The Rules of Court requires such investigation before an information for an offense
punishable by at least four years, two months and one day may be filed in court. The old
Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary investigation of an offense cognizable by
the regional trial court. Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with violation
of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such offense is punishable with, among other penalties,
imprisonment of six years and one month to fifteen years. Under the aforecited Rules,
whether in the old or the revised version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation.
Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver of petitioner’s right to
preliminary investigation. Under Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, “[a]n application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or from
assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x x x.”
3. NO
We disagree. In the first place, nowhere in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or
even the old Rules, is there any mention that this lack is a ground for a motion to quash.
Furthermore, it has been held that responsibility for the “absence of a preliminary
investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity
of the proceedings.” We reiterate the following ruling of the Court in People v. Gomez:
“If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the
information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand
the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.”
FACTS: Jurado operates and manages a rice mill in Bulacan. Ruby Aguilar (Aguilar)
procured rice from him and in payment thereof she gave him two Far East Bank and
Trust Company (FEBTC) checks which were both issued by Alicia Ricaforte and when
presented for payment were dishonored. Thus, Jurado filed a complaint for estafa and
violation of B.P. 22 against Alicia. In her Counter-Affidavit, petitioner denied the
accusation. She alleged that Aguilar who had lost her Metrobank checkbook borrowed
her checks to pay off Aguilars obligations with Leon Jurado; that she willingly lent her
checks to Aguilar on condition that these checks will be replaced with Aguilars own
checks once her new checkbook is issued to her by Metrobank; that when Aguilar issued
the replacement checks, petitioner demanded from respondent the return of her checks
but respondent refused, thus she was constrained to request her bank to issue an order of
stop payment.
The Assistant Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for estaffa and B.P. 22 for
insufficiency of evidence. Subsequent Motion for reconsideration by Jurado was
denied. The prosecutor found that although the issuance of a worthless check
is malum prohibitum, B.P. Blg. 22 still requires that the checks should be issued with
consideration, which element was lacking in this case. Respondent appealed the dismissal
of his complaint to the Department of Justice. The Secretary of Justice issued a
Resolution modifying the Resolution of the City Prosecutor and directing him to file an
information against petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
finding that there is probable cause for the filing of information against petitioner for
violation of BP. Blg. 22.?
RULING: NO.
In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more
than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime
has been committed by the suspect. It does not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The
complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’
evidence. It is enough that in the absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness,
credence is given to the finding and determination of probable cause by the
Secretary of Justice in a preliminary investigation.
FACTS: Eldon Maguan (Maguan) was allegedly shot to death by accused Rolito Go due
to traffic altercation when petitioner’s car and victim’s car nearly bumped each other. The
Security of the “Cravings Bake Shop” saw the incident and point herein petitioner as the
gunman, which he positively identified when questioned by authorities. Thereafter, the
police launched a manhunt operation that caused petitioner present himself before San
Juan Police station to verify said issue. The police detained him then and filed a
complaint against him for frustrated homicide, which was later modified to murder, since
the victim Maguan died of his gunshot wound.
The counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release and proper preliminary investigation. This was granted and was accordingly filed
by Prosecutor with the RTC. The court grants the conduct of preliminary investigation.
However, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order: the granting of bail was
recalled, the conduct of preliminary investigation was recalled and cancelled, and
petitioner’s omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation was
treated as a petition for bail.
When the court set the case for arraignment, petitioner filed a motion to restrain his
arraignment but was denied.
ISSUE: whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the
instant case considering that he was already arraigned
RULING: YES
The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to
invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. In the instant case,
petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his
arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of
Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary
investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail, petitioner
had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, we did hold that
appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately
after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that
they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.” In the instant case, petitioner
Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one
omnibus motion.
Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the
part of petitioner.
Among their contention was that the complaint shall be dismissed as the filling of charges
was politically motivated.
RULING:NO
We find the foregoing averments to be unpersuasive. xxx the filing of the charges is
politically motivated cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is
otherwise evidence to support them. Here a preliminary investigation of the complaint
against petitioners was held during which petitioners were heard. Their evidence, as well
as that of private respondent Gelacio, was considered in great detail in the resolution of
GIO II Violan.
Indeed, this Court is loath to interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman unless such
discretion is clearly shown to have been abused.
There are instances, constituting exceptions to the general rule, when this Court will
intervene in the prosecution of cases. Some of these instances were enumerated in Brocka
v. Enrile, as follows:
What petitioners raise are questions which go to the weight to be given to the
affidavits by Atty. Nueva and Judge Ariño. These are matters for the trial court's
appreciation. A preliminary investigation is not a trial. The function of the
government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine
the existence of probable cause. As we explained in Pilapil vs. Sandiganbayan, this
function involves only the following:
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a
thing is so. (Words and Phrases, Probable Cause v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean
"actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.
ISSUE: Whether Sen. Estrada has been denied of due process when he was denied to be
furnished of the counter-affidavit of his co-respondents during preliminary investigation
RULING: NO
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter affidavits of his
co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada,
however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory
requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. . Neither
Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule
II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s
claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting
affidavits and documents at the time the order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to
the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and
his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent
to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this
point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent. Clearly, what
Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the
affidavits of the co-respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents
are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion
can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order
which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt
and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a
part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to
establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation
are limited to those granted by procedural law. A preliminary investigation is defined as
an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial.
We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists
prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being
sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.
The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him does not
apply in preliminary investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary
investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the witnesses against him. A
preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial.
FACTS: The case arose in an extra-judicial settlement of a parcel of land of the siblings
of Aurara A. Sales. Aurora Sales was a US immigrant. The respondent in the present case
caused the subdivision of the property. Petitioner filed a criminal case of use of falsified
document against respondent claiming that there she never sign the deed of extra-judicial
settlement because she was at that time in the United States and could not have appeared
before a notary public in Makati City. She authorized her son-in-law for the institution of
the said criminal complaint.
The Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it is
impossible for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation without the appearance
of private respondent who will be subjected to some clarificatory questions on certain
matters. They then filed an appeal before the Department of Justice. The Provincial
Prosecutor then ordered the filing of an information.
Thereafter the respondent filed certiorari before the CA which was granted by the latter
court. Hence , this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the complaint is proper because of the petitioner's
failure to appear at the clarificatory hearing set by the investigating prosecutor.
RULING:. NO
The investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the petitioner’s criminal
complaint for falsification simply because of her nonappearance at the clarificatory
hearing. To start with, her personal presence was excusable because of her advanced
age and the distance of her place of residence at the time (New York, United States of
America) from the Province of Batangas, the venue of the proceedings. Secondly, the
records already contained sufficient evidence upon which the investigating prosecutor
could make a finding of probable cause. Thirdly, she was represented in the proceedings
by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of
pursuing the criminal case against the respondents. Being her agent expressly authorized
for that special purpose, Jerico could competently respond to the investigating
prosecutor’s clarificatory questions in a manner legally binding on her. Fourthly, had the
investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her personal presence as absolutely
necessary in the determination of probable cause, he should have granted her request to
have her deposition taken instead. Such power was within his discretion as the
investigating prosecutor. And lastly, the investigating prosecutor’s requiring her personal
presence at the clarificatory hearing was probably unnecessary and superfluous in view of
his failure to specify the matters still needing to be clarified. As earlier mentioned, the
documents submitted by both parties in the proceedings were already sufficient for the
determination of whether or not probable cause existed against the respondents. If the
clarificatory hearing was geared towards the determination of the existence of
probable cause, the non-specification of the matters to be inquired into during the
clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from the
petitioner herself.
Lim filed a motion for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice. There was nothing procedurally infirm in this course of action inasmuch as there
is nothing in Crespo that bars the Secretary of Justice from reviewing resolutions of his
subordinates in an appeal or petition for review in criminal cases. The Secretary of
Justice was merely advised in Crespo that, as far as practicable, he should not take
cognizance of an appeal when the complaint or information is already filed in court.
The June 6, 2006 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court being interlocutory and
the case falling under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Regional
Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari despite the clear
prohibition in Section 19. Indeed, as held in Villanueva, Jr. v. Estoque, 346 SCRA 230
(2000), there can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 19 (e) of the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure and judges have no option but to obey. When the
law is clear, there is no room for interpretation.
Once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case, i.e., its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion
of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
the criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The determination of the case is within the court’s exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which has the option to grant or deny
the same.
FACTS: The provincial prosecution office of daet found probable cause to indict Alaon
for rape. On motion for reconsideration of Alaon, the Provincial prosecutor downgraded
the offense from rape to acts of lasciviousness. Consequently, an information was filed
against Alaon.
Thereafter, the Secretary of Justice directed the forwarding of records for automatic
review and to move for suspension of the proceedings against Alaon. This directive was
based on a letter of BBB, AAA’s mother (private respondent, narrating what happended
and telling that AAA is suffering from an intellectual disability. The Secretary of Justice
treated it as an appeal.
Thereafter the assistant provincial prosecutor sent letter to the Judge of RTC requesting
withdrawal of information in compliance wih the order of secretary mistakenly assuming
that Alaon filed a petition for review.
The criminal case proceeded until trial. Meanwhile, the propriety of the offense charged
was still at issue within the prosecution which the then undersecretary of DOJ issued a
resolution setting aside the downgrading of the offense charged. Alaon thus filed a
Certiorari with Court of Appeals alleging grave abused of disecretion. CA granted the
prtition. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by Petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether there was a violation of the right to preliminary investigation and due
process.
RULING: the appellate court’s holding that Alaon was deprived of his right to
procedural due process, as he was not given an opportunity to be heard on the
letter-appeal of private complainant’s mother.
The DOJ makes much of the fact that Alaon ostensibly knew of BBB’s appeal to the
Secretary of Justice.
This assertion of the DOJ cannot equate to compliance with procedural due process. x x x
Once the Secretary of Justice decided to treat the letter of BBB as an appeal, he should
have required Alaon to comment thereon. Even if the letter did not comply with the
requirements for an appeal under the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on
Appeal, indeed, precisely for such reason, the Secretary of Justice was duty-bound, as the
one hearing the case, to afford Alaon, respondent therein, an opportunity to be heard to
satisfy procedural due process. On this score, the DOJ abused its discretion when it rode
roughshod over Alaon’s rights as it accommodated private complainant.
READING SUPPLEMENT ON PI
FACTS: Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers factory, together with her
witness Espinili, executed a sworn statement before the Calamba City Police Station
regarding the alleged act of Orquinaza, the general manager of the said factory, of kissing
her and touching her breasts while she was taking a nap inside a room of the factory. The
Calamba City Police designated the offense as sexual harrassment and referred the
case to the Office of the Prosecutor.
The assistant city prosecutor issued a subpoena ordering respondent Arida and Orquinaza
to appear for preliminary investigation. Orquinaza filed a motion to dismiss before the
Office of the City Prosecutor, arguing that the affidavits of Arida and Espinili do not
contain allegations to constitute the crime of sexual harassment.
Soon, the assistant city prosecutor issued a resolution finding that there was no
transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, but petitioner's act of grabbing
complainant's breasts and kissing her constitute acts of lasciviousness. Thus, he filed
with the MTCC an information charging petitioner with acts of lasciviousness.
A warrant of arrest was issued against Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion
praying that the warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be
invalidated and the case be dismissed. He also claims that he was deprived of his right to
due process since the information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor was for sexual harassment and not for acts of
lasciviousness. The MTCC denied the motion.
Issues:
FACTS: Petitioners, who are corporate officers and members of the Board
of Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi “Number
Fever” promotion by handlers of the supposedly winning “349” Pepsi crowns. Of the four
cases filed against the petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating
prosecutor only for the crime of estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses.
On 12 April 1993, the information was filed with the trial court without anything
accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutor’s Joint Resolution was
forwarded to and received by the trial court only on 22 April 1993. However, no
affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the
preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found
in the records of the case as of 19 May 1993.
On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the
Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the
holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the
public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending
the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of Justice.
On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1)
denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the
petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest
“after June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge
stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following
whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the
independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge
had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutor’s Joint
Resolution had in fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April
1993, the CA denied petitioners’ application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA
ruled that the Joint Resolution “was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by
respondent Judge in convincing himself that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose
of issuing the corresponding warrants of arrest” and that the “mere silence of the records
or the absence of any express declaration” in the questioned order as to the basis of such
finding does not give rise to an adverse inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his
favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al.
sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore dismissed the petition for mootness.
ISSUES
Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the last
paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which recognizes the authority of
the Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.
Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a
matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to
deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following
grounds:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion
the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and
integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of this court is not the filing
of the aforementioned motions [to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest
and to defer arraignment] at that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw
the information on the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint
Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. Once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the
information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the
Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.
2. YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance
of warrants of arrest without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.
The teachings then of Soliven, Inting, Lim, Allado, and Webb reject the
proposition that the investigating prosecutor’s certification in an information or his
resolution which is made the basis for the filing of the information, or both, would suffice
in the judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In Webb, this Court assumed that since the respondent Judges had before them not only
the 26-page resolution of the investigating panel but also the affidavits of the prosecution
witnesses and even the counter-affidavits of the respondents, they (judges) made personal
evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.
In this case, nothing accompanied the information upon its filing on 12 April 1993
with the trial court. A copy of the Joint Resolution was forwarded to, and received by, the
trial court only on 22 April 1993. And as revealed by the certification of respondent
judge’s clerk of court, no affidavits of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of
the proceedings during the preliminary investigation, or other documents submitted in the
course thereof were found in the records of this case as of 19 May 1993. Clearly, when
respondent Judge Asuncion issued the assailed order of 17 May 1993 directing, among
other things, the issuance of warrants of arrest, he had only the information, amended
information, and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or
evidence supporting the prosecutor's finding of probable cause. And strangely enough, he
made no specific finding of probable cause; he merely directed the issuance of warrants
of arrest “after June 21, 1993.” It may, however, be argued that the directive presupposes
a finding of probable cause. But then compliance with a constitutional requirement for
the protection of individual liberty cannot be left to presupposition, conjecture, or even
convincing logic.
Subsequently, Robert Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation,docketed
as, against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral
Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan. The charge of Attempted Murder against Rainier,
Randall and 14 others was also dismissed by the Assistant Prosecutor.
On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution
modifying the July 28, 1998 J oint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor by ordering,
among others – (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan
be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted Murder
against Rainier, Randall and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide; and
(3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex "Toto" Ofrin be downgraded to Other
Light Threats.On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000
Resolutionand directed the withdrawal of the Informations against the movants..
ISSUES
(1)Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed GAD? No.
FACTS: Petitioners P/Insp. Rodolfo Samson et al., were charged of murder for killing
the son of a politician from Cotabato. The Prosecution Attorney filed the information but
Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for judicial determination of existence of
probable cause with prayer to hold the issuance of warrant of arrest. The trial court
ordered the reinvestigation of the case through Chief Prosecutor. Before the DOJ could
conduct reinvestigation, Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the instant petition to
enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting reinvestigation of charges against them.
ISSUE: Whether Court may enjoin the Secretary of Justice from conducting a
reinvestigation of the charges against petitioners as ordered by the trial court for
determination of probable cause.
RULING: NO. Petitioners plea for injunction to restrain the reinvestigation of the
criminal case against them is not legally permissible.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction preliminary
or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution.[14] With more reason will injunction
not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.
We find petitioners plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly
without merit. As a rule, we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient
evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against an
offender.