45 Ga LRev 311
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WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY:
FACTUAL BASIS CHALLENGES TO GUILTY
PLEAS IN FEDERAL COURTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
311
312 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
I. INTRODUCTION
I See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (requiring the court to inform the defendant of these rights).
2 See FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (requiring criminal defendants to file a notice of appeal
with the district court within fourteen days of the judgment).
3 See infra Part II.A.1.
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 313
supporting their holdings. 4 The unsettled law in this area and the
exiguous reasoning set forth in courts' opinions raise concerns
given the importance of the issue. The principal question goes
directly to the propriety of entertaining a certain type of appeal
following a procedure that results in "[r]oughly 90% of all criminal
convictions."5 Furthermore, the stakes are high in a criminal
prosecution: with community safety and order on one side and an
individual's liberty on the other. This Note surveys the existing
law of factual basis challenges and argues that prohibiting
convicted defendants from making this challenge constitutes the
proper course. Accordingly, this Note offers reasoning to support
those jurisdictions that hold factual basis challenges waived by
guilty pleas and demonstrates that the contemplated benefits
gained from permitting factual basis reviews are largely ineffective
or illusory.
Part II explains the split in circuit court authority. After
presenting the relevant case law on the principal issue, Part II
discusses three pertinent and equally divisive subissues. First, if a
court decides to dismiss a factual basis challenge as waived,
should the court nonetheless engage in a cursory analysis of the
facts that the defendant alleges to be inadequate? Second, if a
court chooses to entertain the defendant's factual basis challenge,
what standard of review should the court employ? Third, should a
court have the power to hold the appeal waived even if the
Government chooses to contest the factual basis challenge on its
merits rather than arguing for waiver? Part II concludes with a
review of several Supreme Court cases addressing guilty plea
appeals to glean some of the overarching objectives and policies
underlying the guilty plea process in federal court.
II. BACKGROUND
6 United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979); see also Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) ("[Plea
bargaining] is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.").
7 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 315
15 See John L. Barkai, Accuracy Inquires for All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas:
Voluntary PleasBut Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 88, 111 (1977) (stating that a
factual basis determination did not attract much attention until Rule 11 was amended to
require it).
16 Id.
316 GEORGIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 45:311
17 Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966
WASH. U. L.Q. 306, 309 (1966).
18 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2).
19 Id. at 11(b)(1).
20 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) ("[The voluntariness of the plea depends
on whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases.'" (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970))).
21 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (stating factual basis requirement).
22 See 571 F.3d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting split among circuits and listing six
divided jurisdictions).
23 Id.
2 Id.
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 317
25 See United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that by
pleading guilty, the defendant "admitted the allegations)" and therefore could not raise a
factual basis challenge on appeal).
26 See United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 497-98 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Ahn, 231 F.3d 26, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502, 510-11
(3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Graves, 106 F.3d 342, 345 (10th Cir. 1997), for courts
reviewing the factual basis of a defendant's guilty plea.
27 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993).
28 Id.
29 Id. (quoting United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25 (6th Cir. 1982)).
30 Id. at 490-91.
31 89 F.3d 778, 784 (11th Cir. 1996).
32 Id.
33 833 F.2d 161, 163 (9th Cir. 1987).
3 Id.
318 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
as Id.
36 Id. at 163-64 (quoting United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
37 United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 24 (6th Cir. 1982).
38 Id. at 25.
39 Id. at 25-26.
40 Id. at 25.
41 Id. at 26.
42 United States v. Turner, 272 F.3d 380, 389-90 (6th Cir. 2001).
43 See United States v. Cheney, 571 F.3d 764, 768 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing the Seventh
Circuit as jurisdiction in which defendants can appeal the adequacy of a factual basis after
entering an unconditional guilty plea).
- 569 F.3d 319, 323-24 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 431 (2009).
2010] WAVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 319
45 Id. at 323.
46 See Milhem v. United States, 834 F.2d 118, 120 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a guilty
plea "constitutes a waiver of any claim of insufficiency of proof on any element of that
offense"). More recently, the Seventh Circuit stated that waiver due to a plea agreement
may extend to constitutional objections as well. See United States v. Harvey, 484 F.3d 453,
455 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Supreme Court authority to support the proposition that "it is
impossible to see why a voluntary plea agreement may not waive constitutional objections
to the particular sentence imposed" (quoting United States v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049,
1052 (7th Cir. 2000))).
47 See United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490-91 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding guilty plea to
constitute a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects but still refuting merits of defendant's
factual basis challenge); United States v. Johnson, 89 F.3d 778, 784 (11th Cir. 1996) (same).
48 312 F.3d 725, 726-29 (5th Cir. 2002).
49 Id. at 727 (citing United States v. Spruill, 292 F.3d 207, 214-15 (5th Cir. 2002)).
50 Id. at 729-30.
si 448 F.3d 492, 498-502 (2d Cir. 2006).
52 Id. at 499.
320 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
the district court must comply fully with Rule 11 to enter a valid
guilty plea.5 3 In vacating the defendant's conviction, the court
stated that a lack of factual basis is a defect "so fundamental as to
cast serious doubt on the voluntariness of the plea."54
United States v. McKelvey presented the First Circuit with an
opportunity to review a factual basis challenge raised for the first
time in the appellate court.55 The McKelvey court viewed the issue
in terms of compliance with Rule 11,56 like the Second Circuit's
reasoning in Adams.5 7 The defendant challenged the district
court's factual basis for finding that he possessed three
photographic negatives which constituted "3 or more books,
magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes or other matter," under
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), the federal statute criminalizing child
pornography.58 The court reviewed the challenge and reversed the
conviction because it found that the negatives did not fulfill the
statutory requirement.59
The Eighth Circuit has contradicting cases on this issue. For
example, in United States v. Beck the Eighth Circuit held that "by
entering an unconditional guilty plea ... [the defendant] waived
his right to appeal the district court's conclusion that the
interstate commerce element was satisfied."60 This holding,
however, conflicted with an earlier Eighth Circuit decision in
which the circuit chose to entertain a factual basis challenge to a
conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. 6 1 In Cheney, the
court took notice of the inconsistent internal case law. 62 The court,
though, declined to rule on the issue and considered the adequacy
63 Id. at 769.
6 United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Johnson, 89
F.3d 778, 784 (11th Cir. 1996).
6* See Willis, 992 F.2d at 490--91 (surveying adequacy of facts underlying guilty plea);
Johnson, 89 F.3d at 784 (same).
6 United States v. Mathews, 833 F.2d 161, 163-64 (9th Cir. 1987).
67 Id.
6 United States v. Freed, 688 F.2d 24, 25-26 (6th Cir. 1982).
69 United States v. Beck, 250 F.3d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir. 2001).
322 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
70 Id.; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756, 757 (1970) (holding defendant's
76 See McKelvey, 203 F.3d at 69 (neglecting to mention whether the Government argued
for waiver); Johnson, 89 F.3d at 784 (same). But see Baymon, 312 F.3d at 727 (noting the
Government's waiver argument).
77 See Baymon, 312 F.3d at 727 ('The Government argues that [the defendant] has
waived his opportunity to challenge the factual basis of the bill of information by virtue of
his unconditional guilty plea and the appeal waiver provision in the plea agreement.").
78 See United States v. Cefaratti, 221 F.3d 502, 511 n.6 (3d Cir. 2000) (referencing the
Government's objection to the defendant raising the issue on appeal).
7 Id.
8o See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
81 See United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490-91 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding the factual
basis challenge waived while approving of the district court's Rule 11 compliance).
324 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
82 394 U.S. 459, 462 n.4, 466 (1969); see also Barkai, supra note 15, at 111-12 (noting
that McCarthy first addressed the factual basis issue three years after the amendment).
8 McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 466.
84 Id. at 467 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note).
8 See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 66 (2002) (stating that the impetus for the
enactment of Rule 11(h) "stemmed from an expansive reading of McCarthy").
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 325
86 See id. (explaining that Rule 11 did not require district courts to conduct detailed plea
colloquies with defendants when the Supreme Court decided McCarthy).
87 Compare McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 462 n.4 (quoting Rule 11 in its entirety as it existed in
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina,397 U.S. 790 (1970).
9 Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).
91 Id. at 758.
92 397 U.S. at 767.
93 Id. at 774.
94 See Andrew D. Leipold, How the PretrialProcess Contributes to Wrongful Convictions,
42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1123, 1156, 1158 (2005) (criticizing Alford pleas because they probably
result in a greater number of wrongful convictions).
9 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
96 See id. at 33 (noting that defendants may have various reasons for pleading guilty and
that they should be permitted to decide for themselves).
326 GEORGIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 45:311
97 See id. at 33, 37 (observing that the defendant may have believed that he had
absolutely nothing to gain by trial because of "the overwhelming evidence against him").
98 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
9 See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 80 n.5 (2004) (discussing the
reasons for amending Rule 11).
' FED. R. CRM. P. 11(h).
101 See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) (proscribing the means by which
defendants can appeal their guilty pleas).
102 Id.
103 Id.
10 Id.
105 Id. at 570.
106 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 327
III. ANALYSIS
116 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (lacking any requirement to call witnesses during the guilty
plea hearing).
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 329
117 United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1971)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
1ns Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (citing Kercheval v. United States, 274
U.S. 220, 223 (1927)).
119 United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989).
120 Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421, 426 (1961).
121 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (asserting that new inroads on the finality
of guilty pleas upsets the integrity and efficiency of criminal procedure (quoting Timmreck,
441 U.S. at 784)); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970) (using "the State's
interests in maintaining the finality of guilty-plea convictions" as a policy reason for its
holding).
122 400 U.S. 25, 31, 37-38 (1970).
330 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
123 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (stating requirement for a factual basis for the plea).
124 Alford, 400 U.S. at 37.
125 See Julian A. Cook, III, Crumbs from the Master's Table: The Supreme Court, Pro Se
Defendants and the Federal Guilty Plea Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1895, 1895 (2006)
('The United States Supreme Court has issued a series of significant rulings that have
fundamentally set back the constitutional and statutory interests of defendants in the plea
bargaining and guilty plea contexts.").
126 Cf. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (deciding that defendants who
plead guilty are not entitled to impeachment information from the Government); United
States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1989) (holding that defendants' guilty pleas to two
counts of conspiracy waived their contention that their offense was really one conspiracy);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-49 (1970) (affirming the lower court's finding
that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntary even though the defendant misapprehended
the extent of possible punishment).
127 See United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that
defendant's venue challenge for failure to raise it at the outset of the case).
129 See United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1986) (dismissing
131 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (calling a guilty plea an
admission to charges against a defendant).
132 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 1(b)(1)(C) (requiring the courts to inform defendants of "the right
to a jury trial").
133 See Joel M. Schumm, Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law and Procedure,
43 IND. L. REV. 691, 695 (2010) (discussing potential inverse relationship between
restriction of guilty pleas and frequency of guilty pleas).
134 See infra Part III.B.
332 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
understand "the nature of each charge"); id. at 11(b)(3) (specifying the court's obligation to
determine a factual basis for a guilty plea).
146 See id. at 11(b)(2) (delegating to the court the responsibility of determining that the
plea did not result from coercion).
147 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1969) (reversing a conviction for
failure to comply with Rule 11 when the trial court failed to address the defendant
personally to make sure the defendant understood the nature of the charge and
consequences of his guilty plea).
148 See id. at 466 ("[Ihf a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it
has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.").
149 See Cook, supra note 125, at 1900, 1905 (criticizing the increased speed with which
pleas are conducted and questioning the obligations often imposed on defense counsel).
334 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
150 See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 6, at 1925-28 (arguing that paternalistic intervention
into defendants' ability to plead guilty may undermine the interests of criminal defendants
collectively); see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (acknowledging that
some innocent defendants may determine that they have "much to gain by pleading" and
little or "nothing to gain by trial," so defendants in such cases should not be forced into
trial).
161 See Barkai, supra note 15, at 135-36 (endorsing this approach as the best way to
ensure the accuracy of the plea); see also Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and
ProceduralJustice, 42 GA. L. REv. 407, 436 (2008) ("[D]efendant voice may help to produce
timely information that prevents wrongful convictions or disproportionate punishments.").
162 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF KING RICHARD THE SECOND act 4, sc. 1.
2010] WAIVNG GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 335
guilty and subsequently challenges the factual basis for the plea
on appeal. The appellate court concludes that the evidence
adduced by the guilty plea proceeding does not point to the
defendant transporting or selling the drugs in interstate
commerce. However, in pleading guilty, the defendant knew or
suspected that if he went to trial the Government would locate and
examine a coconspirator in preparation for trial who would testify
that the defendant had transported and sold the contraband in
interstate commerce.
This hypothetical presents two additional problems. First, the
defendant who pled guilty and succeeded in having his conviction
reversed for lack of a factual basis manipulated the legal system to
gain an upper hand due to the passage of time while the appeal
was processed. As one court noted, "The erosion of memory and
the dispersal of witnesses may well make a new trial difficult or
even impossible. If the latter is the case, an admitted perpetrator
will be rewarded with freedom from prosecution." 5 Second,
reversal of a conviction on technical grounds as in the hypothetical
imposes costs on society. Judges, juries, witnesses, and lawyers
must commit further time and resources to the repetition of
proceedings. 58 Victims must "re-live frequently painful
experiences in open court" after mistakenly believing that the
guilty plea closed the case. 59 Conversely, a rule prohibiting
factual basis appeals after a valid guilty plea may discourage
defendants from manipulating the integrity of the justice system
in such a manner and provide a disincentive for innocent
defendants to plead guilty.
Another practical problem with permitting review of factual
basis challenges is the lack of an ascertainable standard for the
factual determination in the lower court. Neither the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Supreme Court case law provides
a standard for district courts to use in determining what
constitutes an adequate factual basis-that is, how much of a
1'5 Earl G. Penrod, The Guilty Plea Process in Indiana: A Proposal to Strengthen the
DiminishingFactualBasis Requirement, 34 IND. L. REV. 1127, 1147 (2001) (quoting State v.
Eiland, 723 N.E.2d 863, 865 (Ind. 2000)).
15s Id.
159 Id.
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 337
guilty pleas").
'- See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (requiring the court to "address the defendant personally
in open court").
165 See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (stating that post-conviction
attacks on validity of guilty pleas, even constitutional attacks, are "often frivolous").
166 See Camillo v. Wyrick, 640 F.2d 931, 936 (8th Cir. 1981) ("A guilty plea entered with
the assistance of counsel is presumptively valid.").
167 See supra notes 93, 111 and accompanying text.
169 See O'Hear, supra note 151, at 453-54 (discussing the possible advantages of jury
trials over plea bargains for defendants). But see Penrod, supra note 157, at 1130 ("If every
criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government
would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities." (quoting
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971))).
us See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
173 See United States v. Barnhardt, 93 F.3d 706, 710 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[A] finding of fact
is not clearly erroneous unless it is without factual support in the record or, after reviewing
all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." (citing Exxon Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 1994))).
174 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006) ('The court of appeals ... shall accept the findings of
fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. . . ."); Barkai, supra note 15, at
124 ("The courts of appeals regularly defer to a trial judge's exercise of discretion [in a plea
proceeding] unless it is clearly erroneous.").
175 See United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying the "plain
error standard" to factual basis review (citing United States v. Vasquez, 216 F.3d 456, 459
(5th Cir. 2000))); United States v. Graves, 106 F.3d 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1997) (using the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review (citing Barnhardt,93 F.3d at 708-09)).
176 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing the
district court's determination of a factual basis for the guilty plea for an abuse of discretion
(citing United States v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2005))).
177 See Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (noting that the abuse of
discretion standard is proper for all evidentiary rulings (citing Old Chief v. United States,
519 U.S. 172, 174 n.1 (1997))).
178 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
340 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311
courts have the discretion to hold the basis for the appeal waived
even where the Government elects to argue the merits of the
factual basis challenge. This approach provides the greatest
amount of freedom to the involved parties by permitting the court
and the litigant to choose the issues to address with fewer
constraints. If the court can assess the waiver issue sua sponte,
the Government may forgo the waiver argument to pursue a less
expeditious but probably the more thorough route by meeting the
defendant's factual basis challenge on the merits. Similarly, a
court may choose to hold a meritless appeal waived to save time
and resources, even if the Government only addresses the
merits. 179 The main import of this approach: an appellate court is
not obliged to consider waiver unless the Government argues for
it, but the court may act in the interest of justice to address waiver
even if the issue of waiver is not raised by the parties.
E. DIFFERENTIATING THE ADEQUACY OF THE FACTUAL BASIS FROM
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 11
179 It might be proper to qualify this statement by explaining that, ideally, a court will
address the issue in the manner in which it is framed-reaching the merits if that is how
the government chooses to meet the defendant's challenge.
1so See United States v. McKelvey, 203 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2000) (purporting to
determine Rule 11 compliance while reviewing the defendant's factual basis challenge to his
guilty plea).
181FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(G).
2010] WAIVING GOOD-BYE TO INCONSISTENCY 341
IV. CONCLUSION
factual inquiry or substantially deviates from an accurate statement of the law-to the
extent that such a defect renders the plea involuntary or unintelligent.
187 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h) ("A variance from the requirements of this rule is harmless
analysis set forth above. The Supreme Court should take its next
opportunity to provide a lodestar in this area of the law.
In Part II, this Note explained the background of this issue.
Part II provided a brief overview of the procedures and safeguards
involved in the guilty plea process as well as an introduction of the
split in circuit court authority on this issue. It also discussed
peculiarities in the circuit court's respective analyses. The
background concluded with a study of the Supreme Court's guilty
plea jurisprudence and presented some of the conflicting interests
implicated by this issue-most notably, society's stake in the
timely and final resolution of criminal cases, and the protection of
criminal defendants' due process right to enter voluntary and
intelligent guilty pleas.
Part III set forth various arguments in support of the positions
taken by the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.
These arguments included the maintenance of public faith in the
effect and finality of guilty pleas. Cases from the Supreme Court's
guilty plea jurisprudence expressly endorse this significant policy
interest. Additionally, a factually innocent, guilty-pleading
defendant is not doomed without recourse merely because he
cannot appeal the lack of factual basis for the plea; other avenues
already exist through which the defendant might proceed
successfully. Further, numerous practical problems make factual
basis review an untenable choice in this context. Among these
problems are the corruption of potential trial evidence over time,
an increase in unnecessary or frivolous appeals, and the demand
on already heavy judicial case loads. In view of these
considerations, the federal courts should not entertain challenges
to the adequacy of the factual basis for crimes that defendants
have knowingly and voluntarily confessed to in court.
This position, if followed, will further the all-important goal of
uniformity in federal criminal procedure. In a more practical
sense, it will assist attorneys, defendants, and judges making
crucial decisions during the pleading and appellate stages of
criminal proceedings.