2023 Omnibus Notes - Part 1 - Remedial Law

REMEDIAL LAW – OMNIBUS NOTES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART ONE: REMEDIAL LAW

I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A. Doctrine of Non-Interference/Judicial Stability
• Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. v. Trackworks Rail Transit
Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 204452, June 28, 2021
II. JURISDICTION
A. Doctrines of Hierarchy of Courts and Adherence of Jurisdiction
• Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021
B. Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts and Tribunals

• Dayrit vs. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631. December 7, 2021
• Land Bank of the Philippines v. Del Moral, Inc., G.R. No. 187307, October
14, 2020
• Land Bank of the Philippines v. Escaro, G.R. No. 204526, February 10,
2021
• Land Bank of the Philippines v. Quilit, G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021
• People v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206759, December 1, 2021
• Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority,
Marcelo Sagun, and Edner Sagun, G.R. no. 217492, October 4, 2021
• PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021
C. Aspects of Jurisdiction
• Heirs of Jose De Lara, Sr. v. Rural Bank of Jaen, Inc., G.R. No. 212012,
March 28, 2022
• Ramos-Yeo v. Spouses Chua, G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076 (Resolution),
April 18, 2022
III. CIVIL PROCEDURE (A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC)

A. Cause of Action (Rule 2)
• East West Banking Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 221641, July 12, 2021
• Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R.
No. 211563, September 29, 2021
B. Parties to Civil Actions (Rule 3)

• Nagaño vs Tanjangco, G.R. No. 204218, May 12, 2021
C. Pleadings
• Alpha Plus International Enterprise Corp. vs. Philippine Charter Insurance
Corp., G.R. No. 203756, February 10, 2021
• Asis v. Heirs of Calignawan, G.R. No. 242127, September 15, 2021
• Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp. v. Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 201044 & 222691, May 5, 2021
1
• Ngo vs. Gabelo, G.R. No. 207707. August 24, 2020
• Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R.
No. 211563, September 29, 2021
D. Filing and Service (Rule 13)

• Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 205466. January 11, 2021
E. Summons (Rule 14)

April 18, 2022
F. Motions (Rule 15)

• Gemina v. Heirs of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr. G.R. No. 232682, September 13,
2021
G. Pre-Trial (Rule 18)

• Leones v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 204106, November 17, 2021
• Gemina v. Heirs of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr. G.R. No. 232682, September 13,
2021
H. Intervention (Rule 19)

• Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060 & 189333,
June 30, 2020
I. Modes of Discovery
• People vs. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, March 21, 2022
P. Judgments and Final Orders

• Aljem's Credit Investors Corporation vs. Spouses Catalina and Porferio
Bautista, G.R. No. 215175. April 25, 2022
• People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019
Q. Post-Judgment Remedies
• Ancheta v. Cambay, G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021
• Ante vs. University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal and
University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227911. March 14, 2022
• Brual vs. Brual Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022
• Calubad vs. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029. September 2, 2020
• Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation vs. Charlie Chua Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 219317,
June 28, 2021
• Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R.
No. 219340 (Resolution), April 28, 2021
• Dy Buncio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 206120, March 23, 2022
• Gabutina vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 205572, October 07, 2020
• Gaoiran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022
• Heirs of Procopio Borras v. Heirs of Eustaquio Borras, G.R. No. 213888,
April 25, 2022
• Idul v. Alster Int'l. Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021
2
• Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 187323, June 23,
2021
• Land Bank of the Philippines v. Quilit, G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021
• Manila Electric Co. v. AAA Cryogenics Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 207429,
November 18, 2020
• Maynilad Water Services v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6,
2019
• Mega Fishing Corp. v. Estate of Gonzales
• Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. v. Noche et. al., G.R. No. 202392, October
4, 2021
• Philippine Commercial International Bank Vs. Laguna Navigation, Inc.,
Benigno D. Lim, Carmen Lizares Lim, And Vicente F. Aldanese, G.R. No.
195236, February 8, 2021
• Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Victor, G.R. No. 207377, July 27, 2022
• Pineda v. Miranda, G.R. No. 204997, August 4, 2021
• PNTC Colleges, Inc. v. Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698, September 27,
2021
• Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R. Nos. 197510-11 & 201347, April 18,
2022
• Ramirez v. Elomina, G.R. No. 202661, March 17, 2021
• Seming v. Alamag, G.R. No. 202284, March 17, 2021
R. Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments (Rule 39)

• Angono Medics Hospital, Inc., Vs. Antonina Q. Agabin, G.R. No. 202542,
December 09, 2020
• Asis v. Heirs of Calignawan, G.R. No. 242127, September 15, 2021
• Land Bank of the Philippines v. Del Moral, Inc., G.R. No. 187307, October
14, 2020
• Linden Suites, Inc. v. Meridien Far East Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 211969,
October 4, 2021
• Philippine National Bank v. Daradar, G.R. No. 180203, June 28, 2021
• Philippine National Bank v. Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673, March 2, 2022
• Pineda v. Miranda, G.R. No. 204997, August 4, 2021
IV. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

A. Preliminary Attachment (Rule 57)
• Chua vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 202004, November 04, 2020
B. Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)

• Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 221133, June
28, 2021
• Simfru Philippines vs. Spouses Coreho, G.R. No. 218236, February 07, 2018
C. Replevin (Rule 60)

• Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp. v. Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 201044 & 222691, May 5, 2021
3
V. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A. Interpleader (Rule 62)
• Bureau of Internal Revenue v. TICO Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 204226,
April 18, 2022
B. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (Rule 63)

• Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060 & 189333,
June 30, 2020
• Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R.
No. 219340 (Resolution), April 28, 2021
C. Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus (Rule 65)

• Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
and the Monetary Board, G.R. No. 200642. April 26, 2021
• Cervantes, et al vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210805, May 11, 2021
• Dormido vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198241, February 24,
2020
• Gaoiran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022
• Idul v. Alster Int'l. Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021
• Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 187323, June 23,
2021
• Linden Suites, Inc. v. Meridien Far East Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 211969,
October 4, 2021
• Monterde vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, February 14, 2022
• Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, September 27, 2021
• People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Alfonzo Servana Casurra, et al., G.R. No.
239878, February 28, 2022
• People v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206759, December 1, 2021
• Philam Homeowners Association, Inc., and Marcia Caguiat vs. Sylvia de
Luna and Nenita Bundoc, G.R. No. 209437, March 17, 2021
2022
• Radaza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380. August 4, 2021
April 18, 2022
D. Partition (Rule 69)

• Guillerma vs. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021
E. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (Rule 70)

• Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832, March 07, 2022
F. Contempt (Rule 71)

• HCPTI vs. LCUC and PFMC, G.R. No. 240984, September 27, 2021
VI. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

A. Writ of Habeas Corpus (Rule 102)
4
• Miguel v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15,
2021
B. Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)

• Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022
VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. Preliminary Investigation (Rule 112)
239878, February 28, 2022
2022
B. Motion to Quash (Rule 117)

C. Trial (Rule 119)

239878, February 28, 2022
VIII. EVIDENCE (A.M. NO. 19-08-15-SC)

A. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence (Rule 133)
• Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. v. Noche et. al., G.R. No. 202392, October
4, 2021
• Philippine Commercial International Bank Vs. Laguna Navigation, Inc.,
Benigno D. Lim, Carmen Lizares Lim, And Vicente F. Aldanese, G.R. No.
195236, February 8, 2021
5
Summary of Case List
Aljem's Credit Investors Corporation vs. Spouses Catalina and Porferio Bautista, G.R. No. 215175.
April 25, 2022
Alpha Plus International Enterprise Corp. vs. Philippine Charter Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 203756,
February 10, 2021
Ancheta v. Cambay, G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021
Angono Medics Hospital, Inc., Vs. Antonina Q. Agabin, G.R. No. 202542, December 09, 2020
Ante vs. University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal and University of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 227911. March 14, 2022
Asis v. Heirs of Calignawan, G.R. No. 242127, September 15, 2021
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Monetary Board,
G.R. No. 200642. April 26, 2021
Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 205466.
January 11, 2021
Brual vs. Brual Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022
Bureau of Internal Revenue v. TICO Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 204226, April 18, 2022
Calubad vs. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029. September 2, 2020
Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation vs. Charlie Chua Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 219317, June 28, 2021
Cervantes, et al vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210805, May 11, 2021
Chua vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 202004, November 04, 2020
Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060 & 189333, June 30, 2020
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 219340 (Resolution), April
28, 2021
Dayrit vs. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631. December 7, 2021
Dormido vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198241, February 24, 2020
Dumaran v. Llamedo, G.R. No. 217583, August 4, 2021
Dy Buncio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 206120, March 23, 2022
East West Banking Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 221641, July 12, 2021
Gabutina vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 205572, October 07, 2020
Gaoiran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022
6
Gemina v. Heirs of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr. G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021
Guillerma vs. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021
HCPTI vs. LCUC and PFMC, G.R. No. 240984, September 27, 2021
Heirs of Jose De Lara, Sr. v. Rural Bank of Jaen, Inc., G.R. No. 212012, March 28, 2022
Heirs of Procopio Borras v. Heirs of Eustaquio Borras, G.R. No. 213888, April 25, 2022
Idul v. Alster Int'l. Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021
Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 187323, June 23, 2021
Jay V. Sabado v. Tina Marie L. Sabado, G.R. No. 214270, May 12, 2021
Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp. v. Thick & Thin Agri-Products, Inc., G.R. Nos. 201044 & 222691,
May 5, 2021
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Del Moral, Inc., G.R. No. 187307, October 14, 2020
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Escaro, G.R. No. 204526, February 10, 2021
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Quilit, G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 221133, June 28, 2021
Leones v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 204106, November 17, 2021
Linden Suites, Inc. v. Meridien Far East Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 211969, October 4, 2021
Manila Electric Co. v. AAA Cryogenics Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 207429, November 18, 2020
Maynilad Water Services v. Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019
Mega Fishing Corp. v. Estate of Gonzales
Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions,
Inc., G.R. No. 204452, June 28, 2021
Miguel v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021
Monterde vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, February 14, 2022
Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022
Nagaño vs Tanjangco, G.R. No. 204218, May 12, 2021
Ngo vs. Gabelo, G.R. No. 207707. August 24, 2020
Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. v. Noche et. al., G.R. No. 202392, October 4, 2021
Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021
7
Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832, March 07, 2022
Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, September 27, 2021
People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, Alfonzo Servana Casurra, et al., G.R. No. 239878, February 28, 2022
People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019
People vs. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, March 21, 2022
People v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206759, December 1, 2021
Philam Homeowners Association, Inc., and Marcia Caguiat vs. Sylvia de Luna and Nenita Bundoc, G.R.
No. 209437, March 17, 2021
Philippine Commercial International Bank Vs. Laguna Navigation, Inc., Benigno D. Lim, Carmen Lizares
Lim, And Vicente F. Aldanese, G.R. No. 195236, February 8, 2021
Philippine National Bank v. Daradar, G.R. No. 180203, June 28, 2021
Philippine National Bank v. Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673, March 2, 2022
Philippine National Bank v. Spouses Victor, G.R. No. 207377, July 27, 2022
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, Marcelo Sagun, and Edner
Sagun, G.R. no. 217492, October 4, 2021
Pineda v. Miranda, G.R. No. 204997, August 4, 2021
PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021
PNTC Colleges, Inc. v. Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698, September 27, 2021
Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R. Nos. 197510-11 & 201347, April 18, 2022
Radaza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380. August 4, 2021
Ramirez v. Elomina, G.R. No. 202661, March 17, 2021
Ramos-Yeo v. Spouses Chua, G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076 (Resolution), April 18, 2022
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 211563, September
29, 2021
Simfru Philippines vs. Spouses Coreho, G.R. No. 218236, February 07, 2018
Seming v. Alamag, G.R. No. 202284, March 17, 2021
8
Problem
A complaint against the Bautistas’ was filed by Aljem Credit Investors Corporation by reason of the
former’s failure to pay the purchase price in a contract of sell. The Bautista’s contended that the contract
to sell contains a provision constituting a pactum commissorium. Furthermore, the Bautista’s claim that
the contract should be considered as an equitable mortgage.
In its response, Aljem filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, alleging that there is no genuine issue of
fact because: (a) the spouses Bautista admitted that the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of the
property is in petitioner's name; (b) there were no specific denials of the material allegations of the
complaint; (c) the defense of the spouses Bautista are legal issues, not factual; and, (d) there is no
genuine issue of fact.
Questions:
a. What is a Summary Judgment?
b. What is a genuine issue of fact?
c. What is a specific denial?
d. Is a Motion for Summary Judgment proper in this case?
Answers:
a. Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties to avoid long litigation and delays,
where the pleadings show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried. (Philippine Racing
Commission v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., G.R. No. 228505, June 16, 202 1, citing First leverage
and Services Group, Inc. v. Solid Builders, Inc., 690 Phil. I, 13 (2012).
b. A genuine issue of fact is "such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived, or false claim." As such, an issue of fact is
genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be resolved.
c. A specific denial is made by specifying each material allegation of fact, the truth of which the
defendant does not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters
upon which he relies to support his denial. The purpose of requiring the defendant to make a
specific denial is to make him briefly disclose the matters alleged in the complaint which he
intends to disprove at the trial, together with the matter which he relied upon to support the
denial. (Seconds To Gov. Fabriano Societa Per Azioni, Inc., G.R. No. 2 13698, November 12,
2014)
d. No. In order for a motion for summary judgment be granted in lieu of a full-blown trial, the
party moving for a motion for a summary judgment must establish unequivocally the absence
of genuine issues of fact or that the issue posed is so patently insubstantial as to constitute a
genuine issue. The determination of the existence of pactum commissorium is a question of
fact as the trial court needs to look into the contractual stipulations and the intent of the parties.
Thus, it is a genuine issue of fact. (Aljem's Credit Investors Corporation vs. Spouses
Catalina and Porferio Bautista, G.R. No. 215175. April 25, 2022, Hernando, J.)
9
Problem
Company X's warehouse was gutted by fire. On January 20, 2010, it filed a Complaint before the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan against Insurance B and its officers for Specific Performance, Collection of Sum of
Money and Damages. Subsequently, it filed an Amended Complaint later on February 9, 2010.
Insurance B filed Motions to Dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action and insufficient payment of
docket fees, but these were denied by the RTC. It averred that petitioner's insurance claim is already
barred by prescription. The appellate court granted the Petition for Certiorari of the respondent and
ordered the trial court to dismiss the case.
Questions:
a. Is prescription a ground for the dismissal of the complaint?
b. Did the action commence on the date of the Original Complaint?
Answers:
a. Yes. Prescription is a ground for the dismissal of a complaint without going into trial on the
merits. (G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corp., 820 Phil. 254 (2017)
Prescription is based on a fixed time and is concerned with the fact of delay. (Heir of Pastora
T. Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No.
222614, March 20, 2019.) When it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that
an action is barred by prescription, the court is mandated to dismiss the same. (Anido v. Nigado,
419 Phil. 807 (2001)
b. No. An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. As a consequence, the original
complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record. As a rule, the
filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original pleading;
hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment. However, there is
an exception. An amendment which merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged
in the complaint relates back to the date of the commencement of the action and is not barred
by the statute of limitations which expired after the service of the original complaint. Thus,
when the amended complaint does not introduce new issues, cause of action, or demands, the
suit is deemed to have commenced on the date the original complaint was filed. (Alpha Plus
International Enterprise Corp. vs. Philippine Charter Insurance Corp., G.R. No.
203756, February 10, 2021, Hernando, J.)
10
Problem
Vivian obtained a loan from Cambay with a 10% monthly interest payable within two months. As
security for the loan, Vivian executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Cambay. Considering, however,
that the parcel of land was registered under the names of Vivian and her former common-law spouse
Ricardo, both allegedly executed an SPA in favor of Vivian authorizing her to use the land as collateral
for her loan with Cambay. Alleging that Vivian failed to settle her obligation upon maturity despite
repeated demands, Cambay filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage. Vivian alleged that
no summons reached her and/or Ricardo. Vivian filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
with the RTC, which the latter granted. However, neither Vivian nor Ricardo filed an Answer to Cambay’s
complaint.
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision by default against Vivian and Ricardo. On August
31, 2005, the RTC’s Decision became final and executory, and entered into the book of entries of
judgment on September 26, 2005.
Subsequently, the Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff, sold the parcel of land to Cambay.
Vivian then filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, to which the RTC dismissed. Vivian
however, assailed the RTC’s Decision by filing with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The CA dismissed
the said Petition.
Question:
Will a prior resort to a relief from judgment bar a resort to the remedy of annulment of judgment?
Answer:
No, a prior resort to a relief from judgment will not preclude a resort to the filing a petition for annulment
of judgment.
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment of judgment with the appellate
court of the judgments, final orders, and resolutions of the RTCs in civil actions for which the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. The same Rule provides that the annulment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Here, while the invoking party had previously availed of the remedy of a petition for relief from judgment
with the RTC, she is not precluded from filing with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment, which
in this case is anchored on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Lack of jurisdiction being a valid ground
for annulment of judgment, and one which may negate the court’s acquisition of jurisdiction, including
defective service of summons establishes the position that it is a well-founded cause for an action for
annulment of judgment. (Ancheta v. Cambay, G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021, Hernando,
J.)
(MARYLOU R. ANCHETA, in her and on behalf of her missing former common-law husband RICARDO
DIONILA v. MARY CAMBAY G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021)
11
Problem
Agabin was found by the Labor Arbiter to have been illegally dismissed by AMHI. The NLRC affirmed
but modified the computation of Agabin’s separation pay. Agabin then filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari resulting to the CA’s reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter’s computation of her separation pay.
AMHI assailed the said decision arguing that the doctrine of res judicata should apply as the CA’s denial
of his petition for certiorari rendered the NLRC’s decision final and executory. Hence, Agabin can no
longer question the limitation in the computation of her monetary awards.
Question:
a. Is AMHI’s application of res judicata proper?
Answer:
a. No. AMHI's Petition for Certiorari before the CA raised the issue of the Arbiter's and the NLRC's
abuse of discretion, and not the computation of separation pay. Where there is identity of
parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not
as to the matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
'conclusiveness of judgment.’ The instant case should be resolved on the basis of this rule, as
there is only conclusiveness of judgment insofar as the finding of illegal dismissal is concerned
and not as to the computation of the monetary awards. While the appellate court affirmed both
the rulings of the Arbiter and the NLRC as regards the issue of Agabin's illegal dismissal, it did
not delve into the computation of separation pay and backwages. In this regard, it cannot be
said that there was a bar by conclusiveness of judgment by virtue of the finality of SP No.
113939 which would in turn bar Agabin from further contesting the computation of her
monetary awards. (Angono Medics Hospital, Inc., Vs. Antonina Q. Agabin, G.R. No.
202542, December 09, 2020, Hernando, J.)
12
Problem
UP filed seven formal charges against Ante and others in relation to the death of Chris Anthony Mendez,
allegedly due to hazing conducted by the Sigma Rho Fraternity. Ante filed his answer with a request
for production of documents before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT). He emphasized that under
the UP Rules Governing Fraternities, a valid preliminary inquiry must first be conducted to determine
whether a formal charge against any member or officer of a fraternity is warranted. The requests were
denied by SDT. Ante sought for the quashal of the formal charges reasoning that the preliminary inquiry
was invalid, the same having been conducted by the UP Prosecutor and not by the SDT. SDT denied
the omnibus motion. Ante filed the petition upon the denial of his omnibus motion by SDT.
Questions:
a. Is the filing of a petition for certiorari the proper remedy in this case?
Answers:
a. The remedy against the denial of a motion to quash is for the movant to go to trial. Moreover,
the denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject. The
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Ante before the RTC should have been summarily
dismissed; not because of Ante’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration, but because the
denial of a motion to quash is not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. (Ante vs.
University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal and University of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 227911. March 14, 2022, Hernando, J.)
Note: The exceptional circumstances for a remedy of certiorari may be allowed in a denied
motion to quash are as follows: when the court issued the order without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion: 1) when the interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; 2) in
the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice; 3) to promote public welfare and
public policy; and when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof. Under these instances, appeal is considered
an inadequate remedy for a denied motion to quash and certiorari may be allowed instead -
(Radaza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380. August 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
13
Problem
The spouses Cesario and Romana (Spouses Engao) begot two children, namely Felipe and Angeles.
Felipe had four children: Evangeline, Erma, Felicitation, and petitioner Cesar (collectively, Felipe heirs).
Meanwhile Rosello, father of the heirs of Rosello Calignawan grew up with the spouses Vicente and
Angeles in Tacloban City. Lot No. 581 and Lot No. 2064 (subject properties) located in Tacloban City
were registered under the names of Romana and Angeles.
The controversy stemmed from Rosello's Complaint for declaration of nullity of documents, partition
and damages (Complaint for declaration of nullity) against Felipe and his children before the RTC of
Palo, Leyte. Rosello averred that Angeles executed a Deed of Donation in his favor on the subject
properties. Hence, he is entitled to a share in the subject properties.
The RTC adjudged the Deed of Donation executed by Angeles in favor of Rosello not valid. On appeal,
the appellate court held the Deed of Donation in favor of Rosello to be valid following the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement in G.R. No. 188676 entitled Heirs of Felipe Engao, vs. Heirs of Felipe
Engao which had already attained finality per the Resolution dated February 15, 2010.
Hence, Evangeline et al. filed a petition for review. They averred that Rosello, committed forum-
shopping by splitting his cause of action when he filed separate complaints, namely, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity before the RTC of Palo, Leyte, and a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership before
the RTC of Burauen, Leyte.
Questions:
a. Did Rosello commit forum-shopping?
b. Is raising the issue on forum-shopping on appeal proper?
Answers:
a. Yes. The elements of forum-shopping are present in the instant case.
First, there must be identity of parties. Both petitioners and respondents or their predecessors
were the contending parties in the Complaints for Declaration of Nullity and Recovery of
Ownership.
Second, there must be similarity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, where the relief is
anchored on the same facts. While the caption of both complaints was evidently distinct, the
allegations contained in their respective bodies seek a similar relief, that is, the entitlement to
the properties and reconveyance thereof in favor of Rosello and eventually to the respondents
who are the latter's heirs.
Third, the judgment rendered in any of the actions would amount to res judicata as to the
other. The finality of the Decision rendered by the RTC of Burauen, as affirmed by the appellate
court and which subsequently reached to the Supreme Court operated as res judicata on the
matter of the Deed of Donation's validity.
Since the three elements are attendant in this case, Rosello indeed committed forum-shopping.
b. No. The fact that Rosello may have committed forum-shopping should not have escaped
Evangeline et al.’s attention in order for them to take appropriate action. This issue was only
raised on appeal. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections
are deemed waived when they are not pleaded in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. (Asis
v. Heirs of Calignawan, G.R. No. 242127, September 15, 2021, Hernando, J.)
14
Problem
Due to serious financial hardship, Banco Filipino sought help from Banko Central. Monetary Board
granted its request for Financial Assistance subject to the withdrawal or dismissal with prejudice to all
pending cases filed by Banco Filipino against Bangko Sentral and its officials and the execution of
necessary quitclaims and commitments to be given by Banco Filipino's principal stockholders, Board of
Directors, and duly authorized officers "not to revive or re-file such similar cases in the future. Banco
Filipino accepted the offer but refused to abide with the said condition. Bangko Sentral informed Banco
Filipino that its refusal to withdraw all cases filed against Bangko Sentral, was deemed as a failure to
reach a mutually acceptable settlement. Banco Filipino filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus to compel Bangko Sentral and the Monetary Board to approve and implement its business
plan and release its financial assistance and regulatory reliefs package.
Questions:
a. Does the trial court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition?
Answers:
a. No. Banco Filipino’s petition for certiorari and mandamus should have been filed before the
Court of Appeals instead of the trial court. Unless otherwise provided by the law or the Rules
of Court, petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involving acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency are cognizable only by the appellate court pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. This Court has ruled that Bangko Central's Monetary Board is a quasi-
judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, Banco Filipino's petition for certiorari
and mandamus should have been filed before the CA instead of the trial court. (Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Monetary
Board, G.R. No. 200642. April 26, 2021, Hernando, J.)
15
Problem
BCDA filed via registered mail a Petition for Review with Request for Exemption from Payment of Filing
Fees with the CTA involving its claim for refund against the CIR. The deadline for filing the Petition for
Review fell on February 16, 2011. On March 1, 2011, the BCDA received a letter of even date from
Atty. Elvessa P. Apolinario, CTA's Executive Clerk of Court, acknowledging the receipt of the Petition for
Review. However, in the same letter, Atty. Apolinario informed the BCDA that she was returning the
said Petition for Review as it was not deemed filed without the payment of the correct legal fees.
Subsequent letters were exchanged between Atty. Apolinario, who insisted that the BCDA was required
to pay docket fees, and the BCDA, which maintained otherwise and insisted on its status as a
government instrumentality. On April 7, 2011, the BCDA paid the docket fees under protest.
Question:
a. Is the BCDA exempt from payment of docket fees before the CTA?
Answer:
a. Yes. The BCDA is a government instrumentality and therefore exempt from payment of docket
fees. Section 22, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the Republic of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the legal fees provided
in the rule. Local governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or
without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
BCDA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers because it falls under the
definition of an instrumentality under the Administrative Code of 1987. It is a government
instrumentality organized for the specific purpose of owning, holding and/or administering the
military reservations in the country and implementing their conversion to other productive uses.
As such, it is exempt from the payment of docket fees. (Bases Conversion and
Development Authority vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 205466.
January 11, 2021, Hernando, J.)
16
Problem
In a probate proceeding concerning the will of the deceased Fausta Brual, her nephew Jorge Brual filed
a motion-for-intervention questioning the validity of the will. The RTC denied the motion-for-
intervention on November 04, 2010. A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied by the RTC
on January 14, 2011, and the Order was received on January 24, 2011.
On February 03, 2011, the counsel of Jorge Brual filed a notice of appeal; however, the RTC dismissed
the appeal due to the failure to file a record on appeal. On June 27, 2011, the counsel filed a motion
for reconsideration alleging that his failure to file the records on appeal was due to inadvertence and
excusable negligence because of the belief that the submission of a record on appeal would only come
after the filing of the notice of appeal and payment of docket fees. The motion for reconsideration was
denied by the RTC because it was already beyond the reglementary period.
A Petition for Certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the petition ruling that
an appeal must not be dismissed based on mere procedural technicalities.
Questions:
a. What is a record on appeal, when is it required, and how is it different from a notice of appeal?
b. What is the rule regarding filing of records on appeal?
c. Is the Court of Appeals correct in ruling that the appeal should not be dismissed due to
technicality?
d. Can the honest mistake of Jorge Brual’s counsel be considered as an excusable negligence?
Answer:
a. Under Rule 41, Sec. 2, a record on appeal is required only in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where law or the Rules so require.
The ostensible reason for requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the
multi-part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of being finally
determined and terminated independently of the other parts.
An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the original records to
the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court in its further proceedings regarding
the other parts of the case. In contrast, the record on appeal enables the trial court to continue
with the rest of the case because the original records remain with the trial court even as it
affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the appealed matter.
(Brual vs. Brual Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022, Hernando, J.)
b. Rule 41, Sec. 3 provides that where a record on appeal is required, the appellants shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or
final order.
While it is not necessary that a notice of appeal and a record on appeal be filed simultaneously,
the rule is unequivocal that the notice of appeal and record on appeal shall be filed within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order. Thus, both a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal shall be filed within the period prescribed by the Rules.
In this case, since the final order denying their motion for reconsideration was received on
January 24, 2011, applying the fresh period rule, they have 30 days thereafter or until February
23, 2011 to perfect their appeal in accordance with the rules. (Brual vs. Brual Contreras, G.R.
No. 205451, March 7, 2022, Hernando, J.)
17
c. The Court of Appeals is incorrect. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a
component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. The right to appeal is statutory and one
who seeks to avail of it must comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for perfecting
an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays. Moreover, the perfection of
an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional
as well, hence failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory.
In this case, Jorge Brual did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule
41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the
dismissal became final and immutable. (Brual vs. Brual Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, March 7,
2022, Hernando, J.)
d. No. While there are exceptions that may be considered in the strict application of the rules,
mere inadvertence and honest belief that the record on appeal is not yet due are simply
unacceptable. An attorney seeking a review or reversal of a judgment or order against his client
must fully observe scrupulously the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen
awareness that any error or imprecision in compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's
cause. Excusable negligence to be "excusable" must be one which ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against. (Brual vs. Brual Contreras, G.R. No. 205451,
March 7, 2022, Hernando, J.)
18
Problem
TICO is an insurance company that has Company C (CC) and Company B (CB) as its clients who took
a fire insurance policy over several properties in 1997. CICI filed a complaint for Interpleader with the
RTC Makati to determine who among CC and CB which are its clients or the Bureau of Internal Revenue
has a superior right over Condominium Units 7A and 7B. CICI alleged that CC and CB had attached the
condo units to cover their claim for the balance of their insurance proceeds after they had obtained a
judgment in their favor, while the BIR issued a warrant of distraint and/or levy on the real and personal
properties of CICI covering the condo units to answer for CICI’s tax liabilities.
Question:
a. Is CICI’s interpleader complaint improper since it amounts to collateral attack on the final
executed judgment in favor of CC and CB?
Answer:
a. Yes. Interpleader is a special civil action designed to protect a person against double vexation
in respect to a single liability. It requires an indispensable requisite, that conflicting claims upon
the same subject matter are or may be made against the stakeholder (possessor of the subject
matter) who claims no interest whatsoever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole
or in part is not disputed by the claimants. Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all
competing claimants in a single proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing
the stakeholder to the possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability. However,
an action for interpleader may not be utilized to circumvent the immutability of a final and
executory judgment. It is settled that when a decision has attained finality, it "may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions
of fact and law.”
The filing of the instant complaint is improper since it is a belated attempt on CICI’s part to
assail the final and executed judgement in favor of CC and CB. The interpleader suit has forced
CC and CB to defend their rights anew over the condominium units, and has unduly deferred
their right to a satisfaction of their claims under a final court decision in their favor. (Bureau
of Internal Revenue vs. TICO Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 204226, April 18,
2022, Hernando, J.)
19
Problem
Aceron and Oliver entered into an unnotarized deed of conditional sale over a parcel of land, with the
agreement that Oliver shall cause the reconstitution of title in his name and then transfer ownership to
Aceron. When the title was reconstituted, Oliver informed Aceron that he could no longer surrender the
title since he mortgaged the same in favor of Caluba to secure a loan. Aceron moved for the execution
of the RTC's Decision, Oliver manifested that he could not surrender the title because it was already
mortgaged to petitioner Calubad. Upon Aceron’s motion, the RTC ordered the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to issue a new title in his name. Calubad then filed a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47.
Questions:
a. Is the remedy of annulment of judgment proper in this case?
Answers:
a. No. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character allowed only in exceptional
cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. In addition, it may be invoked
only on two grounds, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner Calubad's resort
to the remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is unnecessary as the same extends
only to a party in whose favor the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal, and petition
for relief from judgment are no longer available through no fault of said party. As a non-party
in the civil case, petitioner Calubad could not bring the action for annulment of judgment
considering that the remedies of new trial, reconsideration, appeal or setting the judgment
aside through a petition for relief are not available to him in the first instance.
An action for annulment of judgment is an independent action where the judgment or resolution
sought to be annulled is rendered and is not an appeal of the judgment or resolution therein.
Thus, the issue of petitioner Calubad's alleged interest on or ownership of the subject property
cannot be addressed in this petition for review. (Calubad vs. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029.
September 2, 2020, Hernando, J.)
20
Problem
Cathay Pacific Steel sued Uy, its material handling officer, for Uy’s failure to deliver the sale of scrap
metals amounting to P409,280.00. RTC, relying on the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by Cathay, found that the latter was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that Uy
indeed failed to remit the amount of P409,280.00. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC’s findings, primarily
based on the evidence presented during that trial. In Cathay’s Petition for Review on Certiorari, it argues
that the CA misappreciated the evidence on record, raising, among others, several questions of fact.
Uy assailed the petition stating that only questions of law are allowed in a Rule 45 petition.
Question:
a. Is Uy’s contention in this case correct citing the limited application of Rule 45?
Answer:
a. No. A reading of the Petition reveals that generally, questions of fact are not allowed to be
brought in a Rule 45 petition. The Court's jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the
review of questions of law because the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the rule admits
exceptions, including when the factual findings of the lower courts are conflicting. Since the
factual findings of the RTC and the CA are conflicting in this case, a factual review is proper.
(Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation vs. Charlie Chua Uy, Jr., G.R. No. 219317. June 28,
2021, Hernando, J.)
21
Problem
The petitioners in this case are suing on their own behalf and on behalf of the general public, who will
be directly affected by the privatization of the Philippine Orthopedic Center (POC) and the subsequent
award of the Modernization of the POC Project to private respondents through a Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) arrangement under the provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 6957 as amended by RA 7718.
However, in light of the supervening "Notice of Termination" of the BOT Agreement on November 10,
2015, the petition to annul and set aside the BOT Agreement for the modernization of the POC; and to
permanently enjoin respondents from implementing the MPOC Project has become moot and academic.
Question:
a. Is the dismissal of the case warranted since the issue became moot and academic?
Answer:
a. Yes. A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such an instance, there is no actual
substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss it on
the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or
have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.
There is no dispute that the action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners has been
mooted by the termination of the BOT Agreement of private respondents. The staleness of the
claims becomes more manifest considering the reliefs sought by petitioners, i.e., to annul and
set aside the BOT Agreement for the modernization of the POC; and to permanently enjoin
respondents from implementing the MPOC Project, are hinged on the existence of the BOT
Agreement. (Cervantes, et al vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210805, May 11, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
22
Problem
Intergalactic Logistics applied with China Bank for the issuance of Domestic Letters of Credit (L/C) for
the purchase of goods from Nestlé Philippines. Accordingly, 12 L/Cs with corresponding receipts were
issued to Intergalactic with corresponding trust receipts. The parties executed two Surety Agreements
whereby in the first Agreement, Interbrand and its officers, Chua, Carlos Francisco Mijares (Mijares),
and Caras served as sureties; while Edgar San Luis (San Luis) was the individual surety in the second
Agreement.
When the obligation became due, Interbrand failed to pay China Bank despite repeated demands. China
Bank likewise demanded payment from the sureties, including Chua, but the latter failed and refused
to pay.
China Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Application for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Attachment against Chua and the other sureties. RTC issued an Order granting the
application for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Chua then filed a Motion to Lift Writ of
Attachment which was then later granted by the trial court.
China Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with an Application for Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the CA. The CA rendered a Decision granting
the petition and reinstating the March 3, 2010 Order which directed the branch sheriff to attach the
properties of Chua. The appellate court noted that Chua voluntarily signed the Surety Agreement and
his liability therein is not limited during his incumbency as an officer and stockholder of Interbrand.
Unsatisfied, Chua filed instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Questions:
a. What is a Writ of Preliminary Attachment?

b. What are the ways to secure the discharge of an attachment?
c. What are the requirements in applying for preliminary attachment?
d. Is the presence of fraud essential in the application for a Writ of Preliminary Attachment?
e. Is the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment regular and proper in this case?
Answers:
a. A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the court
where an action is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the defendant may
be levied upon and held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever
judgment might be secured by the attaching creditor against the defendant. The provisional
remedy of attachment is available in order that the defendant may not dispose of the property
attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any judgment that may be secured by the plaintiff
from the former. (Chua vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 202004, November 04, 2020,
Hernando J.)
b. There are two ways to secure the discharge of an attachment. First, the party whose property
has been attached or a person appearing on his/her behalf may post a security. Second, said
party may show that the order of attachment was improperly or irregularly issued. (Chua vs.
China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 202004, November 04, 2020, Hernando J.)
c. Section 3 of Rule 57 requires that an affidavit of merit be issued alleging the following facts:
(1) that a sufficient cause of action exists; (2) that the case is one of those mentioned in Section
1 hereof; (3) that there is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by
the action; and (4) that the amount due to the applicant, or the value of the property the
possession of which he/she is entitled to recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is
23
granted above all legal counterclaims. (Chua vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 202004,
November 04, 2020, Hernando J.)
d. Yes. To sustain an attachment on this ground, it must be shown that the debtor in contracting
the debt or incurring the obligation intended to defraud the creditor. The fraud must relate to
the execution of the agreement and must have been the reason which induced the other party
into giving consent which he[/she] would not have otherwise given. To constitute a ground for
attachment in Section 1(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, fraud should be committed upon
contracting the obligation sued upon. A debt is fraudulently contracted if at the time of
contracting it the debtor has a preconceived plan or intention not to pay.
The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the
debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. (Chua vs. China
Banking Corp., G.R. No. 202004, November 04, 2020, Hernando J.)
e. Yes. In this case, a perusal of the allegations in the affidavit reveals fraud in the violation of
trust receipt agreements. China Bank advanced a total of P189 Million in favor of Interbrand.
However, instead of remitting the sales proceeds to China Bank, Interbrand misappropriated
the same by deliberately diverting the delivery of goods covered by the L/Cs to a location
different from that indicated in invoices. This act of misappropriation demonstrates a clear
intent of fraud. And Chua, having signed the surety agreement, bound himself to jointly and
solidarily fulfill the obligation of Interbrand to China Bank.
Suffice it to say that on the face of the allegations, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment is regular and proper. (Chua vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 202004,
November 04, 2020, Hernando J.)
24
Problem
The Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief in Manila City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) against three big oil companies (Big 3). In its Petition, SJS alleged that the Big 3 companies'
business practice of increasing the prices of their petroleum products violates Article 186 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) and RA 8479, otherwise known as Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998.
The Big 3 filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of legal standing, lack of cause of action,
lack of jurisdiction, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Meanwhile, another group named
Pasang Masda filed a Motion for Intervention with Petition-in-Intervention to join SJS’s petition since
their members are consumers of the oil products of the Big 3 companies. The Motion for Intervention
was opposed by the Big 3. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss and admitted Pasang Masda’s Motion
for Intervention.
The RTC then issued an Order directing the COA and BIR to conduct inspection and examination of the
book of records of the Big 3. The COA and BIR refused to conduct the examination alleging that it is
not within their mandate since the issue pertains to the oil industry which is within the power of the
DOE as provided under RA 8479. Due to such refusal, the RTC cited in contempt the commissioner of
COA and BIR.
In view of the foregoing, the Big 3 filed a Petition for Certiorari contending that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to dismiss and allowing the intervention of Pasang
Masda. The COA and BIR also filed their own respective Petitions for Certiorari. The RTC argued that
the assailed Orders are valid and that it has jurisdiction over the Petition by invoking the doctrine of
parens patriae.
Questions:
a. What is an action for declaratory relief?
b. Is a Petition for declaratory relief a proper remedy in this case?
c. What is the nature of an action in intervention? What are its requisites under the Rules of
Court? Is Intervention a matter of right?
d. Did the trial court commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed Pasang Masda to intervene
in the Petition?
Answers:
a. A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute
and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. It must be filed before the breach or
violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers; otherwise, the court can no longer
assume jurisdiction over the action. Thus, the only issue that may be raised in such an action
is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. (COA vs.
Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020, Hernando, J.)
b. No. An action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy.
In this case, the core issue involved is whether the business practice of the Big 3 violates the
RPC and RA 8479. An action for declaratory relief may no longer be allowed considering that
the petitioner is not merely asking for a declaration of their rights but are actually asking the
court to determine whether there was a violation of RPC and RA 8479, for which the Big 3 may
be prosecuted and found criminally liable. Since there is already an alleged breach, it cannot
be the subject of a declaratory relief. (COA vs. Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020,
Hernando, J.)
25
c. An intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and a supplement to the main
case. As such, the dismissal of the main case would necessarily include the dismissal of the
ancillary case.
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court requires that: (1) the movant must have a legal interest
in the matter being litigated; (2) the intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties; and (3) the claim of the intervenor must not be capable
of being properly decided in a separate proceeding.
The right to intervene is not an absolute right as the granting of a motion to intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and may only be allowed if the movant is able
to satisfy all the requirements. (COA vs. Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020, Hernando,
J.)
d. Yes. In this case, Pasang Masda's allegation that its members consume petroleum products is
not sufficient to show that they have legal interest in the matter being litigated considering that
there are other oil players in the market aside from the Big 3. Jurisprudence mandates that
legal interest must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent or expectant. The Pasang Masda failed to show that is has something to gain or
lose in the outcome of the case. Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC
in allowing Pasang Masda to intervene despite its failure to comply with the requirement for
Intervention. (COA vs. Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020, Hernando, J.) (COA vs.
Pampilo, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020, Hernando, J.)
(COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by its Chairman, THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

represented by its Commissioner, and THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, represented by its Commissioner v.
HON. PAMPILO, JR., SJS and CABIGAO, G.R. No. 188760, June 30, 2020)
26
Problem
Standard Insurance Co. Inc. (Standard Insurance) was assessed with deficiency in the payment of
documentary stamp taxes (DST) and value-added taxes (VAT) for taxable years 2011, 2012, and 2013.
Standard Insurance protested the assessments on the ground that the VAT rate and DST rate imposed
on premiums charged on non-life property insurance pursuant to Sections 108 and 184 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) are violative of the constitutional limitations on taxation.
Standard Insurance filed a petition for declaratory relief in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) for the judicial determination of the
constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC with respect to the taxes charged against the
non-life insurance companies.
The RTC issued a Decision taking cognizance of Standard Insurance's petition for declaratory relief,
holding that the exercise of the right to contest the particular application of the tax laws was not
considered a breach of the provision itself as to deter the action for declaratory relief.
Thus, the CIR filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the
Supreme Court praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC Decision on ground that, among
others, the petition is fatally defective for failing to satisfy the basic requisites under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, and that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Standard Insurance’s petition
for declaratory relief.
Standard Insurance argues that the issues raised in the Petition are factual in nature and are barred
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Questions:
a. Does the petition raise factual issues, and hence barred under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?
b. Does the RTC have jurisdiction to take cognizance of Standard Insurance’s petition for
declaratory relief?
c. Did Standard Insurance satisfy the essential requisites for a petition for declaratory relief?
Answers:
a. No. The Petition raises only questions of law. It is settled that only questions of law should be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of
the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
Here, the CIR is challenging the RTC's grant of the petition for declaratory relief on the premise
that a petition for declaratory relief is inapplicable to contest tax assessments; that the petition
for declaratory relief failed to comply with the basic requisites of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court;
and the constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC vis-à-vis the equal protection
clause. These are clearly questions of law which merely call for an examination and
interpretation of the prevailing law and jurisprudence, and are cognizable by the Supreme Court
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
27
b. The RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Standard Insurance’s petition for declaratory
relief.
Commonwealth Act No. 55 (C.A. No. 55) provides that petitions for declaratory relief do not
apply to cases where a taxpayer questions his liability for the payment of any tax under any
law administered by the BIR. Section 1 of C.A. No. 55 provides:
Section 1. Section one of Act Numbered Thirty-seven hundred and thirty-six is hereby
amended so as to read as follows:
SECTION 1. Construction. — Any person interested under a deed, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, may bring an action in a Court of First
Instance to determine any question of construction or validity arising under such deed,
contract, instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder:
Provided, however, That the provisions of this Act shall not apply to cases where a taxpayer
questions his liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge collectible under any law
administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The Court has previously clarified that C.A. No. 55 has not been repealed by another statute
and remains to be a good law. Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief against the imposition of tax liability or validity of tax assessments.
Here, Standard Insurance only proceeded with its petition after receiving tax assessments from
the BIR and after various requests for reconsideration. However, instead of appealing the
assessments in the proper forum, Standard Insurance filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaratory Relief. Hence, the RTC should have dismissed Standard Insurance's petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
c. No, Standard Insurance failed to satisfy the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory
relief.
A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a person interested in a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute
and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The said action must comply with the
following requisites:
1. the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2. the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial
construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
3. there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between
persons whose interests are adverse;
4. the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
5. adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or
proceeding.
Here, Standard Insurance failed to comply with the abovementioned third, fourth, fifth, and
sixth requisites.
In connection with the third requisite, Standard Insurance had already received assessments
from the BIR for deficiency in the payment of documentary stamp taxes (DST) and value-added
taxes (VAT) for taxable year 2011, 2012, and 2013, when it filed its Petition for Declaratory
28
Relief assailing the constitutionality of the said provisions. Hence, the subject matter of
Standard Insurance’s petition for declaratory relief had already been breached.
Moreover, Standard Insurance's adequate remedy upon receipt of the assessments was to file
an appeal in due course with the Court of Tax Appeals instead of resorting to a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC. Thus, the sixth requisite is likewise absent.
Anent the fourth and fifth requisites, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or
merely anticipatory. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
Here, Standard Insurance’s Petition for Declaratory Relief does not present a justiciable
controversy ripe for judicial determination. Its petition failed to demonstrate that its legal rights
are subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should be prevented by the declaratory
relief sought; the apprehension that its business may be rendered technically insolvent in view
of the continued enforcement of the taxes under Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC appear to
be merely conjectural and anticipatory. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Standard
Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 219340 (Resolution), April 28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
29
Problem
Angelina was the registered owner of two parcels of land located in Misamis Oriental. Later on, the
parcels of land were placed under the coverage of the CARP. Hence, Angelina's titles to the parcels of
land were cancelled, and new titles (pursuant to CLOAs) were issued in favor of respondents. Angelina
filed a petition for the annulment of the CLOAs before the DARAB. While the appeal of the petition for
annulment was pending, Angelina claimed that respondents surreptitiously entered the property and
refused to vacate despite repeated demands. This prompted Angelina to file the instant complaint for
forcible entry before MTC. Respondents argued that the case is an agrarian dispute under the original
and primary jurisdiction of the DARAB while Angelina maintains that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the
instant complaint for forcible entry.
Question:
a. Is the contention of Angelina in this case correct?
Answer:
a. No. First-level courts have jurisdiction on ejectment cases even if the land is public in character
as long as the case is not an agrarian dispute. The public character of the land does not divest
the courts of jurisdiction over ejectment cases. However, if the ejectment case is found to be
an agrarian dispute, the first-level courts will be divested of jurisdiction in accordance with the
CARL, as amended. The controlling aspect, therefore, is the nature of the dispute (i.e., agrarian
or not) and not the character of the subject land. (Dayrit vs. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631.
December 7, 2021, Hernando, J.)
30
Problem
A land dispute regarding ownership of title of Lot 823 arose between Milagros Dormido (Dormido) and
Sps. Felicitas and Rosendo Manahan (Manahan). Ernesto Adobo, Lands Management Bureau’s Officer-
in-Charge-Director of Lands, in the exercise of his official duties, upon seeking the opinion of De la
Pena, then Undersecretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR, ruled in favor of the Spouses Manahan.
Dormido filed a Complaint before the Ombudsman charging Spouses Manahan and Adobo
(respondents) for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides:
“In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
e. Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.”
Dormido alleged that respondents disregarded the basis of her claims on Lot 823, particularly the
existence of the Manotoks’ titles thereto. She also posited that the validity of a Torrens title may only
be questioned in a direct proceeding before the trial courts.
However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his duties, dismissed the Complaint, and held that before
resolving whether the spouses violated RA 3019, the main issue to be resolved first was who between
Dormido and the Manahans had a valid title on Lot 823, which is civil in nature. Moreover, the
Ombudsman held that under BP 129, and Section 20 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6670), it is
the Regional Trial Courts and not the Ombudsman who had jurisdiction over such civil actions. Dormido
argued that the Complaint was criminal in nature and not administrative. She also maintained in her
Complaint that the matter falls within the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial power and primary jurisdiction.
Dormido filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Questions:
a. Did the Ombudsman commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing Dormido’s criminal complaint against respondents for alleged violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019?
b. Was there a finding of grave abuse of discretion in this case?
Answers:
a. No. The foregoing does not allege errors of jurisdiction but errors of judgment.
Such accusations against respondents, without more evidence, cannot be seen as grave abuse
of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty. At most, these only express mere
disagreement with the Ombudsman’s judgment that do not proceed from grave abuse of
discretion. Plainly, the Petition contained no allegations of the Ombudsman’s supposed acts of
grave abuse of discretion adequate to reverse the latter’s pronouncements and indict
31
respondents instead for the charges of graft and corruption (Dormido vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198241, February 24, 2020).
b. No. Grave abuse of discretion is such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an] exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, or an exercise of judgment so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined,
or to act in a manner not at all in contemplation of law.”
The term grave abuse of discretion has, ironically, fallen victim to procedural abuse. As a last-
ditch remedy to tum the odds to their favor, vengeful litigants resort to indiscriminate
imputation of the term to the public officer that issued a verdict adverse to them, in manifest
indifference to the soundness of its exercise or the frailty of their cause. Rules must not be
stretched for personal retribution, or even if such purpose be pursued, it must have a solid
grounding in fact and law. Such situation is not the case at hand. (Dormido vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198241, February 24, 2020, Hernando, J.)
32
Problem
Ignacio Dumaran, an authorized dealer of Pilipinas Shell Philippines, operates gasoline stations within
General Santos City. Magallanes, Llamedo and Cubeta (Magallanes, et al.) proposed for Dumaran to
supply them diesel and gasoline fuel. Although they initially paid in cash, they subsequently paid for
the purchase of the fuel using personal checks.
The post-dated checks issued to pay the obligation were dishonored for insufficient funds/account
closed, and despite demands, they failed to pay the total outstanding obligation. Thus, Dumaran filed
a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorney's Fees with a Prayer for the Ex-Parte Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Magallanes, et al.
Dumaran further alleged his Affidavit in Support of Prayer for Writ of Attachment that the Magallanes,
et al. could not be located or contacted and were about to dispose of their properties, with intent to
defraud Dumaran, because of their monetary obligation to other creditors.
Dumaran invoked Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court as a ground upon which attachment may
be issued against the Magallanes, et al.’s properties. He further emphasized that there was sufficient
evidence to support that the Magallanes, et al. committed fraud in the performance of their obligation,
not particularly in contracting the debt or obligation, when they "undertook to withdraw fuels in other
stations without the knowledge of Dumaran in violation of their agreement and issued worthless checks
in payment therefor."
The RTC issued a Writ of Attachment and Notice of Levy on Attachment. However, the CA set aside the
Order of the RTC and held that the applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment did not sufficiently
show factual circumstances of the alleged fraud.
Question:
a. May fraudulent acts be the basis for a writ of preliminary attachment?
b. What is “fraud” as contemplated in Section 1(d) of Rule 57?
c. Do the allegations of fraud in the complaint and the affidavit of Dumaran meet the requirements
of the law to sustain the issuance of a writ of attachment?
d. Is a counter-bond necessary for the discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment in this case?
Answers:
a. Yes. Section 1 (d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, provides: Sec. 1. Grounds upon which
attachment may issue. - At the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of
judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(d) In an action against a party who has been guilty of a fraud in contracting the debt or
incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof;
b. In Republic v. Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. the Court explained the term "fraud" as related to
Section 1(d) of Rule 57 to be characterized as the voluntary execution of a wrongful act or a
willful omission, while knowing and intending the effects that naturally and necessarily arise
from that act or omission. In its general sense, fraud is deemed to comprise anything calculated
to deceive – including all acts and omission and concealment involving a breach of legal or
equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed – resulting in damage to or in undue
advantage over another. Fraud is also described as embracing all multifarious means that human
ingenuity can device, and is resorted to for the purpose of securing an advantage over another
by false suggestions or by suppression of truth; and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling, and any other unfair way by which another is cheated.
33
c. No. Non-payment of a debt does not automatically equate to a fraudulent act. Dumaran's
allegations in both his Complaint and Affidavit failed to show that he was defrauded into
accepting the offer of the Magallanes, et al. and that they intended from the beginning to not
pay their obligations. The Complaint and Affidavit did not specifically show wrongful acts or
willful omissions that the respondents knowingly committed to deceive Dumaran to enter into
the contract or to perform the obligation. The pleadings filed lacked the particulars of time,
persons and places to support the serious assertions that Magallanes, et al. are disposing off
their properties to defraud Dumaran.
Being a state of mind, fraud cannot be merely inferred from a bare allegation of non-payment
of debt or non-performance of obligation. Dumaran failed to prove with sufficient specificity the
alleged fraudulent acts of the respondents.
d. No. A counter-bond is not necessary for the discharge of a writ of preliminary attachment that
was found to be irregularly issued. Under Rule 57 of the Rules, a party can file a motion to
discharge the attachment to discharge their attached property on the ground that it was
improperly or irregularly enforced. A writ of attachment may be discharged without filing a cash
bond or counter-bond if the writ of preliminary attachment itself has already been proven to be
improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or the bond is insufficient. (Dumaran v. Llamedo,
G.R. No. 217583, August 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
34
Problem
Buncio claimed that she is a registered co-owner, together with nine others, of a parcel of land with an
area of 37,302 square meters, located at San Josef Sur, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50156 of the Registry of Deeds of Cabanatuan City. She further
alleged that respondents Leontina Sarmenta Ramos (Leontina) and Fernando Ramos (collectively,
respondents) are the unlawful and unauthorized possessors of the land who should be directed to
vacate the same.
On the other hand, respondents asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case because there existed a leasehold agreement between the late Luis de Guzman and Erlina
Santos de Guzman (who are the parents of the registered owners of the subject property), with Leontina
and her late husband, Hilario Ramos (Hilario).
Prior to the pre-trial conference, the RTC heard the respective sides of the parties for a preliminary
determination of the existence of tenancy. The RTC initially held that it had jurisdiction over the case
since respondents failed to prove the existence of all elements of agricultural tenancy relationship.
Pre-trial then ensued and during the proceedings, the RTC motu propio conducted an ocular inspection
of the subject property.
The RTC held that based on the ocular inspection and proceedings conducted by the court, it found
that the entire area of 37,302 hectares is devoted to palay production and traversed by a cemented
City Road of Cabanatuan City. Thus, the trial court referred the case to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) since there was an allegation of landowner-tenant relationship
between the parties. The RTC pointed out that the foregoing provision has granted the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) special and original authority to hear and adjudicate cases involving agrarian
disputes.
Buncio’s previous motion for reconsideration and petition for certiorari were all denied. Hence, the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Questions:
a. Is the CA correct in dismissing Buncio's Petition for Certiorari?
b. Did Buncio acquire any vested rights?
Answers:
a. Yes. The CA correctly dismissed Buncio's Petition for Certiorari for being a wrong remedy.
Clearly, Buncio had other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy before the DAR.
Further, the core issue of whether there was a tenancy relationship between the parties so as
to divest the RTC of its jurisdiction in favor of the DAR is mainly factual in nature. A factual
review of the case is an issue beyond the purview of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which covers only questions of law.
In Ligtas v. People, the court underscored that "to be precise; however, the existence of a
tenancy relationship is a legal conclusion based on facts presented corresponding to the
statutory elements of tenancy." The instant petition has not demonstrated why this case falls
among the exceptions as to warrant a review of the factual findings of the trial court.
b. No. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is "conferred only by the
Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of
the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court." Consequently, contrary to Buncio's
claim, she did not acquire any vested right from the January 30, 2008 Order, if subsequently
35
during the trial court's proceedings, it became apparent that the case should be properly
referred to the DAR which has the jurisdiction over the subject matter or issues raised. (Dy
Buncio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 206120, March 23, 2022, Hernando, J.)
36
Problem
East West Bank filed a complaint before the RTC for a Sum of Money with application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment against Ian Cruz and Paul Hua for PhP16M. In the complaint, it
impleaded Francisco Cruz, the father of Ian, and Alvin Cruz, Ian’s brother as unwilling co-plaintiffs. Ian,
Francisco, and Alvin maintained separate accounts at East West Davao Lanang Branch. Paul, the Bank’s
Sales Officer, handled their deposit accounts.
Paul debited the 16M from the accounts of Francisco and Alvin and credited the same to Ian’s account.
Using the debited amounts, Ian obtained back to back loans from the Bank and was able to pay for his
loan. However, instead of regularizing the loan, Francisco and Alvin demanded the payment of the 16M.
The Bank alleged that the transaction was part of a scheme to defraud the Bank.
Ian filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He
explained that the Bank did not allege any right which belonged to it, given that when Francisco and
Alvin demanded the 16M, the Bank rejected it, thereby incurring no damage. He also alleged that the
Bank had no legal personality to institute the case since Francisco and Alvin were the owners of the
debited accounts and are the real parties in interest.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint for failure to state cause of action. It also ruled that Francisco and
Alvin were the real parties in interest. It also explained that the inclusion of Francisco and Alvin as
unwilling co-plaintiffs did not cure the defect of the Complaint.
When the Bank elevated the same to the CA by filing a notice of appeal under Rule 41, Ian filed a
motion to dismiss contending that since only pure questions of law were involved, the Bank availed the
wrong remedy when it appealed the RTC order under Rule 41, when it should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court.
CA granted the motion to dismiss and explained that the issues of whether or not a complaint states a
cause of action and if the Bank is a real party in interest are questions of law. It clarified that Rule 41
addresses questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, and not questions of law.
Questions:
a. What are the three modes to appeal a decision or final judgment of the RTC?
b. What is the difference between a question of law from a question of fact?
c. Is failure to state a cause of action a question of law or fact?
d. Is the bank a real party in interest in this case?
e. Who is an unwilling co-plaintiff? Was the inclusion of Francisco and Alvin as unwilling co-
plaintiffs proper?
f. Should the petition be dismissed?
Answers:
a. The following are the three modes to appeal a decision of RTC:
1. Ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which is brought to the CA from the
RTC, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law;
2. Petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the CA from the RTC,
acting in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and resolves questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law;
3. Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is brought to the Supreme Court
and resolves only questions of law (Heirs of Garcia v. Spouses Burgos, G.R. No. 236173,
March 4, 2020 citing Heirs of Cabigas v. Limbaco, 670 Phil. 274 (2011))
37
b. There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the
doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. On the other
hand, there is a question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. (Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co. Inc. v. People, Phil. 760-
771, 767 (2013) citing Heirs of Cabigas v. Limbaco, 670 Phil. 274 (2011))
c. Failure to state a cause of action is a question of law as one needs only to look at the
allegations in the Complaint and its annexes. (Tocoms Philippines, Inc. v Philips Electronics
and Lighting, Inc., G.R. No. 214046, February 5, 2020 citing Spouses Fernandez v. Smart
Communications, Inc., G.R. No. 212885, July 17, 2019; Guillermo v Philippine Information
Agency, 807 Phil. 555 (2017); Aquino v. Quiazon, 755 Phil. 793 (2015))
d. No, the bank here is not a real party in interest. A real party in interest is defined under
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
In deposits of money, a bank is considered as the debtor while the depositor is the creditor.
Since their contract is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on simple loan or mutuum,
the deposit must be paid upon demand by the depositor. The Bank in this case would not
stand to be injured as it is merely maintaining or keeping the money in trust for the
depositors; Alvin and Francisco were the ones who would stand to be benefitted or injured
by the debiting of their respective deposits without their consent, as well as the issuance and
subsequent denial of the demand to collect. (Philippine National Bank vs. Bacani, 833 Phil.
668, 684 (2018) citing The Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Rosales, 724 Phil. 66, 68
(2014))
e. Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides the definition of an unwilling co-plaintiff. If
the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be
made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. The Bank
arbitrarily impleaded Francisco and Alvin as unwilling co-plaintiffs without securing their
consent, and did not bother to explain in the Complaint why their permission was not
obtained. The Bank conveniently reasoned that Francisco and Alvin’s demand which it
subsequently denied should be construed as an "explanation" for the consent requirement.
All the same, since this "explanation" is insufficient, Francisco and Alvin should have been
impleaded as defendants in the Complaint instead, absent their express consent to be
included as co-plaintiffs.
f. Yes, the petition should be dismissed. The Bank's failure to state a cause of action, justifies
the RTC's dismissal of its Complaint. Given that Ian called for the dismissal of the Complaint,
the trial court correctly considered the allegations in the Complaint and the annexes in
eventually assessing that the Bank failed to state a cause of action. Moreover, the trial court
declared that the Bank was not the real party in interest to institute the action - another
question of law. The CA correctly dismissed the Bank's appeal because the issues involved
are pure questions of law which cannot be appealed through a notice of appeal under Rule
41. It is settled that an appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals raising only questions
of law shall be dismissed; and that an appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall
be dismissed outright. (East West Banking Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 221641, July 12,
2021, Hernando, J.)
38
Problem
Moreno filed an Affidavit-Complaint against the petitioner, Gabutina, and Baldovino, before the Office
of the Ombudsman’s Preliminary Investigation and Administration Adjudication Bureau charging the
following crimes: (1) Violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for
Public Officials
and Employees; (2) Violation of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and
(3) Swindling (Estafa) under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding Gabutina guilty as charged while dismissing
the
administrative case against Baldivino. Upon receipt of the decision in March 17, 2005, Gabutina filed a
Motion for Leave to File and Admit 2nd Motion for Reconsideration and a 2nd Motion for
Reconsideration. While his 2nd motion of reconsideration is pending, he also filed with the same office
a Petition for Review of the decision.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order treating Gabutina's Petition for Review dated May 10,
2005 as his third Motion for Reconsideration and denying the same citing that only one motion for
reconsideration must be filed before the office of the Ombudsman. Despite this, Gabutina filed yet again
a Motion for Reinvestigation with same issues and grounds. The Office of the Ombudsman again
dismissed Gabutina’s motion reiterating that the rules only allowed one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation.
The CA dismissed outright the Gabutina's Petition for Review due to several technical infirmities. It
agreed with the Office of the Ombudsman that in Gabutina's 2nd Motion for Reconsideration, his Petition
for Review, and Motion for Reinvestigation did not stop the running of the reglementary period for
appeal and did not prevent the October 29, 2004 Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman from
attaining finality.
Another dismissal was rendered by CA over Gabutina’s Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, Gabutina
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Questions:
a. What are the prohibited pleadings under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman?
b. What is the proper remedy upon receiving the written order of the Office of the Ombudsman?
c. Did the CA correctly dismiss the Petition for Review of Gabutina due to several procedural
lapses?
Answers:
a. Section 5(g) of Rules of Procedure provides the following as prohibited pleadings:
1. Motion to dismiss, although any ground justifying the dismissal of the case may be
discussed in the counter/affidavit/pleadings of the party;
2. Motion for bill of particulars; and
3. Dilatory motions including, but not limited to, motions for extension of time, for
postponement, second motions for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation. And that said
pleadings shall be stricken off the records of the case. (Gabutina vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 205572, October 07, 2020, Hernando J.)
b. The proper remedy is to appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration. However, an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.
(Gabutina vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 205572, October 07, 2020, Hernando J.)
39
Note:
Note: In Kuizon v. Desierto and Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman, we held that this
Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases. For administrative cases, however, we declared in the case of
Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman(Visayas) that the petition should be filed with the Court of
Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The Dagan ruling homogenized
the procedural rule with respect to administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman - first enunciated in Fabian v. Desierto - that is, all remedies involving the orders,
directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, whether by an appeal under
Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, must be filed with the Court of Appeals.
(Gatchalian vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman)
c. Yes. The Court cannot anymore relax the rules for Gabutina, as his delay in filing the petition
before the CA spanned more than six years when he only had 15 days under the law to do so.
The Court consistently held that the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of the law.
To add, Gabutina was not able to justify the six-year delay with any compelling reason, hence
his Petition for Review must fail. (Gabutina vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
205572, October 07, 2020, Hernando J.)
40
Problem
Timoteo sold a parcel of land to Esperanza, which was registered under the name of Timoteo’s wife.
As proof of sale, Timoteo surrendered the first owner’s duplicate copy of TCT to Esperanza and
promised to deliver a deed of absolute sale signed by his wife. However, Timoteo never delivered his
said promise. Esperanza demanded that Timoteo fulfill his promise, or to pay the purchase price, but
to no avail, which prompted petitioner to institute a complaint for Estafa against Timoteo. Esperanza
also executed an affidavit of possession with notice of lis pendens and brought it to the Register of
Deeds (RD) for annotation of an adverse claim, but the RD said that it cannot be annotated in the
original certificate of title because the complaint is criminal and not civil in nature.
Meanwhile, the representative of Timoteo’s wife, claiming that the owner’s duplicate copy of the title
of the subject land was missing, filed before the RTC a petition praying that the owner’s duplicate copy
had been lost and be declared null and void, and prayed for the issuance of a second owner’s duplicate
copy. She even submitted an affidavit notifying the RD of the lost title. The RTC ordered the issuance
of the second duplicate copy of the owner of the land and declared that the first one as null and void.
Esperanza filed a petition before the CA for annulment of judgment of the RTC arguing that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to issue a new title because the first copy of the owner’s duplicate copy was never
lost, and in fact, is in her possession all along.
However, the CA dismissed the petition declaring that a petition under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
cannot be used to impugn the second owner’s duplicate copy because it would be a collateral attack
upon the issued certificate of title.
Hence, Esperanza filed a petition before the Supreme Court for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
Questions:
a. Is Esperanza correct in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA for dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment? Why or
why not?
b. Is the CA correct in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment declaring that a petition
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court cannot be used by Esperanza to impugn the second owner’s
duplicate title?
Answers:
a. No. Esperanza availed of the wrong mode of appeal when she filed before the Supreme Court
a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the decision of the CA. A petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the
absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
remedy is said to be plain, speedy, and adequate when it will promptly relieve the petitioner
from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or agency. Esperanza
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Court.
b. No, the CA is not correct. Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states that, “The annulment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.” Lack of
jurisdiction here refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or
over the subject matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of jurisdiction, a court should
not take cognizance of the case. The prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction
over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void.
41
The CA erred in denying Esperanza’s petition for annulment of judgment. If a certificate of title
has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title
is void and the court that rendered the decision has no jurisdiction. The fact of loss or
destruction of the owner’s duplicate copy is crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction.
Moreover, Esperanza never questioned the ownership of Timoteo’s wife over the property.
What she sought in her Rule 47 petition with the CA was the annulment of the RTC decision
reconstituting the said title on the ground that the first owner’s duplicate copy was never lost
but was in fact in her possession all along. (Gaoiran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 215925,
42
Problem
The heirs of Espejo filed an action for recovery of possession against Gemina. The latter's counsel failed
to attend any of the pre-trial schedules and subsequently filed a Withdrawal of Counsel with Attached
Motion for Reconsideration citing health reasons as justification for his withdrawal. The withdrawal was
granted and Gemina was directed to secure the services of a new counsel. However, the trial court
regarded the motion for reconsideration as a mere scrap of paper since it lacked the requisite notice of
hearing. Meanwhile, the trial court allowed the heirs of Espejo to present their evidence ex parte. The
court ruled in favor of the heirs of Espejo. Gemina then moved for a motion for reconsideration arguing
that the mere absence of his counsel does not ipso facto authorize the judge to order the plaintiff's ex
parte presentation of evidence.
Questions:
a. Whether the non-appearance of the defendant's counsel, despite the presence of the party-
defendant, during pre-trial could result in the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of evidence?
b. Whether the subject property has been sufficiently identified as required in an action to recover
possession of real property?
c. Whether the purpose of the notice of hearing was attained when the Espejos were able to file
their Comment/Opposition to the said motion for reconsideration?
Answer:
a. No. When the party-defendant is present, the absence of his counsel during pre-trial shall not
ipso facto result in the plaintiff's ex parte presentation of evidence.
Pre-trial serves a significant purpose in court proceedings. It simplifies, abbreviates and

expedites the trial, if not the entire process of administering and dispensing justice. For this
reason, the parties and their counsels cannot take this stage for granted as it is more than just
a part of procedural law or its technicality.
Prior to the amendments brought about by A.M. No. 19-10-20-SC which became effective on
May 1, 2020, there was an apparent confusion with regard to the effect of a non-appearance
in pre-trial. Then Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides: "xxx A similar failure on the
part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and
the court to render judgment on the basis thereof." With the advent of AM 19-10-20-SC, said
Section 5 has been clarified to the effect that it is only when both the party-litigant (plaintiff
and defendant) and his counsel fail to appear in pre-trial that there be the concomitant
consequence of either a dismissal (plaintiff and counsel were absent), or presentation of
evidence ex parte (defendant and counsel were absent). The amended Section 5, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court provides: “xxx A similar failure on the part of the defendant and counsel
shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his or her evidence ex parte within ten (10)
calendar days from termination of the pre-trial, and the court to render judgment on the basis
of the evidence offered.”
In this case, the Espejo's ex parte presentation of evidence following the non-appearance of
Gemina's counsel was unwarranted. Resort to other remedies available is allowed instead of
ordering the ex parte presentation of the plaintiff's (heirs’) evidence when the defendants'
counsel had not appeared during pre-trial.
43
Thus, Gemina's cause of action should not have been prejudiced by the non-appearance of his
counsel, particularly since on record, Gemina had been religiously appearing in the course of
the proceedings, including during the pre-trial. Gemina's right to due process was violated when
he was denied to present evidence. Gemina should have been given the chance to establish
the merits of his defense rather than lose the subject property based on technicalities or upon
a stringent application of the rules. (Gemina v. Heirs Of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr. G.R. No. 232682,
b. No. While it appears on record that the identity of the subject property was ascertained by the
trial court and the appellate court based on the technical description stated in TCT 93809 and
the Judicial Affidavit of Ma. Teresa R. Espejo which merely identified said TCT as one registered
in the names of Gerardo Espejo, Jr. and Nenafe, the technical description that provides the
metes and bounds of a parcel of land cannot stand alone, much more be considered as
foolproof evidence exactly pointing to the subject property. The identity of the disputed land
sought to be recovered or of the subject property in this case may be established through a
survey plan of the said property. Absent such evidence or any other proof to such effect, it
cannot be concluded that the subject property had been sufficiently identified. The identity of
the property and the title of the claimant must be ascertained in an action to recover possession
of real property pursuant to Article 434 of the Civil Code.
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of
the defendant's claim." It is hornbook doctrine that the entitlement to the possession of real
property belongs to its registered owner. However, the registered owner must seek proper
judicial remedy and comply with the requisites of the chosen action in order to recover
possession of a real property from the occupant who has actual and physical possession
thereof. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the plaintiff must not bank on the weakness
of the defendant's title, hence, must establish his title and the identity of the property because
of the possibility that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is entitled or even more the true
owner of the property in dispute. (Gemina v. Heirs Of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr. G.R. No. 232682,
c. Yes, there is substantial compliance when the adverse party (heirs of Espejo) had the
opportunity to file a pleading opposing the motion for reconsideration despite the latter’s
(Gemina’s) lack of a notice of hearing.
Here, when Gemina's counsel filed for his withdrawal as counsel, he attached a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. While the withdrawal as counsel was granted, said motion was
denied for the counsel failed to set the motion for hearing. However, as may be gleaned from
records, the Espejo heirs filed a Comment/Opposition to the said motion.
Hence, the Espejos had an opportunity to be heard in compliance with the requirements of
due process, and the Motion for Reconsideration in this case should not have been denied on
the mere basis of lack of notice of hearing. (Gemina v. Heirs of Gerardo V. Espejo, Jr.
G.R. No. 232682, September 13, 2021, Hernando, J.)
44
Problem
Sometime in 1976, the heirs of Carlos Jr. executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate which provided
that all properties of the decedent shall be owned in common, pro indiviso, by his heirs. Enrica, one of
the heirs, filed a Civil Case before the RTC impleading all the other heirs, her mother and siblings, as
defendants. For three years, under the supervision of the RTC, the heirs negotiated the terms of the
estate's partition to be embodied in a compromise agreement. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of
Partition.
However, various properties of the estate remained undivided and were not distributed among the
heirs. The parties executed a “Kasunduan” covering the partition of the subject property and the
transfer of ownership of half thereof to the eight tenants while the other half remained with the heirs
of Carlos, Jr. The defendants filed a Motion for Approval of New Agreement and New Subdivision Plan
of certain agricultural properties, including the subject property.
The Regional Trial Court granted defendants' motions, and approved the New Agreement and
Subdivision Plan and ordered the plaintiffs to sign the document. Deciding on the petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Orders of the RTC, invalidating the
Kasunduan because it lacked the signature of all the heirs. Only petitioner Guillerma filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Questions:
a. What are the two phases of an action for partition under Rules 69 of the Rules of Court?
b. What is an Interlocutory Order and a Final Order?
c. What is the test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final?
Answers:
a. Rule 69 of the Rules of Court have laid down two phases of an action for partition: first, the
trial court, after determining that a co-ownership in fact exists and that partition is proper,
issues an order for partition; and, second, the trial court promulgates a decision confirming the
sketch and subdivision of the properties submitted by the parties (if the parties reach an
agreement) or by the appointed commissioners (if the parties fail to agree), as the case may
be. (Guillerma vs. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021)
b. The Court defined an interlocutory order as referring to something between the commencement
and end of the suit which decides some point or matter, but it is not the final decision on the
whole controversy. It does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case but
leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. On
the other hand, a final order is one which leaves to the court nothing more to do to resolve the
case.
In this case, the RTC's Order is a final order which respondent failed to appeal before the CA
following Section 2, Rule 69 in relation to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
(Guillerma vs. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021)
c. In more than one occasion, the court has laid down the test to ascertain whether an order is
interlocutory or final, i.e., "Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case?" If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to
what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case.
(Guillerma vs. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021, Hernando, J.)
45
Problem
Respondents La Filipina Uygonco Corp (LFUC) and Philippine Foremost Milling Corp (PFMC) filed a
complaint for compliance with Maritime Law, Law, Regulation and Contract, Breach of Contract, Specific
Performance and Damages against the petitioner, Harbour Centre Port Terminal, Inc (HCPTI). In the
complaint, it alleged that HCPTI failed to provide priority berthing to their vessels and to conduct
dredging to maintain the depth of the navigational access channel and berthing area.
The trial court then issued a temporary restraining order and WPI which enjoined HCPTI from
preventing respondents LFUC and PFMC access to its rail lines and unloaders, and from using the port
facilities of HCPTI, among others. However, LFUC and PFMC’s barges and tugboats were either not
allowed access to their unloaders and rail lines, or were delayed in using berthing area in violation of
WPI issued by the trial court.
This prompted respondents to file a Petition for Indirect Contempt against HCPTI averring that the
petitioner and its officers willfully violated the WPI issued by the RTC Branch 24. HCPTI argued that a
charge for Indirect Contempt is criminal in nature and thus, the rules of evidence in contempt
proceedings should be applied as far as practicable and that the respondents either failed to apply for
berthing of any or all the vessel allegedly denied priority berthing or that some it was never serviced at
all by them.
RTC Branch 42 dismissed the petition for indirect contempt for non-compliance of the respondents of
the requirements in their MOA for the priority berthing. Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to
Court of Appeals. The CA did not sustain the findings of the RTC and found the petitioners liable for
indirect contempt for willfully violating the WPI issued.
Questions:
a. What is contempt of court?
b. Differentiate the two classifications of contempt, namely, civil contempt and criminal contempt.
c. What type of contempt is filed by the respondents?
d. Is the prosecution of the indirect contempt barred by double jeopardy?
e. Is the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt?
Answers:
a. Contempt of court is defined as disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court's order,
but such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. (HCPTI vs.
LCUC and PFMC, G.R. No. 240984, September 27, 2021, Hernando, J.)
b. The punishment of contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal contempt.
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for
the benefit of the other party." Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial
and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and
essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. In general, civil contempt
proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has
a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. The burden of proof is on the complainant,
and the proof needed lies somewhere between the criminal “reasonable doubt” burden and the
civil “fair preponderance.” Punishment is by fine directed to be paid to a party in the nature of
damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as a coercive measure to enforce the
performance of some act for the benefit of the party.
46
While criminal contempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the authority or dignity of the court or judge,
or in doing a duly forbidden act. Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the
nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government,
the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. In proceedings for criminal
contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove
the charges beyond reasonable doubt. (HCPTI vs. LCUC and PFMC, G.R. No. 240984,
c. The nature of the contempt proceeding in this case is more civil than criminal.
The purpose of the contempt petition was for the enforcement of the September 25, 2008 WPI.
It is a remedy resorted to preserve and enforce the rights of respondents and to compel
obedience to the injunctive writ which was issued for their benefit. Hence, the petition for
contempt is civil in nature. (HCPTI vs. LCUC and PFMC, G.R. No. 240984, September 27, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
d. No, because petition for indirect contempt instituted by the respondents herein is civil in nature.
Accordingly, an appeal from the decision dismissing the same is not barred by double jeopardy.
(HCPTI vs. LCUC and PFMC, G.R. No. 240984, September 27, 2021, Hernando, J.)
e. No, the petitioners are not guilty of indirect contempt.
In this case, HCPTI's failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents' vessels during
the period material to the case was not intended to undermine the authority of the court or an
act of disobedience to the September 25, 2008 WPI of the RTC Branch 24.
The petitioners’ failure to provide priority berthing rights to respondents' vessels during the
time material to the instant case was due to respondents' own failure to comply with the
requirements mandated in the November 19, 2004 MOA. Thus, we find that petitioners did not
commit any act amounting to indirect contempt. (HCPTI vs. LCUC and PFMC, G.R. No.
240984, September 27, 2021, Hernando, J.)
(HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC. v. LA FILIPINA UYGONGCO CORP. and PHILIPPINE
FOREMOST MILLING CORP. G.R. Nos. 240984 _ 241120, September 27, 2021)
47
Problem
Baldomero filed a complaint against DBP for annulment of real estate mortgage and foreclosure
proceedings, quieting of title, redemption, and damages before the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint. Unperturbed, Baldomero went to the Court via Petition for Review on
Certiorari, but the same was denied. Baldomero then executed a document denominated as Kasabotan,
where he relinquished to his son, Aurio T. Casiño, all his rights over the properties involved in the
complaint filed. Aurio filed with the RTC Br. 8 an affidavit of third-party claim, alleging that he is the
owner and possessor of the parcel of land sold by DBP to Green River. In response, DBP filed an answer
arguing that Aurio’s complaint is already barred by res judicata. In the meantime, DBP and Green River
filed anew, an ex-parte petition or an alias writ of possession, which the RTC Br. 8 granted. Aurio, at
this time already deceased and represented by his heirs, moved for reconsideration but the motion was
denied.
The RTC Br. 10 rendered a judgment, which declared that the subject property being claimed by Aurio
is different from that being claimed by DBP and Green River. The RTC Br. 10 also directed Green River
to vacate the premises and not to disturb Aurio’s possession of the same. DBP and Green River
separately filed their motions for reconsiderations, while Aurio filed a motion of execution of judgment
pending appeal. The RTC denied the motions for reconsiderations and granted the motion for execution
pending appeal.
Aggrieved, DBP and Green River filed separate appeals with the CA. DBP also filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the RTC Br. 10, acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it used the Order granting Aurio’s
motion for execution pending appeal.
Questions:
a. What is a res judicata? What are the elements?
b. Is there an identity of the parties as to warrant the application of the principle of res judicata?
c. Is there an identity of causes of action as to warrant the application of the principle of res
judicata?
d. What is the nature and purpose of a writ of certiorari?
e. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the Motion for Execution pending appeal?
Answers:
a. Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment
or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.
The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4)
there must be as between the first and second action identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action. (Heirs of Aurio T. Casiño, Sr. v. DBP, G.R. Nos. 204052-53, March 11, 2020,
Hernando, J.)
b. Yes. As held in Guerrero vs. Director, Land Management Bureau, “There is identity of parties
not only when the parties in the cases are the same, but also between those in privity with
them, such as between their successors-in-interest. Absolute identity of parties is not required,
and where a shared identity of interest is shown by the identity of relief sought by one person
48
in a prior case and the second person in a subsequent case, such was deemed sufficient.” The
fundamental rule is that for res judicata to apply, only substantial, not absolute, identity of
parties is required. Aurio, not only being Baldomero’s heir but also the latter’s successor-in-
interest by virtue of the Kasobotan. Aurio and his heirs have community of interest with
Baldomero who initiated the earlier Civil case, and thus meet the test of identity of parties.
(Heirs of Aurio T. Casiño, Sr. v. DBP, G.R. Nos. 204052-53, March 11, 2020, Hernando, J.)
c. Yes. One test of identity is the “absence of inconsistency test” where it is determined whether
the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment. If no consistency is shown,
the prior judgment shall not constitute a bar to subsequent actions. In the earlier case filed by
Baldomero, he assailed the validity of the real estate mortgage foreclosure proceedings, which
resulted to an auction sale that transferred ownership of the subject land, among other parcels
of land, to DBP. In fact, Baldomero, in his complaint, also prayed for quieting of title over the
said land, which is essentially the same relief sought by Aurio in the instant case. In the current
case, Aurio is essentially asking for the same relief as Baldomero, and in effect, is collaterally
asking for the nullification of the real estate mortgage of Baldomero with the DBP and the
subsequent foreclosure proceedings. Any affirmative relief that the Court may grant on said
cause of action would necessarily affect the validity of the real estate mortgage foreclosure
proceedings and the resulting sale of the property subject of the earlier case; issues which
could no longer be revived, as the same have already been settled. Consequently, the rights of
ownership and possession over such property would also be affected. Thus, for having identity
of causes of action which was already decided with finality, res judicata applies. ( Heirs of Aurio
T. Casiño, Sr. v. DBP, G.R. Nos. 204052-53, March 11, 2020, Hernando, J.)
d. The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by
lower courts and tribunals.
It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from
committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the use of a
petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower
court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." (Heirs of Aurio T. Casiño, Sr. v. DBP, G.R. Nos.
204052-53, March 11, 2020, Hernando, J.)
e. No. The Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it held that the RTC Br. 10 committed
grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution pending appeal in favor of Aurio.
In this case, the RTC Br. 10 granted the pending appeal primarily based on the advanced age
of Aurio’s spouse, Patricia, who was supposed to be sixty-five (65) years old at the time. In
any event, they clearly had no authority or jurisdiction to disturb the final and executory
decision. Despite this, RTC Br. 10 acted capriciously and overstepped its jurisdiction when it
ordered the execution pending appeal merely by reason of Patricia's alleged old age. Verily,
the apparent old age of the Patricia would certainly not override the doctrine that a court cannot
and should not disturb the orders or judgments of a co-equal court, especially since the said
decision is already final and executory. (Heirs of Casiño, Sr. v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, Malaybalay Branch, Bukidnon, G.R. Nos. 204052-53, March 11, 2020,
Hernando, J.)
49
Problem
Jose, a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27, was
awarded a parcel of land. Subsequently, Jose obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Jaen secured by
a mortgage over the subject land. Unfortunately, he failed to pay his obligation; hence, the mortgage
was foreclosed. A year passed but neither Jose nor his heirs redeemed the subject land. Thus, on
October 4, 2004, the bank executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership over the said land. On
December 16, 2004, the bank filed a verified petition for cancellation of TCT No. EP-86727 covering the
subject land before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). However, the Heirs of Jose
argued that the bank's petition lacked a cause of action because the purported real estate mortgage
executed by Jose was void ab initio as it was executed within the 10-year prohibitory period under
Section 27 16 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
After the PARAD ruled in favor of the bank, the heirs elevated the case to the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Questions:
Whether the PARAD/DARAB had jurisdiction over the cancellation of TCT No. EP-86727
Answers:
No. As held in Heirs in Juan Dela Cruz vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or
waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or
subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of
the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none
over the cause of action. Further, in Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform v. Heirs of
Abucay, an agrarian dispute between the parties should first exist for the then DARAB or DAR
Secretary to acquire jurisdiction. Here, what is crystal clear is that the bank's petition for
cancellation of certificate of title stemmed from the subject land's foreclosure. Therefore, there was
no agrarian dispute notwithstanding the fact that the land involved is an agricultural land. Thus,
the bank’s petition should have been dismissed by the DARAB for lack of jurisdiction. (Heirs of
Jose De Lara, Sr. v. Rural Bank of Jaen, Inc., G.R. No. 212012, March 28, 2022,
Hernando, J.)
50
Problem
Procopio Borras (Procopio) was the owner of several parcels of land, one of which was Lot No. 5275
located at Barrio Bigaa, Legazpi City. Upon Procopio's death, the properties were inherited by his five
children namely: Inocencio, Vicente, Aurelia, Severina and Leonila. Upon the death of all the siblings,
the properties were inherited by their respective children, including Eustaquio Borras (Eustaquio), son
of Inocencio.
It appears that during his lifetime, Eustaquio claimed ownership over Lot No. 5275 when he filed a
petition for reconstitution before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of OCT No. 2097, with prayer
for issuance of a transfer certificate of title in his name. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 21502 was issued in the name of Eustaquio. Later on, the other heirs (Heirs) of Procopio
sought the annulment of the judgment of the CFI in cancelling OCT No. 2097
Questions:
a. Whether the Annulment of Judgement is the proper remedy available to the heirs in this case.
b. Differentiate Jurisdiction vs. Exercise of Jurisdiction.
Answers:
a. No. In Toledo vs. CA, it was held that “Annulment of judgment may either be based on the
ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by
extrinsic fraud. It is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only
when other remedies are wanting”. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an
absolute lack of jurisdiction. Further, the lack of jurisdiction envisioned in Rule 47 is the total
absence of jurisdiction over the person of a party or over the subject matter. When the court
has validly acquired its jurisdiction, annulment through lack of jurisdiction is not available when
the court's subsequent grave abuse of discretion operated to oust it of its jurisdiction.
Here, while there is no question that the CFI acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it went
beyond ordering the reconstitution of OCT No. 2097 by ordering its cancellation, and directing
the issuance of a new TCT in favor of Eustaquio, nevertheless, such order of the CFI was done
in the exercise of its jurisdiction and not the lack thereof. Thus, since the basis of the Annulment
of Judgement filed by the Heirs was grave abuse of discretion, such action cannot prosper for
it is required that the action be based on ABSOLUTE LACK of jurisdiction. (Heirs of Procopio
Borras v. Heirs of Eustaquio Borras, G.R. No. 213888, April 25, 2022, Hernando, J.)
b. In Lasala v. National Food Authority, the court held that Jurisdiction is the authority to decide
a cause, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and
the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of
the jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal. (Heirs of Procopio
Borras v. Heirs of Eustaquio Borras, G.R. No. 213888, April 25, 2022, Hernando, J.)
51
Problem
Charlo Idul was employed by Alster Int’l Shipping Services, Inc. (Alster Shipping) on behalf of Johann
Mkbluementhal GMBBH Reederei (principal) for 12 months. A few months after Idul boarded M/V IDA,
he figured in an accident while working which resulted to a fracture in his left leg. Idul underwent
surgery in France and was repatriated back the Philippines for further medical attention.
The company referred Idul to Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) under Dr. Lim’s care and Dr.
Chuasuan (orthopedic surgeon). Idul was given medication and was instructed to undergo rehabilitation
therapy. He was also asked to come back for follow-up check-ups.
The company-designated physician issued medical reports dated February 2, 2009, March 9, 2009,
March 30, 2009, June 15, 2009, and July 6, 2009, to which Dr. Chuasuan gave Idul a Grade 10 disability
rating due to "immobility of ankle joint in abnormal position”. However, on March 16, 2009, Idul sought
the opinion of Dr. Garduce, a doctor of his own choice to which Dr. Garduce assessed him to be totally
and permanently disabled, after a single consultation. Alster Shipping offered to pay him a disability
benefit in accordance with the POEA SEC. But Idul rejected and insisted that he was entitled to full
disability benefits instead.
Idul filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits with damages before the DOLE claiming
that he was entitled to full disability benefits because the injury he suffered rendered him incapable of
performing his grueling duties as a bosun.
The LA ruled in favor of Alster Shipping and gave more credence to Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan’s findings.
Idul filed an appeal with the NLRC and the NLRC reversed the LA’s Ruling. NLRC explained that it is the
loss of earning capacity and not the mere medical significance of the injury that determines the gravity
of disability.
After the NLRC’s denial of the Alster Shipping’s motion for reconsideration, the company appealed with
the CA. The CA upheld the LA’s ruling, in its May 14, 2013 decision, and stressed that that a temporary
total disability becomes permanent only when the company-designated physician declares it to be so
within the 240-day period, or when after the lapse of said period, the physician fails to make such
declaration. And since there was no agreement on a 3rd doctor, the CA was constrained to uphold Dr.
Chuasuan’s findings. Aggrieved, Idul filed a motion for reconsideration but was still denied by the CA
in its September 20, 2013 decision. Petitioner received the Resolution of the CA denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on October 3, 2013.
On November 15, 2013, Idul then filed a petition denominated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, but he manifested that "the Honorable Court of Appeals is the
impleaded public respondent in this Petition conformably with Section 5, of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended.”
Questions:
a. Was Idul’s petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 proper?
b. If Idul had already lost his right to an ordinary appeal, is filing a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 proper?
c. In filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, Idul raised that: “The CA committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed decision and
resolution when it ruled that petitioner is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits”
and “The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
promulgating the assailed decision and resolution when it solely gave credence to the certification
of the company physician without considering the findings of petitioner's doctor of choice.” Should
Idul’s petition under Rule 65 be granted?
52
Answers:
a. No, Idul’s petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was not proper. Pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, an appeal is the proper remedy to obtain the reversal of judgments or final
orders or resolutions of the CA. However, Section 2 provides that the petition shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of
the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice
of the judgment. Idul received the CA’s resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration on
October 3, 2013. Thus, he had 15 days or until October 18, 2013 to file its Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. However, the present petition was only filed on November 15, 2013 or
way beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
b. No. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, where the latter remedy is available. While the Court has, in several cases, previously
granted a petition for certiorari despite the availability of an appeal, it only applies:
1. when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates;
2. when the broader interest of justice so requires;
3. when the writs issued are null and void; or
4. when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
5. The case at bar does not fall under any of the exceptions. The remedy of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 was available to Idul, but for unknown reasons, he opted
not to avail of the said remedy.
c. No, Idul’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should be dismissed. In order to avail of the remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65, the following must concur:
1. The writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions;
2. Such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
3. There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By simply alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction without
explaining why an appeal could not cure the errors by the CA, Idul failed to prove that there was
no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law. To reiterate, the remedy of a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was available to Idul. Nevertheless, for unknown reasons,
petitioner opted not to avail of the said remedy. (Idul v. Alster Int'l. Shipping Services, Inc.,
G.R. No. 209907, June 23, 2021, Hernando, J.)
53
Problem
Inter-Island is an internet service provider which hired Ibay on January 20, 2003 as a technical support
in its Network Operations Center (NOC). Seven (7) months into his employment, Ibay received a
Memorandum informing him of his inclusion in the Q Linux Schedule of Training. However, in a revised
Memorandum, Ibay was delisted as one of the trainees. Eventually, Ibay was compelled to submit a
resignation letter to which he refused. Ibay was prevented from entering Inter-Island’s premises. Thus,
necessitating a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA rendered a Decision reinstating Ibay to his former
position with full payment of his backwages and found Ibay’s assertion of facts to be more credible that
Inter-island’s. The NLRC likewise ruled that Ibay was illegally dismissed. Upon appeal by Inter-Island
to the CA, the appellate court issued a Resolution directing Ibay to file comment within ten (10) days
from receipt. However, the Resolution sent to Ibay's counsel was returned unserved. The CA then
issued a Resolution directing Inter-Island to furnish the court within ten (10) days from notice the
present and complete address of both Ibay and his counsel. However, Inter-Island failed to comply.
Thus, the CA dismissed the petition for failure of Inter-Island to comply with its Resolution pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court. Hence, Inter-Island filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule
65.
Questions:
a. Was Rule 65 the proper remedy in this case?
b. Was there any reasonable cause to justify non-compliance and to apply the liberal application
of the Rules?
c. How would you distinguish Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 between Special
Civil Action of Certiorari under Rule 65?
Answers:
a. No. It is settled that an extraordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie if there is
a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, as in this case. Inter-
island should have availed of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 as its petition was dismissed by the appellate court based on Section
3 of Rule 117 which is an adjudication on the merits and not merely an interlocutory order.
(Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 187323, June 23, 2021)
b. No. Inter-island failed to cite any reasonable cause to justify non-compliance with the rules for
its availment of a wrong remedy. In fact, it resorted to a wrong mode of appeal by filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and must be exercised only in the manner and
in accordance with the provisions of law. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of the
party to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory.
(Inter-Island Information Systems, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 187323, June 23, 2021)
c.
Petition for Review on Certiorari Special Civil Action for Certiorari
(Rule 45) (Rule 65)
As to Jurisdiction
Under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction Under the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
of Supreme Court Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, RTC,
Sandiganbayan and Comelec
As to Nature of Proceeding
Mode of appeal Original Action
As to Requirement of Motion for Reconsideration
54
Petition for Review on Certiorari Special Civil Action for Certiorari
(Rule 45) (Rule 65)
Does not require the filing of motion of Filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition
reconsideration with the lower court precedent to the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari
As to Finding of Facts
Finding of facts of the Court of Appeals are Finding of facts of the Court of Appeals are NOT
binding upon the Supreme Court in a binding upon the Supreme Court in a special civil
petition for review on Certiorari action for Certiorari
As to Impleading of Parties
The lower courts or judges whose The lower court or judge whose orders or
decisions are subject of review are not proceedings are subject to challenge are impleaded
impleaded either as petitioners or as respondents.
respondents.
As to Reglementary Period
A petition for review on Certiorari should A special civil action for Certiorari should be filed
be filed within 15 days from notice of within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order,
judgment or final order being appealed or resolution.
from.
(Riguera, Primer-Reviewer on Remedial Law (Vol. 1, Civil Procedure), 7th (2022) Ed., pp. 770-771)
55
Problem
Tina and Jay were married and had 2 children. There came a time when Jay abandoned Tina and their
children, depriving them of financial support. By February 2012, the monthly allotment from Jay which
previously amounted to $4,000.00 was reduced to $2,500.00. Jay also stopped visiting their children.
Tina tried to contact Jay numerous times to settle their issues but her efforts were futile. As a result of
Jay's abandonment and utter disregard for his family, Tina suffered psychological and emotional abuse.
Thus, a Petition for Temporary and Permanent Protection Order, Support and Support Pendente Lite
was filed by Tina against Jay. On October 22, 2012, a TPO was issued by the trial court in favor of Tina.
The court sheriff made several attempts to personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO to Jay at
his address but the security guard said he was not around. He also tried to serve them at the office of
his employer, only to be told that appellant was abroad for deployment.
On November 16, 2012, Atty. Gary O. Palmero, counsel of Jay in a criminal case for violation of Republic
Act No. 9262 (RA 9262), went to Branch 136 and received a copy of the Order and Petition as evidenced
by the latter's signature therein. On January 17, 2013, Jay filed an Entry of Appearance with Opposition
to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order. On January 25, 2013, the trial court issued an Order
denying the admission of Jay's Opposition for having been belatedly filed two (2) months after the
issuance of the TPO. On January 30, 2013, the trial court issued a PPO in favor of Tina. It pointed out
that Jay already waived his opportunity to oppose the petition for his failure to file the necessary
pleading on time. The CA affirmed the findings of the trial court. It held that there was no improper
service of summons. The notice received by counsel representing a party in an action in court is
equivalent to notice to the party himself.
Questions:
a. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jay by substituted service of summons?
b. Did the receipt of Atty. Palmero of the copy of the order and petition operate as constructive
receipt on the part of Jay?
c. Did the court nonetheless acquire jurisdiction over the person of Jay?
Answers:
a. No. In the case at bar, the sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons, petition, and
TPO in Jay's residence and place of employment. Records shows that the sheriff attempted to
personally serve the summons, petition, and TPO on two different dates, On October 22, 2012,
to the residence of Jay, and on October 30, 2012 at Jay’s office address. However, records show
that Jay was out of the country from August 7, 2012 to January 5, 2013 due to his overseas
employment. Since personal service could not be effected upon him, summons should be
served through substituted service, extraterritorial service, or by publication in accordance with
Sections 7, 15 and 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Notably, none of these modes of service
were resorted to by Tina. (Jay V. Sabado v. Tina Marie L. Sabado, G.R. No. 214270, May 12,
2021)
b. No. While the CA is correct in quoting GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Prinsipe that notice
to counsel is equivalent to notice to client, the very same case also states that it is notice sent
to counsel of record which is binding upon the client. In the case at hand, Atty. Palmero was
Jay's counsel in a separate criminal case filed against the latter for violation of RA 9262 pending
at that time before Branch 140 of the RTC of Makati. Therefore, Jay had no counsel of record
yet with Branch 136 of the RTC of Makati at the time Atty. Palmero received the copy of the
order and TPO. (Jay V. Sabado v. Tina Marie L. Sabado, G.R. No. 214270, May 12, 2021)
c. Yes. In G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. v. Tiara Commercial Corporation, it was held that “There is
voluntary appearance when a party, without directly assailing the court's lack of jurisdiction,
seeks affirmative relief from the court. When a party appears before the court without
qualification, he or she is deemed to have waived his or her objection regarding lack of
56
jurisdiction due to improper service of summons.” Moreover, in Frias v. Alcayde, the court ruled
that “If he so wishes to assert this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose
of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court, otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted
himself to that jurisdiction.” Lastly, in Navale v. Court of Appeals, it was stated that “Defects of
summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filing of an answer to the complaint”.
Here, the court noted that Jay voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court
when he filed the Entry of Appearance with Opposition to the Issuance of the Permanent
Protection Order on January 17, 2013. By seeking affirmative relief in his opposition without
objecting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, he thereby voluntarily submitted himself to its
jurisdiction. (Jay V. Sabado v. Tina Marie L. Sabado, G.R. No. 214270, May 12, 2021)
57
Problem
In a complaint for replevin, TTA Inc. sought possession of 4,675 hogs that was a subject of a chattel
mortgage in its agreement with JSI Co. (Jorgenetics). The writ of replevin was issued by the RTC and
was served. Jorgenetics moved to dismiss the complaint for replevin on the ground that service was
improperly served. The trial court dismissed the action on that same ground.
Thereafter, Jorgenetics filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with application for
damages against the replevin bond, alleging that it incurred damages on account of the alleged
wrongful seizure of the hogs. Among others, Jorgenetics vowed to present proof of the damages it
incurred in the hearing on the application for Damages. Aggrieved, TTAI filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65.
While the case was pending in the appellate court and the trial court, TTAI filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of the chattel mortgage covering the hogs. TTAI won the bid in the public
auction and was subsequently issued a certificate of sale.
In resolving the application for damages against the replevin bond, the trial court ruled that the order
dismissing the complaint for replevin became final and executory in view of TTAI's failure to appeal and
that Jorgenetics was entitled to damages against the replevin bond, since the parties must necessarily
revert to their status prior to litigation. A writ of execution was issued thereafter
In the CA, it issued a decision reinstating the complaint for replevin that the dismissal of the action for
replevin is wholly inconsistent with the trial court's cognizance of Jorgenetics' application for damages
against the replevin bond.
Aggrieved, Jorgenetics filed for Petition for Review on Certiorari to annul the CA decision reinstating
the complaint for replevin and seeking for affirmation of the previous order to return the properties
subject of the replevin. On the other hand, TTA Inc. manifested that in view of the lapse of the period
to move for the reconsideration or appeal the above indicated Decision without any action on the part
of the parties, the said Decision had become final and executory which renders the Petitions moot and
academic.
Questions:
a. What is a writ of replevin?
b. Who are the officials or employees of a corporation that can sign the verification and
certification on its behalf without need of a board resolution?
c. Is a variance in the date of the verification with the date of the Petition by Jorgenetics fatal to
petitioner's case?
d. Did Jorgenetics submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon filing an application for damages
and motion for issuance of a writ of execution after the trial court’s dismissal of the action for
replevin?
Answers:
a. Replevin is an action for the recovery of personal property. It is both a principal remedy and a
provisional relief. When utilized as a principal remedy, the objective is to recover possession of
personal property that may have been wrongfully detained by another. When sought as a
provisional relief it allows a plaintiff to retain the contested property during the pendency of
the action
58
b. In Cagayan Valley Drug Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court ruled that certain
officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification and certification on its behalf
without need of a board resolution, such as but not limited to:
1. the chairperson of the board of directors,

2. the president of a corporation,
3. the general manager or acting general manager, personnel officer, and
4. an employment specialist in a labor case.
Moreover, the "lack of authority of a corporate officer to undertake an action on behalf of
the corporation may be cured by ratification through the subsequent issuance of a board
resolution, recognizing the validity of the action or the authority of the concerned officer."
c. No. It is not fatal. A variance in the date of the verification with the date of the petition is not
necessarily fatal to Jorgenetics' case since the variance does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that no verification was made, or that the verification was false. It does not
necessarily contradict the categorical declaration made by Jorgenetics in its affidavit that its
representatives read and understood the contents of the pleading.
d. Yes. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired by service of
summons. However, "even without valid service of summons, a court may still acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant if the latter voluntarily appears before it." "If the
defendant knowingly does an act inconsistent with the right to object to the lack of personal
jurisdiction as to them, like voluntarily appearing in the action, they are deemed to have
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court."
Thus, a defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of

the court if they seek affirmative relief from the court. This includes the filing of motions to
admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration.
We have likewise held that a party is deemed to have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction
of the court when, after the opposing party sought the execution of the decision, they file a
motion asking for the resetting of the hearing without reserving their continuing objection to
the lower court's lack of jurisdiction over their person. "The active participation of a party in
the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court
or body's jurisdiction."
However, this rule is "tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party
who
makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over their
person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority x x x A special appearance
operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance," but only when the
defendant explicitly and unequivocally poses objections to the jurisdiction of the court over
their person.
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, the Court finds that Jorgenetics voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the trial court when it filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution and an application for damages against the replevin bond without objecting
59
to the jurisdiction of the trial court. (Jorgenetics Swine Improvement Corp. v. Thick &
Thin Agri-Products, Inc., G.R. Nos. 201044 & 222691, May 5, 2021, Hernando, J.)
60
Problem
DM Co. is a domestic corporation that owns multiple registered parcels of land in Pangasinan. A total
of 100,000 hectares of these lands were placed under the Agrarian Reform Act (PD 27). In 1987, EO
228 was issued where the Dept of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was authorized to determine just
compensation of lands placed under PD 27.
In 1992, Landbank (LBP) gave a valuation of PHP 342,000 or roughly P3,329.30 per hectare as just
compensation. Finding the just compensation inadequate, DM Co. filed a petition in 2002 before the
RTC for the proper determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled by computing the just
compensation based on the recent fair market value of the property, instead of using the prevailing
factors at the time of the taking in RA 6657, thus, the amount increased from 342,000 to 216,000,000.
Dissatisfied by the RTC decision, DAR and LBP appealed to the CA assailing the RTC’s decision on the
computation of just compensation. Both appeals were dismissed and the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Meanwhile, the decision of the RTC attained finality, prompting DM Co. to file for a writ of execution.
LBP argued that despite being an indispensable party, it cannot be bound with the finality of the decision
because it was not made a party to the appeal and that it was only a mere custodian of the Agrarian
Reform Fund, but the writ was still granted. Aggrieved, LBP directly filed an urgent verified
motion/application for the issuance of a TRO/preliminary injunction arguing that RTC had no jurisdiction
to issue the writ of execution.
Questions:
a. What are the requisites of res judicata?
b. Is the LBP bound by the final and executory judgment against the DAR regarding the
computation of just compensation?
c. Does the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court have jurisdiction over cases of just
compensation?
d. What are the factors that govern the payment of just compensation under RA 6657?
ANSWERS
a. The requisites of Res Judicata are:
(1) there must be a final judgment or order;
(2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action
b. Yes. LBP is bound by the final and executory judgment. In this case, First, there is a final
judgment or order, that is, the RTC Decision. Second, both the CA and the RTC have jurisdiction
over (1) the subject matter, that is, the computation of just compensation of the subject
properties and the awards for temperate and nominal damages as well as legal interest. Third,
the RTC Decision are judgments on the merits, the rights and obligations of the parties with
respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case having been unequivocally
determined and resolved. Lastly, the appeal refers to the same subject matter, raises the same
issues and involves the same parties.
c. Yes. RTC has jurisdiction over cases of just compensation. Under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act, it vests the Special Agrarian Courts the "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." In this case, the
61
determination of just compensation is a judicial function which cannot be curtailed or limited
by legislation, much less by an administrative rule.
d. The factors are laid down under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657:
SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation,

the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, and the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, the
assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
NOTE: While Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 requires the due consideration of the formula
prescribed by the DAR, the determination of just compensation is still subject to the final
decision of the proper court.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Del Moral, Inc., G.R. No. 187307, [October 14, 2020,
Hernando, J.)
62
Problem
Escaro is one of the heirs of the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Camarines Sur consisting
of 24 hectares. It was placed under the compulsory acquisition scheme by DAR on August 30, 1994.
By virtue of its mandate under RA 6657, petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) made an initial
valuation of the property at P272,347 in a Notice of Valuation and Acquisition dated December 30,
1996.
Escaro rejected LBPs valuation and elevated the matter to the PARAD which rendered a decision
increasing the amount to 1,555,084. LBP elevated the matter to the DARAB which reversed PARAD and
went back to the 272,347 valuation. Escaro then filed for a motion for reconsideration which was
denied. Aggrieved, Escaro filed a complaint in the RTC-SAC on January 5, 2009 praying that the
valuation of P1,681,199 be applied. LBP argued that that respondent failed to file a Notice of Filing of
Original Action (NFOA) with the RTC-SAC as prescribed under the 2003 DARAB Rules and that the
DARAB decision has attained finality.
RTC-SAC ruled in favor of the respondent that the MR filed by Escaro was not the proper remedy and
that the DARAB decision has attained finality. Aggrieved, Escaro appealed to the CA. The CA reversed
the RTC-SAC decision. It held that RA 6657 expressly vests the RTC with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. It further ruled
that such rule could not have accorded the RTCs mere appellate jurisdiction over land valuation cases.
LBP moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Questions:
a. In which court should you file an original complaint for just compensation?
b. Was the complaint of Escaro timely filed in the RTC-SAC?
c. Did the DARAB decision attain finality? Why?
ANSWERS:
a. In the RTC-SAC. Under the law, The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Under
the prevailing jurisprudence, It has been well-settled that the "valuation of property or
determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. It was
emphasized in one case that the jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC in actions for determination of just
compensation is original and exclusive, and not merely appellate.
b. Yes. It was timely filed. Under the law. The 10year prescriptive period to question just
compensation starts when the land being has been placed under RA 6657. However, under
prevailing jurisprudence, the Court held that "any interruption or delay caused by the
government like proceedings in the DAR should toll the running of the prescriptive period." The
reason for this is while "the statute of limitations has been devised to operate against those
who slept on their rights," it should not be taken against "those desirous to act but cannot do
so for causes beyond their control."
In this case, the 10-year prescriptive period was tolled by the commencement of administrative
proceedings before the DAR sometime in 1996 when respondent questioned the initial valuation
of the property before the PARAD, which was terminated 12 years later on May 7, 2008, or the
date when respondent received the DARAB Decision reinstating petitioner's valuation of
P272,347.
63
c. No. It did not attain finality. If the DARAB decision would attain finality, it would effectively
diminish the court’s jurisdiction to that of an appellate court. Under prevailing jurisprudence,
there is no statutory basis for the DARAB to promulgate rules that would derogate the
jurisdiction of the RTC-SAC or impose procedural limitations which would effectively bar it from
taking exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction. Any attempt to do so should be
struck down for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
(Land Bank of the Philippines v. Escaro, G.R. No. 204526, February 10, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
64
Problem
Mauricio Laoyan and Magdalena Quilit filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) a
petition for annulment of sale an agricultural land and redemption. After the parties have submitted
their respective position papers, the RARAD rendered a decision holding that Mauricio Laoyan and
Magdalena Quilit may exercise their right of redemption for the subject parcel of land.
After the denial of Notice of Appeal and motion for reconsideration with the RARAD, Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) filed with the DARAB a Petition for Certiorari assailing the said decision of the RARAD.
DARAB then dismissed the said petition on the ground that the DARAB, being only a quasi-judicial body
with limited jurisdiction, cannot acquire jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari.
Questions:
a. Did DARAB err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction?
Answers:
a. No. DARAB did not err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of jurisdiction
While it is true that the lack of an express constitutional or statutory grant of jurisdiction
disables DARAB from exercising certiorari powers, there is however a more fundamental reason
for DARAB's disability.
As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial, DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing

writs of certiorari. This is not merely a matter of statutorily stipulated competence but a
question that hearkens to the separation of government's tripartite powers: executive,
legislative, and judicial. (Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the Philippines G.R. No. 205128. August
09, 2017)
Since DARAB is not a court of law which exercises judicial power, it is therefore inherently
powerless and incapable by constitutional fiat in acquiring jurisdiction over special civil actions
for certiorari, and issuing writs of certiorari to annul acts of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) or RARAD even when it exercises supervisory powers over them. (Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Quilit, G.R. No. 194167, February 10, 2021, Hernando, J.)
65
Problem
Spouses Milu and Rosalina De Jesus filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage,
Promissory Note and Foreclosure Sale and Damages with an Urgent Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, against Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank). The spouses prayed for
the declaration of nullity of the subject real estate mortgages and promissory notes they executed in
favor of the Land Bank, as well as the foreclosure proceedings initiated by the latter.
The bank through its new counsel, filed an Entry of Appearance and Manifestation stating that it will
proceed to consolidate its ownership considering that the one-year redemption period already lapsed
without the spouses redeeming the properties, and because the period for issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction, which was the duration of Atty. Latosa’s commitment not to consolidate, lapsed without the
RTC issuing the same.
Spouses De Jesus filed a Counter-Manifestation and Motion, arguing that Land Bank may not
consolidate its ownership in view of Atty. Latosa's commitment not to consolidate for the duration of
the main case, and not for the period for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, as claimed by
the bank.
Questions:
a. Did the spouses abandon their application?
b. Is “urgent necessity” indispensable in this preliminary injunction?
c. Is the expiration of the period for redemption, without the mortgagor or his or her successor-
in-interest redeeming the property makes such consolidation a matter of right?
d. Did the application for preliminary injunction moot and academic in this case?
Answers:
a. Yes. The Spouses are deemed to have abandoned their application. Given that the trial court
already ordered the spouses to present their evidence in support of their application for
preliminary injunction, considerably in view of the limited duration of Land Bank's commitment
not to consolidate, then they should have complied with the same. Instead, they moved to set
the main case for pre-trial. Such an act constitutes a clear case of abandonment of their
application for preliminary injunction.
b. Yes. “Urgent necessity” is indispensable in a preliminary injunction. Generally, injunction, being

a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights or interests, is not a cause of
action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, that is, an adjunct to a main suit.
It is only resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that
cannot be redressed under any standard of compensation. The controlling reason for the
existence of the judicial power to issue the writ of injunction is for the court to prevent a
threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated.
The application for the writ rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special
reason for such an order to issue before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential
conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts that
appear to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire
showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the injunction is
reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff pending the litigation (City of Iloilo
v. Honrado, G.R. No. 160399, December 9, 2015, citing Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 671 Phil.
320-345, 2011)
66
Jurisprudence dictates that courts should avoid granting injunctive reliefs that consequently
dispose of the main case without trial. Otherwise, it will result in the prejudgment of the main
case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof as it would adopt the allegations which
petitioners ought to prove (Chipoco v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239416, July 24,
2019, citing Republic v. Spouses Lazo, 744 Phil. 367, 401, 2014)
c. Yes. If the redemption period expires without the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest
redeeming the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the
Register of Deeds, the title over the property consolidates in the purchaser. The consolidation
confirms the purchaser as the owner entitled to the possession of the property without any
need for him to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135. The issuance of a writ
of possession to the purchaser becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his
name, while the mortgagor, by failing to redeem, loses all interest in the property.
When the one-year redemption period lapsed without the spouses De Jesus redeeming the
properties, and without any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent consolidation,
nothing barred Land Bank from exercising its right.
d. Yes. The application for preliminary injunction became moot and academic. Land Bank had
already consolidated its ownership over the properties even before the spouses De Jesus filed
their Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court, consistent with its right to do so absent
any TRO or writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. Consequently, the remedy
of injunction, specifically to prevent Land Bank from consolidation, could no longer be
entertained by the appellate court. The act sought to be enjoined had long become fait
accompli. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 221133, June
28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
67
Problem
Olivia Leones was appointed municipal treasurer of the Municipality of Bacnotan, La Union. During
Leones’ stint in the Provincial Treasurer’s Office, she was not paid her RATA. Emilia T. Boncodin
(Boncodin), then DBM Secretary, responded that Leones was entitled to RATA, but only for the fiscal
year of 1999.
Leones filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. She sought to compel Boncodin and Ma. Minda
Fontanilla, then Municipal Mayor of Bacnotan, La Union, to pay her RATA. The CA then ordered Boncodin
and Minda Fontanilla to pay Leones’s RATA however the latter’s RATA remained unpaid. She again filed
a petition for mandamus against Rufino Fontanilla, incumbent mayor of the Municipality of Bacnotan at
that time.
Proposals for amicable settlement ensued. The case ended in a compromise between Leones and Mayor
Rufino Fontanilla where alongside with the payment of her RATA was that upon fulfillment of the
conditions of the compromise agreement, Leones shall obligate herself to retire from her position.
The Municipality of Bacnotan completed its payments to Leones. Thereafter, Leones learned that she
was dropped from the payrolls of the Municipality of Bacnotan effective May 31, 2012. She was also
told to stop reporting for work. Leones sought to verify if she had indeed been unilaterally dropped
from the payrolls, which she asserted was tantamount to illegal dismissal from employment. From the
regional trial court, Leones skipped the appellate tribunal and proceeded straight to Supreme Court for
recourse.
Questions:
a. Whether the compromise agreement and compromise judgment are valid.

b. Is res judicata present in this case?
c. Is direct recourse in a petition for certiorari allowed in this case?
Answers:
a. Yes. Judgments, once final and executory, are incontestable and unappealable. The winning
litigant receives the right to the favorable awards contained in such executory judgment, and
the losing party has to comply with the order of the court that is enforceable by a writ of
execution.
Rights, however, may be waived or modified through a compromise agreement even after a
final judgment has been rendered and already settled the rights of the contracting parties. To
be binding, the compromise must be shown to have been voluntarily, freely and intelligently
executed by the parties, who had full knowledge of the judgment. As with the law on contracts,
the compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy. A
compromise agreement must contain the same elements of a valid contract:
1. Consent of the parties;

2. Object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise; and
3. Cause of the obligation established. (Spouses Garcia v. Spouses Soriano, G.R. No.
219431, August 24, 2020 & Magbanua v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511, 525-526, 2005)
Both parties here clearly agreed in writing that the unpaid RATA in the amount of P1,055,109.00
shall be paid by the Municipality of Bacnotan to Leones in monthly increments beginning June
2011 until she retires on May 31, 2012. The compromise cannot be said to have been tainted
by any defect of will. Fraud, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or coercion applied on any
or both of the contracting parties' contractual discretion must be demonstrated by clear and
68
convincing evidence. Leones had never offered quality proof of, or even slightly alleged, such
vices of consent that could affect the validity of the compromise agreement.
b. No. For res judicata to bar a subsequent action, the following elements must be present:
1. The judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
2. The decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;
3. The disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
4. There must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. (Cruz v. Tolentino, 830 Phil. 196, 210-211, 2018)
The fourth and the most important element, however, is lacking. G.R. No. 169726 determined
the factual and legal bases of Leones' entitlement to payment of her RATA, whereas SCA No.
007-11 is concerned with the manner of execution of the actual payment of the RATA judicially
awarded to Leones.
c. No. A direct resort is allowed only when there are special or compelling reasons that justify the
same such as:
1. When dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of public policy
2. When demanded by the broader interest of justice
3. When the challenged orders were patent nullities
4. When analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.
Leones' cause against the jurisdiction of the RTC is far too generic, personal, and non-
transcendental to fall under any of these four exceptions. Thus, there is no valid reason for her
to take this remedial shortcut. (Leones v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 204106, November 17, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
69
Problem
The Linden Suites, Inc. filed a complaint for damages against Meridien Far East Properties, Inc. before
the RTC of Pasig. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) adjudged Meridien liable for the cost of the demolition,
actual and compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed but
modified the RTC’s Decision by deleting the award of actual and compensatory damages. Considering
that the RTC Decision had already attained finality, Linden Suites filed a motion for issuance of a writ
of execution before the RTC, which it granted. Thereafter, the Sheriff attempted to serve the writ on
respondent in its office address in Makati City and in its condominium in Mandaluyong City but failed.
As a result, the Sheriff returned the writ unserved. Thus, Linden Suites filed an Urgent Motion to
Examine Judgment Obligor before the RTC of Pasig, the same trial court which rendered the final
judgment.
The RTC denied Linden Suite’s motion and ruled that Meridien’s officers cannot be subjected to an
examination as they do not reside in its territorial jurisdiction. On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition
for lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. It held that under Section 36, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court, a judgment obligor cannot be compelled to appear before a court or commissioner
outside the province or city in which he or she resides or is found.
Questions:
a. Does the RTC have supervisory control over the execution of its judgment?
b. Is a judgment obligee entitled to an order of the court which rendered judgment if the writ of
execution issued against the judgment obligor was returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part?
Answers:
a. Yes, the RTC as the judgment court has supervisory control over the execution of its
judgment.
It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has supervisory control over the
execution of its judgment. It does not, however, give the court the power to alter or amend a
final and executory decision in the absence of the recognized exceptions, namely: (a) if there
is a need to correct clerical errors which cause no prejudice to any party, (b) void judgments,
and (c) if circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution
unjust and inequitable.
The judgment court's supervisory control over the case ensures the enforcement of a party's
rights or claims that it has duly recognized. Indeed, a court's mandate to resolve disputes ends
upon its adjudication of the litigation. (Linden Suites, Inc. v. Meridien Far East Properties, Inc.,
G.R. No. 211969, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
b. Yes, the judgment obligee is entitled as a matter of right.
Section 5 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that every court has the inherent power
to "amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and
justice." The court, in carrying out its jurisdiction, can thus issue "auxiliary writs, processes and
other means necessary to carry it into effect" and to adopt any suitable process or mode of
proceeding "which appears conformable to the spirit of the said law or rules."
Here, the trial court should have proceeded to conduct a permissible examination of Meridien,
through its officers, so as to disclose the properties which can be subjected to execution. The
trial court, in denying Linden Suite's motion, exclusively confined itself with the one and only
limitation stated in the provision, thereby ultimately defeating the purpose of the rule, i.e., to
ascertain the properties or earnings of a judgment obligor that are to be applied to the
70
satisfaction of the judgment. The RTC should have employed other allowable means such as,
but not limited to, the submission of documents consisting of a list of properties and income of
Meridien and the affidavits of concerned officers in relation thereto. (Linden Suites, Inc. v.
Meridien Far East Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 211969, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
(LINDEN SUITES, INC. v. MERIDIEN FAR EAST PROPERTIES, INC. G.R. No. 211969, October 4, 2021)
71
Problem
AAA suffered losses as a result of power fluctuations and interruptions. It sent several letters to Meralco
of its problems with respect to the supply of power, but Meralco could not remedy the situation. In the
meantime, AAA stopped paying its electrical bills. Meralco, thus, disconnected and terminated its service
contract with AAA.
AAA filed an action for Injunction and Damages against Meralco. On the other hand, Meralco filed an
action against AAA for Collection of Sum of Money. The two cases were consolidated. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) found Meralco liable for actual damages arising from its failure to deliver constant
energy supply to AAA. The RTC likewise held Meralco liable for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
On the other hand, the RTC also held AAA liable for its unpaid electricity bill, as well as attorney’s fees
and thus ordered the parties’ respective liabilities to offset.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision with modification in that the award of attorney's fees to
both parties was deleted for having no factual or legal basis. Meralco then raised questions in its Rule
45 Petition with the Supreme Court. In its Comment, AAA points out that the Petition did not raise
"special and important reasons" for its allowance. Further, it raised only questions of facts which are
not proper in a Rule 45 petition. In its Reply, Meralco argues that the Court may resolve questions of
fact raised in a Rule 45 petition under the exceptions to the general rule, which exceptions were
supposedly present in the instant case.
Question:
Is the Petition filed by Meralco under Rule 45 proper in this case?
Answer:
Yes, the Rule 45 Petition is proper.
Jurisprudence provides as a rule that the Court’s jurisdiction in a Rule 45 petition is limited to the review
of questions of law because the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the rule admits of exceptions
such as when;
1. the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
3. when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts;
5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
7. when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
9. when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and
10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record.
Here, the case warrants an application of the exception rather than the general rule, thus, the petition
under Rule 45 was properly filed by Meralco. (Manila Electric Co. v. AAA Cryogenics Philippines,
Inc., G.R. No. 207429, November 18, 2020, Hernando, J.)
72
Problem
The DENR EMB-RIII filed a complaint before the DENR’s Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) charging
MWSS and its concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water with failure to provide, install, operate, and
maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities (WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the
degraded quality and beneficial use of the receiving bodies of water. Prompted by the said complaints,
the SENR issued a Notice of Violation (NOV).
The NOV determined MWSS et al.'s violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in that they have not
provided, installed, or maintained sufficient WWTFs and sewerage connections satisfactory enough in
quantity to meet the standards and objectives of the law, notwithstanding court orders and the lapse
of the five-year period provided by the Clean Water Act. After the requisite technical conference before
the PAB, petitioners submitted their respective answers to the charges. MWSS led the defense and
averred that they were compliant with the law.
The SENR found MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila Water liable for violation of the Clean Water Act and
imposed fines upon them. MWSS et. al. then filed separate petitions for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the Orders of the SENR.
Questions:
a. Was the petition for review filed before the CA prematurely filed?
b. Was there denial of procedural due process in this case?
Answers:
a. Yes, the petition for review before the CA was prematurely filed and thus failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Jurisprudence provides that the Orders of the SENR are different from the issuances of the
PAB. While under its 1997 rules, the PAB had jurisdiction to impose the fine or administrative
sanction on all cases of pollution, it is Section 28 of the Clean Water Act and its IRR, Rule 28
of DAO No. 2005-10, which must be correctly applied. It was already in effect in 2009 and
specifically bestows upon the Secretary of the DENR, upon recommendation of the PAB, in
cases of commission of prohibited acts under and violations of the Clean Water Act, the power
to impose fines, order the closure, suspension of development or construction, or cessation of
operations, or, where appropriate disconnection of water supply. The herein assailed Orders
were not issued by the PAB but by the SENR. The appropriate remedy from the Orders of the
SENR is an appeal to the Office of the President.
Hence, erroneous procedural steps effectively rendered MWSS et al.'s appeals dismissible,
resulting in the finality of the Orders of the SENR. (Maynilad Water Services v. Secretary of
DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019, Hernando, J.)
b. No, there was no denial of procedural due process.
Jurisprudence provides that procedural due process means compliance with the procedures or
steps, even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and
without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to administer it.
Here, MWSS et. al. were notified of the charges against them, were given an opportunity to be
heard during a technical conference, and were informed of the penalty for possible violations
of the Clean Water Act. Procedural due process, as applied to administrative proceedings,
means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Maynilad Water Services v.
Secretary of DENR, G.R. No. 202897, August 6, 2019, Hernando, J.)
73
Problem
Deceased Francisco owned a parcel of land which was sold to Gonzales. The Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) was issued to Gonzales but was cancelled on the same day and then reissued to Esperanza.
Subsequently, Mega Fishing Corporation (MFC) purchased the subject property from Esperanza by
virtue of a Kasulatan ng Ganap at Lubos na Bilihan, and was issued a TCT under its name.
However, records revealed that during the lifetime of Francisco, when his last will and testatment was
submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, letters testamentary were issued
in favor of Teresita as the executrix. Teresita then filed a case against Esperanza, Mercedita, MFC, et.
al., to annul and cancel the subject TCT. The RTC ruled, among others, that MFC was not a buyer in
good faith for its failure to discharge the burden of proving the same.
MFC filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but it was later denied. Thus, MFC filed a
notice of appeal to which the Court of Appeals (CA) required MFC to file its appellant’s brief. MFC filed
a motion to be given the opportunity to file its appeal brief. It alleged that it received the notice
sometime in September and had until October 15, 2013 to file its brief. However, MFC only discovered
the said notice which was apparently filed in another case folder during the year-end inventory in
December 2013. Thus, MFC asked for an additional period of 30 days from December 19, 2013 or until
January 19, 2014, which the CA later granted.
On February 6, 2014, MFC filed its motion to admit appellant’s brief. In its first assailed Resolution, the
CA denied MFC’s motion. It held that MFC failed to file its brief within the reglementary period. It noted
that despite the grant of an extension of time to file, it only filed its brief on February 6, 2014 or 18
days after the last day of extension granted by the CA. MFC filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the CA later denied and noted that MFC received the Resolution on April 14, 2014, but only filed its
motion for reconsideration on August 22, 2014, or more than three months after the lapse of the 15-
day period to submit a motion for reconsideration.
In its petition for review on certiorari, MFC argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion when it did
not allow MFC’s appeal brief and ordered the case closed considering that allowing MFC to be bound
by its former counsel’s gross negligence will deprive it of due process of law, result in outright
deprivation of property, and/or grave injustice.
Question:
Is failure to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period due to the negligence of the
appellant’s counsel produces an effect of automatic dismissal of the appeal?
Answer:
No, the belated filing of an appeal brief due to the appellant’s former counsel’s gross negligence does
not render an automatic dismissal of the appeal.
Jurisprudence provides that the court has the power to allow an appeal provided that:
a. the circumstances obtaining warrant the court's liberality;
b. that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of
substantial justice;
c. no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay;
d. there is no contention that the appellees' cause was prejudiced; and
e. there is no motion to dismiss filed.
The Court allowed the relaxation of the rigid rules of procedure in order to serve substantial justice in
considering matters of life, liberty, honor, or property. Here, MFC should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for its case to be decided on the merits since it stands to lose its property rights due to a
74
technicality for the belated filing of its appellant’s brief attributed to its former counsel’s negligence.
(Mega Fishing Corp. v. Estate of Gonzales, G.R. No. 214781, March 9, 2022)
75
Problem
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a Build-Lease-and-Transfer

(BLT) Agreement with Metro Rail Transit Corporation Limited (MRT) regarding the Phase 1 of MRT-3
Light Rail System along EDSA. MRTDC then engaged the services of Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising
(Trackworks) and executed a Contract for Advertising Services. Trackworks, however, defaulted in the
payment of its obligation.
After series of demands to Trackworks, MRTDC then sent a Notice of Termination to Trackworks.
Subsequently, Trackworks filed a Complaint with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against MRTDC with the RTC of Pasay City, to which the RTC of
Pasay City denied the said application.
Trackworks then filed: (1) an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Show Cause Order; (2) Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Status Quo and/or Cease and Desist Order; and (3) Addendum Re: the Urgent Motion
for Issuance of Status Quo and/or Cease and Desist Order. The RTC of Pasay City denied the injunctive
relief and/or status quo order prayed for by Trackworks. However, it clarified that the proceedings
before it are stayed or suspended until such time that the parties conclude their arbitration and an
arbitral award is rendered. Trackworks filed a Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Omnibus
Order issued by the RTC of Pasay City.
Thereafter, Trackworks filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 before
the RTC of Makati City, which prayed for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain MRTDC and Media Puzzle, Inc. (MPI) from circulating any documents regarding the termination
of the advertising contract and appointment of an agent to manage the advertising services along EDSA
MRT-3 and prohibit the Secretary of DOTC from issuing any kind of permit to MRTDC and MPI with
respect to advertising rights. The RTC of Makati granted Trackworks’ application for the issuance of a
TRO and subsequently denied its Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
MRTDC filed a Motion to Dismiss before the Makati RTC, which was denied by the Makati RTC.
Meanwhile, the RTC of Pasig City denied Trackworks’ Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. A Motion
for Reconsideration was filed by MRTDC which was denied by the RTC of Makati, which in effect, it
granted Trackworks’ Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Hence, MRTDC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the validity of the decision of the
RTC of Makati. The CA granted MRTDC’s petition and ruled that the RTC of Makati violated the doctrine
of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court when it
issued ints Omnibus Order, which completely reversed the Order of the RTC of Pasay denying
Trackworks’ application for the issuance of preliminary injunction. Moreover, Trackworks’ Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 filed before the Makati RTC is dismissible on the
ground of litis pendentia. Hence, the certiorari case filed by MRTDC is moot and the adequate remedy
to question the actions of the lower court is by way of ordinary appeal.
Questions:
a. Is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Trackworks the proper remedy in this case?
b. What is the effect of a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction?
c. What is the doctrine of judicial stability?
d. Is Petition for Certiorari dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia?
Answers:
a. No. For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must be established: (1) the writ if directed
against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such
tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
76
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and there is no appeal or any plain
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Here, Trackworks’ Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus ought to have been
dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction as the RTC of Makati is bereft of any authority
to nullify the orders of the RTC of Pasig, a coordinate and co-equal court. (Metro Rail Transit
Development Corporation v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.,
b. A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked
anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the
choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction
is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. (Metro Rail Transit
Development Corporation v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.,
c. The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice to which no court can
interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction
having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale of the doctrine is
founded on the concept of jurisdiction that a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. ( Metro Rail
Transit Development Corporation v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and
Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 204452, June 28, 2012, Hernando, J.)
d. Yes, the Petition for Certiorari is dismissible by litis pendentia.
Jurisprudence provides that there is litis pendentia where another action is pending between
the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. First, there is identity of parties, or at least they represent the
same interest in both actions. Second, identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts. Lastly, the identity of the two cases should be such
that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other.
Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the fact that there is no absolute identity of parties
in both cases will not preclude the application of the rule of litis pendentia since only substantial
and not absolute identity of parties is required for litis pendentia to lie. Moreover, the main
relief sought by Trackworks in the cases filed in the RTC of Makati City and Pasig City was to
enjoin MRTDC from terminating its advertising contract pending the outcome of the arbitration
before PDRCI. Although Trackworks argued that the petition filed before the RTC of Makati City
sought not to enjoin MRTDC, but to restrain the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of DOTC
from issuing permits to MRTDC and MPI, the same would entail the same result, that is, to
prohibit MRTDC from terminating the advertising contract, a relief which was already denied
by the RTC of Pasig City in its various orders. (Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., G.R. No.
204452, June 28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
77
Problem
Petitioner Miguel who was convicted for the crime of Murder, filed a petition for the issuance of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging that his continued detention no longer holds legal basis by virtue of
Republic Act No. (RA) 10592, otherwise known as the "Good Conduct Time Allowance Law" (GCTA
Law).
The respondent Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed his Comment. In response, petitioner Miguel filed his reply. In its resolutions, the Court
required the parties to file their respective Memoranda. In compliance with the said Resolution,
respondent filed its Memorandum dated February 9, 2021. However, petitioner Miguel failed to file his
Memorandum.
Question:
a. Which Court may grant the writ of Habeas Corpus?
Answer:
a. As to which court may grant the writ, Section 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Who may grant the writ. — The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals
or any member thereof in the instances authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and
decision on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof,
on any day and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court, the appellate court, and this Court exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. However,
this does not mean that parties are absolutely free to choose before which court to file their
petitions, thus: Mere concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford parties absolute freedom to
choose the court with which the petition shall be filed. Petitioners should be directed by the
hierarchy of courts. After all, the hierarchy of courts 'serves as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitioners for the extraordinary writs.'
In this case, Petitioner Miguel should have filed the present petition before the RTC, absent
any showing of special and important reasons warranting a direct resort to the Supreme Court.
(Miguel v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
78
Problem
An administrative complaint was filed against the Local Government Officials (Officials) of Esperanza,
Masbate. In its February 22, 2013 Decision, the Ombudsman found merit in the complaint and held
that the local government officials were indeed remiss in their duties and was ordered a six-month
suspension.
The officials were later re-elected during the May 13, 2013 elections. Thereafter, the local government
officials filed a Motion to Stay Execution of the Ombudsman's assailed Decision, which was likewise
denied. Undeterred, the officials then filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme
Court, arguing that the Decision and the Order should be nullified for being rendered with grave abuse
of discretion.
Questions:
a. Is the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy in this case?
b. Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman when it ordered the
execution of its decision?
Answers:
a. No. It is well-settled that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
Accordingly, A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC instructs that any appeal by way of petition for review from
a decision, final resolution, or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or by way of
special civil action relative to such decision, resolution, or order, must be denied or dismissed,
respectively. In view thereof, and insofar as it seeks to nullify the assailed Decision and the first
assailed Order which are both final issuances, the instant petition should be dismissed.
(Monterde vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, February 14, 2022)
b. No. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, Rule III, Section 7 provides that
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are required to be executed
as a matter of course. In fact, not even the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition
for review can stay the immediate implementation of Ombudsman decisions, resolutions, or
orders in administrative disciplinary cases. Only a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction, duly issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, can produce such effect
as stated in Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 01, Series of 2006. Hence, the Ombudsman
cannot be considered to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the officials'
motion to stay execution. It was merely doing its duty as required by law. Accordingly, the
petition ought to be dismissed. (Monterde vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, February 14,
2022)
79
Problem
Fe Morada alleged that on October 14, 2015 at around 8:00 a.m., she received a text message from
her daughter, Jennilyn J. Morada, that her son, Johnson, was arrested and detained by the barangay
tanods of Barangay 176, Caloocan City for alleged theft of a mobile phone in the house of another
barangay tanod, Randy Rias (Randy).
Morada went to the barangay hall at about 7:00 p.m. on October 14, 2015. At the barangay hall, Rolly
Cebu (Rolly) informed Morada that Johnson was already released by either Fernando Domingo
(Fernando) or Romy Donaldo (Romy) from the custody of the barangay as evidenced by the entry in
the barangay blotter, signed by Johnson himself.
On December 2015, Morada went to the Northern Police District (NPD) to report that her son is missing.
An investigation was conducted but the same was terminated in view of the lack of a witness to shed
light on Johnson's disappearance and the insistence of the barangay desk officers that Johnson was
already released from their custody.
In the meantime, rumors circulated within Barangay 176 that Johnson had been extrajudicially killed
and that his body was mixed in cement in order to conceal the incident. This prompted Morada to
institute a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo to determine whether Randy Rias, et al. had
violated or threatened to violate Johnson's right to life, liberty and security, and to compel them to
determine the whereabouts of Johnson, and the person/s responsible for his disappearance or possible
death, among others.
On January 25, 2016, Morada filed before the RTC a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo. The RTC
denied the petition and held that there was no showing of any refusal on the part of the Randy et al.
to acknowledge or to give information on Johnson's whereabouts such that there was no intention to
remove him from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Hence, Morada instituted
the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Morada argues that, contrary to the RTC's findings, the enforced disappearance of Johnson had been
established by substantial evidence. Morada insists that the lack of cooperation on the part of Randy
et al. amounted to a refusal on their part to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts
of Johnson, showing their intention to remove him from the protection of the law
Questions:
a. What are the elements constituting enforced disappearance? Were these elements present in
this case?
b. Is the RTC correct in denying the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo?
Answers:
a. The elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under Republic Act No. 9851 are
as follows:
1. that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

2. that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;
3. that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
4. that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
No, enforced disappearance is not present in the given case. While there is no question that
the first and second elements are attendant in this case, the third and fourth elements are
80
sorely lacking. While it is admitted that Johnson was arrested for the alleged theft that he
committed in the house of Randy, it was sufficiently established by the respondents that he
was already released from their custody on October 14, 2015, as evidenced by the barangay
blotter, signed by Johnson himself.
Morada neither denied nor refuted the said document of release. Greater weight should be
given to the documentary evidence presented by the respondents exhibiting that Johnson was
no longer in their custody when he disappeared. Such evidence strongly militates against
Morada's claim of enforced disappearance.
b. Yes, the RTC is correct in denying the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Amparo. There is no
substantial evidence to prove Morada's claim.
Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC) is explicit that both questions
of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
As a rule, then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the lower court which
rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo. The RTC committed no
reversible error in finding that no substantial evidence exists to compel the grant of the writ prayed
for by Morada.
(Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022, Hernando, J.)
81
Problem
The subject property was placed under the land transfer program of the government pursuant to PD27
and emancipation patents were issued in favor of the tenant-beneficiaries. The respondents filed an
application for retention of five hectares for each of them on the subject property pursuant to RA 6657.
However, petitioners alleged that the respondents were disqualified to retain the subject portion
considering that they already owned more than 24 hectares of the land.
The DAR Director held that the respondents were not entitled to retention in violation of owning more
than 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn lands. DAR Secretary then affirmed the DAR Director’s ruling.
However, after filing a motion for reconsideration, the DAR Secretary reversed and set aside its previous
order. Thereby, ruling that the respondents were entitled to retention. Petitioner filed a motion of
reconsideration before the office of DAR Secretary that was denied for being a prohibited pleading.
Thus, petitioners appealed to the Office of the President.
Office of the President reinstated the DAR Regional Director’s. Upon reaching CA, it reversed the
decision of OP and ruled that the respondents were allowed to retention.
Questions:
a. Are the petitioners in this case considered a real party in interest?
b. What is the purpose of a reply?
c. What is the proper recourse of a party upon receipt of DAR’s resolution on a motion for
reconsideration?
d. Did the petitioners timely file their appeal before the Office of the President?
Answers:
a. No. In this case, petitioners were not real parties in interest since the transfers to them of the
subject lot were made in violation of PD 27, which prohibited any transfer of title to covered
lands except by hereditary succession or to the government.
Petitioners' argument is not supported by any evidence on record. There is no proof that they
are the current possessors of the subject lots, or that they paid for the conversion thereof. As
the records show, and as petitioners expressly admit, none of the subject lots are in any of
their names. (Nagaño vs Tanjangco, G.R. No. 204218, May 12, 2021, Hernando J.)
b. The purpose of a reply is to deny or allege facts in denial of new matters alleged by way of
defense in the answer," or respondents' comment in this case. It is not the function of a reply
to introduce new arguments which would offend the basic principles of fair play and due
process. (Nagaño vs Tanjangco, G.R. No. 204218, May 12, 2021, Hernando J.)
c. Sec. 32 Rule V of D.AO 03-03. is clear in that the remedy to the DAR Secretary's resolution of
a motion for reconsideration filed by any party is to elevate the matter to the Office of the
President, "Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation."
Petitioners' recourse upon receipt of the October 1, 2009 Resolution (which resolved
respondent Luis' motion for reconsideration of the March 26, 2009 Resolution) was to appeal
said resolution to the Office of the President within 15 days. Petitioners failed to do this. As a
result, the October 1, 2009 Resolution became final and executory. (Nagaño vs Tanjangco,
G.R. No. 204218, May 12, 2021, Hernando J.)
82
d. No. In this case, the petitioners filed a motion of reconsideration before DAR secretary instead
of filing it before the Office of the President- which led to expiration of the 15-day period.
Consequently, when the 15-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration lapsed without
petitioners filing such motion, they were no longer allowed to do so and that the resolution had
become final and executory, and therefore, immutable. (Nagaño vs Tanjangco, G.R. No.
204218, May 12, 2021, Hernando J.)
83
Problem
Ngo filed before the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land against herein
respondents, Gabelo, et al., Ngo alleged that he is the lawful and absolute owner of the subject property
by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale between himself and Philippine Realty Corporation and pursuant
to this Court's previous ruling.
RTC issued an order for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action for the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with the barangay law requirements (barangay conciliation proceedings). Ngo filed
his motion for reconsideration and the RTC granted his motion to reinstate the complaint and referred
to the Barangay Court/authorities concerned. Gabelo, et al. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
assailing the RTC’s decision allowing the reinstatement of the complaint.
Question:
a. Can the respondent raise the grounds for dismissal for failure to comply with the barangay law
requirements (barangay conciliation proceedings) without filing a motion to dismiss?
Answer:
a. Yes. as a general rule, grounds for dismissal must be invoked by the party-litigant at the
earliest opportunity, as in in the instant case, while no motion to dismiss was filed, the
petitioners had been constantly pleading for dismissal of the case in their answer and their
subsequent pleadings submitted to the lower court. This is allowed under Section 6, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court which provides that if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any grounds for
dismissal provided for in the Rules may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer
and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to
dismiss had been filed.
It is undisputed that the case was never referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa for conciliation.
The petitioners successfully prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case
by timely invoking the ground in their answer as an affirmative defense. Thus, the complaint is
dismissible for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of barangay conciliation as a
condition precedent before filing an action a motion to dismiss or in the answer; otherwise,
such grounds are deemed waived. (Ngo vs. Gabelo, G.R. No. 207707. August 24, 2020,
Hernando, J.)
84
Problem
Respondents Violeta Noche, Juliana Abrigunda, Crisanta Talavera, Ma. Asuncion Arguelles, Ciriaca
Velasco, Severa Quitain, Rosalinda Balahadia, Anicia Dagle, Norma Plata, Zenaida Buluhan, and Susana
Amparo filed a complaint against Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. (PRBFI) for illegal dismissal, illegal
suspension, regularization, damages, and reinstatement before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch
IV. PRBFI claimed that respondents were dismissed for just cause. The Labor Arbiter found that the
respondents have been illegally dismissed, and that PRBFI showed no factual bases for or specific
circumstances of the infractions allegedly committed by respondents. The NLRC, however, reversed the
ruling of the Labor Arbiter. It held that respondents left the fact of product contamination undisputed
and failed to show any ill motive on PRBFI’s part in accusing them of having caused such contamination.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. They imputed grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the NLRC for entertaining PRBFI’s appeal, the requisite bond of which was posted only
almost a month after the appeal period had lapsed. The CA granted respondents’ Petition for Certiorari,
and found that PRBFI did not present any proof of compliance as to the required posting of an appeal
bond. Thus, PRBFI’s appeal before the NLRC should have been deemed not perfected, and the NLRC
did not acquire jurisdiction over PRBFI’s appeal. PRBFI argued that the Petition for Certiorari should
have been dismissed when the respondents allegedly failed to comply with the CA’s directive to submit
additional supporting documents. PRBFI further insists that the CA erred in considering its appeal of
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision before the NLRC as not perfected for its failure to file a bond. PRBFI argued
that the NLRC’s inaction on its Motion to Reduce Bond, coupled with its resolution of the case on all its
substantial points, is tantamount to an implied affirmance of the perfection of PRBFI’s appeal.
Questions:
a. Will it be a sufficient ground for dismissal if the petitioner failed to comply with the CA’s directive
to submit additional supporting documents?
b. How will an appeal filed by the employer be perfected?
c. What is the required quantum of proof that the petitioner needs to present?
d. Can PRFBI pray for the reopening of the factual record of the case in a Petition for Review
before the Supreme Court?
Answer:
a. No. While Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that the failure of the petitioner to
comply with any of the formal requirements of a petition for certiorari shall be sufficient ground
for its dismissal. The CA is not compelled to automatically order the dismissal of a formally-
infirm pleading. Section 5, Rule 46 of the same Rules states that the court may dismiss the
petition outright with specific reasons for such dismissal or require the respondent to file a
comment on the same within ten (10) days from notice. Two basic options are given to the CA
under the foregoing provision: (1) to dismiss the petition outright, with specific reasons, or (2)
to require the respondent to file a comment on the same within ten (10) days from notice.
In resolving respondents’ Petition for Certiorari, the CA exercised such judicial discretion by
first instructing respondents to complete the documentary attachments. While PRBFI pointed
out respondents attached the allegedly wrong pleadings to their Compliance, the CA noted the
same, and directed PRBFI to file a Comment, and proceeded to decide respondents’ Petition
85
for Certiorari on the merits. The CA did not act arbitrarily (Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. v.
Noche et. al., G.R. No. 202392, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J).
b. Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules provides that an appeal may be perfected by the
appellant-employer only by the posting of a bond in the equivalent amount of the full monetary
award granted to the appellee-employee. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within
the period set by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Consequently, there should be
no implied approval of a jurisdictional requirement that has not been complied with. Otherwise,
the ground of lack of jurisdiction becomes a waivable defect in procedure.
In this case, the CA was correct in granting respondents' Petition for Certiorari and finding
grave abuse of discretion against the NLRC. PRBFI cannot rely on the mere presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties in favor of the NLRC when the latter gave due
course to its appeal; not when it is faced with a serious imputation of non-compliance from
respondents. Considering that the requirements provided under the Labor Code and its
Implementing Rules are mandatory for purposes of perfecting an appeal, the rule on
presumption of regularity cannot apply (Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. v. Noche et. al., G.R.
No. 202392, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J).
c. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provide that in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
In this case, PRBFI had never really proved with substantial evidence the alleged involvement
of respondents in the contamination of its products. The letter implicating respondents in the
alleged plans to sabotage the PRBFI's operations did not specifically name respondents as the
culprits. Neither did its anonymous writer surface to positively incriminate them. The process
and results of the supposed investigations that PRBFI claims to have conducted on the
contamination incident were unsubstantiated with any written report, document, or
corroborating affidavit on the matter. There was not even any proof that PRBFI's clients had
truly complained of poor product quality or that the PRBFI had actually suffered financial
damage from the incident (Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. v. Noche et. al., G.R. No. 202392,
October 4, 2021, Hernando, J).
d. No, PRBFI cannot do so in a Rule 45 proceeding. A petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court filed before the Supreme Court covers pure questions of law –
questions on the application of the law on a certain set and state of established facts. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Such a noble task is better left to the competence of the
trial courts and appellate courts. However, this is not an inflexible rule. A factual probe into the
case may be conducted in a Rule 45 petition if it falls under the exceptional circumstances laid
out by jurisprudence: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals
86
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. The case at hand does not fall under
any of these exceptions. (Pacific Royal Basic Foods, Inc. v. Noche et. al., G.R. No.
202392, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
87
Problem
A complaint for damages was filed by Sen. Angara against Felino Palafox Jr. Sen Angara alleged that
Palafox, Jr. authored an unsigned letter containing defamatory statements against him. In the
Complaint, Sen. Angara indicated that he was holding office in Pasay City. Palafox, Jr. argued that
venue was improperly laid since the Complaint was filed in the RTC of Pasay City instead of Makati City
where both parties reside. Sen. Angara opposed this motion and pointed out that Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code allows the filing of the civil action where the public officer holds office. In response,
Palafox, Jr. argued that Article 360 is inapplicable because the action involved is a civil action for
damages and not a criminal action for libel. Trial court held that the venue was proper since the filing
of a separate civil action for damages where the public officer holds office is allowed under Article 360.
Thus, the RTC denied Palafox, Jr.'s motion to dismiss for improper venue.
Palafox then filed a petition for certiorari with the issue of whether or not the lower court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the venue as
provided under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable in a civil case for Moral and Exemplary
Damages arising from alleged defamatory statements where no criminal case is commenced or filed.
In his Comment, Sen. Angara raised the following counter arguments: (1) that there is no need for a
criminal case to be filed since Article 360 is clear that a criminal and civil action for damages can be
filed simultaneously or separately and (2) that Palafox, Jr. violated the rule on hierarchy of courts when
he filed the Petition directly to the Supreme Court.
Questions:
a. What is the principle of hierarchy of courts?
b. Was it proper for Palafox to file the petition for certiorari, notwithstanding the CA’s concurrent
jurisdiction on the matter?
Answers:
a. Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct recourse to the Supreme Court is improper
because it is a court of last resort and must remain to be so in order for it to devote its time
and attention to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the overcrowding of its
docket. Nonetheless, the invocation of the Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
has been allowed in certain instances on the ground of special and important reasons clearly
stated in the petition, such as, (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement
of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3) when the challenged
orders were patent nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances
called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the case. (Pemberton vs. De Lima,
784 Phil. 918-941, 2016)
b. No. While the Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, it may only do so when absolutely necessary, or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. Further, such serious and important reasons
must be "clearly stated in the petition.” Here, Palafox, Jr. filed his Petition directly to the
Supreme Court despite the concurrent jurisdiction of the appellate court. He also did not bother
to provide any reason or explanation to justify his noncompliance to the rule on hierarchy of
courts. Hence, it is not proper for Palafox to file the petition for certiorari, as it is a violation on
the rule on hierarchy of courts. (Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551, February 15,
2021, Hernando, J.)
88
Problem
Manolo and his siblings (petitioners) filed a complaint of forcible entry against Palajos along with others
(defendants). While the complaint was pending, the plaintiffs filed a motion to render judgment claiming
that the defendants, therein, either filed their answer beyond the reglementary period or did not file
any answer at all. The Metropolitan Trial Court granted plaintiffs’ motion, except against Palajos whose
answer was admitted. In the petition, the plaintiffs alleged, among others, that they suffered and
continue to suffer compensatory damages in the amount of at least P30,000.00 a month equivalent to
the reasonable value and use of the subject property.
In its decision, the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of plaintiffs finding that they had prior physical
possession of the subject property since they constructed a concrete perimeter fence thereon.
In the RTC, the decision was reversed, stating that the plaintiffs failed to prove prior actual physical
possession. On appeal, the CA granted Manolo’s petition and reversed the RTC ruling, stating that
Manolo had sufficiently proved that he had prior physical possession over the subject property. Palajos
moved for a reconsideration with the CA but was also denied.
Questions:
a. What are the elements of a forcible entry suit?
b. What kind of possession is referred to in forcible entry cases?
c. What is the prescriptive period for forcible entry cases?
Answers:
a. The three elements that must be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to prosper are the
following:
1. plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property before the defendant encroached
on the property;
2. plaintiff was deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
by defendant; and
3. that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the plaintiff learned of his
deprivation of the physical possession of the property, except that when the entry is
through stealth, the one (1)-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or
legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical possession of the property.
(Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832, March 07, 2022)
b. As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to prior physical possession or possession
de facto, not possession de Jure or that arising from ownership. Title is not an issue. As an
exception, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall
be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is intertwined with
the issue of ownership.
Thus, the issue of ownership of the property in forcible entry cases may be provisionally
determined - to determine the issue of possession and only if the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. In addition, "possession can be acquired
not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of
one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right."
(Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832, March 07, 2022)
c. In general, the one-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the date of actual entry on the
property. However, if forcible entry is done through stealth, the period is counted from the time
the plaintiff discovered the entry.
89
In the instant case, the same was filed within one year from the time Manolo and his sibling
discovered the clandestine entry of the defendants on the third week of January while the
complaint was filed on February 23, 2006. Entry in the premises of the subject property without
the consent and knowledge of the registered owner, clearly falls under stealth, which is defined
as "any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain
within the residence of another without permission.” (Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832,
90
Problem
The OMB Field Investigation Office (FIO) filed a complaint for Estafa, Falsification of Public Documents,
and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, against Patdu et al (Patdu). The OMB found probable cause
to charge Patdu et al, stating that they conspired among each other through seemingly separate but
collaborative acts to defraud the government.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition outright for having been filed with the wrong court, stating
that the remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal cases is by filing an original
action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. It ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the criminal aspect
of a case elevated from the OMB. The CA explained that it has jurisdiction over decisions in
administrative disciplinary cases only, which can be assailed via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. However,
Patdu argued that the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770, 93 which states that "No court shall
hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except
the Supreme Court, on pure question of law," has been declared unconstitutional in Carpio-Morales v.
CA for increasing this Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence. He claims that
invalidation in Carpio-Morales is all encompassing as the Court did not make a distinction on whether
the ruling is exclusively applicable to administrative cases. Hence, the ruling in Carpio-Morales likewise
applies to findings of probable cause in criminal cases
Questions:
a. Does the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770 have an effect over appellate procedure
for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases?
b. What is the proper remedy in assailing the OMB’s finding of probable cause?
Answers:
a. No. In Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled that “A thorough reading of
the Carpio-Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited in its application — that
it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. xx
Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an administrative case, it
cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative
or criminal cases.” Further, in a number of cases, it has been held that the decisions or orders
of the Ombudsman finding the existence of probable cause (or the lack thereof) should be
questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the Supreme Court. The
rule was not anchored on Section 14 of R.A. 6770 but was instead a rule prescribed by the
Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers. Therefore, the remedy to assail the OMB's
findings of probable cause in criminal or non-administrative cases is still by filing a petition for
certiorari with this Court, and not with the CA. This doctrine has never been struck down or
abandoned by Carpio-Morales (Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, September 27,
2021)
b. The remedy to assail the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal or non-administrative
cases Is by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
Supreme Court. It remains that OMB resolutions on probable cause in criminal cases are
assailable by filing a petition for certiorari with this Court. This has always been and is still the
prevailing rule. The CA has no jurisdiction over findings of probable cause in criminal cases.
(Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, September 27, 2021, Hernando J.)
91
Problem
This case arose from a complaint filed by Task Force Abono, Field Investigation Office (Task Force) of
the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against respondents’ local government officials of Surigao City:
Casurra is the city mayor, Edera is the city treasurer, Monteros is the city accountant, Geotina is the
city engineer and a member of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC), Elumba is the city general
services officer and a BAC member, and Lozada is the city legal officer and a BAC member. Respondent
Rosemarie V. Palacio (Palacio) is a private individual who is the proprietress of Rosa "Mia" Trading. The
task force alleged that in early 2004, the Department of Budget and Management Office issued a special
allotment order amounting to P723,000,000.00 for the implementation of the Farm Inputs and Farm
Implements Program of the Department of Agriculture. Out of the amount, the City Government of
Surigao, Surigao del Norte received P5,000,000.00.
Thus, the city, through respondents, entered into a contract with Palacio and Rosa "Mia" Trading for
the purchase of 3,332 kilograms of Elements 15-15-30+T.E. Foliar Fertilizer for P1,500 per kilogram,
or a total amount of 4,998,000.00. This was allegedly done without the requisite public bidding under
the procurement law. The city paid Rosa "Mia" Trading in two tranches. Subsequently, the Commission
on Audit (COA) post-audited the transaction. It was discovered that there is a variance between the
cost of fertilizers procured and the cost of fertilizers locally canvassed, resulting to an overpricing. As a
result, the COA issued on June 14, 2006 a Notice of Disallowance (NOD), which was subsequently
amended on March 19, 2007. Thereafter, on July 4, 2011, Task Force Abono filed the Complaint against
respondents for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019, Sections 10, 18, and 21 of RA 9184,
otherwise known as the "Government Procurement Reform Act," and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, as well as administrative charges.
The OMB issued a resolution dated October 5, 2016 finding probable cause for the filing of an
Information for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. This was approved by the Ombudsman on March
22, 2017. On September 11, 2017, an Information dated May 2, 2017 was filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging respondents with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Then on September
22, 2017, respondent Monteros filed a motion to quash information/dismiss the case and a motion (A)
to quash/hold in abeyance the release of the warrant of arrest; and (B) to defer arraignment and other
proceedings. Monteros claimed that her right to speedy disposition of cases was violated because of
the length of time that had passed from the COA investigation in 2006 to the filing of the Information
before the Sandiganbayan in 2017. There was inordinate delay of 11 years and three months on the
part of the OMB.
The prosecution countered that the delay in this case is reasonable. Delay becomes inordinate if there
are arbitrary, vexatious, and oppressive actions or inactions that are attendant to the proceedings within
the context of the particular circumstance’s attendant thereto.
Questions:
a. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in granting the motions filed by respondents, which resulted to the dismissal of
the criminal case and their acquittal.
b. Whether the amount of time of the investigation constitutes inordinate delay.
c. Whether there is a violation of respondents' right to speedy disposition of cases.
92
Answer:
a. No. The Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the criminal cases. At the outset, the Court emphasizes that the dismissal of the
instant criminal case against respondents constitutes acquittal. Thus, it may only be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as done here by the
prosecution. Grave abuse of discretion must be alleged in order for the petition to prosper. It
must be shown that respondent court or tribunal "acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction"; it
must be "so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law." In contention
here is the Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the criminal cases against respondents by reason of
inordinate delay. The Constitution guarantees every person's right to speedy disposition of
cases. Article III, Section 16 states: Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. (People v.
Hon. Sandiganbayan, Alfonzo Servana Casurra, et al., G.R. No. 239878, February 28, 2022,
Hernando, J.)
b. Yes. Applying Sections 3 (f) and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the graft investigation officer
shall have 10 days after the investigation to determine probable cause; then, he has five days
from resolution to forward the records of the case to the Ombudsman, who shall act upon the
resolution within 10 days from receipt. Here, it is clear that the prescribed periods were not
observed. As can be gleaned, the case was submitted for resolution on November 4, 2013. But
looking closely, records show that the last pleading was submitted on June 14, 2012, when
respondents submitted their position papers. As there were no further submissions or orders
for parties to submit further pleadings as well as hearings, the case should have been submitted
for resolution as early as June 14, 2012. It was only on October 5, 2016 when the OMB issued
a resolution finding probable cause, which is almost three years after the case was submitted
for resolution, or more than four years from the date the last pleadings were submitted —
clearly way beyond the 10-day period. Further, the Ombudsman herself approved the resolution
only on March 22, 2017, which is almost six months after the issuance of the resolution —
again way beyond the five-day and 10-day period respectively prescribed for the transmittal of
the records to her office and for her to act upon the resolution. (People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,
Alfonzo Servana Casurra, et al., G.R. No. 239878, February 28, 2022, Hernando, J.)
c. Yes. the right to speedy disposition of cases must be timely raised. In Catamco and Alarilla v.
Sandiganbayan, the Court, applying Cagang, considered the filing of a motion for
reconsideration of the OMB resolution finding probable cause as a timely invocation of Monteros
before the OMB sufficient for purposes of determining whether the respondents' right to speedy
disposition had been violated. Her invocation of the right in the motion is deemed to cover the
other respondents as they are co-respondents in a single case and it assails a single resolution
that applies to all of them. In any event, worthy of great consideration is respondents'
immediate filing of the motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan after the filing of the
Information. These circumstances show that respondents did not in any way sleep or waive
their right to speedy disposition of cases. Considering all the foregoing, respondents' right to
speedy disposition of cases was undoubtedly infringed. The Sandiganbayan therefore did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal case against them. (People v.
93
Hon. Sandiganbayan, Alfonzo Servana Casurra, et al., G.R. No. 239878, February 28,
2022, Hernando, J.)
94
Problem
BIR-Manila filed a criminal complaint against the President and the General manager of Topsun, and
the Office of the City Prosecutor (“OCP”) recommended the filing of an Information against them for
violation of NIRC. The Court of Tax Appeals (“CTA”) observed that in the DOJ Resolution attached to
the Information, the President and the General Manager of Topsun were charged with failure to pay
overdue "deficiency VAT". However, the Information stated that they failed to pay "deficiency income
tax" in the said amounts and the criminal information for violation of the Tax Code was without the
written approval of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue (CIR).
CTA ordered the Assistant City Prosecutor (“ACP”) to make the necessary formal correction in the
Information against the accused, the President and the General manager of Topsun. However, ACP still
failed to attach the CIR's recommendation for criminal prosecution of the accused. Thus, the CTA, in
its Resolution dated December 14, 2009, dismissed the criminal complaint for failure of ACP to submit
a certified true copy of the Memorandum of CIR to prosecute and conduct proceedings. The BIR Main
Office received the Notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division on December
17, 2009; while the Office of the City Prosecutor received the same on December 21, 2009. The
prosecution filed its Motion for Reconsideration only on January 18, 2010.
Questions:
a. Has the December 14, 2009 Resolution already become final?
b. Whether the period for the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration has not yet run since it did
not receive a proper notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First Division?
c. Whether the act of the ACP cannot be imputed against the State as it concerns the exercise of
its inherent power to tax?
Answers:
a. Yes, the December 14, 2009 Resolution had already attained finality.
Under Section 1, Rule 15 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, or Revised Rules of the CTA, states that
an aggrieved party shall file a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from the date he/she
received notice of the assailed decision, resolution or order of the court in question. The
doctrine of immutability of judgment means that the judgments or orders become final
and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment
becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected
or no motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. The finality of the order becomes final by
operation of law.
Here, the December 14, 2009 Resolution had already attained finality due to ACP’s failure to
file a Motion for Reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period allowed under the
CTA's revised internal rules. From the date of receipt, BIR-Manila only had until January 4,
2010 to file its Motion for Reconsideration. BIR, however, filed its motion only on January 18,
2010 or 14 days beyond the prescribed period. By virtue of the doctrine of immutability, the
said Resolution can no longer be reviewed nor modified even if it is meant to correct an
erroneous conclusion of law and facts of the said tax court.
Thus, since the Resolution of the CTA First Division has already attained finality, it now becomes
immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect. The Resolution of
the CTA has already become final because of BIR’s belated filing of its Motion for
Reconsideration. (People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019, Hernando, J.)
b. No, BIR received the proper notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of the CTA First
Division, through its counsel, ACP.
95
It is settled that when a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices
must be made upon his/her counsels or one of them. Otherwise, notice to the client and to any
other lawyer, not the counsel of record, is not notice in law.
Here, BIR, through ACP, was properly served notice of the December 14, 2009 Resolution of
the CTA First Division. The BIR Main Office received the Notice of the December 14, 2009
Resolution of the CTA First Division on December 17, 2009; while the Office of the City
Prosecutor received the same on December 21, 2009. Hence, the prosecution had until January
4, 2010 and January 5, 2010, respectively, to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The
prosecution filed its Motion for Reconsideration only on January 18, 2010 or 14 days late.
The services of notice made to the OCP through ACP and the BIR Main Office, respectively, are
deemed proper and are thus service of notice to BIR-Manila itself. (Cervantes v. City Service
Corporation, G.R. No. 191616, April 18, 2016, as cited in People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164,
December 04, 2019, Hernando, J.)
c. No, the act of the ACP can be imputed against the State even if it concerns the exercise of its
inherent power to tax.
Settled is the rule that the negligence and mistakes of a counsel are binding on the client. This
is so because a counsel, once retained, has the implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at
least, incidental to the prosecution and management of the suit on behalf of his/her client. As
such, any act or omission by counsel within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes
of the law, as the act or omission of the client himself/herself.
Here, the alleged negligence of ACP binds BIR-Manila. Had ACP exercised that standard of care
"which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business," then it would have become
aware of the previous resolutions issued by the CTA First Division ordering ACP to submit the
required documents.
Hence, ACP’s negligence can be imputed against the State. (Bejarasco, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
159781, February 02, 2011, as cited in People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019,
Hernando, J.)
(People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019)
96
Problem
Mary Jane Veloso (Mary Jane) was arrested upon her arrival at Adisucipto International Airport in
Yogyakarta, Indonesia for carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin in her travel luggage. She was tried and
later convicted for drug trafficking under Indonesian jurisdiction and sentenced to death by firing squad.
Mary Jane traveled to Indonesia upon Maria Cristina Sergio (Cristina) and Julius Lacanilao's (Julius)
false promise of work abroad.
Cristina and Julius were eventually charged before a Philippine court with Qualified Trafficking of
Persons under Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042, and Estafa under the
Revised Penal Code. Believing Mary Jane to be an essential witness, the Philippine prosecutors made a
daring move — they requested the Indonesian government to suspend the execution of Mary Jane's
sentence in order to take her testimony in Cristina and Julius' Qualified Trafficking in Persons case. The
move succeeded. Indonesia, however, required that Mary Jane remain within the confines of their
territory, and that the questions to be propounded to her be put in writing. Faced with these conditions,
the prosecution resorted to deposition by written interrogatories.
On October 9, 2019, the Court affirmed the trial court and rendered a Decision allowing the taking of
Mary Jane's testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories. The October 9, 2019 Decision
attained finality on March 4, 2020. However, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), now brings before the Court an Urgent Omnibus Motion (Motion), seeking to
supplement the October 9, 2019 Decision with specific instructions as to the conduct of the taking of
depositions by Mary Jane by written interrogatories.
Questions:
a. Can the Motion be granted?
b. Does Rule 23 apply in criminal cases?
c. Whether Mary Jane may be allowed to avail written interrogatories as a mode of taking her
testimony?
Answers:
a. No. The Motion cannot be treated as an exception to the general rule.
In general, final and executory judgments are immutable, unalterable in any respect, and
irreversible even if correctible. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of
occasional errors, [judgments or resolutions] of a court must reach a point of finality set by the
law. The noble purpose is to write finis to [a] dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Established
exceptions to this rule are (a) correction of clerical errors; (b) judgments nunc pro tunc; and
(c) void judgments.
What the OSG requests is a formulation of guidelines in the conduct of the taking of Mary
Jane's deposition to adapt to the conditions set by Indonesia. This task is not at all a mere
correction of clerical error but an amendment of the October 9, 2019 Decision. There is also
no move to nullify this Decision, much less is the Court inclined to strike the same as void.
Neither can it be addressed with a judgment nunc pro tunc. A nunc pro tunc entry in practice
is an entry made now of something which was actually previously done, to have effect as of
the former date. Its office is not to supply omitted action by the court, but to supply an omission
in the record of action really had, but omitted through inadvertence or mistake. There was no
inadvertent omission. The Decision was issued upon full consideration of all the documents
submitted. (People vs. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, March 21, 2022, Hernando, J.)
97
b. Yes. The extraordinary factual circumstances of the case of Mary Jane warrant the resort to
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court Nowhere in the present Rules on Criminal Procedure does it state
how a deposition, of a prosecution witness who is at the same time convicted of a grave offense
by final judgment and imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction, may be taken to perpetuate the
testimony of such witness. The Rules, in particular, are silent as to how to take a testimony of
a witness who is unable to testify in open court because he is imprisoned in another country.
Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Although
the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court
holds that it may be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling
reason.
Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court sees no
reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the
interest of substantial justice and fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony. (People vs. Sergio
and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, March 21, 2022, Hernando, J.)
c. Yes. The deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process.
To disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties
have their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow a fair process
of decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is
accorded this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal
prosecutions. It must likewise be given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a
charge. (People vs. Sergio and Lacanilao, G.R. No. 240053, March 21, 2022,
Hernando, J.)
98
Problem
On June 25, 2003, Assistant Commissioner Salazar of the (BIR) issued a Letter of Authority (LOA)
authorizing the BIR revenue officers to examine the books of accounts of Glo Herbal Trading and
Manufacturing (“Glo Herbal”) for taxable years 2000 to 2002 as it allegedly sold millions of its product
during the said years. However, despite receipt of the LOA, Ms. Tuyay, the registered owner of Glo
Herbal failed to submit the books of account. The BIR issued assessment notices against Tuyay for
deficiency income tax and value-added tax (VAT).
On October 2009, BIR filed a criminal complaint against Tuyay, and Information against Tuyay were
filed with the CTA:
1. The criminal case for violation of Section 254 of the NIRC before CTA First Division (“CTA Crim.
Case No. 0-154”); and
2. The criminal case for violation of Section 255 of the NIRC before CTA Third Division (“CTA Crim.
Case No. 0-155”).
A filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she was immune from criminal liability in view of her
availment of the tax amnesty under RA 9480.
The CTA First Division in CTA Crim. Case No. 0-155, which dismissed the criminal case filed against her
for violation of Section 254 of the NIRC. because she availed of the tax amnesty. Thus, on October 4,
2011, the CTA Third Division issued a Resolution dismissing CTA Crim. Case No. 0-154 against
respondent for violation of Section 255 of the NIRC in view of her availment of the tax amnesty.
Tuyay appealed the dismissal to CTA En Banc via Petition for Review under Rule 43. CTA En Banc
dismissed the Petition. The CTA En Banc resolved to dismiss the Petition because BIR was represented
by the BIR Special Prosecutors, and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
BIR filed a motion for reconsideration (“MR”) citing deputization orders deputizing BIR Special
Prosecutors to continue with the prosecution of appealed tax case before the CTA. CTA En Banc denied
the MR.
BIR filed a second MR attaching copies of the deputization orders and RMC No. 25- 2010. However, for
being a prohibited pleading, the CTA En Banc denied BIR’s second MR.
Thus, BIR filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65, interposing grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the CTA.
Questions:
a. Is the certiorari filed under Rule 65 the correct remedy in this case?
b. Whether the BIR has the authority to institute and prosecute a tax evasion case before CTA?
c. Whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA Division when it dismissed
the complaint against Tuyay because she availed of the tax amnesty?
Answer:
a. No, BIR availed of the wrong remedy.
A special civil action for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will lie only in the
absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Thus, if the remedy of an appeal is available, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will not
prosper as it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
99
While the Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 petition as a Rule 45 petition under the
following circumstances:
1. if the petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition under Rule 45;
2. when errors of judgment are averred; and
3. when there is justifiable reason for the relaxation of the rule, 60 this cannot be done in
the instant case because none of the circumstances are present.
Here, the remedy of an appeal was available. BIR availed of the wrong remedy because instead
of filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Thus, for being a wrong remedy, the instant petition merits an outright dismissal. (People v.
Tuyay, G.R. No. 206759, December 1, 2021, Hernando, J.)
b. No, it was the Solicitor General, not BIR, that has the authority to institute and prosecute a tax
evasion case before CTA.
It is the Solicitor General who has the primary responsibility to appear for the government in
appellate proceedings. The only exceptions are:
(1) when the government is adversely affected by the contrary position taken by the OSG;
(2) when there is an express authorization by the OSG deputizing legal officers to assist the
Solicitor General and appear or represent the government in cases involving their respective
offices; and
(3) when the dismissal of the petition could have lasting effect on government tax revenues
where the issue raised was whether the revenue regulation issued by the CIR has exceeded,
on constitutional grounds, the allowable limits of legislative delegation.
In this case, none of the exceptions apply. When BOR filed its petition for review before the
CTA En Banc, it was represented by the BIR Special Prosecutors, and not by the OSG, which
has the primary responsibility to appear for the government in appellate proceedings. Although
BIR, in its second motion for reconsideration, was able to attach copies of the required
documents, this did not cure the defect.
First of all, the filing of a second motion of reconsideration is not allowed under Section 7,
65 Rule 15 of the 2005 Revised Rules of the CTA. Neither does it toll the running of the
period to appeal.
Second, a perusal of the deputization orders shows that the request for deputization of BIR
Special Prosecutors was received and approved by the OSG only months after the filing of
the petition for review.
Thus, at the time the petition for review was filed, the BIR Special Prosecutors were not yet
deputized by the OSG. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette
Factor as cited in People v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206759, December 1, 2021, Hernando, J.)
c. No, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA Division when it dismissed
the complaint against Tuyay because she availed of the tax amnesty.
As held in jurisprudence, a comparison of Section 8 (e) of RA 9480 and Section 5.5 of its IRR
readily show that the DOJ inserted the phrase "filed in court or in the [DOJ]" in the IRR; thus,
DOJ in effect expanded the law, and added another exception by disqualifying those with
pending criminal complaints before the DOJ for tax evasion and other criminal offenses under
Chapter II of Title X of the NIRC. This is a clear deviation from the law as there is nothing in
100
Section 8 (e) of RA 9480 to indicate that those with pending criminal complaints with the DOJ
are also excluded from availing the tax amnesty.
Here, Tuyay availed of the tax amnesty under RA 9480 and complied with all the requirements
thereof. She was not disqualified to avail of the tax amnesty because at the time she availed
of it, there was no pending criminal case against her before any court as it was only in October
2009 that the criminal cases were filed against her with the CTA. Even though there was already
a pending criminal complaint against her before the DOJ, such fact cannot disqualify her from
availing of the tax amnesty because this is not included in the list of exceptions under Section
8 of RA 9480. Having availed of the tax amnesty and having fully complied with all its
requirements and conditions, Tuyay is indeed entitled to the immunities and privileges
conferred by RA 9480, which includes her immunity from criminal liability under the NIRC
arising from her failure to pay internal revenue taxes for taxable year 2005 and prior years.
The CTA Third Division, therefore, committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
criminal case against Tuyay because she availed of the tax amnesty under RA 9480. (People
v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206759, December 1, 2021, Hernando, J.)
101
Problem
Sylvia de Luna (de Luna), PHAI’s Office Supervisor, was preventively suspended for 40 days, in excess
of the 30-day allowable preventive suspension, while Nenita Bundoc (Bundoc), PHAI’s Cashier, was not
afforded the procedural due process requirement by PHAI. Both of them were dismissed because of
PHAI’s loss of confidence in them. The Labor Arbiter found that the termination of both parties was
legal since it was based on a just cause, and that due process was observed. It emphasized that a trial-
type hearing is not at all times required as long as the parties were given the opportunity to be heard,
as in the case of de Luna and Bundoc. The NLRC affirmed in toto the findings of the Arbiter and relied
on the auditor’s affidavit and exhibits which clearly showcased the fraudulent acts and misappropriation
committed by de Luna and Bundoc. The appellate court extended its review on the factual matters of
the case and modified the NLRC decision insofar as the award of nominal damages and payment of 10-
day salary, allowances and benefits. With regard to the matter of preventive suspension and the due
process requirement, the appellate court found that de Luna’s preventive suspension exceeded the
allowable number of days, and PHAI failed to comply with the procedural due process requirement as
regards Bundoc. PHAI contended that Hon. Court of Appeals exceeded its appellate jurisdiction by
making itself a trier of facts in its review of the case under petition for certiorari (Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court), considering that it can do so only when the factual finding of the Labor Arbiter contradicts or
are at variance with those of the NLRC.
Questions:
a. Did the Court of Appeals exceed its appellate jurisdiction by extending its review to the factual
matters of the case?
b. Is the extension of preventive suspension of De Luna allowed by law?
c. Was due process observed in the case of Bundoc?
Answer:
a. No. Factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great respect, but the appellate court is not
precluded from reviewing evidence alleged to be arbitrarily considered or otherwise disregarded
by the former.
It is settled that in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the issues are limited to
(1) errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the factual findings complained
of are not supported by the evidence on record; (3) when it is necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice; (4) when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the
LA; and (5) when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case.
To make this finding, the CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to determine if the
NLRC ruling had basis in evidence. (Philam Homeowners Association, Inc., and Marcia Caguiat
vs. Sylvia de Luna and Nenita Bundoc, G.R. No. 209437, March 17, 2021, Hernando, J.)
b. No. Preventive suspension shall last only up to 30 days. Afterwhich, the employer shall reinstate
the worker by actual or payroll reinstatement. In the latter case, the worker shall not be bound
to reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer decides, after
completion of the hearing, to dismiss the worker.
In this case, the appellate court found that De Luna's preventive suspension lasted for 40 days.
While the dismissal was valid, PHAI should have paid De Luna her salary for 10 days
corresponding to the number of days in excess of the 30-day period of preventive suspension.
(Philam Homeowners Association, Inc., and Marcia Caguiat vs. Sylvia de Luna and Nenita
Bundoc, G.R. No. 209437, March 17, 2021, Hernando, J.)
c. No. For a dismissal to be valid, it must comply with the substantive and procedural due process.
Procedural due process consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
102
Here, while the dismissal is based on just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, such as
loss of trust and confidence, the termination was procedurally infirm because PHAI (the
company) failed to prove that Bundoc was notified and given the chance to explain. Thus,
Bundoc was awarded nominal damages. (Philam Homeowners Association, Inc., and
Marcia Caguiat vs. Sylvia de Luna and Nenita Bundoc, G.R. No. 209437, March 17,
2021, Hernando, J.)
103
Problem
PCIB and LA Navigation are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The obligations became overdue, but the respondents failed to pay despite PCIB’s repeated demands.
Hence, PCIB filed a complaint and the proceedings ensued. The trial court issued an Order recognizing
the parties' agreement to enter into a partial stipulation of facts to simplify the issues. The parties
submitted their Partial Stipulation of Facts. During the trial, PCIB presented Atty. Reyes as witness.
PCIB then filed its Offer of Documentary Evidence, which the trial court admitted as part of the
testimony of its witness despite the respondents' objection and opposition. The respondents on the
other hand did not present any witnesses, but submitted documentary evidence, which the trial court
likewise admitted.
After the parties' submission of their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for decision. The
trial court subsequently ordered Court Stenographers to submit their transcripts of stenographic notes
(TSN) on the case. However, they failed to do so since court records were destroyed in a fire. The now
RTC, Branch 6 of Manila thus ordered the parties to appear to discuss the proper disposition of the
case. They were able to provide copies of the other TSNs. However, the TSNs which pertained to the
direct examination of Atty. Reyes, PCIB's witness, was not restored. Several postponements and re-
settings of the trial followed. PCIB again asked for another re-setting, stating that its witness refused
to testify due to personal reasons; it asked for re-setting for it to present a different witness.
The RTC finally dismissed the case. It ruled that PCIB failed to prove its case by preponderance of
evidence despite several opportunities afforded to it. The trial court held that it cannot base its findings
on Atty. Reyes' testimony without considering his direct examination. The CA agreed with the RTC that
the case cannot be fairly and justly disposed of without the records being complete and intact, especially
since all the parties were asserting diametrically opposed versions of the facts.
Questions:
a. Does the instant petition clearly present questions of fact?
b. Whether the instant case should be dismissed?
Answer:
a. Yes. The instant Petition clearly presents questions of fact. The general rule is that the SC has
no jurisdiction to resolve questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to
exceptions laid down in case law. There is a question of fact when the issue at hand invites a
review of the evidence presented. The test, therefore, of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is "whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of
fact. We find that the issues raised by PCIB are clearly questions of fact. In so ruling, the trial
court had already made an examination of the available evidence of the parties and determined
that there was no preponderance of evidence. The trial court still afforded PCIB to present a
new witness, and it may have been possible to have a completely different ruling favorable to
the bank had it presented its new witness. But as stated, this was not the situation because
PCIB failed to do so. Hence, the dismissal of this case can be considered as the consequence
that PCIB must suffer for its failure to present a new witness despite several opportunities
afforded to it. (Philippine Commercial International Bank Vs. Laguna Navigation, Inc., Benigno
D. Lim, Carmen Lizares Lim, And Vicente F. Aldanese, G.R. No. 195236, February 8, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
b. Yes. PCIB failed to prove its case by preponderance of evidence despite several opportunities
afforded to it. Preponderance of evidence is the required quantum of evidence in civil cases; it
is defined as the evidence more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than that offered
as opposition thereto.
104
Here, in so ruling, the trial court had already made an examination of the available evidence of
the parties and determined that there was no preponderance of evidence. The trial court even
still afforded PCIB to present a new witness.
Hence, the dismissal of this case can be considered as the consequence that PCIB must suffer
for its failure to present a new witness despite several opportunities afforded to it. (Philippine
Commercial International Bank Vs. Laguna Navigation, Inc., Benigno D. Lim,
Carmen Lizares Lim, And Vicente F. Aldanese, G.R. No. 195236, February 8, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
105
Problem
Daradar entered into a Deed of Promise to sell with PNB covering 2 parcels of land along with its
improvements owned by PNB. Daradar failed to pay the yearly amortizations and fees, thus PNB
rescinded the Deed through a Notarial Notice of Rescission. Daradar filed an action for Annulment to
Rescission, Accounting, and Damages against PNB in the Iloilo RTC to annul the notarial rescission of
the deed. Daradar failed to appear at the scheduled hearing, as such the RTC provisionally dismissed
the case without prejudice (First Order). No motion for reconsideration was filed against the First Order.
After the lapse of 4 years, RTC motu proprio issued an Order (Second Order) finally dismissing the case
on the ground of respondent’s failure to prosecute the case under Sec. 3 Rule 17 of the Rules of Court,
in view of Daradar’s failure to revive or reinstate the case even after the lapse of 4 years from the first
dismissal.
Daradar filed another complaint for declaration of nullity of notarial rescission with the RTC. PNB moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the 2nd order had already dismissed the case for failure of
Daradar to prosecute thereby barring the filing of subsequent filing of the case on the ground of res
judicata.
RTC ruled in favor of PNB. Daradar appealed to the CA which ruled in favor of Daradar stating that the
1st order dismissing the case operated to divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the case, thus the
2nd order was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Questions:
a. Is the contention of PNB correct that the 2nd order barred subsequent filings of the case on
the ground of res judicata?
Answer:
a. Yes, PNB’s contention that the case had attained finality through the 2nd order is correct and
that subsequent filing for the same case is barred by res judicata. In this case, the 1st order
that was made was merely interlocutory as the 1st order was merely a provisional dismissal
and it did not completely dispose of the case and did not decide with finality the rights and
obligations of the parties. The 2nd order has attained finality when the respondent, Daradar,
failed to appeal or move for reconsideration the order provided by the Court. The 2nd order
now bars the revival of the case through a new complaint. Under the principle of res judicata,
a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as
to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. For a claim of res judicata to
prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2)
the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. All elements of res judicata is present in the
case. As such, PNB’s contention is correct. (Philippine National Bank v. Daradar, G.R. No.
180203, June 28, 2021, Hernando, J.)
106
Problem
Spouses Salvador and Alma (Alma) Fontanoza obtained a loan from the Ozamiz Branch of the Philippine
National Bank (PNB). To secure the loan, they mortgaged a parcel of land located at Barangay Dao,
Mahayag, Zamboanga del Sur covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-29979.
Since the Fontanozas failed to pay, PNB foreclosed the property. On January 8, 2002, as the sole bidder
in the public auction, PNB acquired the lot for P236,000.00. PNB registered the sale on January 28,
2002. However, the Fontanozas failed to redeem the property. More than nine years later,
specifically on July 18, 2011, PNB filed an ex-parte petition for issuance of writ of possession before
the RTC. The RTC, ruled that any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be used as a legal ground to refuse the issuance of a writ of possession. Even if there is a
pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or foreclosure, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of
possession without prejudice to the outcome of the annulment case.
Alma appealed the case and the CA held that aside from PNB's delay in applying for a writ, Alma
remained in possession of the property. Although she is not a third person to the mortgage, Alma is
claiming the property as a purchaser and no longer as a mortgagor.
Questions:
a. Is the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of PNB unjust, as the issue of repurchase has
not yet been settled?
b. Whether a writ of possession issued under a resolution that has already become final and
executory can still be disturbed by the filing of a motion to recall (or by a subsequent Court of
Appeals decision ordering the trial court's denial of the said motion to recall to be set aside on
the ground that the previous issuance of the writ was unjust)?
c. Is the Barican case applicable in this case?
d. Was Alma’s right to due process violated as she was not notified of PNB’s petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession?
Answer:
a. No. To reiterate, "the duty of the court to issue a writ of possession is ministerial and may not
be stayed by a pending action for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself. The only
exception is when a third party is actually holding the property by adverse title or right. To be
considered in adverse possession, the third-party possessor must have done so in his own right
and not as a mere successor or transferee of the debtor or mortgagor." Although Alma is
supposedly in possession of the property, she cannot be considered as a third party who held
the property adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor simply because she herself was
the mortgagor who failed to redeem the lot. This is notwithstanding PNB's delay, for reasons
only known to it, in filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. While Alma can no
longer question the issuance of a writ of possession in PNB's favor, she is not without recourse.
She can still assert her claims in the separate suit which she filed before the trial court.
Otherwise stated, the ruling in this case will not be conclusive on her claim of repurchase. Thus,
it is within the trial court's discretion in the separate case to make a final determination
regarding Alma's allegation of ownership over the property. (PNB v. Fontanoza, G.R. No.
213673, March 2, 2022, Hernando, J.)
b. No. The Court stresses that as a rule, a final judgment is immutable and unalterable. It cannot
be disturbed or modified by any court even if the purpose of the alteration is to rectify perceived
errors of fact or law. The doctrine of immutability of judgment is for the purpose of avoiding
delay in the administration of justice and of putting an end to judicial controversies which
cannot drag perpetually. Pursuant to this doctrine, courts have the ministerial duty to enforce
judgment that already attained finality. Notably, there are established exceptions to the
foregoing rule, namely: (i) the correction of clerical errors; (ii) presence of nunc pro tunc
107
entries, which cause no prejudice to any party; (iii) void judgment; and, (iv) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the judgment which renders the execution unjust
and inequitable.
In the case at bench, the aforementioned exceptions are not present. To stress, the August
17, 2011 Resolution of the RTC which granted PNB's petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession already became final and executory on September 15, 2011, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Finality dated November 21, 2011. Alma filed an opposition more than two months
after the issuance of the writ became final and executory. Although this matter was not
immediately raised in the RTC, it is a vital point which must not be overlooked since it
demonstrated that Alma cannot simply object to the issuance of the writ by filing a mere
opposition or motion. (PNB v. Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673, March 2, 2022, Hernando, J.)
c. No. In Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court , the Court denied DBP's application for writ of
possession, and upheld the right of Spouses Barican, the possessors of the property. This is
because DBP had knowledge of the sale with assumption of mortgage between the judgment
debtor and Spouses Barican, and even received payments from them updating the loan. In
addition, the Court found that the judgment debtor was never in possession of the property,
and that there was a pending civil case between the DBP and Spouses Barican concerning
ownership to the foreclosed property. The Court ruled that under the circumstances, the
issuance of a writ of possession is no longer ministerial on the part of the trial court.
Here, although Alma is supposedly in possession of the property, she cannot be considered as
a third party who held the property adversely to the judgment debtor or mortgagor simply
because she herself was the mortgagor who failed to redeem the lot. This is notwithstanding
PNB's delay, for reasons only known to it, in filing a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession. (PNB v. Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673, March 2, 2022, Hernando, J.)
d. No. Her contention is without merit. "To be sure, no hearing is necessary prior to the issuance
of a writ of possession, as it is a proceeding wherein relief is granted without giving the person
against whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its very nature, an ex-parte
petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale.
It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of
a wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."
To conclude, while Alma can no longer question the issuance of a writ of possession in PNB's
favor, she is not without recourse. She can still assert her claims in the separate suit which she
filed before the trial court. Otherwise stated, the ruling in this case will not be conclusive on
her claim of repurchase. Thus, it is within the trial court's discretion in the separate case to
make a final determination regarding Alma's allegation of ownership over the property.
(Philippine National Bank v. Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673, March 2, 2022, Hernando,
J.)
108
Problem
Spouses Nestor and Felicidad Victor and Spouses Reynaldo and Gavina Victor (Respondent Spouses)
filed a Complaint against PNB before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Said complaint questioned the
mortgage and transfer of title in favor of PNB. PNB filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. The
Respondent Spouses filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. PNB failed to file any opposition.
The complaint was deemed submitted for decision. The RTC adjudged PNB's extra-judicial foreclosure
proceedings as null and void which canceled PNB's title on the subject properties. RTC denied PNB's
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration because of failure to strictly adhere
to the 15-day period provided under the rules. The RTC denied PNB’s Motion to Nullify Proceedings
with Opposition to Motion for Issuance for Writ of Execution, because PNB's counsel failed to appear
during the hearing for the said motion. The RTC granted the Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution.
PNB filed a Petition for Relief contending that it was deprived of due process because it failed to present
its defenses due to the gross negligence of its previous counsel.
Questions:
a. Was PNB’s Petition for Relief filed within the reglementary period?
b. Did the acts of PNB’s previous counsel deprived PNB of due process to merit relaxation of
technical rules?
Answer:
a. No. PNB’s Petition for Relief was not filed within the reglementary period. The RTC acted within
the bounds of the law in issuing the Order which denied PNB’s petition for relief from judgment.
The following requirements must be shown in order for a petition for relief from judgment to
prosper. First, no adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or an appeal is available to
the petitioner. Second, the petitioner was prevented through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence from availing said remedies. Third, the petitioner should comply with the
twin-period of within 60 days from the time the petitioner learned of the judgment or final
order, and not more than six months after the judgment or final order was entered, in filing
the petition for relief from judgment. The twin-period is mandatory, jurisdictional, and must be
strictly complied with, otherwise, the petition may be dismissed outright. PNB failed to file its
petition for relief from judgment within the twin-period. The Petition for Relief from judgment
was filed beyond the 60th day.
PNB's averment, that the reckoning period should have been counted from the time it had
knowledge of its counsel's gross negligence when it received the trial court's denial of the
Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration, is misplaced. It has been a
long-standing principle that notice sent to a counsel of record is equivalent to notice to the
client-litigant. PNB's failure to observe the twin-period alone merits the outright dismissal of its
Petition for Relief. (PNB vs. Spouses Victor, G.R. No. 207377, July 27, 2022, Hernando, J.)
b. No. The alleged negligent acts of PNB's counsel did not deprive it of due process or the
opportunity to be heard as it was in fact able to submit its answer with compulsory counterclaim
to the complaint, and subsequently the trial court resolved the case upon motion for judgment
on the pleadings. The essence of due process is to afford parties a reasonable opportunity to
be heard in order to defend and support their case, and the prohibition points to the total and
absolute absence of such opportunity to be heard. PNB, by filing its answer with compulsory
counterclaim, had a chance to forward its case, hence, it was not deprived of due process, and
resultantly there was no outright deprivation of its property. (Philippine National Bank v.
Spouses Victor, G.R. No. 207377, July 27, 2022, Hernando, J.)
109
Problem
Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) instituted several expropriation proceedings for
acquisition of lands needed for the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) Project. The Subject
Properties were originally owned by Belmonte Agro- Industrial Development Corporation (BAIDECO).
BAIDECO mortgaged the properties to PVB. The latter had since foreclosed on the mortgages and
bought the same at a public auction. BAIDECO failed to redeem the foreclosed properties. Thereafter,
PVB was placed under liquidation and subsequently rehabilitated. After the enactment of Republic Act
No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), The Subject
Properties were placed under the coverage of the CARP and consequently distributed to the Saguns
who are farmer-beneficiaries. Afterwards, BCDA instituted two expropriation proceedings seeking to
expropriate the Subject Properties. After learning of the expropriation cases filed by the BCDA, PVB
filed motions to intervene in the cases. PVB asserts that as the owner of the Subject Properties, it is
entitled to receive just compensation either pursuant to the SCTEX expropriation or CARP expropriation.
Questions:
a. Is PVB’s contention correct?
b. Are the Saguns entitled to receive just compensation?
Answer:
a. No. It is settled that the requirement of just compensation is not satisfied by the mere deposit
with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by the LBP or the DAR,
and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set
forth by RA 6657. What is material is the fact that the landowner remains unpaid
notwithstanding the taking of the property. Here, it is evident that PVB, when the SCTEX
expropriation was initiated and to date, has yet to receive just compensation for the taking of
the Subject Properties pursuant to its coverage under CARP. In sum, considering that the
Subject Properties were already distributed to the Saguns when the SCTEX expropriation was
initiated, PVB has to receive just compensation pursuant to CARP. It no longer has an interest
or right over the Subject Properties when BCDA filed the case for the SCTEX expropriation.
(Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, Marcelo Sagun, and
Edner Sagun, G.R. no. 217492, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
b. Yes. As farmer-beneficiaries they are entitled to receive just compensation. Section 24 of the
CARL provides that the rights and responsibilities of farmer-beneficiaries shall commence from
their receipt of a duly registered CLOA, and such certificate by itself is a document evidencing
ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by the DAR. Certificates of title
serve as evidence of an indefeasible title, which becomes incontrovertible after expiration of
the one (1) year period from the issuance of the registration decree, upon which it was based.
It is settled that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings, such as EPs and
CLOAs, are as indefeasible as those issued in judicial proceedings. In this case, the Saguns had
already fully paid LBP for the Subject Properties, and the records are bereft of any indication
that they have pending violations on the conditions for acquiring the same under the CARP. As
registered property owners, the Saguns are entitled to the protection given to every Torrens
title holder. Their rights may only be forfeited in case of violations of agrarian laws, as well as
noncompliance with the restrictions and conditions under the CARL. (Philippine Veterans
Bank v. Bases Conversion and Development Authority, Marcelo Sagun, and Edner
Sagun, G.R. no. 217492, October 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
110
Problem:
The MTC Branch 3 of San Fernando City, Pampanga held Miranda et al. to be the registered owners of
24 parcels of land located in Brgy. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, to which Pineda, et al. have
surreptitiously and arbitrarily occupied without the respondents Miranda et al.’s knowledge and consent.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal before the RTC Branch 42 which affirmed with modification
the MTC’s decision. Miranda, et al, then, filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution which was
granted by the MTC on Feb. 14, 2000. On May 9, 2006, they filed a complaint for Revival of Judgment
holding that the Writ of Execution (issued on Feb 14, 2000) was not implemented within five years
from the finalization of the decision and argued that the judgment was not yet barred by the statute of
limitations. On the other hand, Pineda et al, in their answer, averred that the complaint for revival of
judgment should be dismissed on the ground that the case does not fall within the ambit of unlawful
detainer. Thus, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, they added that the complaint
must have been filed with the MTC, which was the court that rendered the decision sought to be
revived. Pineda et al. subsequently filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution with the MTC for failure
of Miranda et al. to implement the Writ of Execution within five years from the time of its issuance.
In its decision dated March 20, 2009, the RTC Branch 43 ruled in favor of Miranda et al. stating that
the RTC Decision (Branch 42) dated May 17, 1999 can still be revived because the filing of the complaint
for revival of judgment was still within the 10-year period. The petitioners then elevated the matter to
the CA through a petition for Mandamus and Prohibition under Rule 65 (Rules of Court) to compel the
RTC to give due course to their Notice of Appeal.
Questions:
a. Is an action for revival of judgment the proper action for enforcing a judgment which could
no longer be enforced by a motion?
b. Explain the nature of an action for revival of judgment.
c. Why is a Petition for Annulment of Judgment not a proper action in this case?
Answers:
a. YES. An action for revival of judgment is an action with the exclusive purpose of enforcing a
judgment which could no longer be enforced by a motion. Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
provides that a final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five
(5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitation, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also
be enforced by a motion within five (5) years form the date of its entry and thereafter by an
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
This should also be read in relation to Arts. 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right
of action accrues:
XXX
3. Upon a judgement
XXX
Art. 1152 The period of prescription of actins to demand the fulfillment of the obligation
declared by a judgment commenced from the time the judgement became final.
Thus, once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party has two
remedies:
1. (To have the judgment) executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years
from the date of entry of judgment; or
111
2. If the prevailing party fails to have the judgment enforced by motion after the lapse of
five years, to have the judgment enforced as a right of action by the institution of a
complaint in regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment became final.
b. The revival action is a new action altogether; it is different and distinct from the original
judgment sought to be revived or enforced. It is a new and independent action, wherein the
cause of action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the
judgment sought to be enforced is rendered. The Court agrees with the CA in citing Saligumba
v. Palanog, especially when it ruled that revival of judgment is premised on the
assumption that the decision to be revived, either by motion or by independent
action, is already final and executory.
c. Rule 47, Secs. 1 and 2, Rules of Court, provides that the remedy of annulment of judgment
can only be availed when the ordinary remedy of appeal, among others, is no longer available
through no fault of the petitioners. Additionally, the annulment may be based only on the
grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction which were clearly not present in this case.
(Pineda v. Miranda, G.R. No. 204997, August 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
112
Problem
Multiple sugar crop loans were obtained by A from Maybank payable in one year. A, through Special
Power of Attorney (“SPA”) executed a Real Estate Mortgage (“REM”) on the parcels of land owned by
B Agricultural Corporation. A and her son C obtained another sugar crop loan and through an SPA,
executed a REM on parcels of land owned by Sps. D and E. Maybank neither demanded payment nor
filed a case to collect or foreclose the mortgage.
After a lapse of 17 years, A and C filed with the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) to cancel the liens
annotated in the mortgage properties on the ground of prescription and extinction of the loan
obligation. Maybank assigned the case to Philippine National Bank (“PNB”) by virtue of Deed of
Assignment dated July 20, 1998. RTC required additional documents to justify the substitution, which
PNB failed to provide. The Motion for Substitution was denied by RTC. Due to failure of PNB to submit
proof that he was authorized to appear on behalf of Maybank, the receivables were transferred to
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (“BSP”). RTC granted the petition of A and B and held that the annotations
in the Certificates of Title of the properties mortgaged were declared unenforceable due to prescription.
In its appeal to the Court of Appeals (“CA”), Maybank raised the issue that the trial court erred in
granting the petition of A and B since it was not filed in the name of the real parties-in-interest, who
are the registered owners of the properties mortgaged and BSP. CA denied the petition.
Questions:
a. Whether the questions raised by PNB-Republic Bank are questions of law?
b. Whether the Supreme Court is precluded from reviewing the issues raised by Maybank that are
questions of facts?
c. Whether A has no cause of action against PNB-Republic Bank because it is not the real parties-
in-interest?
d. Whether the mortgage liens of PNB-Republic Bank were correctly canceled?
Answer:
a. Yes, the questions raised by Maybank are questions of law.
Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (the Rules) provides that a party may file with
the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari which may include an application
for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth.
As held in the Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, the question of law arises when there
is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact
when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one
of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether
a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise
it is a question of fact.
Here, the petition raised are questions of law, such as the question as to who are the real-
parties-in-interest. (Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan as cited in PNB-Republic Bank v.
Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021, Hernando, J.)
113
b. No, the Supreme Court is not precluded from reviewing the issues raised by PNB-Republic Bank
that are questions of fact even though the questions raised are questions of law.
In Salcedo v. People, the Court enumerated some exceptions to the general rule that only
questions of law are reviewable in a Rule 45 petition, namely:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(3) When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and
such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Thus, if any of the situations above are found to be present, this Court may validly review the
factual findings of the lower courts notwithstanding the general rule that questions of facts are
not allowed in a petition filed under Rule 45 as this Court is not a trier of facts.
Here, there is no need to review the facts as the questions interposed by PNB-Republic Bank
can be answered without disturbing the factual findings of the lower courts. (Salcedo v. People
as cited in PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021, Hernando,
J.)
c. No, A has a cause of action against PNB-Republic Bank because it is a real parties-in-interest.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Under Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules provides that an agent acting in his own name and for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
As held in the jurisprudence, the action to cancel the mortgage is a personal action, as
compared to an action to foreclose such a mortgage, which is a real action that involves real
property. With respect to mortgage, the rule on real actions only mentions an action for
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, it does not include an action for the cancellation of a real
estate mortgage.
The Rules allow agents to bring actions for the principals in their own name without joining
their principals, provided that the contract does not involve things belonging to the principal.
Here, while it may seem that the mortgage contracts "involve" real property of the principals,
such contracts are actually not of that nature; since the mortgage contract itself does not
involve real property, but merely the right to foreclose upon such real property should the
necessary legal pre-conditions are met, such as a breach in the principal contract to which the
mortgage is merely an accessory of.
114
A acted on behalf of the mortgagors-principals when she initiated the action to cancel the
mortgages. There was no need to join such principals as the subject mortgage contracts were
merely accessory contracts that were entered into for the purpose of securing A’s loans and
merely involved the right to foreclose upon the lands specified therein upon the fulfillment of
certain contingencies, such as when there is default.
Therefore, since neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant case involved the
mortgagors-principals' real property rights, there was no need to join them and hence, A validly
instituted the action in her own name but still in her capacity as an agent of the mortgagors-
principals. (Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. as cited in PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-
Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021, Hernando, J.)
d. Yes, the mortgage liens of PNB-Republic Bank were correctly canceled.
As held in the jurisprudence, RTC, in its special and limited jurisdiction as a land registration
court, does not have the power to adjudicate issues properly pertaining to ordinary civil actions
such as questions relating to the validity or cancellation or discharge of a mortgage. It should
be ventilated in an ordinary civil action.
However, such a rule does admit of some exceptions, such that relief under Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act is allowed if there is a unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case. In another case, this Court has
held that Section 112 authorizes, in our opinion, only alterations which do not impair rights
recorded in the decree, or alterations which, if they do prejudice such rights, are consented to
by all parties concerned or alterations to correct obvious mistakes.
The situations above would not require a separate, ordinary action in order for the RTC, while
acting as a cadastral court, to have jurisdiction to rule on the petition for the cancellation of
the annotation of mortgages on the land titles covering the mortgaged lots.
As applied in this case, there was no adverse claim or serious objection interposed by
PNB-Republic Bank on the issue of prescription. The deletion of the mortgage liens would not
even result in any prejudice to the PNB-Republic Bank, since its right to collect on the subject
loans, of which the mortgages were merely accessory contracts thereof, had already been
prescribed.
Thus, the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of the mortgage liens, regardless of whether
it acted as a cadastral court or a court of general jurisdiction. (Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation v. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. as cited in PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-Limsiaco,
G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021, Hernando, J.)
(PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021, Hernando, J.)
115
Problem
Time Realty, in its Answer with Counterclaim, only prayed for P100,000.00 as attorney's fees. Likewise,
Time Realty did not expressly appeal the award of the CA of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees in its favor.
To stress, Time Realty did not file its own motion for reconsideration before the CA or its own petition
before the Supreme Court in order to question the specific amount of the award for attorney's fees. It
merely filed a Comment on PNTC's motion for reconsideration before the CA, followed by another
Comment on PNTC's instant petition, wherein it (Time Realty) suddenly mentioned Paragraph 24 of the
Contract of Lease as the basis for its entitlement to attorney's fees without further explanation or
computation.
Simply put, Time Realty's Comments were only "responses" to PNTC's motion and petition, both of
which cannot be considered as a definite or direct request to modify the award for attorney's fees in
accordance with Paragraph 24 of the Contract of Lease.
Question:
a. Whether the courts can acquire jurisdiction over an issue not properly raised on appeal
Answer:
a. No, courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over an issue not properly raised on appeal
Indeed, "settled is the rule that an issue not properly raised on appeal constitutes a waiver of
that issue on appeal, which precludes the Court from acquiring jurisdiction to review and alter
judgment. An appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court
any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the court below." Considering
that Time Realty did not itself contest the amount of P100,000.00, the said figure is already
final and binding upon it. In any case, this amount is still higher than the minimum of
P10,000.00 as provided by Paragraph 24 of the Contract of Lease. (PNTC Colleges, Inc. v.
Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698, September 27, 2021)
116
Problem
The Province of Bataan filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus with Urgent Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Supreme Court. It
questioned the basis for the filing of the criminal and administrative cases.
Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Supplemental Complaint before
the Ombudsman, recommending the filing of criminal and administrative cases against the involved
public officials and individuals for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The FIO essentially alleged that the purchase of the patrol boat equipped
with a 4-cylinder gas engine is tainted with anomalies as the documents related to its procurement
were altered, the process occurred without public bidding, and because it gave undue advantage to
Asistin.
The petitions in this case assail the finding of probable cause to indict the involved public officers for
the criminal charges. Two proceedings are before the Sandiganbayan that are now in their advanced
stages. And the attendant circumstances revealed that: (1) Information have already been filed against
the concerned individuals; (2) warrants of arrest have been issued against them; (3) they have been
arraigned; and (4) the trials before the Sandiganbayan have begun.
These incidents presuppose that the Sandiganbayan already found the existence of probable cause to
criminally charge the accused, and put them to trial.
Questions:
a. Whether a petition questioning the preliminary investigation of an accused becomes moot once
an information based on the preliminary investigation is filed before the Sandiganbayan?
b. Whether the Province of Bataan is considered as an aggrieved party, be it in the criminal or
administrative aspect of its petitions, which can file a pleading under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
Answers:
a. Yes. As pointed out by the Ombudsman, the issues concerning the criminal aspect in the
petitions have been rendered moot, and thus, should be dismissed.
Jurisprudence states that "[a] petition for certiorari, pertaining to the regularity of a preliminary
investigation, becomes moot after an information is filed and a trial court issues an arrest
warrant upon finding probable cause against the accused." By analogy, the same rationale
should be applied in this case. This is because the Sandigaribayan acts as a "trial court" in
resolving criminal cases against government officials or employees. "'The Sandiganbayan is a
special court tasked to hear and decide cases against public officers and employees, and
entrusted with the difficult task of policing and ridding the government ranks of the dishonest
and corrupt.'"
First case has already been submitted for decision while the other case are undergoing trial.
Even the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence has been denied by the Sandiganbayan,
holding that the evidence of the prosecution, if unrebutted, would be sufficient to support a
conviction for the accused. Thence, with respect to the criminal aspect of the cases, and
because of these supervening events, "this Court is left with no justiciable controversy to
resolve, and a declaration on it would be of no practical use or value."
In view of these, "now that Information were already filed in the Sandiganbayan, petitioners
have all the opportunity there during the trial proper to dispute the findings of probable cause,
and, possibly, to eventually clear their names from the alleged crimes." It is assumed that the
involved personalities have employed efforts to explain their positions, and maximize the legal
117
remedies available to them pending trial. Hence, the decision to dismiss the criminal cases, or
to acquit/convict the accused is for the Sandiganbayan to determine at this point.
To reiterate, a case is rendered moot when, because of supervening events, this Court is left
with no justiciable controversy to resolve, and a declaration on it would be of no practical use
or value.
In Secretary De Lima v. Reyes, this Court reiterated its ruling in Crespo v. Mogul that once an
information is filed before a court, that court acquires jurisdiction over the case. Notably, a
petition questioning the preliminary investigation of an accused becomes moot once an
information based on the preliminary investigation is filed before a trial court, which, in turn,
would complete its own determination of probable cause. After this judicial determination, the
question of an accused's guilt or innocence would rest with the trial court's own sound
discretion.
Simply put, a moot and academic case ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, and thus, this Court should refrain from rendering a ruling on the criminal
aspect of the petitions. (Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R. Nos. 197510-11 &
201347, April 18, 2022)
b. No, the Province of Bataan is not a "person aggrieved" within the contemplation of the Rules
which can properly avail of the special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, as
it was not a party in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. Consequently, the petition
docketed as G.R. Nos. 197510-11 should be dismissed.
Even if the Province of Bataan had the standing to file the petitions, it is settled that "as a
quasi-judicial agency, decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases may only be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a Rule 43 petition" in order to
respect the hierarchy of courts.
Withal, it is only proper that the administrative aspect of the cases be resolved by the CA, in
proper observance of the hierarchy of courts, and in accordance with prevailing rules and
jurisprudence. Similarly, "an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it
renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same
effect as the judgment of a court." When the Ombudsman, in an administrative case, renders
a decision and imposes a penalty, it is performing a quasi-judicial function. Its decision has the
same effect as a court judgment.
Thus, as a "decision," the Ombudsman's ruling (in the performance of its quasi-judicial
functions) is appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Simply put, the
procedurally correct way to elevate the administrative aspect of the case is to file a petition
before the CA.
To emphasize, in cases where the respondent is not exonerated and the penalty imposed is
not merely public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary,
the Ombudsman's decision is appealable, and the proper remedy is to file an appeal under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. (Province of Bataan v. Casimiro, G.R.
Nos. 197510-11 & 201347, April 18, 2022, Hernando, J.)
118
Problem
BAYAN, et al. wrote the office of the ombudsman-Visayas alleging anomalies in pricing and called for
the investigation of the transactions entered into by the DPWH in connection to the street lighting
project. The Ombudsman-Visayas recommended the institution of criminal charges and administrative
cases against the persons and government officials allegedly involved in the street lighting project
irregularities. Among the respondents was herein petitioner Radaza, then the City Mayor. He was
initially recommended to be indicted for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The case as
docketed before the Sandiganbayan. The prosecution filed its manifestation and motion to admit
attached amended information charging Radaza, et al., and the same was approved by Ombudsman
Gutierrez. Radaza filed a comment/opposition with motion to quash amended information, he pointed
out that, as the prosecution itself had declared, the final approving authority of the Joint Resolution
was not Acting Ombudsman Casimiro, but the then newly-appointed Ombudsman Hon. Carpio-Morales.
Sandiganbayan resolved the motion to quash in the negative. Hence, this petition for certiorari before
the Supreme court.
Questions:
a. What are the exceptional circumstances when a remedy of certiorari may be allowed in a denied
motion to quash?
b. Distinguish errors of jurisdiction vs. errors of judgment? Which between the two can be
corrected by certiorari?
c. May the lack of authority of an officer to file information be a ground for a quashal and which
may cause jurisdictional defect?
Answers:
a. The exceptional circumstances for a remedy of certiorari may be allowed in a denied motion to
quash are as follows: when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion: 1) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the
remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; 2) in the interest of a more
enlightened and substantial justice; 3) to promote public welfare and public policy; and when
the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in
the consideration thereof. Under these instances, appeal is considered an inadequate remedy
for a denied motion to quash and certiorari may be allowed instead
b. An error of judgment is an error committed by a court within its jurisdiction that is reviewable
by appeal. Mere allegations of wrongful conclusions based on the facts and the law or supposed
misappreciation of evidence do not, by themselves, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion
against the trial court. On the other hand, errors of jurisdiction are those done outside and in
excess of a trial court's jurisdiction and committed in grave abuse of discretion that are properly
reversible by certiorari. The abuse of discretion should clearly be grave.
c. No. The lack of authority by the officer filing the Information under paragraph (d) of Section
3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court as a non-waivable ground additional to paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of the same provision. It was the prevailing principle that an Information filed by
an officer who had no authority to do so shall be considered jurisdictionally infirm for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and over the subject matter or the offense.
However, in Gomez v. People. It was therein held that a handling prosecutor's lack of prior
written authority from the head prosecutor in the filing of an Information does not affect a trial
court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person of the accused. Such
handling prosecutor who filed an unauthorized Information but without bad faith or criminal
intent is considered as a de facto officer coated with a color of authority to exercise acts that
remain valid and official. If the unauthorized filing was done with malice, the erring officer may
be held criminally or administratively liable for usurpation of official functions at most.
119
Intentional or not, this deficiency remains formal, non- jurisdictional, and curable at any stage
of the criminal proceedings. As it always is, jurisdiction springs from substantive law, whereas
a government officer's authority to sue is a matter of mere form and procedure. Purely technical
infirmities are never determinative of a court's jurisdiction. In no case shall it prevent the court
from acquiring jurisdiction over the offense or the person of the accused. (Radaza vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380. August 4, 2021, Hernando, J.)
120
Problem
Ramirez was issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) pursuant to a Free Patent over a lot in Laguna.
Felomino filed a letter-protest with the Bureau of Lands against the approval of the application and
issuance of the free patent to Ramirez. Consequently, after an investigation, the Regional Executive
Director issued an order cancelling and revoking the free patent of Ramirez and directed the DENR
Legal Division to initiate proceedings leading to the cancellation of Ramirez’ OCT and the reversion of
the subject land to the public domain. Felomino then sued for reconveyance of title and damages before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laguna against Ramirez and the Registry of Deeds of Laguna.
Felomino alleged that he is the actual possessor and occupant of the subject land.
Ramirez filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of forum-shopping considering that there was also a
pending case between the parties before the Supreme Court involving the same issues. However, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The RTC dismissed Felomino’s complaint for lack of merit. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment of the trial court.
Ramirez received a copy of the Decision on October 17, 2011 and she filed a Motion for Reconsideration
on November 3, 2011, which is 17 days from the receipt of the Decision. In a Resolution, the CA denied
the Motion for late filing and that the appellate court’s jurisdiction to act on it had been lost. Thus, the
appellate court ordered the issuance of an Entry of Judgment as its Decision has become final and
executory.
Question:
Was the CA’s denial of Ramirez’ Motion for Reconsideration proper for having been filed belatedly
despite the latter’s claim for alleged undue prejudice?
Answer:
Yes, the denial was proper. Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that a party may file a
motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen days from notice thereof,
with proof of service on the adverse party.
Moreover, Section 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that if no appeal or motion for new trial
or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final order shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date of finality of the
judgment or final order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry.
Here, due to Ramirez’ lack of regard of the Rules, the appellate court was justified in denying her
motion. The appellate court's Decision had become final and executory. Basic is the rule that once a
judgment had attained finality, it can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified, the controversy is
settled and the matter is laid to rest. (Ramirez v. Elomina, G.R. No. 202661, March 17, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
(LETICIA A. RAMIREZ vs. FELOMINO ELOMINA, represented by his attorney-in-fact, FEDERICO

ELOMINA, G.R. No. 202661. March 17, 2021)
121
Problem
The Supreme Court (SC) found that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed a reversible error in denying
the Amended Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the RTC’s Amended Decision that was filed by the
Marilyn Go Ramos-Yeo, Laurence Go and Montgomery Go (the GOs).
The SC held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Gos’ because of
invalid substituted service of summons. Neither did it have jurisdiction over the subject matter which is
within the jurisdiction of a court sitting as a land registration court. This is because the Complaint for
Accion Reinvindicatoria filed by Spouses Chua sought, in reality, to re-open, amend, and review the
transfer of certificates of titles issued to the Gos and the Multi-Realty Development Corporation (Multi-
Realty), and not merely a correction of the exact boundaries of the subject properties. The action is
therefore tantamount to an indirect and collateral attack on the validity of their respective certificates
of title in violation of Sections 32 and 108 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529. The SC further ruled
that the Gos and Multi-Realty are not barred by laches. Considering that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over their persons and subject matter, the trial court's decision is therefore null and void.
The Spouses Chua inquired on the promulgation of the assailed Decision and Resolution by the SC,
which were both on the same date and the Spouses Chua also averred that the issue on improper
substituted service is a question of fact beyond the purview of a Rule 45 petition.
Question:
a. Is there a procedural misstep in the SC’s when it rendered the Resolution and Decision in this
case on the same date?
b. Is an issue on improper substituted service of summons a question of fact?
c. Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case?
Answer:
a. No, there was no procedural misstep in the rendering of the Resolution and Decision on the
same dates.
Jurisprudence provides that the Court is not precluded from resolving a case where the
comments to the Consolidated Petitions have already been deemed filed and considering that
all the pleadings and the records of the case had already been submitted, it, therefore, can
now fully resolve the issues presented by parties in the case pursuant to our constitutional
mandate to promptly dispense justice. To await for the soft copies of the Comments even if
their hard copies were already filed by the parties would only result to the delay of the
resolution of the case.
Here, the Court's actions of taking note of the Comments filed by the parties constitute as an
acknowledgment of receipt. In other words, it simply means that the Court has already received
and considered the Comments that are required to be submitted by the parties within the
prescribed period of filing the same. (Ramos-Yeo v. Spouses Chua, G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076
(Resolution), April 18, 2022, Hernando, J.)
b. No, the issue on improper substituted service of summons is a question of law.
Jurisprudence provides that it is a question of what and how the law should be applied.
Hence, the petition is within the purview of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. (Ramos-
Yeo v. Spouses Chua, G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076 (Resolution), April 18, 2022, Hernando, J.)
c. No, the RTC lacks jurisdiction as the judgment materially altered the boundaries of the
properties owned by the Gos and Multi-Realty, affecting the integrity of their title over their
122
respective lands. It is, therefore, the trial court sitting as a land registration court which has
jurisdiction over the case under PD 1529.
Consequently, the RTC Amended Decision is null and void because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Hence, No rights were also conferred in favor of the
Spouses Chua or imposed obligations against the parties. (Ramos-Yeo v. Spouses Chua,
G.R. Nos. 236075 & 236076 (Resolution), April 18, 2022, Hernando, J.)
(MARILYN L. GO RAMOS-YEO, LAURENCE L. GO, and MONTGOMERY L. GO, v. SPOUSES RICHARD O.

CHUA and POLLY S. CHUA, CENTURY TRADING INC., _ MULTI- REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION ET AL G.R. Nos. 236075 _ 236076 (Resolution), April 18, 2022)
123
Problem
SVHFI claimed to be the registered and absolute owner of an 11,451-square meter lot occupied by
Mabalacat Institute, Inc. (MII), which is now known as Don Teodoro V. Santos Institute. It alleged that
MII occupies the said lot without paying rent and only through its tolerance since the year 1983 until
March 14, 2002.
Nevertheless, through SVHFI's March 14, 2002 letter, it informed MII that beginning April 1, 2002, it
will be charged a rental fee for its use and occupancy of the subject lot at the monthly rate of P50.00
per sq.m. which is payable on or before the 5th day of each month. However, in MII's June 7, 2002
reply letter, it refused to comply with SVHFI's demand.
In view of MII's refusal, SVHFI wrote another letter demanding the rental payment, otherwise, it must
vacate the subject lot. However, MII still failed to comply therewith. SVHFI then filed a Complaint for
collection of a sum of money against MII.
However, prior to pre-trial, MII on September 28, 2007 filed a motion to dismiss citing SVHFI’s failure
to report to the Makati City RTC that on June 20, 2006, it filed an ejectment case before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga.
Questions:
a. Whether SVHFI committed forum shopping when it filed two different actions, i.e., the
Collection and Ejectment Cases, in two different courts.
b. Can an action for collection of sum of money may be joined with an ejectment suit?
Answers:
a. No, SVHFI did not violate the rule on forum shopping when it filed the Ejectment Case while
the Collection Case has been pending for four years.
The determinative factor in violations of the rule against forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court prohibits forum shopping by requiring the plaintiff or
principal party to certify under oath that he or she has not commenced any action involving
the same issues in any court. Forum shopping exists when a party initiates two or more actions,
other than appeal or certiorari, grounded on the same cause to obtain a more favorable decision
from any tribunal." The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or at least such
parties representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
latter founded on the same facts; and (iii) any judgment rendered in one action will amount to
res judicata in the other action.
In the instant case, We find that the second and third elements of forum shopping and litis
pendentia are lacking. Thus, We are of the firm view that there is no identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for between a suit for collection of sum of money and an unlawful detainer
case, and that any judgment rendered in one of these actions would not amount to res judicata
in the other action.
Firstly, there is no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for between both actions. The
only issue that must be settled in an ejectment proceeding is physical possession of the
property involved. Thus, in actions for unlawful detainer, a complaint sufficiently alleges said
cause of action if it states the following elements, to wit: (1) initially, the possession of the
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination
124
of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (4) within one year from the making
of the last demand to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
On one hand, the purpose of the Collection Case was to compel MII to pay its rent in view of
its occupancy on the subject lot from the time of SVHFI's initial demand to vacate the subject
lot. Thus, in Pro-Guard Security Services Corp. v. Tormil Realty and Development Corp. , this
Court pointed out that the party adjudged to be the lawful possessor in an ejectment suit is
entitled to compensation, reckoned from the time he demanded the adverse party to vacate
the disputed property. On the other hand, in the Ejectment Case, SVHFI's cause of action
stemmed from the prejudice it suffered due to the loss of possession of its property.
Nonetheless, its claims in the Collection Case do not have a direct relation to its loss of material
possession of the subject lot.
Secondly, any judgment rendered in ejectment cases of forcible entry or unlawful detainer will
not amount to res judicata in a civil case of collection of sum of money for unpaid rent of the
same property and vice versa. Settled is the rule that the only issue raised in ejectment cases
is that of physical possession of the property. Thus, in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases,
the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the leased property. Hence, the damages which could be
recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property. On the other hand, in a civil suit
for collection of sum of money, what is sought to be recovered is the payment of rentals only
without regard to the unlawfulness of the occupancy.
Therefore, this Court finds SVHFI not guilty of forum shopping when it filed the Ejectment Case
subsequent to the Collection Case, while the latter is still pending. In both cases, there is no
identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and that any judgement on any of these cases
would not amount to res judicata on the other. (Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation,
Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 211563, September 29, 2021)
b. No, An action for collection of sum of money may not be joined with an ejectment suit,
otherwise a misjoinder of causes of action would ensue.
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits the joinder of an ordinary action, such as an
action for collection of sum of money and a special civil action, such as an ejectment suit.
In Lajave Agricultural Management and Development Enterprises, Inc. v. Spouses Javellana

the Court pointed out that "an action for collection of sum of money may not be properly joined
with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a full-blown trial,
while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a summary
procedure.
In the instant case, the Collection Case requires a full-blown trial for the parties to show
evidence on the propriety of paying rent and its rightful amount. These may not be
accomplished in an ejectment proceeding which is summary in nature.
In the Ejectment Case, the cause of action stemmed from the prejudice that SVHFI allegedly
suffered due to the loss of possession of the subject lot. On the other hand, the Collection Case
was founded on the appropriate amount of rental fees that are allegedly due and the damages
that SVHFI allegedly suffered but which have no direct relation to its loss of material possession.
(Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R. No.
211563, September 29, 2021, Hernando, J.)
125
Problem
An Owner and operator of a container yard who entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the
Bureau of Customs in governing the conduct of examination of the container yard. The BOC decided to
revoke the MOA on the grounds of strained relations due to the Owner’s closure of the container yard
and barred the customs examiners from entering the premises and the BOC hauled and scanned the
container vans in the container yard.
Questions:
a. May the Owner file a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the Bureau of Customs?
b. What is a Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
c. When may a Writ of Preliminary Injunction be filed?
d. What is the purpose of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
e. What are the requisites in filing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
f. How do you determine a “clear and unmistakable right”?
Answers:
a. No. The Owner has no clear and unmistakable right on the conduct of examination in the
shipyard as the MOA was revoked and therefore there can be no invasion of right as there is
no right existing anymore. Also, the Court made it clear that a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
to prevent an irreparable injury as set out, the damages or injury suffered by the party applying
for injunction must be unquantifiable. Here, we can estimate the loss to the Owner’s business.
(Bureau of Customs vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 192809, April 26, 2021).
b. A writ of preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantial rights
and interests. It is not a cause of action itself, but a mere provisional remedy adjunct to a main
suit.
c. It is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts; it may
also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
preliminary mandatory injunction. It may be granted by the court where the action or
proceeding is pending.
d. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the

parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied, and its sole aim is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case are fully heard.
e. The requisites in filing a Writ of Preliminary Injunction are as follows: 1) the applicant must
have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right in esse; 2) there is a material
and substantial invasion of such right; 3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and 4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
f. While it is not required that the right claimed by the applicant, as basis for seeking injunctive
relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the right
exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction. Before the courts may
issue a writ of preliminary injunction, it is essential that the party seeking its issuance be able
to establish the existence of a right to be protected. (Simfru Philippines vs. Spouses
Coreho, G.R. No. 218236, February 07, 2018, Hernando, J.)
126
Problem:
A parcel of land known as Lot 512-C with an area of 1,542 square meters is titled under the names of
Jesusa Seming and the spouses Angel and Natividad Pamat. Sometime in 1977, Jesusa’s share of the
said lot was purchased by the spouses Cristina and Etiquio Seming. They then took possession of the
half portion or 771 sqm. The spouses Seming admitted that at that time, the parties did not execute
any written agreement reflecting the sale of the said portion of the land.
Meanwhile, a complaint for quieting of title respecting Lot 512-C was filed by a certain Maria Aguilar
Avecilla against Jesusa and the spouses Pamat. Cristina averred that, with the consent of Jesusa and
the Pamats, she agreed to shoulder all expenses of the litigation. The amount of litigation expenses
spent by Cristina shall then be treated as part of her payment for the purchase price of the subject
property. In 1990, Cristina and Natividad agreed that the payments that Cristina at Etiquio made shall
serve as partial payment for a portion of the property. Three payments were made by Cristina which
totaled to 600 sqm portion of the 771 sqm of the lot from which receipts were supposedly executed by
Natividad. Cristina offered to buy from the spouses Pamat the remaining 171 sqm for 10,000 and further
requested that the sale of the 600 sqm portion be embodied in the Deed of Sale. The Pamats, however,
refused to sell the remaining 171 sqm and execute the said Deed of Sale claiming that they never sold
any portion of their share in Lot 512-C.
However, Cristina claimed that the spouses Pamat sold the property to her, that the spouses never
questioned her right to possess the subject property, and that the Compromise Agreement entered into
by Cristina, the Pamats, and Jesusa states that the spouses Seming were in possession over the ½
portion of Lot 512-C. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Cristina and ordered the Pamats to execute a
Deed of Absolute Sale covering 600 sqm of Lot 512-C.
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the RTC and held that no contract of sale existed between
the spouses Pamat and Cristina because there was no meeting of the minds between them as to the
transfer and sale of the subject property and that Cristina failed to prove that Natividad agreed to
transfer her ownership over the property in exchange for a consideration to be paid by Cristina.
Cristina submitted a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Question:
Decide whether Cristina’s petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court is proper.
Answer:
The petition for review on certiorari filed by Cristina before the Supreme Court is proper. Generally,
factual findings of the CA are not subject to the Supreme Court’s review under a Rule 45 petition.
However, the general rule on conclusiveness of the factual findings of the CA is also subject to well-
recognized exceptions such as where the CA's findings of facts contradict those of the RTC, as in this
case, where they differed in their findings of fact and conclusions on the question of whether there was
a perfected and valid contract of sale. All these considered, the Supreme Court is bound to review the
factual questions presented by Cristina. (Seming v. Alamag, G.R. No. 202284, March 17, 2021,
Hernando, J.)
127

2023 Omnibus Notes - Part 1 - Remedial Law

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REMEDIAL LAW – OMNIBUS NOTES

PART ONE: REMEDIAL LAW

B. Jurisdiction of Various Philippine Courts and Tribunals

III. CIVIL PROCEDURE (A.M. NO. 19-10-20-SC)

B. Parties to Civil Actions (Rule 3)

D. Filing and Service (Rule 13)

E. Summons (Rule 14)

F. Motions (Rule 15)

G. Pre-Trial (Rule 18)

H. Intervention (Rule 19)

P. Judgments and Final Orders

R. Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments (Rule 39)

IV. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

B. Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)

C. Replevin (Rule 60)

B. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies (Rule 63)

C. Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus (Rule 65)

D. Partition (Rule 69)

E. Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (Rule 70)

F. Contempt (Rule 71)

VI. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS

B. Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC)

VII. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

B. Motion to Quash (Rule 117)

C. Trial (Rule 119)

VIII. EVIDENCE (A.M. NO. 19-08-15-SC)

Ancheta v. Cambay, G.R. No. 204272, January 18, 2021

Asis v. Heirs of Calignawan, G.R. No. 242127, September 15, 2021

Brual vs. Brual Contreras, G.R. No. 205451, March 7, 2022

Calubad vs. Aceron, G.R. No. 188029. September 2, 2020

Dayrit vs. Norquillas, G.R. No. 201631. December 7, 2021

Dumaran v. Llamedo, G.R. No. 217583, August 4, 2021

Dy Buncio v. Ramos, G.R. No. 206120, March 23, 2022

Gaoiran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 215925, March 7, 2022

Guillerma vs. Lo, G.R. No. 206667, June 23, 2021

Leones v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 204106, November 17, 2021

Mega Fishing Corp. v. Estate of Gonzales

Miguel v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, UDK-15368, September 15, 2021

Monterde vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, February 14, 2022

Morada v. Rias, G.R. No. 222226, February 14, 2022

Nagaño vs Tanjangco, G.R. No. 204218, May 12, 2021

Ngo vs. Gabelo, G.R. No. 207707. August 24, 2020

Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 209551, February 15, 2021

Patdu, Jr. v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 230171, September 27, 2021

People v. Mallari, G.R. No. 197164, December 04, 2019

People v. Tuyay, G.R. No. 206759, December 1, 2021

Philippine National Bank v. Fontanoza, G.R. No. 213673, March 2, 2022

Pineda v. Miranda, G.R. No. 204997, August 4, 2021

PNB-Republic Bank v. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323, February 8, 2021

Radaza vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 201380. August 4, 2021

Ramirez v. Elomina, G.R. No. 202661, March 17, 2021

Seming v. Alamag, G.R. No. 202284, March 17, 2021

Unsatisfied, Chua filed instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.

a. What is a Writ of Preliminary Attachment?

b. No. An action for declaratory relief is not the proper remedy.

(COMMISSION ON AUDIT, represented by its Chairman, THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Pre-trial serves a significant purpose in court proceedings. It simplifies, abbreviates and

e. No, the petitioners are not guilty of indirect contempt.

1. the chairperson of the board of directors,

Thus, a defendant is deemed to have voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of

SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation,

As an administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial, DARAB is inherently incapable of issuing

b. Yes. “Urgent necessity” is indispensable in a preliminary injunction. Generally, injunction, being