Digesttt 2nd Rounddddd

EH 307 | LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING - JD 12103 | ATTY.
AYLWARD CONSULTA
COURTS OF BOTH LAW AND EQUITY
Reyes v. Lim
G.R. No. 134241, 11 August 2003, 408 SCRA 560.
FACTS:
1. Reyes entered into a contract (Contract to Sell) a parcel of land amounting 28M with Lim as the
buyer, the said property was being occupied by Harrison Lumber as lessee with a monthly of
35,000. The Contract to Sell provides that upon signing the contract Lim would pay 10 million
pesos as the downpayment while the remaining balance shall be given upon the complete
vacation of all the tenants or occupants of the property and execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. However, if the tenants or occupants have vacated the premises earlier than the date
agreed, the Vendor shall give the Vendee at least one week advance notice for the payment of
the balance and execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale or if not vacated, Vendee shall withhold
the payment of the balance.
2. Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and damages against the respondents Lim,
Keng, and Harrison Lumber, alleging that Lim connived with the two other respondents not to
vacate the property until the monthly penalty would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid
purchase price of 18M, but Keng and Harrison Lumber denied it.
3. Lim prayed for the cancellation of the Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against Reyes but was denied. Lim requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to
deposit the down payment with the cashier of the RTC. The trial court granted this motion. Reyes
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court
be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
WON the equity jurisdiction is applicable to the case at bar when there is applicable law in the matter.
RULING:
Yes. SC states that rescission is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever he
may be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is restitution, that is, the parties
are restored to the status quo ante.
SC…: “the trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order the deposit
of the P10 million down payment in court. The purpose of the exercise of equity
jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution. Equity
jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt
its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its
statutory or legal jurisdiction. Equity is the principle by which substantial justice may be
attained in cases where the prescribed or customary forms of ordinary law are
inadequate”
EH 307 | LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING - JD 12103 | ATTY. AYLWARD CONSULTA
APPLICATION:
The application of equity always involves a balancing of the equities in a particular case, a matter
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Here, we find the equities weigh heavily in favor of Lim,
who paid the P10 million down payment in good faith only to discover later that Reyes had subsequently
sold the Property to another buyer. The trial court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order
the deposit of the P10 million down payment in court. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. In this case, it was just, equitable and
proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10 million down payment to prevent unjust
enrichment by Reyes at the expense of Lim.
CONCLUSION:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED.
Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.) v. Patan, Jr.,

G.R. No. 152927, [January 14, 2004], 464 PHIL 517-524
FACTS:
1. The petitioner, Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.), Inc. launched the "Number Fever" under-the-crown promotional
campaign for its bottled soft drink products. With the prior approval and under the supervision of the
Department of Trade and Industry a list of the winning crowns were placed in the safety deposit box of the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). The DTI-approved printed posters advertising the "Number Fever"
promotional campaign enjoined the participants to look for the winning three-digit number and security code
under the crowns or resealable caps.
2. On May 25, 1992, the petitioner announced "349" as the first three digits. After the announcement, the
petitioner received reports that a number of people were trying to redeem non-winning crowns bearing the
number "349" and security codes "L-2560-FQ" and "L-3560-FQ" in the amounts of P100,000 and P1,000,000
each crown. The DTI and the petitioner jointly opened the safety deposit box where the list of winning crowns
had been kept and it was verified that crowns bearing the number "349" and security codes "L-2560-FQ" and
"L-3560-FQ" were not winning crowns.
3. To appease the holders of the non-winning "349" crowns, the petitioner offered P500 for every non-winning
"349" crown that would be presented on or before June 12, 1992. A total of 490,116 holders of non-winning
"349" crowns availed themselves of the offer. Respondents Rustico Patan, Jr., Gregorio Apanto, Jr., Genelyn
Pongcol and Dennis Pestano, holders of non-winning "349" crowns, refused the offer. Instead, they filed their
respective complaints for specific performance and recovery of winning prize with damages against the
petitioner.
4. After trial on the merits, the court a quo, in its Joint Decision, dismissed the complaints against the petitioner
for lack of cause of action and/or insufficiency of evidence. The respondents elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA). However, for failure of respondents Apanto, Jr. and Pongcol to pay the necessary docket fees
within the prescribed period despite notice, their respective appeals were deemed dismissed. Only
respondent Patan, Jr., filed an appellant's brief. On October 18, 2001, the CA substantially affirmed the
findings of the court a quo that the respondents did not win in the petitioner's "Number Fever" promotional
campaign as their crowns were not the winning crowns. The CA, like the court a quo, found that the petitioner
had not been negligent in the implementation of its "Number Fever" promotional campaign. Nonetheless, the
2CA awarded all the respondents P500 each "in the interest of justice and equity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the petitioner to pay the respondents P500
each solely "in the interest of justice and equity" despite finding that the petitioner was neither at fault nor
negligent in the conduct of its "Number Fever" promotional campaign.
RULING: The Court rules in the affirmative. It is not disputed that the CA already dismissed the respective
appeals of respondents Apanto, Jr. and Pongcol in view of their failure to pay the requisite docket fees. The
assailed CA decision itself acknowledged this fact as it mentioned that "for failure of respondents Apanto, Jr. and
Pongcol to pay the necessary appellate docket fees within the prescribed period, their appeal was deemed
abandoned and consequently dismissed." For his part, respondent Pestano failed to file his appeal brief with the
appellate court. This omission, likewise, constituted an abandonment of his appeal therewith.
Having failed to perfect their respective appeals, respondents Apanto, Jr., Pongcol and Pestano could not obtain
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what they had obtained, if any, from the lower court. The CA
thus committed reversible error in modifying the judgment of the court a quo by awarding respondents Apanto, Jr.,
Pongcol and Pestano P500 each since the rule is clear that no modification of judgment could be granted to a
party who did not appeal, or in this case, who failed to perfect the appeal.
APPLICATION:
Neither is the award of P500 to respondent Patan, Jr. "in the interest of justice and equity" warranted. Respondent
Patan, Jr. had consistently refused the petition
er's offer of P500 for his non-winning "349" crown. Unlike the other holders of the non-winning "349" crowns,
around 490,116 of them, who availed themselves of the goodwill money offered by the petitioner, respondent
Patan, Jr. rejected the same. Then again, during the pre-trial in the court a quo, the petitioner manifested its
willingness to consider any offer from respondent Patan, Jr. for a reasonable settlement of the case. No offer was
made by the latter.
As the Court enunciated in Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. vs. Remolado: Justice is done according to law. As
a rule, equity follows the law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable
consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable legal duty, the action must fail
although the disadvantaged party deserves commiseration or sympathy.
In this case, the petitioner's offer of P500 for every non-winning "349" crown had long expired on June 12, 1992.
The petitioner cannot now be compelled to pay respondent Patan, Jr. P500 as a "goodwill gesture," since he had
already rejected the same.
CONCLUSION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 18, 2001, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60383 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of P500 to each of the respondents is DELETED.
Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque,

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605, [December 12, 2005], 513 PHIL 455-511
FACTS:
1. On June 11, 1988, a fire gutted portions of the Quezon City Hall, immolating records stored
in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
2. Heirs of Homer Barque filed a petition with the Land Registration Authority for administrative
reconstitution of the original of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer Barque. The
subject is a land belonging to Lot. 823 of the Piedad estate situated in the then Municipality of
Caloocan, Province of Rizal. In support of their petition, they submitted the following: A.)
Owner’s duplicate title b.) Real estate tax receipts c.) Tax declarations d.) And a plan FLS
3168-D covering the property
3. Severino Manotok IV et. al filed an opposition claiming that the lot covered by the Barque
title formed part of the land covered by their reconstituted title in the name of Severino
Manotok and further alleged that Barque title was spurious.
4. On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin Bustos, reconstituting officer of LRA, DENIED the petition
of Barque on the ground that a.) The land is registered under the name of the Manotoks, b.)
Plan submitted is a spurious document
5. The motion for reconsideration of Barque was subsequently denied
6. Barque appealed to the LRA which reversed the decision of Atty. Bustos and granting the
reconstitution of Barque title while ordering the cancellation of the Manotok’s titleuling that
a.Reconstituting officer should have not required the submission of the documents
other than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as basis for denying the petition
and should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title
b.He further found anomalies in Manotok’s title
7.Thereafter, the parties filed the following in the LRA:
Manotok: Motion for reconsideration (denied by LRA)
Barque: Opposition with prayer that reconstitution be ordered immediately (denied by LRA)
8. Both appealed to the CA:
Manotok: for CA- G.R. No. 66642 saying that LRA erred in imputing that their title was spurious
Barque: CA- G.R. No. 66700 Prayed that LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute Barque
title without being subjected to the condition that Manotok title should be cancelled
9. Felicitas Manahan filed a motion for leave to intervene in Barque’s case seeking the
dismissal of both cases and claiming ownership over the subject property
10. The CA affirmed the decision of the LRA ruling that LRA correctly deferred in giving due
course to the Barques’ petition for reconstitution, since there was yet no final judgment
upholding or annulling barque title and Denied Barque’s petition and affirmed the decision of
LRA which denied the immediate reconstitution
11.Barque filed motion for reconsideration on both cases where the court Reconstituted
Barque title and directing the Registry of deeds of QC to cancel Manotok’s title and
Reconstituted Barque title and directing the Registry of deeds of QC to cancel Manotok’s title.
12. Aggrieved with the twin decision of the CA, Manotoks filed separate petitions for review
before the SC doecketed as G.R. No. 162605 & 162335 On August 2, 2004 the court ordered
consolidation of the cases and referring the same to the SC 1 division.
ISSUE:
WON LRA has no authority to annul their title
WON the CA has jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioner’s title
WON Manotoks were not given the opportunity to be heard
RULING:
1. The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined
himself to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. The
factual finding of the LRA that [the Barques’] title is authentic,genuine, valid,
and existing, while [the Manotoks’] title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the
two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is conclusive before this Court. It should
remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2. The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the
judgment ofthe LRA. Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the
appellate court has jurisdiction on appeals from judgments or final orders of the
LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions
of fact and law.
3. There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due
process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even
without a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the
case to the RTC for a re[1]determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and
petitioners as the same has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the
appellate court.
APPLICATION:
- The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The function is
adjudicatory in nature — it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for reconstitution.
Logically, it can declare a title as sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it cannot make such
declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the reconstitution. In the
reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which between or
among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or approve the petition.
- Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of the two
titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court's ruling to the Court of Appeals. After all, the
LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that petitioners' title is forged.
- No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. The
remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where
the Court is in position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it and particularly where the ends of
justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof.
- As already discussed, the validity of respondents' and petitioners' title have been squarely passed upon by
the LRA and reviewed and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable
by this Court
CONCLUSION: -
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended Decision of the
Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA[1]G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents'
TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of
Five of the Former Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel petitioners' TCT No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents' TCT No.
T-210177 and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Silverio v. Republic,
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged
that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had
always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment
and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when
he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand.
Petitioner then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his
sex from "male" to "female."
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner but this was contested by the Republic of the Philippines
by filing a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals on the reason that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for under RA 9048
RULING:
ART. 376 of the Civil Code: No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law).
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. — No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules
and regulations.
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. — The petition for change of first name or
nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
APPLICATION: No.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
(1) one of the essential requisites of marriage is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on
marriage and family relations. (2) There are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions
of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption
of survivorship in case of calamities. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner's petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly
recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the
remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts.
CONCLUSION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Neither may entries in the birth certificates as to
first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity.
Ocampo v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 225973. November 8, 2016, SERENO, C.J., dissenting
FACTS: Public respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
public respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the
Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB) in reference to the Verbal Order of President Duterte.
● Respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army ( PA)
Commanding General for the Funeral Honors and Service to former President Marcos.
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Saturnino Ocampo and several others, in their capacities
as human rights advocates or human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. and his son, as members of the
Bar and human rights lawyers, and his grandchild.
3. Petition for Prohibition filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in his personal capacity, as member
of the House of Representatives and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization of victims and families of enforced
disappearance, mostly during the martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several others,
in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of the Commission on
Human Rights, and several others, suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations during
the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition filed by Heherson T. Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of
the Philippines, who fought to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others, as concerned Filipino
citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Zaira Patricia B. Baniaga and several others, as
concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Algamar A. Latiph, former Chairperson of the Regional
Human Rights Commission, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of the
Moro who are victims of human rights during the martial law regime of Marcos.
8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Leila M. De Lima as member of the Senate of the
Republic of the Philippines, public official and concerned citizen.
● The Supreme Court ultimately ruled to dismiss such petitions on the grounds that the Court is simply not
in the character to decide the issues since it is majorly a political question.
● Chief Justice Sereno provides her dissenting opinion regarding this decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not such a decision was just or Constitutional.
OPINION/DISCUSSION:
Summary of the arguments on the substantive issues (in verbatim from Ocampo v. Enriquez)
Credit must be given to the Solicitor General for immediately agreeing that the Constitution, decisions of
this Court, human right statutes and the ill-gotten wealth laws and proceedings — in their totality — condemn the
Martial Law regime of the late President Marcos, his family and his cronies. Nevertheless, he posits that all of
these are in the past; human rights victims are to be compensated, anyway; and the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
would continue, including the pursuit of criminal cases against the Marcos family and their cronies. In other words,
while he admits that it would be most difficult to make former President Marcos out as a hero, considering the
latter's martial rule and recorded plunder, nevertheless, Marcos was a bemedalled war soldier, and that, in
addition, his being a former President who was never dishonorably discharged as a soldier — this fact alone —
entitles him to be interred at the LNMB. To the Solicitor General, it is non sequitur for human rights victims to claim
that the burial of Marcos at a cemetery called Libingan ng mga Bayani will entomb him as a hero and negate the
plethora of legal pronouncements that he is not.
The candid admission made by the Solicitor General has made the job of this Court much easier. For the
substantive issue now boils down to whether, in fact and in law, the proposed burial of the late President Marcos
at the LNMB:
(1) will derogate from the state's duty to protect and promote human rights under the Constitution,
domestic statutes, and international law;
(2) will violate Presidential Decree No. 105, and Republic Act Nos. 10066, 10086 and 289;
(3) is an unconstitutional devotion of public property to a private purpose;
(4) is an illegal use of public funds;
(5) cannot be sourced from the residual powers of the President or his powers to reserve lands for public
purposes;
(6) cannot find legal mooring in AFP Regulation G 161-375;
(7) is in violation of the clause on faithful execution of the laws. and thus the proposed burial is
unconstitutional and illegal, and the presidential discretion sought to be exercised is being committed in grave
abuse of discretion. On the procedural points, this Opinion fully agrees with the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Jr., but will nevertheless, attempt to augment what has been so ably discussed by
Justice Caguioa on the political question defense. On the substantive points, I fully agree with Justice Caguioa,
whose Dissenting Opinion had first been proposed as the main decision. I had prepared this Opinion to elucidate
my independent understanding of some of the issues he has covered.
Discussions (personally, I don’t think it would do much good to digest it as it is very substantive. I would rather
you look at the case itself and find her dissenting opinion, as it is so goddamn long. I will try fixing it sometime but
I’ll jot down her main points of discussion here.)
THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE THIS CONTROVERSY UNDER THE EXPANDED
CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
A. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, respondents can no longer utilize the traditional political
question doctrine to impede the power of judicial review.
B. In the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court has decided issues that were traditionally
considered political questions.
C. The assertion that the burial is intended to implement an election campaign promise does not render
the matter non-justiciable.
THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUTY
TO FAITHFULLY EXECUTE THE LAWS WHEN HE ORDERED THE BURIAL OF MARCOS IN THE LIBINGAN
NG MGA BAYANI.
A. Statutes and jurisprudence establish a clear policy to condemn the acts of Marcos and what he
represents, which effectively prohibits the incumbent President from honoring him through a burial in the Libingan
ng mga Bayani.
- At its core, the present dispute turns on whether the state, through the President and the AFP,
may legally honor Former President Marcos and his family. For that is the essence of the
proposed burial at the LNMB regardless of whether Marcos is to be buried as a hero, as a soldier
or as a former president. A clear understanding of our Constitution, laws, jurisprudence, and our
international obligations must lead to the conclusion that the grant of any such honors for the late
dictator is prohibited.
B. The AFP does not have the power to determine which persons are qualified for interment in the
Libingan.
C. The burial cannot be justified by mere reference to the President's residual powers; it is not unfettered,
and such power can only be exercised in conformity with the entire Constitution.
TO ALLOW MARCOS TO BE BURIED IN THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI WOULD VIOLATE

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF STATE OBLIGATIONS, AND
WOULD NEGATE THE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368.
A. Under international law, the Philippines is obligated to provide effective remedies, including holistic
reparations, to human rights victims.
B. The burial would contravene the duty of the Philippines to provide reparations to victims of human
rights violations during the Marcos regime.
C. The burial would run counter to the duty of the state to combat impunity.
PUBLIC FUNDS AND PROPERTY CANNOT BE USED FOR THE BURIAL AS IT SERVES NO
LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE.
A. The burial would contravene the public purpose of the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
B. Respondents have not explained how the burial would serve the avowed policy of national unity and
healing.
C. The burial would promote only the private interest of the Marcos family.
CONCLUSION: WHEREFORE, CJ Sereno voted to GRANT the Petitions.
Ocampo v. Enriquez,
G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117, 226120, 226294, 228186 & 228245
(Resolution), [August 8, 2017], 815 PHIL 1175-1278
FACTS: - During Rodrigo R. Duterte’s campaign in the 2016 Presidential Election, he announced that he would
allow former President Ferdinand E. Marcos to be buried at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the
2016 Presidential Election and assumed office at noon of 30 June 2016. A memorandum was issued by the
Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana to Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines General
Ricardo R. Visaya concerning the interment of former President Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
ISSUE: - Whether President Duterte's determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a
justiciable controversy.
RULING: -
APPLICATION: -
CONCLUSION: -
Almonte v. People,
G.R. No. 252117, [July 28, 2020]
FACTS:
1. Here, petitioners allege that they are prisoners and are among the elderly, sick, and pregnant population of
inmates exposed to the danger of contracting COVID-19 where social distancing and self-isolation measures
are purportedly impossible. As such, they are invoking this Court’s power to exercise “equity jurisdiction” and
are seeking “temporary liberty on humanitarian grounds” either on recognizance or on bail. Moreover, they are
also asking the Court to order the creation of a “Prisoner Release Committee” similar to those set up in other
countries to conduct a study and implement the release of prisoners in congested penal facilities.
2. In seeking their provisional release on recognizance or bail, petitioners essentially argue that:
(a) their continued confinement which poses a high risk of contracting COVID-19 is tantamount to cruel and
unusual punishment proscribed under the Constitution;
(b) the United Nations (UN) standards, particularly the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners (Nelson Mandela Rules), imposes a duty on the part of the State to protect the health and safety of
prisoners consistent with the guarantees of the right to life;
(c) the government's response to the pandemic is not enough to protect the safety of the inmates;
(d) the government should take a cue from other countries which undertook measures to decongest their jails
by releasing eligible prisoners;
(e) the Court may brush aside procedural rules and grant temporary liberty based on humanitarian reasons
and equity jurisdiction; and
(f) it is not feasible for them to file petitions for certiorari with the trial courts due to the Luzon-wide enhanced
community quarantine (ECQ)
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the instant petition filed directly before this Court may be given due course
2. Whether or not petitioners may be given provisional liberty on the ground of equity
RULING:
Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Syquia Mendoza, et al., 810 Phil. 172, 177 (2017) and Rayos, et
al. v. City of Manila , 678 Phil. 952, 957 (2011)
It is a settled rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
Relatedly, a direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction is generally proscribed to prevent inordinate
demands upon its time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction as
well as to prevent further over-crowding of its docket.
Obosa v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 334 Phil. 253, 270 (1997) and Leviste v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 629 Phil. 587,
610-611 (2010)
Concomitantly, the Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the accused except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. However, in cases where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and where the evidence of guilt is strong, bail is a matter of discretion.
APPLICATION:
In this case, petitioners have been charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua. As such, they are not
entitled to bail as a matter of right. Consequently, there is a need to conduct summary hearings for the purpose of
weighing the strength of the prosecution's evidence as to petitioners’ guilt.
The foregoing holds true with respect to the motions for other confinement arrangements which also necessitate
reception and evaluation of evidence by a trial court. Hence, being a court of last resort, the Court ingeminates
and reminds the Bench and the Bar that it is not the proper avenue or forum to ventilate factual questions
especially if they are presented for adjudication on the first instance.
CONCLUSION:
The Supreme Court is the Court of Last Resort at the top of the judicial hierarchy. The Court TREATS the present
petition as petitioners’ applications for bail or recognizance as well as their motions for other confinement
arrangements, and REFERS the same to the respective trial courts where their criminal cases are pending, which
courts are hereby DIRECTED to conduct the necessary proceedings and consequently, resolve these incidents
with utmost dispatch.
SHARI’A COURTS
Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court,

G.R. No. 188832, [April 23, 2014], 734 PHIL 239-267
FACTS: Roldan purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land located in Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres.
Transfer Certificate of Title covering the parcel of land was issued in Roldan’s name. Roldan had the parcel of
land surveyed. In a report, the Geodetic Engineer found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by
Roldan’s certificate of title. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover
the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court alleging among others that he is a
Filipino Muslim.
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on Vivencio. However, despite
the service of summons, Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to present
evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court granted. In its decision, respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court ruled that Roldan, as the registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land.
Thereafter, it issued the notice of writ of execution to Vivencio. Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment
with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. He argued that Shari’a District Courts may only hear
civil actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a Christian, Vivencio argued that
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land. However, respondent court denied the petition.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not a Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.
II. Whether or not proceedings before respondent Shari’a District Court were valid since the latter acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio.
RULING:
I. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with “existing civil courts'' over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein the
parties involved are Muslims. When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to
possess and enjoy it. If the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she has the right of action to
recover its possession from the dispossessed. When the property involved is real, such as land, the action to
recover it is a real action; otherwise, the action is a personal action. In such actions, the parties involved must
be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them. In this case, the allegations in
Roldan’s petition for recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim.
When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from the judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute
this claim. When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should
have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the
court shall dismiss the claim. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no authority under the law to
decide Roldan’s action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims. Thus, it had no
jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of possession.
II. In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his property, restore to him
the possession of his property, and pay damages for the unauthorized use of his property. This action being in
personam service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court to acquire
jurisdiction over Vivencio’s person. However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore, all the proceedings
before respondent Shari’a District Court, including the service of summons on Vivencio, are void.
APPLICATION: The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari'a
District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code,
customary contracts are construed in accordance with Muslim law. Hence, Shari'a District Courts apply Muslim
law when resolving real actions arising from customary contracts. In real actions not arising from contracts
customary to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari'a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions,
Shari'a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is the Civil Code of
the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the action. This is the reason why the original
jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that
of regular courts.
Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindong,

G.R. No. 193340. January 11, 2017
FACTS.
a. The Private respondents, Heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo filed a complaint with the Shari'a District
court of Marawi City against petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for possession and ownership of a parcel
of land located at Brngy. Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte.
b. The respondents alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, that in 1962, Macalabo and the
Municipality of Tangkal entered into an agreement for the latter to "borrow" the land for the construction of
the municipal hall and health center.
c. Upon the agreement, a condition was imposed upon the Municipality to pay the value of the land within 35
years, otherwise ownership would revert to Macalabo. However, the respondent alleged that the
Municipality neither paid nor returned the land.
d. The municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and lack
of jurisdiction. Arguing that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it
cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of muslim Personal Laws, and since the complaint for
recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the RTC of Lanao del Norte.
e. Shari'a District Court denied the motion. It held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Batingolo, is a Muslim,
the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of
regular/civil courts." The venue was also properly laid because the Shari'a District Court has territorial
jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and del norte.
ISSUE: W/N the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed
by Muslim individuals over the Municipality of Tangkal, whose mayor is a Muslim.
RULING: NO. In determining whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the threshold
question is whether both parties are Muslims. There is no disagreement that private respondents, as plaintiffs
below, are Muslims. The only dispute is whether the requirement is satisfied because the mayor of the defendant
municipality is also a Muslim.
When Article 143 (2) (b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions wherein the parties involved are
Muslims," the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real parties in interest. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court defines real parties in interest as those who stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
are entitled to the avails of the suit. It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor
Batingolo was impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal.
When an action is defended by a representative, that representative is not — and neither does he become — a
real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in interest; the representative remains to
be a third party to the action. That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying
with the jurisdictional requirement under Article 143 (2) (b) that both parties be Muslims. To satisfy the
requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition,
however, is a legal impossibility.
The Shari'a District Court appears to have understood the foregoing principles, as it conceded that the
Municipality of Tangkal "is neither a Muslim nor a Christian." The Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction under
the law to decide private respondents' complaint because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.
APPLICATION: The Code of Muslim Personal Laws defines a "Muslim" as "a person who testifies to the
oneness of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad and professes Islam."The ability to testify to the "oneness of
God…and to profess Islam is, by its nature, restricted to natural persons. In contrast, juridical persons are
artificial beings with "no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires." The Municipality of
Tangkal falls under this category.
CONCLUSION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the Shari'a District Court of
Marawi City in Civil Case No. 201-09 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 201-09 is
DISMISSED.
Malaki v. People,
G.R. No. 221075, [November 15, 2021]
FACTS: -
ISSUE: -
RULING: -
APPLICATION: -
CONCLUSION: -
SUPREME COURT
Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127022, June 28, 2000, 334 SCRA 465
FACTS: Subject of these consolidated petitions is a parcel of land located in Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila registered in the name of Spouses Lorenzo and Maria Gana and covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 4216 pursuant to a decision rendered in LRC Case No. 672.
In G.R. No. 109494, entitled Patrocinio Margolles vs. CA, et al., it was in this case when the validity of the original
title OCT. No. 4216 was assailed by petitioner Firestone Ceramics, Inc. However, the Supreme Court upheld the
validity of OCT No. 4216, declaring petitioners' titles adverse to OCT No. 4216 as null and void.
In G.R. No. 117029, entitled Peltan Development, et al. vs. CA, et al., the validity of the said title was again
challenged, where the Court ruled that private respondents had no cause of action in view of the ruling in the
Margolles case upholding the validity of said title.
Subsequently, the Republic filed a petition for annulment of the judgment, cancellation of titles and reversion of
the subject land to the public domain.
In the present G.R. No. 127022, Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, Inc., et al., support the petition filed by the
government through the Office of the Solicitor General for the annulment of OCT No. 4216, recovery of
possession and reversion alleging that it is reasonable and logical to defend the government's case.
Additionally, In G.R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic also raised the argument that OCT No. 4216 in the name of
the Gana spouses was not regularly issued and that the defunct CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction over the land
when the land was registered.
ISSUE: Should the Court pass upon the genuineness and validity of the subject land OCT No. 4216?
RULING: No. Allowing repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT No. 4216 like the present case, will bring to naught
the principle of indefeasibility of titles. We cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the
Highest Tribunal. It is only proper to allow the case to take its rest.The Supreme Court by tradition and in our
system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is. It is the final arbiter of any justiciable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings.
Well-settled is the rule enunciated in Church Assistance Program, Inc. vs. Sibulo, 15 that —
"When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it
remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate"
APPLICATION: The issue of validity of OCT No. 4216 which has been squarely passed upon by this Court in the
long final Margolles case should no longer be disturbed on the principle of res judicata or the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment. The final judgment rendered in the Margolles case is deemed to have settled the
status of OCT No. 4216 and any claim over it not noted thereon by other parties is barred under the principles of
res judicata.
CONCLUSION: The court should not pass upon the repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT No. 4216 because we
cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by the Highest Tribunal which is the Supreme Court,
the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy.
Lu v. Lu,
G.R. No. 153690, February 15, 2011, 643 SCRA 23
FACTS:
The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for “Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership
and Dissolution” filed on August 14, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et al.
against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. and sons (Lu Ym father and sons) and LLDC.
Prayer of petitioners:
In G.R. No. 153690, David Lu (David) prays that this Court annul and set aside the CA Decision dismissing the
initial complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for non-compliance with the rules on non-forum
shopping.
In G.R. No. 157381, Paterno Lu Ym, Sr. (Paterno Sr.), Paterno Lu Ym, Jr. (Paterno Jr.), John Lu Ym (John), Kelly
Lu Ym (Kelly) (collectively referred to as the Lu Ym father and sons), and Ludo and Luym Development Corp.
(LLDC) assail the CA Decision dated February 27, 2003 ordering the RTC to desist from conducting any
proceeding relating to the receivership over LLDC.
In G.R. No. 170889, John and LLDC question the CA Resolutions dated September 6, 2004 denying their
application for a writ of preliminary injunction; and dated December 8, 2005 denying their motion for
reconsideration and further deferring the resolution of the issue on docket fees.
LLDC is a family corporation founded by Paterno Sr. and his brothers primarily to hold real estate for the
family. LLDC’s Board of Directors authorized the issuance of its 600,000 unsubscribed and unissued shares at par
value of P100.00 per share. The Lu Ym father and sons subscribed to and paid most of such shares. David, et al.,
however, claimed that the 600,000 LLDC stocks were issued in favor of the Lu Ym father and sons for less than
their real values. Hence, the complaint filed for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and
Dissolution, before the RTC. They asked for the dissolution of the corporation as their ultimate remedy to
obtain redress for their grievances. To protect the interest of the corporation during the pendency of the case,
David et al. asked that a receiver for the corporation be appointed.
Lu Ym filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-compliance with the certificate of non-forum
shopping and no compromise was executed. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and ordered for the
appointment of receivers. Lu Ym father and sons elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals assailing the
court’s resolutions denying their motion to dismiss and their motion for reconsideration; and placing the
corporation under receivership and appointing two persons as receivers. The appellate court initially dismissed
the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it denied the Lu Ym father and
sons’ motion to dismiss and because of the prematurity of the petition on the issue of receivership (since there
was still a motion for reconsideration pending before the RTC). Later on, the CA granted the Lu Ym father and
sons’ petition and, thus, dismissed the complaint filed by David Lu, et al. for the parties’ (except David Lu)
failure to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping.
The Lu Ym father and sons filed a Manifestation and Motion praying for the immediate lifting of the
receivership order over LLDC. It turned out later that David instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the CA, with Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, on the sole issue of whether or not the RTC should proceed to hear the Lu Ym father and sons’
motion to lift the receivership. CA issued a Resolution temporarily restraining the RTC from conducting any
proceeding in SRC Case No. 021-CEB. The appellate court finally resolved to grant the petition and ordered the
RTC to desist from conducting any proceeding relating to the receivership over LLDC. The court concluded that
the proceedings on receivership could not proceed without the parties complying first with the earlier court
order which required the parties to amend their pleadings.
David filed a Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform to the Interim Rules Governing IntraCorporate
Controversies, which the court admitted. RTC rendered a decision on the merits of the case, annulling the
issuance of LLDC’s 600,000 shares of stocks thereby divesting the Lu Ym father and sons of their shares and
canceling their certificates of stocks. The court further ordered the dissolution of LLDC and the liquidation of
its assets. Aggrieved, the Lu Ym father and sons seasonably filed a Notice of Appeal to CA raising the question
of jurisdiction of RTC to hear the case since David did not pay the prescribed docket fees.
CA did not reconsider, and as to the question of the docket fees, it ruled that the matter be raised in their
appellants’ brief and that the issue be threshed out in the appeal of the merits. Hence, this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the CA for denying their application for writ of preliminary injunction and their
motion for reconsideration and seeking the dismissal of the initial complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction by
the insufficient payment of docket fees.
Issue of the Case:

1. Whether or not the initial complaint should be dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for
insufficient payment of docket fees? (which was only raised in the special civil action before the SC) NO.
Ruling of the Case:
In G.R. No. 170889, while it may be possible to raise the issue of docket fees in their appellants’ brief as
suggested by the CA, it would already be too late because the issue would be rendered moot and academic by
the dissolution of the corporation.
In the instant case, however, we cannot grant the dismissal prayed for because of the following reasons:
First, the case instituted before the RTC is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the correct docket
fees were paid. Second, John and LLDC are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because
of their active participation in the proceedings, and because the issue of payment of insufficient docket fees
had been belatedly raised before the Court of Appeals, only in their motion for reconsideration. Lastly, assuming
that the docket fees paid were truly inadequate, the mistake was committed by the Clerk of Court who
assessed the same are not imputable to David; and as to the deficiency, if any, the same may instead be
considered a lien on the judgment that may thereafter be rendered.
The Court had, in the past, laid down the test in determining whether the subject matter of an action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If the action
is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only
incidental to or merely a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
In the current controversy, the main purpose of the complaint filed before the RTC was the annulment of
the issuance of the 600,000 LLDC shares of stocks because they had been allegedly issued for less than their par
value. Thus, David sought the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of receivers/management
committee. To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and the appointment of
receivers/management committee are actions which do not consist in the recovery of a sum of money. If, in the
end, a sum of money or real property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal
action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, John’s and
LLDC’s contention cannot be sustained. And since David paid the docket fees for an action the subject of which
was incapable of pecuniary estimation, as computed by the Clerk of Court, the trial court validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
Wherefore, petitions GR 153690 and 157381 are DENIED for being moot and academic; while
petition GR 170889 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda,

A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC (Resolution), [June 9, 2005], 499 PHIL 1-17
FACTS: This administrative case was spawned by the November 10, 2003 affidavit of complaint filed by
complainant Aurelio Indencia Arrienda with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In his complaint, the
complainant accused Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno, Santiago M. Kapunan, Bernardo P. Pardo and
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago of this Court, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and Associate Justices
B.A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and Perlita Tria Tirona of the Court of Appeals (CA), of graft and corruption. In particular,
the complainant charged the respondent justices for "willfully, maliciously and arbitrarily" rendering allegedly
unjust decisions in (RTC) Civil Case No. Q-53060, CA-G.R. CV No. 48737 and G.R. No. 137904 which were filed
by complainant and his family against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Crispina de la Cruz.
He also charged them with "willfully, maliciously and arbitrarily" suppressing evidence and resorting "to a modus
operandi or the so-called '1-2-3' to swindle or defraud" him and his family "by simply issuing 'minute' resolutions
based on technicalities without having passed upon the unresolved issues and those other issues that were
resolved contrary to laws, rules on evidence, etc." The complainant accused the respondent justices of acting on
the basis of "personal considerations" when they decided the case against him and his family. On May 11, 2004,
the complainant filed another complaint, this time against the Chief Justice whom he charged with graft and
corruption. He reiterated his previous charges against the other respondent justices. He faulted the Chief Justice
for referring all of complainant's eight letters to Justice Puno and the Third Division of this Court "to cover up their
corrupt practices."
Acting on the complaints, the Court observed in its July 13, 2004 resolution that these complaints were a mere
rehash of a similar complaint against Justice Velasco before the Judicial and Bar Council. In that same resolution,
the Court took pains to explain that the decisions of the trial court, the appellate court and the Supreme Court
showed that complainant's predicament was brought about solely by his failure to pay his loan to the GSIS and
redeem the property after having been given the opportunity to do so. The respondent justices merely applied the
law based on the facts and evidence on record. Because of his offensive and disrespectful statements, the
complainant was ordered to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for attempting to foist
falsehood on the Court and committing grave abuse of court processes. On January 26, 2005, complainant filed
his answer. The complainant denied foisting falsehood on and showing disrespect to the Court. He asserted that
he "merely exercised his right to due process of law, of speech, of expression to air his grievances and that of his
family and to expose to the Court for redress the injustices inflicted upon them."
The complainant repeated his denunciation of the decision in theVda. de Urbano case which allegedly "smack(ed)
of favoritism and partiality" toward the GSIS and de la Cruz. He repeated his litany of accusations against the
justices: deliberate and malicious violation of the Court's own rulings; being motivated by "personal
considerations" in rendering the decision; acting like unscrupulous lawyers for GSIS and de la Cruz; betrayal of
public trust; deliberate intent to defraud, cheat and swindle the complainant and his family; rendering selective
justice; arbitrary denial of complainant's motion for clarification with alternative prayer for an en banc resolution,
motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration and omnibus motion by minute resolutions; and, the
operation of "1-2-3" modus operandi or swindling in the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the judiciary was wrong, partial, and unjust in its decision in the Vda. de Urbano
case; (2) Whether or not petitioner had good reason to raise accusations against the judiciary.
RULING: (1) NO, the judiciary was NOT WRONG, PARTIAL, NOR UNJUST in its decision in the Vda. de
Urbano case. The Court has consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor favor. The complainant's vicious
and unfounded attacks on the integrity of the courts and the officers thereof should end here and now. Enough is
enough. Like all other cases decided by us, the disposition in the Vda. de Urbano case was arrived at after a
careful study and thorough deliberation of the facts and the evidence. Just because a case is resolved against the
interests of a party does not mean that it is "unjust." In any event, there was no truth to his allegation that our
decision inV da. de Urbano left some issues unresolved and that it disregarded certain significant pieces of
evidence. The records of the case show that all pertinent issues raised by the complainant were sufficiently
addressed by the RTC, CA and this Court in their respective decisions. In fact, Justice Puno's ponencia in Vda. de
Urbano considered all matters presented by the complainant and summarized them into "three jugular issues."
But even assuming that certain issues were not discussed, the force and effect of the ponencia remained the
same. It was not incumbent upon the Court to discuss each and every issue in the pleadings and memoranda of
the parties, specially those it did not deem necessary for the full disposition of the case. Neither was the Court
bound to consider or accept each and every piece of evidence presented by the parties as some may be
immaterial or irrelevant while others, even if admissible, may not be sufficiently credible.
Furthermore, this Court is not a trier of facts. The appreciation of complainant's factual evidence was primarily the
function not of this Court but of the RTC before whom the exhibits and testimonies of the witnesses of the
contending parties were offered. The Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the
justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute
resolutions, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution
(signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition or a motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings
of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings. While
most of the Court's work is performed by its three divisions, the Court remains one court — single, unitary,
complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that, while individual justices may dissent or only partially
concur, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. Any doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court may be modified or reversed only by the Court en banc.
(2) NO, petitioner had NO GOOD REASON to raise accusations against the judiciary. The power of contempt
should be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective, not on the retaliatory idea
of punishment. It should be used sparingly, specially against a disgruntled, losing litigant. However, when the
disappointment of the losing litigant turns into hatred because he fails to get what he wants and he resorts to
detestable language, then the Court has to draw the line. The words employed by the complainant against the
justices were not only obnoxious and insulting; they were downright slanderous. Such gutter language can only
come from one who is deeply and self-righteously intolerant not only of our system of laws but also of the opinion
of others. Indeed, complainant's myopic view is that any decision adverse to him is unjust, arbitrary and unlawful.
Conversely, a decision is fair and correct only if it conforms with his position. In such a case, then every man will
be a law unto himself.
The complainant has every right to think highly of himself and of his own interpretation of the law. That is his
prerogative. He cannot, however, demand that the Court adopt his view. The complainant's vituperation against
the Chief Justice on account of what he perceived was the latter's refusal "to take a direct positive and favorable
action" on his letters of appeal overstepped the limits of proper conduct. It betrayed his lack of understanding of a
fundamental principle in our system of laws. Although the Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot legally
decide a case on his own because of the Court's nature as a collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by
himself, overturn the decision of the Court, whether of a division or the en banc. It is reprehensible for the
complainant to threaten the members of the Court with impeachment. To threaten a judge or justice with
investigation and prosecution for official acts done by him in the regular exercise of official duty subverts and
undermines the independence of the judiciary.
One of the most zealously guarded rights under the Constitution is the freedom of speech and expression. Such
right includes the right to criticize the courts and its officers. Decisions and official actions of the Court are "public
property" and the press and the people have the right to challenge or find fault with them as they see fit. Judicial
officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion.
However, any criticism of the Court must possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed by
perspective and infused by philosophy. The cardinal condition is that it is bona fide and does not violate the basic
rules of reasonable and legitimate criticism. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism on one hand, and the
slander of courts and judges on the other.
The right to criticize, guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression under the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. True freedom is not freedom
divorced from responsibility but freedom coupled with responsibility. Freedom of speech and expression, like other
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. It is subject to the limitations of equally important public interests such as
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. Proscribed then are, inter
alia, the use of foul language which ridicules the high esteem for the courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration, or tends to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court
and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court; or offensive, abusive and abrasive language; or
disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the
judge; or disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for remarks. The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant
against the respondent justices, e.g., "Crooks in Robe," "Swindlers in Robe," "corrupt justices who were only
sowing 'judicial terrorism,'" as well as his vilification of the Chief Justice whom he called "Chief-Swindler-in-Robe,"
go beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior.
SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority,

G.R. No. 203655 (Resolution), [September 7, 2015], 768 PHIL 615-666
FACTS:
1.For another time, the respondent-movants Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) and Arnel
Paciano D. Casanova urge before the Court to reconsider its August 13, 2014 decision.
2.The respondent-movants are not persuaded in claiming that the assailed rulings of the Court would cause
unwarranted and irremediable injury to the government, specifically to its major beneficiaries, the Department of
National Defense (DND) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Thus, this results with the
respondent-movants to file Motion for Leave to file Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit the Attached
Second Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en back to Take Cognizance and Set the Case for
Oral Argument in a Court en banc).
ISSUE: - Whether or not the respondent-movants could file Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit the
Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en banc to Take Cognizance of this Case
and/to Set the Case for Oral Argument Before the Court en banc).
RULING: -
1.Section 2, Rule 56 in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court
Second motion for reconsideration. - No second motion for reconsideration of a judgement or final resolution by
the same party shall be entertained.
2.Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
Second motion for reconsideration.- The Court shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and
any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a
vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice"
when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for reconsideration can
only be entertained before the ruling sought to be considered becomes final by operation of law or by the
Court's declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court En Banc. (emphasis added)
The following elements are required for a second motion for reconsideration;
1. The motion should satisfactorily explain why granting the same would be in the higher interest of justice;
2. The motion must be made before the ruling sought to be reconsidered attains finality;
3. If the ruling sought to be reconsidered was rendered by the Court through one of its Divisions, at least three (3)
members of the said Division should vote to elevate the case to the Court En
Banc; and
4. The favorable vote of at least two-thirds of the Court En Banc's actual membership must be mustered for the
second motion for reconsideration to be granted.
APPLICATION: -
In a second motion for reconsideration, the requirements for the Court to be entertained should be in accordance
with Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar, the requirements do not obtain for there are no extraordinarily persuasive reasons “in the
higher interest of justice”. Based on the records, the second motion for reconsideration is a reuse of the previous
arguments and submissions by the respondent-movants which the Court had already addressed in its Decision on
August 13,2014, and was effectively affirmed through a Resolution on March 18, 2015.
In this case, despite BCDA's repeated assurances that it would respect SMLI's rights as an original proponent,
and after putting the latter to considerable trouble and expense, BCDA went back on its word and instead
ultimately cancelled its agreement with SMLI. BCDA's capriciousness became the evident in its conflicting
statements as regards whether or not SMLI's proposal would be advantageous to the government. BCDA failed to
establish a justifiable reason for its refusal to proceed with the competitive challenge. Therefore, the
respondent-movants’ second motion for reconsideration, is totally bereft of merit. There is no argument "in the
higher interest of justice" that would convincingly compel before the Court to admit the prohibited pleading. Thus,
the Division does not find convincing reason to elevate the case to the Court en banc. Also, the Court’s ruling in
this case has already attained finality and an Entry of Judgment. Therefore, it has no jurisdiction to modify the
decision.
CONCLUSION: -
WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Leave to file Second Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit the Attached
Second Motion for Reconsideration (With Motion for the Court en banc to Take Cognizance of this Case and/to
Set the Case for Oral Argument Before the Court en banc), is DENIED for lack of merit. All other petitions shall
NOT be entertained in this case.
Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 178083 & A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC (Resolution), [March 13, 2018]
FACTS: -
The Third Division disbelieved the veracity of PAL’s claim of severe financial losses, and concluded that PAL had
not established its severe financial losses because of its non-presentation of audited financial statements. It further
concluded that PAL had implemented the retrenchment program in bad faith, and had not used fair and reasonable
criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched.
Upon conclusion of the oral arguments, the Court directed the parties to explore a possible settlement and to
submit their respective memoranda. Unfortunately, the parties did not reach any settlement; hence, the Court,
through the Special Third Division, resolved the issues on the merits through the resolution of October 2, 2009
denying PAL’s motion for reconsideration.
The Special Third Division was unconvinced by PAL’s change of theory in urging the June 1998 Association of
Airline Pilots of the Philippines (ALPAP) pilots’ strike as the reason behind the immediate retrenchment, and
observed that the strike was a temporary occurrence that did not require the immediate and sweeping
retrenchment of around 1,400 cabin crew.
ISSUE: -
(1) Did PAL lawfully retrench the 1,400 cabin crew personnel?
(2) Assuming that PAL validly implemented its retrenchment program, did the retrenched employees sign valid quitclaims?
RULING: -
(1) Yes, PAL implemented a valid retrenchment program. Retrenchment or downsizing is a mode of terminating
employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee and without prejudice to the latter,
resorted to by management during periods of business recession, industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or
during lulls over shortage of materials. It is a reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer to
minimize business losses incurred in the operation of its business.
Accordingly, the employer may resort to retrenchment in order to avert serious business losses. To justify such
retrenchment, the following conditions must be present, namely:
1. The retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses;
2. The losses, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if
only expected, are reasonably imminent;
3. The expected or actual losses must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence;
4. The retrenchment must be in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent
the employees’ right to security of tenure; and
5. There must be fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be
retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship
for certain workers.
Upon critical review of the records, we are convinced that PAL had met all the standards in effecting a valid
retrenchment.
The July 22, 2008 decision recognized that PAL underwent corporate rehabilitation. Indeed, a company that
undergoes rehabilitation sufficiently indicates its fragile financial condition.
After having placed under corporate rehabilitation and its rehabilitation plan having been proved by the SEC on
June 23, 2008, PAL’s dire financial predicament could not be doubted. Incidentally, the SEC’s order of approval
came a week after PAL had sent out notices of termination to the affected employees.
Moreover, the fact that airline operations were capital intensive but earnings were volatile because of their
vulnerability to economic recession, among others. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 had wrought havoc among
the air carries, PAL included. The peculiarities existing in the airline business made it easier to believe that at the
time of the Asian financial crisis, PAL incurred liabilities amounting to P90,642,933,919.00, which were way
beyond the value of its assets that then only stood at P85,109,075,351.
APPLICATION:
PAL retrenched in good faith.
The employer is burdened to observe good faith in implementing a retrenchment program. Good faith on its part
exists when the retrenchment is intended for the advancement of its interest and is not for the purpose of defeating
or circumventing the rights of the employee under special laws or under valid agreements.
PAL could not have been motivated by ill will or bad faith when it decided to terminate FASAP’s affected
members. On the contrary, good faith could be justly inferred from PAL’s conduct before, during, and after the
implementation of retrenchment plan.
Notable in this respect was PAL’s candor towards FASAP regarding its plan to implement the retrenchment
program. Records also show that the parties met on several occasions to explore cost-cutting measures, including
the implementation of the retrenchment program. PAL likewise manifested that the retrenchment plan was
temporarily shelved while it implemented other measures (like termination of probationary cabin attendant, and
work-rotations).
Given PAL’s dire financial predicament, it becomes understandable that PAL was constrained to finally implement
the retrenchment program when the ALPAP pilots strike crippled a major part of PAL’s operations. As between
maintaining the number of its flight crew and PAL’s survival, it was reasonable for PAL to choose the latter
alternative. This Court cannot legitimately force PAL as a distressed employer to maintain its manpower despite
its dire financial condition. To be sure, the right of PAL as the employer to reasonable returns on its investments
and to expansion and growth is also enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, although labor is entitled to the
right to security of tenure, the State will not interfere with the employer’s valid exercise of its management
prerogative.
PAL used fair and reasonable criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched pursuant to the CBA.
In selecting the employees to be dismissed, the employer is required to adopt fair and reasonable criteria, taking
into considerable factors, like:
(a) Preferred status;
(b) Efficiency;
(c) Seniority, among others.
The requirement of fair and reasonable criteria is imposed on the employer to preclude the occurrence of arbitrary
selection of employees to be retrenched. Absent any showing of bad faith, the choice of who should be retrenched
must be conceded to the employer for as long as the basis for the retrenchment exists.
In fine, the Court will only strike down the retrenchment of an employer as capricious, whimsical, arbitrary and
prejudicial in the absence of a clear-cut and uniform guideline followed by the employer in selecting him or her
from the work pool. Following this standard, PAL validly implemented its retrenchment program.
PAL resorted to both efficiency rating and inverse seniority in selecting the employees to be subject of
termination.
(2) Yes, the retrenched employees signed valid quitclaims. In EDI Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, we laid down the basic contents of valid and effective quitclaims and waivers, to
wit:
(a) A fixed amount as full and compromise settlement;
(b) The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the employees are giving up
in consideration of the fixed compromise amount;
(c) A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino, or in the dialect
known to the employees – that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they (a) are forfeiting or relinquishing their
rights to receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and
(d) A statement that the employees signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had fully understood the
consents of the document and that their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress,
intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person.
The release and quitclaim signed by the affected employees substantially satisfied the aforestated requirements.
The consideration was clearly indicated in the document in the English language, including the benefits that the
employee would be relinquishing in exchange for the amounts to be received. There is no question that the
employees who had occupied the position of flight crew knew and understood the English language. Hence, they
fully comprehended the terms used in the release and quitclaim that they signed.
CONCLUSION:
WHEREFORE, the Court:
(a) GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of October 2, 2009 and Second
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008 filed by the respondents Philippine Airlines, Inc.
and Patria Chiong;
(b) DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration (Re: The Honorable Court's Resolution dated March 13,
2012) filed by the petitioner Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines;
(c) SETS ASIDE the decision dated July 22, 2008 and resolution dated October 2, 2009; and
(d) AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 23, 2006.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
STUDY THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT
Supreme Court v. Delgado,

A.M. No. 2011-07-SC, [October 4, 2011], 674 PHIL 185-204
FACTS:
This is an administrative case stemmed from the memorandum issued by the Complaints Investigation Division of
the Office of Administrative Services (OAS) against respondents Eddie Delgado, Wilfredo Florendo, and Joseph
Madeja who are utility workers and clerk IV of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division (OCC-SD) for
allegedly participating in removing some pages from one of the sealed Agenda without authority to do so. The
OAS found Delgado guilty of grave misconduct and recommended his dismissal from service, on the other hand,
Madeja and Florendo are found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the service and OAS
recommended their 6-month suspension.
Ms. Christine Puno of the OCC-SD asked Mr. Irving Tanael to photocopy the sealed Agenda from the Office of the
SC Associate Justice and Second Division Chairperson Antonio Carpio in two copies. Subsequently, the finished
copies were given to respondent Delgado for stitching. Ms. Puno caught Delgado acting suspiciously and began
to suspect that respondent Delgado might have taken some pages from the copies of the Agenda. Thereafter,
OCC-SD Clerk of Court Atty. Ma. Luisa Laurea ordered an initial investigation and called the involved personnel
for an initial investigation.
During the initial investigation, Delgado candidly admitted that he took pages from the one of the Agenda.
However, respondent Delgado also disclosed that he removed the pages from the subject Agenda only as a favor
to respondents Madeja and Florendo. Respondents Madeja and Florendo asked and in fact obtained the missing
pages in the May 30 2011 Agenda. Both respondents Madeja and Florendo attested that court employees from
other Divisions had been requesting for copies of the Agenda, to which they were inclined to accede in exchange
for tokens like pang merienda or pamasahe. A memorandum was then submitted to Justice Carpio.
Pursuant to a Resolution issued by the Court, the OAS conducted a formal investigation wherein respondents
Madeja and Florendo adamantly denied having made any admission during the initial investigation. They submit
that there is no actual evidence that shows that they have knowledge of or involvement in the actions of
respondent Delgado. On the other hand, respondent Delgado in his statement during the formal hearings, stood
by his admissions during the initial investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are administratively liable for participating in removing some pages from one
of the sealed Agenda.
RULING: Yes, respondents are guilty of grave misconduct. The SC modified the findings and
recommendations of the OAS.
Respondents Madeja and Florendo asked respondent Delgado for a copy of several items included in the 30 May
2011 Agenda. Acceding to the request, respondent Delgado removed pages 58, 59 and 70 from a copy of the
Agenda entrusted to him for stitching and gave them to respondents Madeja and Delgado. Veritably, the acts of
respondents complement each other; they are but completions of a common Grave Misconduct. As stated earlier,
both respondents Madeja and Florendo vehemently denied having been involved in the taking of the missing
Agenda pages during the formal investigation of the OAS. This sharply contradicts their reported admission of
complicity during the initial investigation conducted by the OCC-SD. The evidence at hand, however, point out
that respondents Madeja and Florendo, indeed, connived with respondent Delgado in removing the three
(3) pages from a copy of the 30 May 2011 Agenda. The denial of respondents Madeja and Florendo, in a
complete turnaround from an earlier admission, is unavailing as against the positive, straightforward and
consistent statements of respondent Delgado.
APPLICATION:
1. The 30 May 2011 Agenda contains an itemized list of cases taken up by the Court's Second Division during
the sessions held on the concerned date and the handwritten marginal notes of Justice Carpio noting the
specific actions adopted by the division on each case. Under Rule 11, Section 5 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court, such a document is considered confidential. Owing to the confidential nature of the contents
of an Agenda, the OCC-SD follows a very strict procedure in handling them. Thus, as can be gathered from
the factual narration, only a few specified personnel within the OCC-SD are authorized to have access to an
Agenda — e.g., only Ms. Puno is authorized to receive and open; only four (4) persons are authorized to
photocopy.
3. None of the respondents is entitled to a copy of an Agenda. None of them has any authority to be informed of
the contents of an Agenda, much less to obtain a page therefrom.
a. Respondent Delgado - holds a casual appointment as a Utility Worker II in the OCC-SD. His
primary work in the said office is to stitch pleadings, records and other court documents.
b. Respondent Madeja - holds a permanent appointment as Clerk IV in the OCC-SD. His primary
task in the said office is the inventory of case rollos.
c. Respondent Florendo holds a permanent appointment as Utility II in the OCC-SD. He performs

various duties in the office like receiving and delivering case rollos, releasing of agenda reports
and stitching court records.
Given the foregoing, there are adequate grounds to hold respondents administratively liable. This Court had
already held that the conduct and behavior of all officials and employees of an office involved in the administration
of justice, from the highest judicial official to the lowest personnel, requires them to live up to the strictest
standard of honesty, integrity and uprightness in order to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.
Court employees, as the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel puts it, "serve as sentinels of justice" and "any
act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people's
confidence in it."
In the case at bench, the respondents palpably failed to meet the high standard expected from them as court
employees. Their conduct is neither excusable nor tolerable. The respondents, through their acts, have proven
themselves to be unfit for continued employment in the judiciary.
sm
CONCLUSION: The respondents Eddie V. Delgado, Utility Worker II, Joseph Lawrence M. Madeja, Clerk IV and
Wilfredo A. Florendo, Utility Worker II, all of the Office of the Clerk of Court, Second Division are hereby
DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, except accrued leave benefits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Re: Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases,

A.M. No. 08-8-7-SC (Notice), [November 13, 2018]
FACTS: -
ISSUE: -
RULING: -
APPLICATION: -
CONCLUSION: -
Okada v. Tiger Resort, Leisure & Entertainment, Inc.,

G.R. No. 256470 (Notice), [August 10, 2022]
FACTS: - On 29 August 2018, Kazuo filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Removal as a Stockholder,
Director, and Officer and Reinstatement as a Stockholder, Director and Officer (Complaint) before the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque City (RTC) against TRLEI and its directors.|
Dispute arose when sometime in May 2017, Kazuo's son, Tomohiro, took control of the 9.78% OHL shares under
the name of Kazuo's daughter, Hiromi. Combining this with his 43.4% shareholding, this resulted to Tomohiro's
control over OHL, or 53.24% of OHL. Hiromi allegedly challenged the validity of the Share Management and
Disposal Trust Agreement (Trust Agreement) executed in favor of Tomohiro on the ground of fraud.
08 September 2017, where the former's removal as director of OHL was declared as invalid. Kazuo then informed
TRLEI that he regained the majority ownership of OHL and he would re-assume control of OHL and its
subsidiaries. However, TRLEI did not recognize Kazuo's claim and the latter was refused entry into Okada Manila,
which is owned and operated by TRLEI, notwithstanding his investment thereto of more than Two Billion U.S.
Dollars ($2,000,000,000.00).
TRLEI, Cojuangco, David, and Sugiyama argued, among others, that the Complaint is an election contest which
has already prescribed. Lazaro essentially offered the same defense. Kazuo countered that his Complaint was not
an election contest the reglementary period for filing of because his unlawful ouster as a stockholder of TRLEI
was integral to his subsequent void removal as a director, chairperson, and CEO thereof.
Through an Order dated 16 November 2018, the RTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of prescription.
Kazuo appealed before the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA denied the appeal in its Decision dated 24
September 2020. The CA likewise denied Kazuo's motion for reconsideration in its Resolution.
ISSUE: - the propriety of delegation to the CA for reception of evidence for determination of factual matters
relating to the case (delegation of the case from SC to CA)
RULING: - As discussed in the foregoing, there are factual issues which would have to be settled before this
Court can properly resolve the pending motions of TRLEI and Sugiyama, as well as any factual matters related to
the main issue of Kazuo's petition, i.e. , whether or not the complaint filed before the trial court is an election
contest and the right to file one had already prescribed.
APPLICATION: -
CONCLUSION: -
DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Yared v. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000

ESTRELLA TIONGCO YARED (now deceased) substituted by one of her heirs, CARMEN MATILDE M.
TIONGCO, PETITIONER v. HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Br.
26, JOSE B. TIONGCO and ANTONIO G. DORONILA, JR., RESPONDENTS., G.R. No. 114732, 1 August 2000,
Second Division
FACTS: 1. 17 October 1990 – The petitioner Estrella Tiongco Yared filed an amended complaint before
the Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Branch XXVI, against private respondents Jose
B.
Tiongco and Antonio Doronila, Jr. Docketed as Civil Case No. 19408, the action was one for
"annulment of affidavit of adjudication, sales, transfer certificates of title, reconveyance and
damages.”
2. 17 April 1974 – The affidavit of adjudication as the basis was filed on the said dated alleging
that he is the sole surviving heir of the previous owner, Maria Luis de Tiongco, succeeded in
having the subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the other surviving
heir of the previous owner, petitioner among them.
3. Petitioner and respondent Tiongco's father were siblings, and both were among several heirs
of Maria Luis de Tiongco.
4. 10 May 1974 – The aforesaid affidavit of adjudication was registered with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Iloilo City.
5. 14 February 1994 – The respondent filed his third Motion for Reconsideration which was
found
to be persuasive, hence, in an Order on the above-mentioned date, the respondent judge
granted the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens.
6. Petitioner prayed that the properties be reconveyed to the original registered owners, subject
to partition among the lawful heirs, and that respondent Tiongco be ordered to pay damages
and costs.
7. To protect the petitioner’s interest in the properties during the pendency of the case, petitioner
caused it to be annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-52547, T-4666 and T-52546,
which covered Lot Nos. 3244, 3246 and 1404, respectively. TCT Nos. T-92383 and T-5050
were derived or transferred from TCT Nos. T-52547 and T-4666 respectively and registered in
the name of Tiongco.
8. After respondent Jose B. Tiongco filed his answer, trial ensued during which, on three
separate occasions, he filed motions seeking the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens.
All these motions were denied.
9. 14 December 1993 – The respondent judge issued a Decision dismissing petitioner's

complaint
and private respondent's counterclaim. The trial court found that petitioner's cause of action
had
already prescribed.
10. 17 December 1993 – Petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
11. 10 January 1994 – Before, respondent Tiongco filed a motion for cancellation of the notices of
lis
pendens dated December 21, 1993; this was denied in an Order dated January 10, 1994.
12. 26 January 1994 – The respondent files a “Second Motion for Reconsideration” which was
also denied in an Order on this date.
13. 14 February 1994 – The respondent filed a “Third Motion for Reconsideration”. His arguments
proved persuasive. This time the respondent judge ruled in favor of the respondent, stating in
an order herein that the criminal complaint for perjury filed by plaintiff against defendant Jose
B. Tiongco based on the same deed of adjudication had already been dismissed with finality
also on the ground of prescription, and that the occupants of the property who were alleged
as formerly paying rentals to the plaintiff had already recognized defendant’s ownership and
had long stopped paying rentals to plaintiff without the latter intervening, much less,
contesting the decision in Civil Case No. 15421.
14. The defendant Jose B. Tiongco was declared with finality as the true and lawful owner of Lots
Nos. 3244 and 3246; and (3) that, if at all, the present claim of plaintiff covers but a very small
portion of subject lots consisting only a total of about 64 square meters hence, it would be
unfair to the defendant who has torrens title covering the parcels of lands solely in his name to
have the same subjected to the harsh effect of such an encumbrance.
15. The Court, in view of all the foregoing considerations and upon further review of the records,
hereby reconsiders its stand on the subject matter of lis pendens and so holds that the
continued annotation of subject notices of lis pendens is intended to molest the defendant,
Jose B. Tiongco, and is not necessary to protect the rights of plaintiff as such rights, if any,
are now foreclosed by prescription.
16. The petitioner’s turn to seek reconsideration.
17. 4 March 1994 – the public respondent issued an Order 15 reversing himself on the ground
that (1) it had already lost jurisdiction over the case due to the expiration of the last day to
appeal of both parties, (2) the notice of appeal has been approved, and (3) the records had
been ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals.
18. Private respondent filed another motion for reconsideration against the Order dated on the
same date.
19. 17 March 1994 – the respondent judge issued the order, which is the subject of the petition,
the lis pendens.
20. 5 April 1994 – the Register of Deeds cancelled the annotation of notices of lis pendens.
21. In fear that the motion for reconsideration would not be successful, petitioner filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari with the allegations that the honorable respondent judge
acted capriciously, whimsically and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the cancellation
of the notices of lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title that are the
subject of the civil case no. 19408, as these are among the documents that are sought to be
declared null and void by the herein petitioner
22. The doctrine of lis pendens is founded upon reasons of public policy and necessity, the
purpose
of which is to make known to the whole world that properties in litigation are still within the
power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or
decree by subsequent alienation.
23. The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real
property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said
property.
24. Rule 13, Section 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 76 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provide the statutory
bases for a notice of lis pendens.
ISSUES: A. Whether or not petitioner’s filing of the instant special civil action for certiorari violates
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
B. Whether Tiangco violated the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: A. CONCERNING THE FIRST ISSUE
The petition should be dismissed, there being a clear violation of the doctrine of judicial
hierarchy that we have taken pains to emphasize in past jurisprudence.
1. SC: “Petitioner has failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as to her failure to comply
with or non-observance of the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason why the
instant petition could not have been brought before the Court of Appeals, considering all the
more that the appeal of the main case was already before it.”
2. SC: “Had petitioner brought the instant petition before the Court of Appeals, the same could,
and would, have been consolidated with the appeal, thereby bringing under the competence
of the said court all matters relative to the action, including the incidents thereof.”
B. CONCERNING THE SECOND ISSUE
CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 — A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
before the courts.
1. SC: “In Romero v. Valle, we stated that a lawyer's actuations, "[a]lthough allowed some
latitude of remarks or comment in the furtherance of the cause he upholds, his arguments,
both written or oral, should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and be of such
words as may be properly addressed by one gentleman to another." Otherwise, his use of
intemperate language invites the disciplinary authority of the court. We are aghast at the
facility with which respondent Atty. Jose B. Tiongco concocts accusations against the
opposing party and her counsel, although it is of public record that in Tiongco v. Deguma, et
al., we dismissed as totally unfounded his charge of fraudulent conspiracy and public scandal
against petitioner, Major Tiongco, Atty. Deguma and even the latter's superior at the Public
Attorney's Office, Atty. Napoleon G. Pagtanac. His lexicon of insults, though entertaining, do
not find a ready audience in us, and he should be, as he is hereby, warned accordingly:
Homines qui gestant, quiqui auscultant crimina, si meo arbitratu liceat, omnis pendeat,
gestores linguis, auditores auribus.”
2. SC: “WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED, without pronouncement
as to costs.”
Vivas v. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,

G.R. No. 191424, [August 7, 2013], 716 PHIL 132-154
FACTS: - This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a status quo ante order or writ of
preliminary injunction ordering the respondents to desist from closing Euro Credit Community Bank,
Incorporated (ECBI) and from pursuing the receivership thereof. The petition likewise prays that the management
and operation of ECBI be restored to its Board of Directors (BOD) and its officers.
The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution with principal office in
Centro Sur, Sto. Niño, Cagayan. Record shows that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005.
Petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006.
At the initiative of Vivas and the new management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results
thereof highlighted the dismal operation of the rural bank.
Euro credit Community Bank was registered as the Rural Bank of Faire prior to changing its name and extending
its corporate life as approved by the BSP after the latter’s corporate life expired. During the investigation
conducted by the BSP, it discovered that the bank incurring substantial losses and was engaged in unsound and
unsafe banking practices.
Thus, after several investigations and conferences, the BSP Monetary Board issued an order placing the bank
under receivership and liquidation based on the grounds enumerated under Section 30 of the New Central
Bank Act, and the inability of the management to restore the financial viability of the bank.
Petitioner Vivas, in behalf of the bank contested the order alleging that the same was done in violation of the
bank’s right to due process, as the order was issued with no prior notice and hearing. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: - WON the Monetary Board may place a bank under receivership and liquidation with no prior
notice and hearing.
RULING: - Yes. Monetary Board has the power to place a bank under receivership and it may not be restrained
or set aside except on a petition for certiorari (RA 7653, Section 30).
SC: To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4,
2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a
bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside except on a petition
for certiorari. Pertinent portions of R.A. 7653.
Prohibition is already unavailing
Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances
obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts,
tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by
law and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate
courts, tribunals, or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its
jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. In our jurisdiction, the rule on prohibition is enshrined in Section
2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant
to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of
a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide
a remedy for acts already accomplished.
The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA:
Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of Rule 65.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or
of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or
not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the FF Wa ed if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by
law or these Rules , the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of Commerce v.
Planters Development Bank and Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.
APPLICATION: - Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the
absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not advanced any special or
important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly
appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas
is questioning the findings of the investigating team.
Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is
also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be
presented to either court.
As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy
must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
CONCLUSION: - In this case, there was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the issuance of R.A.
No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered
the MB to effectively monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances
warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place them under
receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB
and assigned to it only the manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion
and latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the interest
of the public, the banking industry and the economy.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS v. Lim,

G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014
FACTS:
In a preceding case, Social Justice Society, the petitioner therein, filed an original action for mandamus on
praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which reclassified the area described
therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed in Section 1
of the same ordinance to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of
the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. The
Court in the said case granted their petition and directed Honorable Jose Atienza to immediately enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 because as the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as
long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts.
On June 16, 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An Ordinance Adopting the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration,
Enforcement and Amendment thereto." The Industrial Zone was limited to the Light Industrial Zone (I-1). All
ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance were repealed; Provided, that the
rights that are vested upon the effectivity of the Ordinance would not be impaired.
On May 14, 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor
Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The new Ordinance repealed, amended,
rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances
or provisions inconsistent therewith thereby allowing, once again, the operation of "Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and
Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments" and"Highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous[,]
Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous[,] Non-Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing
establishments" within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) in the
Pandacan area.
The petitioners' arguments in this case are primarily anchored on the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 156052
declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid after finding that the presence of the oil terminals in
Pandacan is a threat to the life and security of the people of Manila. From thence, the petitioners enumerated
constitutional provisions, municipal laws and international treaties and conventions on health and environment
protection allegedly violated by the enactment of the assailed Ordinance to support their position.
Respondent former Mayor Lim, Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
ordinance attacks the petitioners' lack of legal standing to sue and points out that the petitioners failed to observe
the principle of hierarchy of courts.
On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal of the petitions based on (1) alleged
procedural infirmities, among others, (2) incomplete requisites of judicial review, (3) violation of the principle of
hierarchy of courts since the act complained of was done in the City of Manila, then the petition should have been
filed before the Regional Trial Courts of Manila, (4) improper remedy, (5) submission of a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping, and (6) forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
RULING:
YES, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Concurrence of jurisdiction does not mean that parties are free to choose which court to seek redress from. This
court is the court of last resort, and observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is necessary to prevent "(1)
inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the court, which is better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the court's docket."
The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and res judicata are not meaningless procedural rules because they are
grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Procedural law has its own rationale in the
orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for
a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.
Nevertheless, this court has, from time to time, relaxed its rules and allowed the direct filing of petitions before it.
The exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts include: (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged
orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and
justified the immediate and direct handling of the case.
None of these exceptions were sufficiently shown to be present in this case so as to convince this court that it
should relax its rules of procedure.
BDO v. Republic
G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015
FACTS: BIR issued a Ruling declaring that interest on PEACe bonds, being deposit substitutes, are subject to
20% final withholding tax. Thus, the Secretary of Finance instructed the Bureau of Treasury to withhold 20% final
tax from the face value of the PEACe bonds upon their payment at maturity. The petitioners then filed a petition in
the Supreme Court to assail the BIR Ruling, alleging, among others, that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
gravely abused her discretion in the exercise of her rule-making power when she classified the PEACe bonds as
deposit substitutes regardless of the number of lenders, in clear disregard of the requirement of 20 or more
lenders under the Tax Code. Respondents refuted the contentions of the petitioners and added that the
petitioner’s direct resort to the SC violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts because the jurisdiction to review rulings of the CIR, after the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
pertains to the Court of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether direct resort to Supreme Court by the petitioners is illegal and violates the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts
RULING: No. Although the jurisdiction to review the rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue pertains to
the Court of Tax Appeals under Sec. 7, 11 and 18 of RA 1125, in exceptional cases, however, the SC entertained
direct recourse to it when "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by
the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal
was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association,
Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government, the SC noted that the
petition for prohibition was filed directly before it in disregard of the rule on hierarchy of courts. However, it opted
to take primary jurisdiction over the petition and decide the same on its merits in view of the significant
constitutional issues raised by the parties dealing with the tax treatment of cooperatives under existing laws and in
the interest of speedy justice and prompt disposition of the matter.
Here, the nature and importance of the issues raised to the investment and banking industry with regard to a
definitive declaration of whether government debt instruments are deposit substitutes under existing laws, and the
novelty thereof, constitute exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify resort to the Supreme Court in the
first instance. The tax provision on deposit substitutes affects not only the PEACe Bonds but also any other
financial instrument or product that may be issued and traded in the market. Due to the changing positions of the
BIR on this issue, there is a need for a final ruling from SC to stabilize the expectations in the financial market.
Querubin v. COMELEC (en banc),

G.R. No. 218787, December 8, 2015
FACTS: - This is a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
validity and seeking to restrain the implementation of the COMELEC En Banc’s Decision for being
against the Corporation Code and the Government Procurement Reform Act.
The COMELEC released the bidding documents for the “Two-Stage Competitive Bidding for the Lease
of Election Management System (EMS) and Precinct-Based Optical Mark Reader (OMR) or Optical
Scan (OP-SCAN) System”. Under the Invitation to Bid are the details for the lease with option to
purchase, through competitive bidding, the ff: Twenty-three thousand (23,000) new units of
precinct-based OMRs or OP-SCAN Systems, with a total Approved Budget for Contract of
P2,503,518,000, to be used in the 2016 National and Local Elections. The joint venture of
Smartmatic-TIM Corporation (SMTC), Smartmatic International Holding B.V., and Jarltech International
Corporation responded to the call and submitted bid for the project on the scheduled date. It informed
the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) that one of its partner corporations, SMTC, has a pending
application with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to amend its Articles of Incorporation
(AOI), attaching therein all pending documents Smartmatic was able to participate in the bidding
process, particularly the testing of their initial technical proposals. However, after the post-qualification
evaluation, Smartmatic was disqualified based on two grounds: (1) Failure to submit a valid Articles of
Incorporation (2) The demo unit failed to meet the technical requirement that the system shall be
capable of writing all data/files, audit log, statistics and ballot images simultaneously in at least two (2)
data storages. Smartmatic filed a protest, seeking permission to conduct another technical
demonstration. This was granted by the COMELEC. After the testing, COMELEC En Banc Resolution
was issued finding that the testing complied with the requirements of the terms of reference.
Petitioners now go before the court questioning the sufficiency of the documents submitted. They also
argue that (1) Smartmatic cannot be eligible since one of its proponents, SMTC no longer has a valid
corporate purpose. SMTC was created solely for the automation of the 2010 National and Local
Elections, not for any other election. Having already served its purpose, SMTC no longer has authority
to engage in business, so petitioners claim. (2) SMTC misrepresented itself by leading the BAC to
believe that it may carry out the project despite its limited corporate purpose, and by claiming that it is a
Philippine corporation when it is, allegedly, 100% foreign-owned.
ISSUE: - Whether or not the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts should always be observed.
RULING: - Generally, yes. Under Rule 65 of the RoC, the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition
are the available remedies for determining and correcting such grave abuses of discretion. This power
is given, not only to the SC, but concurrently with the CA and the RTC. Under the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts recourse must first be made to the lower- ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a
higher court. The petitioners do not have the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court
to which an application for certiorari will be directed.
However, in the case of Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, the court enumerated instances when direct
resort to the SC is allowed: which includes the following: (1) When the issues involved are of
transcendental importance; (2) When the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored
(3) When the petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ.
These grounds are applicable in this case. First, There is a compelling significance of the issue at hand
which is the nationwide automation project. The Court, in the growing number of cases concerning
government procurement of election paraphernalia and services, has consistently exhibited leniency
and dispensed of procedural requirements for petitioners to successfully lodge certiorari petitions.
Second, the time element is also relevant with the 2016 polls visible in the horizon, the post-haste
resolution of this case becomes all the more imperative. It would be the height of absurdity to require
petitioners to undergo scrutiny through the lens of the RTC first, considering that the acquisition of
23,000 OMRs would, at the minimum, affect the clustering of precincts. Third, the rulings of the
COMELEC, as a constitutional body, can immediately be reviewed by the Court on proper petition.
APPLICATION: -
CONCLUSION: -
Pemberton v. De Lima,
G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016
FACTS:
● A complaint for murder was filed by the Philippine National Police Olongapo City Police Office and private
respondent Marilou Laude y Serdoncillo (Laude) against petitioner Joseph Scott Pemberton
● Pemberton received a Subpoena issued by the City Prosecutor of Olongapo City giving him 10 days from
receipt within which to file a counter-affidavit.
● Pemberton filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion:
● Pemberton filed his Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. On the same day, he filed a
Motion to Defer the Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court.
● Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Review and stated that based on the evidence on
record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City."
● Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
● Secretary De Lima denied Pemberton's Petition for Review 29 and stated that based on the evidence on
record, there was "no reason to alter, modify, or reverse the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Olongapo
City."
● Pemberton filed this Petition for Certiorari with application for the ex-parte issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
ISSUE:
● Whether petitioner violated the principle of hierarchy of courts by filing his Petition before this Court
instead of the Court of Appeals
RULINGS:
● Yes, the petitioner did violate the principle of hierarchy of courts.
○ The court held that:
■ The argument is completely bereft of merit. It is not clear why any action by the Court of
Appeals, which has concurrent original jurisdiction in petitions for certiorari under Rule
65, cannot be considered as sufficient for review of petitioner's case.
■ The possibility of the conclusion of the trial of the case against petitioner is not a reason
that is special and important enough to successfully invoke this Court's original
jurisdiction. Once there has been a judicial finding of probable cause, an executive
determination of probable cause is irrelevant. Consequently, even assuming that grave
abuse of discretion somehow taints an executive finding of probable cause, such grave
abuse of discretion has no effect in a trial. Whether respondent De Lima, indeed,
committed grave abuse of discretion in relation to the executive determination of probable
cause is irrelevant to the trial itself.
Belmonte v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices,
G.R. No. 197665, [January 13, 2016], 778 PHIL 221-235
FACTS: -
1. The instant case stemmed from a Complaint filed by Sandra Uy Matiao against petitioners P/S Insp. Samson B.
Belmonte, SPO1 Fermo R. Gallarde, PO3 Lloyd F. Soria, PO1 Homer D. Generoso, PO1 Sergs DC. Maceren,
PO3 Avelino L. Gravador, PO2 Fidel O. Guerejero, PO1 Jerome T. Nochefranca, Jr., members of the Regional
Traffic Management Office-7 (RTMO-7) as well as P/Supt. Eleuterio N. Gutierrez, Regional Director of the Traffic
Management Group Region 7 (TMG-R7).
2. Sandra alleged that sometime on September 3, 2007 in Dumaguete City, petitioners flagged down her vehicle
because the 2007 LTO sticker was not displayed on its windshield. Consequently, petitioners proceeded to seize
and impound the subject vehicle without any warrant or existing complaint for theft. Thereafter, Sandra alleged
that they asked her if she could shoulder their lodging expenses at the OK Pensionne House and treat them for
dinner while an initial macro-etching examination was being conducted on her vehicle. Sandra acceded. While on
their way to dinner, however, petitioner Belmonte told Sandra to just settle the problem for three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00)
3. On December 12, 2007, Sandra filed the subject Administrative Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Abuse of
Authority against petitioners before the Visayas Office of the Ombudsman.
4. In their Counter-Affidavits, petitioners denied the charges and pleaded, as part of their defense, the findings of
Prosecutor May Flor V. Duka on the criminal charges for Anti-Carnapping and Anti-Fencing in her Resolution
dated December 14, 2007 which upheld, in their favor, the presumption of regularity in their performance of duty.
5. On May 24, 2011, the Office of the Ombudsman issued the assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty of Grave
Misconduct. It ruled that Sandra presented substantial evidence, such as hotel receipts, to support her allegations
that petitioners demanded and received favours from her as consideration for the processing of the macro-etching
examination of the subject vehicle.
6. On July 18, 2011, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the Ombudsman’s decision is not
supported by evidence and that the penalty of dismissal imposed on them is oppressive.
7. Before the Ombudsman could resolve the said motion, however, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court by
filing the instant Petition for Prohibition on August 3, 2011, praying that the Court issue a Writ of Prohibition and
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction commanding the Ombudsman to desist from
implementing its Decision dated May 24, 2011.
8. On September 6, 2011, a month after the filing of the instant petition, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an
Order modifying its Decision by finding petitioners guilty not of Grave Misconduct, but of Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and further modifying the penalty from dismissal to suspension from office for a period
of six (6) months and (1) day without pay.
ISSUE: -
WON the Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court appropriate.
RULING: -
No, it violated the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts.
“Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is
also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be
presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to
prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.”
“For a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal,
corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion;
and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
cursory reading of the records of the case readily reveals the absence of the second and third requisites.”
APPLICATION: -
Petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly had some other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner
from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency. As public
respondent pointed out, the remedy of a motion for reconsideration was still available to petitioners, as expressly
granted by the following Section 8 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
CONCLUSION: -
The petitioners have other remedies available to wit: 1) File a Motion for Reconsideration under Section 8 of Rule
III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman; 2) File a Petition for Review in Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
Petition for Prohibition is denied.
Maza v. Turla,
G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017
FACTS: Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal
Investigation and Detection Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three (3)
cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons. Inspector Palomo named 19 individuals, including
Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.
That the named individuals conspired, planned, and implemented the killing of the supporters of AKBAYAN Party
List. Carlito Bayudang and Danilo Felipe were AKBAYAN community organizers, whereas Jimmy Peralta was
mistaken for a certain Ricardo Peralta, an AKBAYAN supporter. On July 18, 2008, Presiding Judge Evelyn A.
Atienza-Turla issued an Order37 on the Palayan cases. Judge Turla held that the proper procedure in the conduct
of the preliminary investigation was not followed in the Palayan cases and remanded the case back to the
prosecutor’s office for another preliminary investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor in order to conduct a
complete preliminary investigation.
RULING: Yes, the trial court judge erred in returning the case to the prosecutor.
SEC. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. -Within ten (10) days from the filing
of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable
cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the
issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
A plain reading of the provision shows that upon filing of the information, the trial court judge has the following
options: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant
of arrest or a commitment order if findings show probable cause; or (3) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause. Upon filing of an information in court, trial court
judges must determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause based on their personal evaluation of
the prosecutor's report and its supporting documents. They may dismiss the case, issue an arrest warrant, or
require the submission of additional evidence. However, they cannot remand the case for another conduct of
preliminary investigation on the ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.
Hence, the trial court judge erred in remanding the case back to the prosecutor’s office for another preliminary
investigation.
Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,

G.R. No. 228539, [June 26, 2019]
FACTS:
· Defendant, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), issued a Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 35-2012,
of which the income of recreational clubs from whatever source, including but not limited to membership fees,
assessment dues, rental income, and service fees is subject to income tax. Likewise, the gross receipts of
recreational clubs are subject also to Value Added Tax (VAT).
· Plaintiff, Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. (ANPC), submitted a position paper requesting the
non-application of the RMC for income tax and VAT liability, but the defendant has not acted upon the request.
Subsequently, all the members of ANPC were subjected to income tax and VAT on all membership fees,
assessment dues, and service fees.
· Plaintiff filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC seeking to declare the said RMC invalid, unjust,
oppressive, confiscatory, and in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, and that BIR acted
beyond its rule-making authority in interpreting the payment fees of membership fees, assessment dues, and
service fees considered as income subject to income tax, as well as a sale of service subject to VAT.
RTC denied the petition for declaratory relief as well as its motion for reconsideration, and upheld the
constitutionality of the RMC. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari before the supreme court.
· Defendant sought the dismissal of the petition for ANPC’S failure to exhaust all the available administrative
remedies and for violating the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts due to its direct resort before the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiff ANPC violated the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.
RULING:
No, the Court holds that there was no violation of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts because
the present petition for review on certiorari, filed pursuant to Section 2 (c), Rule 41 in relation to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, is the sole remedy to appeal a decision of the RTC in cases involving pure questions of law.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is violated only when relief may be had through multiple for having concurrent
jurisdiction over the case, such as in petitions for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition which are concurrently
cognizable either by the Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court.
In Uy v. Contreras
[W]hile it is true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, such
concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor
may be directed. There is a hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which should also
serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for the application for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner and her lawyers ought to have led them to file the
petition with the proper Regional Trial Court.
The correctness of the BIR's interpretation is a pure question of law because the same does not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Thus, being the
only remedy to appeal the RTC's ruling upholding the Circular's validity on a purely legal question, direct resort to
this Court, through a Rule 45 petition, was correctly availed by ANPC.
Thus, the petition for review on certiorari was granted by the Court.
National Steel Corp. v. City of Iligan,

G.R. No. 250981, [July 20, 2022
FACTS: -
1. Petitioner, National Steel Corporation (NSC), is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
various steel products with a plant located in the City of Iligan. Petitioner, under liquidation, directed the transfer of
its assets to its liquidator, petitioner still has real property tax arrears on its plant assets, the land, and the plant it
stood in.
2. The City Government of Iligan then enacted a City Ordinance, providing tax relief to delinquent real
property taxpayers.
3. NSC then sold its plant assets to Global Steelworks Int’l. and had an agreement that the buyer agreed to
start assuming the taxes of the plant starting October 15, 2004.
4. Petitioner then entered in a Tax Amnesty Agreement with respondents under the City Ordinance that was
stated.
5. Global steel failed to pay the current taxes on the plant assets. Consequently, respondent went after
petitioner and issued notices of tax delinquency and warrant of levy against the latter.
6. Petitioners, with the help of Philippine National Bank-Trust Banking Group, paid for all its remaining tax
liability, and respondent has duly acknowledged the payments by issuing two certifications, which proves as
petitioner’s full compliance with the schedule of payments.
7. With all this stated, respondent still did not clear petitioner of its real property tax liabilities. Which led
petitioner to file a case in the RTC of Makati, for the respondents to comply with its obligations under the tax
amnesty agreement. The court ruled in favor of petitioner NSC on October 7, 2011.
8. The respondent moved for reconsideration the ruling on Oct. 7, 2011, but the CA still affirmed to the Oct.
7 ruling.
9. Despite the finality of the RTC of Makati, respondents still included petitioner in the list of delinquent real
property tax payers and proceeded to levy upon the plant assets.
10. On October 18, 2016, the RTC of Makati issued a Writ of Execution to implement its final and executory
decision. Despite this, respondent continued with the auction.
11. CA held that petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, that the petitioner should have filed
before the RTC of Iligan not directly to the CA.
12. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, CA denied. Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE: - Whether petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
RULING: - Ruling: No, Petitioner filed the Prohibition Case not as a result of an adverse judgment in one forum
nor to gamble for a favorable ruling, but plainly to vindicate its right. There being no identity of parties, rights,
causes of action, and reliefs sought between petitioner's Prohibition Case and Global Steel's RTC Iligan Case,
petitioner was not guilty of forum shopping in filing its Petition for Prohibition with the CA.
However, it is also well to remember that the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally
applies to cases involving conflicting factual allegations. As such, litigants should first go to the trial courts to
ascertain the truth or falsity of their assertions on the basis of their evidence. Cases which depend on
disputed facts for decision cannot be brought directly before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.
Thus, "a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before
the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions."
In the RTC Makati Decision, the trial court already determined the conflicting factual allegations of the parties.
Once again, the ruling that cleared petitioner of its real property tax liabilities has since become final and
immutable. There is nothing left to adjudicate. The logical consequence of the judgment's finality is its
execution.
Evidently, the only question to determine in petitioner's Petition for Prohibition with the CA is whether
respondents gravely abused their discretion in continuously exercising acts of ownership over the auctioned
plant assets contrary to what has been decreed in the RTC Makati Decision.
There being no factual issues let to be resolved in the Prohibition Case, petitioner properly proceeded to the
CA, especially that the broader interest of justice demands it.
APPLICATION: -
CONCLUSION: -
MARCH 6, 2023
CASES
[CONTINUATION] ___ DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,

G.R. No. 217158, [March 12, 2019]
Facts
● Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and its attached agency, the
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), posted an Invitation to Pre-qualify and
Bid on the airport development, operations, and maintenance of the Bacolod-Silay,
Davao, Iloilo, Laguindingan, New Bohol (Panglao), and Puerto Princesa Airports.
● The DOTC and the CAAP issued the Instructions to Prospective Bidders which provided
that prospective bidders are to pre-qualify and bid for the development, operations, and
maintenance of the airports, which are now bundled into two groups namely:
Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo
Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol.
● Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao

(petitioner), suing as a taxpayer and invoking the transcendental importance of the
issue, filed the present petition for prohibition.
● It assails the constitutionality of the bundling of the Projects and seeks to enjoin the
DOTC and the CAAP from proceeding with the bidding of the same.
● For its part, the CAAP asserts that the petition violated the basic fundamental principle
of hierarchy of courts. Petitioner had not alleged any special and compelling reason to
allow it to seek relief directly from the Court. The case should have been filed with the
trial court, because it raises factual issues which need to be threshed out in a full-blown
trial.
Issue
WON the petition violated the basic fundamental principle of hierarchy of courts
Rule of Law
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that direct recourse to the Supreme Court is
allowed only to resolve questions of law, notwithstanding the invocation of paramount or
transcendental importance of the action. This doctrine is not mere policy, rather, it is a
constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable the Court to focus on the more
fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land.
Ruling
YES. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond its function to make its own
findings of certain vital facts different from those of the trial court, especially on the basis of the
conflicting claims of the parties and without the evidence being properly passed before it.
This doctrine of hierarchy of courts guides litigants as to the proper venue of appeals and/or
the appropriate forum for the issuance of extraordinary writs. Thus, although this Court, the
CA, and the RTC have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, parties are directed, as a rule, to file their
petitions before the lower-ranked court. Failure to comply is sufficient cause for the dismissal
of the petition.
Aside from the special civil actions over which it has original Jurisdiction, the Court, through
the years, has allowed litigants to seek direct relief from it upon allegation of "serious and
important reasons."... the issues for resolution of the Court are purely legal.
An examination of the cases wherein this Court used "transcendental importance" of the
constitutional issue raised to excuse violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts would show
that resolution of factual issues was not necessary for the resolution of the constitutional
issue/s.
The transcendental importance doctrine does not clothe us with the power to tackle factual
questions and play the role of a trial court. The only circumstance when we may take
cognizance of a case in the first instance, despite the presence of factual issues, is in the
exercise of our constitutionally-expressed task to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the President's proclamation of martial law under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The case before us does not fall under this exception.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to:

(1) prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction;
(2) prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket;
(3) and prevent the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
cases which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as the court better equipped to resolve factual questions.
When a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to
the resolution of the legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the
allegation or invocation of compelling reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount
importance of the case. Such question must first be brought before the proper trial courts or
the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.
Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,

G.R. No. 228539, [June 26, 2019]
On August 3, 2012, Respondent the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued RMC No. 35-2012,
entitled "Clarifying the Taxability of Clubs Organized and Operated Exclusively for Pleasure,
Recreation, and Other Non-Profit Purposes," in which the income of recreational clubs from whatever
source, including but not limited to membership fees, assessment dues, rental income, and service fees
are subject to income tax.
BIR relied on Section 105, 12 Chapter, Title IV of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code [(NIRC)] of
1997, which states that even a nonstock, nonprofit private organization or government entity is liable to
pay VAT on the sale of goods or services. On the VAT component, RMC No. 35-2012 provides that "the
gross receipts of recreational clubs including but not limited to membership fees, assessment dues,
rental income, and service fees are subject to VAT.
On the advice of Atty Quimosing, Chief of Staff, Operations Group of the BIR, ANPC submitted its
position paper, requesting the non-application of RMC [No.] 35-2012.
Because BIR did not act upon the request for 2 years, ANPC filed a petition for declaratory relief before
the RTC on September 17, 2014, seeking to declare RMC No. 35-2012 “invalid, unjust, oppressive,
confiscatory, and in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.” OSG, on behalf of the BIR,
sought the dismissal of the petition for ANPC's failure to exhaust all the available administrative
remedies.
RTC denied the petition for declaratory relief and upheld the validity and constitutionality of RMC No.
35-2012. On the procedural aspect, RTC found that there was no violation of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, since judicial intervention was urgent in light of the
impending imposition of taxes on the membership fees and assessment dues paid by the
members of the exclusive clubs.
RTC denied ANPC’s Motion for Reconsideration in its Order dated November 7, 2016. ANPC filed a
petition of certiorari directly before the Supreme Court.
BIR, through the OSG, sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that ANPC violated the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts due to its direct resort before the Court. Moreover, it asserted that
ANPC violated the doctrine of exhaustion of available administrative remedies, pointing out that
ANPC should have first elevated the matter to the Secretary of Finance for review pursuant to
Section 4, 32 Title I of the 1997 NIRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner violated the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts in filing its petition of certiorari
directly before the Supreme Court
RULING:
NO. The Court holds that there was no violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts because the
present petition for review on certiorari, filed pursuant to Section 2 (c), Rule 41 in relation to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, is the sole remedy to appeal a decision of the RTC in cases involving pure
questions of law.
The correctness of the BIR's interpretation of the 1997 NIRC under the assailed RMC is a pure
question of law, because the same does not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. Thus, being the only remedy to appeal the
RTC's ruling upholding the Circular's validity on a purely legal question, direct resort to this
Court, through a Rule 45 petition, was correctly availed by ANPC.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is violated only when relief may be had through multiple fora
having concurrent jurisdiction over the case, such as in petitions for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition which are concurrently cognizable either by the Regional Trial Courts, the Court of Appeals,
or the Supreme Court.
The Court likewise holds that the said doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
transgressed.
Given its nature, RMC No. 35-2012 should have been subject to the administrative review of the
Secretary of Finance before seeking judicial recourse with the RTC pursuant to Section 4, Title I
of the 1997 NIRC, which provides:
Section 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases .
— The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under
the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the
Secretary of Finance.
However, as exceptions to this rule, when the issue involved is purely a legal question or when
there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. Then the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed.
Thus, ANPC's recourse to the RTC and now, before this Court are permissible and hence, are
not grounds to dismiss the case.
Province of Bataan v. Escalada, Jr.,

[G.R. No. 181311, [November 24, 2021]
FACTS:
Sunrise, a domestic corporation operated a paper mill at its plant site built on its two parcels of land in
Brgy. Doña, Orani Bataan. In 2001, Sunrise obtained loans from Metrobank and it mortgaged the
subject properties, excluding the machinery and equipment, as a security for the said loans.
On September 30, 2002, the Provincial Treasurer's Office (PTO) of the Province sent a final demand to
Sunrise for the payment of its real property taxes on the real properties, the buildings, and machineries
but Sunrise did not comply with the demand to pay its obligation. As such, PTO issued a warrant of levy
against Sunrise over the same on January 3, 2003. On January 17, 2003, and June 06, 2003, Sunrise
paid Php 81, 685.68 and Php 700,000, respectively. The PTO demanded the payment of the remaining
amount for the real property taxes, however, Sunrise did not respond, thus prompting the PTO to issue
a notice of sale of the real properties on August 29, 2003.
It appears that Sunrise obtained a credit line from Philippine Export-Import Credit Agency (PhilEXIM)
worth Php 20M. Sunrise executed a chattel mortgage over the machinery and equipment to secure the
credit line.
Meanwhile, the PTO held a public auction for the real properties, and the Province bought the
properties including the machineries. On June 24, 2004, Sunrise authorized Gawtee to settle its
outstanding obligation to PhilEXIM. In its filed civil action for sum of money and damages to RTC,
Sunrise and Sps. Miranda was held jointly and solidarily liable to Gawtee. PhilEXIM executed a Deed of
Assignment of its mortgagee rights under the chattel mortgage to Gawtee.
The mortgaged machinery and equipment were levied on execution, and the same were sold to
Gawtee. Two days later, a Certificate of Sheriff's Sale was issued in favor of Gawtee and a certificate of
ownership was issued to him on the same day.
Sunrise filed a petition for relief from judgment with the RTC praying for the declaration of the nullity of
the Compromise Agreement between Gawtee and Sunrise dated June 28, 2004 claiming that the
agreement was not signed and executed by its authorized representative, Evelyn Miranda’s signature
was forged, and that Atty. Victor T. De Dios, Jr., Sunrise's purported counsel who endorsed the
agreement, was never engaged by Sunrise as its counsel.
On February 17, 2005, a certificate of final sale was issued in favor of the Province in relation to the
auction of the real properties, machineries, and equipment and was able to obtain new titles over the
real properties in its name. On April 21, 2005, Sunrise filed a verified petition for injunction against the
Province before the RTC. Gowtee moved to intervene on the ground that he owns and possesses the
machineries and equipment assailed by Sunrise. On May 5, 2005, the RTC issued a status quo ante
order ordering the parties to maintain the status quo pending the final determination of the case on the
merits.
On June 10, 2005, Gawtee informed the court in Civil Case No. 7973 that Sunrise was demolishing the
machinery and equipment. Unfazed, the Province and Sunrise entered into a Compromise Agreement,
the same was ratified by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The RTC conducted an ocular inspection of
the real properties and the technical team reported that the paper mill was a total loss and
non-operational.
The RTC denied Sunrise's petition for relief and held that based on the evidence presented, Evelyn's
signature on the Compromise Agreement was genuine. Three days later, the Province manifested in
the said case its third-party claim over the machinery and equipment and attached an Affidavit of
Ownership executed by the Provincial Treasurer. The Province claimed to be the rightful owner and
possessor of the machinery and equipment.
The Province filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on September 30, 2005 to assail the ruling of the
RTC to allow Gawtee to intervene and set the case for further proceedings. The CA dismissed the
same for suffering several procedural infirmities.
Gawtee alleged that after he filed his petition-in-intervention, petitioners, cooperating with one another,
demolished and disposed the machineries and equipment without authority and to his damage. He
prayed that they be held jointly and severally liable to restore the machineries and equipment to him or
to compensate him in such amounts as are on record, or be granted such other relief which are just and
equitable under the law and it was granted by the RTC.
The Province filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the injunction suit due to the RTC's lack of
jurisdiction and lack of Sunrise's interest to prosecute the case. Gawtee opposed the motion.
The RTC, in its decision on June 15, 2007, declared the warrant of levy made by the Province and
notice of sale invalid and illegal. the RTC ruled that Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160 is not applicable in
this case. The reason why a deposit is required under Section 267 is to provide security to the
purchaser in case the auction sale is invalidated.
The RTC held that the validity of the sale by public auction is not the only issue in the case. The issues
on: (1) Gawtee's ownership and possession of the machinery & equipment; and (2) Metrobank's
intervention on the validity of the removal of its mortgage lien annotated on the titles over the real
properties, must also be resolved. Thus, the applicable provision is Section 268.
Abad and the rest of petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration with the RTC. Gawtee
opposed the same. The RTC denied the motions in its January 22, 2008. Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before this Court to assail the Decision and the Order of the RTC.
Gawtee and Metrobank filed their respective comments.
Petitioners argue first, that the RTC erred in denying their motion for reconsideration on the ground that
they availed of the wrong remedy. Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure is clear that the
aggrieved party has the right to file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment. Since the provision does
not exclude judgments by default, petitioners' motion for reconsideration assailing the Decision of the
RTC was the correct remedy. Additionally, it asserts that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case
because Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160 was not complied with. Section 267 requires the payment of a
deposit for any action assailing the validity of the tax sale through a public auction of a real property
under R.A. No. 7160. This is a jurisdictional requirement and is intended to protect the interests of the
buyer at the public auction. Since the action filed by Sunrise was to assail the validity of the auction
sale for its real property tax delinquencies, it should have complied with this requirement
Respondent Gawtee argues that petitioners committed forum shopping by filing petitions before other
courts while the case was still pending before the RTC. They filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 91543 to annul the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8164 even if they participated in
the hearing for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in the latter case. Petitioners did not
question the dismissal of their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 91543 and continued to participate in Civil
Case No. 8164. Before the RTC issued its ruling in Civil Case No. 8164, they once again filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 95947. Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of their
own petition and before the CA ruled on it, they filed the instant petition before this Court. Petitioners
disregarded the doctrine of hierarchy of courts through their actions.
Respondent Cameron first averred that petitioners are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
RTC after participating in the proceedings before it. In any event, Section 267 of R.A. No. 7160 is not
applicable in this case. Hence, there is no basis for petitioners' argument that the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, it asserted that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping when
they failed to disclose to this Court that the CA has not yet acted on their motion to dismiss.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the case should be dismissed applying the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
HELD:
Under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ's
procurement must be presented. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is a constitutional imperative and is
not a matter of mere policy. Failure to comply may result in the dismissal of the action. Nonetheless, the
doctrine is subject to certain exceptions, namely: (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality
that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (3) cases of first impression; (4) the constitutional issues raised are better decided by the
Court; (5) exigency in certain situations; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
(7) when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents' acts in violation of
their right to freedom of expression; [and] (8) the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullifies, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.
Petitioners cannot claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that would justify their direct resort to the Court. A strict application of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts would warrant the outright dismissal of their petition. However, the Court
finds that the fifth exception, namely the exigency of the resolution of this case, justifies a
liberal application of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The issues in this case do not only
concern the jurisdiction of the RTC but the right of Gawtee as the owner of the machinery and
equipment, the right of Cameron as a mortgagee of the real properties, and the extent of the damage
they may have suffered because of petitioners.
National Steel Corp. v. City of Iligan,

G.R. No. 250981, [July 20, 2022
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY/JUDICIAL STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 166859, June 26, 2006
FACTS:
● A Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, is pending before this
Court challenging the denial by public respondent, Sandiganbayan, its Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F.
● During the pendency of said Petition for Certiorari, an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is filed by petitioner.
● In support of its present urgent motion, petitioner pleads that the issue it raised in its Petition for
Certiorari — whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment — must first be resolved, as a continuation of the
proceedings in the civil case by public respondent might be rendered unnecessary in the event
that its Petition before this Court is resolved in its favor.
● The burden is thus on the petitioner in a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus to
show that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction for the purpose of suspending the proceedings before the public
respondent. Essential for granting injunctive relief is the existence of an urgent necessity for the
writ in order to prevent serious damage.
ISSUE: Should the Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be granted?
RULING:
No. The ground on which it bases its urgent motion is the alleged futility of proceeding with the trial of
the case. This assertion, however, is speculative, anchored on the mere supposition that the petition
would be decided in its favor. There is thus, in this case, a marked absence of any urgent necessity for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
Section 7 of Rule 65 provides the general rule that the mere pendency of a special civil action for
Certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before a lower court or court of origin does not stay
the proceedings therein in the absence of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order.
There are of course instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower court or court of origin to
suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. As this Court explained in Eternal Gardens
Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals:
Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate Appellate Court
to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions respectively granting
respondents' motion to expunge from the records the petitioner's motion to dismiss and denying
the latter's motion to reconsider such order, upon learning of the petition, the appellate court
should have refrained from ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon
the filing of a petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of the
above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and practical and ethical
considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final determination of
the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly what was
before this court . . .
A reading of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park shows that the appellate court's failure to observe
judicial courtesy which was frowned upon by this Court lay in its recall of its (the appellate
court's) orders expunging from the records the Motion to Dismiss filed by the therein petitioner,
which Orders were the orders being questioned before this Court via a petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus. Such act of the appellate court tended to render moot and academic the said petition. No
parity of circumstances obtains in the present case, however, where merely setting the case for trial
would not have the effect of rendering the present petition moot.
This Court explained, however, that the rule on "judicial courtesy" applies where "there is a strong
probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result of
the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court [or court of origin]".
Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN) v. Yanagisawa,

G.R. No. 175303
FACTS:
● Characters:
■ Current case for review:
● Characters:
○ Plaintiff: Pacific Ace Finance (PAFIN)
○ Defendant: Eiji Yanagisawa
■ Prior case before review (CA and RTC)
● Characters:
○ Plaintiff: Eiji Yanagisawa
○ Defendant: Evelyn F. Castañeda Yanagisawa
● Event:
■ MAKATI RTC:
● § [July 12, 1989] Eiji and Evelyn contracted marriage in the City Hall of
Manila.
● [August 23, 1995] Evelyn purchased a 152 square meter townhouse unit
located at Bo. Sto. Nino Paranaque, Metro Manila (Paranaque townhouse
unit).
● [1996] Eiji filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Evelyn on the ground bigamy (nullity of marriage case).
● [October 2, 1996] Makati RTC rendered the order:
○ “In view of the commitment made in open court by Atty. Lupo

Leyva, counsel for the defendant [Evelyn], together with his client,
the defendant in this case, that the properties registered in the
name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or
encumbered in any manner during the pendency of this
petition, the Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and
Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction scheduled today
is hereby considered moot and academic.”
● TN: This order was addressing their property of

Paranaque Townhouse Unit.
o PARANAQUE RTC:
● [March 1997] Evelyn obtained a loan of P500,000.00 from petitioner
Pacific Ace Finance Ltd. (PAFIN).
● [August 25, 1998] Evelyn executed a real estate mortgage (REM) in

favor of PAFIN over the Paranaque townhouse unit covered by TCT No.
99791.
● [At the time of the mortgage]:

○ Eiji’s appeal in the nullity of marriage case was pending before the
CA
○ Makati RTC had dissolved Eiji and Evelyn’s marriage and ordered
liquidation of their registered properties (including Paranaque
townhouse unit) to be divided between the parties.
○ The Decision of the Makati RTC did not lift or dissolve its October
2, 1996 Order on Evelyn's commitment not to dispose of or
encumber the properties registered in her name.
○ Eiji filed a complaint for the annulment of REM (annulment of

mortgage case) against Evelyn and PAFIN in the Paranaque RTC.
○
○ DECISION: The Parañaque RTC explained that Eiji, as a foreign
national, cannot possibly own the mortgaged property. Without
ownership, or any other law or contract binding the defendants to
him, Eiji has no cause of action that may be asserted against
them.
○ Eiji appealed the trial court’s decision on the ground that Makati
RTC recognized his contribution in the purchase of the property by
its declaration that he is entitled to half of the proceeds that would

be obtained from its sale.
■ He also emphasized that Evelyn made a commitment to

him and to the Makati RTC that she would not dispose of,
alienate, or encumber the properties registered in her
name while the case was pending. This commitment
incapacitates Evelyn from entering into the REM contract.
o Court of Appeals:
● The CA found merit in Eiji's appeal.
● Makati RTC:
○ The CA noted that the Makati RTC ruled on Eiji's and Evelyn's
ownership rights over the properties that were acquired during
their marriage, including the Parañaque townhouse unit. It was
determined therein that the registered properties should be sold at
public auction and the proceeds thereof to be divided between Eiji
and Evelyn.
● Paranaque RTC:
○ Contrary to this ruling, the Parañaque RTC ruled that Eiji has no
ownership rights over the Parañaque townhouse unit in light of the
constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership of lands and that
the subject property is Evelyn's exclusive property.
● The appellate court determined that the Parañaque RTC's Decision was
improper because it violated the doctrine of non-interference. Courts of
equal jurisdiction, such as regional trial courts, have no appellate
jurisdiction over each other. For this reason, the CA annulled and set
aside the Parañaque RTC's decision to dismiss Eiji's complaint.
● On the basis of Evelyn's commitment and its annotation on TCT No.

99791, the CA determined that Eiji has a cause of action to annul the
REM contract. Evelyn was aware of her legal impediment to encumber
and dispose of the Parañaque townhouse unit. PAFIN displayed a wanton
disregard of ordinary prudence when it admitted not conducting any
verification of the title whatsoever. The CA determined that PAFIN was a
mortgagee in bad faith.
● Thus, the CA annulled the REM executed by Evelyn in favor of PAFIN.
● PAFIN filed this petition for review.
ISSUES:
● Whether the Parañaque RTC can rule on the issue of ownership, even as the same issue was
already ruled upon by the Makati RTC and is pending appeal in the CA.
RULINGS: No. The Court agrees with the CA. The issue of ownership and liquidation of properties
acquired during the cohabitation of Eiji and Evelyn has been submitted for the resolution of the Makati
RTC, and is pending appeal before the CA. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates
that the assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the
subsequent assumption by the Parañaque RTC.
● The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and
while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and
courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to
prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the
process.
● By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively

interfered with the Makati RTC's resolution of the issue and created the possibility
of conflicting decisions.
● Cojuangco v. Villegas 43 states: "The various branches of the [regional trial

courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and
exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their
orders or judgments.
● A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper

the administration of justice."
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The August 1,
2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78944 is AFFIRMED.”
Nicat, Jr. v. Titong, G.R. No. 207682.

December 10, 2014
FACTS:
● Gov Evardone issued 93 appointments few days prior to the end of his term, including
the appointment of the respondents, and they immediately assumed their respected
position. However, the appointments were disapproved by the CSC Regional Office.
● Gov Evardone appealed the disapproval but it was dismissed for nonpayment of the
requisite filing fee and the appointments having been issued in violation of Section 2.1
of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, series of 2007.
● Respondents filed a petition for review before the CSC. CSC granted the petition,
declaring the appointment of Respondents Titong and Abrugar valid on the ground that
the two are qualified for the positions to which they were appointed, and ordering
payment of their salaries. Petitioners filed a petition for review before the CA.
● Pending appeal before the CA, CSC, upon respondents’ motion, issued a writ of
execution. Hence, respondents filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus praying
for the payment of their salaries. Subsequently, CA ruled that the appointments were
invalid, and this was upheld by the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the enforcement of the Decision of the CSC upholding the legality of
respondents’appointment remains proper considering it was declared invalid.
RULING:
● The Supreme Court answered no.
● The SC has, in several cases, held that there are instances where, even if there is no
writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a
lower court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the concept of judicial
courtesy.
● According to SC, considering that the mandamus petition heavily relies on the validity or
invalidity of the appointments which issue is to be resolved by the CA, the court a quo
incorrectly concluded that it may take cognizance of the petition without erroneously
disregarding the principle of judicial courtesy.
● The enforcement of disputed CSC decision upholding the legality of respondents’
appointment is not proper and necessary because SC already issued a resolution
affirming the CA’s ruling that respondents’ appointment were not valid, making the issue
on the propriety of enforcing the CSC Resolution pending appeal moot and academic. A
moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of
mootness. Whatever judgment is reached, the same can no longer have any practical
legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced.
●
Sara Lee Philippines v. Macatlang,

G.R. No. 180147. January 14, 2015
FACTS:
● Aris Philippines permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995 displacing 5,984 rank-and-file
employees. On 26 October 1995, FAPI was incorporated prompting former Aris employees to file a case
for illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was a continuing business of Aris. Sarah Lee Corporation
(SLC), Sarah Lee Philippines (SLP) and Cesar Cruz were impleaded as defendants being major
stockholders of FAPI and officers of Aris, respectively.
● On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984 Aris employees illegal and awarded
them monetary benefits amounting to P3,453,664,710.86. The judgment award is composed of
separation pay of one month for every year of service, back wages, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
● The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond. They posted a P4.5 Million
bond. The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post an
additional P4.5 Million bond.
● The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang petition), filed
a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was not perfected due to failure
of the Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which is equivalent to the judgment award.
● While the case was pending before the appellate court, the NLRC prematurely issued an order setting
aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter for being procedurally infirmed.
● The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to post an additional appeal bond of
P1 Billion
PETITIONERS' CONTENTION:
That by the filing of the motion to reduce the bond and the positing of the bond of Php 4.5m, roughly equivalent to
the 10% of the original judgment award is enough to perfect an appeal. That the Confession of Judgment
submitted by the Petitioners that is only signed by some of the aggrieved workers instead of the 5,984 illegally
dismissed employees and only an amount of P342,284,800.00 is enough as a substitute for a valid compromise
agreement that will dismiss the cases in dispute.
RESPONDENTS' CONTENTIONS:
That the appeal bond made by Petitioners are not enough to perfect an appeal due to its amount being below the
directed amount given by the Courts That the Confession of Judgment submitted by Petitions are not enough to
satisfy the claims of Respondents for being grossly inadequate to satisfy their claims and that they lack all of the
signatures and/or consent of all the 5,984 illegally dismissed employees running counter to the nature of a
compromise agreement.
ISSUE:
1)WON the appeal bond of roughly Php 4.5M is enough to perfect an appeal.
2) WON the Confession of Judgement can be accepted as a valid compromise agreement between the parties.
RULING:
1) NO. The Corporations should have followed the direction of the Court and filed the additional amount requested
by the Courts for the perfection of the appeal so that the NLRC may proceed to try the merits of the case for illegal
dismissal. The 10% requirement pertains to the reasonable amount which the NLRC would accept as the
minimum of the bond that should accompany the motion to reduce bond in order to suspend the period to perfect
an appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10% is based on the judgment award and should in no case be construed
as the minimum amount of bond to be posted in order to perfect appeal. Should the NLRC, after considering the
merit of the Motion to Reduce Ap-peal Bond, determine that a greater amount or the full amount of the bond
needs to be posted by the appellant, then the party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be given a
period of 10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal by posting the required appeal
bond. The Petitioners are then directed to post the amount of PHP 725M in cash or surety bond within 10 days of
the decision to continue with the determination of the merits of the alleged illegally dismissed Respondents
through the NLRC.
2) NO. The Confession of Judgement cannot be accepted as a valid compromise agreement. A confession of
judgment is an acknowledgment that a debt is justly due and cuts off all defenses and right of appeal. It is used as
a shortcut to a judgment in a case where the defendant concedes liability. It is seen as the written authority of the
debtor and a direction for entry of judgment against the debtor. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties,
by making reciprocal con-cessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is an agreement
between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by mutual
consent in the manner which they agree on, and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced
by the danger of losing. A compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy; and
must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. Article 273 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines authorizes compromise agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, in conformity with the
basic policy of the State "to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations,
including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes.” A
compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver
voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. A review of the compromise agreement shows a
gross disparity between the amount offered by the Corporations compared to the judgment award. The
judgment award is P3,453,664,710.86 or each employee is slated to receive P577,149.85. On the other hand,
the P342,284,800.00 compromise is to be distributed among 5,984 employees which would translate to only
P57,200.00 per employee. From this amount, P8,580.00 as attorney's fees will be deducted, leaving each
employee with a measly P48,620.00. In fact, the compromised amount roughly comprises only 10% of the
judgment award.
APPLICATION
The principle of judicial courtesy to justify the suspension of the proceedings before the lower court even without
an injunctive writ or order from the higher court. In that case, we pronounced that "[d]ue respect for the Supreme
Court and practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final
determination of the petition [for certiorari] before taking cognizance of the case and trying to render moot exactly
what was before this [C]ourt." We subsequently reiterated the concept of judicial courtesy in Joy Mart
Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals. We, however, have qualified and limited the application of judicial
courtesy in Go v. Abrogar and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In these cases, we expressly delimited the application
of judicial courtesy to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the principle
of judicial courtesy applies only "if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be
rendered moot and moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court." Through these
cases, we clarified that the principle of judicial courtesy remains to be the exception rather than the rule.
The Corporations' argument is specious. Judicial courtesy indeed applies if there is a strong probability that the
issues before the higher court would be rendered moot as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the
lower court. This is the exception contemplated in the aforesaid ruling and it obtains in this case. The 19
December 2006 ruling of the NLRC would moot the appeal filed before the higher courts because the issue
involves the appeal bond which is an indispensable requirement to the perfection of the appeal before the NLRC.
Unless this issue is resolved, the NLRC should be precluded from ruling on the merits of the case. This is the
essence of judicial courtesy.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Leave of Court to File
and Admit Herein Statement and Confession of Judgment; and the respondents' Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit. The directive in the Decision dated 4 June 2014 to the National Labor
Relations Commission to act with dispatch to resolve the merits of the case upon perfection of the appeal is
hereby REITERATED. SO ORDERED
Tupaz v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas,

G.R. Nos. 212491-92, [March 6, 2019]
Summary: Public prosecutors must address the different dimensions of complaints raised beforethem.
When they provide well-reasoned resolutions on one (1) dimension, but overlook palpableindications
that another crime has been committed, they fail to responsibly discharge thefunctions entrusted to
them. This amounts to an evasion of positive duty, an act of grave abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.
FACTS: Tupaz stated that her mother, Sol Espiña Hubahib, was the registered owner of
a100,691-square meter property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 15609. Since its issuance in
1971, she added, a duplicate has always been in the possession of their family—initially by Hubahib
and, upon her demise, by her heirs. On April 17, 2011, Atty. Abella canceled Original Certificate of Title
No. 15609 and, in its stead, issued Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 116-2011000073 and
116-2011000074 in favor of GenaroEspiña (Genaro), represented by his attorney-in-fact, Macrina.
According to Tupaz, thiscancellation was anchored on the following:
1. A document labeled as the owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 15609but which
Tupaz argued was "materially and essentially different" from the copy on file with the Register of
Deeds and the genuine owner's duplicate copy in her family'scustody;
2. A Certificate Authorizing Registration supposedly issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which
indicated that no capital gains tax was paid despite the property being a more than 100,000- square
meter commercial land with zonal valuation of P400.00per square meter as of 2002. The same
certificate indicated that only P2,655.00 in documentary stamp taxes and P100.00 for the
certification fee were paid;
3. A 1972 Deed of Conveyance, which was never annotated onto Original Certificate of Title No.
15609, and which had surfaced only in 2011, bearing a forgery of Hubahib's signature; and
4. A subdivision plan that was made without the participation of or notice to Tupaz or her
co-heirs/owners.
Tupaz maintained that Atty. Abella: (1) issued a spurious owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate
of Title No. 15609; (2) tolerated the use of an equally spurious Certificate AuthorizingRegistration and
Deed of Conveyance; and (3) enabled the issuance of specious transfer certificates of titles, with
Genaro as beneficiary. Hence, she filed her Complaint, asserting that Atty. Abella, along with Macrina,
were liable for falsification, graft and corrupt practices, misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not finding probable cause to
charge private respondent Fernando M. Abella, along with private respondent Macrina Espiña, with
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Ruling:
The Court grants the Petition.
Probable cause for the filing of an information is "a matter which rests on likelihood rather than on
certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on 'clear and convincing evidence.'... the term
itself implies probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral
certainty; it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
The determination of probable cause is an executive, not a judicial, function. It is generally not for a
court to disturb the conclusion made by a public prosecutor. This is grounded on the basic principle
of separation of powers. However, "grave abuse of discretion
Assessing the evidence before them, public prosecutors are vested with a wide range of discretion,
the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge. As such, the prosecuting attorney cannot be
compelled to file a particular criminal information. Public prosecutors are not bound to adhere to a
party's apparent determination of the specific crime for which a person shall stand trial.
In keeping with the basic precept of judicial non-interference, not even the Supreme Court can
order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to
support at least a prima facie case
When, however, "there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
prosecutor in declining to prosecute specific persons for specific offenses, a writ of certiorari may
be issued to set aside the prosecutor's initial determination
Appraising probable cause for a violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act must begin with the text of Section 3(e):
Accordingly, a violation of Section 3(e) is deemed to have occurred when the following elements
are demonstrated: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge of the
public officer's official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) the act was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the public officer caused any
undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference.
The third element identifies three (3) distinct modes of commission: manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, and gross inexcusable negligence.
The fourth element identifies two (2) alternative, typifying effects: causing undue injury to any party
and/or giving any private party unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference. Prosecution and/or
conviction under Section 3(e) ensues when either or both of these are occasioned by the public
officer's manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence
From the evidence adduced by petitioner, there is basis to maintain a reasonable belief that private
respondent Abella enabled the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title and issuance of new
transfer certificates of title. This was despite manifest and unequivocal deficiencies, most notably in
the owner's duplicate copy, the Certificate Authorizing Registration, and the Deed of Conveyance
that had been presented to him. Private respondent Abella admitted canceling Original Certificate
of Title No. 15609 after he was presented an owner's duplicate that "consists of only two pages
which is somewhat defaced/torn. In contrast, the original copy, which was on file in his own office,
consisted of four (4) pages. Not only did the duplicate presented to him not correspond with the
original on file; it was also severely mutilated, with the effect—rather curiously—that identifying
features could no longer be perused. As pointed out by petitioner, all possible markings of the
nature and origin of the alleged owner's duplicate were torn off: (1) the serial number of the page in
the registry book in which the title is recorded; (2) the free patent number; (3) the lot number;(4) the
signature of the Survey Division chief who attested to the technical description; and (5) the
signature of the "person who verified or checked the technical description. It is not just that these
were missing. What is more dubious is that the duplicate Original Certificate of Title presented to
Abella had holes and tears exactly where these pieces of information would have been indicated,
even as the remainder of the informational portions of the title remained intact. It strains credulity
that whatever fortuitous forces occasioned those holes and tears would be so focused on
specifically removing only the title's identifying feature
Irregularities were also apparent on the Certificate Authorizing Registration that was presented to
Abella. Most glaringly, as petitioner points out, it was dated 2011 and referred to a 1972 Deed of
Conveyance. Despite this, the certificate did not indicate even the slightest charge or penalty for
delayed payment of taxes occasioned by the transfer
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED
Public respondent is directed to file before the proper court the necessary information for violation
of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against private respondents
La Savoie Development Corp. v. Buenavista Properties, Inc.,

G.R. Nos. 200934-35, [June 19, 2019]
Facts: Spouses Frisco and Amelia San Juan, and Spouses Felipe and Blesilda Buencamino entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with La Savoie Development Corporation over three parcels of
land where petitioner undertook to completely develop the properties into a commercial and residential
subdivision on or before May 5, 1995. If petitioner fails to do so within the schedule, it shall pay the
landowners a penalty of P10,000.00 a day until completion of the project. Later, the landowners sold
the properties to Josephine Conde, who later assigned all her rights and interest therein to Buenavista
Properties, Inc. Petitioner failed to finish the project despite the extension granted in the Addendum to
the JVA.
A case was thus filed by respondent for the termination of contract and recovery of property with
damages in RTC QC. However, due to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, petitioner anticipated its inability
to pay its obligations as they fall due. Because of this, petitioner filed a petition for rehabilitation before
RTC Makati. Acting on the petition, Makati thus issued a Stay Order which has as an effect staying the
enforcement of all claims, whether for money or otherwise between the petitioner and respondents. It
appears, however, that the QC RTC already rendered a Decision in favor of respondents and issued a
Writ of Execution despite the Stay Order. The case for rehabilitation was transferred to the
Rehabilitation Court which directed RTC QC to a)stop the execution of the QC RTC Decision; (b) return
and restore the ejected residents of the subject property; and (c) lift the notices of garnishment and
notices of levy upon personal as well as real properties of petitioner.
In addition, the Rehabilitation Court issued a Resolution approving the Amended Revised Rehabilitation
Plan (ARRP) submitted by petitioner with modifications. Among others, it reduced into half the amount
of penalty stated in the QC RTC Decision (from P10k/day to P5k/day). Petitioner thus filed a case with
the CA arguing that the QC RTC Decision had already attained finality, thus the Rehabilitation Court
cannot reduce the penalty imposed on the respondent.
Issue:
1. WON the decision of the RTC became final and executory
2. WON the Rehabilitation Court has the jurisdiction to suspend the Writ of Execution issued by RTC
QC
Ruling:
1. No. Proceedings and orders undertaken and issued in violation of the SEC suspension order are null
and void; as such, they could not have achieved a final and executory status. Since the QC RTC
Decision did not attain finality, there is no legal impediment to reduce the penalties under the ARRP.
Legal basis: Corporate rehabilitation traces its roots to Act No. 1956 or the Insolvency Law of 1909. The
amendatory provisions of PD 902-A, clothed the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with
jurisdiction to hear petitions of corporations for declaration of state of suspension of payments. Such
jurisdiction was, however, transferred to the Regional Trial Court in 2000. Section 6 (c) of PD 902-A, as
amended, provides that "upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board
or body, pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or
associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall
be suspended accordingly."
2. No. the Rehabilitation Court cannot issue an order preventing the QC RTC from enforcing its
Decision. The QC RTC and the Rehabilitation Court are co-equal and coordinate courts. The doctrine of
judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the
judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction.
Bottomline: Order of the Rehabilitation Court reducing the penalties awarded to respondent is
valid; and that the Order of the Rehabilitation Court preventing the implementation of the QC
RTC Decision is invalid for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
Soliman v. Heirs of Ramon Tolentino,

G.R. Nos. 229164 & 229186, [September 2, 2019]
FACTS: Spouses Doroteo Tolentino and Engracia Dela Cruz (spouses Tolentino) were the registered owners of a
parcel of land situated in San Vicente, Pili, Camarines Sur, which is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. RO 529 (263). Their children are Ramon Tolentino (Ramon), Angeles Tolentino (Angeles), Rafael Tolentino
(Rafael), Carmen T. Imperial (Carmen) and Mercedes T. Soliman (Mercedes).
On the ground of OCT No. RO 529 (263)'s loss and destruction, Ramon filed a petition for its reconstitution on
August 25, 1977.
In its Order, dated January 20, 1978, the Court of First Instance (CFI) granted the petition and correspondingly
ordered the issuance of a new title in the name of Ramon. Accordingly, on April 4, 1978, a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) was issued in his name.
Thirty four years later, on August 29, 2012, petitioners questioned the issuance of the TCT. They contended that
the land covered by the TCT is co-owned by them as heirs of spouses Tolentino and that said co-ownership was
terminated by the execution of an Agreement of Partition, the latter of which sprung from a confrontation which
happened among the siblings when the TCT was issued in the name of Ramon alone. As Ramon assured them
that their shares in the property shall be fully protected despite the issuance of the title in his name, said
Agreement, which gave each sibling a particular portion of the property, was executed.
However, as the land was solely in the name of Ramon, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed a
portion of the same under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 and distributed the
same to farmer-beneficiaries. Only Ramon received just compensation corresponding to the value of the
expropriated land. Even then, petitioners' possession of their respective portions was never disturbed.
Not soon thereafter, one of Ramon's heirs, began claiming the land as exclusively belonging to his father and
refused to acknowledge the Agreement among the siblings.
Of the respondents, only Remigio Manchus (Remigio) and Antonio Tolentino (Antonio) filed their Answer,
wherein they insisted on their right as Ramon's lawful heirs, and asserted that Ramon has the exclusive
ownership and possession of the property upon the demise of the spouses Tolentino because his other siblings
were given their respective properties elsewhere.
In an Order dated February 22, 2013, the RTC resolved the defenses laid down by the heirs of Ramon. It explicitly
ruled on the invalidity of the CFI Order, insofar as the issuance of a title in favor of Ramon is concerned, for want
of jurisdiction.
In its Order dated May 9, 2014, the RTC declared the January 20, 1978 Order as valid only insofar as the
reconstitution of the title is concerned. Accordingly, the issuance of the TCT was declared void.
Antonio and Remegio filed an appeal, assailing the authority of the RTC to annul, amend, or modify the January
20, 1978 Order issued by the CFI.
The CA issued a Decision dated April 29, 2016, wherein it applied the doctrine of non-interference, and held
that the RTC erred in declaring void the CFI Order, issued by a co-equal court.
The petitioners filed for a Motion of Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for annulment of title by applying the doctrine of
non-interference.
RULING: No.
To ensure the orderly administration of justice, the quintessential doctrine of judicial stability or
non-interference between concurrent and coordinate courts is being enforced in our jurisdiction. It provides
that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction could not be interfered with by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction. Acting as an "insurmountable barrier," it strongly proscribes the exercise of
jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction as regards cases relative to that already decided by another
co-equal court.
Rooted on the concept of jurisdiction, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders
judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers
acting in connection with this judgment.
Alternatively put, the orders and decisions of a competent court cannot be altered, modified or
amended by another court of concurrent jurisdiction.
By declaring "null and void" the judgment of the CFI insofar as the issuance of title is concerned, the
RTC amended the earlier decision of the CFI, which is a clear violation of the doctrine of non-interference.
As the RTC Order was issued in violation of this aforementioned doctrine, it bears no legal effect as it
is considered as a void judgment, which cannot be a source of any right or the creator of any obligation.
Republic v. Tapay,
G.R. No. 157719, [March 2, 2022]
FACTS:
The present case is a petition for review assailing the 2003 decision of the Court of Appeals. Flora and
Clemente Tapay, respondents, filed an application for the registration involving a 684 meters parcel of
land (Lot No. 1078) before the Lipa City Regional Trial Court. Respondents alleged that Francisca
Cueto possessed the subject property since 1925 before it was sold to Teofila Lindog. Respondents
inherited the property when Teofila died in 1971.
RTC Proceedings
During the proceedings, the Land Registration Commission/Land Registration Authority issued a report
which stated that property was the subject of registration in another case and was already adjudicated
to another person. However, the RTC adjudicated the subject property to Flora Tapay and Clemente
Tapay. The RTC directed LRC to issue the decree of registration and certificate title. However, LRC
submitted a supplemental report stating that the subject land was previously the subject of registration
proceedings yet was still unable to identify the person whom the property was adjudicated since there
were no records of the case. The decision in the prior registration proceedings was set aside.
Petitioner appealed to CA, alleging that the RTC has no authority to set aside the decision of the
cadastral court as it amounted to interference with the authority of another co-equal court.
CA Ruling
Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioner, stating that RTC has no authority to nullify/set aside the
decision of a co-equal court. Moreover, CA contents that the doctrine cannot be applied in the case
since
1. petitioner was unable to present the records of the cadastral case,
2. LRC admitted that it could not determine the identity of the party to whom the subject lot was
adjudicated to, and
3. because the LRC, knowing that it could not execute the decision in the cadastral proceedings as
it never attained finality, recommended that the decision be nullified by the RTC.
CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the RTC’s 1982 decision
PRESENT CASE:
Petitioner’s arguments:
1. The RTC of Lipa City has no authority to nullify the decision of a co-equal court and only the
CA has such power. Thus, the decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 remains valid and
subsisting.
2. The decision of the cadastral court in Cadastral Case No. 33, as well as all matters incident
to it, continue to be within the exclusive control of the cadastral court until a registration
decree is issued.
3. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 constitutes res judicata and thus bars respondents'
subsequent application for registration. While the parties in the cadastral court and the RTC
of Lipa may be different, the decision binds respondents because decisions in cadastral
proceedings bind the whole world.
4. The RTC's May 28, 1982 Decision which adjudicated the land to respondents can no longer
be modified to order the nullification of the decision in Cadastral Case No. 33 due to
immutability of judgment.
Respondents’ Arguments:
1. The nullification of the decision in the cadastral proceedings should be upheld considering that from
1982 up to the present, petitioner failed to produce the records of the case while respondents were
able to present sufficient evidence to support their right to a registration decree.
2. The CA, which is empowered to nullify the decision of the cadastral court, already affirmed the
August 14, 1996 Order of the RTC. Hence, the nullification was made within bounds of law.
3. There is lack of identity of parties to satisfy the elements of res judicata, and the records are
incomplete to show that the proceedings actually took place and that the decision actually attained
finality.
4. There was no modification of the RTC's May 28, 1982 Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's August 14, 1996 Order?
RULING:
Petition should be denied.
The Court agrees with petitioner that a regional trial court has no power to nullify or interfere with the
decision of a co-equal court pursuant to the law and the doctrine of judicial stability. There is no other
available record exists to support the theory which would have included the identity of the parties in the
case and of the court that rendered the decision, as well as the outcome thereof. It has remained
unknown despite the lapse of more than 40 years since the LRC submitted its report. Hence, the court
agrees with the CA that the doctrine of judicial stability finds no application in this case. Practical
considerations now demand that the proceedings in the RTC be no longer disturbed and the August 14,
1996 Order no longer set aside.The ruling is supported by the case of Republic v. Heirs of Sta. Ana
wherein the Court stated that, “it would be the height of injustice for the heirs to be held hostage or
punished by reason of the plain scarcity of the records”.
Ekistics Philippines, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,

G.R. No. 250440, [May 12, 2021]
Facts:
March 17, 2011: The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), through the Monetary Board, issued
Resolution No. 372-A placing the Banco Filipino Saving and Mortgage Bank under receivership of the
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). The Resolution was issued based on the finding that
Banco Filipino cannot continue its business without obtaining probable losses to its depositors and
creditors. Some stockholders of Banco Filipino filed a petition before the Court of Appeals assailing the
validity of the aforesaid Resolution.
October 27, 2011: The Monetary Board issued another resolution, Resolution No. 1635, placing Banco
Filipino under liquidation after the PDIC submitted a report declaring that Banco Filipino can no longer
be rehabilitated. Aggrieved, the majority stockholders of Banco Filipino filed another petition before the
CA questioning the bank's placement under liquidation.
While the petitions of the Banco Filipino majority stockholders were pending before the CA, herein
petitioner Ekistics filed a petition entitled: “In Re: Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank” before the Regional Trial Court.
April 3, 2013: The RTC gave due course to the petition and issued an Order directing the publication
thereof and requiring all claimants of Banco Filipino to file their claims within 30 days from publication of
the aforesaid RTC Order. The stockholders who filed the petitions before the CA moved for the
suspension of the liquidation proceedings before the RTC pending the final determination of the cases
before the CA. The RTC granted the stockholders’ motion.
During the suspension of the liquidation proceedings, the BSP posted in its website an Invitation to Bid
for the sale of certain properties, which include some properties of Banco Filipino. Ekistics filed a
Motion for Leave for Intervention with Petition-in-Intervention with application for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) before the RTC, praying that the BSP be enjoined
from selling and disposing of Banco Filipino assets.
September 27, 2016: The RTC issued an Order granting a 20-day TRO against BSP and scheduled the
hearing for the application of the WPI.
THE RULING OF THE RTC:
The dispositive portion of the RTC Order dated October 17, 2016 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, upon the filing by Petitioner-in- Intervention of a
bond, in the amount of Php1,200,000,000.00 in favor of Petitioner which will answer for all the
damages the latter may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court should finally decide that
the injunction Petitioner-in-Intervention was not entitled thereto, let a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
be issued. Said writ shall restrain the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, its agents, assignees,
representatives or any person acting in behalf from continuing the public bidding, selling and
disposal of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 218667, 7135, 7136, 7138 and 7139, including all
acts leading to the disposal of assets it had acquired or foreclosed from Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank.
Finally, let the writ be implemented by this Court's Sheriff Leodel N. Roxas.
SO ORDERED.
October 25, 2016: Ekistics filed an Urgent Motion to Reduce Injunctive Bond, which the RTC granted
through an Order.
BSP filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO before the CA assailing the RTC
Orders.
THE RULING OF THE CA:
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision dated November 27, 2017, is hereby
reproduced, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present PETITION is hereby GRANTED. The
Orders dated October 17, 2016 and October 25, 2016 issued by Hon. Joselito C. Villarosa,
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Makati, Branch 66 in Case No. M-7411 are hereby ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issued by public
respondent against petitioner Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, its agents, assignees and
representatives is hereby LIFTED. Meantime, petitioner's prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
is deemed mooted by this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Not in conformity with the Decision of the CA, Ekistics moved for the reconsideration thereof. Finding
merit in Ekistics’ Motion for Reconsideration, the CA granted the motion and amended its Decision.
Applying the principle of judicial courtesy, the CA held that considering that the validity of the BSP
Resolution which placed Banco Filipino under receivership is still pending before the Court and the
legality of the Resolution ordering the liquidation of Banco Filipino is yet to be resolved by another
division in the CA, it is prudent to reverse the originally issued Decision in order to prevent the
proceedings before the Court and the CA becoming moot and academic.
Aggrieved, the BSP filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking the reversal of the CA Amended
Decision.
November 13, 2019: The CA granted the BSP’s motion and rendered a Second Amended Decision
reinstating its original Decision dated November 27, 2017. The CA held that the actions of the Monetary
Board may not be restrained by courts except on petition for certiorari, which should be filed before the
CA. The CA further opined that Ekistics circumnavigated the law by filing a Motion to Intervene with
Petition-in-Intervention and Prayer for TRO and/or Injunction in the liquidation proceedings before the
RTC against Banco Filipino beyond the 10-day period prescribed by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7653.
Issue/s:
Whether or not judicial courtesy applies in the present case
Ruling/Decision:
No, the principle of judicial courtesy does not apply in this case.
In its Amended Decision, the CA applied the doctrine or principle of judicial courtesy.
Considering that there are other petitions questioning the validity of the closure and liquidation of Banco
Filipino which are pending before the other Divisions of the CA, the CA initially held that it is prudent to
reverse the original Decision and uphold the validity of the assailed RTC Orders and the issuance of the
WPI in order not to render the proceedings in the other divisions moot. However, in its Second
Amended Decision, the CA reversed its opinion. The CA ruled that had the other CA Divisions in the
other pending cases deemed proper to restrain or enjoin the BSP from proceeding with Banco Filipino's
liquidation, they would have issued a writ of injunction as soon as the case is elevated before them.
The principle of judicial courtesy is applied when the suspension of the proceedings in the lower
court is necessary in order to avoid mooting the matter raised in the higher court. This principle is the
exception rather than the rule.
After a careful review of the case, the Court found that the issues in this case will not render
moot and moribund the issues raised before the Court and before the CA. To reiterate, the petitions
pending before the CA at that time deal with the validity of the BSP Resolutions placing Banco Filipino
under receivership and ordering its liquidation. Regardless of the outcome of these cases, the BSP is
not precluded from enforcing its right as a mortgagee of Banco Filipino.
Section 13 (e) (3) of R.A. No. 3591, as amended by R.A. No. 10846, provides that:
(3) On the assets
Upon service of notice of closure as provided in Section 14 of this Act, all the assets of the closed
bank shall [be] deemed in custodia legis in the hands of the receiver, and as such, these assets
may not be subject to attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or any other court processes. A
judge, officer of the court or any person who shall issue, order, process or cause the issuance or
implementation of the garnishment order, levy, attachment or execution, shall be liable under
Section 27 of this Act: Provided, however, That collaterals securing the loans and advances
granted by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall not be included in the assets of the closed bank
for distribution to other creditors: Provided, further, That the proceeds in excess of the amount
secured shall be returned by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to the receiver.
Fider-Reyes v. Everglory Metal Trading Corp.,

G.R. No. 238709, [October 6, 2021]
FACTS:
This indirect contempt case arose from a complaint for infringement of patent and damages filed on by
Colorsteel Systems Corporation and its president, Jose Rey S. Batomalaque, against herein
respondent Everglory Metal Trading Corporation. Batomalaque is the registered owner of three patents
for specific designs of a tile roofing panel. Everglory then came up with the "Verona tile" which was an
exact copy of the products manufactured under Colorsteel's patents without notice and consent of
Batomalaque. Consequently, Colorsteel sent a demand letter to Everglory to cease and desist from
manufacturing and selling said tile roofing panels. However, the demand went unheeded which
prompted Colorsteel to file a complaint for patent infringement with application for preliminary
injunction.
Everglory filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt of Court against petitioner. In its petition, respondent
alleged that petitioner defied the Decision dated June 25, 2014 when she continued with the summary
proceedings in the infringement case after the expiration of the 60-day TRO. For her defense, petitioner
argued that: (a) she faithfully performed her duties; (b) there was no legal obstacle to continue with the
summary proceeding; (c) and the Decision dated June 25, 2014 had not yet attained finality; hence,
there was no judgment to defy. The CA found petitioner guilty of indirect contempt of court and
imposed a fine on her for continuing with the proceedings in the infringement case despite being fully
aware that in doing so she will be acting in direct contravention. Petitioner argues that the CA acted
without jurisdiction: (1) when it took cognizance of the contempt case against a lower court judge; and
(2) when it found her guilty of indirect contempt of court and imposed a fine on her despite a clear
showing that she acted in good faith and did not willfully defy any final and executory decision of the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court can cite petitioner in indirect contempt of court.
RULING:
No. Petitioner cannot be held guilty of indirect contempt of court. There is no question that
disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court or injunction granted
by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt punishable under Section 3, paragraph (b),50 Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. What is put in issue here is the validity of the proceedings that found petitioner
liable for such misconduct. It is very clear that the very purpose of filing this petition for indirect
contempt against petitioner, as a judge handling the infringement case, is to punish her for the alleged
defiance of the CA's decision. However, this petition for indirect contempt is not the proper action to
determine the legality of petitioner's action.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, mandates of the court, and to the
due administration of justice. It safeguards the respect due to the courts and, consequently, ensures
the stability of the judicial institution. The exercise of the power to punish for contempt has a dual
function, primarily, to punish the party for disrespecting the court or its orders, and, secondarily, to
compel the party to do an act or duty which it refuses to perform. Due to this two-fold aspect of
contempt, the punishment for contempt is classified into two: civil contempt and criminal contempt. Civil
contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge for the benefit of
the other party. Criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and
dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.
APPLICATION: The applicability of judicial courtesy was simply not clear-cut. To be considered
contemptuous, an act must be clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court or tribunal. A
person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or
required to be done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Since the CA Decision did not state
that it was immediately executory, Judge Reyes should not be held accountable for not complying with
it.
CONCLUSION: For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the ponencia's reversal of the CA Decision
dated 23 August 2017 and the Resolution dated 12 April 2018. I vote to GRANT the petition.
Lone Congressional District of Benguet Province v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co.,

G.R. Nos. 244063 & G.R. No. 244216, [June 21, 2022]
FACTS
a. Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) No. 001-90, MARCH 3, 1990 the Republic, through
the DENR, authorized the respondents to conduct mining operations on a vast tract of land located in the
Municipality of Mankayan, Province of Benguet.
b. The Land in question covers part of the ancestral domains of the Mankayan Indigenous Cultural
Communities/IPs (ICCs/IPs). The controversy relates to the renewal of MPSA No. 001-90 that says:
“Section 3.1 of MPSA No. 001-90 provides for an initial 25-year term, renewable for another period of 25
years "upon such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties or as may be
provided for by law.”
c. March 3, 1995, The Congress enacted RA 7942, or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, regulating the
exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of mineral resources.
d. October 29, 1997, Congress enacted the Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). The IPRA
enjoins all departments and other government agencies from granting, issuing or renewing any
concession, license or lease, or from entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior
certification from the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) that the area affected does not
overlap with any ancestral domains.
e. Specifically, the IPRA requires the "Free and Prior Informed and Written Consent" (FPIC) of the
affected ICCs/IPs as a condition for the issuance of the certificate.
f. As MPSA No. 001-90 was about to expire, respondents wrote the MGB -Cordillera Administrative region
letter expressing intention to renew the agreement for a period of another 25 yrs under the same terms
and conditions.
g. Controversy arose when MGB-CAR, while informing Lepanto that it had complied with the requirements, it
advised Lepanto that their application for renewal would be endorsed to the NCIP for the required FPIC
and NCIP Certification Precondition.
h. Respondents questioned the endorsement, arguing that the imposition of the certification as a
pre-condition for the issuance of any mining permits/licenses would impair their vested rights to renew
MPSA No. 001-90.
Among others respondents reiterated the following contract and law provisions:
● Section 3.1 of the MPSA No. 001-90 stating that the term of 25 years is "renewable for another period of
25 years upon such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties or as may be
provided by law";
● Section 32 of the Mining Act which provides that "mineral agreements shall have a term not exceeding
25 years to start from the date of execution thereof, and renewable for another term not exceeding 25
years under the same terms and conditions thereof, without prejudice to changes mutually agreed upon
by the parties.
● Section 56 of the IPRA mandates that "property rights within the ancestral domains already existing
and/or vested upon effectivity of this act, shall be recognized and respected."
i. Respondents wrote to the DENR secretary that MPSA is exempt from the IPRA requirement on the FPIC
and certification precondition. Respondents served the republic a DEMAND FOR ARBITRATION.
ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL: First, ruling for the arbitrability of the disagreement of the parties, the Arbitral Tribunal
debunked the Republic's argument that the Arbitral Tribunal has no jurisdiction to settle the controversy calling for
the interpretation of laws relating to the MPSA's renewal clause. The Arbitral Tribunal cited the policy on
arbitration that arbitral tribunals have jurisdiction to interpret and apply relevant laws in order to resolve the
dispute submitted to it by the parties. Second, the Arbitral Tribunal characterized the FPIC and NCIP Certification
Precondition requirement as an "unfavorable future legislation requirement" relative to MPSA No. 001-90, thus
making it prejudicial to respondents for being violative of Section 14.2 thereof. The Arbitral Tribunal noted that the
areas affected by MPSA No. 001-90 indeed overlap with ancestral domains. With the imposition of the certification
not stipulated by the parties in the agreement, respondents would then be obligated to acquire the consent of the
concerned ICCs/IPs, who are not even parties to the MPSA No. 001-90.
RTC BRANCH 141: The RTC sustained the Republic’s arguments and vacated the Arbitral Award
The RTC Branch 141 found that the Arbitral Tribunal exceeded its authority in taking cognizance of the subject
controversy. The RTC characterized the enactment of the IPRA as the State's exercise of police power promoting
and protecting the rights of the ICCs/IPs, which it opined as superior to respondents' invocation of the principle of
non-impairment of contracts. To the RTC (B141), the parties cannot dispense with the requirement without
contravening the underlying public policy embodied in the IPRA on the promotion and protection of the rights of
the ICCs/IPs.
COURT OF APPEALS : Sets aside RTC Branch 141 Order. The CA affirmed the Arbitral award in favor of the
respondents, Mining, the CA ruled that courts are without power to amend or overrule the Arbitral Award
merely because of disagreement on matters of law or facts as determined by the arbitrators. Emphasizing
that the RTC Branch 141 questioned the correctness of the Arbitral Award and not the validity of the arbitration
agreement or the regularity of the arbitration proceedings, the CA found no ground to vacate the award. To the
CA, the consequence of the interpretation and application by the Arbitral Tribunal of the parties' renewal clause,
as well as the relevant provisions of the Mining Act and IPRA itself respecting the rights of respondents in MPSA
No. 001-90 vis-á-vis the IPRA FPIC and NCIP Certification Precondition, CANNOT BE CHALLENGED under the
pretext of a public policy violation:
ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA erred in denying the motion for leave to intervene of the District of Benguet in
respondents' petition against the RTC Branch 141 Resolution vacating the Arbitral Award.
2. Whether the CA correctly sustained the Arbitral Award.
RULING - APPLICATION:
1. NO, G.R. No. 244216: The CA correctly denied District of Benguet's sought intervention. The District of
Benguet faults the CA in denying its motion for leave to intervene based on a procedural technicality; that
is, it failed to timely intervene in the arbitration and RTC proceedings.
That a resort to the rule of intervention under the Rules of Court even in a suppletory manner is not
allowed is evident from Rule 22.1 of the Special ADR Rules. Further, Rule 1.13 thereof provides that "[i]n
situations where no specific rule is provided under the Special ADR Rules, the court shall resolve such
matter summarily and be guided by the spirit and intent of the Special ADR Rules and the ADR Laws. —
to respect party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to make their own arrangements in the
resolution of disputes, as well as to achieve speedy and efficient resolution of disputes, and curb
a litigious culture.
2. G.R. No. 244216: The Arbitral award in favor of respondent mining companies must be vacated.
(***Generally, the court shall not set aside or vacate the award of the arbitral tribunal merely on the ground that
the arbitral tribunal committed errors of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, as the court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal. But here the SC ruled that: The Republic's invocation of violation of
public policy is impressed with merit. The non-application of the requirement contravenes a strong and compelling
public policy on the protection of the rights of the MANKAYAN IPs, to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being, rooted in no less than the Constitution)
The rule on autonomy of arbitral awards is not absolute. Under the 2004 Arbitration Act, an arbitral award
may be questioned before the regional trial court, which may confirm, vacate, set aside, modify, or correct the
award. The nature of this remedy against an arbitral award is embodied in the 2009 Special ADR Rules, viz.:
Under Section 24 of the Arbitration Law, one seeking to vacate an arbitral award must prove
affirmatively the following:
(a) The award is procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; or

(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of them; or
(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct [that materially prejudiced the rights of any
party; or
(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual,
final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.
The foregoing grounds contemplate integrity of the arbitral tribunal (i.e., award is procured through fraud,
corruption, undue means, or evident partiality on the part of the arbitrators, among others), and the irregularities
in the arbitration proceedings, as grounds for vacating a domestic arbitral award.
CONCLUSION: The Arbitral Tribunal cannot be said to have merely erred in the interpretation or application of
the law, it manifestly disregarded the same, and the law's underlying public policy. The foregoing,
notwithstanding, while the interests of respondent mining companies, indeed, cannot outweigh that of the
ICCs/IPs, due process and fairness dictate that respondent mining companies be given the opportunity to fully
comply with the consent requirement under the IPRA for the renewal of MPSA No. 001-90.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 244216 is GRANTED, the resolution of the CA is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The final award by the Arbitral Tribunal is VACATED. While the petition in G.R. No.
244063 is DENIED.
De Lima v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. Nos. 199972 & 206118, [August 15, 2022]
LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE
TIMBOL v. PNB,
G.R. No. 207408. April 18, 2016.
FACTS:
The Philippine National Bank International Finance Limited (PNB-IFL), a subsidiary of the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), granted Karrich Holdings Limited based in Hongkong and owned by respondent
Felino Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), a revolving credit line.
To secure the payment of obligation, Timbol executed three separate Real Estate Mortgages (REMs)
and promissory notes for and on behalf of Karrich Holdings Ltd. The credit facilities were later renewed,
revised and reduced.
As the borrowers defaulted in the payment, PNB sent a demand letter and warned the borrowers that
PNB would proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgages if they failed to pay. Timbol manifested that
he was "well aware" of the "P33 Million" outstanding obligation thus requested for additional time to
settle the obligation.Such was denied by PNB and it moved for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
On November 15, 1999, PNB caused the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, claiming that
Timbol/KAE/KHL had violated the terms of the real estate mortgage by defaulting on the payment of the
loan obligation despite demands.
On August 4, 2000, Timbol and wife Laguardia filed suit against PNB, Espina, and the Register of
Deeds of Makati City for annulment of the real estate mortgage, of the foreclosure and auction sale, for
accounting and damages, and for a temporary restraining order and/or injunction. Among other
allegations, Sposes Timbol accused PNB, of deliberately "bloating" the amount of the obligation. They
furthermore assailed the foreclosure proceedings as highly irregular, invalid, and illegal for not being
filed in accordance with Supreme Court AO No. 3.
RTC Ruling: The foreclosure of mortgage made by PNB is null and void for being vitiated. Further, the
RTC interpreted PNB's actions as an attempt "to hide the correct amount of the obligation," confirming
the Spouses Timbol's claim that PNB bloated the amount of their obligation.
Without filing MR of the RTC decision, PNB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
CA Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's decision. The Court of Appeals held that factual
issues raised by PNB have been "definitively laid to rest" by this Court's decision in PNB v. Timbol
where it was found that "respondents never denied that they defaulted in the payment of the obligation."
The Court of Appeals noted that the Court's pronouncements in PNB v. Timbol settle the question on
PNB's "attempt to hide something" and the alleged bloating of the amounts in the mortgage documents.
ISSUE: W/N the Court of Appeals was correct to abide by the Court's ruling in PNB v. Timbol? YES
RULE OF LAW:
The term law of the case has been held to mean that "whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. As a general rule, a decision on a prior
appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether that question is right or wrong, the
remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a rehearing."
The doctrine applies when "(1) a question is passed upon by an appellate court, and (2) the appellate
court remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings; the lower court and even the
appellate courts on subsequent appeal of the case are, thus, bound by how such question had been
previously settled."
This must be so for reasons of practicality and the orderly adjudication of cases. The doctrine of the law
of the case is "necessary to enable an appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently,
which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew
in the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal." It is "founded on the policy of ending
litigation." The need for "judicial orderliness and economy require such stability in the final judgments of
courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction."
APPLICATION:
The Court is bound by its earlier ruling in PNB v. Timbol finding the extrajudicial foreclosure to be
proper. The Court therein thoroughly and thoughtfully examined the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure in order to determine whether the writ of preliminary injunction was proper. To allow a
reexamination of this conclusion will disturb what has already been settled and only create confusion if
the Court now makes a contrary finding.
CONCLUSION:
No doubt, this Court is bound by its earlier pronouncements in PNB v. Timbol. The Court of Appeals
was correct to abide by the Court's ruling in PNB v. Timbol, for "once the appellate court has issued a
pronouncement on a point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should not
be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case."
DBP v. GUARIÑA AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

G.R. No. 160758, January 15, 2014
Facts of Case:
Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to
finance the development of its resort complex situated in Trapiche, Oton, Iloilo. The loan, in the amount
of P3,387,000.00 was approved on August 5, 1976. Guariña Corporation executed a promissory note
that would be due on November 3, 1998. Guariña Corporation executed a real estate mortgage over
several real properties existing at the resort complex and those yet to be acquired out of the proceeds
of the loan, also to secure the performance of the obligation. Prior to the release of the loan, DBP
required Guariña Corporation to put up a cash equity for the construction of the buildings and other
improvements on the resort complex.
The loan was released in several installments. GuariñaCorporation demanded the release of the
balance of the loan, but DBP refused. Instead, DBP directly paid some suppliers of Guariña
Corporation over the latters objection. In a letter, DBP demanded that Guari Corporation expedite the
completion of the project, and warned that it would initiate foreclosure proceedings should Guariña
Corporation not do so. Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guariña Corporation, DBP
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. A notice of foreclosure was sent to Guariña Corporation.
Notice was eventually published, leading clients and patrons of Guariña Corporation to think that its
business had slowed down, and that its resort had already closed.
Guariña Corporation sued DBP in the RTC to demand specific performance of the latters
obligations under the loan agreement, and to stop the foreclosure of the mortgages (Civil Case No.
12707). DBP moved for the dismissal of the complaint, stating that the mortgaged properties had
already been sold at a public auction. Due to this, Guariña Corporation amended its complaint to seek
the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings and the cancellation of the certificate of sale.
DBP applied for the issuance of a writ of possession which the RTC later granted upon DBPs
motion for reconsideration. Guariña Corporation filed a petitioner for certiorari before the CA which the
latter dismissed. On January 6, 1998, in another case, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the
extra-judicial sales of the mortgaged properties, null and void (CV NO. 59491). The CA sustained RTC
judgment.
Issue of the Case:

W/N the Honorable Court of Appeals adhered to the usual course of judicial proceedings in deciding CV
NO. 59491 and therefore in accordance with the Law of the Case Doctrine
Ruling of the Case:

The doctrine of law of the case did not apply herein.
DBP insists that the decision of the CA in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP already constituted the law
of the case. Hence, the CA could not decide the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491 differently.
Guariña Corporation counters that the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not constitute the
law of the case because C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP concerned the issue of possession by DBP as the
winning bidder in the foreclosure sale, and had no bearing whatsoever to the legal issues presented in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491.
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means,
more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.
The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once
declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent
appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases. For
practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that
was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the
pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and should not be reopened on remand of
the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the name
implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.
The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case exposes DBP's insistence to be
unwarranted.
To start with, the ex parte proceeding on DBP's application for the issuance of the writ of possession
was entirely independent from the judicial demand for specific performance herein. In fact, C.A.-G.R.
No. 12670-SP, being the interlocutory appeal concerning the issuance of the writ of possession while
the main case was pending, was not at all intertwined with any legal issue properly raised and litigated
in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491, which was the appeal to determine whether or not DBP's foreclosure was
valid and effectual. And, secondly, the ruling in C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP did not settle any question of
law involved herein because this case for specific performance was not a continuation of C.A.-G.R. No.
12670-SP (which was limited to the propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of DBP),
and vice versa.
Fortaleza v. Gonzalez,
G.R. No. 179287. February 1, 2016
FACTS: Maximo Lomoljo Jr., Ricardo Suganob, and Eleuterio Salabas were allegedly kidnapped in
Bacolod City. Days later, their dead bodies were found in different places in Negros Oriental. Several
criminal complaints were filed, among these was the complaint by the wife of Salabas against P/Insp.
Dongail but it was DISMISSED for lack of merit. So she filed another AMENDED AFFIDAVIT
COMPLAINT FOR KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER against Dongail and petitioners PCI Jimmy Fortaleza
and SPO2 Freddie Natividad and eight other people. Probable cause against Dongail was found but the
case against petitioners were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. This prompted the wife of
Salabas to file an URGENT MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION praying for the inclusion of Dongail and
herein petitioners in the information. Without waiting for a reinvestigation, the records of the case were
ordered to be forwarded to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. But the Provincial Prosecution
Office did not conduct a reinvestigation, and instead, affirmed in toto the decision of the prosecutors.
This prompted the wife of Salabas to file an URGENT MOTION TO COMPEL PROSECUTOR TO
CONDUCT REINVESTIGATION. But the Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales issued a Resolution
MODIFYING the resolution of the Negros Oriental Provincial Prosecution Office which found probable
cause against Dongail and Estanislao only and dismissed the case against the others. The new
Resolution ordered that an amended complaint be filed and include Fortaleza and Nativdad therein.
Thus, petitioners filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI with the Court of Appeals challenging the
resolution alleging that: (1) the Resolution of the Prosecution Office had already become final; (2) they
were not informed of the alleged PETITION FOR REVIEW. CA DISMISSED the Petition for lack of
merit, stating that the Secretary of Justice has the power of supervision and control over prosecutors
and can take cognizance of a pending case before the Prosecution Office. And since the case involves
the exercise of the Secretary’s power of control and does not involve a petition for review, the
requirement of furnishing copies of said petition for review to respondents does not apply in the case at
bar.
Hence, petitioners filed a PETITION FOR REVIEW to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Office of the
President through the Executive Secretary SET ASIDE the Resolution of the DOJ contending that even
though DOJ has such power of control, there is yet no new decision in the case to be reviewed. The
second investigation has yet to commence when the DOJ ordered the transmittal of the case for review.
Hence, Salabas filed a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI to the Supreme Court. The two cases were
consolidated, thus, we have two petitions: (1) PETITION FOR REVIEW by Fortaleza and Natividad
which assailed the CA decision; (2) PETITION FOR CERTIORARI by Salabas which assailed the
decision of the Office of the President. The Supreme Court DENIED the PETITION FOR REVIEW for
failure of the petitioners to show that CA committed any reversible error. And since Fortaleza and
Natividad did not file a Motion for Reconsideration, the Resolution of the SC became final and
executory. The case at bar, will now resolve the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI of Salabas.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents have violated the law of the case doctrine by disregarding the
Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the authority of the Secretary of Justice in issuing the resolution
indicting the respondents to the crime charged against them.
HELD: No, respondents did not violate the law of the case doctrine. The second assignment of
error in effect argues that the determination by the Court of Appeals on the question of the validity of
the Secretary of Justice Resolution should be considered the law of the case and should remain
established in all other steps of the prosecution process. The doctrine of the law of the case is well
settled in jurisprudence:
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more
specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court. The concept of law of the case is well explained in Mangold v. Bacon,
an American case, thusly:
The general rule, nakedly and boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether
on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only prescribe the duty and limit the
power of the trial court to strict obedience and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law
of the case in all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded on
convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule there would be no end to criticism, reagitation,
reexamination, and reformulation. In short, there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if
parties litigants were allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the chance of
our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a
given case. An itch to reopen questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the foolishness of
the inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts are allowed, if they so choose, to
act like ordinary sensible persons. The administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a
practical and a good one of frequent and beneficial use.
The doctrine of the law of the case applies even if the prior resort to the appellate court is in a certiorari
proceeding, as in the case at bar. If this doctrine were to be applied, the previous opinion by the Court
of Appeals — that the October 2, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice was valid should govern
on subsequent appeal.
However, the doctrine of the law of the case requires that the appeal be that of the same parties,
and that the pronouncement by the appellate court be with full opportunity to be heard accorded
to said parties.
G. R. No. 179287 and G.R. No. 182090 do not, however, involve the same parties. Of the fifteen
persons required by the October 2, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice to be included in the
Information for Kidnapping and Murder, only Jimmy Fortaleza and Freddie Natividad filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, were heard thereon, and whose arguments were considered in the
Resolution dated April 30, 2008 in G.R. No. 179287. Clarence Dongail, Jonathan Lorilla, Allen Winston
Hulleza and Bernardo Cimatu, on the other hand, appealed to the Office of the President, and are the
parties in G.R. No. 182090, to the exclusion of Jimmy Fortaleza and Freddie Natividad and the other
respondents. The doctrine of the law of the case does not, therefore, apply here in G.R. No. 182090.
cHDAIS Corollary thereto, however, the Office of the President cannot order the reinvestigation of the
charges with respect to Jimmy Fortaleza, Freddie Natividad, and the nine other accused who did not
participate in the appeal before the Office of the President, namely: Jimmy Fortaleza, Freddie
Natividad, Manolo G. Escalante, Ronnie Herrera, July ("Kirhat" Dela Rosa) Flores, Carlo "Caloy" De
Los Santos, Lorraine "Lulu" Abay, Manerto Cañete, Elma Cañete, Elson Cañete, and Jude Montilla.
Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal 20 or who resorted
to other remedies and such additional award constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Office of the President.
On a more substantive point, we cannot adhere to the position of the Office of the President that the
entire case should be remanded to the Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Oriental on the ground that the
Secretary of Justice may not exercise its power to review where there was allegedly no new resolution
rendered by the local prosecutor. As can be gleaned from the records, the Secretary of Justice
conducted an automatic review of the Provincial Prosecutor's affirmance of former resolutions issued by
previous investigating prosecutors without conducting an actual reinvestigation of the case.
It is established in jurisprudence that the Secretary of Justice has the statutory power of control and
supervision over prosecutors. Moreover, Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court recognizes the
Secretary of Justice's power to review the actions of the investigating prosecutor, even motu proprio.
Verily, the Secretary of Justice was empowered to review the actions of the Provincial Fiscal during the
preliminary investigation or the reinvestigation. We note by analogy, however, that in Department of
Justice v. Alaon, the Court declared that respondents should be given due notice of the review
proceedings before the Secretary of Justice and be afforded adequate opportunity to be heard therein.
In the case at bar, we find that there is nothing on record to show that respondents were given notice
and an opportunity to be heard before the Secretary of Justice. For this reason, we remand the case to
the Secretary of Justice with respect to respondents Dongail, Lorilla, Hulleza, and Cimatu for further
proceedings, with the caveat that any resolution of the Secretary of Justice on the matter shall be
subject to the approval of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Office of the President dated September 19, 2007 and its Resolution
dated January 9, 2008 are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Secretary of Justice for
further proceedings with respect to respondents Clarence Dongail, Jonathan Lorilla, Allen Winston
Hulleza and Bernardo Cimatu.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT
Ting v. Velez-Ting,
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.
Facts:
Petitioner Benjamin Ting and respondent Carmen Velez-Tine first met in 1972 while they were
classmates in medical school. They fell in love and got married. After having their second child,
Benjamin passed the medical board examination and proceeded to take residency program of
anesthesiology. Upon completion of the said field, he began working at Carmen’s family as a member
of its staff while Carmen worked as the hospital’s treasurer.
The couple has six children and after being married for more than 18 years, while their youngest was
only two years old, Carmen filed a petition in the RTC of Cebu City praying for the nullity of their
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Carmed claimed that Benjamin suffered from
pychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage.She also stated that prior to
their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his
friends. But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would
go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would
confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were
also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house. Because of his drinking
habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected where he often had to refuse to answer the call
of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped
calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk
to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.
She complained as well that Benjamin refused to give financial support to their family and would even
get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing support,
Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment
for his hobby.
Benjamon, on the other hand, denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being
a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances. As for his alleged failure to support his
family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees
from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.
In the RTC, the court ruled that Benajmin found to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential obligations of marriage. The petitioner appealed to the CA reversing the court’s ruling. The CA
reversed the trial court’s ruling, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that
Benjamin as psychologically incapacitated. Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming the
Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare
decisis, yet the CA denied. Carmen filed a petition for Certiorari on March 5, 2003 and was granted by
the Supreme Court and ordered the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration, and it reversed
its first ruling. When Benjamin filed for reconsideration in the CA, it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1.W/N the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases.
2.W/N the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized.
Ruling:
1.No. Respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not
be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit,
non respicit.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.Basically, it is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application
were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal
authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual
principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the
decision."
2.There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that
he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception
of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.
Philippine Guardian's Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010, 619 SCRA 585
Facts:
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution
No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional
or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was
PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679,
1. The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered
with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the
Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to
participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a
deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007
elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding
election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed;
2. The Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 — Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections — cannot apply in the
instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from
PGBI's; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI
and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not.
The COMELEC denied PGBI's motion/opposition for lack of merit.
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941. 3
The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization does
not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition
must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not
exempt PGBI from registering anew.
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and
did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.
PGBI thus asserts that Section 6 (8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed
to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also
failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI;
RULING:
YES, We find the petition partly impressed with merit.
1. Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6 (8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot
sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
2. First, the law is clear — the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under
the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. 6 The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of
one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. 7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
3. To reiterate, (a) Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure
to garner 2% partylist votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the
Banat ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6 (8) of RA 7941 should
be understood and applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is, and as an
exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis.
Doctrine of Stare decisis:

The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents.It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and
closed to further argument. The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions
Lazatin v. Desierto,
G.R. No. 147097, 5 June 2009, 588 SCRA 285
FACTS: The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaint-Affidavit
charging petitioners (Lazatin) with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalized under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by then Congressman Carmello F. Lazatin of his
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the projects
funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing
Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checks amounting to P4,868,277.08. Thus, petitioner Lazatin,
with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to
convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and it was recommended that 14 counts each of Malversation of Public
Funds and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be filed against the petitioners. Resolution was
approved by the Ombudsman; hence, 28 Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration/Reinvestigation,
which motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to
re-evaluate the cases against petitioners. The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) submitted to the
Ombudsman its Resolution which recommended the dismissal of the cases against petitioners for lack or
insufficiency of evidence.
The Ombudsman ordered the Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum,
the OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial
of the cases against petitioners. The Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving the OSP
Resolution and ordering the prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were then returned to the
Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings.
Petitioners then filed the instant petition alleging that 1) the Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP's
Resolution dismissing the cases against petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate and recommend the filing of
proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the power to prosecute. 2) They point out that under
the Constitution, the power to prosecute belongs to the OSP, which was intended by the framers to be a separate
and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman. 3) Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the
Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority
over the OSP. 4) R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic component of
the Office of the Ombudsman, should be struck down for being unconstitutional.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious. Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is
stale. It has long been settled that the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The issue of whether
said provisions of R.A. No. 6770 violated the Constitution had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in
Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman : The Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman is in
accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shall
“exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided by law.
The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP under the Office of the
Ombudsman, was likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained, thus:
x x x Section 7 of Article XI expressly provides that the then existing Tanodbayan, to be henceforth known as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, “shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.” The
underscored phrase evidently refers to the Tanodbayan's powers under P.D. No. 1630 or subsequent amendatory
legislation. It follows then that Congress may remove any of the Tanodbayan's/Special Prosecutor's powers under
P.D. No. 1630 or grant it other powers, except those powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the
Ombudsman. Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by express mandate of paragraph
8, Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman may “exercise such other powers or perform
functions or duties as may be provided by law,” it is indubitable then that Congress has the power to place the
Office of the Special Prosecutor under the Office of the Ombudsman. In the same vein, Congress may remove
some of the powers granted to the Tanodbayan by P.D. No. 1630 and transfer them to the Ombudsman; or grant
the Office of the Special Prosecutor such other powers and functions and duties as Congress may deem fit and
wise. This Congress did through the passage of R.A. No. 6770.
The foregoing ruling of the Court has been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. More recently, in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Valera, the Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in Acop and Camanag, declared that the
OSP is “merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control,
and upon authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is
lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the
Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the
foundation for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with
it the power to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional
powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE: W/n the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and
the principle of stare decisis be set aside.
RULING: The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things
which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.
It was further explained in Fermin v. People as follows:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow
the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, the Court
expounded on the importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating that:
The doctrine of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will
adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare
decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means
that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those that follow if the facts
are substantially the same, even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice
that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the
same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue.
The doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has ruled that “[a]bandonment
thereof must be based only on strong and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of
predictability which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the public's
confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements diminished.” Verily, only upon showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the Court that the
doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated
how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by
law with the power of control and supervision over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution
issued by the latter. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PLDT v. Alvarez,
G.R. No. 179408. March 5, 2014
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the grantee of a legislative franchise[5]
which authorizes it to carry on the business of providing basic and enhanced telecommunications
services in and between areas in the Philippines and... between the Philippines and other countries
and territories,[6] and, accordingly, to establish, operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase
telecommunications system for both domestic and international calls.[7] Pursuant to its... franchise,
PLDT offers to the public wide range of services duly authorized by the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
During a test call placed at the PLDT-ACPDD office, the receiving phone reflected a PLDT
telephone number (2-8243285) as the calling number used, as if the call was originating from a
local telephone in Metro Manila. Upon verification with the PLDT's Integrated
Customer Management (billing) System, the ACPDD learned that the subscriber of the reflected
telephone number is Abigail R. Razon Alvarez, with address at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio
Compound, Barangay Don Bosco, Parañaque City. It further learned that several lines are...
installed at this address with Abigail and Vernon R. Razon (respondents), among others, as
subscribers.[10]
On November 6, 2003 and November 19, 2003, Mr. Lawrence Narciso of the PLDT's Quality
Control Division, together with the operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP), conducted an
ocular inspection at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound and at No. 38 Indonesia
St., Better Living Subdivision - both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque City - and discovered that
PLDT telephone lines were connected to several pieces of equipment.[16] Mr. Narciso narrated the
results of the inspection,... Judge Mendiola found probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrants applied for. Accordingly, four search warrants[20] were issued for violations of Article 308,
in relation to Article 309, of the RPC (SW A-1 and SW A-2) and of PD No. 401, as... amended (SW
B-1 and SW B-2) for the ISR activities being conducted at 17 Dominic Savio St., Savio Compound
and at No. 38 Indonesia St., Better Living Subdivision, both in Barangay Don Bosco, Paranaque
City.
On February 18, 2004, the respondents filed with the RTC a motion to quash[24] the search
warrants essentially on the following grounds: first, the RTC had no authority to issue search
warrants which were enforced in Parañaque City; second,... the enumeration of the items to be
searched and seized lacked particularity; and third, there was no probable cause for the crime of
theft.
In a July 6, 2004 order,[26] the RTC denied the respondents' motion to quash. Having been
rebuffed[27] in their motion for reconsideration,[28] the respondents filed a petition for certiorari
with the
CA."[29]
The CA, however, nullified the ensuing paragraphs, 7, 8 and 9, for lack of particularity and ordered
the return of the items seized under these provisions. While the same stock phrase appears in
paragraphs 7 and 8, the properties described therein - i.e., printer and... scanner, software, diskette
and tapes - include even those for the respondents' personal use, making the description of the
things to be seized too general in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case of Laurel applicable to the present case?
RULING:
YES, The petition is partially granted for the following reasons:
Taking off from the basic rule that penal laws are construed strictly against the State, the Court
ruled that international long distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or
telephone services by PLDT are not personal properties that can be the subject of... theft.
One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone, covers both tangible and intangible
properties and are subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words "Personal
property" under the Revised Penal Code must be considered in tandem with the... word "take" in
the law. The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all
personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only movable
properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible... of occupation by another
are proper objects of theft
First, the Laurel En Banc ruling categorically equated an ISR activity to theft under the RPC. In so
doing, whatever alleged factual variance there may be between Laurel and the present case
cannot render Laurel inapplicable.
Second, and more importantly, in a Rule 45 petition, the Court basically determines whether the CA
was legally correct in determining whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. Under
this premise, the CA ordinarily gauges the grave abuse of discretion at the... time the RTC
rendered its assailed resolution. In quashing SW A-l and SW A-2, note that the CA relied on the
Laurel Division ruling at the time when it was still subject of a pending motion for reconsideration.
The CA, in fact, did not expressly impute grave abuse of... discretion on the RTC when the RTC
issued the search warrants and later refused to quash these. Understandably, the CA could not
have really found the presence of grave abuse of discretion for there was no Laurel ruling to speak
of at the time the RTC issued the search... warrants.
These peculiar facts require us to more carefully analyze our prism of review under Rule 45.
Requisites for the issuance of search warrant; probable cause requires the probable existence of
an offense
The constitutional requirement for the issuance of a search warrant is reiterated under Sections 4
and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. These sections lay down the
following requirements for the issuance of a search warrant: (1) the existence of probable... cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in
writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to... them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.[44] Should any
of these requisites be absent, the party aggrieved by the issuance and enforcement of the search
warrant may file a motion to quash the... search warrant with the issuing court or with the court
where the action is subsequently instituted.
Principles:
With the Court En Banc's reversal of the earlier Laurel ruling, then the CA's quashal of these
warrants would have no leg to stand on. This is the dire consequence of failing to appreciate the
full import of the doctrine of stare decisis that the CA ignored.
Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the decisions of this Court form part of the country's legal system.
While these decisions are not laws pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence
the laws' meaning, breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding... force as the laws
themselves.[57] Hence, the Court's interpretation of a statute forms part of the law as of the date it
was originally passed because the Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the interpreted... law carries into effect.[58]
Article 8 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to
adhere to precedents and not to unsettle established matters) that enjoins adherence to judicial
precedents embodied in the decision of the Supreme Court. That decision... becomes a judicial
precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis, in turn, is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further... argument.[59] The doctrine of
(horizontal) stare decisis is one of policy, grounded on the necessity of securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions.[60]
In the field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a "decided" case that is
"deemed settled and closed to further argument" if the Court's decision is still the subject of a
motion for reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving... party. Under the Rules of Court, a
party is expressly allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision within 15 days
from notice.[61] Since the doctrine of stare decisis is founded on the necessity of securing certainty
and stability in... law, then these attributes will spring only once the Court's ruling has lapsed to
finality in accordance with law. In Ting v. Velez-Ting,[62] we ruled that:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and... closed to further argument.
In applying Laurel despite PLDT's statement that the case is still subject of a pending motion for
reconsideration,[63] the CA legally erred in refusing to reconsider its ruling that largely relied on a
non-fmal ruling of the Court. While the CA's... dutiful desire to apply the latest pronouncement of
the Court in Laurel is expected, it should have acted with caution, instead of excitement, on being
informed by PLDT of its pending motion for reconsideration; it should have then followed the
principle of stare... decisis. The appellate court's application of an exceptional circumstance when it
may order the quashal of the search warrant on grounds not existing at the time the warrant was
issued or implemented must still rest on prudential grounds if only to maintain the limitation of... the
scope of the remedy of certiorari as a writ to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors of
judgment
Light Rail Transit Authority v. Pili,

G.R. No. 202047. June 8, 2016
EMMANUEL D. QUINTANAR, et. al, petitioners v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILIPPINES,

INC., respondent., G.R. No. 210565, 28 June 2016, En Banc
Digest by: Jamielyn Y. Manlapaz, EH 307
FACTS:
1. At bench is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the July
11, 2013 Decision and the December 5, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
115469, which reversed and set aside the March 25, 2010 Decision and the May 28, 2010 Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), affirming the August 29, 2008 Decision of the Labor Arbiter
(LA), in a case for illegal dismissal, damages and attorney's fees filed by the petitioners against respondent
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Coca-Cola).
2. Complainants allege that they are former employees directly hired by respondent Coca-Cola on
different dates from 1984 up to 2000, assigned as regular Route Helpers under the direct supervision of the
Route Sales Supervisors.
3. Their duties consist of distributing bottled Coca-Cola products to the stores and customers in their
assigned areas/routes, and they were paid salaries and commissions at the average of P3,000.00 per month.
4. After working for quite sometime as directly-hired employees of Coca-Cola, complainants were
allegedly transferred successively as agency workers to the following manpower agencies, namely, Lipercon
Services, Inc., People's Services, Inc., ROMAC, and the latest being respondent Interserve Management and
Manpower Resources, Inc.
5. Complainants also allege that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted an
inspection of Coca-Cola to determine whether it is complying with the various mandated labor standards, and
relative thereto, they were declared to be regular employees of Coca-Cola, which was held liable to pay
complainants the underpayment of their 13th month pay, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), and
other claims.
6. January 2004 – When the respondents learned of the filing of the claims with DOLE, they were
dismissed on various dates during this month of the said year.
7. Their claims were later settled by the respondent company, but the settlement allegedly did not include
the issues on reinstatement and payment of CBA benefits.
8. 10 November 2006 – petitioners they filed their complaint for illegal dismissal.
9. In support of their argument that they were regular employees of Coca-Cola, the complainants relied on
the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of CCBPI vs. NOWM, G.R. No. 176024, on June 18,
2007.
10. Respondent Coca-Cola denies employer-employee relationship with the complainants pointing to
respondent Interserve with whom it has a service agreement as the complainants' employer.
11. Further, respondent Coca-Cola argued that all elements of employer-employee relationship exist between
respondent Interserve and the complainants.
12. On its part, respondent Interserve merely filed its position paper, pertaining only to complainants
Quintanar and Cabili totally ignoring all the other twenty-eight (28) complainants.
13. 29 August 2008 - the LA rendered its decision granting the prayer in the complaint.
14. The LA opined that it was highly inconceivable for the petitioners, who were already enjoying a stable
job at a multi-national company, to leave and become mere agency workers.
15. He dismissed the contention of Coca-Cola that the petitioners were employees of Interserve, stressing
that they enjoyed the constitutional right to security of tenure which Coca-Cola could not compromise by
entering into a service agreement manpower supply contractor, make petitioners sign employment contracts
with them, and convert their employment status from regular to contractual.
16. The LA ordered Coca-Cola to reinstate the petitioners to their former positions and to pay their full back
wages.
17. 25 March 2010 - Similar to the conclusion reached by the LA, the NLRC found that the petitioners were
regular employees of Coca-Cola.
18. It found that the relationship between the parties in the controversy bore a striking similarity with the
facts in the cases of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. National Organization of Workingmen (N.O.W.)
and Magsalin v. National Organization of Workingmen (Magsalin).
19. The NLRC, thus, echoed the rulings of the Court in the said cases which found the employees involved,
like the petitioners in this case, as regular employees of Coca-Cola.
20. As for the quitclaims executed by the petitioners, the NLRC held that the same could not be used by
Coca-Cola to shield it from liability.
21. Coca-Cola sought reconsideration of the NLRC decision but its motion was denied.
22. The Decision of the CA - reversing the findings of the LA and the NLRC, the CA opined that the
petitioners were not employees of Coca-Cola but of Interserve. In its decision, the appellate court agreed with
the contention of Coca-Cola that it was Interserve who exercised the power of selection and engagement over
the petitioners considering that the latter applied for their jobs and went through the pre-employment
processes of Interserve.
23. The CA also gave credence to the position of Coca-Cola that it was Interserve who paid the petitioners'
salaries.
24. The CA then took into consideration Interserve's admission that they had to sever the petitioners' from
their contractual employment because its contract with Coca-Cola expired and there was no demand for
relievers from its other clients. The CA equated this with Interserve's exercise of its power to fire the
petitioners.
25. CA considered the view that it was Interserve which exercised the power of control.
26. The CA then went on to conclude that Interserve was a legitimate independent contractor.
27. The petitioners sought reconsideration, but they were rebuffed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is guilty of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in rendering a decision that is contrary to law and established jurisprudence, and misappreciating facts
which gravely prejudiced the rights of the petitioners.
SUPREME COURT’S RULING:
The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof.
1. SC: “The Court, consistent with sound pronouncements above, adopts the rulings made in Pacquing that
Interserve was a labor-only contractor and that Coca-Cola should be held liable pursuant to the principle of
stare decisis et non quieta movere.”
2. SC: “A reading of the decision of the CA and the pleadings submitted by Coca-Cola before this Court reveals
that they both lean heavily on the service agreement entered into by Coca-Cola and Interserve; the admission
by Interserve that it paid the petitioners' salaries; and the affidavit of Sambilay who attested that it was
Interserve which exercised the power of control over the petitioners.”
3. SC: “As to the characterization of Interserve as a contractor, the Court finds that, contrary to the conclusion
reached by the CA, the petitioners were made to suffer under the prohibited practice of labor-only
contracting. Article 106 of the Labor Code provides the definition of what constitutes labor-only contracting.
4. SC: “Even granting that the petitioners were last employed by Interserve, the record is bereft of any evidence
that would show that the petitioners voluntarily resigned from their employment with Coca-Cola only to be
later hired by Interserve.”
5. SC: “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The July 11, 2013 Decision and the December 5, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 115469 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
August 29, 2008 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case Nos. 12-13956-07 and 12-14277- 07, as
affirmed in toto by the National Labor Relations Commission, is hereby REINSTATED.”
xxx
United Coconut Planters Bank v. Spouses Uy,

G.R. No. 204039. January 10, 2018
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the 23 May 2012 Decision and the
18 October 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118534 which affirmed
with modification the 24 March 2010 Decision of the Office of the President (OP).
Facts:
Prime Town Property Group, Inc. (PPGI) and E. Ganzon Inc. were the joint developers of the Kiener
Hills Mactan Condominium Project (Kiener Hills). In 1997, spouses Walter and Lily Uy (respondents)
entered a Contract to Sell with PPGI for a unit in Kiener Hills. The total contract price amounted to ₱1,
151,718. 7 5 payable according to the following terms: (a) ₱l00,000.00 as down payment; and (b) the
balance paid in 40 monthly installments at ₱26,297.97 from 16 January 1997 to 16 April 2000.
On 23 April 1998, PPGI and petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) executed the following:
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), and Sale of Receivables and Assignment of Rights and Interests.
By virtue of the said agreements, PPGI transferred the right to collect the receivables of the buyers,
which included respondents, of units in Kiener Hills. The parties entered into the said agreement as
PPGI's partial settlement of its ₱l,814,500,000.00 loan with UCPB.
On 17 April 2006, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board Regional Office (HLURB Regional
Office) received respondents' complaint for sum of money and damages against PPGI and UCPB. They
claimed that in spite of their full payment of the purchase price, PPGI failed to complete the
construction of their units in Kiener Hills.
In its 29 November 2006 decision,9 the HLURB Regional Office found that respondents were entitled to
a refund in view of PPGI' s failure to complete the construction of their units. Nonetheless, it found that
UCPB cannot be solidarily liable with PPGI because only the accounts receivables were conveyed to
UCPB and not the entire condominium project.
The HLURB Regional Office suspended the proceedings as to PPGI on account of its being in
corporate rehabilitation.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed before the HLURB-Board of Commissioners who then reversed the
regional office's decision, finding UCPB, as PPGI's successor-in-interest, to be solidarily liable with
PPGI, and was ordered to refund to the complainant the total amount with interest at the legal rate of
6% per annum until fully paid.
UCPB appealed before the OP which affirmed the decision of the HLURB board.
UCPB then appealed before the CA which affirmed with modification the OP's decision.
It held that the respondents are entitled to a full refund while also ruling that the UCPB is not solidarily
liable with PPGI, hence limiting UCPB's liability to the amount respondents have paid after UCPB
assumed the right to collect the receivables Citing similarities in facts and issues with UCPB v. O
'Halloran, a case previously decided by the CA with finality, the CA ruled that the assignment of the
receivables did not make UCPB the developer of Kiener Hills, and as such, UPB cannot be deemed as
the debtor with respect to the construction, development, and delivery of the subject condominium
units.
UCPB moved for reconsideration but was denied.
UCPB appealed to the SC raising that the CA erred in applying UPB v. O'Halloran and in finding them
liable for the amount which they did not receive.
Issue:
WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT MISCONSTRUED

THE APPLICABILITY TO THE INSTANT CASE OF THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION IN
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. JOHN P. O'HALLORAN AND JOSEFINA O'HALLORAN
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS
Ruling:
Yes. The CA grievously erred when it misconstrued the applicability to the instant case of the final and
executory decision in UCPB. UCPB v. O’Halloran is not binding precedent since it was not issued by
the Supreme Court.
Respondents assailed that the CA erred in applying O'Halloran because the circumstances were
different, notably the issue that estoppel did not arise in the said case. In addition, they argued that
O'Halloran and the other cases cited by UCPB are not binding pursuant to the doctrine of stare
decisis because they were decided by the CA and not by this Court. As such, respondents posited
that only decisions of the Court, excluding all other courts such as the CA, form part of the legal
system.
On the other hand, UCPB countered that the only issue to be resolved in the present petition is the
actual amount of its liability. It explained that the assailed CA decision had become final and executory
after respondents failed to appeal the same. UCPB pointed out that the issues respondents raised were
already ventilated before the appellate court. It believed that respondents should have filed their own
appeal to assail the issues they found questionable. TIADCc
It must be remembered that when a case is appealed, the appellate court has the power to review the
case in its entirety. In Heirs of Alcaraz v. Republic of the Phils., the Court explained that an appellate
court is empowered to make its own judgment as it deems to be a just determination of the case, to wit:
In any event, when petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appealed case was
thereby thrown wide open for review by that court, which is thus necessarily empowered to come out
with a judgment as it thinks would be a just determination of the controversy. Given this power, the
appellate court has the authority to either affirm, reverse or modify the appealed decision of the trial
court. To withhold from the appellate court its power to render an entirely new decision would violate its
power of review and would, in effect, render it incapable of correcting patent errors committed by the
lower courts.
Thus, when UCPB appealed the present controversy before the Court, it was not merely limited to
determine whether the CA accurately set UCPB's liability against respondents. It is also empowered to
determine whether the appellate court's determination of liability was correct in the first place. This is
especially true considering that the issue of the nature of UCPB's liability is closely intertwined and
inseparable from the determination of the amount of its actual liability.
Stare Decisis applies only to cases decided by the Supreme Court

As above-mentioned, respondents bewail the reliance of the CA on O'Halloran arguing that it was not a
binding precedent since it was not issued by this Court. In De Mesa v. Pepsi-Cola Products Phils., Inc.,
20 the Court explained that the doctrine of stare decisis deems decisions of this Court binding on the
lower courts, to wit:
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already
established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the doctrine of stare decisis becomes operative only when judicial precedents are
set by pronouncements of this Court to the exclusion of lower courts. It is true regardless whether
the decisions of the lower courts are logically or legally sound as only decisions issued by this Court
become part of the legal system. At the most, decisions of lower courts only have a persuasive effect.
Thus, respondents are correct in contesting the application of the doctrine of stare decisis when the CA
relied on decisions it had issued.
Supreme Court affirmed with Modification the decision of the CA.
NCC Art. 8. Judicial Decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.
University of the East v. Masangkay,

G.R. No. 226727, [April 25, 2018]
Gotesco Properties, Inc. v. International Exchange Bank,

G.R. No. 212262, [August 26, 2020]
FACTS:
● Gotesco Properties, Inc. (Gotesco), as borrower, and International Exchange Bank (IBank), as
lender, entered into a credit agreement. Then, Gotesco and IBank executed a Compromise
Agreement where Gotesco's loan was restructured.
● IBank filed with the trial court a Motion for Execution claiming that Gotesco failed to comply with
the terms of the Compromise Agreement when it did not pay P619,179,627.01 as of February 5,
2000. The RTC, through Judge Mayor, denied the Motion for Execution and found the action
premature as the ten-year term loan in the Compromise Agreement would end in 2013.
However, through Judge Marajas, the same RTC granted the motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed by IBank.
● CA upheld the decision of the RTC.
● In its Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court, Gotesco argued that the RTC
should not have granted respondent's Motion for Reconsideration due to stare decisis. It
claimed that Judge Marajas should not have reversed Judge Mayor's ruling because
respondent's case in its Motion for Reconsideration was identical with those arguments it raised
in the Motion for Execution. Since Judge Mayor's Order already ruled upon respondent's
arguments, Judge Marajas should not have set his order aside on the basis of IBank’s motion
for reconsideration. He acted with grave abuse of discretion and disrespect by setting aside
Judge Mayor's Order.
● Respondent argued that Judge Mayor’s Order did not constitute stare decisis which bound
Judge Marajas and prevented him from issuing a contrary resolution because it was not an
issuance of the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the principle of stare decisis applies in this case.
RULING:
No. The principle of stare decisis applies only to final decisions of the Supreme Court, because only the
Supreme Court may create judicial precedents that other courts should follow. In De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola
Products Phils., Inc.:
“The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires our courts to follow a rule already
established in a final decision of the Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.”
Decisions of lower courts or other divisions of the same court are not binding on others. No grave
abuse of discretion is committed when a judge sets aside an earlier ruling rendered by the previous
judge in the same trial court branch for the same case, especially when, as in this case, a reversible
error had been committed.
Gotesco's position that the principle of stare decisis precluded the issuance of Judge Mayor’s
Resolution contradicts the very reason why motions for reconsideration are allowed by the Rules of
Court. An aggrieved party is permitted to question alleged errors in a judgment or final order, and
should the court find merit in the moving party's arguments, then it is duty-bound to correct those errors.
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Ronquillo,

G.R. No. 204948, [September 7, 2020
Kolin Electronics Co., Inc. v. Kolin Philippines International, Inc.,

G.R. No. 226444, [July 6, 2021]
FACTS:
ISSUES: Whether the principle of stare decisis finds application here;
RULING:
Torres v. Republic
G.R. No. 247490, [March 2, 2022]
FACTS:
1. On April 5, 1991, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Solicitor General, filed with
Branch 8, Regional Trial Court (RTC Branch 8), Davao City a Complaint for Cancellation of Titles
against spouses Leonora R. Gaspar (Leonora) and Florencio Gaspar (Florencio) (collectively, Spouses
Gaspar) and the Register of Deeds of Davao City praying for the cancellation of the free patents and
the original certificates of titles (OCTs) issued pursuant thereto in the names of Spouses Gaspar and
docketed as Civil Case No. 20,665-91.
2. In the Decision 7 dated April 20, 1999, the RTC Branch 8 found that the free patent applications
granted to Spouses Gaspar were tainted with fraud and misrepresentation; thus, it ordered the
cancellation of their titles.
3. Spouses Gaspar filed their appeal with the CA docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 64921. In the Decision
dated January 5, 2011, the CA affirmedin toto the RTC Branch 8 Decision. It likewise denied Spouses
Gaspar's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution 11 dated July 14, 2011.
4. Leonora filed before the Court a petition for review oncertiorari docketed as G.R. No. 197918. In the
Court's Resolution dated February 6, 2012, the Court denied the petition for Leonora's failure to show
any reversible error on the part of the CA. The Court also denied her motion for reconsideration in the
Resolution dated June 27, 2012. Subsequently, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment on August 23,
2012.
5. During the execution stage of the decision, the Republic filed with the RTC Branch 8, in Civil Case
No. 20,665-91, a Manifestation and Motion dated April 7, 2014. The Republic moved for the
cancellation of all the derivative titles emanating from the free patents and OCTs of Spouses Gaspar
that RTC Branch 8 ordered cancelled in its Order dated April 20, 1999.
6. The State's Comment brought to light a similar petition for annulment of judgment against the exact
same June 30, 2015 Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 20,665-91, titled Hsi Pin Liu, et
al. v. Republic of the Philippines , docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07590-MIN involving the cancelled titles
in the name of Spouses Gaspar.
7. In CA-G.R. SP No. 07590-MIN, the petitioners in that case petitioned to annul the same Order
sought to be annulled here in this case. They raised the same issues and argument, but were found by
this court's Twenty-Third Division to be without merit in its Resolution dated August 24, 2016.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Doctrine of Stare Decisis et non quieta movere applies to the present case.
RULING:
YES, “The case of Liu is binding and applicable in the instant case based on the salutary doctrine of
stare decisis et non quieta movere which means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things
which are established."
The Court had already declared in the Liu case that a petition for annulment of the RTC Order
dated June 30, 2015 is unavailing because the assailed Order is not a judgment, final order, or
resolution contemplated under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court but an issuance to carry out the execution
of the RTC Decision dated April 20, 1999 which ordered the reversion of the subject lots to the
government. Consequently, the Court applies the Liu ruling to the instant case. Once a case has been
decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, as in the present case,
should be decided in the same manner.
APPLICATION:
To stress, the facts of the instant case and those of the Liu case are substantially the same. The
RTC Branch 8 ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of herein petitioners and of Hsi Pin Liu, in its Order
dated June 30, 2015 because their TCTs were all derived from OCT Nos. P-10221 and P-9923 issued
in the names of Florencio and Leonora, respectively. To recall, in its Decision dated April 20, 1999, the
RTC ordered the cancellation of the free patents and OCTs of the Spouses Gaspar by reason of fraud
and misrepresentation attendant in their issuances and directed that the lots covered by the order of
cancellation be reverted back to the government. Herein petitioners and Hsi Pin Liu, et al., separately
filed petitions for annulment of the RTC Order dated June 30, 2015 wherein both respectively alleged
that they were not original parties in Civil Case No. 20,665-91, the court had not acquired jurisdiction
over their person, and they were denied due process.
RES JUDICATA
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc.,

G.R. No. 150470, August 6, 2008, 561 SCRA 75
FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner-spouses Felipe and Victoria Layos (Spouses Layos) seeking the reversal and setting aside of
the Decision 2 dated 26 April 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61759, which affirmed
the Order 3 dated 19 January 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93 of San Pedro,
Laguna, summarily dismissing the spouses Layos' Petition for Reconstitution of Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 239 in LRC Case No. B-1784.
Factual background:
G.R. No. 120958:
The injunction cases
In a previous case, Fil-Estate Golf (FEGDI) was the developer of a golf course in Laguna along with La
Paz who provided the properties registered in its name. Thereafter, Layos filed for injunction against
FEGDI and alleged that he is the legal owner of the lands in question, and further alleged an intrusion
on the part of FEGDI and La Paz. Layos filed two different cases in two separate courts, praying for the
same thing. Complaint was dismissed for forum-shopping.
CA-G.R. CV No. 50962:

The Quieting of Title Case
Only months after instituting the injunction cases, Layos filed a complaint for quieting of title against La
Paz. Layos alleges that La Paz “grabbed” his land and entered it without his consent. His main proof
was the Original Certificate Title No. 239, issued in his name. La Paz argues that Layos never owned or
possessed the land in question an in fact, it got the lands from the government and it was issued the
assailed Transfer Certificate of Titles. The court ruled in favor of La Paz and declared their titles to be
indefeasible and found the OCT of Layos to be spurious.
G.R. No. 150470:

The Reconstitution Case
The instant Petition originated from a Petition for Reconstitution 19 of OCT No. 239 filed by the
Spouses Layos on 12 August 1993 with the San Pedro RTC, docketed as LRC Case No. B-1784. It is
noted that the Spouses Layos instituted this reconstitution case on the same day as their quieting of
title case before the Biñan RTC. Several parties filed their intervention and/or opposition to the Petition
for Reconstitution. The case was dismissed on the grounds that the title sought to be reconstituted,
specifically OCT No. 239 is a forgery as held no less than the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958,
Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc., (FEGDI) vs. Court of Appeals, December 16, 1996, the Court
has no other option but to dismiss the case.
Spouses Layos’ filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the San Pedro RTC denied such.
Aggrieved, the Spouses Layos filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however,
found no reversible error in the ruling of the lower court dismissing the Spouses Layos' Petition for
Reconstitution. According to the Court of Appeals, the validity of OCT No. 239 of the spouses Layos
was already determined by the Supreme Court in its Decision dated 16 December 1996 in G.R. No.
120958, in which the Supreme Court categorically declared that the said certificate of title was a
forgery.
The Spouses Layos, thus, filed before this Court the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 150470, stating the following
assignment of errors:
[1/4] The Court of Appeals erred in applying the principle of res judicata in the instant case, when it
declared that the ruling of this Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive upon the
issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos'] O.C.T. No. 239
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals truly erred in applying the principle of res judicata in the
instant case.
RULING: NO, the Court of Appeals did not err in applying the principle of res judicata
Res Judicata
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and
(b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in
issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to
that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or
their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in
the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in the
second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of
action is not required but merely identity of issue.
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already
settled in a previous case. The second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer
touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of judgment requires only
the identity of issues and parties, but not of causes of action.
It is on the ground of res judicata, in its second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — that
the Petition for Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos must be dismissed. As explained by the
Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision:
In the case at bar, the ruling of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 120958 is conclusive upon
the issue of validity of the [Spouses Layos'] OCT No. 239, inasmuch as the said issue has
already been mutually controverted by the parties and ruled upon with finality by the
Supreme Court no less, in favor of the invalidity of the [Spouses Layos'] title.
Conclusiveness of Judgment in G.R. No. 120958

Contrary to the position of the Spouses Layos, there is identity of parties and issues between G.R. No.
120958 (the injunction cases) and LRC Case No. B-1784 (the reconstitution case).The principal parties
in both cases are the Spouses Layos, on one hand, and La Paz and FEGDI, on the other. The Spouses
Layos and La Paz both claim title to the subject property, while FEGDI is the partner of La Paz in a joint
venture to develop the said property. There may be other parties named in both cases, but these
parties only derive their rights from the principal parties. The Court has previously held that for
purposes of res judicata, only substantial identity of parties is required and not absolute
identity. There is substantial identity of parties when there is community of interest between a
party in the first case and a party in the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the
first case. In other words, privity or a shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke
application of the principle of res judicata. It is fundamental that the application of res judicata
may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in a subsequent litigation.
Conclusiveness of Judgment in G.R. No. 155612

During the pendency of the Petition at bar, a significant development took place in the quieting of title
case. The Court had already denied in a Resolution dated 13 January 2003 the appeal of the Spouses
Layos in G.R. No. 155612 and, in effect, affirmed the Decision dated 20 February 2001 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962. It should be recalled that in said Decision, the appellate court
upheld the validity of OCT No. 242 from which La Paz derived its TCTs and, at the same time, explicitly
found OCT No. 239 of the Spouses Layos spurious. This ruling of the Court of Appeals on the
spuriousness of OCT No. 239, once again, constitutes res judicata by conclusiveness of
judgment on the Petition for Reconstitution of the Spouses Layos.
Finality of Judgment
A statement in the Spouses Layos' Petition for Review before this Court reveals their ultimate intent:
The test of a man's honor is his ability to admit his mistake. In the instant case, it would [be] in keeping
with the rule of law and justice for this Most Venerable and Honorable Court to allow the parties to fully
ventilate their claims in the court below instead of depriving the [Spouses Layos] of their valued
property based on a sweeping obiter dictum by this Court in the FEDGI [sic] case where the [Spouses
Layos'] title was not directly attacked. It may be nicely and even deceptively phrased but, simply, what
the Spouses Layos pray to this Court is for the re-litigation of an issue settled conclusively in this
Court's Decision dated 16 December 1996 in G.R. No. 120958, and also in the Court of Appeals'
Decision dated 20 February 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50962. Both Decisions have already become
final, and no part thereof may be disturbed by any court, even if to correct a purported error therein.
Philippine Postal Corporation v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 173590, 9 December 2013
Facts:
De Guzman, then a Postal Inspector at the Postal Services Office, was recommended to be
formally charged with offenses and eventually be relieved from his post, in view of an anonymous
complaint charging him of dishonesty and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The recommendation was forwarded to the Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES)
of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) since the Postal Services Office was
then a line agency of the latter. However, after evaluation, ISLES recommended that De Guzman be
exonerated from charges against him due to lack of merit, which the DOTC later approved through the
issuance of a Memorandum.
Pursuant to RA 7354 otherwise known as the “Postal Service Act of 1992”, the Postal Services
Office under DOTC was abolished, and all its powers, duties, and rights were transferred to the
Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC). Likewise, officials and employees of the Postal Services Office
were absorbed by the PPC. Subsequently, De Guzman, who had by then become Chief Postal Service
Officer, was formally charged and later found guilty by PPC, for the same acts of dishonesty, gross
violation of regulations, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and the
Anti-graft law thereby dismissing him from service.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. A second MR was filed which was
resolved in his favor to have a formal hearing of the case and was ordered to be conducted as soon as
possible. After due hearing, PPC found De Guzman guilty of the charges against him and consequently
dismissed him from the service, emphasizing also therein that the complainant was the PPC, which has
its own charter and was no longer under DOTC. Hence, the ISLES memorandum exonerating De
Guzman and dismissing the complaints against him was merely recommendatory.
De Guzman elevated his case to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus,
imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in that: (a) the case
against him was a mere rehash of the previous complaint already dismissed by the DOTC, and
therefore, a clear violation of the rule on res judicata. The CA rendered a Decision, reversing the
PPC Resolutions, and held that the revival of the case against De Guzman constituted grave abuse of
discretion considering the clear and unequivocal content of the Memorandum that the complaint against
De Guzman was already dismissed. PPC moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied,
hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether the investigation conducted by the DOTC, through the ISLES, bars the filing of the
subsequent charges by PPC
Ruling:
No, the investigation conducted by the DOTC, through the ISLES, did not bar the subsequent
charges filed by PPC, hence, res judicata principle is inapplicable. In order that res judicata may bar the
institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be
final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and the
second actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of action.
In this case, there was no "judgment on the merits". The dismissal of the complaint against De
Guzman in the Memorandum issued by DOTC was a result of a fact-finding investigation only for
purposes of determining whether a prima facie case exists and a formal charge for administrative
offenses should be filed. This being the case, no rights and liabilities of the parties were determined
therein with finality. In fact, the CA, conceding that the ISLES was "a mere fact-finding body," pointed
out that the Memorandum recommending the dismissal of the complaint against De Guzman "did not
make any adjudication regarding the rights of the parties." Hence, for the reasons discussed, the Court
holds that PPC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it revived the case against De Guzman
despite the previous dismissal thereof. Since said dismissal was not a judgment on the merits, the
doctrine of res judicata does not apply.
Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the Resolutions of petitioner Philippine Postal Corporation are hereby REINSTATED.
Cano Vda. de Viray v. Usi,

G.R. No. 192486, November 21, 2012, 686 SCRA 211
Facts:
● The case deals with plots of land owned by the Mendozas. There was a subdivision plan
dividing the land of the Mendozas into 6 parts, named Lots 733 A-F, wherein Lots A and F were
sold to the Petitioner. This division will be called the Fajardo Plan.
● Notwithstanding this division, Mendoza and Respondent are in a Subdivision Agreement, which
divided the said Lot 733 into 3 parts. This division is known as the Galang plan.
● Then, they again enacted another Subdivision Agreement, which divided the Lot 733 – C, which
was first directed only to Mendoza, is now divided into 13 parts.
● Where, 2 of these 13 new plots are now co-owned by respondent.
● The problem arose where the lots which was sold to Petitioner were now in question since it
affected the title since the Galang Plan has now put in the respondents as co-owners to some of
the parts that were sold to the petitioner.
● Thus, a suit for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale was filed. Which sought for the annulment
of the sale of land of Mendoza and Petitioner. Which after appeals made the Petitioner the sole
owner of the land. The decision became final and executory, and the respondents did not appeal
it. The decision was made in July 1998.
● Then, in December of 2001 respondents filed a Petition for Accion Publiciana/Reinvindictoria
against petitioners regarding the same lot, instead of appealing the past decision.
● Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the case since it was already barred by a prior judgment
(res judicata).
● The CA rendered its Decision giving the ownership to the Respondents.
● Hence, this case was made after the petitioner was denied for reconsideration.
Issue: Did the CA erred in giving the respondents the ownership of the land?
Held:
Yes, Notably, the Petitioners, after peremptorily prevailing in their cases supportive of their claim
of ownership and possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo Plan), cannot now be deprived of their
rights by the expediency of the respondents maintaining, as here, an accion publiciana and/or accion
reivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions to recover possession of real property.
The better right to possess and the right of ownership of Petitioners over the disputed parcels of land
cannot, by force of the res judicata doctrine, be re-litigated thru actions to recover possession and
vindicate ownership filed by the Respondents. The Court, in G.R. No. 122287, has in effect determined
that the conveyances and necessarily the transfers of ownership made to the Petitioners on April 29,
1986 were valid.
Thus, the Court's decision in G.R. No. 122287 juxtaposed with that in G.R. No. 154538 would suffice to
bar the Respondents accion publiciana, as the spouses had invoked all along their ownership over the
disputed Lot 733-F as basis to defeat any claim of the right of possession. While an accion
reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an ejectment case, such judgment constitutes a bar to the
institution of the accion publiciana, because the matter of possession between the same parties has
become res judicata and cannot be delved into in a new action.
Taganas v. Emuslan,
G.R. No. 146980, September 2, 2003
Facts
● On July 11, 1997, a road accident involving four vehicles along the national highway in
La Union. The vehicles involved were a minibus, an Izusu Elf van owned by Josalde
and Zenaida Junto, a Petron tanker truck owned and operated by petitioner Luz
Taganas and a Shell tanker truck.
● The owners of the Elf van filed a complaint for damages against petitioners and Petron
tank owner and driver under Civil Case No. 97-02055-D, and was decided by the court
holding the owners of the Izusu Elf van liable for damage sustained by petitioner
Taganas’ Petron tanker truck.
● Private respondent Standard Insurance Co., Inc., insurer of the Shell tanker truck, filed
a separate complaint for damages against both the Juntos and petitioners, docketed as
Civil Case No. 6754.
● The petitioners filed a second motion they invoked res judicata, and moved for dismissal
of the Juntos’ cross-claim against them.
● The trial court granted the motion to dismiss the cross-claim in the ground of res
judicata but denied the second motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioners filed a
partial motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
● The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition because the principle of Res Judicata that
would operate as an absolute bar to the subsequent action does not apply to the case
at bench as the decision rendered in Civil Case No 97-02055-D is not a bar to complaint
by private respondent.
Issue
WON res judicata will apply between the respondent claims in damages to the owner and
driver of Petron tanker truck.
Rule of Law
Res Judicata- a matter that has been adjudicated by a competent court and may not be
pursued further by the same parties.
Ruling
No. The decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 97-02055-D was conclusive only as
between the petitioners and the Juntos, and not as to private respondent. Consequently, the
principle of res judicata did not apply.
Res Judicata refers to the rule that a final judgement or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits
on all points and matters determined in the former suit. The Elements of Res judicata are as
follows: 1. the former judgement or order must be final; 2. the judgment or order must be on
the merits; 3. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; 4. there must be identity of parties, between the first and second action, of
subject matter and cause of action. For res judicata to apply, all the above essential requisites
must exist.
Degayo v. Magbanua-Dinglasan,
G.R. Nos. 173148, April 6, 2015
FACTS:
Lot No. 861 is a 36,864 sq.m. parcel of land in the Cadastral Survey of Dingle, Iloilo, registered in the
name of Elsa Degayo's deceased parents. Lot No. 861 used to be bounded on the southwest by the
Jalaud River that serves to separate Dingle from Pototan Iloilo.
On the other side of Jalaud River, opposite to Lot No. 861, lies a 153,028 square meter parcel of land,
Lot No. 7328 of the Cadastre of Pototan, Iloilo, owned by the respondents Cecilia
Magbanua-Dinglasan, etc. The Jalaud River, which separates these parcels of land, flows along the
northeast side of Lot 861 and the southwest side of Lot No. 7328.
Sometime in the 1970's the Jalaud River changed its course and moved southwards towards the banks
of Pototan, where Lot No. 7328 lies, leaving its old riverbed dry. As a result, Lot No. 7328 decreased in
size while the banks adjacent to Lot No. 861 increased in land area.
Degayo and the tenants believed that the area was an accretion to Lot No. 861. As a result, her tenants
commenced cultivating and tilling that disputed area with corn and tobacco. The area allegedly added
to Lot No. 861 contains 52,528 sq.m of which included portions of the abandoned riverbed and the
resurfaced area.
The respondents Magbanua-Dinglasan argued that the disputed property was an abandoned riverbed,
which should rightfully belong to them to compensate for the erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328, over
which the Jalaud River presently runs.
1st Civil Case: Civil Case No. 16047

On October 4, 1984, Magbanua-Dinglasan filed a complaint for ownership and damages against the
tenants of Lot 861, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo, Branch 27 docketed as Civil Case No.
16047. Degayo sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 16047 but her motion was denied. Notably, she
did not question the denial by filing a petition for certiorari. Notwithstanding the denial of her motion to
intervene in Civil Case No. 16047, Degayo was still able to participate in the proceedings therein as a
witness for the defense.
On May 7, 1996, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 16047, in
favor of Magbanua-Dinglasan. The decision in Civil Case No. 16047 became final and executory
on August 6, 1999.
2nd Civil Case: Civil Case No. 18328
After her Motion for Intervention in Civil Case No. 16047 was denied, Degayo instead initiated another
suit of declaration of ownership with damages against Magbanua- Dinglasan RTC of Iloilo, Branch 22,
involving the same disputed parcel of land. The Court found in favor of Degayo and declared the
property in question as an accretion to Lot No. 861. Magbanua-Dinglasan filed a motion for
reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence, they filed an appeal with the CA.
CA Ruling on Civil Case No. 18328
CA reversed and set aside the RTC Ruling in Civil Case No. 18328. CA noted that the disputed
properties are abandoned riverbeds. Being abandoned riverbeds, the property in question rightfully
belongs to the respondents Magbanua-Dinglasan as the owners of the land now occupied by the
Jalaud River. The CA likewise noted that the previous RTC Branch decision in Civil Case No. 16047 is
conclusive to the title of the thing, being an aspect of the rule on conclusiveness of judgment.
Degayo sought reconsideration of the CA decision. It was denied. Thus, the petition for review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court.
Degayo assailed that RTC Branch 27 decision in Civil Case No. 16047 is not conclusive upon her
when she was not even a party in the said Civil Case.
Respondent Magbanua-Dinglasan claimed that the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes
res judicata
ISSUES: whether or not (1) the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes res judicata and (2)
Degayo is a party in Civil Case No. 16047
RULING:
(1) YES, Civil Case No. 16047 constitutes res judicata. Res judicata refers to the "rule that a final
judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. Only the
identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness
of judgment. The court further said:
While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of
a bar by former judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former
nonetheless estops the parties from raising in a later case the issues or points that
were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the ruling in the earlier
case.
It is beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case No. 16047 has attained finality in view of the
tenant's abandonment of their appeal to the CA. The decision was adjudicated on the merits. It was
rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.
(2) YES, Degayo is a party in Civil Case No. 16047. There exists a community of interest between
Degayo and her tenants, who were respondents in Civil Case No. 16047. One test to determine
substantial identity of interest would be to see whether the success or failure of one party
materially affects the other. In the present case, Degayo is suing for the ownership of the disputed
land. Degayo's rights over the disputed land is predicated on the same defenses that his alleged
tenants interposed in Civil Case No. 16047, that is, their perceived rights which emanated from
the disputed accretion to Lot No. 861. The interests of Degayo and the tenants in relation to the two
cases are inextricably intertwined in that both their claims emanate from a singular fundamental
allegation of accretion.
Thus, the petition for review on certiorari was denied by the Court.
ESPERANZA SUPAPO v. Spouses De Jesus, Macario

G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015
FACTS:
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Sps.
De Jesus) and Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a
piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City. Registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo’s
names. The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer
but they made sure to visit at least twice a year. The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents
the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti Squatting Law. The trial court convicted the respondents. The
respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted
Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as “An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772,”
which resulted in the dismissal of the criminal case.
ISSUE/S: Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.
HELD:
Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of
the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47.
“Bar by prior judgment” means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the merits and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the
same claim, demand or cause of action. It is obvious that there is no identity of subject matter, parties and
causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for
the recovery of the subject property. Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court
in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot
again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
subject matter of the two actions is the same. The only issue in accion publiciana is whether the Spouses
Supapo have a better right than the respondents to possess and occupy the subject property.
For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.
The complaint is not barred by res judicata.
DELA ROSA LINER, INC. v. BORELA ,

G.R. No. 207286, July 29, 2015
EULOGIO v. BELL, SR.,

G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Facts:
● Respondent spouses Paterno and Rogelia Bell executed a contract of sale of their residential
house and lot with petitioner spouses Enrico and Natividad Eulogio. However, they and their
children filed a complaint for annulment of the contract of sale and quieting of title. RTC granted
the said complaint. However, the trial court ordered them to pay petitioner, spouses Eulogio
1,000,000 pesos plus interest. Both appealed to CA, but decision was affirmed in toto.
● RTC issued a writ of execution, wherein the said property was levied on execution.
● Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration to lift the writ of execution on the ground that
the property was a family home.
● Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking
Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the current market value of the property
exceeded the statutory limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a commercial area,
and that respondents had even sold it to them for P1 million.
● Respondents argued that petitioners' bid to determine the present value of the subject property
was just a ploy to re-litigate an issue that had long been settled with finality.
● RTC eventually denied the respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, since the petitioners
invoked Article 160, and appointed a Board of Appraisers. Respondents appealed before CA,
which granted the petition.
● The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become final and executory, only
declared respondents' house and lot as a family home. Since the issue of whether it may be
sold in execution was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was as yet no
res judicata.
Issue:
Whether a hearing to determine the value of respondents’ family home for purposes of execution under
Article 160 of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res judicata
Ruling:
Yes. Re-litigating the issue of the value of the respondents’ family home is barred by res judicata, since
the trial court has already determined that the value of the property fell within the statutory limit in its
earlier decision (Civil Case No. 4581).
Under the 1997 Rules of Court, there are two aspects of res judicata, namely: bar by prior judgment
and conclusiveness of judgment.
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in which the judgment has been
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is an identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
second action. The judgment or decree on the merits of the court of competent jurisdiction concludes
the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or any other tribunal.
On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where there is an identity of parties in the first
and second cases, but no identity of causes of action. Under this rule, the first judgment is conclusive
only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions
is the same.
In this case, the trial court's final decision in Civil Case No. 4581 bars petitioners' move to have the
property in dispute levied on execution.
GUERRERO v. DIRECTOR, LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU,

G.R. No. 183641, April 22, 2015
FACTS:
§ First Case: RTC
o Before the Court is a petition/complaint to cite respondents for contempt for

alleged forum shopping.
o Petitioner Benjamin Guerrero obtained a miscellaneous sales patent and, eventually,

an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) over a parcel of land located at Pugad Lawin,
Quezon City. The title OCT No. 0-28, covering 174 square meters, was issued in his
name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on August 27, 1982.
o The issuance of the title, however, became the subject of a Protest by Angelina
Bustamante (now deceased), the wife of Marcelo Bustamante (also deceased), 3 before
the then Director of Lands. The ground of the protest was the title's alleged
encroachment on the area subject of Marcelo's own patent application.
o The protest by Bustamante was initially dismissed by the Director of Lands, and was
similarly dismissed in subsequent appeals to the Ministry of Natural Resources 6 and the
Office of the President. The latter office rendered its dismissal in a Decision dated
October 10, 1986.
§ However, on the motion for reconsideration filed by Angelina Bustamante, the

Office of the President, on October 30, 1987, ordered the case remanded to the
Department of the Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for the conduct
of an ocular investigation and resurvey of the disputed area
· This then had the office of the president direct the DENR to take action
for the correction of the technical description of the property covered OCT
No. 0-28 under the basis of findings of the ocular investigation and
relocation survey.
o On November 7, 1989, following the Order of the Office of the President, the Director
of Lands filed a Petition for Amendments of the Plan and Technical Description of OCT
No. 0-28 in the name of Benjamin Guerrero with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.
o On July 13, 1995, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 77, rendered its Decision
dismissing the petition for lack of basis and merit.
§ Second case: CA
o The dismissal was appealed by the Director of Lands to the Court of Appeals, but the
latter court, in a Decision dated February 12, 1998, affirmed the RTC's decision.
§ Third case: SC (1st attempt)

o Then, this Court, in its Decision in Republic of the Philippines v. Benjamin Guerrero,
13 dated March 28, 2006, affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the RTC
dismissing the petition of the government based on the protest filed by Bustamante.
§ In that case, it was held that there was no proof that the titleholder, Benjamin
Guerrero, employed fraud in obtaining his title, OCT No. 0-28.
§ Fourth case: SC (2nd attempt)
o Private respondents heirs of Marcelo Bustamante, this time represented by Cora

Bustamante, on February 1, 2007, filed another Protest with the Land Management
Bureau (LMB), 14 DENR, to again question Guerrero's title.
§ The heirs of Bustamante claim that "fraud, strategy, stealth and intent to
defraud" was employed by Guerrero in causing the survey of the land and the
eventual issuance of his title.
o Acting on the protest, respondent LMB, through Director Arthus T. Tenazas, effectively
gave due course to the same, through an Order of Investigation dated May 9, 2007
§ “WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, Mr. FLORANTE EDWARD

R. BENITEZ, Project Evaluation Officer III, of the Legal Division, is hereby
directed to conduct the desired investigation pursuant to standing rules and
regulations provided for under Lands Office Circular No. 68, dated August 28,
1975, to ascertain, whether or not there is a valid and sufficient ground to warrant
the institution of a legal proceeding before the Courts by the Office of the Solicitor
General.”
§ Florante Edward R. Benitez then ordered the parties to file their respective
position papers
o Hence, the present petition/complaint praying for the respondents to be held in indirect
contempt on the ground of forum shopping.
ISSUES: Whether the private respondents, through their predecessors, had already gone through an
identical process which terminated in a final and executory decision of this Court in the aforementioned
case of Republic v. Guerrero.
RULINGS: Yes. This Court finds that private respondents heirs of Bustamante, in filing their protest, are
only repeating what had previously been done by their predecessor Angelina Bustamante. The protest
by Angelina with the Director of Lands was what started the process that ultimately led to the decision
in Republic v. Guerrero, 37 a process that merely mirrors the currently pending protest of private
respondents with public respondent LMB-DENR, the successor of the Bureau of Lands. Both protests
essentially allege Guerrero's title's encroachment on the Bustamantes' alleged property. Both pray for
the government to file a petition in court to question Guerrero's title. Both protests ultimately seek the
amendment or cancellation of the title, for the allegedly fraudulent encroachment. Such matters,
however, have long been examined, decided and settled with finality.
Note: Forum shopping is manifest whenever a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and
the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other court.
§ A Forum shopping can be committed in three ways:

o (1) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (which makes the cases
susceptible to dismissal based on litis pendentia);
o (2) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer,
the previous case having been finally resolved (which makes the subsequent case
susceptible to dismissal based on res judicata);
o (3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers (which amounts to splitting of causes of action, which renders the cases
susceptible to dismissal on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata).
The act of private respondents of essentially repeating and relitigating what has already been settled
via the case filed by their predecessors-in interest is forum shopping and is punishable by this Court.
GR: The rule is that judgments by a court of competent jurisdiction, which have attained finality, are not
subject to reversal, modification or alteration and are, thus, immutable.
§ XPN:
o (1) the correction of clerical errors
o (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party
o (3) void judgments.
When a judgment has become final, the only action that needs to be done is the execution thereof.
Neither are these judgments to be disturbed on points or matters already adjudged on the merits.
It bears emphasis that res judicata exists as a rule of reason, justice, fairness, expediency,
practical necessity, and public tranquility.
§ Public policy, judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time, and the interest of litigants, as well as the
peace and order of society, all require that stability should be accorded judgments, that controversies
once decided on their merits shall remain in repose, that inconsistent judicial decisions shall not be
made on the same set of facts, and that there be an end to litigation which, without the doctrine of res
judicata, would be endless.
As a principle, res judicata stands upon two (2) grounds, namely:
§ (1) public policy and necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end
to litigation
§ (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause.
In conclusion: Private respondents are hereby found guilty of direct contempt of court for forum
shopping, while public respondents, for lack of basis, are absolved of the charge of indirect contempt.
In addition, although it is noted that private respondents' counsel, Atty. Vicente D. Millora, was not
herein impleaded as respondent in the contempt charge, this Court finds in the record that he was the
counsel who assisted private respondents in filing their second Protest with the LMB and, thus, likely
aided in or facilitated the forum shopping.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is here by PARTIALLY GRANTED and, accordingly,
private respondents heirs of Marcelo Bustamante, represented by and including Cora Bustamante, are
hereby found guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT of court and collectively penalized with a FINE of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00). The petition to cite public respondents for indirect contempt is
DENIED.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora is DIRECTED to show cause, in writing, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
this Decision, why he, too, should not be cited in direct contempt for forum shopping.
SO ORDERED.”
YAMSON v. CASTRO,
G.R. Nos. 194763-64, July 20, 2016
FACTS:
● The petitioners and respondents are all officials and employees of the Davao City Water
District. Petitioner occupied concurrent membership in its Pre-Bidding and Awards
Committee-B.
● Board Members of DCWD approved the recommendation of Gen. Manager
Carbonquillo to undertake the Cabantian Water Supply System. Included in the
recommendation was the direct negotiation of the well drilling phase of the project to
Hydrock Wells, Inc. Hydrock President, Puentespina, wrote a letter informing
Carbonquillo about their willingness to undertake the drilling even without the approval
of DCWD as their crew and equipment were idle. Thereafter, a resolution was approved
which opted to invite accredited drillers to participate in VES 15 and 21 but only Hydrock
and AGM agreed. The Board of Directors resolved to award the VES Project to
Hydrock.
● The respondent filed a joint Affidavit-Complaint with the Ombudsman, charging the
petitioners with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for allegedly giving
Hydrock unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the “surreptitious” grant of
the contract. Less than two months later, respondents filled two separate joint affidavit
complaints with the Ombudsman administratively charging the petitioners. Two weeks
after, the respondent filed another separate Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse of
Authority, Dishonesty, and Gross Negligence.
● The respondent adopted the allegations in the separate criminal complaints they filed
with the Ombudsman against the petitioners in OMB-M-C-05-0051-A and
OMB-M-C-05-0054-A as bases for administrative charges. Meanwhile, the
Affidavit-Complaint filed both contained the same allegations.
ISSUE: WON the respondent violate the prohibition against forum shopping
RULING:
● The rule on forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, and not on
administrative cases. Forum shopping may be committed in three ways: (1) Through
litis pendentia - filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet; 2) through res judicata-
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved; and 3) splitting of causes of action - filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers - the
ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res judicata. Common in these is the
identity of causes of action. Cause of action has been defined as "the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another."
● In this case, a review of the Affidavit-Complaints separately filed by the respondents in
OMB-M-A-05-104-C and OMB-M-A-05-093-C reveals the respondents' violation of the
prohibition via the first mode, that is, through litis pendentia. The requisites of litis
pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other.
● The consequences of forum shopping depend on whether the act was wilful and
deliberate or not. If it is not wilful and deliberate, the subsequent cases shall be
dismissed without prejudice. But if it is wilful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are
more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice on the ground of either litis
pendentia or res judicata. In this case, the Court cannot grant the petitioners' prayer for
the dismissal of the two administrative cases as there is no clear showing that the
respondents' act of filing these was deliberate and wilful. Records show that these
cases were premised on the two criminal complaints for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, which were separately filed and entertained by the Ombudsman. At the most,
VES 15 Project, which was filed subsequent to VES 21 Project, should be, and is
hereby, dismissed.
MEJIA-ESPINOZA v. CARIÑO,
G.R. No. 193397, January 25, 2017
FACTS:
● Petitioner Estrella Mejia-Espinoza was the plaintiff in an action for ejectment against respondent Nena A.
Cariño before the MTC of Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The MTC rendered a joint decision in favor of
Espinoza. It ordered Nena and Alberto to vacate the respective properties and to pay rents from time of
default, litigation expenses, and attorney's' fees. Upon Nena’s appeal to the RTC of Dagupan City, it
reversed the MTC decision and dismissed the case against Nena for lack of cause of action. On
Espinoza's petition for review, the CA 17th Division reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the
MTC decision.
● Espinoza filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution before the MTC, which Nena opposed. The
MTC granted the motion and subsequently issued a writ of execution. The sheriff served the writ upon
Nena. When Sheriff Hortaleza proceeded to the property subject of the ejectment suit, he found out that
Nena had voluntarily vacated the place and turned over the padlock to one Gertrudes Taberna, Nena's
caretaker. Thus, the sheriff was able to peacefully turn over the property to copetitioner Norma Mejia
Dellosa (Dellosa), Espinoza's attorney-in-fact. Sheriff Hortaleza then levied a separate commercial lot
owned by Nena to cover the monetary awards for rent, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees, and
correspondingly issued a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property.
● Nena filed a complaint captioned as "Annulment of Court's Processes with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and/or Prohibition, and Damages" before the RTC of
Dagupan City. Nena argued that she was deprived of the opportunity to ask for reconsideration of the
order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance of writ of execution because she was not furnished a copy
of the order.
● The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. It opined that the issue on the alleged
irregularity of the issuance of the writ of execution was rendered moot by its implementation. It noted that
Nena had already voluntarily relinquished her possession of the property-including the building-before the
demolition.
● On appeal, the CA 4th Division reversed the RTC. It held that Nena correctly filed the petition for
annulment with the RTC of Dagupan City in accordance with Section 10 of Rule 47. The CA 4th Division
opined that because Nena did not receive a copy of the order granting Espinoza's motion for issuance of
writ of execution, it "did not become final and executory insofar as [Nena] is concerned." The CA 4th
Division concluded that the writ of execution was "premature and without legal basis" and, therefore, void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment was proper (NO)
RULING: A petition for annulment of judgment or final order under Rule 47 is an extraordinary remedy that may
be availed of only under certain exceptional circumstances. Under the Rules, there are three requirements that
must be satisfied before a Rule 47 petition can prosper. First, the remedy is available only when the petitioner can
no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of the petitioner. This means that a Rule 47 petition is a remedy of last resort-it is not an
alternative to the ordinary remedies under Rules 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 45. Second, an action for annulment
of judgment may be based only on two grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Third, the action must be
filed within the temporal window allowed by the Rules. If based on extrinsic fraud, it must be filed within four years
from the discovery of the extrinsic fraud; if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred by
laches or estoppel. There is also a formal requisite that the petition be verified, and must allege with particularity
the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
The averments of Nena's complaint a quo, however, do not make out an action for annulment of judgment or final
order. It was therefore inaccurate for both the CA 4th Division and the RTC to characterize it as a Rule 47 petition.
While the non-compliance with the requisites laid down in Rule 47 is glaring-there is neither any averment in the
complaint showing prima facie compliance with the aforementioned requisites nor even a reference to Rule 4
7-the first thing the lower courts should have considered is the subject of the complaint.
Nena is challenging the MTC's order granting the issuance of the writ of execution, the writ of execution itself, as
well as the sheriff’s notice of levy and notice of sale on her real property. Clearly, these are not the judgments or
final orders contemplated by Rule 47. A final order or resolution is one which is issued by a court which disposes
of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul
the levy and sale at public auction. Neither does it apply to an action to annul a writ of execution because a writ of
execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out the mandate of the court in the enforcement
of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a final order or judgment against the losing
party. The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion to nullify the writ of execution and notices of levy and sale
before the MTC, instead of instituting a new complaint before the RTC.
APPLICATION
Rule 47 does not apply to an action to annul the levy and sale at public auction. Neither does it apply to an action
to annul a writ of execution because a writ of execution is not a final order or resolution, but is issued to carry out
the mandate of the court in the enforcement of a final order or of a judgment. It is a judicial process to enforce a
final order or judgment against the losing party. The proper remedy for Nena was to file a motion to nullify the writ
of execution and notices of levy and sale before the MTC, instead of instituting a new complaint before the RTC.
This is because the execution of a decision is merely incidental to the jurisdiction already acquired by a trial court.
As we explained in Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato: Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance
and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered
the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 26, 2009 and Resolution dated August
3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89905 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
April 10, 2007 of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City in Civil Case No. 2005-0317-D is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Monterona v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,

G.R. No. 209116, [January 14, 2019])
Central Visayas Finance Corp. v. Spouses Adlawan,

G.R. No. 212674, [March 25, 2019]
Facts: Respondents Eliezer and Leila Adlawan obtained a Php3,669,685.00 loan from petitioner
Central Visayas Finance Corporation covered by a Promissory Note, Chattel Mortgage over a Komatsu
Highway Dump Truck, and a Continuing Guaranty executed by respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena
Adlawan.
Eliezer and Leila Adlawan failed to pay the loan, prompting petitioner to file an action against
respondents for replevin. The trial court ruled in petitioner's favor, and respondents were ordered to
deliver possession of the dump truck to petitioner.
In 2000 petitioner commenced a second case before the RTC for collection of sum of money and/or
deficiency judgment relative to respondents' supposed unpaid balance on their loan with damages. It
also sought to hold respondents Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan liable on their continuing guaranty.
RTC rendered an Order ruling that the second case was barred by res judicata under Section 47(b),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court for the reason that the case involves the same parties, subject matter,
and cause of action. Petitioner appealed the decision before the CA, claiming that the trial court erred in
ruling that res judicata applied as the first was one for the recovery of personal property used as
collateral in the loan, while the latter case was one for deficiency judgment and based on the continuing
guaranty.
Issue: WON or not petitioner is barred by res judicata from instituting the second case
Ruling: Yes. In case of a loan secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against
the debtor — the recovery of the credit with execution upon the security. The creditor cannot split his
single cause of action by filing a complaint on the loan, and thereafter another separate complaint for
foreclosure of the mortgage. To allow petitioner to do so will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress
for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression
to the debtor.
Pursuant to Section 47, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on the effect of judgments or final
orders is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been
raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the petitioner and respondent. By praying for recovery of
possession with a money judgment as a mere alternative relief in Civil Case No. CEB-22294, and when
it did not pursue a claim for deficiency at any time during the proceedings in said case, including
appeal, petitioner led the courts to believe that it was not interested in suing for a deficiency so long as
it recovered possession of the dump truck.
With the final resolution in the first case, petitioner's cause of action against respondents Eliezer, Sr.
and Elena Adlawan is likewise barred. The contract of guaranty is merely accessory to a principal
obligation; it cannot survive without the latter. Eliezer and Leila Adlawan are deemed to have paid their
loan obligation due to the judgment in first case rendered in favor of petitioner. For this reason, their
obligation has been extinguished which should, in turn, operate to the benefit of their co-respondents,
Eliezer, Sr. and Elena Adlawan whose liability is based on guaranty, a mere accessory contract to the
loan obligation
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Dai: For res judicata to apply, four requisites must be met: (1) the
former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or an order on the merits; (3) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there
must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.
Tanyag v. Tanyag,
G.R. No. 231319, [November 10, 2021]
FACTS: On July 31, 1979, Arturo married Dolores G. Tanyag (Dolores). Having been married before the
effectiveness of the Family Code, their property relations were governed by the rules on conjugal
partnership of gains.
In 2004, however, Dolores filed a Petition to declare their marriage null and void due to Arturo's
psychological incapacity before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the Nullity Case, Dolores filed a separate Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal
Property before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet (Property Case). In this Petition, she prayed that
the trial court declare as her exclusive paraphernal property two parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of
Title Nos. P-5362 and P-5363, and that Arturo be ordered to surrender to her the owner's duplicate of the titles.
Arturo challenged the trial court's jurisdiction over his person in the Property Case. He also
alleged that the Property Case was barred by litis pendentia and that Dolores was guilty of forum
shopping because of the Nullity Case.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered a Decision, declaring the marriage between Dolores
and Arturo null and void. Dolores thus moved to liquidate, partition, and distribute their properties in the Nullity
Case. However, her motion was denied. She thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Arturo joined her by filing
a Manifestation. Both parties elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Arturo filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses in the Property
Case, seeking to have the Petition dismissed on the ground of primary jurisdiction, litis pendentia, and
deliberate forum shopping. After an exchange of pleadings, the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad Benguet
denied Arturo's motion. Arturo appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the same. The Court of
Appeals also denied his motion for reconsideration. Thus, this Petition for Review.
Petitioner Arturo alleges that the Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property is barred by litis
pendentia. He claims there is identity of parties in the two cases, as well as identity in the rights they invoke
and the reliefs they seek. He points out that respondent Dolores prayed that their marriage be declared null
and void in the Nullity Case, "with all the legal effects attaching thereto pursuant to the Family Code of the
Philippines." In the Property Case, respondent prayed to have particular parcels of land as her exclusive
paraphernal property. The declaration of the land as exclusive paraphernal property of the respondent will
allegedly result in the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. He claims that since the declaration of nullity
results in the dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership of
gains, the jurisdiction over the determination of the ownership of the properties is with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City.
Petitioner asserts that respondent is guilty of willful and deliberate forum shopping. As the respondent
did not include the subject parcels of land in the inventory of properties in the Nullity Case, she allegedly
circumvented the rule on prohibition against forum shopping. Respondent also did not indicate in her
verification and certification that she filed the Nullity Case praying for the same reliefs. Respondent is also
seeking to have the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City liquidate, partition, and distribute their properties. At
the time of the filing of this Petition, the matter was pending before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner also points out that the nullity of the marriage must attain finality before the liquidation,
partition, and distribution of their properties.
In her Comment, respondent counters that it was improper and premature for petitioner to raise forum
shopping as an issue when the assailed Order involved the denial of his Motion for Preliminary Hearing on
Affirmative Defenses, not a motion to dismiss. She also argues that petitioner is estopped from questioning
the validity of the proceedings having already participated in trial.
ISSUE: WON the Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property must be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia.
RULING: Yes.
Respondent's Property Case is barred by litis pendentia. As she committed forum shopping, the Property Case
should be dismissed.
In the case of Pavlow v. Mendenilla, the Court states that Res judicata is the conceptual backbone upon
which forum shopping rests.
In the case of City of Taguig v. City of Makati, therein explained in detail the definition of forum shopping,
how it is committed, and the test for determining if it was committed. Such a test relies on two (2) alternative
propositions: litis pendentia and res judicata. Even then, litis pendentia is itself a concept that merely proceeds
from the concept of res judicata.
In the case of Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporation, it was
explained that Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the
same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action. It can also be committed in
several ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the
previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple
cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata).
In the case of Yap v. Chua, et al., it was noted that litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious." For litis pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must concur: (a) the identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. On the other
hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and the second actions — identity
of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
The requisites of litis pendentia are present in this case. At first impression, the causes of action in
the Nullity and Property Cases may appear different. In the Property Case, it is to determine whether the two
parcels of land covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. P-5362 and P-5363 form part of Dolores'
paraphernal property. Meanwhile, in the Nullity Case, it is to determine the validity of Dolores and Arturo's
marriage. Ultimately, however, as to the parties' properties, there is an identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for. The parties are claiming ownership rights and seeking to be adjudged as the respective owners
thereof.
While the Property Case does not involve the validity of the marriage, the outcome of the Nullity Case
will necessarily affect the outcome of the Property Case. The status of a marriage determines the property
relations between the parties. The declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
capacity will create a special co-ownership between the parties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The parties have not informed the Court of further developments in the Nullity Case, including
whether the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City has fully resolved the matter of partition. Depending on the
status of the liquidation, partition, and distribution in the Nullity Case, the Property Case will be barred by litis
pendentia or res judicata.
In any event, the respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
Upon the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the trial court also acquired
jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the marriage. Among these incidental and
consequential matters is the settlement of the parties' common properties, which entails a determination of
which properties are included in and excluded from the co-ownership.
Yet, respondent filed a separate Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property, asking a different
trial court to determine that the two parcels of land subject of the Property Case are not conjugally owned. By
doing so, respondent committed forum shopping by splitting causes of action.
The Property Case should be dismissed for litis pendentia if the liquidation, partition, and distribution
are still pending in the Nullity Case, or for res judicata if the liquidation, partition, and distribution have already
been finally resolved in the Nullity Case.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Abellana,

G.R. No. 237369, [October 19, 2022]
FACTS:
The present case is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or Preliminary Injunction to set
aside CA’s 2017 Decision and 2018 Resolution. A 21,887 square-meter parcel of land located in Barrio San
Jose, Puerto Princessa City and under the TCT No. 136030, was owned by respondent Albrando Abellana.
On 28 June 2000, Abellana and Ernesto Villaos executed a Real Estate Mortgage over the aforementioned
property in favor of Landbank of the Philippines to secure a 2-million-peso loan by Villaos.
Abellana and Villaos defaulted on their loan obligation which resulted in foreclosure of the REM by
Landbank. On 25 February 2003, the subject property was auctioned and Landbank won for the
amount of P4,258, 520.11.
The title of the subject property was consolidated in Landbank’s name under TCT No. 174178.
However,
Abellana filed a complaint for repurchase of real property against Landbank with the Puerto Princessa
RTC. Abellana alleged that he was only an accommodation mortgagor and was not aware that Villaos
failed to settle his loan obligations. Also, he was only not made aware of the auction sale. Respondent
requested to repurchase the property which Landbank did not entertain. Hence, Abellana filed and
prayed that Landbank be directed to sell the property to him at a fair price.
On 8 January 2014, Landbank sold the property to Joven Arzaga and TCT was issued under his name.
On 26 November 2014, Abellana filed a case for the instant declaration of nullity. He alleged that he
failed to settle his loan obligation with Landbank that resulted in the foreclosure of the REM yet was not
informed. Also, he was not given a copy of the Certificate of Sale. Abellana prayed that the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings, final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership and TCT No 174178 be
declared null and void. To which Landbank raised the grounds of laches, prescription, and res judicata,
and amongst others. On 16 October 2015, RTC denied Landbank’s motion to dismiss and ruled in the
regard to res judicata that:
1. As to the doctrine of res judicata by former judgment, the same is not a bar to the present action
as there is not subject matter
2. However, under the doctrine res judicata by the conclusiveness of judgment, Abellana is already
barred from contesting all matters essentially connected with the repurchase case.
Landbank moved for reconsideration with the RTC but was then denied. Hence, Landbank elevated this
to the CA through a petition for certiorari. CA dismissed Landbank’s petition and affirmed the orders of
RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in declaring that the doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment
is inapplicable?
RULING:
No, since there is no identity in causes of action and issues with the repurchase case, both concepts of
res judicata are inapplicable to the present case.
● Res judicata is inapplicable as a bar to the instant action as it alleges different and distinct
causes of action from the repurchase case
There are two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness
of judgment. The elements of the first concept of res judicata are:
1. the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;

2. the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties;
3. the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.
Given that the instant complaint for declaration of nullity, when taken on its face, involves a different and
distinct cause of action from the previous repurchase case, then the judgment of the latter cannot be a
bar to the present action.
● There is no identity of issues in the repurchase case and the present case, hence the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable.
"The second concept — conclusiveness of judgment — states that a fact or question which was in
issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and
persons in privity with them are concerned, and cannot be again litigated in any future action between
such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the
same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has
been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. “
● There is clearly no identity of issues between the repurchase case and the present case, as the
validity of the foreclosure proceedings leading to Landbank's ownership of the subject property
was never an issue in the former case (as opposed to the present case) because Abellana
himself already admitted Landbank's ownership of the subject property.
RATIO DECIDENDI
Gonzales v. Solid Cement Corporation,

G.R. No. 198423, October 23, 2012, 684 SCRA 344
Facts:
October 5, 1999: Solid Cement terminated Gonzales’ employment.
December 12, 2000: The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared that Gonzales was illegally dismissed and
ordered his reinstatement.
January 5, 2001: Gonzales filed a Motion for Execution of reinstatement aspect.
January 22, 2001: Solid Cement reinstated Gonzales in the payroll.
March 26, 2002: The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) modified the LA decision by
reducing amount of damages awarded by the LA but otherwise affirmed the judgment.
June 28, 2004: The CA dismissed Solid Cement’s certiorari petition.
March 9, 2005: The Court ultimately denied Solid Cement’s petition for review.
July 12, 2005: The judgment became final and an entry of judgment was recorded.
July 15, 2008: Gonzales was actually reinstated.
August 4, 2008: Gonzales filed with the LA a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution (with
computation of monetary benefits as of August 28, 2008 — the day before his termination anew,
allegedly due to redundancy, shall take effect).
August 18, 2009: The LA issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution.
February 19, 2010: The NLRC rendered a decision affirming with modification the LA’s Order by
including certain monetary benefits in favor of Gonzales.
May 31, 2011: The CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the LA’s Order.
November 16, 2011: The Court denied Gonzales’ petition for review, questioning the reinstatement of
the LA's Order.
February 27, 2012: The Court denied Gonzales’ 1st motion for reconsideration.
April 12, 2012: Gonzales again moved for reconsideration and asked that his case be referred to the En
Banc.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the fallo or dispositive portion part of a decision is the controlling factor in resolving the
issues in a case
Ruling/Decision:
Yes, the resolution of the court in a given issue — embodied in the fallo or dispositive part of a
decision or order — is the controlling factor in resolving the issues in a case. The fallo embodies the
court’s decisive action on the issue/s posed, and is thus the part of the decision that must be enforced
during execution. The other parts of the decision only contain, and are aptly called, the ratio decidendi
(or reason for the decision) and, in this sense, assume a lesser role in carrying into effect the tribunal’s
disposition of the case.
When a conflict exists between the dispositive portion and the opinion of the court in the text or body of
the decision, the former must prevail over the latter under the rule that the dispositive portion is the
definitive order, while the opinion is merely an explanatory statement without the effect of a directive.
Hence, the execution must conform with what the fallo or dispositive portion of the decision ordains or
decrees.
Significantly, no claim or issue has arisen regarding the fallo of the labor tribunals and the CA’s ruling
on the merits of the original case. Quoted below are the fallo of these rulings, which the Supreme Court
ultimately sustained.
LA ruling:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby declared guilty of ILLEGAL
DISMISSAL and ordered to reinstate complainant to his former position with full backwages and
without loss of seniority rights and other benefits which to date amounts (sic)to Six Hundred Thirty
Six Thousand and Six Hundred Thirty Three Pesos and Thirty Three Centavos (P636,633.33).
Further, respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the following:
1. P18,080 as reimbursement for food and transportation allowance;
2. Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
3. Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages; and
4. 10% of all sums owing to complainant as attorney’s fees.
NLRC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is hereby, MODIFIED by
REDUCING the amount of moral and exemplary damages due the complainant to the sum of
P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively.
Further, joint and several liability for the payment of backwages, food and transportation
allowance and attorney’s fees as adjudged in the appealed decision is hereby imposed only upon
respondents Allen Querubin and Solid Cement Corporation, the latter having a personality which
is distinct and separate from its officers.
The relief of reinstatement is likewise, AFFIRMED.
CA Ruling:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby dismissed for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the decision of the Second Division of the NLRC dated 26 March 2002 in
NLRC CA No. 027452-01 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Supreme Court affirmed the CA ruling on the original case in the final recourse to us; thus, on the
merits, the judgment in Gonzales' favor is already final. From that point, only the implementation or
execution of the fallo of the final ruling remained to be done.
Pelejo vs. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 60800, August 31, 1982, 116 SCRA 406.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a Civil Case for Annulment of Deed, Title, Reconveyance and Damages. According to
petitioners, respondents Paterno C. Zaballero and his wife Aurora Gonzales Zaballero approached
them sometime in 1974 for assistance. They borrowed the title TCT No. T49125, covering the property
so that they could have a collateral for a loan from the Monte de Piedad Bank, a simulated Deed of
Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage was executed in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Paterno C.
Zaballero. The Zaballeros took the Deed of Sale to mean what it stated and had the title transferred to
their names. As a consequence, TCT No. T-49125 was cancelled and TCT No. 130117 was issued in
the names of the Zaballeros.
Respondents denied the allegations. Case was dismissed but it was not appealed or otherwise
elevated to an appellate court. Instead, petitioners filed a new complaint for "Annulment of Deed, Title,
Reconveyance and Damages" assigned to another branch of the Manila Court of First Instance.
DISMISSED. Private respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession which was
granted As a consequence, the possession of the property in question was turned over to herein
respondents .
ISSUE:
Whether or not mandatory injunction may be granted in favor of the respondents.
RULING:
A mandatory injunction is granted only on a showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. Petitioners' right over the property is not
clear. As stated above, the title to the property in question is already in the names of private
respondents who, therefore, have better right to the possession thereof.
The procedural error incurred by private respondents in not asking for affirmative relief in the dispositive
portion of the lower court's order dismissing the case and which led to the dispute surrounding the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of possession is a mere technicality which would not prevail over
considerations of substantial justice. There is no point in prolonging the litigation when private
respondents are the owners of the property and therefore are entitled to its possession. It would be an
injustice to allow petitioners to continue holding subject property.
APPLICATION:
Petitioners' right over the subject property is not clear. On the other hand, title to said property is
registered in the names of private respondents. Besides, the writ of possession ordering the sheriff to
eject petitioners and place private respondents in possession of the premises has already been
implemented. Hence, there is no point in prolonging the litigation when private respondents are
admittedly the owners of the property and therefore entitled to its possession. It would be an injustice to
allow petitioners to continue holding subject property.
CONCLUSION:
ACCORDINGLY, We reconsider and set aside Our decision dated August 31, 1982 and hereby
DISMISS instant petition.
Florentino v. Rivera,
G.R. No. 167968, [January 23, 2006], 515 PHIL 494-505)
Syllabus: It is settled rule that "the operative part in every decision is the dispositive portion or the fallo, and
where there is conflict between the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls
The petition stemmed from a complaint filed before the RTC by Mariano, Cynthia and Adelfa, all surnamed Rivera
against Vicente Florentino and the latter as third-party plaintiff against Teofila Mendoza, et al., as third-party
defendants for rescission, annulment, redemption, reconveyance and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
5761-M.
Aggrieved, private respondent appealed the foregoing decision to the CA which affirmed the same in a decision
dated March 29, 1996. Undaunted, private respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court which the latter denied in its Resolution dated February 9, 2000. Per entry of judgment issued by the
Supreme Court, the said Resolution became final and executory on June 1, 2000 and was recorded in the Book
of Entries of Judgments.
Consequently, petitioners filed before the RTC a Motion for Execution of its decision dated October 20, 1986
which the latter granted. Dissatisfied, the private respondent moved for a reconsideration on the ground that the
decision sought to be enforced is vague and contrary to the pronouncement made by the CA in the body of its
decision that the petitioners were deprived of only an area of 1,650 square meters or an annual harvest of 16.5
cavans. On September 13, 2000, the RTC granted the said motion, the decretal portion of which reads:
"All told, going by the explanation enunciated by the Court of Appeals, which this Court must pay obeisance to,
paragraph (cc) of the decision rendered by this Court on October 20, 1986 is hereby CLARIFIED to such extent that
the quantity of the damages which defendant Florentino must pay the Riveras for unrealized annual harvest is 16.5
(instead of 100) cavans from 1978 onwards.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted order was denied
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated September 13,
2000 and October 31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch 9, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
RTC is ordered to enforce its Decision dated October 20, 1986 in accordance with its terms and conditions.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in modifying the dispositive portion of
a final and executory judgment, since the modification substantially reduced the amount of damages awarded to
herein respondents — A motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed the instant petition insisting that the challenged judgment and resolution of the appellate tribunal is
not in accordance with law. According to the petitioner, the orders of the trial court "merely clarified and
quantified" the decision sought to be executed.
ISSUE:
1. WON the RTC could revised the fallo
2. WON the fallo would prevail in case of vagueness of the decision
RULING:
1. NO, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law. In
short, once a judgment becomes final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed no matter how erroneous it
may be and nothing further can be done therewith except to execute it
2. YES, Succinctly stated, "where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body
thereof, the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body of the decision." While
the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in the manner the court's reasoning
preponderates, it is the dispositive portion thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for
the exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
APPLICATION: It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the parties over a
subject fully and fairly adjudicated. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated
system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely:
(1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation - republicae ut sit litium, and
(2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause - nemo debet bis
vexari et eadem causa.
CONCLUSION: Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice
requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them.
BBB v. People,
G.R. No. 249307, [August 27, 2020]
Yu v. Turla,
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2378 (Resolution), [November 4, 2020]
FACTS: This case is rooted on a verified Letter-Complaint filed by complainant Imelda P. Yu (Imelda)
against Judge Turla for grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, violation of the
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and violation of Sec. 3 RA 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
In the Resolution dated July 30, 2019: The Court found Judge Turla administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law, undue delay in rendering orders, and simple misconduct, and deemed it proper to
issue a reprimand against her with a stern warning that the commission of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severity.
However, the Fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS Judge Decoroso M. Turla, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 21, Northern
Samar, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, undue delay in rendering orders and simple misconduct;
and issues stern warning that repetition of same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severity.
ISSUE: Given the apparent discrepancy between the body and fallo of the Resolution, what must be
the proper penalty to be imposed?
RULE OF LAW:
GR: In cases where there is a conflict between the fallo, or the dispositive part, and the body of a
decision, the fallo is generally controlling on the theory that it is the final order which becomes the
subject of execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the ratio decidendi for the
disposition. In other words, the execution of a decision must conform to that which is ordained or
decreed in the fallo.
XPN: This rule is not absolute. "The only exception when the body of a decision prevails over the fallo
is when the inevitable conclusion from the former is that there was a glaring error in the fallo, in
which case the body of the decision will prevail." In such cases, the clerical error, mistake, or
omission in the fallo may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered to make it
conform with the body of the decision.
APPLICATION:
Here, the Resolution clearly reveals a clerical error in the fallo as to the penalty to be imposed. After all,
the Court resolved to impose the penalty of reprimand against Judge Turla for his actions.The Court
finds that this case easily falls under the exception rather than the general rule and clarifies that Judge
Turla was indeed meted out with the penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severity.
CONCLUSION: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AMENDS the fallo in its Resolution dated July 30,
2019 to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, Judge Decoroso M. Turla, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Laoang,
Northern Samar, is hereby REPRIMANDED for gross ignorance of the law, undue delay in rendering
orders, and simple misconduct, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Municipality of Makati v. Municipality of Taguig,

G.R. No. 235316, [December 1, 2021]
OBITER DICTUM
Delta Motors Corporation v. C.A.,

G.R. No. 121075, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 212
FACTS: Private respondent State Investment House, Inc. (hereinafter, SIHI) brought an action for a sum of money
against DELTA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch VI. DELTA was declared in default. The RTC,
per Judge Ernesto Tengco, rendered a decision that could not be served on DELTA due to its earlier dissolution.
However, Delta had been taken over by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime. This
notwithstanding, SIHI moved for service of the decision by way of publication, which the trial court allowed. The
decision was published. After publication, SIHI moved for execution of the judgment, which the trial court granted
on the ground that no appeal had been taken by DELTA despite publication of the decision. The writ of execution
was issued and pursuant thereto certain properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and sold.
The sheriff likewise levied on some other properties of DELTA.
DELTA then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals wherein DELTA insisted that:
(a) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant (DELTA) since there was no
valid/proper service of summons, thus rendering the decision null and void; and (b) the void decision never
became final and executory. The Court of Appeals ruled against DELTA on the first ground, but found that the
record before it "is bereft of any showing that a copy of the assailed judgment had been properly served on P.N.B.
which assumed DELTA's operation upon the latter's dissolution."
In a motion for reconsideration, DELTA insisted that there was no valid service of summons and the decision of
the RTC was not in accordance with the Rules, hence, void. This motion was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Unsatisfied, DELTA filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari which was denied. A motion for
reconsideration was denied.
DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. The trial court dismissed the Notice of Appeal. DELTA moved to
reconsider, which SIHI opposed. The trial court denied Delta's motion.
DELTA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. SIHI appealed to this Court that DELTA had
lost the right to appeal in view of the lapse of more than 15 days from DELTA's receipt of a certified true copy of
the RTC decision. While SIHI's petition was pending before this Court, DELTA fifield, with the Court of Appeals, an
Omnibus Motion.The Court of Appeals denied DELTA's Omnibus Motion.
DELTA filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification. On the other hand, on 2 February 1995, SIHI filed a
motion for clarification wherein it asked for the deletion, for being mere obiter dictum, the following paragraph in
the Resolution of 5 January 1995, to wit:
While it is true that as a necessary consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1991
ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 "has not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on
petitioner Delta, which may appeal therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings and/or orders
arising from the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 are null and void . . .
SIHI argued that this paragraph was "not necessary to the decision of the case before it" and "cannot be
considered binding for the purpose of establishing precedent;" likewise, the Resolution itself did not decide the
incident on its merits or consider and dispose of the issues, nor determine the respective rights of the parties
concerned. The Court of Appeals granted SIHI's motion for clarification and denied DELTA's motion for
reconsideration. It then decreed to amend its Resolution of 5 January 1995 by deleting the assailed paragraph.
DELTA contested the grant of SIHI's motion to strike out a paragraph in the resolution of 5 January 1995 for being
obiter dictum, DELTA submitted that the latter contained a finding or affirmation of fact, thus could not have
constituted obiter dictum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was indeed obiter dictum.
RULING: Yes, the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was indeed obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before
him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.
The assailed phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter not raised by petitioner expressly in its
petition assailing the dismissal of its notice of appeal. It was not a prerequisite in disposing of the aforementioned
issue. The body of the resolution did not contain any discussion on such matter nor mention any principle of law to
support such statement.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED and the challenged resolutions of 5 January 1995 and 14 July
1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 29147 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Landbank of the Philippines v. Suntay, G.R. No. 188376,

14 December 2011, 662 SCRA 614.
Facts:
Antecedents
Respondent Federico Suntay owned a land situated in Sta. Lucis , Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated Suntay’s land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The
Land Bank and DAR fixed the value for the expropriated portion for a total of P4,251,141.68. Suntay rejected the
value and filed a petition for determination of just compensation in Regional Agrarian Refor Adjudicator (RARAD).
Miñas, the one assigned, rendered a dicision with the amount of P157,541,951.30.
This Case
On October 29,2008, Suntay filed his urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to resume interrupted execution,
and it was immediately granted and ordered the DARAB sheriffs to resume their implementation of the writ of
execution. DARAB sheriffs forthwith served a demand to comply dated October 30, 2008 on the Philippine
Depository and Trust Corporation (PDTC) and Securities Transfer Services, Inc. (STSI). PDTC notified Land Bank
about its being served with the demand to comply and its action, including an implied request for Land Bank to
"uplift" the securities. Land bank wrote back to request PDTC to disregard the DARAB sheriffs’ demand. But,
PDTC said it was not in the position to determine the legality of the demand to comply, and that it was taking the
necessary legal action. With this, Land bank filed a civil action of certiorari in the CA, stating that RARAD Miñas
had "committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering ex parte and
DARAB sheriffs had "committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing to,
and serving on, the Philippine Depository and Trust Corporation, a copy of the Demand to Comply dated October
30, 2008 notwithstanding the unquestioned finality of the Supreme Court’s decision dated October 11, 2007.
Suntay commented and opposed the issuance of TRO. MERALCO, on the other hand, cancelled Land Bank’s
42,002,750 shares of stock and issued new stock certificates in the name of Lubrica. These were done in
compliance with the demand to comply by the DARAB sheriffs pursuant to the certificate of sheriff’s sale dated
October 24, 2005 and the certificate authorizing registration dated November 20, 2008 (respecting Land Bank’s
MERALCO shares) issued in favor of Lubrica.
The CA issued a TRO to prevent the implementation of RARAD Miñas’ order dated October 30, 2008. The
petitioner sought the approval of its bond for that purpose. Upon court’s learning with MERALCO’s cancellation
and transfer of shares in the name of Lubrica, Petiitoner filed its urgent manifestation and omnibus motion praying
that the CA’s TRO issued be made to cover all acts done pursuant to the assailed order dated October 30, 2008.
CA denied the petitioner’s urgent motion.
In the meantime, DAR administratively charged and preventively suspended RARAD Miñas for issuing the
October 30, 2008 order. On June 5, 2009, the CA promulgated its resolution dismissing Land Bank’s petition for
being moot and academic. Petitioner, filed in this court a motion for extension of time to file petition for review on
certiorari.
Issues:
1.Whether or not RARAD Casabar’s orders dated December 15, 2008 and December 18, 2008 rendered Land
Bank’s petition for certiorari moot and academic.
2. Whether or not RARAD Miñas’ order dated October 30, 2008 was valid.
Ruling:
1.No. The Court feels bound to undo the CA’s deeming Land Bank’s petition for certiorari mooted by RARAD
Casabar’s recall order.
We further discern that the parties have heretofore acted to advance their respective interests and claims against
each other by relying on seemingly conflicting pronouncements made in DARAB v. Lubrica (G.R. No. 159145) and
Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903). Their reliance has unavoidably spawned and will continue to spawn
confusion about their rights and can occasion more delays in the settlement of their claims.
At first glance, indeed, RARAD Casabar’s December 15, 2008 order seemingly rendered the reliefs prayed for by
the petition for certiorari unnecessary and moot. An issue is said to become moot and academic when it ceases to
present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.
Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP)
xxx once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically
deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when
the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.
2.Yes.
SC: “…the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007
Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from
the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period
stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord
with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before
the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must
not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.”
SC:”The finality of the judgment in Land Bank v. Suntay (G.R. No. 157903) meant that the decrees thereof could
no longer be altered, modified, or reversed even by the Court en banc. Nothing is more settled in law than that a
judgment, once it attains finality, becomes immutable and unalterable, and can no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest
court of the land. This rule rests on the principle that all litigation must come to an end, however unjust the result
of error may appear; otherwise, litigation will become even more intolerable than the wrong or injustice it is
designed to correct.”
Saludo, Jr. v. Philippine National Bank,

G.R. No. 193138, [August 20, 2018]
Facts:
1. On June 11, 1998, SAFA Law Office entered into a Contract of Lease 5 with PNB, whereby the latter
agreed to lease the second floor of the PNB Financial Center Building for a period of three years.
2. On August 1, 2001, the Contract of Lease expired. According to PNB, SAFA Law Office continued to
occupy the leased premises but discontinued paying its monthly rental obligations.
3. PNB sent a demand letter for SAFA Law Office.
4. In February 2005, SAFA Law Office vacated the leased premises. PNB sent a demand letter 14 dated
July 7, 2005 requiring the firm to pay its rental arrears. In response, SAFA Law Office sent a letter ,
proposing a settlement. PNB, however, declined the settlement proposal, stating that it was not amenable
to the settlement's terms. PNB then made a final demand for SAFA Law Office to pay its outstanding
rental obligations.
5. On October 4, 2006, PNB filed a motion to include an indispensable party as plaintiff, praying that Saludo
be ordered to amend anew his complaint to include SAFA Law Office as principal plaintiff. PNB argued
that the lessee in the Contract of Lease is not Saludo but SAFA Law Office, and that Saludo merely
signed the Contract of Lease as the managing partner of the law firm. Thus, SAFA Law Office must be
joined as a plaintiff in the complaint because it is considered an indispensable party under Section 7, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court.
6. On October 23, 2006, Saludo filed his motion to dismiss counterclaims, mainly arguing that SAFA Law
Office is neither a legal entity nor party litigant. As it is only a relationship or association of lawyers in the
practice of law and a single proprietorship which may only be sued through its owner or proprietor, no
valid counterclaims may be asserted against it.
Ruling of the CA:
On the question of whether SAFA Law Office is an indispensable party, the CA cited US case(Sycip Case) and
held that it is not. As a partnership, it may sue or be sued in its name or by its duly authorized representative.
Saludo, as managing partner, may execute all acts of administration, including the right to sue. Furthermore, the
CA found that SAFA Law Office is not a legal entity. A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity but a
mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. Thus, SAFA Law Office cannot file an action in court.
Based on these premises, the CA held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying PNB's motion
to include an indispensable party as plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether the cited US case(Sycip Case) by CA is an obiter dictum which cannot serve as a binding precedent?
Ruling:
Yes, we hold that our reference to In re Crawford's Estate in the Sycip case is an obiter dictum.
1. The reference of the Sycip case to theIn re Crawford's Estate case was made without a full consideration
of the nature of a law firm as a partnership possessed with legal personality under our Civil Code. First,
we note that while the Court mentioned that a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity, it
also identified petitioner law firms as partnerships over whom Civil Code provisions on partnership apply.
The Court thus cannot hold that a partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity without running
into conflict with Articles 44 and 1768 of the Civil Code which provide that a partnership has a juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of each of the partners.
2. Second, our law on partnership does not exclude partnerships for the practice of law from its coverage.
Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]wo or more persons may also form a partnership for the
exercise of a profession." Article 1783, on the other hand, states that "[a] particular partnership has for its
object determinate things, their use or fruits, or a specific undertaking, or the exercise of a profession or
vocation." Since the law uses the word "profession" in the general sense, and does not distinguish which
professional partnerships are covered by its provisions and which are not, then no valid distinction may be
made.
3. Finally, we stress that unlike Philippine law, American law does not treat of partnerships as forming a
separate juridical personality for all purposes. In the case of Bellis v. United States, 66 the US Supreme
Court stated that law firms, as a form of partnership, are generally regarded as distinct entities for specific
purposes, such as employment, capacity to be sued, capacity to hold title to property, and more. State
and federal laws, however, do not treat partnerships as distinct entities for all purposes.
Doctrine of Obiter Dictum:

An obiter dictum is an opinion of the court upon a question which was not necessary to the decision of the case
before it. It is an opinion uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside from the
main topic of the case to collateral subjects, or an opinion that does not embody the court's determination and is
made without argument or full consideration of the point. It is not a professed deliberate determination of the judge
himself.
Bermon Marketing Communication Corp. v. Spouses Yaco,

G.R. No. 224552, [March 3, 2021]
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philex Mining Corp.,

G.R. No. 230016, [November 23, 2020]
Rama v. Spouses Nogra,

G.R. No. 219556, [September 14, 2021]

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EH 307 | LEGAL RESEARCH AND WRITING - JD 12103 | ATTY.

COURTS OF BOTH LAW AND EQUITY

Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.) v. Patan, Jr.,

Manotok IV v. Heirs of Barque,

5. The motion for reconsideration of Barque was subsequently denied

b.He further found anomalies in Manotok’s title

7.Thereafter, the parties filed the following in the LRA:

Manotok: Motion for reconsideration (denied by LRA)

8. Both appealed to the CA:

WON LRA has no authority to annul their title

WON the CA has jurisdiction to order the cancellation of petitioner’s title

WON Manotoks were not given the opportunity to be heard

ISSUE: Whether or not such a decision was just or Constitutional.

TO ALLOW MARCOS TO BE BURIED IN THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI WOULD VIOLATE

CONCLUSION: WHEREFORE, CJ Sereno voted to GRANT the Petitions.

Villagracia v. Fifth Shari'a District Court,

Municipality of Tangkal v. Balindong,

Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127022, June 28, 2000, 334 SCRA 465

Issue of the Case:

Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda,

SM Land, Inc. v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority,

PAL retrenched in good faith.

(a) Preferred status;

(c) Seniority, among others.

(a) A fixed amount as full and compromise settlement;

STUDY THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT

Supreme Court v. Delgado,

c. Respondent Florendo holds a permanent appointment as Utility II in the OCC-SD. He performs

Re: Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases,

Okada v. Tiger Resort, Leisure & Entertainment, Inc.,

DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Yared v. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732. August 1, 2000

9. 14 December 1993 – The respondent judge issued a Decision dismissing petitioner's

10. 17 December 1993 – Petitioner filed a notice of appeal.

16. The petitioner’s turn to seek reconsideration.

B. Whether Tiangco violated the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: A. CONCERNING THE FIRST ISSUE

B. CONCERNING THE SECOND ISSUE

CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

Vivas v. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,

Prohibition is already unavailing

The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA:

APPLICATION: - Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS v. Lim,

YES, petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Querubin v. COMELEC (en banc),

Petition for Prohibition is denied.

Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,

National Steel Corp. v. City of Iligan,

ISSUE: - Whether petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

[CONTINUATION] ___ DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS

Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,

Bundle 1: Bacolod-Silay and Iloilo

Bundle 2: Davao, Laguindingan, and New Bohol.

● Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR, Inc., represented by its Chairperson Gerardo M. Malinao

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to:

(2) prevent further over­crowding of the Court's docket;

Association of Non-Profit Clubs, Inc. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,

Province of Bataan v. Escalada, Jr.,

National Steel Corp. v. City of Iligan,

DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY/JUDICIAL STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE

(2) prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket;