Title: The United States vs.

Andres Pablo
G.R. No. 11676, October 17, 1916
Ponente: Justice. Torres

FACTS:

In compliance with his chief’s order, Andres Pablo (Defendant) raided Bario Tuyo on October 21, 1915 where a jueteng
game is allegedly being held. Prior to the arrival of the defendant, the players have already absconded the area. At the area,
the defendant saw Maximo Malicsi, Antonio Rodrigo and Franciso Dato. Defendant only arrested Francisco Dato, seized
as well the tambiolo and the 37 bolas left in the area, this information if carried in the defendant’s report to his chief

With this information, The Three (3) persons of interest were charged with illegal gambling in violation with Municipal
Ordinance # 5. Dato pleaded guilty while Malicsi and Rodrigo pleaded not guilty.

During the hearing, the defendant testified under oath that he and Tomas De Leon went to Bario Tuyo to raid a jueteng
game. But before they arrived, from afar the say the gambles scampering towards the hills, when they arrived they saw
Dato and a low table caused them to suspect jueteng game is being held, that in fact they saw the tambiolo and 37 bolas
but they did not see Malicsi and Rodrigo nor they see them running. Only afterwards they’ve known that these two are the
cabecillas upon the information given anonymous person.

Before the trial of the case, the defendant had an interview and conference with Malicsi and Rodrigo at the house of
Valentin Sioson. On this occasion the defendant was instructed not to testify against the two in exchange of P5.00

By reason of the foregoing, the defendant was charged with crime of perjury under the provision of Sec 3 of Act. No 1697

RTC on December 28, 1915 rendered judgement therein sentencing the defendant to the penalty of two (2) years
imprisonment and fine of P100. The defendant is also disqualified from holding any public office and from testifying from
courts until disqualification should be removed.

SC affirmed the judgement and sentenced Andres Pablo to Penalty of Two (2) years four (4) months and one (1)
imprisonment and pay the sum P1000 pesetas, in case of insolvency shall suffer the subsidiary imprisonment, which shall
not exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty. He shall pay the cost for the both instances.

ISSUES:

Is the defendant guilty of perjury under the Penal Code notwithstanding the repeal under Act No. 1697.

HELD:

Yes, the defendant is Guilty of Perjury.

Though the administrative code repealed Act 1697 but it did not expressly repealed the provision under the penal code.
With the repeal of Act 1697, the need to demand the enforcement of Article 318-324 arises because it is undeniable that
the community must necessarily punish perjury or false testimony, and if it is impossible to conceive that crimes of this
kind may go immune and be freely committed without any punishment at all, because the liberty to pervert the truth, in
sworn testimony for the very reason that it might save a guilty party from punishment, might also determine the
conviction and punishment of an innocent party, the conclusion is inevitable that there must be some previous and
preexisting law which punishes perjury or false testimony

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPIC:

Nullum Crimen nulla poena sine lege – There is no crime when there is no law punishing the same.

If a penal law is impliedly repealed, the subsequent repeal of the repealing law will revive the original law. So the act or
omission which was punished as a crime under the original law will be revived and the same shall again be crimes
although during the implied repeal they may not be punishable.

In this case, the repeal of Act 1697 revive provisions under the Articles 318-324 of the Penal code, hence, by these
provision becomes in full force by the virtue of repeal making the defendant guilty under Section 318-324 of Penal Code
instead of Act No. 1697.
Title: The People of Philippines Islands vs. Gregorio Santiago
G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922
Ponente: Justice. Romualdez

FACTS:

The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6 meters wide, notwithstanding the
fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other
side where there were two young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing
his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take
in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran over the boy
Porfirio who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.

The defendant herein was prosecuted for the crime of homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one
year and one day of prison correctional and to pay the cost of trial.

The defendant argued that the lower court committed error by not taking judicial notice that of the fact that the defendant
was being prosecuted under act 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the act is unconstitutional and gave no
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.

HELD:

The SC decides that the provisions of section 2 of General Order No. 58, as amended by Act No. 2886, do not partake of
the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any
constitutional provision and that the court a quo not commit any of the errors assigned.

The sentence appealed from is hereby is affirmed, the appellant being furthermore sentenced to the accessory penalties
prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the
payment of the costs of both instances.

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPICS:

The right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. This assertion is right; but it is also true that by
reason of the principle of territoriality as applied in the suppression of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate
government subdivisions such as territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the territorial legislatures have the power
to define and punish crimes, a power also possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of section 7,
already quoted, of the Jones Law.

These territorial governments are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the
territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of the authority
delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
Title: ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, vs. JUDGE DOMINGO
MEDINA ANGELES

G.R. No. 64279 April 30, 1984

Ponente: Justice. Aquino

FACTS:

Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers, than on April 2, 1982 after securing permits from the following:
(1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code
and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under
the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command
attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the livestock
inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot. They transport in
an Isuzu 10-wheeler truck Twenty Six (26) Carabaos from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia as their destination.

Despite the permits on hand while passing through Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabao were confiscated by Lt. Arnulfo
V. Zenarosa (Police Station Commander) and Doctor Bella S. Miranda (Provincial Veterinary) citing EO 626-A as basis of
their action.

The confiscated carabaos was then distributed to 25 farmers from Municipality of Basud and 1 farmer for municipality of
Vinzon

Pesigan brothers filed an action for replevin against Lt. Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda for the recovery of the P70,000
alleged value of the carabaos and damages valued at P92,000. In April 25, 1983 J. Domingo Medina Angeles dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action

Pesigan brothers appealed to SC the decision of J. Angeles

ISSUE:

Are the defendant guilty of the violating provision Presidential Executive Order No. 626 Dated October 25, 1980, an order
prohibiting transport of carabao from one province to another, provided that the EO only published in the official gazette
on June 14, 1982?

HELD:

SC hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPIC:

Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on
persons affected thereby
Title: THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs. PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant

G.R. No. 64279 April 30, 1984

Ponente: Justice. Ladd

FACTS:

The defendant on July 1901, arrested Marcelino San Pedro and a certain other individual upon suspicion of being
concerned in a insurrectionary conspiracy in Pasig. that San Pedro had in his possession or under his control arms,
ammunition, money, and supplies which had been collected for the purposes of the movement.

An investigation was accordingly instituted at the police station. In course of investigation San Pedro denied all knowledge
as to the conspiracy.

For the purpose of compelling San Pedro about the whereabouts of the ammunitions, the defendant struck San Pedro
several times with a whip, drawing blood but not injuring him so severely as to incapacitate him from working or to
necessitate medical attendance.

Nothing was shown by the defense which can constitute a justification or excuse for the assault.

The defendant was convicted under article 588, No. 1 of the penal code. To which the defendant subsequently appealed
citing that he is an employee of the US military does civil court has no jurisdiction over him.

ISSUE:

Does civil court have jurisdiction over Philip K. Sweet?

HELD:

The case is open to the application of general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the
military or other special characters of the person brought before them for trial unless controlled by express legislation to
the contrary

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPIC:

Generality of Penal Laws:

General Rule - The penal law of the country is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to
the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations

Except as provided in the treaties or laws of preferential application

Title: JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000

Ponente: Justice. Ynares – Santiago

FACTS:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering
defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171.

Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal
charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an
"office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from
legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.

Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA.
When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier
issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the
criminal cases were filed in court.

ISSUE:

Does the petition for immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country?

Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit

HELD:

The petition is denied

A diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except
in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving state outside his official functions. 5 As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty.

RELEVANCE TO THE CASE:

Generality of Penal Laws:

General Rule - The penal law of the country is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to
the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations

Except as provided in the treaties or laws of preferential application

Title: THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH SING, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 13005 October 10, 1917

Ponente: Justice. Malcolm

FACTS:

The defendant is a subject of China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign
steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant
bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession
during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on
making a search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's
engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not
confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the accused was to
import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

ISSUE:

Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven?

HELD:

It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms

The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that
the opium be discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of
the Philippine Islands on a boat destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.

The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the
trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this
instance against the appellant

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPIC:

Territoriality of Penal Laws – Penal laws of a country have force and effect only within its territory. Territory of a
country is not limited to the land where its sovereignty resides but includes also its maritime and interior waters as well as
atmosphere
Title: MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and
PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS,
respondent

G.R. No. 30026 January 31, 1971

Ponente: Justice. Fernando

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno
Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other
offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954
and, as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of
rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua. Each of the
petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has served more than 13
years.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners be given a retroactive effect with habeas corpus as appropriate remedy.

HELD:

Yes,

The writ prayed for should issue, since as held in Directo vs. Director of Prisons, 7 "the only means of giving retroactive
effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused where the trial judge has lost jurisdiction over the case, is the writ of
habeas corpus."

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPIC:

Constitutional Limitations of Penal Laws:

EQUAL PROTECTION

Art. 3, Sec 1 of the 1987 Constitution

“No Person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of laws”

DUE PROCESS

Art. 3, Sec 14 of the 1987 Constitution

“No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law”

NON-IMPOSITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT OR EXCESSIVE FINE

Art. 3, Sec 19 of the 1987 Constitution

“Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua”

R.A 9346 – The act prohibiting the imposition of death penalty

• Repealed RA 8177 – imposition of death penalty by lethal injection
• Repealed RA 7659 – imposition of death penalty

BILL OF ATTAINDER
Art 3, Sec 22 of the 1987 Constitution
“NO ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted

Title: THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. 5272 March 19, 1910

Ponente: Justice. Carson

FACTS:

Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in the same place and usually slept in
the same room. One night, after the defendant had gone to bed, he was awakened by some one trying to open the door,
and called out twice, "who is there?" He received no answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber, leaped from the
bed and again called out: "If you enter the room I will kill you." At that moment he was struck by a chair which had been
placed against the door. Believing that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the
intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon he called to his employers and rushed back into the room to
secure bandages to bind up the wound

ISSUE:

Whether a person can be held criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he
would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state
of facts at the time.

HELD:

There is no criminal liability, provided that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPIC:

Mistake of Fact (ignorantia facti excusat)

It is a reasonable misapprehension of fact on the part of the person causing injury to another. Such person is NOT
criminally liable as he acted without criminal intent.

Under this principle, what is involved is the lack of intent on the part of the accused. Therefore, the defense of mistake of
fact is an untenable defense in culpable felonies, where there is no intent to consider.

An honest mistake of fact destroys the presumption of criminal intent which arises upon the commission of a felonious
act.

Requisites:
(a) That the act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be;
(b) That the intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful;
(c) That the mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused. When the accused is
negligent, mistake of fact is not a defense.16
Title: JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, petitioner,vs.HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO,
Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE,
respondents

G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010

Ponente: Justice. Carpio

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC),with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent
Ponce);and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the
death of respondent Ponce's husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted bail
for his temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty
of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. SICDAa

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. 3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC),in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner's motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner's absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. 4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution
denying petitioner's motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. 5 Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

ISSUE:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest following
his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and
2. If in the negative, whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

HELD:

SC grant the petition to dismissed Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy

RELEVANCE TO THE TOPIC:

Double Jeopardy:
 Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for the
same act.
 For the essence of the quasi-offense under Art. 365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent act which would be
punishable as a felony.
 The law penalizes the negligent act and not the result.
 The gravity of the consequences is only taken into account to determine the penalty. It does not qualify the substance of
the offense.
 As the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.

In this case, Ivler vs San Pedro, the two charges arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of
the RPC, thus, warranting double jeopardy.

Cooperation