G.R. No.

48541 August 21, 1989

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 Barnabe Castillo's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:00 p.m.)
 Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep on the right lane of the McArthur Highway with
Generosa Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated in front and Eulogio Castillo,
then a minor child at the rate of 25 kms/hr
 Juanito Rosario, with his wife, Cresencia Rosario drove his car speeding and oncoming
the same lane for the purpose of overtaking a cargo truck
 To evade collission, Bernabe swerved his jeep hard right and the car rested on the
shoulder of the right lane as the jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short
tiremarks behind it while the rear left long tire-marks
 The jeep suffered a shattered windshield, pushed-in radiator. The left mid-portion of its
bumper badly dented. The car had a flat tire on its right front wheel; its right fender
badly dented as the headlamp on top of it. The bumber stooped downward.
 Bernabe's patella on his right knee was fractured and he suffered serious physical
injuries, in other parts of his body. Serapion Castillo whose head crushed through the
windshield and was nearly beheaded, while the other two passengers suffered multiple
slight and less serious injuries.
 Juanito Rosario's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:30 p.m.)
 He was about to overtake a slow cargo truck but due to a flat tire, he parked his car on
the left shoulder of the road
 as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep
driven by Bernabe from the opposite direction
 In the criminal case, Juanito was acquited from the crime for reckless imprudence on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt
 Court held that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito Rosario but it
was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car
was is the proximate cause of the collision
 CA affirmed CFI: Dismissed the case against Juanito as well as the counterclaim
against Bernabe

ISSUE: W/N the negligence of Juanito can make him civilly liable despite being acquitted
from his criminal charges

HELD: YES.
 Since the civil action is predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged negligence which does
not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal action, which is already final, carried
with it the extinction of civil responsibility arising therefrom
 findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable by the
Supreme Court
NAGUIAT V. NLRCG.R. No. 116123March 13, 1997Topic:

Part 1

Petitioners: SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, doing business under the name and style SERGIO
F.NAGUIAT ENT., INC., & CLARK FIELD TAXI, INC.

Respondents: NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION),

NATIONALORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN and its members, LEONARDO
T. GALANG, Et Al.

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J

DOCTRINE: Essentially,"tort"
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply
stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty.

FACTS:

Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire’s contract with the Army Air Force Exchange
Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F.
Naguiat was CFTI’s president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated ("Naguiat Enterprises"or “NE”), a trading firm, it was a
family-owned corporation. Respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab
drivers.

Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, the AAFES was dissolved,
and the services of individual respondents were officially terminated.Thus, the
AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers’ union") and CFTI held
negotiations as regards separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers.
The parties agreed that the separated drivers will be given severance pay. Most of the
drivers accepted said amount, but the respondents herein refused to accept theirs.

The respondents, after disaffiliating themselves from the driver’s union and joining a new
labor organization (National Organization of Workingmen or “NOWM”), filed a complaint
against the petitioners for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out. The
respondents alleged that they were regular employees of Naguiat Enterprises, although
their individual applications for employment were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have
been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI, and that the former
managed, controlled, and supervised their employment; that they were entitled to
separation pay. On the other hand, petitioners claimed that the cessation of business of
CFTI was due to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity" resulting from the
phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration
of the RP-US military bases agreement.

The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI, ordered
the latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian consideration”
(they weren’t granted separation pay, to do so would be unjust to the employer whose
business was brought down by force majeure). Thus, respondents appealed to the NLRC. In
its Resolution, the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation
pay to the private respondents. In discharging the above obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises should be joined as indispensable party whose liability is joint and several.
Petitioners submitted additional issues by way of supplement, the pertinent issue being
Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. is a separate and distinct juridical entity which cannot be held
jointly and severally liable for the obligations of CFTI. And similarly, Sergio F.Naguiat and
Antolin Naguiat were merely officers and stockholders of CFTI and, thus, could not be held
personally accountable for corporate debts.

ISSUE: W/N Sergio Naguiat is solidarily liable.

HELD: YES

Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint
andseveral liability in the payment of separation pay to individual respondents. The Labor
Code provides that an ‘Employer’ includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers
or agents except when acting as employer. As a corporation is an artificial person, it must
have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the ‘person acting in the
interest of the ‘employer corporation’. The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the
employer. The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally liable.
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the
business.

Thus, he falls under the definition of the word ‘employer’.

Petitioners conceded that CFTI and NE were close family corporations. According to the Corp
Code, stockholders of close family corporations shall be personally liable for corporate
torts. Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty
imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. The Labor Code mandates
the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-
imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged in the
management or operation of the business should be held personally liable. In the present
case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because he had actively
engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and co-owner
thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, the individual respondents their
separation pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso equivalent
at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment
Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation

DOCTRINE: a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.

FACTS: Petitioner Vinzons-Chato was then the CIR while respondent Fortune Tobacco
Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes,
among which are "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654), which took
effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and
"More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%.
However, on July 1, 1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC
37-93 reclassifying "Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes
bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. RMC 37-93 in effect
subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654,
specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently
classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes an ad valorem tax of "55% provided
that the minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."

On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A. Deoferio, Jr.
sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was addressed to no one in
particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox
copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993. The
same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00
(computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt
thereof. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the
implementation of RMC 37-93. In its decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that
RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from
collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of
the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against
petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93
violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law
and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. RTC denied the motion. The cse was elevated to the CA,
however, the same was dismissed.
ISSUE: Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states a
cause of action?

HELD: The Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, that a public officer who
directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice
or bad faith.
The complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the decisive provision
thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code.

A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute, as the term is generally
understood, is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular
portion or section of the state only.

A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari materia and should,
accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view to giving effect to
both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and
the other general which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict
with the special act, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than that of a general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more
particular and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to
construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.

The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not
change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to,
or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special
statute will be construed as remaining an exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly
or by necessary implication.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of
the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a
cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a
violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Elcano v. Hill (G.R. No. L-24803)

May 26, 1977

FACTS:

Reginald Hill was accused of killing Agapito Elcano. Hill was subsequently acquitted on the
ground that his act was not considered criminal because of “lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake.”

Pedro Elcano, father of the victim Agapito, filed a case for recovery of damages instead
against Reginald and his father, Marvin Hill, before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City.

The Hills filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging, among others, that the action is barred by a
prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata. The CFI granted said motion.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the action for recovery of damages by the Elcanos is barred by the acquittal of
Reginald Hill in the criminal case filed against him. -- NO.

HELD:

The acquittal of Reginald Hill does not extinguish his liability for quasi-delict, and the
acquittal is not a bar for civil action for damages.

Under Art 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, nor for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

Art 2177 means that a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

Culpa acquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may or may not be punished
by law.

In the case of Barredo vs. Garcia, the Supreme Court held that negligent act can result in
civil liability under the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case the Court said that an act
of negligence may be a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent
civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or negligence under the Civil Code (1902).

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Porfirio P. Cinco V. Hon. Mateo Canonoy Et Al.

(1979)

G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979

Laws Applicable: Rule 111, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, Art. 31 and Article 2176 of the
Civil Code

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:

 Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated
by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident
 At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111,
Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same
offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may
be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered

 City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case

 CFI by certiorari: dismissed
ISSUE: W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the
pendency of the criminal action

HELD: YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

 nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
 Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant
 primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society
 The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in
section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.

 Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after
the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the
civil action based on quasi-delict
 Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to
persons but also damage to property
 word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm
done
G.R. No. L-21291 March 28, 1969
Lessons Applicable: Pater familias (Torts and Negligence)

FACTS:
 Feb 21, 1957 near midnight: although the conductor applied the brakes Ralph W.
Corliss' jeep collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company
 in his eagerness to beat, despite the tooting of the horn and the oncoming locomotive,
took the risk and attempted to reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the
victim of his own miscalculation
 Case was filed by Preciolita V. Corliss, 21 year old widow
ISSUE: W/N the Manila Railroad Co. is negligent

HELD: NO. Decision is affirmed

 negligence - The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand
whereby such other person suff ers injury.
 Negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or
comparative, not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably
require. Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to
observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.
 The weight of authorities is to the effect that a railroad track is in itself a warning or a
signal of danger to those who go upon it, and that those who, for reasons of their own,
ignore such warning, do so at their own risk and responsibility
 Corliss Jr., who undoubtedly had crossed the checkpoint frequently, if not daily, must
have known that locomotive engines and trains usually pass at that particular crossing
where the accident had taken place
 it was incumbent upon him to avoid a possible accident — and this consisted simply in
stopping his vehicle before the crossing and allowing the train to move on. A prudent
man under similar circumstances would have acted in this manner
David Taylor vs Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company

G.R. No. L-4977 – 16 Phil. 18 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Elements of Quasi Delict

David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able
to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s
office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical
draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well beyond his age.

One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power
plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode
the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted in the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries
to his companion and in Taylor losing one eye.

Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company negligently left the caps
exposed to children, they are liable for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.

HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:

(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.

(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.

In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps
which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor.
However, the causal connection between the company’s negligence and the injuries
sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion
of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode
the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.

Taylor at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally
and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able
to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred;
and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care.
The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character
of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in
his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge
the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the applications of a
match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can
there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be
dangerous.

“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from another.”
Torts And Damages Case Digest: Natividad V. Andamo, Et Al., V. Intermediate

Appellate Court Et Al. (1990)

G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its
agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake within
its land
 inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's land, caused a
young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction
 July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
 February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
 CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until
after judgment in the related Criminal Case
 spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil
Case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private propety

HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE

 All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
 (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
 (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond
 (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff
 While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the
property subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners'
complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
 It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431
of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a
manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which
require that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to
build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained
using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
 can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
 Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
 whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. CA and MS. LYDIA GERONIMOG.R.
No. 110295 October 18, 1993
Petition for review on certiorari (under Rule45) the decision of the CA
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in

Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the
Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out that
the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks severely
plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses. She demanded
damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on motion by petitioner
based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled the orders of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under article 1561 of
the CC which prescribes after six months from delivery of the thing sold.

RULING: Petition Denied.

The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in the case at bar is found
on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in four years and not on
breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is supported by the allegations
in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of
"adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."