• Cases

• Sps. Sanchez v. Divinagracia, G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 228680, September 17, 2018

SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND DELMA SANCHEZ, REPRESENTED BY HILARIO

LOMBOY, Petitioners, v. ESTHER DIVINAGRACIA VDA. DE AGUILAR, TERESITA
AGUILAR, ZENAIDA AGUILAR, JUANITO AGUILAR, JR., AMALIA AGUILAR, AND
SUSAN AGUILAR, THE MUNICIPALITY OF LAKE SEBU, REPRESENTED BY ITS
MAYOR, BASILIO SALIF, NOEMI DUTA D. DALIPE IN HER CAPACITY AS ZONING
OFFICER II, ZALDY B. ARTACHO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN AD HOC
COMMITTEE ON LAND CONFLICT, HON. RENATO TAMPAC, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE 6TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF
SURALLA-LAKE SEBU, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated July 28, 2016 and the
Resolution2 dated October 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
03481-MIN, which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated July 8, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surallah, South Cotabato, in Civil Case No. 1029-LS.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner spouses Francisco and Delma
Sanchez (Spouses Sanchez) a 600-square-meter portion of his 33,600-square meter lot
identified as Lot No. 71, Pls 870, located in the Municipality of Lake Sebu, South
Cotabato. On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito Aguilar, namely, respondents
Esther Divinagracia Vda. de Aguilar, Juanito's spouse, and their children, fenced the
boundary line between the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses and the alleged
alluvium on the northwest portion of the land by the lake Sebu. The Spouses Sanchez
protested the act of fencing by Esther before the barangay, but since no settlement was
reached, they filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against the heirs of Aguilar before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake Sebu, Province of South
Cotabato. They claimed that under the law, they are the owners of the alluvium which
enlarged their 600-square-meter lot. It cannot, therefore, be fenced by the heirs of
Aguilar. For their part, the heirs refute the existence of the alluvium. They assert that the
"alluvium" referred to is the 800-square-meter area beyond the 600-square-meter lot of
the spouses which has been in their actual possession but was used, with their
tolerance, by the spouses in connection with their operation of fish cages in that portion
of Lake Sebu abutting their lot.4
On June 7, 2006, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint of the
Spouses Sanchez. It held that the spouses failed to controvert the prior actual physical
possession of the heirs which was manifested by the improvements found in the subject
lot area consisting of 4 mahogany trees of about 12 to 26 years old, 1 lanzones tree of
the same age, 2 coconut trees of about 30 years old, and other unidentified trees of
about the same age. But since the spouses purchased the 600-meter land adjacent to
the land in question only on July 11, 2000, they could not have been in possession
thereof ahead of the heirs of Aguilar. Thus, the heirs are the ones in actual possession
of the subject property and cannot be held liable for forcible entry by stealth as alleged
by the Spouses Sanchez. They merely protected their interests in manifesting the metes
and bounds of the area purchased from them by placing the bamboo fence. In addition,
the MCTC was unconvinced with the spouses' contention that the subject land is an
alluvium. An alluvium is an area formed by running water like a river or a creek. But in a
lake like the subject Lake Sebu, the water is stagnant. Thus, the land in question is a
natural surrounding of the lake which existed at the same time with the lake itself.
Moreover, the MCTC pointed out that the subject land is 800 square meters in size
which is greater than the area purchased by the spouses so if there could be a legal
claimant, it is the government of Lake Sebu as foreshore or salvage zone for public use.
Finally, on the conflicting description of the deed of sale which states that the property is
600 square meters or 20 x 30 meters, on the one hand, and boundary on the SW by the
lake, on the other, the court held that the former should prevail as the same is the
clearer intention of the spouses.5

On May 27, 2008, the MCTC issued a Writ of Execution ordering the Sheriff to execute
its June 7, 2006 Decision by setting, defining, and/or fixing the boundaries of the
respective properties of the parties according to the following description in the Deed of
Sale: "A 600-square-meter portion of Lot 21, Pls 870 in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato with
dimension of 20 meters along the national highway and depth of 30 meters in
rectangular shape. Bounded on the SE by national highway; on the NW by Lake Sebu;
on the NE by Lot 71, Pls 870 port; on the SW by Lot 71, Pls 870 port." 6 In implementing
the same, the MCTC authorized the Sheriff to engage the services of professional
surveyors, if necessary. In his Report dated August 26, 2008, however, the Sheriff
stated that he discontinued the execution because when the surveyor measured the
national highway at 60 meters wide, Esther objected and claimed that the width of said
highway is only 30 meters. Said disagreement as to the width of the highway was
submitted to the MCTC, which adopted the findings of the District Engineer's Office that
the width thereof is 58.53 meters. Based on said measurement, monuments were set
on both sides of the highway to determine the area of the spouses' 600-square-meter
property. Thus, using the national highway as reference point, the Sheriff adopted the
plan prepared by the geodetic engineer showing that the edge or boundary line of the
600-square-meter lot of the spouses in the northwest direction is the 20-square-meter
wide public easement abutting Lake Sebu.

Nevertheless, the spouses received a Notice dated February 17, 2009 from the Zoning
Section of the Municipality of Lake Sebu informing them that based on the findings of its
own survey team, the "150-square-meter" lot along Lake Sebu is owned by the heirs of
Aguilar. Thus, in accordance with Section 5(g) of the Zoning Ordinance of the
Municipality of Lake Sebu, the privilege on the utilization of the municipal waters shall
be given first priority to the legal owner of the land alongside the lake unless otherwise
waived by him to others.7 In another Notice dated March 10, 2009, the Municipality
directed the spouses to demolish their fish cages or refer the case to the Ad
Hoc Committee on Lake Sebu Water Dispute. But after the referral, said Committee
ruled in its Decision dated June 19, 2009 that the land area in excess of the 600-
square-meter property purchased by the spouses belongs to the heirs of Aguilar. As
such, said heirs have priority to utilize the lake waters abutting the land.8

On May 22, 2010, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and
Damages before the RTC seeking to annul the June 7, 2006 Decision of the MCTC for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for rendering judgment over a non-existent
parcel of land since there is no excess of the 600-square-meter portion to speak of. 9

On July 8, 2013, the RTC granted the spouses' complaint and annulled the June 7,
2006 MCTC Decision. It rendered erroneous and without legal basis the findings of the
MCTC that there is a portion of land between the 600-square-meter lot and the lake in
the following manner:

The record of this case shows that when the writ of execution of the decision rendered
by the court a quo in the forcible entry case filed thereat by plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez)
was implemented, the parties did not agree as to the point of reference when the survey
was conducted in order to establish the 600-square-meter area bought by plaintiffs
(spouses Sanchez) from the defendants (heirs of Aguilar). Thus, the court a
quo directed the District Engineer's Office of South Cotabato to fix the width of the
national highway in order to serve as the point of reference in locating the 600-square-
meter area. The said Office of the District Engineer found that the width of the national
highway is 58.53. It must be remembered that when the implementing sheriff had
the area surveyed, the surveyor told them that the width of the national highway
is sixty meters, while the defendants (heirs of Aguilar) insisted that it is only thirty
(30) meters. As explained in his Report, the implementing sheriff informed the
court that if the sixty-meters width of the national highway is made as a point of
reference, the lot of the plaintiffs will go downwards to the lake. Considering then
that the width of the national highway was found by the District Engineer's Office
to have measured 58.53 meters, or almost sixty (60) meters, the length of the lot
in question therefore must have reached the edge of the lake. Except however for
the easement that the landowner has the obligation to follow, the lot allegedly
claimed by the defendants (heirs of Aguilar) as alluvium has no basis because the
600-square-meter area purchased by the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) from them
went downwards to the lake by reason of the 58.53 width of the national highway.
The defendants (heirs of Aguilar) could not include the area which is part of the
national highway in the 600-square-meter lot they sold to the plaintiffs (spouses
Sanchez), thus, inevitably, if there is any alluvium that was formed at the back
portion of the lot abutting the lake, it is part or accessory of the lot sold to the
plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) by them.

The notice, therefore, sent by the Zoning Office of the Municipality of Lake Sebu for the
plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) to demolish the fish cages built by them and to remove any
improvement put up by them in the area abutting their lot, is not proper and no basis in
view of the findings of this court that it is the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) who are the
legitimate owners of the alleged lot formed by said alluvium, if there is
any. Considering likewise the findings of this court that there is no more lot
abutting the lake waters except that of the plaintiffs (spouses Sanchez) by reason
of the findings of the width of the national highway by the District Engineer's
Office, which is and should be the point of reference, plaintiffs are declared the
legal owners of the said lot in question as it is part of the 600 square meters
bought by them from the defendants (heirs of Aguilar). 10
On July 28, 2016, however, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Decision. First, the
appellate court ruled that the MCTC Decision cannot be annulled on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It is clear that the MCTC acquired
jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the
forcible entry complaint before said court. As to the nature of the action, the MCTC
likewise had jurisdiction since under the law, it exercises exclusive original jurisdiction
over ejectment suits.11 And, second, the CA held that the spouses' complaint is already
barred by laches since it was only on May 22, 2010, or 4 years after the issuance of the
June 7, 2006 MCTC Decision that the spouses filed their complaint for annulment. In
fact, the challenged decision had already been executed more than a year prior to the
filing of the complaint. Thus, the spouses' action must necessarily be dismissed. 12

Furthermore, in a Resolution dated October 10, 2016, the CA rejected the contention of
the Spouses Sanchez that the appeal of the heirs of Aguilar must be denied since their
counsel failed to comply with the MCLE requirements. Under En Banc Resolution dated
January 14, 2014, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number
and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in
the dismissal of the case and expunction of the pleadings from the records.
Nonetheless, failure will subject the lawyer to disciplinary action.13

On January 26, 2017, the Spouses Sanchez filed the instant petition essentially insisting
that the ruling of the RTC must be upheld in view of the findings of the Sheriff that since
the width of the national highway is almost 60 meters wide, the lot of the spouses must
have gone downwards towards the lake, and thus any portion of land beside said lake
must be considered as part of the land purchased by the spouses from Aguilar.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

Time and again, the Court has ruled that a petition for annulment of judgment is a
remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to
be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.4 Its
objective is to undo or set aside the judgment or final order, and thereby grant to the
petitioner an opportunity to prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. Being
exceptional in character, it is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties
aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions. Thus, the Court has instituted
safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. 15 In this
regard, if the ground relied upon is lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set
aside without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the
judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA
may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had
been granted therein.16

In the instant case, the Spouses Sanchez anchored their Complaint for Annulment of
Judgment on the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC. Jurisdiction is the power and
authority of the tribunal to hear, try and decide a case17 and the lack thereof refers to
either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject
matter of the action. Lack of jurisdiction or absence of jurisdiction presupposes that the
court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because the law or the
Constitution does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the one hand,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary
 appearance or submission by the defendant/respondent to the court, or by coercive
process issued by the court to such party through service of summons. On the other
hand, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for. Thus, whether
the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed therein is not
essential. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law
and not by agreement or consent of the parties. Neither does it depend upon the
defenses of the defendant in his/her answer or in a motion to dismiss.18

Here, the Court agrees with the appellate court that the MCTC had both jurisdictions
over the person of the defendant or respondent and over the subject matter of the claim.
On the former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the Forcible Entry suit
before it. On the latter, Republic Act No. 7691 (R.A. No. 7691) clearly provides that the
proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, which includes unlawful
detainer and forcible entry.19

Despite this, the Spouses Sanchez insist that the MCTC could not have had jurisdiction
over the disputed land area in excess of their 600-square-meter lot. This is because
since the District Engineer's Office found that the width of the national highway is almost
60 meters wide, the edge of their 600-square-meter lot must have gone downwards and
necessarily reached the edge of the 20-meter wide public easement abutting the Lake
Sebu. Thus, the heirs of Aguilar could not have been in "actual physical possession" of
a non-existent lot for the disputed area belongs to them. The Court, however, is not
convinced. As duly noted by the CA, the area beyond the 600-square-meter lot abutting
Lake Sebu, whether it is a lot claimed to be in "actual physical possession" of the heirs
of Aguilar or a public easement, refers to the "alluvium" lot area claimed by the Spouses
Sanchez as their own in their forcible entry complaint. It is clear, therefore, that the
MCTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter, which, in this case, is the 600-square-
meter lot and its alleged alluvium.

It bears stressing, moreover, that the Spouses Sanchez explicitly brought the subject
matter to the jurisdiction of the MCTC. They cannot now deny such jurisdiction simply
because said court did not rule in their favor. The Court has consistently ruled
that jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the
exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a cause, and not the
decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of the
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.20

Thus, the issue of whether the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible entry complaint,
ruling that the heirs of Aguilar were in actual physical possession over the subject
property should have been raised by the Spouses Sanchez in an appeal before the
RTC. But as the records reveal, the spouses did not do anything to question the
decision of the MCTC, merely allowing the same to attain finality. In fact, the sheriff had
already started its execution. Moreover, without even providing any explanation for their
delay, it was only on May 22, 2010, or four (4) years after the issuance of the MCTC
ruling on June 7, 2006, that the spouses filed the instant Complaint for Annulment of
Judgment. On this matter, the Court must emphasize that an action for annulment of
judgment based on lack of jurisdiction must be brought before the same is barred by
laches or estoppel.21 On the one hand, laches is the failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due
diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. On the other hand, estoppel
precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation about something as
true from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or
representation.22 To the Court, the failure on the part of the Spouses Sanchez to file
either an appeal of the MCTC Decision or the instant complaint for annulment of
judgment for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, four (4) years to be
exact, despite receiving notice and knowledge of the said decision, constitutes laches
that necessarily barred their cause.

Indeed, the attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final
order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-honored
doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid cornerstone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability
serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and, thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put
an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why
the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable and is no longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification
is made by the court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to
the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental considerations
of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights and obligations of every
litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time.23

In the end, the Court deems it proper to note that an ejectment case, such as the
forcible entry complaint filed before the MCTC below, is a summary proceeding
designed to provide expeditious means to protect the actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. The sole question for resolution in the case is the
physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property in question, and
neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive the trial court from taking due
cognizance of the case. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the
pleadings, the court may pass upon the issue but only to determine the question of
possession especially if the question of ownership is inseparably linked with the
question of possession. The adjudication of ownership in that instance, however, is
merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving the title to the property.24

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision dated July 28, 2016 and the Resolution dated October 10, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 03481- MIN are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

• Pajares v. Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning, G.R.No.212690, February

20, 2017

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 212690 (Formerly UDK-15080), February 20, 2017
 SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES AND IDA T. PAJARES, Petitioners, v. REMARKABLE
LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING, REPRESENTED BY ARCHEMEDES G.
SOLIS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Breach of contract may give rise to an action for specific performance or rescission of
contract.1 It may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages filed pursuant
to Art. 1170 of the Civil Code.2 In the specific performance and rescission of contract
cases, the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence jurisdiction
belongs to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In the case for damages, however, the court
that has jurisdiction depends upon the total amount of the damages claimed.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari3 is the December 11, 2013 Decision4 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 07711 that set aside the February
19, 2013 Order5 of the RTC, Branch 17, Cebu City dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-
39025 for lack of jurisdiction.
Factual Antecedents
On September 3, 2012, Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning (respondent) filed a
Complaint denominated as "Breach of Contract and Damages"6 against spouses
Romeo and Ida Pajares (petitioners) before the RTC of Cebu City, which was docketed
as Civil Case No. CEB-39025 and assigned to Branch 17 of said court. Respondent
alleged that it entered into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract7 with petitioners
whereby the latter, acting as a dealer outlet, shall accept and receive items or materials
for laundry which are then picked up and processed by the former in its main plant or
laundry outlet; that petitioners violated Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties)
of said contract, which required them to produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each
week, when, on April 30, 2012, they ceased dealer outlet operations on account of lack
of personnel; that respondent made written demands upon petitioners for the payment
of penalties imposed and provided for in the contract, but the latter failed to pay; and,
that petitioners' violation constitutes breach of contract. Respondent thus prayed, as
fol1ows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by reason of the above-mentioned breach
of the subject dealer contract agreement made by the defendant, it is most
respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to order the said defendant to pay the
following incidental and consequential damages to the plaintiff., to wit:
a) TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PHP200,000.00) plus legal
interest as incidental and consequential [sic] for violating Articles IV and
XVI of the Remarkable Laundry Dealer Contract dated 08 September
2011.
b) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as legal expenses.
c) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages.
d) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as cost of suit.
e) Such other reliefs that the Honorable Court deems as just and
equitable.8 (Italics in the original)
Petitioners submitted their Answer,9 to which respondent filed its Reply.10
During pre-trial, the issue of jurisdiction was raised, and the parties were required to
submit their respective position papers.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On February 19, 2013, the RTC issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025
for lack of jurisdiction, stating:
In the instant case, the plaintiff's complaint is for the recovery of damages for the
alleged breach of contract. The complaint sought the award of P200,000.00 as
incidental and consequential damages; the amount of P30,000.00 as legal
expenses; the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the amount of
P20,000.00 as cost of the suit, or for the total amount of P280,000.00 as
damages.
Under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691, the amount of demand or claim in the complaint for the Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs) to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction shall exceed
P300,000.00; otherwise, the action shall fall under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts. In this case, the total amount of demand in the complaint
is only P280,000.00, which is less than the jurisdictional amount of the RTCs.
Hence, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction over the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction.
Notify the counsels.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration,12 arguing that as Civil Case No. CEB-
39025 is for breach of contract, or one whose subject is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, jurisdiction thus falls with the RTC. However, in an April29, 2013 Order,13 the
RTC held its ground.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Respondent filed CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 07711, a Petition for Certiorari14 seeking to
nullify the RTC's February 19, 2013 and April 29, 2013 Orders. It argued that the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025. According
to respondent, said case is one whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and that the damages prayed for therein are merely incidental thereto.
Hence, Civil Case No. CEB-39025 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to
Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as Amended (BP 129).
On December 11, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the
February 19, 2013 Order of the RTC and remanding the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings. It held as follows:
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must
first be ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court
 depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of the principal relief sought, such are actions
whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the
RTCs.15
xxxx
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction
over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief
sought.16
In our considered view, the complaint, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation;
thus, one within the RTC's jurisdiction. x x x
xxxx
A case for breach of contract [sic] is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a
counterpart of an action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.17
Thus, the totality of damages principle finds no application in the instant case
since the same applies only when damages is principally and primarily
demanded in accordance with the specification in Administrative Circular No. 09-
94 which reads: 'in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action...the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court.'
Thus, the court a quo should not have dismissed the instant case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order dated February 19, 2013 of
the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 17, Cebu City in Civil Case
No. CEB-39025 for Breach of Contract and Damages is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. This case is hereby REMANDED to the RTC which is ORDERED to
PROCEED with the trial on the merits with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioners sought to reconsider, but were denied. Hence, the present Petition.

Issue

In a June 29, 2015 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition,
which claims that the CA erred in declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over
respondent's Complaint which, although denominated as one for breach of contract, is
essentially one for simple payment of damages.
Petitioners' Arguments
In praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that the RTC's February
19, 2013 Order dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 be reinstated, petitioners in their
Petition and Reply20 espouse the original findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. CEB-
39025 is for the recovery of a sum of money in the form of damages. They asserted that
in determining jurisdiction over the subject matter, the allegations in the Complaint and
the principal relief in the prayer thereof must be considered; that since respondent
merely prayed for the payment of damages in its Complaint and not a judgment on the
claim of breach of contract, then jurisdiction should be determined based solely on the
total amount of the claim or demand as alleged in the prayer; that while breach of
contract may involve a claim for specific performance or rescission, neither relief was
sought in respondent's Complaint; and, that respondent "chose to focus his [sic] primary
relief on the payment of damages,"21 which is "the true, actual, and principal relief
sought, and is not merely incidental to or a consequence of the alleged breach of
contract."22 Petitioners conclude that, applying the totality of claims rule, respondent's
Complaint should be dismissed as the claim stated therein is below the jurisdictional
amount of the RTC.
Respondent's Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, counters in its Comment23 that the CA is correct in
declaring that Civil Case No. CEB-39025 is primarily based on breach of contract, and
the damages prayed for are merely incidental to the principal action; that the Complaint
itself made reference to the Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract and the breach
committed by petitioners, which gave rise to a cause of action against the latter; and,
that with the filing of the case, the trial court was thus called upon to determine whether
petitioners violated the dealer outlet contract, and if so, the amount of damages that
may be adjudged in respondent's favor.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The Court grants the Petition. The RTC was correct in categorizing Civil Case No. CEB-
39025 as an action for damages seeking to recover an amount below its jurisdictional
limit.
Respondent's complaint denominated
as one for ''Breach of Contract &
Damages" is neither an action for
specific performance nor a complaint
for rescission of contract.
In ruling that respondent's Complaint is incapable of pecuniary estimation and that the
RTC has jurisdiction, the CA comported itself with the following ratiocination:
A case for breach of contract [sic] is a cause of action either for specific
performance or rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as a
counterpart of an action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, and therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.24
without, however, determining whether, from the four corners of the Complaint,
respondent actually intended to initiate an action for specific performance or an action
for rescission of contract. Specific performance is ''[t]he remedy of requiring exact
performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the
precise terms agreed upon. [It is t]he actual accomplishment of a contract by a party
bound to fulfill it."25 Rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, on the
other hand, is a remedy available to the obligee when the obligor cannot comply with
what is incumbent upon him.26 It is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party
who violates the reciprocity between them. Rescission may also refer to a remedy
granted by law to the contracting parties and sometimes even to third persons in order
to secure reparation of damages caused them by a valid contract, by means of
restoration of things to their condition in which they were prior to the celebration of the
contract.27
In a line of cases, this Court held that —
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily
for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal trial courts or in the courts
of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).28
To write finis to this controversy, therefore, it is imperative that we first determine the
real nature of respondent's principal action, as well as the relief sought in its Complaint,
which we quote in haec verba:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPNES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH ____
CEBUCITY
Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning Civil Case No. ____
herein represented by Archemedes G. Solis, For: Breach of Contract & Damages
Plaintiff,
vs.
Spouses Romeo Pajares and Ida T. Pajares,
Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff, by counsels, to the Honorable Court most respectfully states THAT:
l. Plaintiff Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning Services, is a sole
proprietorship business owned by Archemedes Solis with principal office address
at PREDECO CMPD AS-Ostechi Bldg. Banilad, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue
City.
2. Defendant Ida Pajares is of legal age, Filipino, married with address at
Hermag Village, Basak Mandaue City where she can be served with summons
and other processes of the Honorable Court.
3. On 08 SEP 2011, parties entered and signed a Remarkable Laundry Dealer
Outlet Contract for the processing of laundry materials, plaintiff being the owner
of Remarkable Laundry and the defendant being the authorized dealer of the
said business. (Attached and marked as Annex "A" is a copy of the Remarkable
Laundry Dealer Outlet Contract.)
 CAUSES OF ACTION:
4. Sometime on [sic] the second (2nd) quarter of 2012, defendant failed to follow
the required standard purchase quota mentioned in Article IV of the subject
dealership agreement.
5. Defendant through a letter dated April 24, 2012 said it [sic] would CEASE
OPERATION. It [sic] further stated that they [sic] would just notify or advise the
office when they are [sic] ready for the business again making the whole
business endeavor totally dependent upon their [sic] whims and caprices.
(Attached and marked as Annex "B" is a copy of letter of the defendant dated
April 24, 2012.)
6. The aforementioned act of unilateral cessation of operation by the defendant
constitutes a serious breach to [sic] the contract because it totally, whimsically
and grossly disregarded the Remarkable Laundry Dealer Outlet Contract, which
resulted to [sic] failure on its part in obtaining the minimum purchase or delivery
of 200 kilos per week for the entire duration of its cessation of operations.
7. Under the aforementioned Dealer Contract, specifically m Article XV of the
same are classified as BREACH BY THE OUTLETS:
'The parties agree that the happening of any of the stipulation and events
by the dealer outlet is otherwise [sic] in default of any of its obligations or
violate any of the terms and condition under this agreement.
Any violation of the above-mentioned provisions shall result in the
immediate termination of this agreement, without prejudice to any of the
RL Main Operators rights or remedies granted to it by law.
THE DEALER OUTLET SHALL ALSO BE LIABLE TO PAY A FINE OF
TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS, (P25,000.00) FOR EVERY
VIOLATION AND PHP 50,000 IF PRE-TERMINATION BY THE RL MAIN
OPERATOR DUE TO BREACH OF THIS AGREEMENT.'
8. Likewise it is provided in the said contract that:
... The DEALER OUTLET must have a minimum 200 kilos on a six-day or
per week pick-up for the entire duration of the contract to free the dealer
outlet from being charge[d] Php 200/week on falling below required
minimum kilos per week of laundry materials. Automatic charging shall
become part of the billing on the services of the dealer outlet on cases
where the minimum requirements on required kilos are not met.[']
9. The cessation of operation by the defendant, which is tantamount to gross
infraction to [sic] the subject contract, resulted to [sic] incidental damages
amounting to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP200,000.00). Defendant
should have opted to comply with the Pre-termination clause in the subject
contract other than its [sic] unilateral and whimsical cessation of operations.
10. The plaintiff formally reminded the defendant of her obligations under the
subject contract through demand letters, but to no avail. The defendant purposely
ignored the letters by [sic] the plaintiff. (Attached and marked as Annex "C" to "C-
2" are the Demand Letters dated May 2, 2012, June 2, 2012 and June 19, 2012
respectively.)
11. To reiterate, the defendant temporarily stopped its business operation prior to
 the two-year contract duration had elapsed to the prejudice of the plaintiff, which
is a clear disregard of its two-year obligation to operate the business unless a
pre-termination is called.
12. Under Article 1159 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides [sic]:
'Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith'
13. Likewise, Article 1170 of the Civil Code of the Philippines [provides] that:
'Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof are liable for damages.'
14. That the above-mentioned violations by the defendant to the Remarkable
Laundry Dealer Contract, specifically Articles IV and XVI thereof constitute gross
breach of contract which are unlawful and malicious under the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which caused the plaintiff to incur incidental and consequential
damages as found in the subject dealer contract in the total amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP200,000.00) and incidental legal expenses to
protect its rights in the amount of P30,000.00
PRAYER:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, by reason of the above-mentioned breach
of the subject dealer contract agreement made by the defendant, it is most
respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to order the said defendant to pay the
following incidental and consequential damages to the plaintiff, to wit:
a) TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PHP200,000.00) plus legal interest
as incidental and consequential [damages] for violating Articles IV and XVI of the
Remarkable Laundry Dealer Contract dated 08 SEP 2011;
b) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as legal expenses;
c) Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages;
d) Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as cost of suit;
e) Such other reliefs that the Honorable Court deems as just and equitable.
August 31, 2012, Cebu City, Philippines.29
An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint shows that there is
nothing therein which would support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is one for
specific performance or rescission of contract. It should be recalled that the principal
obligation of petitioners under the Remarkable Laundry Dealership Contract is to act as
respondent's dealer outlet. Respondent, however, neither asked the RTC to compel
petitioners to perform such obligation as contemplated in said contract nor sought the
rescission thereof. The Complaint's body, heading, and relief are bereft of such
allegation. In fact, neither phrase appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for
purposes of clarity, respondent's counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law,
could and should have used any of those phrases to indicate the proper designation of
the Complaint. To the contrary, respondent's counsels designated the Complaint as one
for "Breach of Contract & Damages," which is a misnomer and inaccurate. This
erroneous notion was reiterated in respondent's Memorandum30 wherein it was stated
that "the main action of CEB 39025 is one for a breach of contract." 31There is no such
thing as an "action for breach of contract." Rather, "[b]reach of contract is a cause of
action,32 but not the action or relief itself"33 Breach of contract may be the cause of
action in a complaint for specific performance or rescission of contract, both of which
are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, cognizable by the RTC. However,
as will be discussed below, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a
complaint for damages.
A complaint primarily
seeking to enforce the
accessory obligation
contained in the penal
clause is actually an
action for damages
capable of pecuniary
estimation.
Neither can we sustain respondent's contention that its Complaint is incapable of
pecuniary estimation since it primarily seeks to enforce the penal clause contained in
Article IV of the Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract, which reads:
Article IV: STANDARD REQUIRED QUOTA & PENALTIES
In consideration [sic] for such renewal of franchise-dealership rights, the dealer
outlet must have a minimum 200 kilos on a six-day or per week pick-up for the
entire duration of the contract to FREE the dealer outlet from being charge [sic]
Php200/week on falling below required minimum kilos per week of laundry
materials. Automatic charging shall become part of the billing on the services of
the dealer outlet on cases where the minimum requirements on required kilos are
not met.
The RL Main Operator has the option to cancel, terminate this dealership outlet
contract, at its option should [sic] in the event that there are unpaid services
equivalent to a two-week minimum required number of kilos of laundry materials
but not P8,000 worth of collectibles, for services performed by the RL Main
Operator or its assigned Franchise Outlet, unpaid bills on ordered and delivered
support products, falling below required monthly minimum number of kilos.
Ten [percent] (10%) interest charge per month will be collected on all unpaid
obligations but should not be more than 45 days or an additional 10% on top of
uncollected amount shall be imposed and shall earn additional 10% on the next
succeeding months if it still remains unpaid. However, if the cause of default is
due to issuance of a bouncing check the amount of such check shall earn same
penalty charge with additional 5% for the first two weeks and 10% for the next
two weeks and its succeeding two weeks thereafter from the date of dishonor
until fully paid without prejudice to the filling of appropriate cases before the
courts of justice. Violation of this provision if remained unsettled for two months
shall be considered as violation [wherein] Article XV of this agreement shall be
applied.34
To Our mind, petitioners' responsibility under the above penal clause involves the
payment of liquidated damages because under Article 222635 of the Civil Code the
amount the parties stipulated to pay in case of breach are liquidated damages. "It is
attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance and has a double function:(1)
to provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the
obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach."36
Concomitantly, what respondent primarily seeks in its Complaint is to recover aforesaid
liquidated damages (which it termed as "incidental and consequential damages")
premised on the alleged breach of contract committed by the petitioners when they
unilaterally ceased business operations. Breach of contract may also be the cause of
action in a complaint for damages filed pursuant to Article 1170 of the Civil Code. It
provides:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof;
are liable for damages. (Emphasis supplied)
In Pacmac, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,37 this Court held that the party who
unilaterally terminated the exclusive distributorship contract without any legal
justification can be held liable for damages by reason of the breach committed pursuant
to Article 1170.
In sum, after juxtaposing Article IV of the Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract vis-à-
vis the prayer sought in respondent's Complaint, this Court is convinced that said
Complaint is one for damages. True, breach of contract may give rise to a complaint for
specific performance or rescission of contract. In which case, the subject matter is
incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC.
However, breach of contract may also be the cause of action in a complaint for
damages. Thus, it is not correct to immediately conclude, as the CA erroneously did,
that since the cause of action is breach of contract, the case would only either be
specific performance or rescission of contract because it may happen, as in this case,
that the complaint is one for damages.
In an action for damages, the court
which has jurisdiction is determined by
the total amount of damages claimed.
Having thus determined the nature of respondent's principal action, the next question
brought to fore is whether it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
Civil Case No. CEB-39025.
Paragraph 8, Section 1938 of BP 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,39 provides
that where the amount of the demand exceeds P100,000.00, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, exclusive
jurisdiction is lodged with the RTC. Otherwise, jurisdiction belongs to the Municipal Trial
Court.40
The above jurisdictional amount had been increased to P200,000.00 on March 20, 1999
and further raised to P300,000.00 on February 22, 2004 pursuant to Section 5 of RA
7691.41
Then in Administrative Circular No. 09-9442 this Court declared that "where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court." In other words,
where the complaint primarily seeks to recover damages, all claims for damages should
be considered in determining which court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case regardless of whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes
of action.
Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the respondent in its Complaint filed
with the RTC on September 3, 2012 amounted only to P280,000.00, said court was
correct in refusing to take cognizance of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the December 11, 2013 Decision and
March 19, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 07711
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 19, 2013 Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 17, Cebu City dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-39025 for lack of
jurisdiction is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

• Maslag v. Monzon, G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 174908, June 17, 2013
DARMA MASLAG, Petitioner, v. AND ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON,
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF BENGUET, Respondents.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is incumbent upon x x x appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the
decisions of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy,
they can blame no one but themselves."1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the May 31, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83365, which dismissed petitioner Darma Maslag’s
(petitioner) ordinary appeal to it for being an improper remedy. The Resolution disposed
of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Appeal is

hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.4nad

The Petition also assails the CA’s September 22, 2006 Resolution5 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.6

Factual Antecedents

In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint7 for reconveyance of real property with declaration
of nullity of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon
(Monzon), William Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet. The
Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.

After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioner’s property.8 It ordered her to reconvey the said property to petitioner, and to
pay damages and costs of suit.9

Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.

After going over the MTC records and the parties’ respective memoranda, the RTC of
La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, through Acting Presiding Judge Fernando P. Cabato
(Judge Cabato), issued its October 22, 2003 Order,10 declaring the MTC without
jurisdiction over petitioner’s cause of action. It further held that it will take cognizance of
the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of

jurisdiction. – x x x

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it
has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.

Both parties acknowledged receipt of the October 22, 2003 Order,11 but neither
presented additional evidence before the new judge, Edgardo B. Diaz De Rivera, Jr.
(Judge Diaz De Rivera).12

On May 4, 2004, Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a Resolution reversing the MTC
Decision. The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from the Municipal Trial Court of La

Trinidad, Benguet is set aside. [Petitioner] is ordered to turn over the
possession of the 4,415 square meter land she presently occupies to [Monzon].
This case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings to determine
whether [Maslag] is entitled to the remedies afforded by law to a builder in good
faith for the improvements she constructed thereon.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.14

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal15 from the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution.

Petitioner assailed the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution for reversing the MTC’s factual
findings16 and prayed that the MTC Decision be adopted. Her prayer before the CA
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the

decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of La Trinidad, Benguet, appealed
from be reversed in toto and that the Honorable Court adopt the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court. Further reliefs just and equitable under the premises are
prayed for.17

Respondents moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper
remedy. They asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under
Rule 42 because the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate
jurisdiction.18

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. It observed that the RTC’s May 4, 2004
Resolution (the subject matter of the appeal before the CA) set aside an MTC
Judgment; hence, the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an
ordinary appeal.19

Petitioner sought reconsideration.20 She argued, for the first time, that the RTC
rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction. She cited the earlier
October 22, 2003 Order of the RTC declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over the
case.

The CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in its September 22, 2006
Resolution:21

A perusal of the May 4, 2004 Resolution of the RTC, which is the subject matter
of the appeal, clearly reveals that it took cognizance of the MTC case in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, as We have previously
enunciated, the proper remedy, is a petition for review under Rule 42 and not an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration

is DENIED. The May 31, 2006 Resolution of this Court is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.

SO ORDERED.22

Hence this Petition wherein petitioner prays that the CA be ordered to take cognizance
of her appeal.23

Issues

Petitioner set forth the following issues in her Petition:

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING

THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10 OF LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET HELD
THAT THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AS FILED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET WAS DECIDED BY THE LATTER
WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION AND, IN ORDERING THAT THE CASE SHALL
BE DECIDED PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF SECTION 8 OF RULE 40
OF THE RULES OF COURT, IT DECIDED THE CASE NOT ON ITS APPELLATE
JURISDICTION BUT ON ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 10 OF LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET, WHEN IT DECIDED A
CASE APPEALED BEFORE IT UNDER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 8,
RULE 40 OF THE RULES OF COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS TO THE
COURSE OF REMEDY THAT MAY BE AVAILED OF BY THE PETITIONER – A
PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 OR AN ORDINARY APPEAL
UNDER RULE 41.24nad

Ruling of the Supreme Court

In its October 22, 2003 Order, the RTC declared that the MTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case based on the supposition that the same is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, it took
cognizance of the case and directed the parties to adduce further evidence if they so
desire. The parties bowed to this ruling of the RTC and, eventually, submitted the case
for its decision after they had submitted their respective memoranda.

We cannot, however, gloss over this jurisdictional faux pas of the RTC. Since it involves
a question of jurisdiction, we may motu proprio review and pass upon the same even at
this late stage of the proceedings.25

In her Complaint26 for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of OCT,
petitioner claimed that she and her father had been in open, continuous, notorious and
exclusive possession of the disputed property since the 1940’s. She averred:

7. Sometime in the year 1987, Elizabeth Monzon, the owner of the adjacent
parcel of land being occupied by plaintiff [Maslag], informed the plaintiff that the
respective parcels of land being claimed by them can now be titled. A suggestion
was, thereafter made, that those who were interested to have their lands titled,
will contribute to a common fund for the surveying and subsequent titling of the
land;

8. Since plaintiff had, for so long, yearned for a title to the land she occupies, she
contributed to the amount being requested by Elizabeth Monzon;

9. A subdivision survey was made and in the survey, the respective areas of the
plaintiff and the defendants were defined and delimited – all for purposes of
titling. x x x

10. But alas, despite the assurance of subdivided titles, when the title was finally
issued by the Registry of Deeds, the same was only in the name of Elizabeth
Monzon and WILLIAM GESTON. The name of Darma Maslag was fraudulently,
deliberately and in bad faith omitted. Thus, the title to the property, to the extent
of 18,295 square meters, was titled solely in the name of ELIZABETH MONZON.

As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to reconvey the portion of the
property which she claimed was fraudulently included in Monzon’s title. Her primary
relief was to recover ownership of real property. Indubitably, petitioner’s complaint
involves title to real property. An action "involving title to real property," on the other
hand, was defined as an action where "the plaintiff’s cause of action is based on a claim
that [she] owns such property or that [she] has the legal rights to have exclusive control,
possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same."27 Under the present state of the
law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to
either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property. 28
Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,29 as amended by Republic Act
(RA) No. 7691,30 provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
 any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x
x x the [assessed] value [of the property] exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands
or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

xxxx

SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: x x x x

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.

In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real

Property31 dated November 12, 1991, which was later marked as petitioner’s Exhibit
"A",32 showing that the disputed property has an assessed value of P12,40033 only.
Such assessed value of the property is well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine,
the RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in determining
which court has jurisdiction over the case and in pronouncing that the MTC is divested
of original and exclusive jurisdiction.

This brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was correct in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal.

Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an improper
appeal:

SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – An appeal

under Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising
only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being
reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of
by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court
shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to

the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. (Emphasis supplied)

There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact and
law.34 The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the RTC
exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.
The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the RTC
exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a Petition for
Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes of appeal lies
in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision being appealed.

As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken cognizance
of the case and review the court a quo’s Judgment except in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Besides, the new RTC Judge who penned the May 4, 2004
Resolution, Judge Diaz de Rivera, actually treated the case as an appeal despite the
October 22, 2003 Order. He started his Resolution by stating, "This is an appeal from
the Judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad
Benguet"35 and then proceeded to discuss the merits of the "appeal." In the dispositive
portion of said Resolution, he reversed the MTC’s findings and conclusions and
remanded residual issues for trial with the MTC.36 Thus, in fact and in law, the RTC
Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from the MTC. It was
a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. With regard
to the RTC’s earlier October 22, 2003 Order, the same should be disregarded for it
produces no effect (other than to confuse the parties whether the RTC was invested
with original or appellate jurisdiction). It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not within the courts, let alone the
parties, to themselves determine or coveniently set aside."37 Neither would the active
participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive
jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the
case.38 Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have
been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41.

Seeing the futility of arguing against what the RTC actually did, petitioner resorts to
arguing for what the RTC should have done. She maintains that the RTC should have
issued its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction because it had earlier ruled
that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the cause of action.

Petitioner’s argument lacks merit. To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction.
Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held
that "any judgment, order or resolution issued without [jurisdiction] is void and cannot be
given any effect."39 By parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring that it
has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when under
the law it has none cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of
jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced. Since BP 129 already apportioned the
jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the
courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining the
proper mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative factor is
the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in rendering its Decision or
Resolution. Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at what type of jurisdiction
was actually exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what type of jurisdiction the
RTC should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into what the RTC should
have done in disposing of the case is a question which already involves the merits of
the appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was
improper to begin with.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed May 31, 2006 and September 22, 2006 Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83365 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

• Philippine-Japan Active Carbon Corporation v. Habib Borgaily, G.R.No.197022,

 January 15, 2020

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197022, January 15, 2020
PHILIPPINE-JAPAN ACTIVE CARBON CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. HABIB
BORGAILY, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
CARANDANG, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Philippine-Japan
Active Carbon Corporation assailing, the Decision2 dated Feb1uary 25, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01315 dismissing the complaint of petitioner
for lack of jurisdiction.

Antecedents

On July 17, 2002, Philippine-Japan Active Carbon Corporation (petitioner) leased two
apartment units from Habib Borgaily (respondent) for P15,000.00 each unit. The two
lease contracts3 have a lease period from August 1, 2002 to August 1, 2003. To secure
faithful compliance of the obligations of petitioner under the lease contracts, a security
deposit was required, to wit:
19. Upon signing hereof, the LESSEE shall pay a deposit of FORTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00) as a security for the faithful performance by
the LESSEE of his obligations herein provide[d], as well as to answer for any
liability or obligation that the LESSEE may incur to third parties arising from or
regarding the use of the subject premises. Accordingly, said deposit may not be
applied to any rental due under this contract and shall be refunded to the
LESSEE only upon termination hereof after ascertaining that the latter has no
further obligations under this contract or to any person or entity from or regarding
the use of the premises.4
Petitioner deposited the amount of P90,000.00 as security deposit for the two apartment
units.
The lease contract was not renewed after the expiration of the lease on August 1, 2003.
However, petitioner still occupied the premises until October 31, 2003.

After vacating the premises, petitioner asked respondent to return the amount of
P90,000.00. Petitioner alleged that it has no outstanding obligation to any person or
entity relative to the use of the apartment units to which the security deposit may be
held accountable.

As counterclaim in his Answer,5 respondent claimed that petitioner failed to comply with
its obligations in the lease contracts, such as keeping the apartment units
"neat[-]looking" and keeping the lawns and hedges watered and trimmed.6 Petitioner
was also obliged to keep the leased premises in good and tenantable
condition.7 Further, upon termination of the lease, the lessee should surrender the
leased premises to the lessor in a good and tenantable condition with the exception of
ordinary fair wear and tear.8
Respondent alleged that when petitioner vacated the leased premises, the same was
destroyed and rendered inhabitable. As such, respondent had to make the necessary
repairs amounting to P79,534.00 to the units. Respondent furnished petitioner with the
receipts of the expenses incurred from the labor and materials for the repair of the units.
Hence, respondent had the right to withhold the release of the deposits due to the
violation of the terms and conditions of the lease agreements.

Respondent claimed that when petitioner leased the two apartment units, the latter
made respondent believe that the apartment units were going to be occupied by
petitioner's executives and their families while assigned in Davao City. Instead,
petitioner used the apartment units as staff houses. The use and occupancy of the
apartment units became hazardous because petitioner's occupants, recklessly and with
impunity, disregarded all norms of decent living in apartments and destroyed the units.
Thus, as counterclaim, respondent claimed that he had the right to withhold the refund
of the security deposit amounting to P90,000.00 and apply the same to the cost of the
repairs amounting to P79,534.00.9

Since respondent refused to return the security deposit, petitioner filed an action for
collection of sum of money equivalent to the amount of the security deposit against the
respondent.

MTCC ruling

In a Decision10 dated May 20, 2005, the Municipal Trial Court Cities (MTCC) of Davao
City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 1, found that respondent had the obligation to return
the security deposit. Under the lease agreement, it is provided that the security deposit
shall be returned after the expiration of the lease. The lease agreement does not
authorize the outright withholding of the security deposit by the lessor if it appears to
him that the terms and conditions of the lease are violated. The lessor should first bring
it to the proper forum to determine whether the lease contracts were violated, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered m favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant:

a.) Ordering the defendant to refund plaintiff its security deposit in the amount of
Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) with interest at twelve percent (12%) per
annum, until refunded in full;

b.) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as attorney's fees plus cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.11
RTC ruling

In a Decision12 dated August 16, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City,
11th Judicial Region, Branch 13, reversed the ruling of the MTCC. The RTC held that,
according to Paragraph 19 of the lease agreements, the security deposit is for the
faithful performance by the lessee of its obligations under the lease
agreement.13 Respondent had the right to withhold the deposit until his claim for
damages to the units which were not caused by ordinary wear and tear have been
reimbursed.14 The pictures showing the damage to the leased premises presented by
the respondent during the hearing showed that when petitioner vacated the premises,
the same were in need of major repairs.15 Furthermore, the RTC found that the major
repairs were all covered by receipts, which convinced the court that respondent spent
P79,534.00 for the repairs for the two apartment units, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside.

The court finds that the claim of plaintiff for refund of the amount of P90,000.00
which it paid defendant as security deposit for the two apartment units which
plaintiff leased, had already been offset by amount of P79,534.00 which
defendant spent for the repairs of the leased premises and the nominal damage
in the amount of P11,464.00 which the court hereby awards to defendant. Plaintiff
and defendant have therefore no more claims against each other.

SO ORDERED.16
CA ruling

Upon Petition for Review under Rule 42 to the CA, petitioner ascribed to the RTC grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the claim for the refund of the security deposit has
already been offset by the amount respondent spent for the repairs, and when the RTC
ruled that defendant is entitled to nominal damages.
However, the CA in its Decision17 dated February 25, 2011, resolved the case
completely different from the raised errors by petitioner. The CA held that the pivotal
issue was whether the MTCC has jurisdiction over the complaint.18 The CA ruled that
the allegations in petitioner's complaint make out a case for breach of contract and,
therefore, an action for specific performance is an available remedy.19 As such, the
same is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Therefore, the MTCC has no
jurisdiction over the case. The action for sum of money representing the security deposit
is merely incidental to the main action for specific performance.20 Thus, the CA
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 16,
2006 and the Order dated September 19, 2006 of the RTC are SET ASIDE. The
Decision dated May 20, 2005 of the MTCC is also SET ASIDE. The Complaint is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.21
Aggrieved by the CA Decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari22 before this Court, alleging that the nature of its complaint is one for
collection of sum of money and attorney's fees, and not one for breach of
contract.23 Petitioner claimed that the lease contracts were already terminated at the
time of respondent's refusal to return the security deposit.24 Since an action of breach of
contract presupposes the existence of a contract, and that breach must be committed
during the effectivity of the same, petitioner's action for the return of the security deposit
cannot be considered as an action for breach of contract.25

Respondent, in his Comment,26 claimed that the ruling of the CA that the action is one
for breach of contract is correct. However, respondent has a legal and justifiable reason
to withhold the refund of the security deposits, because petitioner vandalized the leased
units and destroyed the same when the latter left the premises.27

Issues

The issues for Our resolution are: (1) whether the MTCC has jurisdiction over the case;
and (2) whether the RTC was correct when it offset the amount of the security deposit
with the amount of the repairs made by the respondent, plus the amount of nominal
damages awarded to respondent.
 Ruling of the Supreme Court

In order to determine whether the subject matter of an action is one which is capable of
pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must be
considered. If it is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, then the claim is considered
as capable of pecuniary estimation, and the jurisdiction lies with the municipal trial
courts if the amount of the claim does not exceed P300,000.00 outside Metro Manila,
and does not exceed P400,000.00 within Metro Manila. However, where the basic issue
of the case is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is merely incidental to the principal relief sought, then the subject matter of
the action is not capable of pecuniary estimation, and is within the jurisdiction of the
RTC.28

The CA held that the allegations of the complaint filed by petitioner make out a case for
breach of contract where an action for specific performance is an available remedy.
Since the same is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the same is cognizable by the
RTC. The refund of the P90,000.00 security deposit was merely incidental to the main
action for specific performance.29

The CA was mistaken in appreciating the facts of the case. Contrary to its ruling, a
perusal of the complaint filed by petitioner makes out a case for collection of sum of
money and not for breach of contract. It is to be noted that the lease agreement had
already expired when petitioner filed an action for the return of the security deposit.
Since the lease had already expired, there is no more contract to breach.The demand
for the return of the security deposit was merely a collection suit. What the petitioner
prayed for before the MTCC was the return of the amount of P90,000.00, and not to
compel respondent to comply with his obligation under the lease agreement. As such,
the CA erred when it held that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case and
dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction.

Respondent pleaded as counterclaim in his answer the cost of the repairs amounting to
P79,534.00, which he incurred in fixing the two units leased by the petitioner. Petitioner
rendered the two apartment units hazardous because petitioner recklessly and with
impunity disregarded all norms of decent living. Petitioner destroyed the two apartment
units and rendered it inhabitable and in need of major repairs. Thus, while respondent
must return the security deposit to petitioner, respondent had the right to withhold the
same and to apply it to the damages incurred by the apartment units occupied by
petitioner. The RTC found that respondent spent a total of P79,534.00 for the repairs on
the leased premises. Petitioner, when it occupied the apartment units, acknowledged
that the leased premises were in good and tenantable condition. Petitioner shouldered
all expenses for repairs of the apartment units, regardless of its nature, and that upon
termination of the lease, petitioner must surrender the premises, also in the same good
and tenantable condition when taken, with the exception of ordinary wear and tear.
However, photographs of the extent of the damage on the leased premises presented
during trial showed that when petitioner vacated the apartment units, they were in need
of major repairs. The repairs undertaken by respondent were all covered by receipts,
which the latter furnished to petitioner. The failure of petitioner to inspect the repairs
undertaken by respondent, despite notice of the same, bars petitioner to question the
propriety of the repairs on the apartment units. Therefore, the RTC was correct when it
ordered the offsetting of the P90,000.00 security deposit to the expenses of the repairs
amounting to P79,534.00.

However, the award of nominal damages has no basis. It has been settled that nominal
damages cannot co-exist with actual damages.31 Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for
any loss suffered by him. Since respondent has already been indemnified for the
damages made on the leased premises, there is no more reason to further grant
nominal damages.

Since respondent must return the security deposit of P90,000.00 less than the cost of
repairs amounting to P79,534.00, the remaining amount of P10,466.00, should still be
returned by respondent to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 01315 and, therefore, within the original jurisdiction odismissing the
complaint and holding that the case is one for specific performance incapable of
pecuniary estimation of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated August 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 13 in Civil Case No. 31, 103-2005 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The security deposit in the amount of P90,000.00 has already been offset by the
amount of P79,534.00 as expenses for the repairs of the apartment units. Nevertheless,
respondent Habib Borgaily is ORDERED to return the amount of P10,466.00, the
remaining amount of the security deposit, to petitioner Philippine-Japan Active Carbon
Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

• Ramiro v. Bacaron, G.R. No. 196874, February 6 2019

FIRST DIVISION
February 6, 2019
G.R. No. 196874
The Heirs of the Late Spouses ALEJANDRO RAMIRO and FELICISIMA LLAMADA,
namely; HENRY L. RAMIRO; MERLYN R. TAGUBA; MARLON L. RAMIRO;
MARIDEL R. SANTELLA, WILMA L. RAMIRO; VILMA R. CIELO and CAROLYN R.
CORDERO, Petitioners
vs.
Spouses ELEODORO and VERNA BA CARON, Respondents
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the October 19, 2010 Decision2 (assailed Decision) and May 3, 2011
Resolution3 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
01350-MIN. The CA affirmed in toto the July 13, 2007 Decision4 of Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lupon, Davao Oriental, in Civil Case No. 1966 (045).
Respondent spouses Eleodoro and Verna Bacaron (spouses Bacaron) filed Civil Case
No. 1966 (045) before the RTC against petitioners. In their amended
complaint, 5 spouses Bacaron claimed that the father of petitioners, the late Alejandro
Ramiro (Alejandro), was the registered owner of Lot 329, Cad-600 containing an area of
48,639 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-12524
(property); that Alejandro and his wife, Felicisima Llamada (spouses Ramiro), sold the
property to spouses Bacaron, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale6 executed on October
20, 1991; 7 that spouses Bacaron took possession of the property after the sale; that the
property, however, was earlier mortgaged by spouses Ramiro to the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP); that spouses Bacaron paid the DBP ₱430,150.00 for the
redemption of the property; and that in June 1998, petitioners forcibly dispossessed
spouses Bacaron of the property. 8
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the amended
complaint, raising the following affirmative defenses: (a) the RTC does not have
jurisdiction over the case considering that it involves recovery of possession of the
property; (b) the instrument denominated as a Deed of Sale should be interpreted as an
equitable mortgage; and (c) laches has barred respondents from instituting the
complaint.9
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision10 on July 13, 2007 in favor of
spouses Bacaron. It ruled that spouses Bacaron were able to prove by preponderance
of evidence the due execution of the Deed of Sale dated October 20, 1991 with spouses
Ramiro over the property. Although the original copy of the Deed of Sale was lost, the
RTC held that spouses Bacaron were able to introduce competent secondary evidence
to prove its existence. 11 It also found that the purchase price of ₱400,000.00 as stated
in the Deed of Sale corresponded, more or less, to the amount paid by spouses
Bacaron to the DBP. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision states:
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, a DECISION is hereby issued:
1. DECLARING as VALID the Deed of Sale dated October 20, 1991;
2. Directing herein Defendants to execute a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition with
Confirmation of the Sale dated October 20, 1991 in favor of herein Plaintiffs within
fifteen (15) days from the finality of this DECISION. Should Defendants fail to execute
said document as directed by the Court the execution of said document shall be
undertaken pursuant to law and the rules;
3. Directing the Register of Deeds to cause the registration of the parcel of land subject
of this case in the name of the Plaintiffs upon the presentation by Plaintiffs of the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition and Confirmation of Sale referred to in par. No. 2 hereof.
a) Directing Defendants and all other persons acting for and in their behalf to vacate the
property subject of this case and restore the possession thereof to herein Plaintiffs;
b) Directing Defendants to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as reasonable Attorney's
Fees.
SO ORDERED. 12 (Emphasis omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the trial court's Decision to the CA. In their appeal,
petitioners argued that the main thrust of the complaint was to recover the property; yet,
spouses Bacaron failed to allege its assessed value. Petitioners, thus, asserted that the
RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case pursuant to Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, 13 as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. 14
On October 19, 2010, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, 15 dismissing the appeal
and affirming the RTC Decision in toto. The CA upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over
the subject matter of the case. Noting that the amended complaint alleged causes of
action for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale or specific , and recovery of
possession, damages, attorney's fees and injunction all of which are incapable of
pecuniary estimation, joinder in the RTC is allowed by the Rules of Court. 16
The CA likewise rejected petitioners' contention that in view of their actual physical
possession of the property and their payment of realty taxes thereon, the real
transaction between their late parents and spouses Bacaron was an equitable
mortgage. The CA ruled that petitioners failed to assail the trial court's finding that the
reason they currently have possession of the property was because they forcibly took
possession of the same from respondents in June 1998. The CA also found that
contrary to petitioners' claims of religious payment of realty taxes, the official receipts
they presented showed that they paid the realty taxes for 1991 and 1992, and for 1993
and 1994, only on August 17, 1998 and March 12, 1999, respectively. 17 The CA also
found petitioners' arguments on laches untenable due to their failure to prove its
elements. 18
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA via its
assailed Resolution. 19 Hence, this petition which presents the following issues:
I. Whether the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
II. Whether the Deed of Sale dated October 20, 1991 should be treated as an equitable
mortgage.
III. Whether the spouses Bacaron's claims are barred by laches.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

We grant the petition.

Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, provides that the RTC shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction.
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
Meanwhile, Section 33 of the same law provides the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level courts, viz.:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions
in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent
lots.
Settled is the rule that the nature of the action and which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.20 For instance, when the main relief sought is specific
performance, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC. When the action, on the other hand, primarily involves title to, or
possession of land, the court which has exclusive original jurisdiction over the same is
determined by the assessed value of the property.
Here, petitioners argue against the CA's view that the action is under the RTC's
jurisdiction because it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. They contend that the main
thrust of respondents' complaint before the RTC is the recovery of possession of the
property. Thus, the primary purpose of all of respondents' alternative causes of action
involves title to or possession of real property. This is allegedly evident from
respondents' amended complaint which seeks, among others, to cancel OCT No. P-
12524 covering the property, to have a new title issued in their name, and to place
respondents in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property. In view of these
allegations, petitioners posit that the complaint should be filed with the court having
jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the property. In this case, however, there
was no effort on the part of respondents to allege the assessed value of the property. 21
Spouses Bacaron counter that the case record shows that the main relief prayed for in
the amended complaint is one for the declaration of validity and effectivity of the Deed
of Sale and specific performance or, in the alternative, that petitioners be ordered and
directed to execute the deed or instrument of conveyance and transfer of the property in
respondents' favor. They argue that based on existing jurisprudence, the Court has
recognized actions involving the legality of conveyances as actions incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Likewise, actions for specific performance are exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, in this case, since the main reliefs prayed for by
respondents are the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale and specific
performance, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.22
We agree with petitioners.
Respondents' amended complaint pertinently narrates the following:
3. That the above-named defendants are all surviving heirs of the late spouses
[Alejandro] Raqmiro (sic) and Felicisima Llamada-Ramiro;
4. That the late Alejandro Ramiro, father of the defendants, is the registered owner of a
parcel of land situated in Gov. Generoso, Davao Oriental, consisting of an area of about
Forty Eight Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Nine (48,639) square meters, more or less,
and embraced and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-12524; said
property is mainly used and operated as a fish pond, with some portions of the said
parcel of land being devoted to and planted with coconut trees;
(Said parcel of land formed part of spouses Ramiro's [spouses Alejendro (sic) Ramiro's
and Felicisima Llamada's] conjugal properties- as registered owner Alejandro Ramiro is
referred-to and acknowledged in the property's title as married to Felicisima Llamda')
(sic);
xxxx
5. That sometime in 1991, said spouses Alejandro Ramiro and Felicisima Llamada-
Ramiro sold the abovementioned property unto the plaintiffs herein, as may be shown
and evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly executed by the spouses, dated October 20,
1991;
xxxx
11.a. That just sometime after the aforesaid sale of the subject property, plaintiffs took
over the possession thereof;
11. b. That likewise, since the subject property was earlier mortgaged by the Ramiro
spouses unto the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Plaintiffs caused the
payment unto the bank the amount of about Four Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos and
Hundred Fifty Pesos (P430, 150.00) for the redemption of the property from the
Development Bank of the Philippines;
12. That Alejandro Ramiro passed away sometime in 1996 or thereabout; That
Felicisima Llamada on the other hand died later in 1997 or sometime thereabout;
13. That thereafter (sic), sometime on the month of June of 1998, or thereabout, the
above-named defendants, led by defendant Henry Ramiro, unlawfully and coercively
took over the possession of the subject property without any justifiable cause
whatsoever, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, arrogating unto themselves the supposed
ownership of the property;
14. And despite several demands, defendants unjustifiably refused to return unto the
plaintiffs the possession thereof, thus causing unwarranted damage and injuries unto
the latter;
x x x x23 (Underscoring in the original.)
In the same vein, the following are the reliefs sought by respondents in their amended
complaint:
a.) that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining and prohibiting the
defendants from exercising, doing and/or otherwise causing to be done all acts, deeds
and activities which may be inimical to the plaintiffs' claims, rights and interest as lawful
owners thereof - more specifically (but not limited to ), the actual operation of the
fishpond by the defendants, and defendants' gathering and harvesting of coconuts and
other products found within the property; directing the defendants to return unto the
plaintiffs the possession of the subject property; and enjoining and prohibiting
said defendants from further effecting and causing whatever acts of disturbances
in contravention of plaintiffs['] peaceful possession of the property;
b.) that Writs of Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunctions likewise be issued in
plaintiffs' favor directing and/or providing the same wise (as stated in the foregoing);
c.) that after hearing, the said Injunctions be made permanent;
d.) that after the fact and verity of the subject property's sale (in plaintiffs' favor)
shall have been proved and established in the course of the proceedings of the
above-entitled case, the validity and effectivity of said sale be categorically
declared and upheld: Or otherwise, defendants be ordered and directed to
execute the proper deed or instrument of conveyance and transfer of the subject
property in plaintiffs' favor;
e.) that [the] Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P12524 be ordered cancelled
and in lieu thereof, another title be accordingly issued in the name of the
plaintiffs; and
f.) that the plaintiffs be ordered placed in a peaceful and undisturbed possession
over the property.
g.) that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees
and P1,200.00 as appearance fees of counsel per hearing;
h.) that defendants be made to pay plaintiffs the amount of P100,000.00 as moral
damages as well as exemplary damages in the amount to be fixed by this Honorable
Court.
All other reliefs in plaintiffs' favor, as may be deemed by this Honorable Court as just
and equitable under the premises, are herein likewise prayed for. 24 (Emphasis supplied;
underscoring in the original.)
It is clear from the foregoing that while respondents claim that their amended complaint
before the RTC is denominated as one for the declaration of validity of the Deed of Sale
and for specific performance, the averments in their amended complaint and the
character of the reliefs sought therein reveal that the action primarily involves title to or
possession of real property. An action "involving title to real property" means that the
plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has
the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same. Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the
property itself. "25
The ultimate relief sought by respondents is for the recovery of the property through the
enforcement of its sale in their favor by the late spouses Ramiro. Their other causes of
action for the cancellation of the original title and the issuance of a new one in their
name, as well as' for injunction and damages, are merely incidental to the recovery of
the property. 26 Before any of the other reliefs respondents prayed for in their complaint
can be granted, the issue of who between them and petitioners has the valid title to the
lot must first be determined. 27
Similarly in Gochan v. Gochan,28 we ruled that where a complaint is entitled as one for
specific performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a
parcel of land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself
and is, thus, deemed a real action. Accordingly, under these circumstances, the court
which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is determined by the assessed
value of the subject property. 29
Here, respondents neither alleged the assessed value of the property. The Court cannot
take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. Thus, absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot be
determined which between the RTC or the Municipal Trial Court had original and
exclusive jurisdiction over respondents' action. Consequently, the complaint filed before
the RTC should be dismissed.30
Furthermore, it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject matter or nature of the action. 31 In resolving the issue of whether or not the
correct amount of docket fees were paid, it is also necessary to determine the true
nature of the complaint. 32 Having settled that the action instituted by respondents is a
real action and not one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the basis for determining the
correct docket fees shall, therefore, be the assessed value of the property, or the
estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant. 33 As already discussed, however,
respondents did not allege the assessed value of the property in their amended
complaint. They also did not allege its estimated value. As a result, the correct docket
fees could not have been computed and paid by respondents and the RTC could not
have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.34 All the proceedings
before it are consequently null and void.
In light of all the foregoing, we see no further need to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioners.1awp++i1
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 19, 2010 and
Resolution dated May 3, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01350-MIN
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
dated July 13, 2007 is declared NULL and VOID. The amended complaint in Civil Case
No. 1966 (045) is dismissed without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

• Fuerte v. Estomo G R No 223399 April 23 2018

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018
FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE, MARRIED TO MAURICE GEORGE
FUERTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES SILVINO S.ESTOMO AND CONCEPCION C.
ESTOMO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For resolution of this Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by herein petitioner
Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte (Fuerte) assailing the Decision1 dated October 6, 2015
and Resolution2 dated February 16, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 138513 which reversed and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 98, in SCA Case No. 12-1237.
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint4 for unlawful detainer dated August 10,
2009 filed by Fuerte against respondents spouses Silvino S. Estomo (Silvino) and
Concepcion C. Estomo (Concepcion) (Spouses Estomo). The subject property is
situated at Block 3, Lot 2, Birmingham Homes, Dalig City 1, Antipolo City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-55253.

Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
the subject property in her favor. Upon Co's failure to pay the loan, Fuerte caused the
foreclosure proceedings and eventually obtained ownership of the property. However,
the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the
property and that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the same. It was only
after the said return that Fuerte discovered and verified that the Spouses Estomo were
in possession of the property. In a letter5 dated December 1, 2008, she demanded them
to vacate and surrender posession of the subject property and pay the corresponding
compensation. The Spouses Estomo refused to heed to her demands.

In their Answer,6 the Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject
property. They also denied the existence of the December 1, 2008 letter. They averred
that they acquired the property from the Homeowners Development Corporation on
February 15, 1999 through a Contract to Sell, registered it under their names, covered
by TCT No. 407613, and had been their family home since 2000. Sometime in 2006,
Concepcion sought the services of Co, a real estate broker, to assist her in securing a
loan. Co obtained the certificate of title to be shown to potential creditors, however, she
never returned it. The TCT was cancelled by an alleged Absolute Sale of Real Property
executed on June 22,2006, when Silvino was out of the country as a seaman, and then
TCT No. R-39632 was issued under Co's name. On July 13, 2006, Co mortgaged the
subject property in the amount of P800,000.00. Consequently, the Spouses Estomo
filed an annulment case against Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007. When they were
served with the writ of possession in favor of Fuerte, they filed a terceria with the sheriff,
a motion to recall the writ of possession, and asked for the consolidation of the land
registration case to the annulment case on August 5, 2008. In the Orders dated October
28, 2008 and October 30, 2008, the trial court quashed the writ and directed the
consolidation of the cases.

The Spouses Estomo also prayed that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that
the allegations are insufficient to establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer. By
Fuerte's own allegation, the Spouses Estomo's entry to the property was unlawful from
the beginning. The case cannot be considered as one for forcible entry since it was
never alleged that their entry was by means of force, intimidation, threat, stealth or
strategy. Lastly, prescription has already set, since Fuerte was aware that the spouses
possessed the property when they filed the complaint for annulment of deed of absolute
sale and real estate mortgage against Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007.

In a Decision dated October 3, 2012, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of
Antipolo City, Branch 1 dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that Fuerte
failed to attach in the complaint a copy of the demand letter and establish that the same
was duly received by the spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint is ordered dismissed without
prejudice.

SO DECIDED.7
On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the decision of the MTCC. It held that
Fuerte established the existence of the December 1, 2008 demand letter, which was
sent through registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 5209 of the Antipolo City Post
Office. The notice to vacate the subject property served through registered mail is a
substantial compliance with the modes of service under Section 2,8 Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court. Suits for annulment of sale, cancellation of titles, reconveyance as well as
criminal complaints for falsification do not operate to abate ejectment proceedings
involving the same property. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby ordered
GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Decision dated October 3, 2012 rendered by the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 1, Antipolo City, is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered ordering the [respondents] Spouses Silvino S. Estomo
and Concepcion C. Estomo as follows:
• To vacate and surrender the possession of the property situated at
Block 3, Lot 2, Birmingham Homes, Dalig City 1, Antipolo City and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-55253 in favor of
[petitioner];

• To pay [petitioner] the amount of Five Thousand Pesos

([P]5,000.00) representing the compensation for the use and
occupation of the property computed from the time the complaint
was filed on August 12, 2009 until the actual physical possession of
the property has been delivered in favor of the [petitioner];

• To pay the [petitioner] the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos

([P]10,000.00) as and for attorney's fees;
SO ORDERED.9
Subsequently, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It held that the
complaint in ejectment cases should embody such statement of facts as to bring the
party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1,10 Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parole evidence. The CA found that the complaint failed to
describe that the possession by the Spouses Estomo was initially legal or tolerated and
became illegal upon termination of lawful possession. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
October 1, 2014 Decision of the Antipolo City Regional Trial Court, Fourth
Judicial Region, Branch 98 in SCA CASE No. 12-1237 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Resultantly, the Unlawful Detainer & Damages case filed by the herein
[petitioner] against the herein [respondents] is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.11

Ruling of the Supreme Court

Upon denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case before this
Court raising the following issues:
• The CA, in reversing and setting aside the RTC decision, decided a
question of substance not in accord with law and with the applicable
jurisprudence as instructively laid down by this Honorable Court when it
ruled that the complaint filed by the petitioner does not constitute unlawful
detainer and thereupon concluded that MTCC Antipolo where the case
 was filed had no jurisdiction to try it, being without legal and/or factual
basis;

• The CA, in ruling to dismiss the complaint filed by the petitioner with the
MTCC Antipolo, defied Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court thereby it
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding as to
call for an exercise of power of supervision of this Honorable Court.

The instant petition is devoid of merit.

At the outset, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains
vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some
of the claims asserted therein.12

Fuerte maintains that it is a hornbook rule that the purchaser of a real property from a
vendor who no longer occupies the said property need not prove as an essential
requisite how and the manner the present possessor came into occupation. As long as
she fulfills the requisite of demand to vacate, she may bring an action for unlawful
detainer against the Spouses Estomo who defied her demand.13 She avers that prior to
the expiration of the period she granted to the spouses to vacate the premises, their
occupation of the subject property was only by mere tolerance. The same became
illegal upon the expiration of the said period.

In summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only issue
to be determined is who between the contending parties has better possession of the
contested property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, and the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases
and the proceedings are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.14
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.15

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following:
(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant about the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the
defendant, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.16
As the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court, the complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
unlawful detainer. In the absence of these factual allegations, an action for unlawful
detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction
over the case.17

Here, the pertinent portion of the Complaint reads:

xxxx

3. Plaintiff is the absolute and registered owner of that parcel of land with a
house and structures thereon situated at Blk 3, Lot 2, Birmingham Homes, Dalig
City 1, Antipolo City, being illegally occupied by the defendants, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-55253 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of
Antipolo, a machine copy thereof is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made an
integral part hereof.

4. Plaintiff came to know and discovered that defendants are illegally occupying
and staying at [the] above subject premises without their (sic) permission,
consent and approval when the writ of possession issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in LRC Case No. 07-3916, over the subject
premises in favor of the plaintiff and directed to the mortgagor thereof, Manuela
Co, was returned UNSATISFIED by Sheriff Rolando C. Leyva, on the ground that
the said mortgagor is no longer residing thereat and the persons occupying the
subject property are the defendants and their family, a machine copy of the
Parital (sic) Sheriffs Report, dated August 20, 2008, is hereto attached as Annex
"B" and made an integral part hereof.

5. Hence, upon verification that indeed, the defendants are occupying and
staying on the subject premises obviously WITHOUT their knowledge, consent,
permission and approval and therefore, unlawful, plaintiff demanded that they
vacate the subject premises and forthwith, to deliver the actual physical
possession thereof to them but despite of the foregoing, the defendants unjustly
and unlawfully failed and refused to comply thereto, resulting to the undue and
irreparable damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

6. In view thereof, plaintiff was constrained to refer the matter to her counsel who
then made a FORMAL DEMAND by way of a demand letter upon the defendants
to vacate the subject premises and forthwith, to surrender the possession thereof
to the plaintiffs and to pay them the corresponding amount of monthly
compensation of at least TEN THOUSAND PESOS ([P]10,000.00), Philippine
Currency, from the time of their illegal occupancy, or from August 20, 2008, until
they shall have fully vacated the subject premises and the actual physical
possession thereof shall have been completely delivered and turned to the
plaintiff, a machine copy of the demand letter of plaintiff's counsel dated
December 01, 2008, is hereto attached as Annex "B" (sic) and made an integral
part hereof.

7. Notwithstanding the foregoing demands, defendants unjustly and unlawfully

failed and refused to comply thereto and they continue to stubbornly, defiantly,
unlawfully and unjustly refuse and fail to vacate the subject premises and to
surrender and deliver the actual physical possession thereof to the plaintiff and to
pay the just compensation for their undue and unlawful use and occupancy of the
subject premises, thereby resulting to herein plaintiff's undue and irreparable
damage and prejudice.
 x x x18
A perusal of the Complaint shows that it contradicts the requirements for unlawful
detainer. A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the
possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the
right to possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such
lawful possession must then be established.19 Paragraphs 2 and 3 make it clear that
Spouses Estomo's occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent. Likewise, the
Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest
tolerated the spouses' possession on account of an express or implied contract between
them. Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on Fuerte's part
indicatiye of her permission to occupy the land.

Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his
predecessor's tolerance or permission for them to occupy the disputed property.20 There
should be any supporting evidence on record that would show when the respondents
entered the properties or who had granted them to enter the same and how the entry
was effected.21 Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim regarding
"tolerance" cannot be upheld.22

Moreover, the December 1, 2008 demand letter supports the fact that she characterized
the Spouses Estomo's possession of the subject property as unlawful from the start, to
wit:
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Estomo:

We represent our client, DR. FATIMA O. DE GUZMANFUERTE, the absolute

and registered owner in fee simple of the above premises you are presently
occupying without her consent, permission nor approval.

Our client is presently the absolute registered owner in fee simple of the above
premises you are presently occupying covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
R-55253 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Antipolo. Please note that a writ
of possession is issued by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in
LRC Case No. 07-3916, anent the said real property but which cannot be
enforced as against you being third persons in the case, pursuant to the ruling
laid down in Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 135219,
January 17, 2002, 374 SCRA 22[,] 31-33). In the said case, it is mandated that
our client instead institute the appropriate ejectment suit or accion
reivindicatoria for the purpose of obtaining possession over their said real
property. Nevertheless, since your occupancy of our client's property is
without her consent, permission and approval, it is, therefore, unlawful.

In view thereof, FORMAL DEMAND is made upon you to immediately vacate the
premises you are presently unlawfully occupying and to peacefully surrender the
same to our client and to pay our client the corresponding compensation for your
use thereof in the amount of not less than TEN THOUSAND PESOS
([P]10,000.00), Philippine Currency, within fifteen (15) days from your receipt
hereof. Your failure to comply shall constrain us to institute the appropriate
ejectment suit against you and claim from you such other damages and such
relief as may be allowed and warranted by law.23
It is apparent from the letter that Fuerte demanded the spouses to immediately vacate
the subject property, contrary to her allegation in the instant petition that she granted
such period, during which she tolerated the spouses' possession. She failed to satisfy
the requirement that her supposed act of tolerance was present right from the start of
the possession by the Spouses Estomo. It is worth noting that the absence of the first
requisite is significant in the light of the Spouses Estomo's claim that they have been
occupying the property as owner thereof, and that they have filed an annulment of sale
and real estate mortgage against Co and Fuerte even before the property was
foreclosed.

From the foregoing, this Court finds that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
for unlawful detainer. Since the complaint fell short of the jurisdictional facts to vest the
court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the CA correctly dismissed the
unlawful detainer case against the Spouses Estomo.

Fuerte asseverates that the pronouncement of the CA that the dismissal of the unlawful
detainer case "is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the
determination of the issue of ownership" merely invites multiplicity of suits. Such
dismissal defied Section 8,24 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. She alleged that the CA
should have remanded the case to the RTC as the appellate court which has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the complaint to
proceed with the case.

It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of

ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land.
What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action
(accion publiciana) and from a reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that the
first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion
interdictal), together with forcible entry, are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be
filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession
and accion reivindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also includes
recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover
possession.25

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to summarily restore physical
possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly
deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of
juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid
disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to
enforce their claimed right ofpossession.26

A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case, or an unlawful detainer as in this case, will
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title or ownership because
between a case for forcible entry or unlawful detainer and an accion reinvindicatoria,
there is no identity of causes of action. Such determination does not bind the title or
affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive of the facts therein found in a
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.27 In fact, Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
a "judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with
respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land." Since there is no identity of causes of action, there can be no multiplicity of
suits.

Furthermore, the Court expounded in Serrano v. Spouses Gutierrez28 that the first
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal
issued without trial of the case on the merits, while the second paragraph deals with an
appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was tried on the merits. Both
paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction.
The above section ordains the RTC not to dismiss the cases appealed to it from the first
level court which tried the same albeit without jurisdiction, but to decide the case on the
merits.

In the case at bar, the RTC actually treated the case as an appeal, with the decision
starting with, "This is an appeal from the Decision dated October 3, 2012 rendered by
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1 Antipolo City" and then discussed the merits
of the "appeal" in the unlawful detainer case. In the dispositive portion of said decision,
the trial court reversed the MTCC's findings and conclusions. In a petition for review
filed before it, the CA decided the case based on the judgment issued by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only
by law and it is "not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or
conveniently set aside." Neither would the active participation of the parties
nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or
tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case.29

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
However, the registered owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is
in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper
remedy, and once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.30 In this case, Fuerte chose the remedy of
unlawful detainer to eject the Spouses Estomo, but, failed to sufficiently allege the facts
which are necessary to vest jurisdiction to MTCC over an unlawful detainer case. In
fine, the CA did not commit reversible error in dismissing Fuerte's complaint for unlawful
detainer.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition filed by petitioner Fatima 0. De Guzman-Fuerte

assailing the Decision dated October 6, 2015 and Resolution dated February 16, 2016
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138513 is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

• Padlan v. Dinglasan, G R No 180321 March 20 2013

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. NO. 180321 : March 20, 2013
EDITHA PADLAN, Petitioner, v. ELENITA DINGLASAN and FELICISIMO
DINGLASAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated June 29, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86983, and the Resolution2 dated October
23, 2007 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.3
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Elenita Dinglasan (Elenita) was the registered owner of a parcel of land designated as
Lot No. 625 of the Limay Cadastre which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-105602, with an aggregate area of 82,972 square meters. While on board a
jeepney, Elenita's mother, Lilia Baluyot (Lilia), had a conversation with one Maura
Passion (Maura) regarding the sale of the said property. Believing that Maura was a real
estate agent, Lilia borrowed the owner's copy of the TCT from Elenita and gave it to
Maura. Maura then subdivided the property into several lots from Lot No. 625-A to Lot
No. 625-O, under the name of Elenita and her husband Felicisimo Dinglasan
(Felicisimo).
Through a falsified deed of sale bearing the forged signature of Elenita and her husband
Felicisimo, Maura was able to sell the lots to different buyers. On April 26, 1990, Maura
sold Lot No. 625-K to one Lorna Ong (Lorna), who later caused the issuance of TCT No.
134932 for the subject property under her name. A few months later, or sometime in
August 1990, Lorna sold the lot to petitioner Editha Padlan for P4,000.00. Thus, TCT
No. 134932 was cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner.
After learning what had happened, respondents demanded petitioner to surrender
possession of Lot No. 625-K, but the latter refused. Respondents were then forced to
file a case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan for the
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466, docketed as Civil Case No. 438-
ML. Summons was, thereafter, served to petitioner through her mother, Anita Padlan.
On December 13, 1999, respondents moved to declare petitioner in default and prayed
that they be allowed to present evidence ex parte.4
On January 17, 2000, petitioner, through counsel, filed an Opposition to Declare
Defendant in Default with Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Jurisdiction Over the
Person of Defendant.5 Petitioner claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her, because the summons was not validly served upon her person, but only by means
of substituted service through her mother. Petitioner maintained that she has long been
residing in Japan after she married a Japanese national and only comes to the
Philippines for a brief vacation once every two years.
On April 5, 2001, Charlie Padlan, the brother of petitioner, testified that his sister is still
in Japan and submitted a copy of petitioner's passport and an envelope of a letter that
was allegedly sent by his sister. Nevertheless, on April 5, 2001, the RTC issued an
Order6 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss and declared her in default. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
On July 1, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision7 finding petitioner to be a buyer in good
faith and, consequently, dismissed the complaint.
Not satisfied, respondents sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. NO.
CV No. 86983.
On June 29, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision8 in favor of the respondent.
Consequently, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the RTC and ordered the
cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Lorna and the petitioner, and the revival of
respondents' own title, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated July
1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 4, Mariveles, Bataan
(Stationed in Balanga, Bataan) in Civil Case No. 438-ML is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.
The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134932 issued in the name of Lorna Ong and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137466 issued in the name of defendant-appellee Editha
Padlan are CANCELLED and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 134785 in the name of the
plaintiffs-appellants is REVIVED.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA found that petitioner purchased the property in bad faith from Lorna. The CA
opined that although a purchaser is not expected to go beyond the title, based on the
circumstances surrounding the sale, petitioner should have conducted further inquiry
before buying the disputed property. The fact that Lorna bought a 5,000-square-meter
property for only P4,000.00 and selling it after four months for the same amount should
have put petitioner on guard. With the submission of the Judgment in Criminal Case No.
4326 rendered by the RTC, Branch 2, Balanga, Bataan, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Maura Passion10 and the testimonies of respondents, the CA concluded
that respondents sufficiently established that TCT No. 134932 issued in the name of
Lorna and TCT No. 137466 issued in the name of petitioner were fraudulently issued
and, therefore, null and void.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner argued that not only
did the complaint lacks merit, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and the person of the petitioner.
On October 23, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution11 denying the motion. The CA
concluded that the rationale for the exception made in the landmark case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy12 was present in the case. It reasoned that when the RTC denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner neither moved
for a reconsideration of the order nor did she avail of any remedy provided by the Rules.
Instead, she kept silent and only became interested in the case again when the CA
rendered a decision adverse to her claim.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF THE PETITIONER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS A BUYER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE. 13
Petitioner maintains that the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy finds no application in the
case at bar, since the said case is not on all fours with the present case. Unlike in Tijam,
wherein the petitioner therein actively participated in the proceedings, petitioner herein
asserts that she did not participate in any proceedings before the RTC because she
was declared in default.
Petitioner insists that summons was not validly served upon her, considering that at the
time summons was served, she was residing in Japan. Petitioner contends that
pursuant to Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant
does not reside in the Philippines and the subject of the action is property within the
Philippines of the defendant, service may be effected out of the Philippines by personal
service or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, summons
was served only by substituted service to her mother. Hence, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person.
Also, petitioner posits that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, considering
that from the complaint, it can be inferred that the value of the property was
only P4,000.00, which was the amount alleged by respondents that the property was
sold to petitioner by Lorna.
Finally, petitioner stresses that she was a buyer in good faith. It was Maura who
defrauded the respondents by selling the property to Lorna without their authority.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the CA was correct in ruling in their favor.
The petition is meritorious.
Respondents filed the complaint in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7691, An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.14
Section 1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxx
Section 3 of RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts,
thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law BP Blg. 129 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation
purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, before proceeding any further
with any other issues raised by the petitioner, it is essential to ascertain whether the
RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the above-quoted
provisions.
However, in order to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, an
examination of the complaint is essential. Basic as a hornbook principle is that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court
or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover
upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the
allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 15
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.16
Respondents' Complaint17 narrates that they are the duly registered owners of Lot No.
625 of the Limay Cadastre which was covered by TCT No. T-105602. Without their
knowledge and consent, the land was divided into several lots under their names
through the fraudulent manipulations of Maura. One of the lots was Lot 625-K, which
was covered by TCT No. 134785. On April 26, 1990, Maura sold the subject lot to
Lorna. By virtue of the fictitious sale, TCT No. 134785 was cancelled and TCT No.
134932 was issued in the name of Lorna. Sometime in August 1990, Lorna sold the lot
to petitioner for a consideration in the amount of P4,000.00. TCT No. 134932 was later
cancelled and TCT No. 137466 was issued in the name of petitioner. Despite demands
from the respondents, petitioner refused to surrender possession of the subject
property. Respondents were thus constrained to engage the services of a lawyer and
incur expenses for litigation. Respondents prayed for the RTC (a) to declare TCT No.
137466 null and to revive TCT No. T-105602 which was originally issued and registered
in the name of the respondents; and (b) to order petitioner to pay attorney's fees in the
sum of P50,000.00 and litigation expenses of P20,000.00, plus cost of suit.18
An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiff's cause of action is
based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have
exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same. Title is the "legal
link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself." "Title" is
different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership under the
Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the Register of Deeds.
While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the
evidence of such claim.19
In the present controversy, before the relief prayed for by the respondents in their
complaint can be granted, the issue of who between the two contending parties has the
valid title to the subject lot must first be determined before a determination of who
between them is legally entitled to the certificate of title covering the property in
question.
From the Complaint, the case filed by respondent is not simply a case for the
cancellation of a particular certificate of title and the revival of another. The
determination of such issue merely follows after a court of competent jurisdiction shall
have first resolved the matter of who between the conflicting parties is the lawful owner
of the subject property and ultimately entitled to its possession and enjoyment. The
action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the
subject lot, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of such lot. 20
In no uncertain terms, the Court has already held that a complaint must allege the
assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon to
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.21 In the case at bar, the only
basis of valuation of the subject property is the value alleged in the complaint that the lot
was sold by Lorna to petitioner in the amount of P4,000.00. No tax declaration was even
presented that would show the valuation of the subject property. In fact, in one of the
hearings, respondents' counsel informed the court that they will present the tax
declaration of the property in the next hearing since they have not yet obtained a copy
from the Provincial Assessor's Office.22 However, they did not present such copy.
To reiterate, where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property,
it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the
property subject thereof.23 Since the amount alleged in the Complaint by respondents
for the disputed lot is only P4,000.00, the MTC and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
action. Therefore, all proceedings in the RTC are null and void.24
Consequently, the remaining issues raised by petitioner need not be discussed further.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86983, dated June 29, 2007, and its Resolution dated October 23, 2007,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated July I,
2005, is declared NULL and VOID. The complaint in Civil Case No. 438-ML is dismissed
without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

• Orlina v. Ventura G R No 227033 December 3 2018

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 227033, December 03, 2018
REYNALDO E. ORLINA, Petitioner, v. CYNTHIA VENTURA, REPRESENTED BY HER
SONS ELVIC JHON HERRERA AND ERIC VON HERRERA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated October 26, 2015 and the
Resolution2 dated September 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
133837 which annulled and set aside the Decision3 dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 215, which in turn, approved the Final Bill of
Sale issued by the City Treasurer of Quezon City in favor of petitioner Reynaldo E.
Orlina, declared Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 272336 in the name of
respondent Cynthia Ventura null and void, and ordered the issuance of a new title
covering the subject property in the name of Orlina.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

The property involved in the present controversy is a 406 square meter parcel of land
located in Baesa, Quezon City and covered by TCT No. 272336 in the name of Ventura,
and likewise, covered by Tax Declaration No. E-004-01387. From 1998 to 2008, Ventura
had been delinquent in the payment of its real property taxes amounting to P27,471.18,
inclusive of penalty charges, failing to pay despite notice of such delinquency. As a
result, the City Treasurer of Quezon City issued a warrant subjecting the property to
levy. To satisfy the tax delinquency, the property was then advertised for sale at a public
auction by posting a notice at the main entrance of the Quezon City Hall, as well as in a
public and conspicuous place in the barangay where the property was located, and by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. On April 2, 2009, a public auction was
conducted during which Orlina turned out to be the highest bidder with a bid price of
P400,000.00. The corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued in his favor on even
date. After the lapse of the one (1)-year period of redemption without Ventura
redeeming the subject property, the City Treasurer of Quezon City issued a Final Bill of
Sale to Orlina.4

Consequently, Orlina filed a petition for the approval of the final bill of sale, cancellation
of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 272336, and issuance of a new certificate
of title for the subject property in his favor. On September 28, 2011, the RTC issued an
Order setting the case for hearing on December 7, 2011 and directed the service of
notice of hearing, together with a copy of the petition and its annexes upon the
following: the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the Land Registration Authority of
Quezon City, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
he Office of the Solicitor General, and the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The RTC also
ordered the posting of a notice of hearing at the main entrance of the Quezon City Hall,
the bulletin board of the RTC, and at the site of the subject property. During the initial
hearing on December 7, 2011, Orlina marked several documents to establish
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements. There being no opposition filed, the
RTC issued an order of general default and granted Orlina's motion to present
evidence ex-parte.5

On May 14, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Section 75 of P.D. No. 1529,
the Final Bill of Sale issued by the City Treasurer of Quezon City in favor of
petitioner Reynaldo Orlina is hereby APPROVED and CONFIRMED,
PROVIDED, however, that the proceeds of the sale in excess of the delinquent
tax, including the interest due thereon, and the expenses of the sale, in the total
amount of P363,869,75, shall be remitted to Cynthia F. Ventura, the registered
owner of the real property, or person having legal interest therein. Further, TCT
No. 272336 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued in the name of
Cynthia F. Ventura is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
 Upon finality of this Decision, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to
cause the issuance of a new title covering the property subject of this petition in
the name of REYNALDO ORLINA.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the following:

The Regist[er] of Deeds - Quezon City;

The Administrator, LRA - Quezon City;
The Secretary, DENR - Quezon City;
The Office of the Solicitor General - Makati City; and
The City Prosecutor - Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.6
Pursuant to the Decision quoted above, TCT No. 004-2012010324 was issued in favor
of Orlina, who subsequently filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, which was granted by the RTC in an Order dated February 27, 2013.
It was only at this point that Ventura filed an omnibus motion seeking a reconsideration
of the RTC's Decision. She argued that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person, thus, depriving her of her .right to due process. She also filed an urgent motion
for reconsideration of the Order granting the issuance of the writ of possession, praying
for the suspension of its implementation pending resolution of the omnibus motion. In
denying both motions, however, the RTC held that the reliefs sought by Ventura are
proper to be raised and taken up in a separate action and not in a case before it, which
is already decided and has become final.7

On October 26, 2015, however, the CA annulled and set aside the Decision of the RTC
and all subsequent proceedings taken in relation thereto. It held that there was no proof
that Ventura was served with notices of the proceedings before the trial court. As a
consequence of this violation of her constitutional right to due process, said court did
not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Thus, the CA disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision dated 14 May 2012 and all proceedings,
resolutions, orders and other issuances are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL TCT No.
004-2012010324 issued in the name of private respondent Reynaldo Orlina as a
consequence of the execution of the disposition in LRC Case No. Q-32175(11)
and to REINSTATE TCT No. 272336 in the name of petitioner Cynthia Ventura.

SO ORDERED.8

Ruling of the Supreme Court

Upon the denial of Orlina's motion for reconsideration, he elevated the matter before the
Court via the instant petition, assigning the following grounds:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE REMEDY OF CERTIORARI CAN BE AVAILED OF BY

 THE HEREIN [RESPONDENT] DESPITE LOSS OF REMEDY OF APPEAL.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT APPROVED THE

FINAL BILL OF SALE HAS JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE TAX SALE PROCEEDING CONDUCTED BY THE
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE [RESPONDENT] COMPLIED WITH [THE]

REQUIREMENTS ON VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM
SHOPPING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF THE HEREIN [PETITIONER].

V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF HEREIN [RESPONDENT]. 9

First, Orlina argues that the petition for certiorari filed by Ventura before the CA should
not have been allowed, since it is not a substitute for her lost appeal. At the time she
filed her Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration questioning the Decision of the RTC, the
same had already become final. Second, he maintains that the RTC that approved the
final bill of sale had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the tax delinquency auction
sale proceeding conducted by the City Government of Quezon City. Any question
Ventura may raise as regards the said sale must be raised in an entirely separate
proceeding and not in the petition for approval of final bill of sale filed by Orlina. Third,
Orlina assails the verification and certification of non-forum shopping filed by Ventura
accompanying her petition before the CA on the ground that the same was signed by
her sons and not by Ventura herself. According to him, there is no justifiable reason for
Ventura's sons to substitute her. Neither was there any mention of an authority to sign
said verification in her behalf in the Special Power of Attorney attached to the petition
filed before the CA. Fourth, granting the existence of irregularities in the tax delinquency
sale, the same must be determined in a separate case and not in the instant petition for
approval of final bill of sale as the same is tantamount to a collateral attack on Orlina's
title. This is because the subject property was already transferred in his name. It cannot
simply be altered, modified, or cancelled, except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. Finally, Orlina insists that the RTC duly acquired jurisdiction over her person.
Contrary to the findings of the CA that Ventura was not served with any notice of the
proceedings, he and the City Treasurer of Quezon City actually sent the warrant of levy
and notices to Ventura using the address stated in the tax declaration and certificate of
title of the subject property. In addition to this, the posting requirement was, likewise,
complied with when the order of the trial court was posted at the site where the property
is located. Thus, Ventura was sufficiently accorded due process and any accusation of
malice on the part of Orlina is negated. Ventura only has herself to blame for her
belated participation in the proceeding which has already attained finality.
We rule in favor of Ventura.

As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect
the appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executory.10 As such, it has been
held that the availability of an appeal is fatal to a special civil action for certiorari for the
same is not a substitute for a lost appeal.11 This is in line with the doctrine of finality of
judgment or immutability of judgment under which a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any
act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.12

But like any other rule, the doctrine of immutability of judgment has exceptions, namely:
(1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause
no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. Similarly,
while it is doctrinally entrenched that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, the
Court has allowed the resort to a petition for certiorari despite the existence of or prior
availability of an appeal, such as: (1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy
and adequate remedy; (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or
without jurisdiction; (3) for certain special considerations, as public welfare or public
policy; (4) where in criminal actions, the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the
prosecution as, in case of acquittal, there could be no remedy; (5) where the order is a
patent nullity; and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future
litigations.13

Thus, in many instances, the Court found it necessary to apply the exception rather than
the general rule above. In Montoya v. Varilla,14 for example, the Court therein held that
since the proceedings dismissing Montoya from service were conducted without notice
to him, the judgment of dismissal was rendered in violation of his right to due process.
As such, even if his appeal thereof was filed beyond the period provided by law,
Montoya was not barred from filing the same because the violation of his constitution
right deprived the regional director of jurisdiction over his case thereby rendering the
judgment null and void. Likewise, in Salva v. Valle, the Court excused the fact that the
appeal filed by Valle was beyond the reglementary period and allowed the liberal
application of the rules of procedure for perfecting appeals in exceptional circumstances
to better serve the interest of justice. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be
faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about
procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper administration of justice. Thus, if
the rules are intended to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation, it is because of the
higher objective they seek, which is the protection of substantive rights of the parties.

In like manner, the Court, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) v. Spouses Perez,15 did not
hesitate in affirming the ruling of the CA which granted PNB's petition for certiorari even
with the existence of the remedy of appeal and even if the challenged RTC decision had
already become final and executory and was, in fact, already the subject of a writ of
execution. There, PNB sought to foreclose the mortgaged properties of the Spouses
Perez when they defaulted on their financial obligations. Refusing to admit their
obligation, the spouses filed an action to release the mortgaged properties and to annul
the sheriffs notice of extra-judicial sale; among others. When the trial court set the case
for hearing, it failed to issue a proper notice of pre-trial to PNB. Consequently, PNB
failed to attend the hearing. The trial court then allowed the Spouses Perez to present
their evidence exparte and eventually rendered judgment in favor of the spouses
enjoining PNB from foreclosing their properties. Nevertheless, the Court therein ruled
that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the spouses to
present evidence ex-parte without due notice to PNB. This lack of notice of pre-trial
rendered all subsequent proceedings null and void. Hence, the CA was correct in not
dismissing the petition for certiorari and ordering the titles issued in favor of the spouses
to revert back to PNB.16

Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court failed to serve Ventura with a notice of
hearing and a copy of the petition with its annexes. As aptly found by the CA, there was
no proof that Ventura was personally served with said notice. Neither was there proof of
substantial service or even service by publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
The records of the present case reveal that only the following were notified: the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City, the Land Registration Authority of Quezon City, the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

On this matter, Orlina insists that he and the City Treasurer of Quezon City actually sent
the warrant of levy and notices to Ventura using the address stated in the tax
declaration and certificate of title of the subject property. In addition, the posting
requirement was, likewise, complied with when the order of the trial court was posted at
the site where the property is located. The Court, however, finds said contention
unacceptable. First, the notices allegedly sent to Ventura were made in a separate and
distinct proceeding, specifically, the tax sale. Nowhere in the records of the case,
however, did Orlina show that Ventura was duly notified of the instant proceeding for the
approval of the final bill of sale, cancellation of the original and duplicate copy of TCT
No. 272336, and issuance of a new certificate of title for the subject property in Orlina's
favor.

Second, while Orlina persistently argues that notices were sent to Ventura, the validity
and due execution of the same remain doubtful. The Court is curious as to why, in
attempting to prove proper notification, Orlina makes reference to different addresses.
To illustrate, in his petition before the Court alone, he refers to three (3) different
addresses where notices were allegedly sent. In page 13 thereof, he categorically
states that "it cannot be denied and, in fact, admitted by the petitioner-appellee
(Ventura) that its address is in No. 201 Quirino Highway, Baesa, Quezon City."17 But in
page 18, Orlina provides that "it is very clear in the Tax Declaration of Real Property that
the address of the (sic) Cynthia Ventura is 201 Baesa, Caloocan City."18 In page 19,
moreover, he again makes mention of yet another address in saying that "the certificate
of posting of the court interpreter dated October 4, 2011 shows that the Order of the
Honorable Court dated September 28, 2011 was posted at No. 201 Baesa, Balintawak,
Quezon City." Furthermore, as Ventura points out, Orlina sent out notices and other
court documents to different addresses. For one, he sent his Demand to Vacate to 201
Quirino Highway, Baesa, Quezon City, which is actually the true address of Ventura and
her heirs. But on other occasions, however, Orlina's Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of
a Writ of Possession, as well as his Petition for the Approval of Bill of Sale, were both
addressed to 201 EDSA, Baesa, Caloocan City.

To the Court, these circumstances belie Orlina's claims of good faith. But even if We
assume that he sent notices to the different addresses by mere honest mistake and in
good faith, believing said addresses to be true, the fact remains that Ventura was,
indeed, not properly notified of the instant proceedings. Verily, this fact alone is a denial
of her right to due process which the Court deems necessary to correct. Time and
again, the Court has held that where there is an apparent denial of the fundamental
right to due process, a decision that is issued in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction,19 in view of the cardinal precept that in cases of a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. This violation raises a
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Thus, it
is well settled that a judgment or decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked at any time directly or collaterally by means of a separate
action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked20 for
such judgment or decision is regarded as a "lawless thing which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head."21

As the CA noted, the action filed by Orlina is a petition seeking the cancellation of
Ventura's title and the issuance of a new one under his name, brought under the
auspices of Sections 7522 and 10823 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529; otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, which is evidently an action in rem. While
jurisdiction over the parties in an action in rem is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court, it is nonetheless required to satisfy the requirements of due process. 24

In view thereof, We find that the CA aptly held that the order of the RTC of general
default, allowing Orlina to adduce evidence ex parte, is void for violating Ventura's right
to due process. Similarly, the May 14, 2012 Decision of said trial court, which granted
Orlina's petition for approval of deed of sale and the transfer of the titles in his name,
and all subsequent orders issued pursuant to the said judgment are also null and void. It
has been held in the past that a void judgment is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Necessarily, it follows that the
nullity of the RTC Decision carries with it the nullity of all acts done which implemented
the same. This includes the issuance of the new TCT No. 004-201201324 in the name
of Orlina.25

As for Orlina's belated attempt at refuting Ventura's allegation of denial of due process,
We find that the fact that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
accompanying the petition before the CA was signed by her sons and not by Ventura
herself should not affect the substantive findings of the present case. It must be noted
that at the time when the subject RTC Decision was rendered in violation of her right to
due process and when demands on her sons to vacate the premises, Ventura was
already residing in the United States as stated in the Special Power of Attorney attached
to the certification and petition filed before the CA. This constitutes justifiable reason for
her sons to substitute her in the instant case. As We previously mentioned, rules of
procedure are tools to facilitate and not hinder the administration of justice and, thus, for
justifiable reasons, may adopt a liberal application thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed

Decision dated October 26, 2015 and Resolution dated September 14, 2016 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 133837 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, is DIRECTED to CONDUCT further
proceedings with dispatch on the Petition for the Approval of the Final Bill of Sale,
Cancellation of the Original and Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 272336, and Issuance of a
New Certificate of Title.

SO ORDERED.

• Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059, January 22, 2008

 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother,
of swindling government funds?
MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang
kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?
The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the
Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash
the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the
Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is known as a government scholar. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student
regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on
December 31, 2000.
In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of
Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings
and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall
Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI
as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according
to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student
regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of
the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state
university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property
with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to
indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor,
hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of
 the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public
officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines,
Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud
the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University
of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and
believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to
said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000
and misappropriated for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said
accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does
not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as
UP student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It
has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered
by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against
Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped.
Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada,
not from the coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person.
As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her
peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity.
She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student
regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds.
Such power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not
alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or
that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v.
Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law.
Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all
phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial. 13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, she was a public
officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the general powers of administration and
exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a public office,
petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is
erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically,
compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner
was compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s

motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this
case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the
jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b)
of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other
offenses committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office.
From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the
student body, she was never a public officer since she never received any
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view
of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. (Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has
 original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated
in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their
responsibilities and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines
reveals that the Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law
such sums as may be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To
prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the
university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are
consistent with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on
recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors,
lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours
of service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant
to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to
remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through
its board of directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-stock corporations.
The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the
corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the
Philippines is performing functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a
non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of
such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public
officials upon whom this Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction,
regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary
Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15
Million was received from former President Estrada and not from the coffers of
the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during
the trial on the merits of this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was
denied with finality in a Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION
OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with
Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not
committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from
President Estrada, not from the government.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds.
Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,
the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash.20 Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to
avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and
illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory
and cannot be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2
of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an
answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal
from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to
quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal
lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is
that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal
and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or
offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical
and capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed
the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash
based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the
 case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and
enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to
dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss
based on bar by prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and
directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to
dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition
for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by
respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal
case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based
on prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed
by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section
4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the
Sandiganbayan.25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in
her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It
bears stressing that petitioner repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No.
3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief
legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms
of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that
public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. 29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on
December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made
succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintended or higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
 this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final
judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of
their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or
that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall
apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor,
shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of
the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet
been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation
and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960.
The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10
of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by
petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on
private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any
person having family or close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or
pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction,
application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official
has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by
consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal
relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections,
and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free
access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public
official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt
practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among
those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to
the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible
construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat
maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to
each other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention
of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of the
act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct
opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle
that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est
ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang
kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang
mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
 B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of
this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is
committed in relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over an indictment for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an
Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later
designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February
7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro
F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O. No.
3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of
Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27,
1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709,
dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular
government agency under the Office of the President and allotments for its
maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A,
Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness
in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional
Trial Court, for the simple reason that the latter would not have jurisdiction over
the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to
hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees
separately charged for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00,
committed by government employees in conspiracy with private persons,
including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint
trial would nonetheless not be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary
or remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that
We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public
officer.39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the
varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by
which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office
under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists
at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest
or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42
Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by
which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public.
The individual so invested is a public officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also
has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v.
People,43 We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive
officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision
of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction
over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls
under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions
similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate
of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public
office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an
individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised
by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the
Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional and
technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no
dividends and is not a corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not
committed in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the
BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to
contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private
capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. 51 More
than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or
respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or
respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being
then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her
position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when
it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and
not from the government coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered
to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of
the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the
merits of the instant case.54
A lawyer owes candor, fairness
and honesty to the Court.
As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his
reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.
A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum,
unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer
shall not misquote or misrepresent."
The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty
Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal
case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different
from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and
warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A
lawyer’s conduct before the court should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor
and honesty before the courts.58
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

• Ambil v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.2 assailing the
Decision3 promulgated on September 16, 2005 and Resolution4 dated November 8,
2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892.

Facts

The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the
Eastern Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of
the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor
Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the
provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A.
Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January 4, 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
recommended the filing of criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of
Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the new President of the
IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no longer
interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the
dismissal of the complaint against petitioners.8
Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and
Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, together with SPO3 Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a Memorandum10 dated August 4, 2000, recommending the
dismissal of the complaint as regards Balano and the amendment of the Information to
include the charge of Delivering Prisoners from Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the remaining accused. The Amended
Information12 reads:
That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or]
subsequent thereto, [in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named
accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,] being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar,
and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both
having been public officers, duly elected, appointed and qualified as such, committing
the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest partiality and evident bad faith,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and cause the release from
the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim, accused in Criminal
Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by Honorable
Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and
thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.’s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused
Ambil’s residence for a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was
done without any court order, thus accused in the performance of official functions had
given unwarranted benefits and advantage to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the
prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.13
On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.
At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason,
however, that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his
person and the dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to
petitioners, Adalim’s sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners
to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its
case after the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave
to File Demurrer to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of
Denial14 but the same was denied.
At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A.
Adalim-White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to
2001. According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed the
transfer of Adalim’s detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as
the primary reason for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter
would be in the company of inmates who were put away by his sister and guards
identified with his political opponents.15
For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar
and the sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested while
they were attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998.
According to Atty. White, she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after
Provincial Warden and herein petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s
safety.16
Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar.
He confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed
against him in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim
confirmed Atty. White’s account that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for,
or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a
prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him with a raised clenched fist. Sensing danger, he
called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted staying at Ambil, Jr.’s residence for almost
three months before he posted bail after the charge against him was downgraded to
homicide.17
Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern
Samar. He recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at home
to assist in the arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality
of Mayor Adalim’s arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking him for
detention. At the provincial jail, petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed
him that he was under the governor, in the latter’s capacity as a provincial jailer.
Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governor’s order to
relinquish custody of Adalim.18
Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be
dilapidated and undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of
looking after 50 inmates. There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates,
while an isolation cell of 10 square meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, there
were several nipa huts within the perimeter for use during conjugal visits.19
On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed
Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court
ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord
him unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to
television and other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under
the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred
except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.21
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s transfer was made
to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any
actual threat on Adalim’s life but relied simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The
Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within
the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate
Adalim from other prisoners. Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s failure to turn over
Adalim despite advice from Assistant Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of
Interior and Local Government.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve
(12) years and four (4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated
the incomplete justifying circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced
him to imprisonment for six (6) years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8)
months.
Hence, the present petitions.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED,
APPLIES TO PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A
PRIVATE PARTY FOR PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO.
3019, AS AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT,
MANIFEST PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE
NEGLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION 3(e).
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER
UNDER SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC
ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE CUSTODY OF A DETENTION
PRISONER.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE
OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED
BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.22
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the Sandiganbayan:
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO,
EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
II
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER,
THE LATTER SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND
HEREIN PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED
BENEFITS AND ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE
GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST, SPECULATIVE.23
The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether
a provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and
(3) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under
Article 11(5)24 of the RPC.
Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can be condensed into two:
(1) Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019; and (2) Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC.
Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not
apply to his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary
nature. Since the law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a
private person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to
Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the
mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under the Administrative Code of
1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying circumstance
of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him
and petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the
orders of a superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes
immunity from criminal liability.
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of
jurisprudence that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions
of a pecuniary nature. The OSP explains that it is enough to show that in performing
their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to
attach under the provision. Further, the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private
party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the unwarranted
benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detention
prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that petitioners were motivated by bad
faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec.
Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of authority to take custody of a
detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not
entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur:
(1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions; (2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and (3) his action caused any undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.26
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers
discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-
Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended
by R.A. No. 8249.28 The pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
read as follows:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial
department heads[;]
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification29 from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows
that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it
is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here,
petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over
whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried
jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction
over them – the Sandiganbayan.
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as
follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report
matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so
defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting
to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons
may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property." x x x31
In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no
merit to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of
prisoners by virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local chief
executives over the units of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National
Police.—The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over
the police force, fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their
respective jurisdictions shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department
of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990," and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology provides:
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control
over all city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and
controlled by the provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall
be subsidized by the National Government for not more than three (3) years after the
effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.33 An officer in control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.34
On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties."35 If the subordinate
officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of
supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed,
or that subordinate officers act within the law.36 The supervisor or superintendent merely
sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he
have discretion to modify or replace them.37
Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has
authority to exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of
said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the
contrary, subordinates must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event
that the subordinate performs an act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act
should be done, but always in conformity with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites
Section 1731, Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917 on Provincial jails in support.
Section 1731 provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the province shall
be charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to
administer the same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for
the government of provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the
jail may be committed to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor.
The position of jailer shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be
filled in the manner in which classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee
shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges of classified employees, except that he
shall hold office only during the term of office of the appointing governor and until a
successor in the office of the jailer is appointed and qualified, unless sooner
separated. The provincial governor shall, under the direction of the provincial
board and at the expense of the province, supply proper food and clothing for the
prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its discretion, let the contract for the
feeding of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again,
nowhere did said provision designate the provincial governor as the "provincial jailer," or
even slightly suggest that he is empowered to take personal custody of prisoners. What
is clear from the cited provision is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is
confined to the administration of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the
prisoners. After all, administrative acts pertain only to those acts which are necessary to
be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared by the legislative
body or such as are devolved upon it38 by the Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of
his administrative powers, the governor can only enforce the law but not supplant it.
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section
173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring province
in case the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial
prisoners. However, this provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention
by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when
he is admitted to bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by
legal process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the
governor. This was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication40 dated
October 6, 1998 addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier
received by this Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody Mayor
Francisco "Aising" Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by
virtue by a warrant of arrest issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of
Section 3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that an arrested person be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the
accused municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power of
supervision vested unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does not,
definitely, include the power to take in custody any person in detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the bounds
of law and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to avoid
legal complications.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer." Said
petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful
defiance to official advice in order to accommodate a former political party
mate,41 betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime.
As mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019, it is required that the act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing
undue injury to any party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his
official, administrative or judicial functions.
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving
unwarranted benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with
murder, by causing his release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of
petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019 in this case on two points. First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly
because the last sentence thereof provides that the "provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses,
permits or other concessions" and he is not such government officer or employee.
Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private party but to a
public officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has
obviously lost sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v.
Sandiganbayan42 where we held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer is "charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions." Following is an excerpt of
what we said in Mejorada,
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any
public officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without
distinction or qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the
view adopted by the Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e)
is intended to make clear the inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or
government corporations which, under the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not
come within the term. It is a strained construction of the provision to read it as applying
exclusively to public officers charged with the duty of granting licenses or permits or
other concessions.43 (Italics supplied.)
In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution for
violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.45
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No.
3019 defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and
employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or
exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal from the government.
Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes the giving by a public officer of unwarranted benefits to a private party, does
the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of such benefits take petitioners’ case
beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than
"private person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference for a reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning
in legal parlance46 as distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a
human being.47 Thus, a private person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer.
While a private party is more comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person
or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his personal interest.
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail
and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to
Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder.
Thus, for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim
was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official,
administrative or judicial functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate
or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason.
"Advantage" means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or
gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or
higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.49
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other
than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters,
provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television.
Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his
lawyers that the mayor’s life would be put in danger inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the
existence of any risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in
having unfriendly company in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a
closed fist at Adalim as a threat of aggression, the same would still not constitute a
special and compelling reason to warrant Adalim’s detention outside the provincial jail.
For one, there were nipa huts within the perimeter fence of the jail which could have
been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the prisoners while the isolation cell was
undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have exceeded the 85 days that
Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly, even if Adalim could
have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners, a court
order was still indispensable for his transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed
by petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty
or lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any
person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
does not incur any criminal liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two
requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
such right or office.50 Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case.
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he
ordered the transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the
resulting violation of the Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his
duty or lawful exercise of his office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience
to an order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC,
any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the
following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2)
such order must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the first requisite is present in this
case.
While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry
it out was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar,
petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a
court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable
as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1)52 of the RPC.
An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same
object, one performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it
with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently
independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.53
Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation
in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of
a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of
ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under
detention by legal process is elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is
unschooled in the intricacies of the law expressed reservations on his power to transfer
Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in
the violation charged, makes them equally responsible as conspirators.
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019
punishes a public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019
with imprisonment for not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than
fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the
offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed
by the same.1avvphi1
Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years
and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an
incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the
same penalty.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We
find petitioners Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R.
Apelado, Sr. is, likewise, sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for
nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4)
months.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

• Garcia v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 170122 October 12, 2009
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171381
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions under Rule 65, each interposed by
petitioner Clarita D. Garcia, with application for injunctive relief. In the first petition for
mandamus and/or certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 170122, petitioner seeks to nullify
and set aside the August 5, 2005 Order,1 as reiterated in another Order dated August
26, 2005, both issued by the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, which effectively denied
the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to quash Civil Case No. 0193, a suit for
forfeiture commenced by the Republic of the Philippines against the petitioner and her
immediate family. The second petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 171381,
seeks to nullify and set aside the November 9, 2005 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, insofar as it likewise denied the petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or
quash Civil Case No. 0196, another forfeiture case involving the same parties but for
different properties.

The Facts

To recover unlawfully acquired funds and properties in the aggregate amount of PhP
143,052,015.29 that retired Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, his wife, herein petitioner
Clarita, children Ian Carl, Juan Paulo and Timothy Mark (collectively, the Garcias) had
allegedly amassed and acquired, the Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB), pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 1379,3 filed with the Sandiganbayan (SB) on
October 29, 2004 a petition for the forfeiture of those properties. This petition, docketed
as Civil Case No. 0193, was eventually raffled to the Fourth Division of the anti-graft
court.
Civil Case No. 0193 was followed by the filing on July 5, 2005 of another forfeiture case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0196, this time to recover funds and properties amounting to
PhP 202,005,980.55. Civil Case No. 0196 would eventually be raffled also to the Fourth
Division of the SB. For convenience and clarity, Civil Case No. 0193 shall hereinafter be
also referred to as Forfeiture I and Civil Case No. 0196 as Forfeiture II.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB
charged the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) under an
Information dated April 5, 2005 which placed the value of the property and funds
plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99. Docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107, the Information
was raffled off to the Second Division of the SB. The plunder charge, as the parties’
pleadings seem to indicate, covered substantially the same properties identified in both
forfeiture cases.
After the filing of Forfeiture I, the following events transpired in relation to the case:
(1) The corresponding summons were issued and all served on Gen. Garcia
at his place of detention. Per the Sheriff’s Return4 dated November 2, 2005, the
summons were duly served on respondent Garcias. Earlier, or on October 29,
2004, the SB issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic, an issuance
which Gen. Garcia challenged before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 165835.
Instead of an answer, the Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the
SB’s lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The OMB
countered with a motion to expunge and to declare the Garcias in default. To the
OMB’s motion, the Garcias interposed an opposition in which they manifested
that they have meanwhile repaired to the Court on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 165835 to nullify the writ of attachment SB issued in which case the SB
should defer action on the forfeiture case as a matter of judicial courtesy.
(2) By Resolution5 of January 20, 2005, the SB denied the motion to dismiss;
declared the same motion as pro forma and hence without tolling effect on the
period to answer. The same resolution declared the Garcias in default.
Another resolution6 denied the Garcias’ motion for reconsideration and/or to
admit answer, and set a date for the ex-parte presentation of the Republic’s
evidence.
A second motion for reconsideration was also denied on February 23, 2005,
pursuant to the prohibited pleading rule.
(3) Despite the standing default order, the Garcias moved for the transfer and
consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were respectively
pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is
mandatory under RA 8249.7
On May 20, 2005, the SB 4th Division denied the motion for the reason that the
forfeiture case is not the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from the criminal case of plunder.
(4) On July 26, 2005, the Garcias filed another motion to dismiss and/or to quash
Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the filing of the plunder case
ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case; and (b) that the
consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements.
By Order8 of August 5, 2005, the SB merely noted the motion in view of movants having
been declared in default which has yet to be lifted.
It is upon the foregoing factual antecedents that petitioner Clarita has interposed her
first special civil action for mandamus and/or certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 170122,
raising the following issues:
I. Whether or not the [SB] 4th Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion x x x in issuing its challenged order of August 5, 2005 and
August 26 2005 that merely "Noted without action," hence refused to resolve petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and/or to quash by virtue of petitioner’s prior default in that:
A. For lack of proper and valid service of summons, the [SB] 4th Division
could not have acquired jurisdiction over petitioner’s, [and her children’s] x x x
persons, much less make them become the true "parties-litigants, contestants or
legal adversaries" in forfeiture I. As the [SB] has not validly acquired jurisdiction
over the petitioner’s [and her children’s] x x x persons, they could not possibly be
declared in default, nor can a valid judgment by default be rendered against
them.
B. Even then, mere declaration in default does not per se bar petitioner from
challenging the [SB] 4th Division’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
forfeiture I as the same can be raised anytime, even after final judgment. In the
absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, any and all proceedings before
the [SB] are null and void.
C. Contrary to its August 26, 2005 rejection of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the first challenged order that the issue of jurisdiction raised
therein had already been passed upon by [the SB 4th Division’s] resolution of
May 20, 2005, the records clearly show that the grounds relied upon by petitioner
in her motion to dismiss and/or to quash dated July 26, 2005 were entirely
different, separate and distinct from the grounds set forth in petitioner’s
manifestation and motion [to consolidate] dated April 15, 2005 that was denied by
it per its resolution of May 20, 2005.
D. In any event, the [SB] 4th Division has been ousted of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of forfeiture I upon the filing of the main plunder case against
petitioner that mandates the automatic forfeiture of the subject properties in
forfeiture cases I & II as a function or adjunct of any conviction for plunder.
E. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly
repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
F. Since the sought forfeiture includes properties purportedly located in the USA,
any penal conviction for forfeiture in this case cannot be enforced outside of the
Philippines x x x.
G. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is
imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder
case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements, and to avoid possible
conflicting decisions by 2 divisions of the [SB] on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction.9 (Emphasis added.)
With respect to Forfeiture II, the following events and proceedings occurred or were
taken after the petition for Forfeiture II was filed:
(1) On July 12, 2005, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his
return of July 13, 2005, the sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to
the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center who in turn handed them to
Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the summons, but as to those
pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the
same, but with the following qualifying note: "I’m receiving the copies of Clarita,
Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will not guarantee it being
served to the above-named (sic)."
(2) On July 26, 2005, Clarita and her children, thru special appearance of
counsel, filed a motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II primarily for lack of
jurisdiction over their persons and on the subject matter thereof which is now
covered by the plunder case.
To the above motion, the Republic filed its opposition with a motion for
alternative service of summons. The motion for alternative service would
be repeated in another motion of August 25, 2005.
(3) By Joint Resolution of November 9, 2005, the SB denied both the petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and/or to quash and the Republic’s motion for alternative
service of summons.
On January 24, 2006, the SB denied petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration. 10
From the last two issuances adverted to, Clarita has come to this Court via the instant
petition for certiorari, docketed as GR No. 171381. As there submitted, the SB 4th
Division acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its Joint Resolution dated November 9, 2005 and its Resolution of January 24,
2006 denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss and/or to quash in that:
A. Based on its own finding that summons was improperly served on
petitioner, the [SB] ought to have dismissed forfeiture II for lack of jurisdiction
over petitioner’s person x x x.
B. By virtue of the plunder case filed with the [SB] Second Division that mandates
the automatic forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties upon conviction, the
[SB] Fourth Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of forfeiture.
C. Being incompatible, the forfeiture law (RA No. 1379 [1955]) was impliedly
repealed by the plunder law (RA No. 7080 [1991]) with automatic forfeiture
mechanism.
D. Based on orderly procedure and sound administration of justice, it is
imperative that the matter of forfeiture be exclusively tried in the main plunder
case to avoid possible double jeopardy entanglements and worse conflicting
decisions by 2 divisions of the Sandiganbayan on the matter of forfeiture as a
penal sanction.11 (Emphasis added.)
Per Resolution of the Court dated March 13, 2006, G.R. No. 170122 and G.R. No.
171381 were consolidated.

The Supreme Court Ruling

The petitions are partly meritorious.
The core issue tendered in these consolidated cases ultimately boils down to the
question of jurisdiction and may thusly be couched into whether the Fourth Division of
the SB has acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner—and her three sons for
that matter—considering that, first, vis-à-vis Civil Case Nos. 0193 (Forfeiture I) and
0196 (Forfeiture II), summons against her have been ineffectively or improperly served
and, second, that the plunder case—Crim. Case No. 28107—has already been filed and
pending with another division of the SB, i.e., Second Division of the SB.
Plunder Case in Crim. Case No. 28107 Did Not Absorb the Forfeiture Cases in
Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
Petitioner maintains that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the plunder case
against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the filing of the main plunder
case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic forfeiture mechanism in the event of
conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
forfeiture cases. The inclusion of the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary,
so petitioner claims, to obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding
case dispositions. Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave
abuse of discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to
dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the plunder case on
the foregoing ground.
Petitioner’s contention is untenable. And in response to what she suggests in some of
her pleadings, let it be stated at the outset that the SB has jurisdiction over actions for
forfeiture under RA 1379, albeit the proceeding thereunder is civil in nature. We said so
in Garcia v. Sandiganbayan12 involving no less than petitioner’s husband questioning
certain orders issued in Forfeiture I case.
Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder case,
thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by
the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases
are the corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly
ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,13 the civil liability for
forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense, thus:
Such liability is based on a statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover
unlawfully acquired properties. The action of forfeiture arises when a "public officer or
employee [acquires] during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly
out of proportion of his salary x x x and to his other lawful income x x x."14 Such amount
of property is then presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.15 Thus "if the
respondent [public official] is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has
lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid
shall become property of the State.16 x x x (Citations in the original.)
Lest it be overlooked, Executive Order No. (EO) 14, Series of 1986, albeit defining only
the jurisdiction over cases involving ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, his
immediate family and business associates, authorizes under its Sec. 317 the filing of
forfeiture suits under RA 1379 which will proceed independently of any criminal
proceedings. The Court, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan,18 interpreted this provision as
empowering the Presidential Commission on Good Government to file independent civil
actions separate from the criminal actions.
Forfeiture Cases and the Plunder Case Have Separate Causes of Action; the
Former Is Civil in Nature while the Latter Is Criminal
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of
a cause of action separate and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion
that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases.
In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the commission of the
criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. In the language of Sec.
4 of RA 7080, for purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it is "sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy [to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth]." On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of
evidence, under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his
legitimate income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. As
correctly formulated by the Solicitor General, the forfeitable nature of the properties
under the provisions of RA 1379 does not proceed from a determination of a specific
overt act committed by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the
illegal wealth.19
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner’s thesis on possible double jeopardy
entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim. Case 28107 collapses
entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense,20 suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate
criminal prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. As a
necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be proceeded against for a
criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under that law is not barred by the conviction
or acquittal of the defendant in Crim. Case 28107 for plunder.
Moreover, given the variance in the nature and subject matter of the proceedings
between the plunder case and the subject forfeiture cases, petitioner’s apprehension
about the likelihood of conflicting decisions of two different divisions of the anti-graft
court on the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction is specious at best. What the SB
said in this regard merits approving citation:
On the matter of forfeiture as a penal sanction, respondents argue that the division
where the plunder case is pending may issue a decision that would collide or be in
conflict with the decision by this division on the forfeiture case. They refer to a situation
where this Court’s Second Division may exonerate the respondents in the plunder case
while the Fourth Division grant the petition for forfeiture for the same properties in favor
of the state or vice versa.
Suffice it to say that the variance in the decisions of both divisions does not give rise to
a conflict. After all, forfeiture in the plunder case requires the attendance of facts and
circumstances separate and distinct from that in the forfeiture case. Between the two (2)
cases, there is no causal connection in the facts sought to be established and the
issues sought to be addressed. As a result, the decision of this Court in one does not
have a bearing on the other.
There is also no conflict even if the decisions in both cases result in an order for the
forfeiture of the subject properties. The forfeiture following a conviction in the plunder
case will apply only to those ill-gotten wealth not recovered by the forfeiture case and
vise (sic) versa. This is on the assumption that the information on plunder and the
petition for forfeiture cover the same set of properties.21

RA 7080 Did Not Repeal RA 1379

Petitioner takes a different tack in her bid to prove that SB erred in not dismissing
Forfeitures I and II with her assertion that RA 7080 impliedly repealed RA 1379. We are
not convinced.
Nowhere in RA 7080 can we find any provision that would indicate a repeal, expressly
or impliedly, of RA 1379. RA 7080 is a penal statute which, at its most basic, aims to
penalize the act of any public officer who by himself or in connivance with members of
his family amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount
of at least PhP 50 million. On the other hand, RA 1379 is not penal in nature, in that it
does not make a crime the act of a public official acquiring during his incumbency an
amount of property manifestly out of proportion of his salary and other legitimate
income. RA 1379 aims to enforce the right of the State to recover the properties which
were not lawfully acquired by the officer.
It has often been said that all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal and
all efforts should be exerted to harmonize and give effect to all laws and provisions on
the same subject. To be sure, both RA 1379 and RA 7080 can very well be harmonized.
The Court perceives no irreconcilable conflict between them. One can be enforced
without nullifying the other.
Sandiganbayan Did Not Acquire Jurisdiction over the Persons of Petitioner and
Her Children
On the issue of lack of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire
jurisdiction over her person and that of her children due to a defective substituted
service of summons. There is merit in petitioner’s contention.1 a vv p h i 1
Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides for the
requirements of a valid substituted service of summons, thus:
SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable
time as provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by
its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and
proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a
person.22
In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served
personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention
Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed
that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on
petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center.
However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being irregular and
defective.
In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals,23 we broke down the requirements to be:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying on substituted
service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or
there is impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time. Reasonable
time being "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a
reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or
duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of
loss, if any[,] to the other party."24 Moreover, we indicated therein that the sheriff
must show several attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on at
least two (2) different dates.
(2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in the Return of
Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service.
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion
residing at defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge
of defendant’s office or regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of
summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj.
Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a
valid substituted service of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not
strictly complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioner’s house or
residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. Garcia is detained, even if
the latter is of suitable age and discretion. Hence, no valid substituted service of
summons was made.
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the defendants, however, admits of exceptions, as when the party
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief. 25 In
the instant case, the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning
improper service of summons since the improvident service of summons in both
forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner and her children) voluntary
appearance in the forfeiture cases. The Republic points to the various pleadings filed by
petitioner and her children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe
to the Republic’s views.
Special Appearance to Question a Court’s Jurisdiction Is Not Voluntary
Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.—The defendant’s voluntary appearance in the action
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court
over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have
appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance—the first
sentence of the above-quoted rule—means is that the voluntary appearance of the
defendant in court is without qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived
his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject forfeiture cases, however, do not show
that she voluntarily appeared without qualification. Petitioner filed the following
pleadings in Forfeiture I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to
admit answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture
case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in
Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial
reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed by petitioner
solely for special appearance with the purpose of challenging the jurisdiction of
the SB over her person and that of her three children . Petitioner asserts therein that
SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her three children for lack of valid
service of summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both
Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned when she filed
her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to admit their attached Answer Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with
a claim for damages. And the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon
her stance and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of
summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the
1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not voluntarily
appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent to service of summons.
Moreover, the leading La Naval Drug Corp. v. Court of Appeals26 applies to the instant
case. Said case elucidates the current view in our jurisdiction that a special appearance
before the court––challenging its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to
dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds––is not tantamount to estoppel or a
waiver by the movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his person; and such is not
constitutive of a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it cannot be said that petitioner and her three children voluntarily appeared before
the SB to cure the defective substituted services of summons. They are, therefore, not
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the SB over their persons nor are they
deemed to have waived such defense of lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, there being
no valid substituted services of summons made, the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of petitioner and her children. And perforce, the proceedings in the subject
forfeiture cases, insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned, are null and
void for lack of jurisdiction. Thus, the order declaring them in default must be set aside
and voided insofar as petitioner and her three children are concerned. For the forfeiture
case to proceed against them, it is, thus, imperative for the SB to serve anew summons
or alias summons on the petitioner and her three children in order to acquire jurisdiction
over their persons.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and mandamus are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division has not acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Clarita
D. Garcia and her three children. The proceedings in Civil Case Nos. 0193 and 0196
before the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, insofar as they pertain to petitioner and her
three children, are VOID for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 • City of Manila v. Hon. Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014

EN BANC
G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS.
LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE
HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS.,
INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and
SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and
November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty
Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against
private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center,
Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils.,
Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In
addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14,
15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered
the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the
same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the
issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the
₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City] the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or
Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public respondent's sala [at
Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private
respondents alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section
143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They
further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent
portions of the RRCM had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by
the Department of Justice.2

In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it in its Order5 dated
October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9,
2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for
certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed
with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution
dated November 29, 2006.

Ruling of the Supreme Court

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a
Writ of Injunction the petitioners, their agents and/or authorized representatives
from implementing Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as
amended, against private respondents.
III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of
Injunction despite failure of private respondents to make a written claim for tax
credit or refund with the City Treasurer of Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under
Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting
agents of the City Government.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of
Injunction because petitioner City of Manila and its constituents would result to
greater damage and prejudice thereof. (sic)8
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should
be denied for being moot and academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a
Decision9 in the main case had already been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor
of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid
pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the
year 2002 in the following amounts:
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63
To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc. - 419,689.04
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - 231,453.62
Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp. - 140,908.54
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp. - 220,204.70
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp. - 94,906.34
TOTAL: - P 19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code
of Manila from herein plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.10
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had
already become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same
trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on
November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in
the present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering that the trial
court, in its decision on the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of
respondents and that the same decision is now final and executory. Well entrenched is
the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. 13
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by
petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a
settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.14
However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it
proper to likewise address a procedural error which petitioners committed.
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA
which dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for
reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of
the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is
settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case.15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.16 As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.17
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in
the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari
as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed
within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2)
when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify
the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-
day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that
an error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on
jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the
instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case.
The basic question posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction
over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the
RTC in a local tax case.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the
CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of
property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto;
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising
under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282)
amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership
and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent
portions of the amendatory act provides thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
 1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides
a specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a
denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their
original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability
for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or
release of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation
thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and
taxation of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to
him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of
nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of
Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302,
respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures
under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision
to impose or not to impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from
violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs
Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or
the Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies
mentioned in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be
tried by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be
appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be
 simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in the same
proceeding by the CTA, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve
the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action will be
recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial
jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases
originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and
executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides,
however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million
pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective
territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax
collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the
amendatory RA 9282, which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before
it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or
by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.20 Thus,
in the cases of Pimentel v. COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v.
COMELEC,23 Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and
Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25 this Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or
tribunals over petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which expressly
gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be observed, however, that with the
exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts but to
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to the Sandiganbayan, Republic
Act No. 824928 now provides that the special criminal court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of
certiorari, in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP
129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with
respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides,
nonetheless, that judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the
power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it
must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring
exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be
assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if
not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason
why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.29 that "if a case may be appealed to a
particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction."30 This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the
Court stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if
said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or
decisions of the lower court."32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated
in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by
law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes
and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari
petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial
bodies, the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter –
precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration
of justice.35 The Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized
competence over tax and tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases
without mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court
agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for
certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should,
likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise would lead to an absurd
situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules
on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial
abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the
authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving
to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the
same case. It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that
the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the
RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to,
its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC,
in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to
exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and
to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to
protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The
court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and
incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the
performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular
jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within
such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its
jurisdiction and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and
to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such
process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as
the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a
general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the
courts, as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the power
to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 38
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental
powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of
prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to
effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates."39 Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or
incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles,
may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in
aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called
on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be
within its cognizance.40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority
of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders
issued by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the
Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar
as quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must
still be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the
mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to
quasi-judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.