Essays on Contemporary Issues in African

Philosophy
Jonathan O. Chimakonam • Edwin Etieyibo
Ike Odimegwu
Editors

Essays on Contemporary
Issues in African Philosophy
Editors
Jonathan O. Chimakonam Edwin Etieyibo
Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy
University of Pretoria University of the Witwatersrand
Pretoria, South Africa Johannesburg, South Africa
Department of Philosophy
University of Calabar
Calabar, Nigeria

Ike Odimegwu
Department of Philosophy
Nnamdi Azikiwe University
Awka, Nigeria

ISBN 978-3-030-70435-3 ISBN 978-3-030-70436-0 (eBook)

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To the twenty-first century African Thinker!
Preface

In recent times, a lot has been happening on the African continent, which has
brought to the fore some issues of development in the areas of politics, economy
and the social sphere. Some of these issues call for some rigorous, reflective and
well-articulated ideas to help move the content forward. African philosophy can and
does have a central role to play here insofar as it is at once concerned with the
African life-world and experience and in addition, interrogates the substance and
nature of the African life-world and experience systematically within the context of
unfettered reason. To be sure, different ideas pop up in the mind when one thinks of
African philosophy, and these ideas get some nuanced slanting when one qualifies
“African philosophy” with the term, “contemporary.”
The point is that the phrase, “contemporary African philosophy” or African phi-
losophy in contemporary times generates a certain sort of ideas. Foremost of these
ideas relate to the substance and the distinctiveness of contemporary African phi-
losophy in comparison to pre-contemporary African philosophy. Indeed, there are
differences between contemporary African philosophy and pre-contemporary
African philosophy. The difference is not simply that one is African philosophy that
is located in the contemporary period, and the other is African philosophy that is
situated in the past or pre-contemporary times. The difference, we think, lies mostly
in the substantive issues that are investigated in both periods and the relevance that
is attached to these issues as they apply or affect the given or particular period in
question viz-a-viz the African life-world and experience.
This book investigates some contemporary issues in African philosophy. By
focusing on contemporary issues in African philosophy, the edited volume there-
fore, shows itself to be first and foremost about contemporary African philosophy
(and not the pre-contemporary African philosophy) insofar as it takes the issues that
it investigates to be quite relevant to contemporary times. The collection brings
together invited essays and those that were presented at the October 12-14, 2017
African Philosophy World Conference at the University of Calabar, Calabar, which
featured the theme: “The State of African Philosophy in Africa Today.” The Calabar
conference, which was jointly hosted by the University of Calabar, Nnamdi Azikiwe
University, and the University of the Witwatersrand, was remarkable in the sense

vii
viii Preface

that it featured very many young, vibrant and emerging scholars who brought lots
of intellectual energies and ideas to debating issues of African philosophy. And
some of the chapters in the volume reflect these energies and ideas.
We believe that by giving space to and a glimpse of some of the presentations at
the Calabar conference, this book helps memorialize and preserve the legacy of the
conference. Part of that vision is to continue the tradition of increasing the visibility
of African philosophy through the rigor and quality of scholarship and published
research that advance the directions of knowledge excavation in African philosophy
and that contribute to developmental ideas in Africa.
The point about the advancement of the directions of knowledge excavation in
African philosophy is poignant and interesting if we place African philosophy in the
context of some of the works that have recently emerged in the discipline. In the last
decade or so, African philosophers and scholars have helped raise the bar and stan-
dard of African philosophy in terms of shifting away from metaphilosophical issues
that continuously problematize the existence of African philosophy to focusing
attention on substantive issues in African philosophy. A number of the published
research during this period tackle questions of socio-economic and political rele-
vance; others focus on questions about methodology, knowledge production, epis-
temicization, the decolonization and Africanization of philosophy, and still others
examine issues in feminism and of African philosophy and the environment. This
volume contributes to these work and research through its devotion to thematic
issues of contemporary relevance done not with the aim of problematizing the exis-
tence of African philosophy but rather to steer these methodological concerns to
substantive contemporary issues and discussions.
Truly, it is an exciting time to be engaged with works in African philosophy. And
much more exciting to be an African philosopher or scholar, to be working in
African philosophy, and to be part of the systematic “silent” revolution that is hap-
pening in the discipline, which, as the evidence shows, is now positioned as an
important constituent of world/intercultural philosophies and the philosophical can-
ons. It is our hope and expectation that this volume will positively contribute to the
continuous positioning of African philosophy as a respectable tradition of philoso-
phy and to debates on contemporary issues that relate to the African life-world and
experience.

Pretoria, South Africa Jonathan O. Chimakonam

Johannesburg, South Africa Edwin Etieyibo
Awka, Nigeria Ike Odimegwu
July 2020
Introduction
Ike Odimegwu, Jonathan O. Chimakonam and Edwin Etieyibo

The Unfolding Palms of Contemporary African Philosophy

The occasion was the 2nd World Conference on African Philosophy. The venue was
the University of Calabar in the beautiful seaport city of Calabar; and the theme:
“The State of African Philosophy Today”. The rains had set their face on the path of
departure, and the growing heat and thirsty winds were announcing the arrival of the
dry season. The last quarter of the year had begun and the mixed grill of anxious
gloom, of unfulfilled “new year resolutions” and the exciting air of approaching
yuletide and year-end celebrations pervaded the atmosphere of the conference
arena. That was October, 2017 when African philosophers and other philosophers
from other philosophical traditions with research interests in African philosophy
gathered to confer on the issues that constitute the points of concern, interest and
departure for the African philosophical engagement in our day and time.
It was a grand meeting of the old, the young and the upcoming generations of
African philosophy field workers. The University of Calabar which had emerged as
a front-runner in the development of African philosophy in the first two decades of
the twenty-first century was also the perfect location for a conference aimed at
working out a brave future for the discipline of African philosophy. It was a

Ike Odimegwu
Department of Philosophy, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria

J. O. Chimakonam
Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
University of Calabar, University of Calabar, Calabar, Nigeria
Center for Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Studies (CIIS), Eberhard Karls University Tubingen,
Tubingen, Germany

E. Etieyibo
Department of Philosophy, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

ix
x Introduction

nostalgic event for some and a first-time experience for others who were cutting
their academic teeth attending their first conference and wondering what joy the
philosopher, or the scholar generally, relishes in the free and unfettered exchange of
ideas, fresh sprouting of acquaintances and exultant developing of global networks
and citizenships.
The scenario of social conviviality masked the seriousness of the business at
hand and at the same time presented most appositely the nature of the philosophic
engagement: an engagement with the fundamentals of all reality and human exis-
tence; a critical engagement with the basics of any and all undertakings; a dialogic
involvement with life and reality: and so what could be more serious? And yet an
engagement with the attitude of passionate disinterest and detached involvement
that many a time presents the philosopher as not seriously concerned with the affairs
of the present environment and community. This matrix of deep engagement and
belying attitude opens to sight one ground for the many conceptions of philosophy
wherewith the very nature and concept of philosophy is itself a perennial problem
of philosophy. Expectedly, therefore, the claim about the occupation of philosophy
as an engagement with the fundamentals of all reality and human existence, and not
less the notion of critical engagement with the basics of any and all undertakings or
yet the conception as a dialogic involvement with life and reality is certain to draw
so much controversy that progress in the present discourse will surely be hindered.
Indeed, these claims are more likely to elicit more disagreements than agreements.
And even in the context of the agreements, divergent perceptions and interpretations
of the points of agreement are sure to emerge. For, while the philosophers of the
analytic tradition will argue for attention to clarity of terms, concepts and language
generally, the hermeneutic school will posit the interpretation as the basic concern
of philosophy; the phenomenologists will draw attention to the difficulty of holding
on to a reality that is neither present nor presentable. And yet, the ontologist will call
for further inquiry if any of the foregoing will subsist in the subsistence of non-
reality or in the non-subsistence of any reality that will then warrant clarification,
interpretation and or presentation. In all this, the dialogical approach will continu-
ally integrate the positions as loci of understanding and perspectives of contribution
to the ever-unfolding palms of the communal dialogue.
Bertrand Russell may be right in his criticism of Aristotle’s predilection to specu-
lation even on present physical realities that could be empirically ascertained with-
out recourse to speculation such as telling the number of teeth in the dentition of
Mrs. Aristotle. This predilection not-withstanding, it is difficult to fault Aristotle on
his claim that no rational being acts to no purpose. And so, that a measure of intent
is or should be characteristic of any rational acting or action. Or, in the least, that
some level of meaning or meaningfulness should accrue to any undertaking to worth
the undertaking of a rational being. This speculative reasoning is captured in the
wisdom of various peoples and cultures. Among the Igbo, for instance, there is no
dearth of sayings that portray such reasoning. A few at the instant: Ihe mere ede o ji
bee nwiii, Awo anaghi agba oso ehihie na nkiti. Onye o na eme omume omume na
ebe obube obube. The first says that something caused the cocoyam to wince. The
Introduction xi

second tells us that the toad does not run in the daytime for no cause. And the third
argues that whoever is crying is caused by something to cry. All point to the reason
of acting of any rational being, and so of the reasonableness of searching for the
explanation or solution to any event or action from the cause of the event or the
reason for the action. By the way, the wincing of the cocoyam recalls to mind the
serious joke by the Sufi poet Rumi where a manager slaps a worker and then decides
to go speculative by asking: “the sound that you heard, was it made by my hand or
by your cheek?” Whereupon the worker retorted: “the pain that I feel does not give
me room for speculation!” The proverbs tell of the necessary relations of rationality
and purpose. No rational being acts to no purpose. But they tell us more. They con-
vey the feelings that at times go with the causes of actions and the concomitant
effects of these feelings on the characteristics of the consequent reactions and or
responses. And of the many forgetfulness with which we attend to the attendant
feelings abstracting the causes and their effects as if these happen in clinical envi-
ronments bereft of all contextual accretions. And so, the reminder by Theophilus
Okere that every philosophy is a cultural hermeneutic becomes a necessary guide in
any philosophical undertaking. To understand any philosophy, therefore requires a
journey to the culture and milieu of the philosophizing in order to appreciate the
contexts and feelings that surround the generation and development of this
philosophy.
If the argument is sustained that every rational action is engendered by an end,
even more should it be expected that no philosophical journey may take off or be
undertaken without a cause for, if the individual who calls for definition by rational-
ity shall be held responsible for rationality, what less may be expected of the store-
house of reason whose primary work tool is reason and whose only business is
reasoning. The history of the various philosophical traditions would therefore seem
to bear out the generalization that every philosophy, every tradition of philosophy
and indeed every philosophizing is engendered by an occurrence that questions the
peace and normalcy of the prevailing situation, tradition or way of existence of a
people. Every philosophy becomes then a response to a life situation that caused the
philosopher or the philosophic group to embark on the philosophical journey. It
would follow then that the purpose of every philosophizing is to attend to the reason
and or experience that caused the philosophizing. Whether it is the response to the
extraordinary existential circumstance when all the basic necessities of life had been
satisfied, and the priestly class of ancient Egypt had the leisure to speculate on the
heavenly bodies and beings as well as the relations of these to the human world and
situation; or whether it is the claim to wonder on the basic stuff of all things engen-
dered by the crisis of consciousness of belief, culture and social existence arising
from the meeting with foreign nationals and cultures at the seaport of Ionia; or
whether it is the dehumanizing experiences of slavery and colonization in the unholy
meeting of the European merchants and colonizers and their African commodities
and colonies in modern times: whatever situation or circumstance it may be, the
arising philosophy points to the relations of causality and teleology. Something
caused the philosophy to come into existence. Something caused the philosopher to
xii Introduction

philosophize. But again, that thing that causes the philosophy to come to be, does
more than this.
The way of coming of a being determines in a significant measure the way of
being and not less the way of becoming of the being. Arising as a response to the
dehumanizing experiences of slavery, colonization and their attendant theologies,
philosophies and ideologies, contemporary African philosophy has been preoccu-
pied with the baggage of claim and proof of humanity, of equal humanity, of equal
yet distinct humanity of the African in relation to the unrelentingly undermining
“white gaze”. And so, passing through the Great Debate about the existence and
nature of African philosophy which was, as it were, a response to the charge of sub-
humanity of the African, a charge that had to be sustained as philosophical, theo-
logical moral prop for the edifice of slavery and colonization, this philosophy has
been concerned with issues of identity and defining mode of existence, what it
means to be African, the concept and ownership of communalism as a way of being
and living distinctive of the African, etc.
These concerns have also stimulated oppositions and counter-positions whereby
some African philosophers have argued that the primary ground this philosophy
must address is the question of its relevance to the situation of the contemporary
Africa ravaged by political oppression, dehumanizing poverty and hunger, col-
lapsed economies and failed states consequent on pestilential political leaderships
on the heels of the departing foreign colonizers. Incidentally, while this question of
relevance may seem to be addressing another cause of philosophizing or to have
charted another route for African philosophy, a deeper investigation reveals a laby-
rinthine return to the question of the identity of both the philosophy and the philoso-
pher. And this involving reoccurrence has adorned itself with more accoutrements
and accompaniments. The question of relevance has been discussed mostly jointly
with the problem of development or the lack of it on the continent and the possible
causes and remedies with a focus on what role philosophy can play in addressing
the problem. This also has generated no less controversy and diversity of schools.
There are as many concepts of development and positions on what philosophy can
do for African development as there are philosophers ready to address the issue.
And the problem of method that constituted part of the discourses of the Great
Debate has not waned in its currency. On the contrary, the question of object and
method of doing philosophy that will be distinctly African without being less philo-
sophical and at the same time possessing the capacity for universal relevance and
applicability has persisted, and in its wake, generating new schools, propositions
and proponents among the scholars of African philosophy. Even the traditional
branches defined in western philosophy have acquired their African counter-posers,
alter-egos or replications in African philosophy. And so, African philosophy does
not lack proponents of postulations like African metaphysics, African epistemology,
African ethics, African logic, etc. Again, as will be expected, these postulations
have generated their own scores of counter-positions and controversies. Critics of
these replications of branches of philosophy in the western tradition argue that
African philosophy must not toe all the developmental and or structural lines of
Introduction xiii

western philosophy. Others posit that such replications are artificial creations that
do not bear any substantive inherence on either particular realities of African con-
text or universal realities of conceptual denotation. However, it would seem that one
issue that has not only survived the Great Debate, but is rather gathering storm by
the day is the question of historiography or periodization in African philosophy. The
dimensions of this debate are many and complex. The questions may be framed as
follows: Shall we date African philosophy from the time of ancient Egyptian mys-
tery schools? Or shall we date it from Placide Tempels’ publication of his Bantu
Philosophy? What are the justifications for inclusion or exclusion of the ancient
Egyptian mystery corpus in African philosophy? And what justifies dating from
Tempels? Even the question of Tempels awakens the angst of the anti-ethno-philos-
ophers as the argument arises on whether Tempels’ was even philosophy and or
African as such? Do scholars like St. Augustine of Hippo, Anton Amo and Zera
Yacob belong to the corpus of African philosophy, or shall we count them within the
European philosophical tradition? None of these divides has been lacking in propo-
nents, arguments or passion. Further developments in this area draw attention to the
various tags on the periodization and their historical reference. What periods in his-
tory do such terms as ancient, mediaeval, modern and contemporary coincide with
or refer to in African philosophy; and whose history is in reference? And must these
nomenclatures that define western philosophical historiography apply to African
philosophy? How do they apply? The field of African philosophy is expanding. The
commitment is intensifying. The controversy is growing, and the passion and
involvement of the practitioners are heightening and deepening.
However, it must be recorded that in some significant way, the current fire was
ignited when the first conference in this series chaired by Edwin Etieyibo was con-
voked at the University of Witwatersrand in September, 2015. That conference, with
its theme “African Philosophy” Past, Present and Future” took the bold step of start-
ing an inventory of the strides and gaps in African philosophy, and in a substantial
way, framed the agenda, set the tone and furnished the impetus for the current wave
of African philosophic renaissance. It was in that meeting that the participants delib-
erated and resolved on the constitution of the current platform for the biennial world
conference on African philosophy within the African continent for the communal
and critical dialogue and conversation on the issues that are of common concern to
the African person in the African world by philosophers and scholars interested in
African philosophy.
The 2017 African philosophy world conference at the University of Calabar
which was chaired by Jonathan Chimakonam was the second. It was at this second
meeting that the new movement took on the name: “African Philosophy World
Conference,” and the association, African Philosophy Society (APS) was formed.
The theme of the 2017 conference was “The State of African Philosophy in Africa
Today”. The diversity of participation and presentations at the conference indicated
signs of the growing vitality and vivacity in the African philosophical engagement.
The current book is developed from the papers presented at the Calabar confer-
ence. From a variety of perspectives, the chapters show a continuation of engage-
ment with the contemporary issues and topics of concern in African philosophy.
xiv Introduction

They display the active commitment of African philosophers to both conceptual and
existential problems that confront the African person and African philosopher in our
world today. The collection is also proof and disproof of sorts. It demonstrates the
growing sphere and attraction of African philosophy as a global philosophical tradi-
tion and questions the conception of African philosophy as “philosophy done by
Africans”. Expectedly, if this addresses some issues, it also raises and or accentu-
ates others: while the conception of African philosophy as ‘philosophy done by
Africans’ may no longer be easily sustained, the assumption of the new position
arising from this paradigm shift makes the search for the definition of ‘African’
more problematic in the conceptualization of African philosophy. A good number of
the chapters also bear testimony to the growing attention to methodological and
substantive issues by African philosophers. This following section will introduce
the essays in the varying groups and sets as they unfold the issues of contemporary
African philosophy.
The first chapter sets the tone for this journey in search of direction by a critical
review of the spectrum of issues that occupy contemporary African philosophy. In
choosing to outline and discuss eight practical issues that contemporary African
philosophers should engage, Chimakonam and Chemhuru offer the bridge to con-
nect what has been done, what is being done and what should be done. The chapter
is, therefore, an acknowledgment of the work that has been going on in the field of
African philosophy as well as a presentation of the gaps that call for attention and a
route beckoning the travelers. In qualifying the issues as ‘practical’ the authors draw
attention to the matrix of the discourse of relevance of African philosophy to the
African world and people in the daily struggles of their lives. These issues - racism,
poverty, religion, gender, Afrophobia, sexuality, democracy and environment –
according to the authors, are central and unresolved practical problems facing con-
temporary African philosophy. The chapter addresses these issues systematically by
problematizing, analyzing and representation in new philosophic frameworks for
new horizons of understanding.
The second chapter on “How African is Philosophy in Africa?” returns to the
critique of ethno-philosophy. Paulin J. Hountondji criticizes ‘African philosophy’
seen as the collective idea of Africans because, according to him, it does not meet
the criteria of criticality and universalism, which are the hallmarks of philosophy.
These criteria have not gone unchallenged. It has been argued that if they were to be
applied to the corpus of Western philosophy which seems to be the model Hountondji
is drawing on, the bulk of what has gone under the name of Western philosophy will
be “cast into the flames” as Hume will fume. The chapter defines African philoso-
phy as philosophy done by Africans and urges that the application of western ideas
in Africa should take the need of the people into account. The author also calls for
the use of African languages in African philosophizing. By defining African phi-
losophy as one done by Africans the chapter created the problem of distinguishing
Africans from non-Africans. Again, the definition raises the problem of the place of
content or subject matter in the definition of disciplines. Hountondji manifests
awareness of the problems raised by his positions, but the chapter does not resolve
Introduction xv

these problems. In so doing, it opens further the controversy over the nature and
definition of African philosophy.
Hountondji’s call for the use of African languages in African philosophizing
echoes the debate for the place of language in self-emancipation and decoloniza-
tion, a controversy that has raged unceasingly in African philosophy as in African
literature. The challenge posed by this issue which borders on the crisis of language
as a means of communication and a symbol of cultural identity constitute the con-
cern of Chukwueloka Uduagwu in “Doing Philosophy in the African Place”.
The next three chapters that follow discuss aspects of conversationalism as a
method and a school of thought, a school that has shown itself an emerging frontier
in African philosophy. The seventh chapter by Chimakonam is in some measure
representative of the thoughts of the conversationalists. Other essays on various
aspects of conversationalism include the “The Fallacy of Exclusion and the Promise
of Conversational Philosophy in Africa” by Fainos Mangena, “How Conversationalist
Philosophy Profits from the Particularist and the Universalist Agenda” by Uchenna
Ogbonnaya and Aribiah Attoe’s “Examining the Method and Praxis of
Conversationalism”. While the latter two dwelt on methodological concerns,
Mangena addressed the vexed issue of exclusion.
In “Why the Normative Conception of Personhood is Problematic” Chimakonam
takes up the perennial debate on the nature of human personhood in African phi-
losophy. He approaches the discussion from a critique of Menkiti’s normative con-
cept of the person and proposes a conversational alternative. The chapter
problematizes Menkiti’s account of personhood arguing that it is “grossly inade-
quate because it makes some weak and dangerous assumptions”. He observes that
these assumptions deflate Menkiti’s theory and proposes a conversational account
of personhood where “a person is a being in conversation”. The author outlines five
assumptions that undercut the validity and universalizability of Menkiti’s normative
theory. However, like many scholars who try to navigate the midway between indi-
vidualist and communalist polar concepts of personhood, the author vacillates
between personhood as potentiality and personhood as actuality. When he argues
that “personhood is a natural capacity which individuals develop at some point in
their biological maturation” he seems to be arguing for capacity to converse as the
quality of personhood. On the other hand, the position that “One is therefore a per-
son if they have attained the capacity to engage in these two-way conversations”
raises the questions of what effectively confers personhood. Such questions include:
“Is the human being that has not matured biologically to the point of development
of the capacity for moral conversation a person? The author answers that such a
person is a person-in-potency. This would seem to amount to double potentiality
seeing the concept of person he is proposing is already characterized by a form of
potency or capacity. What of the human being that has matured biologically but has
not developed the capacity for moral conversation? At this point, the chapter seems
to have come face on with these questions that confronted Descartes when he devel-
oped the psychological concept of the person in which self-consciousness became
the definitive element of personhood. And his responses to this confrontation are
quite interesting.
xvi Introduction

“On the One Concept and the Many Accounts of African Ethics” by Etieyibo
seeks to argue for one fundamental African ethics that has been expressed in a vari-
ety of theories by different African philosophers. He argues that what defines the
one African ethics is communal flourishing. The paper uses the theories of Ubuntu,
Ujamaa and Ukama to represent the many accounts that have been given of this one
ethics. He demonstrates this relation of one and many using such examples as Kant’s
categorical imperative. That a people’s ethics derive from their metaphysical posi-
tion, he states as uncontroversial. Taking examples from philosophers like Plato,
Etieyibo wonders what makes it news or controversial that African ethics should
derive from the metaphysical positions of the people. Setting out with the thesis that
flourishing of self is achieved in communal flourishing, the author adopts a system-
atic integrative argumentation to arrive at the conclusion that since individual flour-
ishing is realized in communal flourishing, “one ought to act in ways that realize the
self’s ends by choosing those actions that lead to the flourishing of the community.
The author also addresses the “supposed tension between communal flourishing and
individual rights.” The responses to this tension may be classified into two: Those
that attempt to defend African ethics against the charge of undermining the rights of
the individual, and those that reject the basis for evaluating African ethics by the
notion of rights. The research into, and in-depth discussion of these areas are pro-
posed by the author for future research in African philosophy.
In “How to Report on War in the Light of an African Ethic”, Thaddeus Metz
sketches what he calls ‘a prima facie attractive African moral theory, grounded on a
certain interpretation of the value of communal relationship,’ and brings out ‘what
it entails for the ways journalists should report on war.’ He shows ‘how this Afro-
communal ethic can provide a unitary foundation for a wide array of plausible con-
clusions about reporting on war, and, in particular, can avoid objectionable
implications such as support for embedded and patriotic journalism.’
The question of relevance is joined with the concern for praxis in the essays by
Mojalefa Koenane and Cyril-Mary Olatunji as well as Jim Unah. These essays
address issues concerning the practical application of African ethical principles.
In “The Struggle to Forgive: Some Philosophical and Theological Reflections”
Koenane and Olatunji address the case of the famous Reitz Four in South African
troubled history.
In his essay titled “Taking African Virtue ethics and Character Training Principles
to the Schools” Unah states that departing debate on the existence and nature of
African philosophy is being replaced by the question of the relevance of philosophy
to “the social, economic and political malaise bedeviling African States.” In this
circumstance of rebirth, he urges African philosophers to campaign for the introduc-
tion of teaching of African virtue ethics and character training principles in the
schools starting from the primary and running through to tertiary educational insti-
tutions. The author argues that this should be pursued to infuse African cultural
ethos in African children and youths in their formative years. The content for this
project shall be acquired through a distillation of the sublime values of the various
African nationalities. And the project is worthwhile for more reasons than one. It
will “popularize the subject of philosophy and create more awareness of its impact
Introduction xvii

on society; it will increase job opportunities for philosophy graduates who will
teach the subject, and; raise good and law-abiding citizenry that will not only pos-
sess strong moral character but also capable of transforming the society while trying
to transform the self”.
Another set of very topical essays is offered by Victor Nweke, Motsamai Molefe
and Ada Agada. These stirring contributions address burning ethical concerns in
African philosophy. While Nweke searches for the possibilities of ubuntu as a plau-
sible ground for a normative theory of justice, Molefe investigates African ethics
and agent-centred duties and Agada explores the themes of nihilism, pessimism and
optimism in ibuanyidanda and consolation ontologies.
The abiding problem of imperialist-colonialist philosophy is further accentuated
in this collection by the contributions of Isaiah Negedu and Solomon O. Ojomah,
and Nnamdi Konye. The essay by Negedu and Ojomah addresses the issue of impe-
rialism from the perspective of cultural globalization while Konye approaches it
from the point of view of intellectual history. The uniting idea among these exciting
essays is the challenge of cultural imperialism facing African intellectual space
today, and this is a concern with renewed vigor in the contemporary era of African
philosophy.
In “The African Philosopher and the Burden of Indigenous Knowledge System,”
Oyeshile campaigns for a return to the indigenous knowledge systems by African
philosophers in order to rebuild the foundations of African development and growth.
He urges African philosophers that indigenous knowledge is as important as Western
knowledge and calls on them to promote the same since it is the key in the quest for
African development. He practices what he preaches by the use of traditional Yoruba
values to show how the problems of injustice and greed in current African society
can be solved by the application of indigenous African knowledge systems.
Asouzu, in his very deep and rigorous essay begins on the joyful note that “the
state of African philosophy is today more promising than ever”. However, he
observed that there are two areas of African philosophy closely linked with rem-
nants of the spirit of the Great Debate and which appear to be resistant to changes.
African philosophy must liberate itself or be liberated from these malaises to realize
this promise. The first of these areas is “the persistence by some practitioners of
African philosophy to model philosophical discourse after soliloquy” whereby they
are either talking to themselves or constitute a small circle of cronies instead of
desiring to speak to a wider global audience. And the second “relates to the precon-
ceived myth that in African philosophy nothing actually changes: For this reason,
there is only one pattern of philosophising that is valid and commands respect in this
area: that pattern that portrays African philosophy as the collective idea of African
peoples.” Using the principle of complementarity and the method of ikwa ogwe, to
achieve a complementary comprehensive existential analysis, the author assumes
the responsibility of addressing these areas as part of the challenge of realizing the
promise of African philosophy in Africa today.
In “Decolonial Philosophical Praxis Exemplified through Superiorist and
Adseredative Understandings of Development” Freter undertakes a cerebral
xviii Introduction

deconstruction of the dominant Western concept of development which culminates

in African underdevelopment. The author demonstrates that such concept derives
from a superiorist self-conception. This superiorist self-conception which reached
its height in the European Enlightenment provided the philosophical foundation and
justification for the subjugation and colonization of other peoples. He argues that
this self-conception is deceptive. It is also the foundation of the false perception of
the moral high ground that the Western world currently parades.
The analysis proceeds from the recognition of the harsh truth that Africans will
not be able to demand their rights if they are not fully conscious of their duties and
their responsibilities. This realization constitutes the foundation for the two core
components of the decolonial process: What the Africans must do and what the
West must do. The African must undergo “adseredition” (coming back to oneself),
and the Western must undergo “desuperiorization” (ridding oneself of the toga of
superiority). These components or the need thereunto, argues Freter, are founded on
two vital documents: the 1957 Congolese Manifesto of Conscience Africaine and
The New European Consensus on Development (2017). And the two components of
the decolonial process are necessary for the rehumanization of both the colonized
and the colonizer for, colonialism dehumanizes all in the reduction of the human
from human-being to human-thing. Decolonizing development requires this rehu-
manizing process for it is the human being that either develops or underdevelops,
and the concept of development that involves the instrumentalization of one human
being for the benefit of another human being fails the universalizability principle
and ultimately dehumanizes and underdevelops all. Never mind that Kant who pro-
pounded the principle of universalizability failed the test of the principle in also
propagating Western superiorist ideology.
The arguments for proper conceptualization is taken further by Leonhard Praeg.
In “Totality by Analogy; or: the Limits of Law and Black Subjectivity”, Praeg
delves into the vexed questions of post-apartheid South African social relations and
how the philosopher can help the understanding of the role of law in the complex
situation. He draws upon the resources of complexity theory to explore the complex
discourses on Black Consciousness and South African constitutionalism in order to
understand how the totality of black subjectivity read in conjunction with the total-
ity of constitutionalism allows for a mapping of the emancipatory logic of both
disciplining Subject and disciplined subject.” In examining the tension between
Black subjectivity and constitutionalism in South Africa the essay argues that the
tension leads to a paradox that sees the adoption of liberal democracy either as a
culmination of colonialism or the struggle against colonialism.
Iyare, Imafidon and Abudu probe into one of the existential issues in African
social philosophy: the issue of generational perceptions and social relations:
“Ageing, Ageism, Cultural Representations of the Elderly and the Duty to Care”.
The chapter focuses on the cultural representations of the aged and the moral
responsibility of the young, as espoused in many African traditions, to care for the
aged. It exposes the divergence of cultural representations and biological under-
standing of ageing and the aged. This divergence creates crisis of consciousness that
Introduction xix

results in contradictions of coexistence of feelings of moral responsibility and dis-

criminatory practices in Sub-Saharan African communities. The authors decry that
this unfortunate situation is sustained by traditional beliefs and representations and
some forms of modern religious beliefs and practices. Arguing for the resolution of
the paradoxical contradictions between African social ontological and moral posi-
tions and attitudes to the old and the aged, the chapter concludes with a call for
enlightenment, reorientation and moral revaluation in African social relations, par-
ticularly regarding perception and care for the elderly and the aged.
This exclusive selection of papers from the 2nd African Philosophy World
Conference presents the multiple approaches through which philosophers of African
philosophy are perceiving, presenting and discussing the state of African philoso-
phy in Africa today. The many issues that concern African philosophy are discussed
with the passion of involvement as with the dispassion of critical search for truth
and meaningfulness. The positions canvassed, and the arguments will surely pro-
voke more discussions, and the result will be the growth of the African philosophic
engagement. This collection of essays presents and calls forth the unfolding of the
palms: the many issues, trends and streams that constitute contemporary African
philosophy.
Contents

Eight Practical Issues in Contemporary African Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Jonathan O. Chimakonam and Munamato Chemhuru
How African is Philosophy in Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Paulin J. Hountondji
Doing Philosophy in the African Place: A Perspective
on the Language Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chukwueloka S. Uduagwu
The Fallacy of Exclusion and the Promise
of Conversational Philosophy in Africa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Fainos Mangena
How Conversational Philosophy Profits
from the Particularist and the Universalist Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
L. Uchenna Ogbonnaya
Examining the Method and Praxis of Conversationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Aribiah David Attoe
Why the Normative Conception of Personhood
is Problematic: A Proposal for a Conversational Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Jonathan O. Chimakonam
African Ethics and Agent-Centred Duties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Motsamai Molefe
On the One Concept and Many Accounts of African Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Edwin Etieyibo
How to Report on War in the Light of an African Ethic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Thaddeus Metz

xxi
xxii Contents

Taking African Virtue Ethics and Character

Training Principles to the Schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Jim Ijenwa Unah
Ubuntu as a Plausible Ground for a Normative Theory
of Justice from the African Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Victor C. A. Nweke
Remedial Approach to Cultural Globalization
and Intercultural Competence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Isaiah A. Negedu and Solomon O. Ojomah
Decolonial Philosophical Praxis Exemplified Through
Superiorist and Adseredative Understandings of Development . . . . . . . . . 209
Björn Freter
Totality by Analogy; Or: The Limits of Law and Black Subjectivity . . . . 227
Leonhard Praeg
The African Philosopher and The Burden of Indigenous
Knowledge System (IKS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
Olatunji Alabi Oyeshile
Changes, Adaptation and Complementary Noetic Transformation . . . . . . 261
Innocent I. Asouzu
Ageing, Ageism, Cultural Representations of the Elderly
and the Duty to Care in African Traditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Austin E. Iyare, Elvis Imafidon, and Kenneth Uyi Abudu
The Struggle to Forgive: Some Philosophical
and Theological Reflections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
Mojalefa L. J. Koenane and Cyril-Mary P. Olatunji
The Themes of Nihilism, Pessimism, and Optimism
in Ibuanyidanda and Consolation Ontologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
Ada Agada
African Philosophy: The Twentieth Century Rhetorics of Identity . . . . . . 333
Michael Nnamdi Konye

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349