[ G.R. No.

211751, May 10, 2021 ]

MARK E. JALANDONI, PETITIONER, VS. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, AND THE
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THROUGH ITS THIRD DIVISION, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. Nos. 217212-80]

MARK E. JALANDONI, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN THROUGH ITS THIRD DIVISION, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. Nos. 244467-535]

MARK E. JALANDONI, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN THROUGH ITS THIRD DIVISION, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. Nos. 245546-614]

NENNETTE M. DE PADUA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THROUGH ITS THIRD DIVISION, THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN THROUGH THE OFFICE
OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:

Jalandoni was the former Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, while De Padua was a former Assistant Ombudsman.

Jalandoni was appointed by Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez as Assistant Ombudsman. He was tasked to,
among others, prepare and review draft resolutions, decisions, and orders from Ombudsman Gutierrez and to oversee the
daily operations of the Office of the Ombudsman-Proper.

In 2010, Jalandoni was appointed as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. He then learned from De Padua that a substantial
number of cases were still pending review and approval in the Office of the Ombudsman-Proper.4 Allegedly, Ombudsman
Gutierrez delegated the final approval of the pending cases to Jalandoni.

The following year, Jalandoni and Ombudsman Gutierrez resigned from office. Then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Orlando
C. Casimiro (Ombudsman Casimiro) assumed office as Acting Ombudsman.

Soon after, Ombudsman Casimiro ordered the inventory of pending cases and administrative matters in the Office of the
Ombudsman-Proper.7 He discovered that some cases already approved were not released for unknown reasons, while
others were superimposed with a patch of paper indicating Jalandoni as the approving authority.

Fifty-six tampered cases were summarized as follows: Group A, consisting of 28 cases, had unsigned patches bearing
Jalandoni's name superimposed on Ombudsman Casimiro's signed name; Group B, with 15 cases, also had unsigned
patches bearing Jalandoni's name on Ombudsman Gutierrez's signed name; and Group C, with 13 cases, similarly had
unsigned patches bearing Jalandoni's name on Ombudsman Gutierrez's signed name.

For these irregularities, Ombudsman Casimiro filed a Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman Internal Affairs
Board, charging Jalandoni and De Padua, among others, with falsification of public documents under Article 171 and
removal, concealment, and destruction of documents under Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code.

In his defense, Jalandoni argued that he was given the authority to act on the cases. He cited the April 20, 2010 Office
Order No. 136 and Memoranda dated June 11, 2010, July 21, 2010, and March 9, 2011, all of which were issued by
Ombudsman Gutierrez.

Andes, Ma. Joanna Carmela

Jalandoni admitted that he instructed his staff to tamper the documents to indicate that he was the new approving
authority, but claimed that this was done in the regular course of his authority. He added that he may not be held liable for
falsification because it was not shown that his office had actual custody over the documents, and that he altered their
meaning.

For her part, De Padua denied participating in the "patching" of the documents or having custody over them.

On the other hand, Ombudsman Casimiro questioned the veracity of the issuances cited by Jalandoni. He called attention
to a 2011 Court of Appeals Decision that ruled that the March 9, 2011 Memorandum could not be found despite diligent
search. He added that the issuances submitted by Jalandoni were not certified true copies.

In its March 19, 2013 Resolution,17 the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Jalandoni and De
Padua, among other respondents, with the two crimes:

(1) Finding probable cause to CHARGE respondents [Jalandoni], [De Padua] ... of falsifying documents pertaining to the
"Group C" cases as listed herein, it is respectfully recommended that corresponding INFORMATIONS for THIRTEEN (13)
COUNTS of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 6 of the
Revised Penal Code be FILED in the proper court against the said respondents;

(2) Finding probable cause to CHARGE respondents [Jalandoni], [De Padua] ... of concealing documents pertaining to the
"Group A", "Group B" and "Group C" cases as listed herein, it is respectfully recommended that
corresponding INFORMATIONS for FIFTY-SIX (56) counts of INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
BY WAY OF CONCEALMENT OF DOCUMENTS defined and penalized under Article 226 of the Revised Penal Code
be FILED in the proper court against the said respondents; and

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING
PETITIONER MARK E. JALANDONI'S MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS?

RULING:

As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash cannot be appealed because it is merely interlocutory. An appeal from
interlocutory orders is proscribed to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which inevitably results in delay.
In Miranda v. Sandiganbayan:

The reason of the law in permitting appeal only from a final order or judgment, and not from interlocutory or incidental one,
is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the
merits of the case during the pendency of the appeal. If such appeal were allowed, the trial on the merits of the case
should necessarily be delayed for a considerable length of time, and compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses; for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as incidental questions may be raised by him and
interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court.

The remedy for a denial of a motion to quash is for the accused to proceed to trial and, if convicted, raise the motion's
denial as an error of the court. Thus, a denial of a motion to quash cannot be assailed in a petition for certiorari, which
only operates if there is no other adequate, plain, or speedy remedy.

In the usual course of procedure, a denial of a motion to quash filed by the accused results in the continuation of the trial
and the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. If a judgment of conviction is rendered and the lower
court's decision of conviction is appealed, the accused can then raise the denial of his motion to quash not only as an
error committed by the trial court but as an added ground to overturn the latter's ruling.

In this case, the petitioner did not proceed to trial but opted to immediately question the denial of his motion to quash via a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Andes, Ma. Joanna Carmela
As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory
order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition
for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The
plain and speedy remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial as discussed above.

However, if the denial was rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the accused may assail it in a petition for certiorari. It
would be unfair for the accused to undergo trial "if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not
the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of
discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment."214 In these cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal is not
plain and adequate.215

In a motion to quash an information, "an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against
[them] for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information."

To test the viability of a motion to quash, it must be settled "whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law."217 Matters aliunde or those beyond what is
alleged in the information are not considered.

Under Rule 110, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

SECTION 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.

An information is deemed sufficient if the acts or omissions complained of are alleged in a way that enables "a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged[,]" allows them to prepare their defense, and
equips the court to render proper judgment.219 Thus, an information must clearly and accurately allege the elements of
the crime and the circumstances constituting the charge.

In alleging the acts or omissions, the wording of the information need not be an exact reproduction of the law. Rule 110,
Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides guidance:

SECTION 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

Derivatives, synonyms, or allegations of facts constituting the crime suffice as long as they are framed in intelligible terms.
In Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan:

The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense. Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is
sufficient.222

Here, the alleged facts in the Informations constitute the crimes charged.

The facts constituting all the elements of infidelity in the custody of public documents through concealment are clearly
averred in the Informations. They state the following: (1) that Jalandoni was a public officer, being the then Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; (2) that he concealed an order; (3) that the order was a genuine and official document entrusted
to him by reason of his office; and (4) that the concealment was done to the damage and prejudice of public interest.

Similarly, the Informations on the charge of falsification are sufficient. They clearly allege all the elements: (1) that
Jalandoni made alterations and intercalations in a resolution by covering Ombudsman Casimiro's name and signature
Andes, Ma. Joanna Carmela
with a patch of paper bearing his own name and signature; (2) that the resolution was a genuine and official document; (3)
that the alterations and intercalations changed the meaning of the resolution by making it appear that Jalandoni, and not
Ombudsman Casimiro, was the official authorized to sign and approve it; and (4) that these changes made the resolution
speak something false, because in truth, the document was already signed and approved by Ombudsman Casimiro.

Jalandoni argues that the Informations on infidelity in the custody of documents are defective because there is no
allegation that he hid, stole, or removed the documents, and that the act was done for an illicit purpose. Similarly, he
contends that the Informations for falsification are insufficient because they fail to allege that the meaning of the
documents changed.

Jalandoni is mistaken.

The Informations are sufficient because they alleged all material facts pertaining to the elements of the crimes. Hiding,
stealing, or removing the documents and illicit purpose are not elements of the crime, and thus, need not be reflected in
the Informations.

Similarly, the Informations on falsification sufficiently allege that the alterations and intercalations changed the meaning of
the documents. As gleaned from their wording, the changes made it appear that Jalandoni was the official authorized to
sign and approve the document, when an approving authority has already done so. This is sufficient; the absence of the
exact phrase "changed the meaning" does not nullify the Informations.

Again, a verbatim reiteration of the law is not required in averments in an information. The allegations of basic facts that
constitute the crimes will suffice. That is the case here. The assailed Informations sufficiently enable Jalandoni to
understand the crimes charged. There is no ambiguity as to preclude him from formulating his defense.

The Sandiganbayan, therefore, committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Quash the Informations.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions for Certiorari are DISMISSED. The Resolution and Order of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-0124 to 0179 and SB-14-CRM-0180 to 0192
are AFFIRMED.

Andes, Ma. Joanna Carmela