Third Division

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.

Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.

Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del
Rosario Mariategui.

Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria
del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first
wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children,
namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was
survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his
second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was
born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930.
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February
16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941
(Rollo, Ibid).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when
he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are
described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa
Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163
of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary
registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land
registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1,
1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs.
Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots
Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties (Rollo, ibid).

On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot
No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father,

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Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they
(children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the
deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia
Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs
although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the
partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8;
Record on Appeal, p. 4).

The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record
on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one
for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:

It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the
Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous
application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).

However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:

The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or

recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo,
pp. 67-68)

The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are
not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . .
. " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).

On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the
children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who
eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of
reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights
of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties
to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui
after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on
December 7, 1981.

The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action
for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The
resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.

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The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the
deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime,
Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children
and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on
the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with
the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing
estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared
as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful
shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature
of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting
the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).

It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted
under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and
the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint,
although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).

With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate
of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased.

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or
about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to
(him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to
this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106
[1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85
SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978];
Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
135 SCRA 439 [1985]).

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of

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 law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must
be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).

The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at
bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the
parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions
among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence
which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In
the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as
their brother Jacinto.

While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided,
these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and
despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until
Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its
decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the
petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga
kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156
SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC,
156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in
their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made
by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration
of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had

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not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition
(Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners,
except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge
and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This
allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never
successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed
knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs,
petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from
petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their
deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry
because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must

have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice

of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was
one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private
respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

* Penned by Associate Justice Elias B. Asuncion, concurred by Sison,

P.V. and Censon, JJ.

** Presided by Judge Serafin E. Camilon.

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 SECOND DIVISION

G.R.. No. 214529, July 12, 2017

JERRYSUS L. TILAR, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a direct recourse from the Decision1 dated June 3, 2014 and the
Order2 dated August 19, 2014, both issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
Baybay City, (RTC) in Special Proceeding (SP) No. B-10-11-39 dismissing the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On November 4, 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a petition3 for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of private respondent's (respondent) psychological incapacity
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that he and respondent were
married on June 29, 1996 in a Catholic Church in Poro, Poro Camotes, Cebu with Rev.
Fr. Vicente Igot as the solemnizing officer; that a son was born of their marriage; that
their marriage went well in the first few months but respondent later became an
extremely jealous, violent person which resulted to frequent quarrels and petitioner
being threatened and physically harmed; that she is a happy-go-lucky and extravagant
type of person and a gambler; that they eventually separated in 2002; and, that
respondent is now living with another man in Cebu City. Petitioner consulted a clinical
psychologist and respondent was said to be suffering from "aggressive personality
disorder as well as histrionic personality disorder" which made her psychologically
incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations.

Respondent failed to file her Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then
required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an investigation whether collusion existed. In
his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to the absence of
collusion between the parties.4 Trial, thereafter, ensued with petitioner and his witness
testifying.

On June 3, 2014, the RTC issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this case is ORDERED DISMISSED for

lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.5

In so ruling, the RTC ratiocinated in this wise:

x x x the lingering issue that confronts this Court, whether it can validly [pass] upon the
validity of church marriage in the light of the separation of the Church and the State as
enunciated in Section 6 of Art. (sic) of the 1987 Constitution. Withal, marriage is a
sacrament according to the teaching of the Catholic Church. Being a sacrament, the
same is purely religious. Declaration of nullity, which is commonly called an annulment
in the Catholic Church, is a judgment rendered by an ecclesiastical tribunal determining
that the sacrament of marriage was invalidly contracted. The procedure is governed by
the Church's Canon Law not by the civil law observed by the State in nullity cases
involving civil marriages. Ergo, the principle of separation of Church and State finds
application in this case. x x x

xxxx

Clearly, the State cannot encroach into the domain of the Church, thus, resolving the
validity of the church marriage is outside the province of its authority. Although the

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Family Code did not categorize the marriage subject of the petition for nullity or
annulment, the Constitution as the fundamental law of the State laid down the principle
of separation, ergo, it is beyond cavil that nullity of a church marriage cannot be taken
out of the church jurisdiction. The court being an entity of the State is bereft of any
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

As the second issue hinges on the affirmative resolution on the jurisdiction of this Court,
the same becomes moot due to the non-affirmance of jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case.6

Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an Order dated
August 19, 2014.

In denying the motion for reconsideration, the RTC said:

Marriages solemnized and celebrated by the Church are [per se] governed by its Canon
Law. Although the Family Code provides for some regulations, the same does not follow
that the State is authorized to inquire to its validity, The Constitution is supreme to the
Family Code. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the Constitution is written
in all laws, acts and transactions, hence, the same must be upheld.7

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that:

The Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the validity of
church marriage is outside of the province of its authority.8

Petitioner contends that the RTC had rendered judgment principally on the ground that
the validity of church marriage is outside the province of its authority, however, it is the
civil law, particularly the Family Code, which principally governs the marriage of the
contracting parties.

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment on the petition for review
arguing that the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the
provision of the Family Code, and that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over cases
involving contracts of marriage and marital relations.

We find merit in this petition.

Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution provides:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.

Our Constitution clearly gives value to the sanctity of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.9 Thus, the State is mandated to
protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the
nation.10 The State has surrounded marriage with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the State are largely dependent
upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the
bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction.11

Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional provision
to protect the inviolability of marriage and the family relations. In one of the whereas
clauses of the Family Code, it is stated:

Whereas, there is a need to implement policies embodied in the New Constitution that
strengthen marriage and the family as a basic social institution and ensure equality
between men and women.

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Accordingly, Article 1 of the Family Code pertinently provides:

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except
that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code.

As marriage is a special contract, their terms and conditions are not merely subject to
the stipulations of the contracting parties but are governed by law. The Family Code
provides for the essential12 as well as formal13 requisites for the validity of marriage. The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.14 No prescribed form or
religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer
and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage
certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and
attested by the solemnizing officer. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil
registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides,
except in marriages where no license is required.15 The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license is that it is the authority granted by the State to the
contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to
contract marriage.16

The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage may be
solemnized, thus:

Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

xxxx

(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by
his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within
the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that
at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or
religious sect;

xxxx

Article. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in
open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul
or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which
case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement to that effect.

Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and
formalities prescribed by law. The marriage of petitioner and respondent which was
solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was in accordance with the
above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic
church, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As
petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant petition only seeks to nullify the marriage
contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines; and the
declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is
another matter.17 Notably, the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance
with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State as the couple is still

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considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of
separation of the church and state finds no application in this case.

As marriage is a lifetime commitment which the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the
Family Code has provided for the grounds18 for the termination of marriage. These
grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or
in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the
court exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

Hence, a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which petitioner filed before the
RTC of Baybay City, falls within its exclusive jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in
dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari isGRANTED. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14, Baybay City, Leyte is ORDERED to PROCEED with the resolution of
the case based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Mendoza, Leonen and Martires, JJ., concur.

Carpio, J., certify that J. Leonen left his vote concurring with this ponencia.

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 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.

Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.

Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del
Rosario Mariategui.

Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria
del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first
wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children,
namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was
survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his
second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was
born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930.
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February
16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941
(Rollo, Ibid).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when
he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are
described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa
Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).

On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163
of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary
registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land
registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1,
1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs.
Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots
Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties (Rollo, ibid).

10 | P a g e
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot
No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father,
Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they
(children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the
deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia
Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs
although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the
partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8;
Record on Appeal, p. 4).

The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record
on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one
for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:

It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the
Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous
application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).

However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:

The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or

recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo,
pp. 67-68)

The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are
not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . .
. " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).

On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the
children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who
eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of
reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights
of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties
to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui
after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.

The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on
December 7, 1981.

The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action
for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The

11 | P a g e
resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.

The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the
deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime,
Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children
and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on
the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with
the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing
estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared
as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful
shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).

A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature
of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting
the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).

It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted
under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and
the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint,
although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).

With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate
of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased.

Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or
about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to
(him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were
known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to
this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the
mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106
[1984]).

Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85
SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978];
Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
135 SCRA 439 [1985]).

Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of

marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that

12 | P a g e
 such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).

So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must
be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).

The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at
bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the
parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions
among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).

Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence
which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In
the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as
their brother Jacinto.

While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided,
these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and
despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until
Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its
decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the
petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga
kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).

In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156
SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC,
156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at
once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in

13 | P a g e
their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made
by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration
of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had
not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition
(Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).

In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners,
except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge
and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This
allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never
successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed
knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs,
petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from
petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their
deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry
because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.

Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must

have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice

of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was
one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private
respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

14 | P a g e
 EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of

Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in
said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping
on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent
had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent
and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he
has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and
liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13,
1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that
the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a
witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to
arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having
five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid
marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5,
1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single
parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents
and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a
license.

15 | P a g e
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said
Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the

purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by
the Family Code.

Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under
Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who
beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of
law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he
was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student
would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married.
Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he
and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license
on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership
in the legal profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a

Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began
and continued when he was already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as
to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is
also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the
performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts
too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v.
Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave
and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory

16 | P a g e
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998

JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar.
Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme
Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.

On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for
disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused
of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2

The complainant narrated:

The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty.

Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college
instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in
the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a
first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty.
Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent
member of the legal profession and then member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita,
gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his
wishes.

They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles

in the community, but which they managed to from me. It therefore
came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief
and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with
Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances.

It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a

member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the
employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry
Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for
this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of
right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of
the Bar.

It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty.

Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-
year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.] 3

This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 4

On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from
complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint.
She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to
humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent

17 | P a g e
and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional
confusion arising from extreme jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her
husband had remained a faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted
that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor
abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and
a Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the
IBP commission on bar discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP
Board of Governors 9 dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to
prosecute. 10

The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court 11 received another letter 12 from the complainant, with her seven
children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband.
She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his
continuous threats against her. 14

In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in

compliance with this Court's Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, 15 respondent
prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he
had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had
voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even
appearing before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under
oath "that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her
own free will and affirmed the contents thereof."

In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied
abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife
as a person emotionally disturbed, viz:

What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably

jealous and possessive woman, and every time the streak of
jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against
her husband in every conceivable forum, all without basis, and
purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her
"loving" jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards,
when her jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts
against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of
November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of
jealousy. 18

On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment
of respondent to the IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C.
Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20

2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left
him not even a square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in
life: a purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant comes
from what she claims to be very rich parents who value material
possession more than education and the higher and nobler
aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor.

3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle

ways of love, forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor.
Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different
environment. Her value system is the very opposite.

4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he
could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve
his family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love,
education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected
name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and

18 | P a g e
children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and never
inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged
professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social

institution.

On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy,

Complainant has been systematically and unceasingly destroying
the very foundations of their marriage and their family. Their
marriage has become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent
has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED,
TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and
emotionally, by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their
marriage has become a nightmare.

For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore

the pain of his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite
patience, if only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this
is not to be. The Complainant never mellowed and never became
gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more fierce
and predatory.

Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your
Respondent does not seem in sight. The darkness continues to
shroud the marital and familial landscape.

Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from

enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in "Death and the Maiden", can
the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together?

Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and

uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is to destroy,
destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and
with great sorrow, filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage, Spl.
Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . .

5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending.

But your Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to
other people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his wife.
This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey
your spouse, for better or for worse, in sickness and in health . . .
Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything
derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal
all these things to defend himself.

On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage,

Complainant tells everyone, everywhere, that her husband is
worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges
and universities, professional organizations, religious societies, and
all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and
immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor,
as Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad,
and immoral. Is this love? Since when did love become an
instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life — his good
name, reputation and dignity?

Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against

her husband, employing every unethical and immoral means to

19 | P a g e
 attain his ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and
irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is
not a scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly
scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. 21

To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent
presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against
him and Gina Espita:

3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .

3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG,

Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . .

3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial

Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . .

3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and

concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. . . .

3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao,

Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED.

3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial

Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109.
DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion for
Reconsideration. DENIED. (. . .).

3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme]

C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by IBP Board of
Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .).

3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case

No. 3405. Pending.

3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third

MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. . . . 22

In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:

I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .)
are inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in
"Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383,
February 20, 1996. (. . .).

xxx xxx xxx

II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never

courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He
never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never
had or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any
time. He never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any
time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any
other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally,
respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are
false and fabricated, . . .

xxx xxx xxx

20 | P a g e
 III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her
two sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home.
After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many
times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the
family from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs.
Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he
offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs.
Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. . . .

IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent,

vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the
beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered,
brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated
respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and
psychologically, . . .

V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-manifestation

dated March 28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B.
Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and
intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely,
voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown
by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of
Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador
Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439, People vs.
Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3,
1996. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man — a senior citizen of

63 years — sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated
by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to
earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and
economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things
attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached
medical certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates
touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from
hypertension. 23

On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, 24 recommending
the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material
portions of said report read as follows:

Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence

submitted by the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for
the disposition of the case, namely:

a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment

of respondent's own family and [whether he was] living with his
paramour, Gina Espita;

b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with
Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on
paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten
love letters, the due execution and contents of which, although he
objected to their admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were
never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and
offered proof to support otherwise.

Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose

testimonies tend to depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an

21 | P a g e
 incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering everytime
with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the
witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn
comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina
Espita, to disprove the adulterous relationship between him and
their having begotten their illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle
Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse,
respondent's denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for
disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).

Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent

25
subject to disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession.

In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the
investigating commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of
the respondent. 27 Subsequently the complaint sought the disbarment of her
husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP
granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.

After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence
presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the
imposition of the penalty of disbarment.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall

not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall

at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and
support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall

not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in
public or private life,
behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of
law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a
lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred. 29

Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency. 32

22 | P a g e
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of
the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."

Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in

order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant,
and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case
by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34

Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie

Espita, 36 Magdalena Bautista, 37 Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr. Jervis
B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and Nieves F. Reyes. 42

Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated

complainant's charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave
to the investigating officer:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?

A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my

sister, Gina Espita.

Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?

A Yes, sir.

(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador

Narag)

Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?

ATTY. NARAG:

Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.

CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT

A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and

that they are now living together as husband and wife
and that they already have two children, Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador.

xxx xxx xxx

During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita

repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with
whom she had two children:

Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living

with your sister as husband and wife. You claim that?

A Yes, sir.

Q Why do you say that?

23 | P a g e
 A Because at present you are living together as
husband and wife and you have already two children
and I know that is really an immoral act which you
cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values
don't allow me that my sister is living with a married
man like you.

Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your

sister? Did you see them in the house?

A Yes, si[r].

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have
two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is
it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty.

Narag?

A Because you are staying together in that house and

you have left your family. 44

In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag
the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to
dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings. 45

Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this

wise:

Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this

case?

A I know him very well, sir.

Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?

A Because he was always going to the house of my

son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty.

Dominador M. Narag?

A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of

Reynaldo Angubong, sir.

Q And this is located where?

A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.

Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath

that this is the residence of Atty. Narag?

A Yes, sir.

24 | P a g e
 xxx xxx xxx

Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina

Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife, is it
not?

A Yes, sir. 46

Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified
that she learned from the Narag children — Randy, Bong and Rowena — that their
father left his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept
the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent
"went back to his woman," and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47

On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to
establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman.
Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify
falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief.

Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent
had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina
and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition,
complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received
from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a
comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the
respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by
one and the same person. 48 Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to
prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that he
wrote them.

While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not
only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a
member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character
is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have
his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49 This he failed to do.

Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At
the same time, he depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater, vitriolic and
unbending," and as an "insanely and pathologically jealous woman," whose only
obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him as shown by her filing of a
series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his
allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and
ten (10) witnesses. 51

We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not
establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the
profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their
testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had
abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children.
Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but
merely relied on information from either respondent himself or other people, while
others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife.

Respondent may have provided well for his family — they enjoyed a comfortable
life and his children finished their education. He may have also established
himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these
accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a
member of the noble profession of law.

25 | P a g e
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties — e.g., to
support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good
example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as
moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his
wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and
support. 53

Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from
home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work;
instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who bore him two
children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good
husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of
their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love.

Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father's
moral frailties in his testimony:

Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that

it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is so serious
that it is incapable of forgiveness?

A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin
or fault is with the emotional part of myself, I suppose
I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing
person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in
order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COMR. JOSE:

I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of

argument that your father is the worst, hardened
criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have
him disbarred? That is the question.

CONTINUATION.

A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I

suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this point in
time, I might just forgive him if he will have to
experience all the pains that we have also suffered for
quite sometime.

Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs
in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones are
your bones and you now disown him because he is
the worst man on earth, is that what you are saying.

A Sort of, sir.

Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are

concerned because your father has sinned, you have
no more father, am I correct?

A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father

even when I was still a kid because my father is not
always staying with us at home. So, how can you say
that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir,
you did not give me love. 54

26 | P a g e
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the
trauma he went through:

Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which

contains the fact that your father is maintaining a
paramour, could you please tell this Honorable
Commission the effect on you?

A This has a very strong effect on me and this

includes my brothers and sisters, especially my
married life, sir. And it also affected my children so
much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to
say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason
that affected us.

Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your

wife parted ways?

A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened

to my family and that she could not face the people,
our community, especially because my wife belongs to
a well-known family in our community.

Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters?

Please tell us what are those.

A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my

elder sister because she knows so well that my mother
suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my
mother.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Why did your wife leave you?

A The truth is because of the things that had

happened in our family, Your Honor.

Q In your wife's family?

A In our family, sir.

Q And what do you mean by that?

A What meant by that is my father had an illicit

relationship and that my father went to the extent of
scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in
provincial government, which my mother-in-law hated
him so much for this, which really affected us. And
then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an
illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two
children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle
Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to
this, Your Honor. 55

Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his

acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted
marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his
wife and remain faithful to her until death.

27 | P a g e
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that
affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct
for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage."

In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law,
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child.

Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous
relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the
bar.

In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs.
Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court."

WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is

ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in
the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Paganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.

28 | P a g e
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of

Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the
Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
"Balalong," respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the
document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its
subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by
extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals1 (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated
August 24, 1998, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being

more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the challenged Decision
dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in
toto.2

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of

[herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner] Tomasa
Guison as follows:

a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called "reconstructed marriage contract"

excluded under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said Exh.
B spurious and non-existent.

b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the
issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.

c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction

earlier issued; and

d) To pay attorney's fees of P50,000.

And costs against [herein petitioner.]

The Facts

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of

deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix for the
various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased.

29 | P a g e
Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of
Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July 1961
issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the
petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro
Pilapil.1âwphi1.nêt

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in
Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein
defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the
deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro
questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his
adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for
injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellee's claim as
the legal heir of Alfredo.

The following issues were raised in the court a quo:

a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased

Alfredo Jacob was valid;

b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of

deceased Jacob.

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo
was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila
sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the
Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when Msgr. Yllana
allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original,
Tomasa presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract
issued in 1978.

During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the
execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:

1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by
the solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there was no copy
of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry
of Manila;

2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed
his "thumbmark" on said contract purportedly on 16 September 1975
(date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between
appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the alleged date of marriage
or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as
husband and wife for five (5) years, Alfredo [af]fixed his customary
signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the "thumbmark" was
logically "not genuine". In other words, not of Alfredo Jacob’s;

3. Contrary to appellant’s claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances

of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana never
mentioned that he allegedly "gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to
Mr. Jose Centenera for registration". And as admitted by appellant at the
trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at
the date of the marriage since he was then in Australia. In fact, on the
face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one "Benjamin
Molina" who signed on top of the typewritten name of Jose Centenera.
This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the
Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera;

30 | P a g e
 4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage
entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage
was allegedly solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in
Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya granting the
petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro
Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge

Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moya's

signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge
Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.

In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the
facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago when he
was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering
from "glaucoma".

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity
and genuineness of Judge Moya's signature.

A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI

Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen signatures
of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out
irregularities and "significant fundamental differences in handwriting
characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the "standard"
signature" and concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures
"JOSE L. MOYA" were NOT written by one and the same person.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moya's signature,

appellee presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination
made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who
examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya inclusive of the
thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui
noted the existence of significant similarities of unconscious habitual pattern
within allowable variation of writing characteristics between the standard and the
questioned signatures and concluded that the signature of Judge Moya
appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was
indeed genuine.

Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of
Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as
genuine and authentic.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee
sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased
Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-
existent."4 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, Article
6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the contracting
parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an
instrument signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person

31 | P a g e
solemnizing the marriage." Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must
be an authentic copy of the marriage contract.

And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section
5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the

subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original

document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy. Or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be

established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the
transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the document and
subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3)
copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant
failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the original
document.

With regard to the trial court's finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in
the questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of Pedro Pilapil
was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof
to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order
acted in the performance of his regular duties.

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was

subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the
possibility of forgery of Judge Moya's signature. The value of the opinion of a
handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies in and between genuine
and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or
dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in the final analysis, the
assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the
discretion of the trial court, and the test of qualification is necessarily a relative
one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of the
particular witness. Except in extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not
reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in
determining qualifications of this case.

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial court's findings of fact when ably supported
by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight and respect by
the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or
ignored by the court below which if considered might vary the outcome of this

32 | P a g e
 case nor there exist cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings
below. Factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and respect
on appeal especially when established by unrebutted testimony and
documentary evidence.5 (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.6

The Issues

In her Memorandum petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this
Court:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and
deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and

b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E.

Jacob.7

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner's marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has
not been sufficiently established.

First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one
may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 Aware of this fundamental distinction,
Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner
was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage
ceremony.9 We cannot sustain this contention.

To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the
parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been
established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years.10 An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 Clearly
then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 The Civil Code governs this case, because the
questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the
Family Code.

When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed?

"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced
in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents
may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by
recollection of witnesses."13 Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and
subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence
may be adduced to prove its contents.14

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1)
excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2)
disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary
evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the
marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the
wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time
requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by
the Archbishop — through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino —
ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a

33 | P a g e
corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana
stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate.

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus
confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 the Court clarified this misconception thus:

. . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the
execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and
the contents of the document. It is the contents, . . . which may not be prove[n]
by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the
execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document,
and, as a matter of fact, such proofs precede proofs of the contents: due
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of
secondary evidence of the contents.

xxx xxx xxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily

collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers.
Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily,
if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence.
At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may affect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 But even there, we said that "marriage may be
prove[n] by other competent evidence."17

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 The
Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of
its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character
are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy
the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil,
who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to
the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the
officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own declaration in court.
These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence — testimonial and documentary — may be admitted to prove the
fact of marriage.

The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were
certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 Even if we were
to agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we
must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob
and petitioner.

Proof of Marriage

As early as Pugeda v. Trias, 21 we have held that marriage may be proven by any
competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

34 | P a g e
 Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The
person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an
eyewitness to the fact of marriage.22 (emphasis supplied)

In Balogbog v. CA,23 we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the

failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may
be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote ommitted)

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We

reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 in which, because of the destruction of the
marriage contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its place.25

Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to

1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National
Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have
waited three years before registering their marriage.27 On both counts, he proceeds from
the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for
record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.28 In the second place, it was not the
petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead,
this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29

Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Likewise, we have held:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is . . . of marriage.

Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.30 (emphasis supplied)

This jurisprudential attitude31 towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.32 Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 fact that Dr. Jacob
and petitioner lived together as husband and wife,34 we find that the presumption of
marriage was not rebutted in this case.

Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature
of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied
on the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties.
The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting
expert, for "the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the
discretion of the trial court . . . "35

We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight
and respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a

35 | P a g e
testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was
Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two
expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 Hence, the present case is an exception
to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule
45.37

Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya's signature on the
questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert
witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial
court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge
Moya himself.38 Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the
Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether
the signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof:39

Q. What was you[r] response, sir?

A: I said I do not remember.

Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out
of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements
contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following
manner:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. What else did she tell you[?]

A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.

Q. What was your response sir[?]

A. I said I do not remember.40

The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what
he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges
during the Deposition:

Atty. Benito P. Fabie

Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall
whether you issued this Order and whether the facsimile of the signature
appearing thereon is your signature.

A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature
reading Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya
is not my signature.41

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More
importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was
not his.

The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his
statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the
request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him.42 Indeed, we
find no reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the
Deposition of Judge Moya.

36 | P a g e
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document
Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:

Atty. Paraiso

Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination
of this document?

A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the
standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the same person.
On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the
writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of letters which is very
apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital letter "J".43

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been
sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by
Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was
purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that
he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court
were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 Moreover, Judge Moya
insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions
and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore,
Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as
shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. 46 In
the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted
child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 in Manila and the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 issued Certifications that there was
no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these
circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.49

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship.50 This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by
petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda.
de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID
and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT.
No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

37 | P a g e
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 191936, June 01, 2016

VIRGINIA D. CALIMAG, Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF SILVESTRA N. MACAPAZ,

REPRESENTED BY ANASTACIO P. MACAPAZ, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) promulgated on October 20, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 which affirmed with
modification the Decision3 dated September 28, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 147, in Civil Case No. 06-173, an action for annulment of deed of
sale and cancellation of title with damages. The CA Resolution4 dated April 5, 2010
denied the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The Facts

Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case,
with Silvestra N. Macapaz (Silvestra).

On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua
(Alicia) (respondents) are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr.
(Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de Macapaz (Fidela).

The subject property, with a total area of 299 square meters, is located at No. 1273 Bo.
Visaya Street, Barangay Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati City, and was duly registered in the
names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and Silvestra under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry No.
02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over
a portion of the said property measuring 49.5 sq m.6

On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088
was cancelled and a new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the name of
the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale8 dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra
allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for P300,000.00. Included among the
documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an
Affidavit9 dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra.
It was stated therein that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by
the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati City, making the same legally ineffective. On
September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.10

On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of
falsification of public documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code
against the petitioner.11 However, said criminal charges were eventually dismissed.

On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra,
instituted the action for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No.
221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Makati City.12

In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the
respondents have no legal capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they
are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such, they have no right over Silvestra's
estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate children from
inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.

After trial, the RTC found for the respondents and rendered its Decision on September
28, 2007.14 The fallo of the RTC decision reads:

38 | P a g e
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the Deed of Sale purportedly executed by [Silvestra] in favor of

[the petitioner] on January 18, 2005 over a parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 183088 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City, as Null and Void;

2. Ordering the Registrar of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT No. 221466
issued in the name of [the petitioner], the same having been issued on
the basis of a fraudulent/falsified Deed of Sale, and thereafter to reinstate
TCT No. 183088 issued in the name of [the petitioner] and [Silvestra] with
all the liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, including the adverse
claim of [Fidela]; [and]

3. Ordering [the petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the sum of PI00,000.00

as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

[The petitioner's] counter-claim is dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.15

The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the
cancellation of TCT No. 183088 was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who
purportedly executed said deed of sale died on November 11, 2002, about three years
before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.16 Respecting the respondents' legal
capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:

Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents]
to initiate this action as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between
[Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the Certificate of (canonical)
Marriage (Exh. "M"). The name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the
respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden name but Fidela
signed the same as the informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth
certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the name of the
father.17 (Emphasis ours)

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, the petitioner elevated her case to the CA resting on the argument that the
respondents are without legal personality to institute the civil action for cancellation of
deed of sale and title on the basis of their claimed status as legitimate children of
Anastacio, Sr., the brother and sole heir of the deceased, Silvestra.18

On October 20, 2009, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTC decision with
modification as to the amount of damages. The fallo of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED, for lack
of merit. The Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the [RTC] of Makati City, Branch
147 in Civil Case No. 06-173 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
award of moral and exemplary damages is hereby reduced from PI00,000.00 to
P50,000.00, respectively.

With costs against the [petitioner].

SO ORDERED.19

The CA sustained the RTC ruling that the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the
issuance of TCT No. 221466 in the name of the petitioner were obtained through
forgery. As to the question of whether the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra and
thus have the legal capacity to institute the action, the CA ruled in this wise:

39 | P a g e
Reviewing the evidence on record, we concur with the trial court in sustaining the
appellees' legitimate filiation to Silvestra's brother [Anastacio, Sr.] The trial court found
unsuccessful the attempt of Atty. Demetrio Calimag, Jr. to assail the validity of marriage
between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] with a certification from the NSO that their office
has no record of the certificate of marriage of [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela], and further
claiming the absence of a marriage license.

The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. A certificate of
marriage issued by the Most Holy Trinity Parish, Alang[-]alang, Leyte (Exh. "M") as well
as a copy of the marriage contract were duly submitted in evidence by the
[respondents].

xxxx

The Marriage Contract (Exh. "U") in this case clearly reflects a marriage license number
and in the absence of a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage
license was issued, the marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] may not be
invalidated on that ground.

x x x.

xxxx

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. This
jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Here, the fact of marriage between [Anastacio, Sr.] and [Fidela] was established by
competent and substantial proof. [The respondents] who were conceived and born
during the subsistence of said marriage are therefore presumed to be legitimate children
of [Anastacio, Sr.], in the absence of any contradicting evidence.20 (Citations omitted)

The petitioner sought reconsideration,21 but her motion was denied in the
Resolution22 dated April 5, 2010.

Hence, this petition.

Notably, even before the CA, the petitioner never assailed the factual finding that forgery
was indeed committed to effect the cancellation of TCT No. 183088 and the consequent
transfer of title of the property in her name. Verily, in this petition, the petitioner
continues to assail the legal capacity of the respondents to institute the present action.
Invoking the provisions of Article 992 of the Civil Code,23 the petitioner insists that the
respondents have no legal right over the estate left by Silvestra for being illegitimate
children of Anastacio, Sr.

While the petitioner does not question that Anastacio, Sr. is the legal heir of Silvestra,
she, however, claims that the respondents failed to establish their legitimate filiation to
Anastacio, Sr. considering that the marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was not
sufficiently proven. According to the petitioner, the marriage contract24 presented by the
respondents is not admissible under the Best Evidence Rule for being a mere fax copy
or photocopy of an alleged marriage contract, and which is not even authenticated by
the concerned Local Civil Registrar. In addition, there is no mark or stamp showing that
said document was ever received by said office. Further, while the respondents also
presented a Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage,25 the petitioner asserts that the same is
not the marriage license required under Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code;26 that said
Certificate of (Canonical) Marriage only proves that a marriage ceremony actually
transpired between Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela.27cralawred

40 | P a g e
Moreover, the petitioner contends that the certificates of live birth of the respondents do
not conclusively prove that they are legitimate children of Anastacio, Sr.

In their Comment,28 the respondents reiterate the finding and ruling of the CA that the
petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on considering that one's legitimacy can only
be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by a party who is related to the former
either by consanguinity or affinity.29

Thereupon, the resolution of this case rests upon this fundamental issue: whether or not
the respondents are legal heirs of Silvestra.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

While it is true that a person's legitimacy can only be questioned in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, as held in Spouses Fidel v. Hon. CA, et al.,30 this
Court however deems it necessary to pass upon the respondents' relationship to
Silvestra so as to determine their legal rights to the subject property. Besides, the
question of whether the respondents have the legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs of
Silvestra was among the issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial.

At first blush, the documents presented as proof of marriage between Anastacio, Sr. and
Fidela, viz: (1) fax or photo copy of the marriage contract, and (2) the canonical
certificate of marriage, cannot be used as legal basis to establish the fact of marriage
without running afoul with the Rules on Evidence of the Revised Rules of Court. Rule
130, Section 3 of the Rules on Evidence provides that: "When the subject of the inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, x x x." Nevertheless, a reproduction of the original document can still be
admitted as secondary evidence subject to certain requirements specified by law.
In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr.,31 it was held that:

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5,
which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3)
the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss
would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence, x x x.32 (Citation
omitted)

On the other hand, a canonical certificate of marriage is not a public document. As early
as in the case of United States v. Evangelista,33 it has been settled that church
registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of
General Orders No. 68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor
are they kept by duly authorized public officials.34 They are private writings and their
authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with
the rules of evidence.35 Accordingly, since there is no showing that the authenticity and
due execution of the canonical certificate of marriage of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela was
duly proven, it cannot be admitted in evidence.

Notwithstanding, it is well settled that other proofs can be offered to establish the fact of
a solemnized marriage.36 Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven
by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person's birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.37

Thus, in order to prove their legitimate filiation, the respondents presented their

41 | P a g e
respective Certificates of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office38 where
Fidela signed as the Informant in item no. 17 of both documents.

A perusal of said documents shows that the respondents were apparently born to the
same parents — their father's name is Anastacio Nator Macapaz, while their mother's
maiden name is Fidela Overa Poblete. In item no. 24 thereof where it asks: "24. DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARENTS (For legitimate birth)" it was stated therein
that respondents' parents were married on "May 25, 1955 in Alang-alang, Leyte." 39

The petitioner asserts that said documents do not conclusively prove the respondents'
legitimate filiation, albeit, without offering any evidence to the contrary. The certificates
of live birth contain no entry stating whether the respondents are of legitimate or
illegitimate filiation, making said documents unreliable and unworthy of weight and value
in the determination of the issue at hand.

Moreover, the petitioner states that in the respondents' certificates of live birth, only the
signature of Fidela appears, and that they were not signed by Anastacio, Sr. She argues
that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to be competent evidence
to establish filiation, whether legitimate or illegitimate, invoking Roces v. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila40 where it was held that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged
father is not competent evidence of paternity.41

The petitioner's contentions are untenable.

"A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts
of birth) in public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer (Civil Registrar)."42 Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of
live birth are presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
in them.43

"Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense and which if not rebutted
or contradicted, will remain sufficient."44

The petitioner's assertion that the birth certificate must be signed by the father in order to
be a competent evidence of legitimate filiation does not find support in law and
jurisprudence. In fact, the petitioner's reliance on Roces45 is misplaced considering that
what was sought to be proved is the fact of paternity of an illegitimate child, and not
legitimate filiation.

Verily, under Section 5 of Act No. 3753,46 the declaration of either parent of the new-born
legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his birth in the civil register, and
only in the registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth
certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant, or only by the
mother if the father refuses to acknowledge the child.

The pertinent portion of Section 5 of Act No. 3753 reads:

Sec. 5. Registration and Certification of Birth. - The declaration of the physician or

midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of cither parent
of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil
register. Such declaration shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the
physician, or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newly born
child.

In such declaration, the persons above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a)
date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship, and
religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status
of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; if) and such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.

42 | P a g e
xxxx

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to
jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. In the
latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the
father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which
such father could be identified, x x x (Emphasis Ours)

Forsooth, the Court finds that the respondents' certificates of live birth were duly
executed consistent with the provision of the law respecting the registration of birth of
legitimate children. The fact that only the signatures of Fidela appear on said documents
is of no moment because Fidela only signed as the declarant or informant of the
respondents' fact of birth as legitimate children.

Nonetheless, the respondents' certificates of live birth also intimate that Anastacio, Sr.
and Fidela had openly cohabited as husband and wife for a number of years, as a result
of which they had two children — the second child, Anastacio, Jr. being born more than
three years after their first child, Alicia. Verily, such fact is admissible proof to establish
the validity of marriage. Court Resolution dated February 13, 2013 in GR. No. 183262
entitled Social Security System (SSS) v. Lourdes S. Enobiso47 had the occasion to state:

Sarmiento v. CA is instructive anent the question of what other proofs can be offered to
establish the fact of a solemnized marriage, viz:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court ruled that as proof of marriage may
be presented: a) testimony of a witness to the matrimony; b) the couple's public and
open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock; c) the birth and
baptismal certificate of children born during such union; and d) the mention of such
nuptial in subsequent documents.48 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Moreover, in a catena of cases,49 it has been held that, "[p]ersons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is 'that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."50

Furthermore, as the established period of cohabitation of Anastacio, Sr. and Fidela

transpired way before the effectivity of the Family Code, the strong presumption
accorded by then Article 220 of the Civil Code in favor of the validity of marriage cannot
be disregarded. Thus:

Art. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of
the family in case of unlawful aggression.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated October 20, 2009 and Resolution dated April 5, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 90907 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Perez, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on official leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

43 | P a g e
44 | P a g e
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014

PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,

vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the
31 August 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which
1

reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao
2

City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case
No. 26, 908-98.

The Facts

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married
to the same man, now deceased.

Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on
the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido
(Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized
on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said
town. According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate
recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to
World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification was issued by the LCR.
3

During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children, namely:
Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August
1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15
December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not
known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City
living with another woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977
without any issue.

In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the
name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being
bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.

On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim, essentially
4

averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989
in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in
Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties
she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.

Trial ensued.

Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:

1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and

Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic)
Eustaquio;

2) Documentary evidence such as the following:

45 | P a g e
 a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol; 5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office

of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R.
Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila; 6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that
were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila,
started only in 1932; 7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila; 8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido; 9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.; 10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido; 11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the

Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942; 12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by

Second World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon,
Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the
Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido; 13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March

1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla; 14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and

Peregrina. 15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took
place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio
when he already had poor health, as well as her knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife,
but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio. Peregrina likewise set forth documentary
16

evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:

1) Marriage Contract between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of
17

marriage on 3 March 1979;

2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single

when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law
relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely: Climaco,
Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido; 18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte; and 19

4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the
Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte. 20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in
bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of
Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorney’s fees.

On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision denying Tecla’s petition, as well as
21

Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

46 | P a g e
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed
by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby
DENIED.

The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA

HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED. 22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged disregard of
the evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.

In its 31 August 2005 Decision, the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her
23

marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between
Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void. The CA ruled:

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss
of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded. 24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the
CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum dated 5 June 2008, raises the following legal
25

issues:

1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to
overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;

2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance

of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of
the best evidence, the original document;

and

3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative

value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued the
same being presented to the witness stand. 26

Our Ruling

Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.

The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied
on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate,
the trial court considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The
same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of
Manila. The trial court observed:

Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise,
issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:

records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of
Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter
part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, this office
has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of
marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September
1942, in Talibon, Bohol.27

47 | P a g e
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony
of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions.
Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not even produce her own copy
of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.

The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage
between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot
four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary evidence consisting of the
same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence
especially that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the
fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in
Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, we said, citing precedents, that:
28

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the
fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate.
Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.

The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the
fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals. Thus: 29

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both
constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused
the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In
Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution
of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution and the contents of the
document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven by secondary evidence when the

instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or
non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due
execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the inroduction of secondary
evidence of the contents.

xxxx

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or
primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the
document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its
face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the
document, when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence.

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n]
by other competent evidence.

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the
swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even
by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has
also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by
any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place
or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person
in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed
[been] lost."

48 | P a g e
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who
was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event.
The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest,
Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution
and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of
marriage.30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:

In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was
established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present
during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The
loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These
are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of
the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence –
testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v.
TRIAS, the

Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence.
The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the
marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who
officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage."

xxxx

The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of
[Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding
celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon,
Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary
evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss
of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has
disregarded. 31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, this Court has elucidated on the
32

rationale behind the presumption:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in
1âwphi1

this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties
were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio –
Always presume marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the
testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage
issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua
Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and VOID. No
pronouncement as to costs.

49 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

50 | P a g e
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY

MACARAIG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND
ROSAURA* MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision dated 14

September 20112 and Resolution dated 1 March 20133 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445,
L.R.C. Record No. N-22499. The land, situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City,
contains an area of 484 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-24660.4 The land was previously owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and
Mariquita de Villa (Spouses Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
0-2840.

On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint5 for Declaration of Nullity
of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and
spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).

In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated
that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in
1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight
children.

Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,6 he and his wife acquired a 484 square
meter residential land for a consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of
Sale7 from the Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and
TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G.
Uy."

On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of

Absolute Sale,8 another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land
from the spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras).
The second purchase consisted of 215 square meters, as declared under Tax
Declaration No. 61724, for a consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level
house with a floor area of 208.50 square meters was constructed on the 484
square meter land.

Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and
signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale9 dated 18 April 1979 on the 484
square meter land, together with the house erected thereon, for a consideration
of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.

Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in
favor of Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights,
interest, and ownership; (2) that defendants be directed to pay, jointly and
severally, to Uy the amounts of P100,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as
attorney's fees, P2,000 as expenses incident to litigation, plus costs of suit; (3)
upon declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of
Batangas City and the City Assessor be directed to register Uy as the sole owner

51 | P a g e
of the real properties; (4) if defendant Spouses Lacsamana are found by the
court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be ordered to turn over to Uy the entire
proceeds of sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay the damages; and (5)
that the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the mass of
the conjugal partnership properties.

In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the
allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real
properties using her paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married
to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In her
Counterclaim, Rosca prayed that the court award her (1) P200,000 as moral
damages; (2) P100,000 as exemplary damages; (3) P12,000 as attorney's fees;
(4) P3,000 as incidental litigation expenses; and (5) costs of suit. Spouses
Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979
claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied
on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject
property.

In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated
the matter, on consulta,10 with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because
of an affidavit subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among
others, that the property was conjugal in nature and sold without his marital
consent.

In a Resolution11 dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of

registration stating that since the property in question was registered in Rosca's
name, such circumstance indicated that the property belonged to Rosca, as her
paraphernal property. The LRC added that litigious matters, such as a protest
from the other party based on justifiable and legal grounds, were to be decided
not by the Register of Deeds but by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution states:
LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document

should be admitted for registration.

SO ORDERED.12

On 18 February 1981, Uy died.13 His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia)

and Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later
or on 10 May 1996, Rosca also died.14 Earlier, respondent Jose Lacsamana died
on 20 March 1991.15 redarclaw

Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to

Corazon Buena (Buena) through a Deed of Absolute Sale.16 Thus, both Rosca and
the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in this case.

During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and
Shirley, as his own witnesses, as well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.

Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by
Uy and Rosca. She alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by
Buena's agent sometime in 2006. Lydia also stated that the funds used to
construct the family dwelling came from Uy's business. Shirley corroborated the
testimony of Lydia on all material points.

Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II,
she and Uy cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to
formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the
celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on
the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage

52 | P a g e
contract.

Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee,
with money coming from her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land
covered by OCT No. 0-2840 and owned by Spouses Manuel. Thereafter, on 15
June 1964, she again purchased, using her own personal and paraphernal funds,
the land adjacent to the first purchased property owned by Spouses Contreras
and covered by Tax Declaration No. 61724. Immediately after, she caused the
construction of a split level house on the land using her own paraphernal funds
which became their family dwelling.

Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with
her which led to their physical separation before the year 1973. On 17
September 1976, Rosca obtained a real estate loan in the amount of P50,000
from Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral.
In support of this loan, Rosca executed an Affidavit of Ownership17 dated 27
September 1976, stating that (1) she was the lawful and sole owner of the 484
square meter land, together with the building erected thereon, and (2) the land
was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to
Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status.

Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura
Mendoza, and Buena.

Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the
Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The
Register of Deeds elevated the matter on consulta with the LRC, which issued a
Resolution dated 7 November 1979 recognizing Rosca as the sole registered
owner of the property.

Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount
of P80,000, the 484 square meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a
Deed of Absolute Sale of House and Lot.18 The Registry of Deeds of Batangas
City cancelled TCT No. T-24660 and issued TCT No. T-3519 in favor of the
spouses. Then, Spouses Lacsamana mortgaged the property to PBC for P48,000.
Upon full payment of the mortgage debt on 15 April 1982, PBC issued a Release
of Real Estate Mortgage.

Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from
Spouses Lacsamana on 24 December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000.
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-35
and issued TCT No. T-324420 in her name. Likewise, the Assessor's Office of
Batangas City issued Tax Declaration No. 90210.21 redarclaw

Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that
Buena entered the property and caused the construction of structures without
any court order. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 21 September
2007 granting the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the case was submitted for
resolution.

In a Decision22 dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of
respondents. The lower court found that (1) there was no valid marriage
between Uy and Rosca; (2) the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the house
and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; and (3) both parties were not
entitled to their respective claims for damages. The dispositive portion of the
Decision states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy

is hereby DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are
rendered of no force and effect. The claims for damages of both parties are
hereby DENIED. Cost against both parties.

53 | P a g e
SO ORDERED.23

Uy filed an appeal24 with the CA. In a Decision25 dated 14 September 2011, the
CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that
respondents were able to overthrow the presumption of marriage and that the
subject property was Rosca's paraphernal property. The appellate court also
upheld the validity of the sale. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
LawlibraryofCRAlaw

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.26

Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate
court in a Resolution27 dated 1 March 2013.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April
1979, executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana, is valid.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being
simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Uy states that no
proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid
P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property. Uy also insists that he did not
give his consent to the sale which prejudiced his rights and interest. Uy argues
that Rosca did not give physical possession of the house and lot to the alleged
buyers. Further, Uy adds, without admitting that the sale is valid, that the
consideration paid was unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it
constitutes an equitable mortgage. Uy insists that Spouses Lacsamana and
Buena cannot be considered buyers in good faith.

Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the
re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence of the parties which had
previously been passed upon exhaustively by both the trial and appellate courts.
Respondents added that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45.
Since the findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts were supported by
substantial evidence and none of the recognized exceptions allowing this Court
to exercise its power to review is present, then the petition should be dismissed.

We agree with respondents.

The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and
appellate courts. We find no reason to disturb their factual findings. In petitions
for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, like in the present
case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law. Here, Uy would like us to
review again the factual circumstances surrounding the Deed of Sale executed
by Rosca with the Spouses Lacsamana and to declare the Deed of Sale invalid for
being simulated due to lack of consideration and consent. Clearly, these are
questions of fact which are within the purview of the trial and appellate courts to
determine. Also, the issues raised do not come within the purview of the
recognized exceptions28 for this Court to take cognizance of the case. We have
reiterated time and again that this Court is not the proper venue to consider

54 | P a g e
factual issues as it is not a trier of facts.

Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by
Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is
a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage."29Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume
marriage.30 However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and
overcome by other evidence.

Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v.

Trias,31 we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one
of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the
solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact
of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of

Appeals,32 we held that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929,33 as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114,34 which is applicable to the present
case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the
marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take each
other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person solemnizing the
marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the
Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where
the marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract, the
marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the
same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the
marriage.

Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he
could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or
the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings
of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was
actually married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed
that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other. The pertinent portions
of the RTC Decision state: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which

plaintiff Uy anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal
that there is plethora of evidence showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca
were never actually married to each other, to wit: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself
stated in the fifth paragraph of his Petition, to quote: "I am married (not
legally)."

Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of
Batangas executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization
categorically states, in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not
legally).

Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October

1951, plaintiff Uy also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded
himself as "single" when filling up his civil status therein.

Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff
Uy was an alien duly registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines
and that his civil status was single.

55 | P a g e
Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas,
establishes in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to
defendant Rosca.

Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that

plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not
consummated.

For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage
certificate by presenting public documents, namely: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee
alias Luis G. Uy, to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines";

Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and

defendant Rosca and the descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy
was legitimate;

Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by
defendant Rosca, stating that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their
children;

Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July

1985 wherein she admitted being the wife of plaintiff Uy;

Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca

admitting she is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified
by Rosca;

Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant

Rosca admitting her status as married;

to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy
presented defendant Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her
the fact of his marriage with the latter. However, this presumption had been
debunked by plaintiff Uy's own evidence and most importantly, by the more
superior evidence presented by the defendants.

While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and
wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally
married to her because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs.
Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case,
to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage
sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff
Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant
Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to
submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however,
dismally failed to do so.35

Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca,
their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code
which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting
married. Article 147 provides: LawlibraryofCRAlaw

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other,
live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their

56 | P a g e
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in
the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation.

The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed
co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and
appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-
owned but is paraphernal.

First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No.
1194, Rosca was recognized as the sole registered owner of the property.36 redarclaw

Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel
and Rosca covering the 484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to
Rosca's purchase of the land as evidenced by his signature under "signed in the
presence of."37 This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of
Rosca's ownership over the property.

Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca

in support of her real estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5
0,000, Rosca stated that she was the sole and lawful owner of the subject
property and that the land was registered under her name and that the phrase
"Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a
description of her status.38
redarclaw

Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy"
was notice to the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such
belonged to Rosca as her paraphernal property.39 The words "married to" were
merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was registered in
her name.40 Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property
should have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca.41 redarclaw

In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,42 the property subject of the mortgage was

registered in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz,
Filipinos." This Court ruled that the title is registered in the name of Corazon
alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the
civil status of Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her husband is
also a registered owner.

Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome
the presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned
by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's
paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without

57 | P a g e
Uy's consent.

Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for
being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was
presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to
Rosca for the purchase of the property or even if there was consideration, such
was unreasonably low and unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena
cannot be considered as buyers in good faith.

We disagree.

Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any
consideration for the sale. Neither did he submit any evidence, whether
documentary or testimonial, showing the fair market value of the property at the
time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was unreasonably low or
unconscionable. It was even mentioned by the appellate court that "appellants
failed to prove that on April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth
millions of pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient substantiation.

Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are
binding on this Court when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial
court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again since payment of the
purchase price and the consideration for the sale are factual issues which cannot
be raised in this petition.

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal
property in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14

September 2011 and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Brion, Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

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