Tiktok Shows Why Social Media Companies Need More Regulation
Tiktok Shows Why Social Media Companies Need More Regulation
Executive Summary
There has been increasing political awareness regard- these platforms, and policymakers should do more to
ing the national security issues posed by TikTok, the encourage the companies to seek solutions. Addition-
popular social media app owned by Chinese company ally, mis- and dis-information often run rampant due to
ByteDance. Lawmakers and the public are right to be social media companies’ varying and often lax rules on
concerned—numerous data points are now available, content moderation, which can pose a particular chal-
from ByteDance’s connections to the Chinese Com- lenge to American democracy when a social media
munist Party to its potential for social manipulation to company is under the influence of a foreign adversary.
its gathering of American personal data. Some efforts
have been made to limit the potential risks, for example Holding social media companies accountable is dif-
storing TikTok data on U.S. (rather than Chinese) serv- ficult under present law, most notably due to Section
ers. However, more could be done. Additional measures 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which pro-
should also be considered by lawmakers, including the vides broad legal liability protections to companies
forced sale of ByteDance’s U.S. operations or even a for content their users post. Additionally, ensuring that
complete nationwide ban on TikTok. U.S. user data is secure and cannot be exploited by for-
eign adversaries may require CFIUS to make a recom-
TikTok’s national security threat is only one component mendation either leading to the forced sale of TikTok
of the myriad challenges facing regulators looking to or banning the platform altogether. We explore policy
protect citizens utilizing social media platforms. For solutions to the aforementioned issues, including pass-
that reason, TikTok is a useful case study to examine ing an updated data protection law, incentivizing the de-
broader issues with social media at large. TikTok and velopment of better age verification practices by social
other social media platforms, including Instagram and media companies, and re-establishing a “duty of care”
Facebook, often have adverse effects on the mental standard requiring companies to take reasonable steps
health of minors. Unrealistic beauty standards, bullying, to prevent harm to users.
and sexual harassment are all very real problems on
Not surprisingly, Congress is currently considering a Concerns over foreign influence in elections drove, in
number of legislative responses, including the bipartisan part, an early bipartisan request by Senators Chuck
RESTRICT Act, which would give the Department of Com- Schumer (D-NY) and Tom Cotton (R-AR) for a national
merce authority to ban or limit technology developed by security investigation of TikTok. Republican lawmakers
Chinese firms that may pose a security threat, including have recently argued that TikTok could use its algo-
TikTok. As with automobiles, which have positive bene- rithm and user data to “subtly indoctrinate” American
fits but also pose serious dangers and therefore are reg- citizens, citing TikTok’s reported censorship of political-
ulated, social media also merits cost-effective regulation ly sensitive content critical of the Chinese government.
that preserves the benefits and limits the risks. Toward
that end, in this report, we discuss first the current prob- Indeed, ByteDance’s founder and former CEO validated
lems with social media in general and the reasons why it these concerns when he publicly promised to support
merits more stringent regulation. We then outline the ex- Chinese Communist Party ideology in a 2018 statement.
isting domestic and international regulatory frameworks Leaked content moderation documents obtained by the
that purport to control the negative side effects of social British newspaper the Guardian demonstrated TikTok’s
media platforms. We conclude by recommending certain censorship of videos in line with Chinese foreign poli-
ways in which the dangers of TikTok can be addressed in cy, such as videos about Hong Kong protests or Tibet-
the short run, as well as how new legislation would better an independence. Former ByteDance employees also
minimize the downsides of social media in the long run. claimed that an English-language ByteDance news app
pushed pro-China content, a claim that was denied by
the company. Further, a Forbes investigation found that
TikTok’s National large numbers of current and former ByteDance and Tik-
Tok employees had worked for Chinese state media.
Security Risks
In further support of these concerns, a recent report
There are multiple reasons for regulating ownership of submitted by a group of researchers to the Austra-
social media companies by international firms based in lian Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference
adversarial nations with autocratic regimes that the Tik- through Social Media concluded that ByteDance’s pro-
Tok example highlights, including political interference motion of government propaganda through its Chinese
resulting from misinformation that can be steered by an app generated “material risk that they could do the
authoritarian regime. same on TikTok.” The report also found that TikTok has
been an active participant in China’s military-industri-
The vast quantities of data that TikTok collects may al- al-surveillance complex, and that ByteDance is deeply
low it to become an instrument of political interference enmeshed with the Chinese Communist Party.
in the U.S. through disinformation or propaganda cam-
paigns that target U.S. voters. This could happen either In sum, between ambiguous Chinese laws that could al-
through direct Chinese government influence on TikTok low the Chinese government to lay claim to data stored
and the algorithm that promotes, hides, and even cen- within the country and ByteDance’s own actions indi-
sors certain content over others or by the Chinese gov- cating a lack of robust, transparent measures to pro-
ernment creating content for other social media sites tect user information, China could utilize TikTok data in
that utilizes TikTok user data to target political ads to ways that could pose a national security threat to the
American citizens, similar to Russia’s election inter- United States.
ference campaign in 2016. (We now know that of the
Given the mountains of Americans’ personal data col- FBI Director Christopher Wray has warned that if TikTok
lected by ByteDance, the Chinese owner of TikTok, user data falls into Chinese government’s hands, Chi-
Americans are right to be concerned about the conse- na could weaponize the data for its political purposes.
quences of this data falling into the hands of the Chi- Weaponization can take various forms, from tracking
nese government. of government employees to spying on the activities
of individuals and corporations. Republican lawmakers
Apart from the growing strength of the China’s author- Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Mike Gallagher (R-WI-8) have
itarian regime, the government’s activities in tech pose echoed these concerns.
specific concerns. In 2021, the government passed a
law requiring the country’s domestic technology com- Leaked records from TikTok in 2022 bolster these
panies to route all decisions regarding the security of claims. The records showed that employees in China
“core state data” through the government’s national had accessed U.S. personal user data. Such claims
security officials. Officials may demand access to such had been made previously by former TikTok employees
data from tech firms, and failure to comply can result in as well. Further, a recent update to TikTok’s European
large fines or the revocation of a tech firm’s operating privacy policy confirmed that employees in China have
license. “Core state data” is only loosely defined in the remote access to user data. A Forbes investigation
law as data that poses a “serious threat” to Chinese na- revealed that Beijing-based TikTok employees were
tional security and categories of specific data that fall planning to track specific American citizens’ locations
under this umbrella may continuously change. Experts through TikTok.
say the law leaves room for the government to force
domestic tech companies to report large amounts of TikTok responded to earlier data privacy concerns by
user data to the government. Additionally, while this law stating that a U.S.-based security team determined all
contains some “data protection” provisions, important- data access and that the company would decline any
ly, the law does not limit the Chinese government’s ac- request from the Chinse government for U.S. user data.
cess to user data in any way. Further, TikTok has stated that its U.S. user data was
previously channeled only through the company’s U.S.
Experts say that through its multiple tech-related ac- and Singapore data centers and is now being deleted
tions, China is seeking to “expand extraterritorial con- from its own servers as it transitions entirely to using
trol over digital platforms” and to “conquer” more digital Oracle servers. However, TikTok recently declined to ex-
territory through controlling user data. Large Chinese plicitly commit to ending all Chinese employee access
initiatives for global digital control include the Digital to U.S. data. Among the most recent disturbing disclo-
Silk Road Project that covers international technology sures is that TikTok may have unlawfully surveilled U.S.
cooperation and export, an expanding Chinese telecom journalists. The Department of Justice has opened an
and media footprint, and China’s large and growing investigation into the matter.
presence in global digital value chains. TikTok is the
most prominent example of how China could poten- In sum, while the unique national security challenges
tially control U.S. user data. U.S. military branches and presented by foreign-owned social media like TikTok
security agencies have banned the use of TikTok on of- go beyond data privacy concerns, TikTok’s case under-
ficial devices, and security concerns have been raised scores the data privacy concerns presented by social
by senior officials such as the director of the Federal media platforms more generally.
Bureau of Investigation as well as the deputy attorney
Concerns about TikTok have also alarmed regulators CFIUS’s broad role is to “review certain transactions in-
abroad. In 2020, the Dutch Data Protection Authority volving foreign investment in the United States and cer-
submitted a report investigating digital grooming and tain real estate transactions by foreign persons, in order
online bullying on TikTok. It later fined TikTok €750,000 to determine the effect of such transactions on the na-
for not providing a privacy statement in Dutch, which tional security of the United States.” CFIUS’s jurisdiction
it stated violated the privacy rights of young children. covers foreign investments in U.S. companies. TikTok’s
The European Commission has also engaged in exten- history reveals the grounds for CFIUS intervention.
sive dialogue with TikTok about changing its practices
after complaints emerged to the European Consumer The Chinese company ByteDance launched a short-vid-
Organization that the platform “failed to protect chil- eo app in 2016, primarily for the Chinese domestic mar-
dren from hidden advertising and inappropriate con- ket, and subsequently released an international version
tent.” The Commission is seeking greater transparency of this app called TikTok. In 2017, ByteDance acquired
into TikTok’s business operations to better understand Musical.ly, a Chinese company with a strong U.S. pres-
its impact on young users. In our policy recommen- ence including an office in California, and merged it into
TikTok in 2018. This acquisition is considered a “foreign
investment,” thereby enabling CFIUS to review the case.
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