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Kenneth L. Pearce - Berkeley - S Theory of Language, 2019
Kenneth L. Pearce - Berkeley - S Theory of Language, 2019
Kenneth L. Pearce
Trinity College Dublin
January 7, 2019
Abstract
According to the ideational theory of meaning held by most 17th and
18th century European philosophers, meaningful words signify ideas in the
mind of the speaker. This view was famously rejected by George Berkeley.
Some interpreters hold that, in rejecting this view Berkeley meant merely
to carve out some exceptions to the general principle that meaningful
words stand for ideas. Others attribute to Berkeley the view that, rather
than signifying ideas, words signify speaker intentions. Finally, some in-
terpreters attribute to Berkeley a use theory of language similar to the
later Wittgenstein. This article provides an overview of this interpretive
debate and a defence of the use theory interpretation.
University Press).
1
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 2
all the ‘exceptions’ to the ideational theory Berkeley carves out, there is nothing
left of the theory at all.
A second interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy of language holds that lan-
guage serves to communicate the intentions of the speaker. In §3 I argue that,
although this account solves many of the problems associated with the modified
ideational theory, it too must ultimately be rejected.
A third interpretation attributes to Berkeley a use theory of meaning, similar
to the later Wittgenstein. In §4, I defend this interpretation: Berkeley’s view
is that a word gets to be meaningful when it is used according to conventional
rules within a community to accomplish some practical purpose.
an important exception for the class of words he calls ‘particles’. These words,
Locke says, “signify the connexion that the Mind gives to Ideas, or Propositions,
one with another.” Included in this class are “Is, and Is not, [which] are the
general marks of the Mind, affirming or denying” (E, 3.7.1:471). Locke also
follows Port-Royal in taking affirmation and denial to involve “The joining or
separating of signs” to construct a truth-evaluable proposition (E, 4.5.2:574).
Locke distinguishes sentences, which he calls ‘verbal propositions’, from the
corresponding mental states, which he calls ‘mental propositions’ (E, 4.5.3:574).
The mental proposition, like the verbal proposition, exhibits subject-predicate
structure.
The ideational theory, endorsed by Port-Royal and by Locke, holds that the
human mind possesses a variety of ideas and the capacity to perform acts of
judgment whereby these ideas are assembled into truth-evaluable states with
subject-predicate structure.3 Words are conventional signs meant to signify
these ideas and judgments, that is, to let the hearer know what the speaker is
thinking. This process, however, is error-prone, and many of our mistakes in rea-
soning actually stem from the various ‘imperfections’ and ‘abuses’ of language.
These failings all come down to the problem of developing a stable association
between a word and some one single idea (Arnauld and Nicole [1662] 1996,
58–66; E, 3.9.4–5:476–477, 3.10.2–3:490–491, 3.10.5:492–493, 3.10.28:505–506).
Uncertainty, inconstancy, or imprecision regarding the idea signified by a word
leads to failures of communication and, as Berkeley observed, communicating
ideas is, according to this ‘received opinion,’ “the chief and only end of language”
(PHK, Intro 20:37).
to fit Berkeley into early 20th century debates. On the contrary, this is not
merely a product of Berman’s assimilation of Berkeley to Ayer, but rather a
general problem that must be confronted by any modified ideational interpre-
tation. Port-Royal and Locke made essential use of their theory of the mental
proposition in their accounts of truth and inference. However, a proposition,
on the ideational theory of meaning, is a joining or separating of two ideas. If
the subject term or the predicate term in a sentence does not stand for an idea,
then the ideational theory’s account of truth and inference cannot be employed
and some other account must be sought.
In fact, the difficulty is even more serious than this, and brings us to the
second main problem for the modified ideational interpretation: Berkeley’s re-
jection of abstract ideas prevents him from accepting the ideational theory’s ac-
count of the meaning of even simple subject-predicate sentences like ‘the apple is
red’ or (to use Berkeley’s own example) ‘Melampus is an animal’. However, this
is just the portion of language with respect to which proponents of the modified
ideational interpretation claim that Berkeley has preserved Locke’s theory. If
Berkeley cannot endorse what the ideational theory says about these sentences,
then the exceptions have completely swallowed the rule and there is nothing left
of the ideational theory at all.
In his discussion of the sentence ‘Melampus is an animal’ in the Manuscript
Introduction, Berkeley correctly reports that, according to the ideational theory
espoused by Port-Royal and Locke, the word ‘Melampus’ in this sentence stands
for “the Idea of some one particular. . . Dog” while “the Name Animal stand[s]
for an Abstract, Generical Idea” of animal (MI, 34:101–103). The word ‘is’
stands for the mind’s act of judging that these two ideas agree.
Berkeley clearly cannot endorse this account since he argues that ‘Abstract,
Generical Ideas’ do not exist. However, it might be thought that only a very
minor modification is required since, in the published Introduction, Berkeley
accepts the existence of general ideas, provided these ideas are not understood
to be abstract.6 Thus Berkeley might still hold that the word ‘animal’ in the
sentence signifies a general idea.
In fact, Berkeley cannot endorse this moderate position. When Berkeley
admits the existence of general ideas in the published Introduction to the Prin-
ciples, he writes:
as the [general idea of a line] owes its generality, not to its being
the sign of an abstract or general line, but of all particular right
lines that may possibly exist, so the [word ‘line’] must be thought
to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, the various
particular lines which it indifferently denotes. (PHK, Intro 12:32)
Since general words and general ideas get to be general in just the same way
it cannot be the case that general words get to be general by standing for
general ideas, as Locke supposed (E, 3.3.6:410–411). If this were the case, then
6. In the manuscript, Berkeley had rejected general ideas entirely (MI, 20:83, 27:93; see
Belfrage 1986b).
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 7
Berkeley would have to say that general ideas get to be general by standing for
other general ideas, generating a regress.
It might be thought that Berkeley’s view here is that, each time we meaning-
fully use or understand the word ‘animal’, we have some one of the ideas in its
extension in mind (but not always the same one).7 However, Berkeley explicitly
rejects this view in the 1732 edition of Alciphron (7,7*:335) and he presents an
argument against it in the ‘Melampus’ passage of the Manuscript Introduction.
His argument is as follows:
in the Proposition we have instanced [i.e., the sentence ‘Melampus is
an animal’] in it is plain the Word Animal is not suppos’d to stand
for the Idea of any one particular animal. for if it be made stand
for another different from that is marked by the Name Melampus,
the Proposition is false and includes a Contradiction. And if it be
made signify the very same Individual that Melampus doth, it is a
tautology (MI, 35:105, crossed out and bracketed text omitted).
‘Melampus is Melampus’ is a tautology, and ‘Melampus is Fido’ is a false-
hood, but ‘Melampus is an animal’ is neither tautologous nor false. Without
abstract ideas, the ideational theory of meaning cannot explain this fact (see
Pearce 2017b, 566–567; 2017c, 143–144). Berkeley therefore concludes, con-
trary to the ideational theory, that “in that Proposition [the word ‘animal’ does
not] stand for any Idea at all. All that I intend to signify thereby being only
this. That the particular thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by the
Name Animal” (MI, 34:103, bracketed text omitted). In this context, there is no
idea corresponding to the word ‘animal’. Consequently, there can be no mental
proposition corresponding to the sentence ‘Melampus is an animal’.
In the notebooks, Berkeley expressed puzzlement about the absence of men-
tal propositions in certain cases of apparently meaningful speech (PC, 728–
731a:96, 738:97, 793:104, 809:106). By the time he wrote the ‘Melampus’ dis-
cussion in the Manuscript Introduction, he had rejected the mental proposition
entirely.
It may be objected that my argument has relied heavily on manuscript ma-
terial and on a comment in Alciphron that Berkeley deleted from later editions.
I concede that this provides a good reason for us to wonder whether Berkeley
might have rejected, or at least been uncertain about, the views in question.
However, alternative interpretations still need to explain why Berkeley wrote
these words in the first place, even if he later rejected them. The discussion of
propositions in the Manuscript Introduction shows that from the beginning of his
career Berkeley was aware of a compelling argument for the claim that someone
who rejects abstract ideas cannot accept mental propositions, and nowhere does
Berkeley do anything to undermine that argument. Without abstract ideas, the
theory of mental propositions is untenable, and without mental propositions the
ideational theory of meaning, together with the associated theories of truth and
inference, collapses.
7. Melissa Frankel (2009, 383n5) suggests that PHK, Intro can be read this way, though
she recognizes that Berkeley rejects this view in Alciphron.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 8
Williford here indicates that speaker intentions are only part of the story. Later
in the paper he says that “If the speaker intends to communicate ideas, then
there is a further step involved [in understanding the utterance]: [the hearer]
must then also grasp the ideas answering to the terms of the speaker’s sentence”
(Williford 2003, 287). The point of Berkeley’s discussion of operative language
is to argue that this is not always part of the speaker’s intention.
The speaker intentions theory, like the modified ideational theory, sees Berke-
ley as agreeing with the view of Port-Royal and Locke that words “indicate what
takes place in the mind” of the speaker (Arnauld and Nicole [1662] 1996, 74).
According to this interpretation, Berkeley’s innovation lies in considering the
relevant items in the mind of the speaker to be intentions rather than ideas.
This approach has a number of advantages over the modified ideational
theory. First, it preserves Berkeley’s claim that ‘operative’ religious utterances
get to be meaningful in the just the same way other utterances do: they serve
to communicate the intentions of the speaker. Second, this view accounts nicely
for Berkeley’s claim about the ‘Melampus’ sentence. Berkeley writes, “All that
I intend to signify [by the sentence ‘Melampus is an animal’] being only this.
That the particular thing I call Melampus has a right to be called by the Name
Animal” (MI, 34:103, bracketed text omitted). The effect the speaker intends
to produce here is that the hearer should come to regard the application of the
label ‘animal’ to Melampus as appropriate.
Nevertheless, the speaker intentions theory does not ultimately succeed in
making sense of Berkeley’s remarks about language. First, the speaker inten-
tions theory does not provide a plausible account of operative language. In the
published Introduction, Berkeley writes:
I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it does not often
happen either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of
fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise immedi-
ately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any
ideas coming between. (PHK, Intro 20:37)
Shortly after the manuscript version of this passage, Berkeley writes, “Upon
hearing the Words Lie Rascal, Indignation, Revenge and the suddain motions
of Anger do instantly [ ensue ]11 in the minds of Some Men without ever at-
tending to the Definition of those Names” (MI, 42:113, some crossed out and
bracketed text omitted). It seems unlikely that Berkeley thinks that the word
‘danger’ produces fear by making the hearer conceive that the speaker intends
her to be afraid, or that the word ‘rascal’ produces anger by making the hearer
conceive that the speaker intends her to be angry. Rather, these passions arise
‘immediately’ or ‘instantly’ and are not mediated by notions about the speaker’s
intentions any more than they are mediated by ideas.
Williford argues that his interpretation is supported by the final stratum of
the manuscript’s discussion of moral language. This is a brief but dense text
and Berkeley marked it up extensively before crossing out the entire section and
11. Brackets in original.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 10
I ask any Man whether every time he tells another that Such an
Action is Honourable & vertuous with an intention to excite him
to the performance of it he has at that instant Idea of Honour &
Vertue in his view, and whether in reality his intention be to raise
Idea together with their agreement to the idea of that particular
Action in the Understanding of him he speaks to.
In this later stratum of the manuscript, Berkeley is careful to speak, not of the
sentence in general, but of the speaker’s intentions on a particular occasion.
Williford argues, with considerable plausibility, that Berkeley’s revisions are in-
tended to avoid the implication that moral words never stand for ideas (Williford
2003, 296–297). Again, however, it is implausible to suppose that grasping the
speaker’s intention “to excite him to the performance of” the action in question
will motivate the hearer. Rather, as the concluding sentence common to the
earlier and later strata indicates, this use of moral language “stirr[s the hearer]
up to the performance of” the action by “excit[ing] in the Mind of the Hearer
an esteem of that particular action.” This, again, is an immediate effect of the
words which need not be mediated by either ideas or notions.
This difficulty is closely connected with another problem that Williford
briefly recognizes (Williford 2003, 288n31), which we might call ‘the problem
of hidden agendas’. Not only is it often the case that the hearer’s grasping the
speaker’s intentions would not assist in realizing those intentions, sometimes it
would actively prevent the speaker from fulfilling those intentions. This will
happen in any case of deception or manipulation.
There is also a difficulty about the speaker intentions theory’s relationship
to the theory of notions. Speaker intentions are active, and hence there can
12. Brackets in original.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 11
of reflections on not only the individual but also the social impact of various
religious and scientific forms of words.
I conclude, therefore, that Williford has made a strong case for the im-
portance of speaker intentions to Berkeley’s understanding of speaker meaning.
However, there are a number of reasons why this cannot be the whole story even
regarding speaker meaning. Further, the essential publicity of language is rec-
ognized in Berkeley’s early philosophy and emphasized in his later philosophy.15
The speaker intentions theory is not, however, a theory of ‘the propriety of lan-
guage’ and thus is not an adequate answer to the central question of philosophy
of language as Berkeley himself framed it.
ends] can be obtained without it, as I think not infrequently happens in the
familiar use of language” (PHK, Intro 20:37).
The use theory also provides a plausible interpretation of Berkeley’s remarks
on operative language more broadly. Like the emotivist interpretation of oper-
ative language, the use theory interpretation takes seriously Berkeley’s claims
that “passions. . . arise immediately in the mind upon the perception of certain
words” (PHK, Intro 20:37). However, like the speaker intentions theory, the use
theory also takes seriously Berkeley’s insistence that religious language is not
a special case but gets to be meaningful in the same way as ordinary bits of
language, such as number words (Alc, 7,5:293).
The use theory is also able to explain how Berkeley is able to make sense of
belief without mental propositions. In Alciphron, Berkeley claims to be giving
an account of “assent [i.e., in our terms, belief] in all its different degrees” (Alc,
7,14:307). Since, as I argued in §2, Berkeley rejects the mental proposition, the
object of assent must be a verbal proposition, i.e., a sentence. To assent to a
sentence is to regard it as true.
According to Euphranor, “Science [i.e., scientific knowledge] and faith agree
in this, that they both imply an assent of the mind” (Alc, 7,11:303). The
character Crito (who typically also speaks for Berkeley in Alciphron) insists,
however, that:
faith . . . is . . . placed in the will and affections rather than in the un-
derstanding, and producing holy lives, rather than subtle theories.
Faith, I say, is not an indolent perception, but an operative persua-
sion of the mind, which ever works some suitable action, disposition,
or emotion in those who have it. (Alc, 7,10:301)
According to the use theory, this is not a point of contrast between faith and
scientific knowledge, but a point of commonality: all assent is a matter of being
disposed to relate to the world around one in a certain way, which is practical
and emotional as well as cognitive.18
The most serious problem for such an interpretation, however, is how assent
(belief), understood on this model, could be a kind of taking for true. Admit-
tedly, Berkeley never directly addresses this issue, and any reconstruction of his
views on truth must be somewhat speculative. I have attempted such a specula-
tive reconstruction elsewhere (Pearce 2017c, 157–171).19 It suffices here to note
that since, as I argued in §2, Berkeley rejects the mental proposition and there-
fore could not inherit his predecessors’ conception of truth, every interpretation
of Berkeley is faced with this difficulty.
Berkeley’s views in the early works (Flew [1974] 1993, 214). However, John
Russell Roberts (2007, ch. 2; 2017) has argued that Berkeley had this theory in
mind, at least in its basic outline, when he wrote the Manuscript Introduction
in 1708. I agree.
In both the manuscript and published versions of the Introduction, Berkeley
describes his task as “to try if I can discover what those Principles are, which
have introduc’d all that Doubtfulness & Uncertainty, those Absurdities & Con-
tradictions into the several Sects of Philosophy” (MI, 4:65, crossed out text
omitted; compare PHK, Intro 4:26). In the manuscript Berkeley goes on, al-
most immediately, to identify the culprit as “the opinion that there are Abstract
Ideas or General Conceptions of Things” (MI, 6:67). In this text, language is
not introduced until §16, where Berkeley includes two lengthy quotations from
Locke (E, 2.11.10–11:159–160) to the effect that non-human animals’ lack of
language is evidence that they lack abstract ideas. Berkeley uses these texts
to emphasize the tight connection between abstraction and a particular the-
ory of language (MI, 17–18:77–81). §6 of the manuscript has been extensively
marked up, indicating Berkeley’s dissatisfaction with his original formulation.
In the published version, Berkeley has decided to emphasize the connection
to language from the very beginning: before even mentioning abstract ideas,
he introduces the project of the Introduction by writing, “In order to prepare
the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to
premise somewhat, by way of introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of
language” (PHK, Intro 6:27).
This does not represent a change in Berkeley’s position or his approach to
the issues. Rather, it provides additional emphasis to prevent the reader from
missing the point. In both the manuscript and published versions, immediately
after completing the case against abstraction, Berkeley identifies a mistaken
theory of language (namely, the ideational theory) as the source of the doctrine
of abstraction (MI, 30–33:95–101; PHK, Intro 18–19:36–37). He goes on to
argue, again in both versions, that there are other words that are even farther
divorced from ideas than general names for sensible objects.
Additionally, while Berkeley does not present his theory in the same explicit
and detailed fashion as he does in Alciphron, the particular examples he dis-
cusses conform to his later theory.20 In his discussions of ‘triangle’ and ‘animal’,
Berkeley treats the definition as a rule for determining which objects ‘have a
right to be called by’ a particular name (MI, 32–34:99–103). In the discussion
of ‘good things’ and ‘reward’, Berkeley discusses how we learn to give a cer-
tain practical and emotional response to these words, and how that response
accomplishes various practical goods (MI, 36–37:105–109). In the discussion of
‘Aristotle’, Berkeley speaks of the “close and immediate . . . Connexion . . . long
Custom [has] established betwixt the very Word Aristotle and the motions of
Assent and Reverence in the Minds of some Men” (MI, 38:111). The point of the
discussion is to show how the learned rule connecting the name ‘Aristotle’ (NB:
the name, not the philosopher) to these mental responses is used by the ‘School-
20. For a more detailed defense of this claim, see Pearce 2017c, ch. 2.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 16
man’ to accomplish a certain end (“to dispose you to receive his Opinion with
. . . deference and Submission”). This rule is established by ‘custom’. Finally,
the discussion of ‘virtue’ and other terms of moral praise and blame is focused
on explaining how the moral emotions attached to these words by conventional
rules serve to motivate actions (MI, 41–42:111–112). This also neatly explains
why Berkeley here speaks not only of the intentions of a particular speaker on a
particular occasion (as Williford emphasizes), but also of ‘the ends of language’
(MI, 40:111), that is, the ends at which this conventional practice aims. Thus
it appears that, already in the Manuscript Introduction, Berkeley’s view is that
the way to understand any particular use of words is to understand the practical
ends at which that use aims and the conventional (‘customary’) rules by means
of which those ends are accomplished.
Admittedly, there are comments in both the manuscript and published ver-
sions that appear to favor the modified ideational theory over the use theory.
The strongest of these statements is found in MI, 30:97:
when any Truth whether general or particular is made known to me
by words So that I rightly apprehend the Ideas contained in it, I
see no manner of reason, why I may not omit the Words, and yet
retain as full and clear a Conception of the Ideas themselves, as I
had while they were cloathed with Words. Words being, so far as
I can see, of use [only]21 for Recording and Communicating, but
not absolutely apprehending Ideas. [Crossed out, bracketed, and
inserted text omitted.]
This text, as it stands in the first stratum, in fact appears to endorse the
unmodified ideational theory, but this certainly cannot be Berkeley’s view. Ac-
cordingly, it is unsurprising that this text is extensively marked up and then
entirely omitted from the published version. Most importantly, Berkeley modi-
fied this text to restrict the scope of his claim to “any Truth whether about gen-
eral or particular Ideas.” (The italicized words are inserted above caret marks.)
Further, in its context, this text was likely intended as ad hominem to begin
with: Berkeley has just noted that the abstractionists often claim that words
are necessary for knowledge of general truths, but this, he alleges, is inconsistent
with the ideational theory of meaning which the abstractionists endorse.
Another text in the Introduction that appears to support the modified
ideational theory is this one from the conclusion:
Since therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding,
whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and
naked into my view, keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am able,
those names which long and constant use has so strictly united with
them. (PHK, Intro 21:38–39; compare MI, 47:115)
This, Berkeley says, is necessary in order “to clear the first principles of knowl-
edge from the embarrass and delusion of words” (PHK, Intro 25:40).
21. Inserted above a caret.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 17
ley surely cannot hold that all words lack extra-linguistic reference. Spirits and
ideas, at least, must surely exist prior to language.
The use theory can, however, accommodate this. Even Wittgenstein does not
deny that naming is one of the things we do with words (see, e.g., Wittgenstein
1953, §1.7). What use theorists reject is the view that naming or referring has
some kind of privileged status among the many things we do with words (see
Wittgenstein 1953, §§1.11–14).
The use theory, then, has no problem admitting that I can use words like
‘red’ to name my ideas, and that I can use words like ‘I’ and ‘myself’ to name my
own soul or spirit of which I have immediate consciousness (see DHP, 231).25
Admittedly, there is some unclarity regarding exactly how Berkeley believes he
can secure reference to other minds and the ideas within them. However, as is
widely recognized,26 this is a difficult issue on any interpretation.
Toland saw the mysteries of religion as a tool of tyranny: the clergy, backed
by the state, seek to undermine the intellectual autonomy of the laity by forcing
them to repeat whatever nonsense words the church prescribes.27 Many other
deistic writers, including Matthew Tindal (1706, 20–23; [1730] 1732, 27–30, 58–
60, 93–99, 213–217, 331)28 and Anthony Collins (1713, 112–122),29 argued that
the attempt to impose doctrines on the laity was contrary to the stated justifica-
tion for government support of religion, namely the state’s interest in promoting
virtue among its citizens.30 Although many Anglican clergy, including Berke-
ley,31 supported some form of religious toleration, any defense of Anglicanism
must necessarily involve a defense of the mysteries as obligatory articles of faith
within a state-supported church.32 If this promotion of the mysteries is to be
justified as part of the established church’s activity, it must play some role in
the church’s promotion of virtue, and this is precisely what many Anglican writ-
ers, including Berkeley, argue (see, e.g., Stillingfleet 1691, 28; 1697, lvii; Astell
[1705] 2013, §64; Alc, 7,8–10:296–303). Furthermore, even before Berkeley, this
argument about the (alleged) salutary moral effects of belief in, e.g., the Trinity
is often tangled up with the argument about the meaningfulness of the words
used to express such belief. This entanglement can be observed in a particularly
strong form in a philosopher and clergyman whose influence on Berkeley is well
documented: William King, the Archbishop of Dublin (see King 1709).33
In Berkeley’s context, the debate about the meaningfulness of Christian
mysteries and the debate about the tendency of belief in those mysteries to
promote virtue were already entwined. Explicitly in Alciphron, and implicitly
27. A very strong statement of this view, which may have influenced Toland, can be found
in the opening of the anonymous Account of the Word Mystery:
MYSTERY and Persecution are the Tutelar God and Goddess of the new Sys-
tems, framed by Worldly Christians. Upon those two Antichristian Principles
they ground all their Arguments: Mystery makes up the Premises, and Perse-
cution the Consequence or Conclusion. (Anonymous 1691, 3)
Also see Berkeley’s comments on this view in Alc, 1,6–7:40–42.
28. Berkeley discusses the central argument of Tindal (1730) 1732 (referring to Tindal by
the pseudonym ‘Glaucus’) in Alc, 6,18–19:254–255, and mentions Tindal 1706 in TVV, 2:251,
5:253.
29. Alciphron discusses Collins under the pseudonym ‘Diagoras’ (Alc, 1,12:52, 4,16–22:163–
171), and Berkeley makes explicit reference to Collins in TVV, 6:254. On Berkeley’s inter-
pretation of, and response to, Collins, see O’Higgins 1976; Berman 1990, ch. 3; Taranto 2010;
Pearce 2018.
30. In addition to Tindal and Collins, see Toland 1720, 133–136.
31. It is unclear exactly what Berkeley takes to be the correct boundaries of religious tol-
eration, and there is some evidence that he becomes more liberal about this later in his
career. However, both early and late, he clearly supports the legal toleration of at least some
non-Anglican Christians (RGB, 70–71; Q, 191:120–121, 256–257:126, 1,297–299:160).
32. Tindal (1706, 22) argues that it is inconsistent to support religious toleration while also
supporting a state church with obligatory doctrines: “if it be the highest Injustice to force
Men to profess such Speculative Opinions as they don’t believe, it can’t savour much of Justice
to make ’em contribute [through taxation] to the Support of [those opinions].”
33. Berkeley explicitly references King’s sermon at CGB, 36, and likely also has King in mind
at Alc, 4,16–18:163–166. Additionally, I have argued that King’s sermon forms an important
part of the background to DHP (Pearce 2018). On the pragmatist tendencies of King’s sermon,
see Berman 1976.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 22
5 Conclusion
According to the ideational theory of meaning, humans have certain ideas to-
gether with a capacity to perform acts of judgment assembling these ideas
into truth-evaluable mental states with subject-predicate structure. Individual
words, on this view, typically signify the speaker’s ideas, while complete sen-
tences signify these truth-evaluable mental states (mental propositions). Both
early and late in his career, Berkeley explicitly attacks this view. I have argued
that Berkeley’s attack is more radical than most interpreters have recognized.
Berkeley in fact entirely rejects the notion that meaningful words must signify
what takes place in the mind of the speaker. Instead, both early and late in
his career, Berkeley holds that words get to be meaningful when they are used
according to rules in a conventional social practice aiming at some practical
goods.34
Abbreviations
Alc Berkeley, George. (1732) 1948–1957. Alciphron: or, the Minute Philoso-
pher . In BW, vol. 3.
BW Berkeley, George. 1948–1957. The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of
Cloyne. Edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. 9 vols. London: Thomas
Nelson and Sons.
CGB Hight, Marc A., ed. 2013. The Correspondence of George Berkeley. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
34. A shortened version of this paper was presented at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee
Berkeley Workshop, 20 October 2018. I thank all of the workshop participants, and especially
my commentator Keota Fields, for helpful discussion of these issues. Additionally, I am
grateful to Samuel Rickless and Shelley Weinberg for helpful comments previous drafts.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language 23
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Arnauld, Antoine, and Claude Lancelot. (1660) 1975. General and Rational
Grammar: The Port-Royal Grammar. Edited and translated by Jacques
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