November 2, 2023

The Honorable Xavier Becerra

Secretary
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
200 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, DC 20201

Dear Secretary Becerra:

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, Committee on Oversight and

Accountability, and Committee on Energy and Commerce (together “the Committees”), have
already made significant accommodations to the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS” or “the Department”) in its September 14, 2023, joint request letter [hereinafter
“September 14 Letter”]. At the request of the Department, we are now making additional
accommodations. These accommodations include increasing specificity, providing priority
search terms for, limiting the time frame of, and removing completed requests from the
Committees’ September 14 Letter. As such, please see the updated requests, follow the updated
production schedule, and use the priority search terms as outlined in Appendixes (I)-(III).

As a further accommodation, the Committees have accepted every proposed transcribed

interview date proposed by the Department. For your ready reference, the transcribed interviews
currently scheduled are:

1. Dr. Michael Lauer: November 2, 2023

2. Dr. Erik Stemmy: November 13, 2023
3. Dr. Emily Erbelding: November 28, 2023
4. Mr. Gray Handley: December 8, 2023
5. Mr. Greg Folkers: December 12, 2023
6. Dr. Hugh Auchincloss: December 20, 2023

The Committees continue to have serious concerns regarding the adequacy of the
Department’s efforts to comply with our legitimate oversight requests. At the request of the
Department, the Committees deferred a transcribed interview with Assistant Secretary Melanie
Egorin to accommodate a meeting requested by the Department to discuss its oversight
compliance efforts—including its response to our September 14 Letter. As outlined below, the
Department’s explanations were insufficient and did not address the Committees’ outstanding
questions. Accordingly, attached to this letter please find a subpoena for Assistant Secretary
Melanie Egorin to appear for a deposition on November 16, 2023.1

1
While the Committee on Oversight and Accountability is serving the Department with a testimonial subpoena, this
deposition will be conducted jointly. If necessary, the Committee on Energy and Commerce will issue a separate
testimonial subpoena pursuant to Rule 16 of the Committee’s Rules.
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 2

I. Background

The Committees have a Constitutional duty to conduct oversight to inform legislative

solutions that address deficiencies and ingrain proficiencies within the federal government. Since
early 2020, House Republicans have been investigating the origins of SARS-CoV-2 and the
resulting COVID-19 pandemic, which has killed more than one million Americans. Regrettably,
House Democrats have not joined us in these efforts.2 This investigation will inform potential
legislation to improve pandemic preparedness, strengthen grant processes and oversight, enhance
biosafety and biosecurity of laboratory and field research, and amend or strengthen current
criminal laws regarding defrauding the United States, among other issues.

At the beginning of the 118th Congress, on February 2 and 13, 2023, respectively, the
Committees sent the Department requests for documents and communications relevant to this
investigation.3 The Select Subcommittee’s letter also included requests for 29 voluntary
transcribed interviews.4

As part of our duty to conduct oversight of the Executive Branch, we recognize our
obligation to participate in the constitutionally mandated accommodations process. To that end,
the Committees have endeavored to work in good faith with the Department. Between February
and September 2023, the Committees have: (1) identified priority categories of document
requests as well as discrete documents of interest, (2) deprioritized or withdrawn certain
document requests, (3) freely granted extensions of time, and (4), at the request of the
Department, reviewed certain documents in camera.

Our accommodations have not been met with reciprocal actions from the Department,
and its efforts to produce documents are deficient. For example, the Department has: (1)
produced documents with more substantial redactions than those in documents that are publicly
available, (2) redacted the names of non-governmental employees and foreign nationals without
legitimate reasons, (3) missed numerous production deadlines, often without explanation, (4)
withheld requested documents, again often without explanation, and, as the Congress has gone
on, (5) made productions at a slower and slower cadence.

On September 14, 2023, as a further accommodation to the Department and to facilitate

its compliance with investigative requests regarding the origins of COVID-19, the Committees
jointly consolidated our previous requests. The September 14 Letter deferred certain earlier
requests, increased the specificity of others, reduced the scope of previous requests, and, again,
prioritized requests for documents and information determined to be most important to the

2
Letter from Hon. James Clyburn, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. on Oversight
& Reform, to Hon. Steve Scalise, Ranking Member, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Crisis, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Reform, & Hon. James Comer, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform (June 11, 2021).
3
Letter from Hon. Cathy McMorris Rogers, et. al., Chair, H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, to Lawrence Tabak,
D.D.S, Ph.D., Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, Nat’l Insts. Of Health (Feb. 2, 2023); Letter
from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability (Feb. 13, 2023).
4
Id.
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 3

Committees.5 Critically, the letter tabled 21 of the 29 previously requested transcribed

interviews. Finally, the letter clearly delineated the Committees’ expected production timeline.

Because the Department’s good-faith compliance is in question the September 14 Letter

also requested readily available data that would help verify that the Department was, in fact,
cooperating with Congress “in good faith,” as it routinely claims.6 The requested data included:
(1) how many new or unique searches or pulls of information were conducted by the
Department, (2) the dates of these searches or pulls of information, (3) a list of search terms used
for these pulls, and (4) a list of custodial inboxes searched. If the Department failed to produce
this data by September 21, the Committees reiterated the Select Subcommittee’s request, from
six months earlier, for Assistant Secretary Egorin to participate in a transcribed interview on
September 28, 2023.

On September 18, 2023, Select Subcommittee staff reminded the Department that the
requested information was expected and that, if the Department failed to comply, the Committees
expected Assistant Secretary Egorin’s appearance and testimony on September 28.7 On
September 21, the Department sent a letter to the Committees attempting to defend its record of
compliance with oversight requests.8 Unfortunately, the Department’s response did not address
our concerns, and—tellingly—the letter did not include any of the documents or data requested
by the Committees.

On September 25, Select Subcommittee staff informed the Department that its response
in the September 21 letter “did not satisfy the Chairs’ requests” and that the interview of
Assistant Secretary Egorin would proceed as requested.9 Select Subcommittee staff also
reiterated that the Department had yet to indicate whether Assistant Secretary Egorin would not
cooperate. The Department did not immediately respond.

On September 27—the day before the scheduled interview—Department staff informed

the Committees that Assistant Secretary Egorin tested positive for COVID-19 and would not be
available to testify.10 At no point did the Department indicate that Assistant Secretary Egorin was
refusing to testify, but instead simply requested an extension. The Committees granted an

5
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability, to Hon. Xavier Becerra, Sec’y, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs. (Sept. 14, 2023)
[hereinafter “September 14 Letter”].
6
Letter from Hon. Melanie Anne Egorin, Ass’t Sec’y for Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Hon.
Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability
(Oct. 11, 2023) [hereinafter “October 11 Letter”].
7
E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs.
(Sept. 18, 2023).
8
Letter from Hon. Melanie Anne Egorin, Ass’t Sec’y for Legislation, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Hon.
Brad Wenstrup, et. al., Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on Oversight & Accountability
(Sept. 21, 2023).
9
E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs.
(Sept. 25, 2023).
10
E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic (Sept. 27, 2023).
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 4

extension—to October 5—pending a negative test. Again, at no time after the extension was
granted did the Department indicate that Assistant Secretary Egorin would refuse to cooperate.

On October 2, Select Subcommittee staff followed up regarding Assistant Secretary

Egorin’s status and availability for an interview on October 5.11 That same day, Department staff
informed the Committees that Assistant Secretary Egorin was still testing positive for COVID-
19.12 The Committees, once again, granted an extension—to October 12—pending a negative
test.13 Again, the Department gave no indication that Assistant Secretary Egorin would refuse to
cooperate.

On October 10, Select Subcommittee staff reminded the Department of Assistant

Secretary Egorin’s upcoming transcribed interview.14 The Department did not immediately
respond, but again, gave no indication that the Assistant Secretary was refusing to cooperate.

On October 11, Select Subcommittee staff notified the Department of the logistical
details for the interview.15 The Department’s response gave no indication that Assistant Secretary
Egorin would refuse to cooperate.16 Later that day, Committee and Department staff discussed
the scheduled interview via a phone call. The Department stated that the Committees would
receive a substantive response that day, but never indicated that Assistant Secretary Egorin would
refuse to cooperate.

II. The Committees’ Response to the Department’s October 11, 2023 Letter

On October 11, the Department sent the Committees a letter.17 This letter included
minimal information responsive to the Committees’ outstanding questions. The September 14
Letter requested answers to four questions:

1. How many new or unique searches or pulls of information were conducted by the
Department?

The Department failed to answer.

2. What were the dates of these searches or pulls of information?

11
E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs. (Oct. 2, 2023).
12
E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic (Oct. 2, 2023).
13
E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs. (Oct. 2, 2023).
14
E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs. (Oct. 10, 2023).
15
E-Mail from Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, to Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human
Servs. (Oct. 11, 2023).
16
E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic (Oct. 11, 2023).
17
October 11 Letter, supra note 6.
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 5

The Department failed to answer.

3. What was the list of search terms used for these pulls?

The Department provided the Committees with six search terms but stated that additional
unspecified terms were also used. Unfortunately, one of the six search terms disclosed,
“2R01AI110964-06,” is arbitrarily limiting. Instead of searching for the original grant
number, the Department evidently only searched for the grant renewal, thus cutting off
five years of responsive documents. Regardless, the list of search terms provided by the
Department is incomplete.

4. What was the list of custodial inboxes searched?

The Department provided the Committees with the names of seven custodians who had in
some manner had their email accounts searched. Again, the Department promised there
would be additional unspecified custodians. Regardless, the list provided by the
Department is incomplete.

Why the Department chose to only provide an admittedly incomplete list of custodians and
search terms is unknown.

Moreover, instead of answering the Committees’ questions, the Department erroneously

stated that the Committees have no “reasonable basis” to ask these questions—which is false—
and that the Committees have no “specific informational need” to ask these questions—which is
also false.

A. The Committees have a reasonable basis to suspect the Department is not making a
sufficient effort to address legitimate oversight requests.

As outlined below, the Department is not addressing our legitimate oversight requests and
is withholding information and documents without a legal basis:

• The Department redacted information in productions to the Committees that was not
redacted in related Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) productions.18 FOIA does not
apply to Congress. There is no legal basis for a Congressional Committee to receive less
information than a FOIA requestor.

• The Department redacted the names of non-governmental employees and foreign

nationals, including members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), under the guise of
a “concerning escalation of threats and harassment, particularly towards public health
professionals and scientists.”19 The Committees condemn unequivocally any such threats,
18
See e.g., SSCP_NIH002640 – 2967 where all names of individuals are redacted versus documents obtained via
FOIA by Judicial Watch, Inc. where names are, largely, unredacted.
19
E-Mail from Staff, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., to Staff, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus
Pandemic (June 27, 2023).
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 6

however, when asked to provide the Committees with information on how the
Department ascertained these threats, especially those regarding foreign nationals, the
Department failed to answer.

• The Department missed numerous deadlines and, in some cases, simply failed to produce
any of the requested documents in response to legitimate oversight requests.

• As discussed above, despite the Committees coordinating schedules, booking rooms, and
preparing questions and exhibits, the Department misled the Committees regarding
Assistant Secretary Egorin’s intent to refuse a voluntary transcribed interview and only
informed the Committees of her refusal less than 24 hours prior to her scheduled
interview.

These actions reflect bad faith and form a reasonable basis for the Committees’ skepticism
regarding the Department’s compliance efforts.

B. The Committees have a specific informational need to request data responding to the
questions outlined in the September 14 Letter.

We have a Constitutional obligation to conduct thorough and vigorous oversight to

inform legislation and improve the performance of the Department and its operating divisions.
The Department exists because Congress created it and continues to fund it. It is incumbent upon
the Department to cooperate with this legitimate oversight, not obstruct it.

Anticipating the possibility that the Biden Administration would obstruct efforts to
investigate the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic, the House specifically granted the Select
Subcommittee the power and authority to investigate:

cooperation by the executive branch and others with Congress, the

Inspectors General, the Government Accountability Office, and others in
connection with oversight of the preparedness for and response to the
coronavirus pandemic.20

We have explicit jurisdiction, as voted on and passed by the whole of the House, to investigate
how the Department is responding, or not, to Congress.

Notwithstanding this explicit jurisdiction, the Committees have a legitimate need to

understand how and to what extent the Department is cooperating with its investigations. The
Committees must ensure the Department is retaining, securing, and producing all relevant
information. This is especially important considering the revelations that at least one senior
Department employee intentionally used a personal e-mail address to avoid FOIA and possibly

20
H. Res. 5, 118th Cong. §(4)(a)(2)(ix) (2023) (emphasis added).
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 7

deleted government records.21 Platitudes professing the Department’s “good faith” and
assurances that political appointees are “work[ing] diligently” on requests without providing
corroborative evidence is not sufficient.22

III. Bipartisan October 20, 2023 Meeting

On October 20, 2023, at the request of and as a further accommodation to the

Department, the Committees, again, deferred the transcribed interview of Assistant Secretary
Egorin in exchange for a staff-level meeting to address our concerns. Unfortunately, that meeting
demonstrated that the Department is not making a sufficient effort to remedy its self-imposed
restraints on its ability to respond adequately to Congressional oversight.

The attendees included bipartisan Committee staff, Assistant Secretary Egorin, and two
other Department representatives. Despite the promise of a substantive discussion, the
Department representatives only had one copy of the September 14 Letter amongst them and
brought no other documents. The lack of seriousness and preparation was insulting.

Reflecting the minimal resources the Department dedicates to congressional oversight,

the Department informed the Committees that: (1) it would take months to gather answers to the
questions posed in the September 14 Letter, (2) while collecting these answers, the Department
would have to cease all other cooperation with the Committees, (3) the Department has no way
of easily retrieving the search terms used to gather responsive documents because it did not keep
track of search terms it used, (4) the Department would not tell the Committees if it had
conducted custodial interviews of the individuals identified in the September 14 Letter, (5) the
Department does not employ the Department’s Office of General Counsel to assist with oversight
requests as was the practice in past administrations, and (6) the Department no longer uses a
document review or e-discovery software to assist with document productions to Congress.

At the Department’s insistence, the meeting ended before the Committees could ask all
their questions. It is now clear that the Department, under the Biden Administration, has made a
deliberate decision to create a system that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to respond to
Congressional oversight requests. In addition, in prior administrations, the Department and/or its
operating divisions have detailed or hired additional staff as needed to respond adequately to a
high volume of Congressional oversight requests.

The only conceivable explanation for why the Department would deliberately cripple its
ability to respond to oversight requests is that its political leadership wants to obstruct Congress.
The Department’s continued assertions that it is working in “good faith” with Congress are
outrageous when compared to how it actually responds to oversight requests. The Department’s
course of conduct over several months in response to our oversight requests is not reasonable and

21
Letter from Hon. Brad Wenstrup, Chairman, Select Subcomm. on the Coronavirus Pandemic, H. Comm. on
Oversight & Accountability, to David Morens, M.D., Senior Scientific Advisor, Office of the Dir., Nat’l Inst. Of
Allergy & Infectious Diseases (June 29, 2023).
22
October 11 Letter, supra note 6.
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 8

lacks a legal basis. There is no evidence that the Department is willing to take steps to address
the Committees’ concerns.

The above facts and unanswered questions necessitate and support this subpoena for
testimony. We look forward to Assistant Secretary Egorin’s cooperation.

***

Pursuant to clause 2(m)(1)(B) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives

authorizes committees “to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of
such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers,
and documents as it considers necessary.” Clause 2(m)(3)(A)(i) further provides that the power
to authorize and issue such subpoenas “may be delegated to the chair of the committee.” Rule
12(g) of the Rule of the Committee on Oversights and Accountability delegates such authority to
that Committee’s chair. Section 4(a)(3)(A)(ii) of H. Res. 5 also authorizes the chair of the
Committee on Oversight and Accountability to authorize and issue subpoenas to be returned to
the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic.

The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic is authorized to investigate “the

origins of the Coronavirus pandemic, including but not limited to the Federal Government’s
funding of gain-of function research,” “executive branch policies, deliberations, decisions,
activities, and internal and external communications related to the coronavirus pandemic,” and
“cooperation by the executive branch and others with Congress, the Inspectors General, the
Government Accountability Office, and others in connection with oversight of the preparedness
for and response to the coronavirus pandemic” under H. Res. 5.

The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is authorized to investigate “any matter”

at “any time” pursuant to House Rule X.

The Committee on Energy and Commerce is the authorizing committee with jurisdiction
and oversight responsibilities for public health service agencies, including the National Institutes
of Health and the entities it funds, as well as federal biomedical research and development.

Sincerely,

Brad Wenstrup, D.P.M. James Comer

Chairman Chairman
Select Subcommittee on the Committee on Oversight and
Coronavirus Pandemic Accountability
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 9

Cathy McMorris Rodgers H. Morgan Griffith

Chair Chair
Committee on Energy and Subcommittee on Oversight and
Commerce Investigations

Brett Guthrie
Chair
Subcommittee on Health
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 10

Appendix I

As an accommodation to the Department, the Committees are willing to table some

Requests in exchange for production of certain documents already collected and produced to
other entities, further limit the responsive time frame for Request (6), further scope Request (4),
provide priority search terms for each request in this section (Appendix III), and stagger
production based on priority custodians (Appendix II). However, considering the already very
limited scope of Request (7), the Committees are unwilling to amend that request. Finally, the
Committees are also committed to continuing to work with the Department to protect its interests
while serving the Committees’ interests in information pertaining to unfunded grant proposals.
These are all significant accommodations to the Department and have been provided at the
request of the Department.

THE COMMITTEES’ FEBRUARY 2 AND 13, 2023 LETTERS

I. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc.

1. As NIH provided to the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector
General in approximately October or November 2021, the 32 GB production, totaling
more than 20,000 emails, no later than November 8, 2023.

2. All documents and communications between and among NIH, NIAID, and/or HHS
employees and EcoHealth employees, or affiliated individuals, regarding the letter in The
Lancet entitled “Statement in support of the scientists, public health professionals, and
medical professionals of China combatting COVID-19.”

II. The February 1, 2020, Teleconference and Proximal Origin

3. All documents and communications regarding, referring to, or relating to the February 1,
2020 teleconference regarding COVID-19.

This request should be construed broadly to include documents and communications

including but not limited to other government agencies and non-governmental
individuals.

4. All documents and communications regarding the drafting, publication, and critical
reception of “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2” published in Nature Medicine on
March 17, 2020.

This request should be construed broadly to include documents and communications

including but not limited to other government agencies and non-governmental
individuals.
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 11

It should also be construed to include documents and communications regarding the

drafting, preparation, and critical reception of “The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2”
published in Virological on February 16, 2020.

III. The Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV)

5. All documents and communications between and among NIH, NIAID, and/or HHS
employees regarding the WIV from November 1, 2019 through present.

6. All documents and communications between and among NIH and/or NIAID employees
and employees of the WIV from January 1, 2014, through present. The likely responsive
e-mail addresses would end with “@wh.iov.cn.”

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE’S JULY 13, 2023 LETTER

7. All notes in the custody and control of the Department or any of its sub-agencies
resulting from the February 1, 2020, conference call.

The existence of contemporaneous notes regarding the February 1 conference call was
confirmed to the Select Subcommittee by XX. XXXXXXXX XXX, who was on the call.

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE’S AUGUST 3, 2023 LETTER

On October 19, 2023, the Department provided the Committees with the unfunded
application numbers, titles, received by dates, and locations of research for two proposals that
were responsive to our previous requests.

Understanding the Department’s concerns regarding proprietary and business confidential

information and as an accommodation to the Department, the Committees are willing to view the
full proposals in camera. Accordingly, the Committees will contact the Department to schedule
the review.
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 12

Appendix II

For the Requests (2)-(7) in Appendix I, the Department should prioritize the following
custodians and follow the corresponding production schedule:

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the
following custodians as soon as possible but no later than November 9, 2023:
1. Dr. Michael Lauer;
2. Dr. Emily Erbelding; and
3. Dr. Erik Stemmy.

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the
following custodians as soon as possible but no later than November 16, 2023:
1. Dr. Hugh Auchincloss;
2. Mr. Greg Folkers; and
3. Mr. Gray Handley.

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the
following custodians as soon as possible but no later than November 23, 2023:
1. Dr. David Morens;
2. Dr. Cliff Lane; and
3. Dr. Ping Chen.

Please produce the responsive documents and communications for Requests (2)-(7) from the
following custodians as soon as possible but no later than November 30, 2023:
1. Dr. Anthony Fauci;
2. Dr. Francis Collins; and
3. Dr. Lawrence Tabak.
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 13

Appendix III

For the Requests (2)-(7) in Appendix I, the Department should prioritize the following
search terms, names, and entities to include any iterations thereof:

Terms
1. Coronavirus;
2. Novel;
3. CoV;
4. Novel bat-CoV;
5. SARS;
6. SARS-like;
7. SARS-related;
8. Zoonotic;
9. Market;
10. Lab;
11. Origin;
12. Outbreak;
13. Pangolin;
14. Pneumonia;
15. Conspiracy;
16. Genome;
17. Sequence;
18. Backbone;
19. Furin Cleavage Site;
20. Polybasic Cleavage Site;
21. Codon;
22. ACE2;
23. Spike Protein;
24. S1;
25. S2;
26. O-linked Glycans;
27. Receptor Binding Domain;
28. Serial Passage;
29. Cell Culture;
30. Tissue Culture;
31. Gain of Function;
32. Manipulated;
33. Modified;
34. Recombination;
35. Weapon;
36. P3CO;
37. Potential Pandemic Pathogen;
38. Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogen;
39. Dual Use;
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 14

40. COVID-19;
41. SARS-CoV-2;
42. China;
43. Wuhan;
44. Hubei;
45. Huanan;
46. R01AI110964;
47. Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence;
48. DUNS Number: 077090066;
49. Lancet;
50. Statement in support of the scientists, public health professionals, and medical
professionals of China combatting COVID-19;
51. Teleconference;
52. Nature;
53. Nature Medicine;
54. Virological;
55. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2

Names
1. Dr. Francis Collins;
2. Dr. Anthony Fauci;
3. Dr. Lawrence Tabak;
4. Dr. Hugh Auchincloss;
5. Mr. Greg Folkers;
6. Dr. Cliff Lane;
7. Dr. Ping Chen;
8. Mr. Gray Handley;
9. Dr. Erik Stemmy;
10. Dr. Michael Lauer;
11. Dr. Emily Erbelding;
12. Dr. David Morens;
13. Dr. Jeremy Farrar;
14. Dr. Kristian Andersen;
15. Dr. Robert Garry;
16. Dr. W. Ian Lipkin;
17. Dr. Edward Holmes;
18. Dr. Michael Farzan;
19. Dr. Christian Drosten;
20. Dr. Ron Fouchier;
21. Dr. Marion Koopmans;
22. Dr. Ralph Baric;
23. Dr. Peter Daszak;
24. Dr. James LeDuc;
25. Dr. Charles Calisher;
26. Dr. Dennis Carroll;
The Honorable Xavier Becerra
November 2, 2023
Page 15

27. Dr. Rita Colwell;

28. Dr. Ronald B. Corley;
29. Dr. Luis Enjuanes;
30. Dr. Hume Field;
31. Dr. Josei Golding;
32. Dr. Alexander Gorbalenya;
33. Dr. Bart Haagmans;
34. Dr. James M. Hughes;
35. Dr. William B. Karesh;
36. Dr. Gerlad T. Keusch;
37. Dr. Sai Kit Lam;
38. Dr. Juan Lubroth;
39. Dr. John S. Mackenzie;
40. Dr. Larry Madoff;
41. Dr. Jonna Mazet;
42. Dr. Peter Palese;
43. Dr. Stanley Perlman;
44. Dr. Leo Poon;
45. Dr. Bernard Roizman;
46. Dr. Linda Siaf;
47. Dr. Kanta Subbatao;
48. Dr. Mike Turner;
49. Dr. Victor Dzau;
50. Dr. David Asher;
51. Ms. Adrienne Hallett;
52. Dr. Lanying Du;
53. Dr. Zhang Yongzhen;
54. Dr. Shi Zhengli;
55. Dr. Ben Hu;
56. Dr. Yu Ping;
57. Dr. Yan Zhu; and
58. Dr. Zhou Yusen.

Entities
1. EcoHealth Alliance, Inc;
2. New York Blood Center;
3. Georgia State University;
4. Wuhan Institute of Virology;
5. Wuhan Center for Disease Control;
6. Wuhan University;
7. Chinese Academy of Sciences;
8. People’s Liberation Army; and
9. Academy of Military Medical Sciences;