Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Codilla v. de Venecia
Codilla v. de Venecia
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* EN BANC.
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Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in
nature.
Same; Same; Same; Finality of Judgment; When a candidate
has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared
stray.—Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus
Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the
votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered “stray.” Hence,
when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor
cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising
the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a
candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the
election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention
to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the
candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
Same; Same; Same; When the majority speaks and elects into
office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in
the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his
place.—In every election, the people’s choice is the paramount
consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given
effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by
giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the
office, no one can be declared elected in his place. In Domino v.
COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz.: “It would be extremely repugnant to
the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage
if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes
is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume
that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He
could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. x x x xxx xxx
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office
is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser
because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of
the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle
the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a
choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and
repudiated candidate to take over the elective
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PUNO, J.:
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8 Id., p. 23.
9 Id., p. 21.
10 Id., pp. 24-26. From the Records, it appears that respondent Locsin did
not file a separate Motion for Intervention.
11 Id., p. 26.
12 Id., Registry Receipt No. 78660, p. 30.
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vit of Wilfredo
21 A. Fiel; (d) Supplemental Affidavit
22 of Wilfredo
A. Fiel; and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.
On May 25, 23 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension, alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the
Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied
the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b)
that he did not receive a copy of the summons on the petition
for disqualification and after personally obtaining a copy of the
petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and
(c) that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC
Second Division suspending his proclamation only on May 22,
2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his
Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, 24 and
requested the setting of a hearing on his Motion.
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the
petitioner’s Motion and the parties
25 were ordered to submit
their respective memoranda. On June 4, 2001, petitioner
26
submitted his Memorandum in support of his Motion
assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds
that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has no
legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently
inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He
prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional
candidate be expediently made, even while the
disqualification case against him continue upon due notice
and hearing. He attached the following additional evidence in
his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification
27 issued by PNP
Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre; (b) Certification
28 issued
by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer; (c) Copy of
certification issued by
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43 Id., pp. 166-173. Annex “A” contains the Affidavits of Edgardo Apuya,
Carmelita Manongsong, Danilo Pingoy, Rolando Viovicente, and Samuel
Antipuesto; Annex “B” includes the Affidavits of Samuel Antipuesto, Pastora
Capuyan and Feliciano Apuya; Annex “C” consists of Affidavits of Agripino
Beltran, Taciana Beltran, Samuel Antipuesto, Buenaventura Tasan, Rustico
Alogbate, Pastora Capuyan, Feliciano Apuya, Ellen Pingoy and Joel Ranolas;
Annex “D” contains the Affidavits of Noel Gomez and Jovito Laurente; and
Annex “E” contains the Affidavit of Roman Domasin.
44 Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 108-115.
45 Id., pp. 43-163.
46 Id., pp. 212-219.
47 Petition, Annex “B-2”; Rollo, pp. 149-159.
48 Petition, Annexes “B-4” and “B-5”; Rollo, pp. 162-179.
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“JUDGMENT
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Summary of Votes
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67 Resolution dated October 18, 2001, HRET Case No. 01-043; Annex “5”,
Comment of Respondent Locsin; Rollo, pp.377-379.
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VOL. 393, DECEMBER 10, 2002 661
Codilla, Sr. vs. De Venecia
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71 See petitioner’s Answer, Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 74; Motion
to Lift Suspension of Proclamation, id., p. 42; Memorandum, id., p. 343;
Motion for Reconsideration, id., vol. II, p. 24.
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The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state
the time and place of the hearing of the motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.—No motion shall be acted upon by
the Commission without proof of service of notice thereof, except
when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the rights of the
adverse party or parties are not affected.”
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73 The Electoral Reform Law of 1987, January 5, 1988.
74 Cledera vs. Sarmiento, 39 SCRA 562 (1971); Andra v. CA, 60 SCRA 379
(1979); Sembrano v. Ramirez, 166 SCRA 30 (1988).
75 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 27.
76 Id., p. 30, Registry Receipt No. 78660.
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We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt
of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division
gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
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evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer,
and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations
within the five (5) days from completion of the hearing and the
reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of
his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an oral argument
on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file
their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon.
Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution
on the petition for disqualification against the petitioner. It was
based on the follow-ing evidence: (a) the affidavits attached to
the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to
the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion
to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be substituted for the
hearing in the disqualification case. Although intrinsically
linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties
in the main disqualification case are the same as those in the
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. The parties may have
other evidence which they may deem proper to present only
on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be
evidence which are unavailable during the hearing for the
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be
available during the hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his
Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the
disqualification case against him. This submission was
sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of
the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon consideration of the
additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that
the evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More
specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division held:
“Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the
COMELEC (Second Division); concerns only the incident relating to
the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation. It also
appears that the order for the submission of the parties’ respective
memoranda was in
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lieu of the parties’ oral argument on the motion. This would explain
the fact that Codilla’s Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the
issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is,
however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the
suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the
Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of the Commission
(Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en banc
had the opportunity to consider Codilla’s affidavits. This time, Codilla
was able to present his side, thus, completing
78 the presentation of
evidentiary documents from both sides.” (emphases supplied)
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78 Rollo, p. 89.
79 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 214-228.
80 Id., pp. 229-231.
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81 Rollo, p. 89.
82 Id., pp. 95-102.
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Codilla family.
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint
Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks owned by
the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on
the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A
payloader then85 scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the
white trucks.
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary
employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned to check
and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different
barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
“3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an
employee of the City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to
Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the source of the sand
and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but Engr.
Padayao said that it’s not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M.
Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the property is owned by the family
of Mayor Codilla. We were to 86 deliver sand and gravel to whoever
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87 Id., p. 8.
88 Id., p. 304.
89 Id., p. 306.
90 Id., p. 307.
91 Id., p. 310.
92 Id., p. 312.
93 Id., p. 313.
94 Id., p. 318.
95 Id., p. 319.
96 See Affidavits of Arnel Surillo, id., p. 308; Tolentino Denoy, id., p. 314; Jerome
Ychon, id., p. 315; Benjamin Aparis, id., p. 316; and Rene Maurecio, id., p. 317.
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102 Labo v. COMELEC, supra; Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991);
Aquino v. COMELEC, supra.
103 Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 546 (1994).
104 310 SCRA 546 (1999).
105 Id., pp. 573-574 (citations omitted).
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(b) The instant case does not involve the election and
qualification of respondent Locsin.
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109 “The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of their respective members.”
110 HRET Case No. 42, July 25, 1988, 1 HRET 32-33.
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A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of 111
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111 Rule 17, Revised Rules of HRET provides: “Quo Warranto.—A verified
petition for quo warranto contesting the election of a Member of the House of
Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate
of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10) days
after the proclamation of the winner.”
112 Section 3 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
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113 Samson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198 (1936); Lemi v. Valencia, 26 SCRA 203
(1968); Meralco Securities Corp. v. Savellano, 77 SCRA 804 (1982), as cited
in I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 714 (1997).
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Petition granted.
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