LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS REVIEWER

DAN AXIS MARI N RAPANUT

I. Law on Public Officers

a. Definition- Public Office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at
all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives. (Art. XI, Sec. 1. PHIL. CONST.)

A public trust implies a fiduciary relationship between a public officer, who is a trustee,
and the people who are the beneficiaries, of a public office. This fiduciary relationship
makes the public officer the servant of the people, which requires of him utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency, fidelity, good faith and accountability in the
discharge of his duties, and demands that he take no advantage of his position for his personal
benefit or to the prejudice of the public.

i. JAVIER V. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 147026-27.

September 11, 2009
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Book Publishing Industry Development Act (R.A. No. 8047), the National Book
Development Board (NBDB) was created under the administration and supervision of the office of the
President. Having foremost in its policy the State’s goal in promoting the continuing development of the
book publishing industry, through the active participation of the private sector, Carolina R. Javier (Javier)
was appointed to its Governing Board for a term of one (1) year. She was authorized to attend the
Madrid International Book Fair in Spain in which she was paid P139,199 as cash advance for her
traveling expenses. Javier, however, was not able to attend. The Auditor then sought the return of the
traveling allowance but Javier failed to return the same.
The NBDB’s Executive Director filed information against Javier in the Ombudsman for
malversation of public funds and properties. She was formally charged in the Sandiganbayan for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.), docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867. Also, the
Commission on Audit (COA) charged Javier with Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, another information was filed before the Sandiganbayan and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25898. Both cases were consolidated. Javier filed a Motion to Quash
Information which the Sandiganbayan denied. Again, she filed a Motion to Quash Information in the
criminal case charging her with Malversation under the RPC by invoking her right against double
jeopardy, again it was subsequently denied. She filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the same was
denied.
In the present petition, Javier argues that the Sandiganbayan has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing the two informations charging her with
violation of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019) and the Revised Penal Code on malversation of public funds.
Her first argument is that she is not a public officer, and second, she was being charged under two (2)
informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.

ISSUE:
a. Whether or not Javier is a public officer
b. Whether or not the two informations charged against Javier are in violation of her right against
double jeopardy

HELD:
The powers and functions of the NBDB partake of the nature of public functions. A public office
is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed

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by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the NBDB,
the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so that the
purpose of the government is achieved. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it
that the purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant to the Anti-
Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a
public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the
President to Governing Board of the NBDB. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of
no moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive per
diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and subject to
pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one’s appointment,
and whether the compensation one receives from the government is only nominal, is immaterial
because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any person who, by direct
provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer. Where, as in this case, petitioner performs public
functions in pursuance of the objectives of R.A. No. 8047, verily, she is a public officer who takes part the
performance of public functions in the government whether as an employee, agent, subordinate official,
of any rank or classes. In fine, we hold that petitioner is a public officer.
Anent the issue of double jeopardy, we cannot likewise give in to the contentions advanced by
petitioner. Records show that the Informations in the two Criminal Cases refer to offenses penalized by
different statutes, R.A. No. 3019 and RPC, respectively. It is elementary that for double jeopardy to
attach, the case against the accused must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon valid information sufficient in form and
substance and the accused pleaded to the charge. In the instant case, petitioner pleaded not guilty to
the Information for violation of the Anti-Graft Law. She was not yet arraigned in the criminal case for
malversation of public funds because she had filed a motion to quash the latter information. Double
jeopardy could not, therefore, attach considering that the two cases remain pending before the
Sandiganbayan and that herein petitioner had pleaded to only one in the criminal cases against her. It is
well settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1)
there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and in substance to sustain
a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid
arraignment or plea to the charges; and (4) the accuses is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise
dismissed or terminated without his express consent. The third and fourth requisites are not present in
the case at bar.

ii. LAUREL V. DESIERTO. G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002

1. A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law,
by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer. The characteristics of a public office
include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by
contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office. (Laurel vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368,
April 12, 2002)
2. The National Centennial Commission performs executive functions, generally
defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws and performs sovereign

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 functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and its Chair is a public officer. (Laurel
vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002)
3. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of
the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part
of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office provided for it is a
naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public
good. It may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative
office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are
attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless. (Laurel vs. Desierto, G.R. No.
145368, April 12, 2002) Reviewer on Law on Public Officers Alberto C. Agra,
Ateneo Law School 2
4. An ad-hoc body may be a public office if the other elements of a public office
are present. (Laurel vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 145368, April 12, 2002)

FACTS:
In 1998, a committee was created to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the
National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence.
President Ramos issued E.O. No. 128, “reconstituting the Committee and renamed the Committee as
the “National Centennial Commission.” Appointed to chair the reconstituted Commission was Vice-
President Salvador H. Laurel.
The Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and petitioner was
among the nine incorporators, and was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
However, there were alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial
Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone that were was referred to the Blue Ribbon
Committee for investigation.
President Joseph Estrada issued A.O. No. 35, creating an ad hoc and independent Citizens’
Committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the Philippine centennial
projects.
Among the Committee’s recommendations was “the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of
Laurel, chair of National Centennial Commission (NCC) and of Expocorp for violating the rules on
public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK Corp.; for exhibiting manifest bias
in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the
absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in
the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the
implementation of the said contracts all in violation… of the anti-graft law.”
Probable cause was found to indict respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL and TEODORO Q. PEÑA
before the Sandiganbayan for conspiring to violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation
to Republic Act No. 1594.” The resolution also directed that an information for violation of the said
law be filed against Laurel and Peña.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the
charge against Peña.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer
as defined by R.A. No. 3019 and that NCC was not a public office.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, as Chair of the NCC, was a public officer.

RULING:
The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as “protectors of the people,” who
“shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees
of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations.”
Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution upon the Office
of the Ombudsman is to “[i]nvestigate… any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.”
In sum, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance by a public officer or employee of the government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

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 Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers
are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that provided by Mechem, a recognized
authority on the subject:
A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for
the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
The characteristics of a public office, according to Mechem, include the delegation of
sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the
position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office.
Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC
Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not
receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary.
Mechem describes the delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government as “[t]he most important characteristic” in determining whether a position is a public
office or not.
The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or
contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of
some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the
public; – that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or
judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers
conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.
Did E.O. 128 delegate the NCC with some of the sovereign functions of government? Certainly,
the law did not delegate upon the NCC functions that can be described as legislative or judicial.
We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power “is generally defined
as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the
implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
The NCC was precisely created to execute the policies and objectives, to carry them into effect.
Our conclusion that petitioner is a public officer finds support in In Re Corliss. There the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the office of Commissioner of the United States
Centennial Commission is an “office of trust” as to disqualify its holder as elector of the United
States President and Vice-President.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a
public office, we need no longer delve at length on the issue of whether Expocorp is a private or a
public corporation. Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner’s position as
CEO of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC. Consequently, his acts or omissions as
CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light of his powers and functions as NCC Chair.

A “public officer,” under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows:
SEC. 2. Definition of terms. – As used in this Act, the term –
xxx
(b) “Public officer” includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation,
even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. [Emphasis supplied.]

It is clear from Section 2 (b), above, that the definition of a “public officer” is expressly limited to
the application of R.A. No. 3019. Said definition does not apply for purposes of determining the
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, as defined by the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that
are best resolved at trial.
To illustrate, the use of the term “includes” in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not
restrictive. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define “public
officers.”
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is:
x x x any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or

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 performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official, of any rank or class.
Section 2 (14) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987, on the other hand,
states:
Officer – as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”, refers to a person whose duties not being of a
clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of
the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or
perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, “officer” includes any
government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.

It bears noting that under Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees), one may be considered a “public official”
whether or not one receives compensation, thus:
“Public Officials” include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel,
whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Petition was dismissed.

b. Scope of Power of Public Officers

i. SORIANO v. LAGUARDIA G.R. No. 164786. April 29,

2008
FACTS:

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate
but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the
above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.

ISSUE:

Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse
and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?

RULING:

No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the adverse
effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang
Dating Daan for three months.

Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension was an undue

curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent punishment.
Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship
character of a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast media), a
requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the
content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the
use of less offensive language.

c. De Facto and De Jure Offices

De Jure – is a descriptive condition in which there has been total compliance with all
requisites of law.

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 A de facto officer is distinguished form a de jure officer, as follows: The difference between
the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests
on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened to the difference between character and
reputation. One is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him. Moreover, as
against a mere usurper, “[i]t is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes
an officer de facto from a usurper.” Thus, a mere usurper is one “who takes possession of
[an] office and undertakes to act officially without any color of right or authority, either
actual or apparent.” A usurper is no officer at all. (Re: Nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile,
A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC, December 10, 2013)

De Jure Officer – one who is in all respects legally appointed or elected and qualified
to exercise office.
De Facto Officer – one who assumed office under a color of a known appointment or
election, is void because the officer was not eligible or because there was a want of
power in the electing body, or by reasons of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power, or defect being unknown to the public.
- One who assumed office under an incomplete appointment,
even if such assumption is tolerated or acquiesced by superior
officers and even when the appointee had served for years, for
the reason that he assumed office under color of a known
appointment which is void by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise.
- One who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority
derived from an appointment.
- He is entitled to emolument for actual services rendered.
He cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during
his term of office because his acts are valid as those of a de
jure officer.
- He is one who has the reputation or appearance of being the
officer he assumes to be but who, in fact, under the law, has no
right or title to the office he assumes to hold.
- An officer may be considered de facto officer who holds office
“by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such”
- A person who has been declared a winner by the court or by
the COMELEC in an election protest and assumed office based
thereon and who has thereafter been adjudged not entitled to
the office is a de facto officer because he exercised the duties
of the elective office under the color of election thereto and
is thus entitled to the emoluments of the office.
The main reason for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest
demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a
valid statute be deemed valid insofar as the public is concerned.
The title to the office of a public officer, whether de jure or de facto, can only be
determined in a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto.

i. TUANDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 110544, October

17, 1995

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 A person whose appointment as sectorial representative has been
immediately questioned before the appropriate agency as violative of law
is, if such appointment is declared invalid, not a de facto officer.

The conditions and elements of de facto officership are:

(1) there must be a de jure office; (2) there must be a color of right or
authority; (3) there must be actual physical possession of the office in
good faith; and (4) there must be a general acquiescence by the public or a
recognition by the public who deals with him of his authority as holder of
the position.
There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office,
although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. One can
qualify as de facto officer only if all the elements are present.

Facts:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying
petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.
On February 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial
labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang
Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of
office on February 16 and 17, 1989.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of
said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize respondent as private
sectoral representatives. Respondents then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros
Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed.
Petitioners filed an action to RTC Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of
respondents as sectoral representatives. (Civil Case 9955)
An information was then filed before the Sandiganbayan accusing Tuanda and others of taking
advantage of their public positions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and
Binaohan by refusing to pay the P95,350 and P108,900 representing their per diems, salaries
and other privileges and benefits. (Crim case 16936)
Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the
ground that a prejudicial question exists in the Civil Case. The RTC rendered a decision
declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of Sec 146(2) of
BP 337. (Saying that before the Secretary of DILG may appoint members of local legislative
bodies, the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the
city/municipality to warrant representation.)
Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution denying said motion. (Saying that the
private respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the
presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the
salaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void,
they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as representatives has made
them a de facto officers.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of
the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment,
instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written showcause why
they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the
arraignment.

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Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to
respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions
for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case
B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the
proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two
alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in
violation of petitioners' right to due process.

Issue: Whether or not the legality of private respondents’ designation as sectoral

representatives is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case against petitioners.

Held: yes
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It
has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case,
CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the
arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case.
There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the
criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on
petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries
and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to
resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were
made in accordance with law.

Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) due to their
refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay private respondents salaries as sectoral
representatives. This refusal, however, was anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations
were made in violation of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void.
Therefore, should the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private
respondents' designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the provisions of the
Local Government Code (B.P, Blg. 337, sec, 146[2)), the charges against petitioners would no longer, so
to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be accused of bad faith and partiality there being in
the first place no obligation on their part to pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not
have any legal right to demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court of
Appeals' resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or not
there is basis to proceed with the criminal case. Private respondents insist that even if their
designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree.
As found by the trial court and as bore out by the records, from the start, private respondents'
designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition
filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26

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February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office." Hence, private respondents'
claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.

Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to
compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as
borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral
representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the
Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February
1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim
that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that
private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de
facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can
be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office. Although there may be a de facto
officer in a de jure office.

Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside.

ii. RODRIGUEZ v. TAN. G.R. No. L-3913, August 7, 1952

An elective officer who has been proclaimed and had assumed
office but was later on ousted in an election protest is a de facto officer
during the time he held the office, and he can retain the emoluments
received even against the successful protestant.

Where the law gives the officer’s assumption of office color of

validity, it entitles him to compensation for his work, and his
subsequent ouster from the position entitles him to retain the
emoluments received as against the successful protestant.
Facts:
Plaintiff seeks to collect from the defendant the aggregate sum of P18,400 as salaries and
allowances and the sum of P35,524.55 as damages, upon the plea that the latter usurped the
office of Senator of the Philippines which rightfully belongs to the former from December 30,
1947, to December 27, 1949.
Plaintiff claims that on December 30, 1947, defendant usurped the office of Senator of the
Philippines, and from that date until December 1949, he continuously collected the salaries,
emoluments and privileges attendant to that office amounting to P18,400; that protest having
been filed by plaintiff against defendant, the Senate Electoral Tribunal on December 16, 1949,
rendered judgment declaring plaintiff to have been duly elected to the office; and that by reason
of such usurpation, plaintiff suffered damages in the amount of P35,524.55 for expenses he
incurred in prosecuting the protest.

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On February 2, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging, on one hand, that the
judgment rendered by the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the protest case is a bar to this action
under the principle of res judicata, and, on the other, that said Tribunal denied without any
reservation the claim of the plaintiff for expenses incurred in prosecuting the protest.
Issue: Whether defendant, who has been proclaimed, took the oath of office, and discharged
the duties of Senator, can be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has
received during his incumbency to the plaintiff who has been legally declared elected by the
Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Held:
There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the
office of Senator. He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of
November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the
Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered into
the performance of the duties of the position. Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator
and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed that defendant is
entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution
provides for the position.
Another reason that may be involved in opposition to the claim of the plaintiff is the principle of
res judicata. It appears that plaintiff had already set up this claim in the protest he filed against
the defendant before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, but when the case was decided on the
merits the Tribunal passed up this matter sub silentio. In our opinion, this silence may be
interpreted as a denial of the relief.

d. Eligibility and Qualifications

i. Eligibility –
*A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the
appropriate eligibility prescribed. (Achacoso vs. Macaraig, G.R. No. 93023,
March 13, 1991)
*In order to qualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must possess
the rank appropriate to the position. Failure in this respect will render the
appointment merely temporary. (Cuevas vs. Bacal, G.R. No. 139382, December
6, 2000)
1. PHIL CONST., Art. IX-B

B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 1.

1. The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman
and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for public administration,
and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment.
2. The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and
another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

10
Section 2.

1. The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
2. Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be
determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-determining, primarily
confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.
3. No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.
4. No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering
or partisan political campaign.
5. The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
6. Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by
law.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs.

Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold and defend this
Constitution.

Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials
and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,
taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their
positions.

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election, shall within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled corporations or in any
of their subsidiaries.

Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect
compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any
present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation

2. Pres. Decree No. 807 (1975) or the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, Secs. 5-6

Section 5. The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to
be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical
qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure.

The Career Service shall include:

1. Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is
required;

2. Closed Career positions which are scientific or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty
and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in
scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

11
 3. Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of
Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;

4. Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

5. Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate
merit system;

6. Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or

proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

7. Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.

Section 6. The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those
of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to
a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to
his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment
was made.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

1. Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

2. Department Heads and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold positions at the pleasure of the
President and their personal or confidential staff(s);

3. Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or
confidential staff;

4. Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a

special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available
in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed
one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a
minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and

5. Emergency and seasonal personnel.

ii. Qualifications- Congressional plenary power to determine

qualifications
ARTICLE VI

Creation of office is primarily a legislative function. All offices created by the

legislature are wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the
mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the office holders, and if it
sees fit, abolish the office.

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum

The question of when eligibility of persons seeking public office

must exist to qualify him for the position is a matter of legislative intent.

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Relative to public offices created by statute, Congress has virtually plenary powers to
prescribe qualifications, provided that (i) the qualifications are germane to the objective/s for
which the public office was created; and (ii) the qualifications are not too specific as to fit a
particular, identifiable person, because that would deprive the appointing authority of discretion
in the selection of the appointee. (Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993)

1. Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of Appeals, 246

SCRA 281 [1995] GR No. 104639 July 14, 1995
FACTS:

On October 12, 1972, private respondent Tito Dato was granted a temporary appointment as Assistant
Provincial Warden by then Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr which was renewed annually. On January 1, 1974,
Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon
the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards.
Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
reasoning that Tito Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was
appointed to. His appointment therefore remained temporary.

On March 16, 1976, private respondent Tito Dato was indefinitely suspended by Governor Alfelor after
criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to
evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. After a period, Dato
was acquitted of the charges against him and requested the Governor for reinstatement and back wages
but was denied. As consequence, Dato filed an action for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of
Pili, Camarines Sur which renders decision in his favor.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. In due course, petitioner, Province of Camarines Sur
appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether private respondent Tito Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines
Sur thus entitled to benefits.

RULING:
No. The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be
exercised by the Civil Service Commission. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove an
appointment set before it. It does not have the power to make the appointment itself or to direct
the appointing authority to change the employment status of an employee. The CSC can only
inquire into the eligibility of the person chosen to fill a position and if it finds the person qualified
it must so attest. If not, the appointment must be disapproved. The duty of the CSC is to attest
appointments and after that function is discharged, its participation in the appointment process
ceases.

Based on the foregoing, private respondent Tito Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled
to the relief he seeks, including his claim for back wages for the entire period of his suspension

iii. Disqualifications-
1. General Disqualifications

Disqualifications under the Omnibus Election Code

Election season is near. Political hopefuls must ensure that they not only possess the qualifications for
the position they are eyeing but they must also possess NONE of the disqualifications.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code (“Election Code”) provides
for certain disqualifications. Thus, under the Election Code, the following are disqualified from running for
public office:
1. Those declared as incompetent or insane by competent authority.
2. Those sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he
has been sentenced to a penalty of more than 18 months imprisonment.
3. Those sentenced by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.
4. Those who are permanent residents of or immigrants to a foreign country, unless he has waived his
status as such.

13
The disqualification for insane persons shall be removed upon declaration by the competent authority that
such insanity or incompetence has been removed. For those sentenced by final judgement of offenses in
items 2 and 3 above, the disqualification shall be lifted after the expiration of 5 years from service of
sentence.
Disqualifications as a Result of Election Offenses
Even after a candidate has filed his Certificate of Candidacy and duly received by the Comelec, the
candidate may still be disqualified if he has committed election offenses under Section 68 of the Election
Code. Thus, the following election offenses are sufficient to cause the disqualification of a candidate:
1. Giving money or materials to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions
2. Committing acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy
3. Spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law.
4. Soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions
5. Commission of the following prohibited acts under Sec. 80 (campaign period), Sec 83 (removal,
destruction of lawful election paraphernalia, Sec 85 (prohibited forms of propaganda), Sec 86 (regulation
of propaganda through mass media) and Sec 261 (election offenses)
In a Petition for Disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code, a prior judgment by a competent
court that the candidate is guilty of an election offense is not required before the said petition can be
entertained or given due course by the Commission on Elections [Francisco vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
230249, 24 April 2018]
Disqualifications under the Local Government Code (for local officials only)
For local candidates, such as those running for the position of mayor, vice-mayor, governor, vice-
governor, councilor, among others, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991”, as amended (“Local Government Code”) has provided for certain disqualifications. Thus,
the following are disqualified from running for a local elective post:
1. those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by 1 year or more imprisonment within 2 years after serving sentence.
2. those removed from office as a result of an administrative case
3. those convicted by final judgment for violating oath of allegiance to the Philippines
4. those with dual citizenship
5. fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here and abroad
6. permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right
7. the insane or feeble-minded

2. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN GR. NO. 78239 Feb 9, 1989

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts:

In 1983, Monsanto (then assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City) was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of
estafa thru falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government
in the sum of P4,892.50. The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but
while said motion was pending, she was extended by President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted (at that time, clemency could be given even before conviction).

On the strength of such pardon, she wrote the City Treasurer of Calbayog asking
for automatic reinstatement to her position without need of a new appointment since it was still vacant.
The letter was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MF) which at that time had control over the City
Treasuries. The Ministry of Finance ruled in favor of Monsanto but said that appointment was only to
retroact from the date of she was given pardon. Monsanto asked for reconsideration saying that the full
pardon wiped out the crime and thus her service in the government should not be considered to have
interrupted. Thus, the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive
suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should
not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.

14
The motion for reconsideration was referred to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Factoran
reversed the ruling of MF, ruling that acquittal and not pardon is the only ground for reinstatement in the
public service and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the
period of his suspension pendente lite.

Monsanto thus filed a petition before the SC. She contends that since the pardon was given when her
case was still pending on appeal before the SC, no final verdict has yet been handed
and consequently the accessory penalty attached to the crime which is forfeiture from public office did
not attached. Also she contends that the pardon given before the final verdict is tantamount to acquittal.

Issues:

1. What is the effect of absolute pardon?

2. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

3. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

4. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the
laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a
crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all
purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

2. No. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation
to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.”

3. No. Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare),
it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of
bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.

The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

4. No. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of

15
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor
and debtor, compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989)

Note: Conviction by final judgment is now necessary before parole or pardon could be extended. (Section
19, Article VII of the Constitution, People vs. Casido; People vs. Salle)

3. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,

GR. Nos. 83896 and 83815 February 22, 1991
In cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the
office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the
office, and may in appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the
office. (Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991)

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284 which ostensibly restricted the number of positions that
Cabinet members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries and other appointive officials may
hold in addition to their primary position but in effect allowed them to hold multiple positions contrary
to Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution.* In averring that EO 284 creates an exception to the rule in Art VII,
Sec 13, respondents contend that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in the Constitution” in said
section makes reference to Art IX-B, sec 7(2)** insofar as appointive officials mentioned therein are
concerned.

ISSUE:

Does the prohibition in Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for
appointive officials in general under Art IX-B, Sec 7(2) of the same?

RULING:

NO. Art IX-B, sec 7(2) is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to appointive public officials,
while Art VII, Sec 13 is meant to be the exception applicable particularly to the President, Vice-President,
Cabinet Members, their deputies and assistants.*** Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or employment during their tenure when such is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of their positions, Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants may do so
only when expressly authorized by the Constitution. EO 284 is thus null and void as it is repugnant to Art
VII, sec 13. It was noted, however, that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or
employment by the Pres., VP, Cabinet members, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure
(provided in Sec 13, Art VII) does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the
primary functions of the officials concerned who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity**** as
provided by law.

* The pertinent provision of the assailed EO read: “Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of
his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials
of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions
in the government and government corporations”

** [Civil Service Commission] Art IX-B, sec 7(2): Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries

16
*** In the case at bar, there seemed to be a contradiction between Art IX-B, sec 7 and Art VII, sec 13 of
the Constitution. One section is not to be allowed to defeat another if by any reasonable construction
the two can be made to stand together. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a
stricter prohibition on the President and his official family insofar as holding other offices or
employment in the govt or elsewhere is concerned. If the contention of the respondents is adopted, the
aforestated intent of the framers would be rendered nugatory. It must therefore be departed from (Civil
Liberties Union v. Exec Sec, 194 SCRA 317)

**** “Ex-officio.” – means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from
official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to
the official position.” Also denotes an “act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office,
and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.” An ex-officio
member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the exofficio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light
Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the
principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to
collect any extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.

4. FUNA V. ERMITA, GR No. 184740 Feb 11, 2010

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the
designation of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in
concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed
the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is
proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of
the MARINA and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this
case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the
appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the
relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present
petition moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction is likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the
constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.

Held:
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he

17
filed this suit as a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal
act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or
constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In the
present case, the mootness of the petition does not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants
shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall
not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the
disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is not qualified by the
phrase "in the Government" unlike in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives from holding "any other office or employment in the Government";
and when compared with other officials and employees such as members of the armed forces and civil
service employees, we concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which
prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members
of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and
to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment
in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section
13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition
must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that
it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding
multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is
prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only
to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President
in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of
Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as
Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with
her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.

18
Note:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand,
connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as where, in the
case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are
designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in
nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the
naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the
term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing
authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which
does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

5. R.A. No. 10742. Sec. 10.

SEC. 10. Qualifications. – An official of the Sangguniang Kabataan, either elective or appointee,
must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan, a resident
of the barangay for not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, at
least eighteen (18) years but not more than twenty-four (24) years of age on the day of the
elections, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, must not be related within
the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to any incumbent elected national official or
to any incumbent elected regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality
where he or she seeks to be elected, and must not have been convicted by final judgment of
any crime involving moral turpitude.

e. Acquisition of Public Office by Appointment

i. VELICARIA-GARAFIL V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R.
No. 203372, June 16, 2015

The present consolidated cases involve four petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E. Velicaria-
Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No. 206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty. Venturanza), who was
appointed Prosecutor IV (City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R. No. 209138 with Irma A.
Villanueva (Villanueva), who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the Board of Administrators of
the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B. Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed
Commissioner of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and G.R. No.
212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong (Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member of the Board of
Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), as petitioner. All petitions question the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.

Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government
offices.

The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and
the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary

19
 appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety."
None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President
of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing,
and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban
on midnight appointments.

Issue:
(1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, and
(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional.

Held:

The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as
both complete and effective) appointment:

(1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority;

The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the Constitution and
laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of appointment. Considering that
appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he
may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those
who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

(2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal;

It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the
President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may
be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked
drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal
act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance.

For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment paper
must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be
accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.

(3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to
acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a
prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.

Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.

Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it,
unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional.

ii. DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, GR Nos. 191002,

191032, 191057, 191149 April 20, 2010
The ban on making presidential appointments around the time of presidential elections in Section 15
is confined to appointments in the Executive Department. It does NOT extend to the Judiciary. The

20
 filling of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period prescribed by Section 4 (1), Article VIII was
made a true mandate for the President.

FACTS:

The 2010 presidential election is forthcoming. C.J. Puno is set to retire on 17 May 2010 or seven
days after the presidential election. January 2010, the JBC begun to take applications for the position
of C.J.

Meanwhile, strong objections to Pres. GMA’s appointing C.J. Puno’s successor arose.

The instant petitions were thus filed questioning her authority to appoint a new C.J. in the light of
the ban imposed on presidential appointments two months immediately before the next
presidential elections up to the end of the President’s term under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution. This view however seemingly conflicts with Section 4(1), Article VIII which provides
that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and
Section 9, Article VIII which provides that the President shall issue appointments to the Judiciary
within 90 days from submission by the JBC of the list of nominees.

It is further argued that there is no imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice considering
that Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next
President appoint the successor. It provides that in case of a vacancy in the office of the C.J. or of his
inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice
who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another C.J. is appointed and duly
qualified. It is also argued that there is no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the
prohibition period the successor of C.J. Puno because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the
90 days mandated in Section 4 (1), Article VIII remaining (the period that remains of the 90 days
counted from C.J. Puno’s retirement after the end of GMA’s term).

ISSUE:

1. Does the ban on making presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII extend to
appointments to fill vacancies in the SC and in the rest of the Judiciary?

2. Does Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 dispel the imperative need to appoint a new C.J.?

3. Does the fact that there will still be about 45 days after the prohibition period to comply with the
mandate of the President to fill vacancies in the SC dispel the need for Pres. GMA to appoint C.J.
Puno’s successor?

4. May the JBC be compelled by mandamus to submit to Pres. GMA a short list of nominees now?

RULING:

1. No. We reverse Valenzuela.¹ Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the SC, they could have explicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. The exchanges during
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission further show that the filling of a vacancy in the SC
within the 90-day period was made a true mandate for the President. This was borne out of the fact
that 30 years hitherto, the Court seldom had a complete complement. Further, the usage in Section
4 (1), Article VIII of the word “shall”—an imperative—should not be disregarded. Given the
background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, undoubtedly, the
Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive
Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured
that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary and appointments to the
Judiciary for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan
considerations. The fact that Sections 14 and 16 of Art VI² refer only to appointments within the
Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 of the same also applies only to the

21
 Executive Department. This is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. If the framers intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of
presidential appointments, they would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition. To hold
that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary undermines the intent of the Constitution
of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department for it will tie the Judiciary and the SC to the
fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election.³

2. No. The express reference to a Chief Justice [in Section 4(1), Article VIII] abhors the idea that the
framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court.
Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section
12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief
Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution. Said Section 12 only responds to a rare
situation in which the new C.J. is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent C.J. is unable to
perform the duties and powers of the office.

3. No. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from C.J.
Puno’s retirement by 17 May 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4 (1) to every situation of a
vacancy in the SC.

4. No. For mandamus to lie, there should be unexplained delay on the part of JBC in performing its
duty; and there has been no delay on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of nominees for C.J. to
the President because the vacancy in the office has not yet occurred. The President is
constitutionally mandated to fill vacancies in the SC within 90 days after the occurrence of the
vacancies. Thus, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees on or
before the occurrence of the vacancy in order to enable the President make the appointment within
the 90-day period therefrom. This is a ministerial duty of the JBC.⁴ JBC therefore has until the date
C.J. Puno retires, or 17 May 2010, to submit the list nominees to the President.

1. OBIASCA V. BASALLOTE, GR. No. 176707 Feb 27, 2010

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that,
for reasons of law, comity and convenience, where the enabling
statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a
system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not
entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have
been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given an
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum.

ISSUE: whether the deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible officials) to
submit respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from its issuance made her
appointment ineffective and incomplete.

RULING:

The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is filed
within fifteen days from receipt thereof.

A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or reversed.

It is incorrect to interpret Section 9(h) of Presidential Decree (PD) 807 as requiring that an
appointment must be submitted by the appointing authority to the CSC within 30 days from issuance,
otherwise, the appointment would become ineffective. Such interpretation fails to appreciate the
relevant part of Section 9(h) which states that "an appointment shall take effect immediately
upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and
shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the [CSC].”

22
The tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-observance of the
pertinent rules on the matter does not render the legal requirement, on the necessity of approval
by the Commissioner of Civil Service of appointments, ineffective and
unenforceable.44 (Emphasis supplied)

Taken in its entirety, this case shows that the lack of CSC approval was not due to any
negligence on respondent’s part. Neither was it due to the "tolerance, acquiescence or
mistake of the proper officials." Rather, the underhanded machinations of Gonzales and
Oyardo, as well as the gullibility of Diaz, were the major reasons why respondent’s
appointment was not even forwarded to the CSC.

iii. Hilario v. Civil Service Commission, GR No. 116041 March 31, 1995
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner's position as city legal officer is not confidential

Whether or not respondent CSC has no authority to remove or terminate the services of petitioner

RULING:

1. We have consistently held in previous cases that the position of City Legal Officer is a confidential
5

one. In the recent case of Griño v. Civil Service Commission, respondent was appointed provincial
6

attorney at a time when Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 was in effect. We held that the position of City
Legal Officer has its counterpart in the position of provincial attorney appointed by the provincial
governor, both being positions involving the rendering of trusted services.

2. Nothing in the Administrative Code precludes the CSC from deciding a disciplinary case before it.
Although respondent Planas is a public official, there is nothing under the law to prevent her from
filing a complaint directly with the CSC against petitioner. Thus, when the CSC determined that
petitioner was no longer entitled to hold the position of City Legal Officer, it was acting within its
authority under the Administrative Code to hear and decide complaints filed before it.

iv. Hold-Over and Ad Interim Appointments

1. LECAROS V. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR. No. 130872
March 25, 1999.
An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office. Only
when the public officer has satisfied this prerequisite can his right to
enter into the position be considered plenary and complete. Until then,
he has none at all, and for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover
officer is the rightful occupant

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his
son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of
Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing
the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won
as the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However,
Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the
Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment
papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral
representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to
receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the
Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment
paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several
criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him

23
assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed
with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of public documents
against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the
two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No.
3019; the Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for
reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is guilty of violating anti-graft and corrupt practices

HELD: NO. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers
elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their
successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become
vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but
the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be
beyond the term fixed by law. In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian
member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to
qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied
constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his
successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must
be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to
assume that the law-making body favors the same. Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,
and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a
condition which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time,
wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on
obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent
public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of
government functions.

The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman Reyes in 1985,
Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It should
be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec.
21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It
was only after the approval of RA No. 6733 on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a
newspaper of general circulation that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first
time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office
taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer
oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all. To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. Only when the public
officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and
complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is
the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post,
petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity,
and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and
all the emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and
liable for encroachment of public office.

On the issue of criminal liability of petitioners, clearly the offenses of which petitioners were convicted,
i.e., estafa through falsification of public documents under Art. 171, par. 4, of The Revised Penal Code,
are intentional felonies for which liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors acted with
criminal intent or malice. If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person
committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be rightfully imputed to him. Was criminal intent
then demonstrated to justify petitioners’ conviction? It does not so appear in the case at bar. Ordinarily,
evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to

24
particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of
course is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a
criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of
negligence and imprudence. In the instant case, there are clear manifestations of good faith and lack of
criminal intent on the part of petitioners.

2. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO GR. No 149036 April 2,

2002

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President. “Ad interim” means “in the meantime” that Congress is in recess.

FACTS:

The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of the EID. Such appointment was
renewed in “temporary” capacity twice, first by Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier.
Later, PGMA appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason as
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three took their oaths of office and assumed
their positions. However, since the Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments,
PGMA renewed the ad interim appointments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX-C.

2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra
and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent
assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX-C.

RULING:

Nature of Ad Interim Appointments

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can
no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. The
second paragraph of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:

“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment,
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. xxx

…the term “ad interim appointment”… means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn
or revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a
definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.

25
Right of an Ad Interim Appointee

An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government
employee and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitution protection that “[n]o officer
or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” Thus,
an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into
office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated
to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the
office which is protected not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for
cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

How an Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated

An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first
cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second
cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his
appointment. These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all
ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over
the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appointees.

Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an

appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC
xxx

Was the Renewal of Appointment Valid?

There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can
no longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its
consent after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not
provide for any appeal from such decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well
as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the appointment not
because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the
Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.

An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally
acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee xxx

The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to
disapproved nor by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be
revived by another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment
because there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years.

26
 f. What is the other mode of acquiring office?
g. Powers and Duties of Public Officers
i. PHILIPPINES v. SERENO GR. No. 237428, May
11, 2018
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed
of when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the time of
appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office
as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding,
but of impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the
act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether
the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC
and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and
review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the
Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the
nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent nomination
by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the
court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and
prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and
uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-
be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the

27
Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be
actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover, the petition
of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private individual
or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and
not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely
free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or
disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Bias must
be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings
were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on
matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for
inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition
has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices
may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the quo
warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance between the
Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who
ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the SolGen who has
supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in
the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best
person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be
disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.
A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and
important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the action is directed
against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-reaching
implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition
based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to
settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character
– it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual
controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other
branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of
the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political
process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be contested
collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong
and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given
permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national
interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping
and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1)
jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum
shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some
other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for
determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or

28
causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable
officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable
offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings,
impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer,
the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from
holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the charges of
impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally
holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does
not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be
initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of
discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and
cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In
American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be
taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this
express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for
an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to
qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions
assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly provide for
the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses
are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a
complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are available, then other modes
of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are
outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold
otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned
even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative
of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise be
an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that
impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference between quo
warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s culpability of
an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own
prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor
will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

29
However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion
that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and
legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of
perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the initiation of a process
specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a
public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official,
cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the
public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year
after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the
one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike
the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the
government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the
person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of
the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the
preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes
of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public right. There
is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it
was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto.
Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless
to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest
position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification· for office
only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether
she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on
the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies
with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see
to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-
action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution contemplates. What is
more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute
nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC
process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to
the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional
and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to
place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving. [

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the
JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good
reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards.”
Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence,

30
the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a person
of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation
of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public
officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is
so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may
result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even
provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may
also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive
duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case,
those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and
obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative
provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand
the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no
position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a
formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade
considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or
commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not
the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and
the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily
dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet,
Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked
by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the personnel of the
branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the
repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to
have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and
the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by mere
inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN
filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to
conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO and
Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the burden
of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests upon the
respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN because it
is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the
periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted
from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno
was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had not yet
established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and
Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came about only on 2006
from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not
substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and

31
administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of the date
of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated
by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates
for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have
been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered Sereno eligible
because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this
Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the
party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended
by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996
SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-
2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006
SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious
increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore
clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty
betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and
non-disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the
JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices,
absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From the
minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for having
failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away with
the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno
who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a
letter containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P.
in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her
government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all
academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in
her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno
curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P. Such
failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially
from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was no
compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the
first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the
law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to perform
his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC
should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false representations that
she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her false
claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of
tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a brand new
Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding,
misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the
3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines
v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to
transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the
grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of

32
deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis
Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national security against the latter among others, all
belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her
integrity was not established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief Justice.
On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in
order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to submit the
required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness
or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of
bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot
verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and
assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the
JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of course. The
Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial
notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains
the power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or
franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident from the
composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which,
the appointment is susceptible to attack.

Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her
removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice.

ii. SAMSON v. RESTTRIVERA GR No. 178454 March

28,2011
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be held administratively liable
for grave misconduct.
RULING:

33
True, public officers and employees must be guided by the principle
enshrined in the Constitution that public office is a public trust.
However, respondents allegation that petitioner meddled in an affair
that belongs to another agency is a serious but unproven accusation. It
does not show that petitioner made an illegal deal or any deal with any
government agency. Even the Ombudsman has recognized this fact. The
survey shows only that petitioner contracted a surveyor.

However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved of any
administrative liability. For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid
amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer.
Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the amount
to respondent after failing to accomplish the task she had willingly
accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her for estafa, thus
reinforcing the latter's suspicion that petitioner misappropriated her
money. Although the element of deceit was not proven in the criminal
case respondent filed against the petitioner, it is clear that by her
actuations, petitioner violated basic social and ethical norms in her
private dealings. Even if unrelated to her duties as a public officer,
petitioners transgression could erode the public's trust in government
employees, more so because she holds a high position in the service.

h. Rights and Privileges of Public Office

i. Compensation - R.A. No. 6758 (1989) or the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989
Section 2. Statement of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal
pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates
of pay, due regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for
comparable work.

1. BITONIO, JR. V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, GR.

No. 147392 March 12, [2004]
"The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part
of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right
to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It
should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a
meeting of the Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is
actually and in legal contemplation performing the primary function of
his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters,
which come under the jurisdiction of his department. For such
attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or
an honorarium or an allowance, or some other such euphemism. By

34
 whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is
prohibited by the Constitution."
Issue:

Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for
his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as representative of the Secretary of
Labor.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any
compensation for this additional office, because his services are already paid for and
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the petitioner,
who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise
prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would
have a better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s position as Director
IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in
the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended
the board meetings by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his
representative. If it were not for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in
the Board at all.

2. DE LA VICTORIA V. BURGOS, GR. No. 111190

June 27,[1995]
ISSUE: whether the salary check of a government official or employee funded with public funds can
be subject to garnishment.

RULING:

The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a teacher does not
belong to him before it is physically delivered to him. Until that time the check
belongs to the government. Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check,
the payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the consent of the
Government.

As a necessary consequence of being public fund, the checks may not be garnished to satisfy the
judgment. The rationale behind this doctrine is obvious consideration of public policy.
9

3. In Re: Gross Violation of Civil Service Law on the

Prohibition Against Dual Employment and Double
Compensation in the Government Service Committed
by Mr. Eduardo V. Escala, SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer, Security Division, Office of the Administrative
Services, A.M. No. 2011-04-SC, July 5, 2011

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.

The prohibition on dual employment and double compensation in the government service is further
specified under Sections 1 and 2, Rule XVIII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No.
292, viz:

35
 Sec. 1. No appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position.

Sec. 2. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, xxxxx.

All court personnel ought to live up to the strictest standards of honesty and integrity, considering
that their positions primarily involve service to the public. For knowingly and willfully transgressing
the prohibition on dual employment and double compensation, as well as the Court’s rules for its
personnel on conflict of interest, respondent violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by the
Court. Considering the sensitive and confidential nature of his position, the Court is left with no
choice but to declare the respondent guilty of gross dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, which are grave offenses punished by dismissal.

ii. Security of Tenure – R.A. No. 6656 (1988) or An Act to

Protect Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and
Employees in the Implementation of Government
Reorganization

Republic Act No. 6656 June 10, 1988

AN ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND

EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to protect the security of tenure of civil service
officers and employees in the reorganization of the various agencies of the National Government
and of local governments, state colleges and universities expressly authorized by law, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, without sacrificing the need to
promote morale, efficiency in the civil service pursuant to Article IX, B, Section 3 of the Constitution.

Section 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause
and after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

(a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern
of the department or agency concerned;

(b) Where an office is abolished and other performing substantially the same functions is
created;

(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;

(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and
the reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original offices;

(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.

36
Section 3. In the separation of personnel pursuant to reorganization, the following order of removal
shall be followed:

(a) Casual employees with less than five (5) years of government service;

(b) Casual employees with five (5) years or more of government service;

(c) Employees holding temporary appointments; and

(d) Employees holding permanent appointments: provided, that those in the same category
as enumerated above, who are least qualified in terms of performance and merit shall be laid
first, length of service notwithstanding.

Section 4. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for
appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former position
or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank.

No new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have been
appointed, including temporary and casual employees who possess the necessary qualification
requirements, among which is the appropriate civil service eligibility, for permanent appointment to
positions in the approved staffing pattern, in case there are still positions to be filled, unless such
positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature.

Section 5. Officers and employees holding permanent appointments shall be given preference for
appointment in other agencies if they meet the qualification requirements of the positions therein.

Section 6. In order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in any
reorganization, there shall be created a Placement Committee in each appointments shall be given
preference for appointment in the judicious selection and placement of personnel. The Committee
shall consist of two (2) members appointed by the head of the department or agency, a
representative of the appointing authority, and two (2) members duly elected by the employees
holding positions in the first and second levels of the career service: provided, that if there is a
registered employee association with a majority of the employees as members, that employee
association shall also have a representative in the Committee: provided, further that immediately
upon approval of the staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned, such staffing pattern
shall be made known to all officers and employees of the agency who shall be invited to apply for
any of the positions authorized therein. Said application shall be considered by the Committee in the
placement and selection of personnel.

Section 7. A list of the personnel appointed to the authorized positions in the approved staffing
pattern shall be made known to all the officers and employees of the department or agency. Any of
such officers and employees aggrieved by the appointments made may file an appeal with the
appointing authority who shall make a decision within thirty (30) days from the filling thereof.

Section 8. An officer or employee who is still not satisfied with the decision of the appointing
authority may further appeal within ten (10) days from the receipt thereof to the Civil Services
Commission which shall render a decision thereon within thirty (30) days and whose decision shall
be final and executory.

Section 9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been
separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the
case may be without loss of seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation.
Unless also separated for cause, all officers and employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and
other benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their
separation or from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be:
provided, that application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the
corresponding department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a
separation gratuity in the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such
separation pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the
department or agency concerned.

37
Section 10. All heads of department, commissions, bureaus, agencies or offices who after the
effectivity of this Act willfully violate any provision thereof, including failure to abide by the rules
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission or to implement a Civil Service Commission
reinstatement order, shall upon conviction be punished by a fine not, exceeding ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) or by imprisonment of not less than three (3) nor more than five (5) years or both such
fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court, and suffer permanent disqualification to hold
public office.

Section 11. The executive branch of the government shall implement reorganization schemes within
a specified period of time authorized by law.

In the case of the 1987 reorganization of the executive branch, all departments and agencies which
are authorized by executive orders promulgated by the President to reorganize shall have ninety
(90) days from the approval of this Act within which to implement their respective reorganization
plans in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

Section 12. The Civil Service Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of this Act.

Section 13. All laws, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The rights and benefits under this Act shall be
retroactive as of June 30, 1987.

Section 14. If any part, section or provisions of this Act shall be held invalid or unconstitutional, no
other part, section or provision thereof shall be affected thereby.

Section 15. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in at least two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.

Security of tenure is the right of an employee, as mandated by the 1987

Philippine Constitution that protects him/her against unjust termination from
employer by the employer. This is in line with the declaration of state policy
under the Constitution to protect labor and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all. The law says:

Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.

1. DE RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS, GR. No.

131136 Feb 28,2001
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter to the Civil
Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. He justified
his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the
said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former
mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII,
Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s
request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen
employees for lack of merit and declared that the appointments
were issued in accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same
were effective immediately and cannot be revoked until

38
 disapproved by the CSC. The CSC upheld the validity of the
appointments on the ground that they had already been approved
by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for
petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the
revocation or recall of the said appointments.
The CSC also cited the SC ruling in Aquino vs CSC wherein
the court held that “Once an appointment is issued, and the
moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service
under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal not
merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not
only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be
taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment,
or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and
hearing. (Emphasis supplied)
- The CA held that there was no abuse of power of appointment
on the part of the outgoing mayor

Issues:
- Whether or not the appointments made by the outgoing Mayor
were “midnight appointments” and done in violation of Art. VII,
Sec. 15 of the Constitution
- Whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.

Ruling:

- NO. The CSC correctly ruled that the constitutional

prohibition on so-called “midnight appointments,”
specifically those made within 2 months immediately
prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to
the President or Acting President. There is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure.

- NO. It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment

and the appointee's assumption of the position in the civil service, "he
acquires a legal right which cannot be taken away either by
revocation of the appointment or by removal except for cause and
with previous notice and hearing."17 Moreover, it is well-settled that
the person assuming a position in the civil service under a completed
appointment acquires a legal, not just an equitable, right to the
position. This right is protected not only by statute, but by the
Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away by either
revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is valid
cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.

Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the

Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that "an
appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or
revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in
effect until disapproved by the Commission." Thus, it is the CSC that
is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only
when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of
applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations.

Accordingly, the appointments of the private

respondents may only be recalled on the following
grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the
procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit

39
 Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the
agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the
existing collective agreement between management and
employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of
other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.

2. DE LEON V. COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 127182

January 22, 2001
An appointment to a position in the Career Service of the Civil Service
does not necessarily mean that the appointment is a permanent one
and the appointee entitled to security of tenure. Where the appointee
does not possess the qualifications for the position, the appointment is
temporary and may be terminated at will. (De Leon v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 127182, January 22, 2001)

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) or a member of the
Career Executive Service, was appointed as "Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV in the Ministry of Local
Government" (now DILG), by then Minister Pimentel. Atty. Montesa's appointment was approved as
permanent by the CSC.

In 1987, then President Aquino promulgated EO 262, reorganizing the DILG. In 1988, then Secretary
Santos, designated Patricio as chief of Legal Service in place of Montesa who, in turn, was directed to
report to the office of the Secretary to perform special assignments.

Montesa filed a petition for quo warranto against then Secretary Santos and Patricio. The court ruled in
favor of Montesa and ordered his reinstatement to his former position.

Meanwhile, the position of "Department Service Chiefs," which include the Department Legal Counsel,
was reclassified and ranked with "Assistant Bureau Directors" under the generic position title of
"Director III".

In 1994, then Secretary Alunan III, citing as reasons the interest of public service and the smooth flow of
operations in the concerned offices relieved Montesa of his current duties and responsibilities and
reassigned him as "Director III (Assistant Regional Director), Region XI,".

Montesa, however, did not report to his new assigned position. Instead, he filed a 90-day sick leave, and
upon the expiration thereof, he submitted a memorandum for then acting Secretary Aguirre, signifying
his intention to re-assume his position as Department Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal Services. The
memorandum was denied the same with his motion for reconsideration.

Private respondent appealed to the CSC, but the latter sustained his reassignment to Region XI.

(on the ground that: 1) the subject reassignment was not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution or of Montesa's right to security of tenure; 2) the reassignment did not entail any reduction
in rank or status and that 3) Montesa could be reassigned from one station to another without his
consent as the rule against unconsented transfer applies only to an officer who is appointed to a
particular station, and not merely assigned thereto.)

With non-compliance of his reassignment, Montesa was dropped from the roster of public servants for
serious neglect of duty and absences without leave (AWOL).

ISSUE:

40
Whether a person who lacks the necessary qualification (eligibility) for a public position be appointed to
it in a permanent capacity.

RULING:

No. It must be stressed that the position of Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career
Executive Service. Under the Integrated Reorganization Plan, appointment thereto shall be made by the
President from a list of career executive eligible recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall
be made on the basis of rank.

The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any person who is not a Career Executive
Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive
Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until qualifies in such
examination.

At the initial implementation of this Plan, an incumbent who holds a permanent appointment to a
position embraced in the Career Executive Service shall continue to hold his position, but may not
advance to a higher class of position in the Career Executive Service unless or until he qualifies for
membership in the Career Executive Service.

The required Career Executive Service eligibility may be then acquired by passing the CES examination
and Conferment is done after an evaluation of the examinee's performance in the four stages of the CES
eligibility examinations.

In the case at bar, there is no question that Montesa, as he admits, does not have the required CES
eligibility.

Settled is a rule that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed.

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security or
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A
person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the
first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in
the absence of appropriate eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as
permanent even if it may be so designated. (Achacoso vs Macaraig)

Evidently, Montesa's appointment did not attain permanency. Not having taken the necessary Career
Executive Service examination to obtain requisite eligibility, he did not at the time of his appointment
and up to the present, possess the needed eligibility for a position in the Career Executive Service.
Consequently, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal Counsel and/or
Director III, was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without
violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.

3. PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. GONZALES,

G.R. No. 185740, July 23, 2013

The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of

Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that
enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change
according to the nature of the position. Congress has the power and
prerogative to introduce substantial changes in the provincial
administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential,
non-career service position. When done in good faith, these acts would

41
 not violate a public officer’s security of tenure, even if they result in his
removal from office or the shortening of his term. (Provincial
Government of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales, G.R. 185740, July 23,
2013)
FACTS:

Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then
Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. An
administrative case was filed against her for gross insubordination, this was later on captioned as
Administrative Case No. 001. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee
found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held
administratively liable. On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation
Committees recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.

On appeal, the CSC modified Governor Pimentel’s decision finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and
suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC
denied.

The CSC then issued Resolution No. 002245, which directed Gonzales reinstatement. Governor Pimentel
reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her services the next
day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and
Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee.

The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008, which again directed Gonzales reinstatement as
provincial administrator. It clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA
7160) made the provincial administrator position coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this
conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as
administrators prior to the new laws effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested
right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this
office despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position.

Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Nortes incumbent
governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988, which ordered
Gonzales reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position. Thus, the
petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA.

- The CA supported the CSCs ruling citing Aquino vs CA ruling. Petitioner sought for reconsideration
but the same was denied. Hence, this petition before the SC. In its present petition for review on
certiorari, the petitioner argues that the provincial administrator position has been converted into a
highly confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of
tenure to the position she held prior to RA 7160s enactment.
- In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues that the provincial
administrator position has been converted into a highly confidential, coterminous position by RA
7160. Hence, Gonzales no longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held prior to RA
7160’s enactment.

ISSUE: 1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career
service to a primarily confidential, non-career service position; and

2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the
Province of Camarines Norte.

HELD:

1. Yes. RA 7160 made the provincial administrator position coterminous with its appointing authority,
reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is primarily confidential. Congress reclassification
of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a valid exercise of legislative power that does not
violate Gonzales security of tenure.

2. Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee.

42
To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure. All 1âwphi1

permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the
career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from
office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process.45 The concept of security
of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic
concept of a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority,
the primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust
in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed" from
office; his term merely "expires" and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by
law that results in the termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence
has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he
decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.

Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be suspended
or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot be expanded to grant
a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held. In other words, the CSC might
have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of tenure
when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the situation had since then
been changed.

In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law
prevailing at the time of the termination of her service; i.e., she was then already occupying a position that
was primarily confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and
confidence of the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She
could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other comparable
position. This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to retirement benefits,
leave credits, and future employment in government service.

4. Cf. to Government’s right to promote, demote,

transfer, detail, and reassign.
(in another document)
i. Liabilities of Public Officers
i. Official Immunity from Liabilities- TUZON v. CA. GR No.
90107 Aug 21, 1992
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC OFFICERS; NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR INJURIES
OCCASIONED BY PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY WITHIN SCOPE OF OFFICIAL AUTHORITY;
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF ORDINANCE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE BAD FAITH; CASE AT
BAR. — The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the scope of their authority
and in consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. We agree
that it was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring
it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the
appellate court said there was nothing wrong with it). As executive officials of the
municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the
Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. . . . As a rule, a public officer, whether
judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally liable to one injured in consequence
of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in line of his official
duty. . . . It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not
constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an
award for damages. (Philippine Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99).
Facts of the case:

On March 14, 1977, the Sangguaniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted Resolution No. 19
which provides that a fundraising scheme will be implemented to help finance the construction of Sports
and Nutrition Center in the municipality, by soliciting 1% donation from the thresher operators who will
apply for a permit to thresh within the jurisdiction of the municipality.

43
 To implement this Resolution. Lope Mapagu, the municipal treasurer prepared a document for all
thresher/owner/operators applying for a mayor's permit. It is an agreement where it states that the
thresher-owner-operator voluntarily agree to donate 1% of all palay threshed by him to help finance the
construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building.

When private respondent Saturnino Jurado paid his license fee for thresher operators, the
municipal treasurer, Lope Mapagu, petitioner in this case, refused to accept private respondent's payment
and required him to first secure Mayor's permit. But then. the Mayor, Domingo Tuzon, also the petitioner
in this case, said that Jurado should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before
permit could be issued.

However, Jurado ignored this requirement and instead send his payment by postal money order
but the municipal treasurer returned his money. Jurado filed a special civil action for mandamus with
actual and moral damages to compel the issuance of mayor's permit and license. Also, he filed another
petition for declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the implementing agreement) for being
illegal cither as a donation or as a tax measure.

The trial court upheld the Resolution and dismissed the claims for damages. When Jurado
appealed to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the validity of the Resolution but ordered
petitioners to pay damages to private respondent.

Issue of the case:

Whether or Not the petitioners are liable in damages to the private respondent for having withheld
from him the mayor's permit and license because of his refusal to comply with Resolution No. 9.

Ruling of the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The private respondent anchors his claim for damages
on Article 27 of the New Civil Code. But then the court said that the purpose of this article is to end the
bribery system, where a public official delays or refuses the performance of his duty until he gets some
kind of bribery or pabagsak. Official inaction may also be due to plain indolence or a cynical indifference
to the responsibilities of public service. According to Phil. Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, the provision
presupposes that the refusal or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to
malice or inexcusable negligence. In any event, the erring public functionary is justly punishable under
this article for whatever loss or damage the complainant has sustained.

In this case, it was not even alleged that Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act upon Jurado's application
was an altempt to compel Jurado to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application.

It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners singled out
the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners stood to gain personally
from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were not
Jurado's business competitors nor has it been established that they intended to favor his competitors. On
the contrary, the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the
municipality without discrimination or preference.

The court was convinced that the petitioners act within the scope of their authority and in
consonance with their honest interpretation of the resolution in question.

We agree that it was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision
declaring it invalid, its legality would have to be presumed (in fact, both the trial court and the appellate
court said there was nothing wrong with it). As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to
enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts. . . .
As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial or executive, is not personally liable to
one injured in consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in
line of his official duty.. . . It has been held that an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does
not constitute nor does it amount to bad faith that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for
damages. (Philippine Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99).

The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners' acts, he was prevented from
operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom, as he had in previous years.
But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the prudent course of signing the
agreement under protest and later challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate."
Pendente lite, he could have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro
cesante that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful act. He could have opted for
the less obstinate but still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit.

44
 ii. Three-fold liability of Public Officers –
Domingo v. RAYALA GR Nos. 155831, 155840, 158700, Feb
18, 2008
The "threefold liability rule" holds that the wrongful acts or omissions of
a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative
liability. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such
violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public
officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured pat1y. If the
law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may also be
punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension,
removal from office, or other administrative sanctions.

FACTS:

In this case, there are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolution of the CA’s
Former Ninth Division. The Resolution modified the Decision of the CA’s Eleventh Division, which
had affirmed the Decision of the Office of the President (OP), dismissing from the service then NLRC
Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the
NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Laguesma of the
DOLE.

Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the incidences of sexual harassment complained of. (she
stated that Chairman Rayala grabs and squeezes her shoulders while she was typing. Then on
another day, Chairman Rayala gave her money secretly. After that he kept on giving unnecessary
remarks about her body, particularly her hips)

Domingo filed for leave of absence and asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed
the Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of AO No. 250, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.

Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being
a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive Secretary Zamora, ordered Secretary
Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose.

The Committee found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the
minimum penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6)
months.

The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee Report and
Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty should be suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance with AO 250.

On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO 119 concurring with the
findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the respondent Rayala. However, disagreeing with
the recommendation that respondent be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day considering that respondent took advantage of his position as Chairman stating that it
was incumbent upon him to set an example to the others as to how they should conduct themselves
in public office.

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a Resolution. He then filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order. However, the
same was dismissed. Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its
Resolution12 dated September 4, 2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.

The CA held that there was sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala
committed the acts he was charged with.

45
It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for
disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713.

All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:

(1) Whether or not Chairman Rayala committed sexual harassment?

(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?

RULING:

(1) It was ruled that Rayala committed the acts complained of – and was guilty of sexual harassment
–

However, he insists that his acts do not constitute sexual harassment, because Domingo did not
allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request, or requirement of a sexual favor as a
condition for her continued employment or for her promotion to a higher position.

The court found respondent’s insistence unconvincing.

Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or
omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for
each can proceed independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full force to sexual
harassment.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3.

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work,

education or training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any
other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a
work or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed

when:

(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to
grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which
in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect said employee;

(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor
laws; or

(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive

environment for the employee.

This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of
sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6, authorizes the institution of an
independent civil action for damages and other affirmative relief.

Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative cases.

The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of
Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal

46
infraction, of sexual harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating
Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.

It is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender.

It is also not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts result in
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.

Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced, because the factual setting in that case is
different from that in the case at bench. In Aquino, It is clear from the circumstances that most of the
kissing incidents were done on festive and special occasions," and they "took place in the presence
of other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness of the moment."

In the instant case, Rayala’s acts of holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers
across her neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines
of Rayala’s office when no other members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a
circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayala’s acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile
work environment for Domingo.

The court reiterated that what is before it is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus,
whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.

(2) Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is dismissal. 52 On the other
hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service54 both provide that the first offense of disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.

Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during good behavior until he or
she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed for cause as provided by law or
becomes incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.55

In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would
determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power,
however, is qualified by the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when the President found
that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense.

Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government
position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,56 taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance57 and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.58 Hence, the maximum penalty
that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.

iii. Administrative Liability – CARPIO MORALES v. CA GR.

Nos 217126-27 November 10, 2015
The Condonation Doctrine, also known as the Aguinaldo Doctrine, provides that a re-
elected public official cannot be removed for an administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office effectively operates as a condonation
of his past misconduct to the extent of abolishing the right to remove him therefor

47
(Aguinaldo v Santos. G.R. 94115, 21 August 1992). To place it simply, re-election
extinguishes administrative liability.

The Condonation Doctrine had been considered as good law for more than half a
century until the doctrine was abandoned in the case of Carpio-Morales v Court of
Appeals and Binay (G.R. Nos. 217216-17, 10 November 2015). The decision penned
by Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Benabe abandoned the Condonation
Doctrine for lack of basis in the Constitution, the Local Government Code, nor any of the
laws of the Philippines.

In reviewing the Doctrine, the Supreme Court explained that the Condonation
Doctrine is plainly inconsistent with the concept that “public office is a public
trust,” and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at all times,
as mandated under the 1987 Constitution. With the abandonment of the
Condonation Doctrine, public officials seeking re-election to the same posts can
no longer invoke the Doctrine to escape from their administrative offenses.

Last March 2021, however, the Supreme Court clarified the effectivity of abandonment
of the Condonation Doctrine is prospective or enforceable upon finality of the Carpio-
Morales decision, which was on 12 April 2016. Thus, the Condonation Doctrine can no
longer be used by elected public officials as a defense if they have been re-elected on
or after 12 April 2016.

iv. Criminal Liability – LLORENTE v. SANDIGANBAYAN

GR. No. 122166, March 11,1998
In a prosecution for violation of Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law, that is,
"causing undue injury to any party," the government prosecutors must prove
"actual" injury to the offended party; speculative or incidental injury is not
sufficient.

First Issue: Undue Inquiry

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 3[e] of R.A. 3019, which states:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public

officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

To hold a person liable under this section, the concurrence of the following elements must be
established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution:

48
 (1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the
former;

(2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or
her official duties or in relation to his or her public positions;

(3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private
party; and

(4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.11

The solicitor general, in his manifestation,12 points out that "undue injury" requires proof of actual
injury or damage, citing our ruling in Alejandro vs. People13 and Jacinto
vs. Sandiganbayan.14 Inasmuch as complainant was actually paid all her claims, there was thus no
"undue injury" established.

This point is well-taken. Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Sec. 3[e] cannot be presumed
even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence must be proven as
one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury or the giving of any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is
required that the undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.

In jurisprudence, "undue injury" is consistently interpreted as "actual damage." Undue has been
defined as "more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal;" and injury as "any wrong or damage
done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property[; that is, the] invasion of any
legally protected interest of another." Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to
that in civil law.15

Other than the amount of the withheld salaries and allowances which were eventually received,
the prosecution failed to specify and to prove any other loss or damage sustained by the
complainant. Respondent Court insists that complainant suffered by reason of the "long period of
time" that her emoluments were withheld.

This inconvenience, however, is not constitutive of undue injury. In Jacinto, this Court held that
the injury suffered by the complaining witness, whose salary was eventually released and whose
position was restored in the plantilla, was negligible; undue injury entails damages that are more
than necessary or are excessive, improper or illegal.21 In Alejandro, the Court held that the
hospital employees were not caused undue injury, as they were in fact paid their salaries.

Second Issue: No Evident Bad Faith

The petitioner's failure to approve the complainant's vouchers was therefore due to some
legal obstacles, and not entirely without reason. Thus, evident bad faith cannot be
28

completely imputed to him.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn
duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud.
(Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 8 NE 2nd Series, 895, 1007). It contemplates a state
of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self interest or ill
will for ulterior purposes (Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167). Evident
bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong
or cause damage.

v. General Civil Liability – New Civil Code sec. 27, 32 and 34.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or

49
 impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of
grievances;

(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet
the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced
to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission
constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

50
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.

vi. Other Liabilities

1. ALBERT v. GANGAN GR. No. 126557 March 6,
2001
The mere fact that a public officer is the head of an agency does not
necessarily mean that he is the party ultimately liable in case of
disallowance of expenses for questionable transactions of his agency.
The head of the agency cannot be held personally liable for the
disallowance simply because he was the final approving authority of
the transaction in question and that the officers/employees who
processed the same were directly under his supervision. (Albert vs.
Gangan, G.R. No. 126557, March 6, 2001)
We have consistently held that every person who signs or initials documents in the course of transit
through standard operating procedures does not automatically become a conspirator in a crime
which transpired at a stage where he had no participation. His knowledge of the conspiracy and his
active and knowing participation therein must be proved by positive evidence. The fact that such
officer signs or initials a voucher as it is going the rounds does not necessarily follow that the said
person becomes part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
each supposed conspirator must be established.

"We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems-
dishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain
incompetence- is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally
examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception and investigate the
motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving
authority.

2. GARCIA v. SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. 165835,

June 22, 2005
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping. The present petition was
filed accompanied by the requisite Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping.

However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had filed a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the
petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this motion was only brought to the
attention of this Court by respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A scrutiny of
the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the
same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition.

Considered a pernicious evil, it adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since it clogs
the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with
and mocks judicial processes.85 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary
dismissal of the complaint or initiatory pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct contempt of
court, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in
the same case where the forum-shopping is found.

j. Discipline and Removal from Office

i. Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals GR. No.
168079 July 17, 2007
ISSUE: whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative
penalties on public officials or employees.

51
RULING:
In the present case, the Court similarly upholds the Office of the Ombudsman’s power to impose the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or
employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise
of such power is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.

Section 21 of RA 6770 vests in the Ombudsman "disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government," except impeachable officers, members of Congress, and
the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of RA 6770, the Ombudsman may impose in administrative
proceedings the "penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (₱5,000.00) to twice the amount
malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman x x x."

Clearly, under RA 6770 the Ombudsman has the power to impose directly administrative penalty on
public officials or employees.

ii. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan GR No. 123792, March 8, 1999

Second, the proposed testimony of complainant Pedellaga that the accused
"berated" him and ordered him to process the applications for legalization of
stay of certain aliens even without payment of filing fees would not constitute
proof of "evident bad faith and manifest partiality." Petitioner simply wanted
expeditious action on the applications, a prerogative of the head of office. The
alleged loss of revenue to the government from non-payment of legalization fees is not
charged in the amended information. chanrobles law library : red

iii. In Re Raul M. Gonzalez AM No. 88-4-5433 April 15, 1988

The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members
of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from
office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment (Sec. 2, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)

ISSUE:

May a Supreme Court justice be disbarred during his term of office?

RULING:

No. A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the
Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed
from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the
incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency,
cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any
offence which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service
of which would amount to removal from office.

To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Member's
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the constitutional
mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment for
and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI (2) of the Constitution.

52
The Court is not here saying that it Members or the other constitutional officers we referred
to above are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is
saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before
such liability may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first
be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be
thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or
administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehavior that may be
proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

iv. REMOLONA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R.

No. 137473, August 2, 2001
ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an offense
which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty.

HELD:

Yes. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably
reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in office and the discipline and morale of
the service. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal
for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292. And the rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course
of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a government
officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of
character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Government
cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well,
because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts
of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than the
office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and
power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and
prepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations.

v. NARVASA V. SANCHEZ, GR. No. 169449 March 26, 2010

ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute grave misconduct?

HELD:
Yes.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior.11 To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate
to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public
officer.12 In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an established rule
must be manifest.13
Length of service as a factor in determining the imposable penalty in administrative
cases is a double-edged sword.16 In fact, respondent’s long years of government service
should be seen as a factor which aggravated the wrong that he committed. Having been
in the government service for so long, he, more than anyone else, should
have known that public service is a public trust;17 that public service requires
utmost integrity and strictest discipline, and, as such, a public servant must
exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and integrity.18Sadly,
respondent’s actions did not reflect the integrity and discipline that were expected of

53
 public servants. He failed to live up to the image of the outstanding and exemplary public
official that he was. He sullied government service instead.

vi. QUEZON V. BORROMEO, GR. No. 70953 April 9, 1987

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the petitioner was dropped from the government service without
notice and without affording her an investigation

RULING:

In the present case, there is not only violation of Rule XVI, Section 33 but also
abandonment of position because Petitioner completely disregarded the fact that her
requests for extensions and for detail to Zamboanga Hospital were never approved, and
continued to stay away until it suited for her to return and demand reinstatement at the
Iligan City Hospital. . As to the claim of lack of prior investigation, Rule XVI, Section 33
speaks of automatic dropping from the government service and clearly does not require
prior hearing before an employee may be dropped from the government service. This is
an EXCEPTION to the rule on prior hearing. The automatically of the sanction of
dropping from the government service under Rule XVI, Section 33 13 one of the means
by which return to an employee's post is sought to be achieved. That automatically also
enables the government to fill the office in effect abandoned by the employee involved,
as the exigencies of the service may demand. The demands of procedural due process
are satisfied by giving an employee who has been "AWOL" the opportunity to contest
the legality of his being dropped from the government service upon his return to his
post. As a purely practical matter, it is very difficult to see how hearing can be had and
due process extended to the employee unless he first reports for work. Here, petitioner
was given a full bearing and full opportunity to present her side before the MSB and the
CSC after she had reported for work and demanded reinstatement. Here, the
requirements of procedural due process were fully met.

vii. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. CORTEZ GR. No.

155732 June 3, 2004
ISSUE: WHETHER THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL METED OUT TO RESPONDENT IS TOO
HARSH TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION HER BEING A FIRST-TIME OFFENDER AND HER
OVER TWENTY-ONE (21) YEARS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

RULING:

The mitigating circumstances of length of service and "first offense" invoked by respondent cannot
be considered since dismissal is an indivisible penalty. In any case, if length of service is to be
considered at all, it should be taken against the respondent because despite her long service in the
government, she did not exhibit any sense of loyalty; instead, she abused the government’s trust by
taking advantage of her position. Petitioner also asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in imposing
the penalty of forced resignation on respondent since forced resignation as an administrative penalty
is not provided under the Administrative Code of 1987. Besides, the penalty of forced resignation
without forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reemployment in the government service for
the grave offenses of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service is reprehensible because this, in effect, would be rewarding an erring
employee instead of punishing her for her offense.

Petitioner CSC is correct that length of service should be taken against the respondent. Length of
service is not a magic word that, once invoked, will automatically be considered as a mitigating
circumstance in favor of the party invoking it. Length of service can either be a mitigating or
aggravating circumstance depending on the factual milieu of each case.

54
We cannot also consider length of service in favor of the respondent because of the gravity of the
offense she committed and of the fact that it was her length of service in the CSC which helped her
in the commission of the offense.

it is clear from the ruling of the CSC that respondent’s act irreparably tarnished the integrity of the
CSC. Respondent was the Chief of the EPSD, but despite such important and senior position which
should have impelled her to set a good example to her co-employees and other civil servants,
respondent flagrantly and shamelessly violated the law by selling, for her own financial gain, used
examination fee stamps, right in her own office and during office hours. Such flagrant and shameless
disregard of the law by a senior officer seriously undermined the integrity of the CSC, the body
mandated by the Constitution to preserve and safeguard the integrity of the civil service.

k. Preventive Suspension - GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with
offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive suspension pending investigations
(§51) and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty imposed by the disciplining
authority is suspension or dismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated (§ 47(4)).

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable to

10

enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter
from intimidating or any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and
a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will
automatically be reinstated. If after investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is
exonerated, he should be reinstated.

Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already discussed, is not a penalty but only means
of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand,
preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently
considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is
reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, §47(4)
states that respondent "shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the appeal in the event he wins." On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not
exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or
dismissal.

l. Termination of Office
i. By Resignation
1. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO, 353 SCRA 452 [2001] GR
Nos. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.
RULING:
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an (1) intent to resign, and that
intent must be coupled by (2) acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the
resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.
Petitioner made pronouncements which was interpreted as intention of giving up the position such as
when he proposed a snap election where he would not be a candidate; non-defiance to the request of a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power; prior agreement to the transfer of power with conditions as to the
state of the Petitioner and his family; and the issuance of a statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the

55
palace, the seat of the Presidency, for the sake and peace and order. Hence, the resignation of the
Petitioner was implied by his actions to leave the Presidency.

2. SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, ET

AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS GR. No. 118883
January 16, 1998
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent's resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner
Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres, Catanduanes is deemed complete.

RULING:

The petitioner submits that the resignation of private respondent was valid and effective
despite the absence of an express acceptance by the President of the Philippines. The letter
of resignation was submitted to the secretary of the DILG, an alter ego of the President, the
appointing authority. The acceptance of respondent's resignation may be inferred from the
fact that the DILG secretary himself appointed him a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Catanduanes. 27

In Ortiz vs. COMELEC, we defined resignation as the "act of giving up or the act of an officer
28

by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of
the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and
relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority." To constitute a
complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the
proper authority. The last one is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal
29

Code. 30

Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to

whom they should be submitted, should be tendered to the appointing person or
body. Private respondent, therefore, should have submitted his letter of resignation to the
31

President or to his alter ego, the DILG secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the latter
a copy of his letter, there is no showing that it was duly received, much less that it was acted
upon. The third requisite being absent, there was therefore no valid and complete
resignation.

ii. By Expiration of term

1. By abandonment - CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE,
357 SCRA 657 [2001 GR. No. 133132 January 25,
2000
Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention
of terminating his possession and control thereof. 4 In order to constitute abandonment of office, it
must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute
relinquishment. 5 There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law
will infer a relinquishment. 6 Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; 7 it springs from and is
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. 8 There are, therefore, two essential elements of
abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or “external” act by which the
intention is carried into effect. 9

It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the
first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or
proceeding. 15 Public policy considerations dictate against allowing the same individual to perform
inconsistent and incompatible duties. 16 The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere physical

56
impossibility of one person’s performing the duties of the two offices due to a lack of time or the
inability to be in two places at the same moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and
relations of the two positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and antagonism should one
person attempt to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one toward the incumbent of the
other.

iii. De facto resignation - PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V.

ELMA, 306 SCRA 287 GR. No. 138965 March 5, 2007
The Court ruled that respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are
unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices. This ruling does not render both appointments void.
Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated
his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.

iv. By removal
1. PABLICO V. VILLAPANDO, 385 SCRA 601 [2002]
GR. No. 147870 July 31, 2002
The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the
courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, insofar as it vests power on the "disciplining authority" to remove from office
erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the
Local Government Code of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must
be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is
vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public
official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage.
Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. Where
the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should
not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. 1

2. ROSALES V. MIJAREs, 442 SCRA 532 [2004] GR.

No. 154095 November 17, 2004

A transfer connotes an absolute relinquishment of an office in exchange for another office. Such
request must be voluntary on the part of the officer concerned and not vitiated by force, coercion, or
intimidation or even deceit. Indeed, in Sta. Maria v. Lopez, we held that:
9

“A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a

transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position," cannot be
done without the employee's consent. For that would constitute removal from office.
Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first
removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position.”

The Court also held that unconsented transfer is anathema to security of tenure. A transfer that
11

aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation constitutes removal. An 12

employee cannot be transferred unless for causes provided for by law and after due process. Any 13

attempt to breach the protective wall built around the employee's right to security of tenure should be
slain on sight. The right of employees to security of tenure should never be sacrificed merely at the
whims and pleasure of some unscrupulous and heartless politicians. As we held in Nemenzo v.
Sabillano:14

v. By Impeachment - PHIL CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 11; Art. XI,

Sec. 3
ARTICLE 8, SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold
office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to

57
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges
of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

ARTICLE 11, SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of Representatives or
by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session
days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.

(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the
Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate
shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting for
that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted
without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.

vi. By Forfeiture - PHIL CONST., Art. VIII, Sec. 3

SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

vii. By Abolition
1. CANONIZADO V. AGUIRRE, 351 SCRA 359 (2001)
GR. No. 133132 January 25, 2000
Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their
security of tenure.
It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters. As such, they cannot be removed or
5

suspended from office, except for cause provided by law. The phrase "except for cause provided by
6

law" refers to ". . . reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for
removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of
discretion may deem sufficient." 7

58
The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function. It is acknowledged that
9

Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer's right to continue in the
position held and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of
funds or in the interest of economy. However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made
11 12

in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the
constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees. 13

An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as
the word "abolished" denotes. Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested
14

with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition.

RULING:
NO.
Abolition of an office is obviously not the same as the declaration' that that office is vacant. While it is
undoubtedly a prerogative of the legislature to abolish certain offices, it can not be conceded the
power to simply pronounce those offices vacant and thereby effectively remove the occupants or
holders thereof from the civil service. Such an act would constitute, on its face, an infringement of
the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure, and will have to be struck down on that account. It
cannot be justified by the professed "need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested
with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or
emoluments.

This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to do — declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by declaring
that "the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired," thereby removing
petitioners herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done
pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.

RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners' positions. In order to determine whether there has
been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the new law
in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM.

Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described a collegial body within the DILG whereas RA
8551 made it an agency attached to the department for policy and program coordination. This
does not result in the creation of an entirely new office.

Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative,

supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.

Regarding the respondents’ contention that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the
abolition of petitioners' offices, it was held that there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to
effect such a reorganization.

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of

government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
28

abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. Naturally, it may result in the
29

loss of one's position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be
valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison: 30

. . . As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a
dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition,"
which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely
to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place
and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where
there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are
belied by the existence of ample funds.

59
No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551,
insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as
expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office
without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm.

Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new
appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government
employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is
considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace
petitioners are not valid.32

2. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, ETC. V.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 142801-802
[2001]

FACTS:

On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued EO 1273 establishing the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB). The EIIB was designated to perform
particular functions on intelligence and investigation.

11 years after, President Joseph Estrada issued EO No. 191, deactivating the EIIB. He also
ordered the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of
Investigation.

President Estrada then issued EO No. 1968 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task
Force “Aduana.”

On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 223 providing that all EIIB
personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service
effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition,
redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions.

Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before the SC, invoking its
power of judicial review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. They anchor their petition in the
following arguments:

Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive orders is: (a) a violation
of their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to
make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions of
which are essentially and substantially the same as that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the
power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.

Arguing in behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys
the totality of the executive power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the
Constitution, thus, he has the authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said
executive orders were issued in the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and
to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was not abolished, it was only
deactivated.

ISSUE:

-WHETHER OR NOT the President have the authority to reorganize the executive department?

-WHETHER OR NOT the reorganization is valid?

RULING:

Surely, there exists a distinction between the words “deactivate” and “abolish.” To
“deactivate” means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning

60
personnel,13 while to “abolish” means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely.14 In
essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently.15 Thus,
while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office
continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and
abolition are both reorganization measures.

(1) The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of
law.17 Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished
by the same legislature that brought it into existence.18

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the
functions of a particular office,19 or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out
reorganization measures.

Under Section 31, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, “the President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the
Office of the President.” For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments
or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that
reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition
thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It takes place when there is an
alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of
control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance.26 It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President’s continuing authority to reorganize.

(2) It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out
reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to
resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have
been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried
out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.27 Pertinently, Republic Act No. 665628 provides for the circumstances which may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result
of reorganization, to wit:

(a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;

(b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created;

(c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;

(d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and

(e) where the removal violates the order of separation

In the examination of the pertinent Executive Orders, it shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the
creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the
EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task
Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the
government.

Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196 provides
that the technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of people who
are already in the public service, they being employees of other existing agencies. Their
tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary, i.e., only when the agency where they

61
belong is called upon to assist the Task Force. Since their employment with the Task force is
only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their employment with the existing agencies.
And should the need for them cease, they would be sent back to the agency concerned.

Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct control
and supervision of the President as base of the government's anti-smuggling campaign. Such a
smaller base has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or
office and to use their respective personnel, facilities and resources; and 2) "to select and recruit
personnel from within the PSG and ISAFP for assignment to the Task Force." Obviously, the idea
is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing
departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a
whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself burdensome for the government
because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.

And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the creation of
the Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIB's expenses. Tracing from the yearly
General Appropriations Act, it appears that the allotted amount for the EIIB's general administration,
support, and operations for the year 1995, was P128,031,000;31 for 1996, P182,156,000;32 for
1998, P219,889,000;33 and, for 1999, P238,743,000.34 These amounts were far above
the P50,000,00035 allocation to the Task Force Aduana for the year 2000.

It was then held that petitioners' right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in
our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in
case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it
may, if the 'abolition,' which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid
'abolition' takes and whatever 'abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid 'abolition'
as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.

Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary.

3. EUGENIO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 243

SCRA 196 [1995] GR. No. 115863, March 31, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a
Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on August 2, 1993, she was given a CES
eligibility. On September 15. 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the
Career Executive Service Board.

On October 1. 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No. 93-4359 which resolves
to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the Career
Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the
Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service. The said
resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul,
among others, resolution No. 93-4359

62
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it abolished CESB, an
office created by law, through the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359

RULING: Yes. The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created in the PD
No. 1, which adopted the Integrated Plan. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was
created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.

This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily
a legislative function. Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily a legislative function.

In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is
supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient.
When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative
department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether
these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by
the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office
and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.
On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside
funds for the operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission's power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control. From its inception,
the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It is
expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook." The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally interrelated government agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination”.

4. FERNANDEZ V. STO. TOMAS, 242 SCRA 192

(1995) GR. No. 116418, March 7, 1995
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 94-3710 violated petitioners' constitutional right to security of
tenure.

RULING:

We note, firstly, that appointments to the staff of the Commission are not appointments to a specified
public office but rather appointments to particular positions or ranks.

The clue to such transfers may be found in the "nature of the appointment." Where the
appointment does not indicate a specific station, an employee may be transferred or reassigned
provided the transfer affects no substantial change in title, rank and salary. Thus one who is
appointed "principal in the Bureau of Public Schools" and is designated to head a pilot school may
be transferred to the post of principal of another school.

And the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies
only to an officer who is appointed — not merely assigned — to a particular station. Such a
rule does not prescribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an
agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the
agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management to harness the
abilities of employees to promote optimum public service cannot-be objected to

5. PAN V. PENA, 579 SCRA 314 (2009) GR. No. 174244

Feb 13, 2009

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A reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions."20 It alters the existing structure of government
offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them 21 to
make the bureaucracy more responsive to the needs of the public clientele as authorized by law. 22 It
could result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. For a
reorganization for the purpose of economy or to make the bureaucracy more efficient to be valid,
however, it must pass the test of good faith, otherwise it is void ab initio.

As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or
to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would
not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in
good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is
an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where
claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 cites certain circumstances showing bad faith in the removal of
employees as a result of any reorganization, thus:

Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and
after due notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge,
divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes
allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving
rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:

a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern
of the department or agency concerned;

b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created;

c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit; 1awphi1

d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;

e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
(Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

While the CSC never found the new appointees to be unqualified, and never disapproved nor
recalled their appointments as they presumably met all the minimum requirements therefor, there is
nothing contradictory in the CSC’s course of action as it is limited only to the non-discretionary
authority of determining whether the personnel appointed meet all the required conditions laid down
by law.26

Congruently, the CSC can very well order petitioner to reinstate respondents to their former positions
(as these were never actually abolished) or to appoint them to comparable positions in the new
staffing pattern.

In fine, the reorganization of the government of the Municipality of Goa was not entirely undertaken
in the interest of efficiency and austerity but appears to have been marred by other considerations in
order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees like respondents.

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 viii. What are the other modes of termination of office?

Modes of Terminating Official Relationship

1. Expiration of term or tenure

2. Reaching the age limit

3. Resignation

4. Recall

5. Removal

6. Abandonment

7. Acceptance of an Incompatible Office

8. Abolition of Office

9. Prescription of the Right to Office

10. Impeachment

11. Death/permanent disability

12. Failure to Assume Elective Office w/in 6 months from proclamation

13. Conviction of a Crime

14. Filing of Certificate of Candidacy

o Principle of Hold-Over: public officer is entitled to hold his office until his successor
shall have been duly chosen and shall have qualified. Purpose is to prevent hiatus in
public service.

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