HORACIO G. ADAZA and FELICIDAD MARUNDAN VS.

CA

G.R. No. 47354

March 21, 1989

Facts:

Victor Adaza and Rosario Gonzales have six (6) children: petitioner Horacio,
Homero, Demosthenes, respondent Violeta, Teresita and Victor, Jr. The head of the
family, Victor Adaza, Sr., died in 1956, while the wife died in 1971. During his lifetime,
Victor Adaza, Sr. executed a Deed of Donation dated 10 June 1953, covering the
parcel of land subject matter of this caselocated at Sinonok, Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte, in favor of respondent Violeta, then still single. The donation
was accepted in the same instrument, which both donor and donee acknowledged
before Notary Public ex officio Milagros C. Galeposo. The land donated was then
part of the public domain, being disposable public land, and had been held and
cultivated by Victor Adaza, Sr. for many years. Violeta, with the aid of her brother
Horacio, filed a homestead application covering the land involved. Four (4) years
later, petitioner Horacio invited respondent Violeta and the other brothers and sister
for a family gathering in his house. There, Horacio asked Violeta to sign a Deed of
Waiver which had been prepared in respect of the property in Sinonok donated by
their father Victor Adaza, Sr.. This Deed stated that the Sinonok property was owned
in common by Violeta and her brother Horacio G. Adaza, even though the certificate
of title had been issued in her name only. The Deed also provided for the waiver,
transfer and conveyance by Violeta in favor of Horacio of one-half (1/2) of the
Sinonok property, together with all improvements existing in that one-half (1/2)
portion. Violeta signed this Deed of Waiver: the Deed was also signed by petitioner
Horacio and Homero Adaza as witnesses.

Issue:

WONan implied trust was created in favor of Horacio.

Held:

Yes. Since Violeta traced her title to and based her claim of ownership upon the
Deed of Donation executed by their father, it is necessary to examine this Deed of
Donation. That Deed of Donation is noteworthy for its inclusion of a paragraph that
was crossed-out. The crossed-out provision reads:

"That the donee shall share one-half (1/2) of the entire property with one of her
brothers or sisters after the death of the donor."
Petitioner Horacio claimed that that intent was precisely to make both Violeta and
himself co-owners of the land then being donated to Violeta though respondent alone
was to be the registered owner, she was to share the land donated by the father with
Horacio on an equal sharing basis. We think this intent is evidenced, firstly, by the
Deed of Waiver executed by Violeta. The Deed of Waiver is important because there
Violeta acknowledged that she owned the land in common with her brother Horacio
although the certificate of title bore only her name.

The execution of the Deed of Donation of 10 June 1953 by respondent Violeta's

father created an implied trust in favor of Violeta's brother, petitioner Horacio Adaza,
in respect of half of the property donated. Article 1449 of the Civil Code states that:
"There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears
that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to
have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof."

Ting Ho vs Teng Gui.

GR No. 130115

July 16, 2008

Facts:

Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo
against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around
a parcel of land, and the improvements which should form part of the estate of their
deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the
siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26,
1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and
properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of respondent Vicente
Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen,
was then disqualified to own public lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death
of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive
use and benefit to their exclusion and prejudice.

Issue:

WON there was an implied trust

Ruling:

None. No implied trust can arise from a violation of the constitutional prohibition on
alien ownership of lands
[G.R. No. 182177, March 30, 2011]

RICHARD JUAN VS. GABRIEL YAP

G.R. No. 182177

March 30, 2011

Facts:

Spouses Maximo and Dulcisima Cañeda mortgaged to petitioner Richard Juan two
parcels of land in Talisay, Cebu to secure a loan of P1.68 million, payable within one
year. On 30 June 1998, petitioner, represented by Solon, sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. The properties were auctioned and sold to petitioner but
no certificate of sale was issued due to his failure to pay the sale's commission.
Respondent and the Cañeda spouses executed a memorandum of agreement
(MOA) where (1) the Cañeda spouses acknowledged respondent as their "real
mortgagee-creditor while Richard Juan is merely a trustee" of respondent; (2)
respondent agreed to allow the Cañeda spouses to redeem the foreclosed properties
for R1.2 million; and 3) the Cañeda spouses and respondent agreed to initiate judicial
action "either to annul or reform the contract or to compel Richard Juan to reconvey
the mortgagee's rights" to respondent as trustor.

Issue:

WON an implied trust arose between petitioner and respondent, binding petitioner to
hold the beneficial title over the mortgaged properties in trust for respondent;

Ruling:

The court ruled that an implied trust arising from mortgage contracts is not among the
trust relationships the Civil Code enumerates. Under the general principles on trust,
equity converts the holder of property right as trustee for the benefit of another if the
circumstances of its acquisition makes the holder ineligible "in good conscience to
hold and enjoy it." Based on parol evidence, the Cañeda spouses acknowledged
respondent as the lender from whom they borrowed the funds secured by the
Contract. Furthermore, it was respondent, not petitioner, who shouldered the
payment of the foreclosure expenses. Thus, the court gave credence to the parol
evidence of the latter and found the former liable to hold the purchased property in
trust of the actual buyer under an implied trust. Lastly, the court ruled that the formal
holders of title may be deemed trustees obliged to transfer title to the beneficiaries in
whose favor the trusts were deemed created. The court, see no reason to bar the
recognition of the same obligation in a mortgage contract meeting the standards for
the creation of an implied trust.

PILAPIL vs. HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES

February 5, 2007

G.R. No. 150175

Facts:

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones. Respondents are the heirs of the late
Maximino Briones. Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. In 1952, Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
husband’s estate with the CFI Cebu City. CFI issued a Letters of Administration in favor of
Donata who submitted an inventory of Maximino’s properties included the disputed land. In
same year 1952, CFI issued order awarding ownership to Donata. In 1960, such order was
recorded in Register of Deeds and by virtue thereof, a new TCT was issued in her name. In 1977,
Donata died. Her niece, Erlinda, one of the Petitioners, instituted with the RTC a Petiton for
Administration of the Intestate Estate of Donata. RTC appointed her and her husband Gregorio
as Administrators of Donatoa’s estate. In 1985, Silverio, Maximino’s nephew, one of the
Respondents, filed with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the Intestate Estate of
Maximino which initially granted ordering him to collect rentals from Maximino’s properties.
But Gregorio filed a motion to set aside the Order claiming that said properties were already
under his and his wife’s administration as part of intestate estate of Donata. Hence, Silverio’s
Letters of Administration was subsequently set aside. In 1987, Respondents filed a complaint
with RTC against Petitioners for Annulment/Recovery of possession of real property. In 1992,
Respondents amended their complaint alleging that Donata, as Administrarix of Maximino’s
Estate, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of
the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of Maximino. RTC favored Respondents and Ordered Petitioners to reconvey
subject properties and render Accounting to the former. Petitioners appealed to CA but the CA
affirmed the RTC, hence, they petitioned to SC.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents' right to recover possession of the disputed properties,

based on implied trust, is also barred by laches.

Held:

Yes. Respondents' right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on

implied trust, is also barred by laches. Considering the circumstances in the afore-
quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents' conduct before this Court, particularly
the belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or
justification for such delay. It is well established that the law serves those who are
vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act. The
law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that
he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.

Ecsay vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150175

February 5, 2007

Facts:

Emilio and Jose Escay, now both deceased, were brothers. In his lifetime, Emilio
mortgaged his properties now in question, to the Philippine National Bank. He died in
1924 before he could pay his obligation with the bank which had mounted. The bank
then filed in 1930 a foreclosure suit against the estate of Emilio represented by the
administrator, Atty. Eduardo Arboleda. Pending the said suit, on April 28, 1933, a
contract hereafter referred to as original contract was entered among the Philippine
National Bank, Jose Escay, Sr., and the administrator, Atty. Arboleda, under which
Jose assumed the mortgage indebtedness of his deceased brother Emilio. This was
agreed to by Magdalena Vda. de Escay, widow of Emilio, in her own behalf and as
guardian ad litem of their children. When it was discovered that the original contract
failed to state the transfer of the ownership of the properties in question to Jose
Escay, Sr., in consideration of his assumption of the mortgage indebtedness of Emilio
(subject to the right of repurchase of the heirs of Emilio within five (5) years after the
mortgage indebtedness had been fully paid), a supplementary contract was entered
into among the Philippine National Bank, the administrator, Atty. Arboleda and Jose
Escay, Sr. This was approved by the probate court taking cognizance of the estate of
the deceased Emilio Escay in its order of February 24, 1934. In 1941, Magdalena
Vda. de Escay, Roberto and the other children filed a complaint against Jose Escay,
Sr. and Atty. Arboleda (administrator of the deceased Emilio), for the recovery of the
ownership and possession of the properties in question. This case was provisionally
dismissed after defendants have answered, upon motion of the parties on July 24,
1944.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in holding of the properties in trust (implied) for the
heirs of Emilio Escay.
Held:

Petitioners contend that since the titles over the properties in question were
transferred to the name of respondents' predecessor-in-interest, Jose Escay, Sr., by
fraudulent means, an implied trust was created between the testate estate of Emilio
Escay and Jose Escay, Sr. under which, by operation of law, Jose Escay, Sr. became
a trustee of the properties in question in favor of the heirs of Emilio Escay as the
cestuique trust; consequently, the respondents are duty bound to reconvey the
properties in question to the petitioners whose right to recover the properties does
not prescribe. Petitioners also argue that the original contract, Exhibit "F" and the
supplementary contract, Exhibit "I", created in their favor an express trust because
the true intention of the parties was that only the possession and administration of
the properties of petitioners in question should be transferred to respondents,
predecessor-in- interest Jose Escay, Sr., which properties he was supposed to hold
in trust for the petitioners until such time as he shall have fully liquidated the
obligations of the testate estate of Emilio Escay, and since an action based on an
express trust does not prescribe the right of petitioners to recover the properties in
question from the respondents does not prescribe and therefore the respondents can
be ordered to reconvey the properties in question to petitioners. The prescriptibility of
an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, is now a settled
question in this jurisdiction. It prescribes in ten years.

G.R. No. 171717 December 15, 2010

RAMON B. BRITO, SR. vs. SEVERINO D. DIANALA

FACTS:

Subject of the present petition is a parcel of land located at Barrio Sicaba, Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental. Which was originally owned by a certain Esteban Dichimo and
his wife, Eufemia Dianala, both of whom are already deceased. Petitioner’s wife,
Margarita, together with Bienvenido and Francisco, filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages and alleged that they are the heirs of a certain Vicente
Dichimo, who is the only heirs of Eusebio and Eufemia, and as compulsory heirs,
inherited Lot No. 1536-B while Edito, Maria, Herminia, Leonora, Felicito and Merlinda
claimed to be the heirs of one Eusebio Dichimo. On July 29, 1983, herein
respondents filed an Answer-in-Intervention claiming that prior to his marriage to
Eufemia, Esteban was married to a certain Francisca Dumalagan; that Esteban and
Francisca bore five children, all of whom are already deceased; that herein
respondents are the heirs of Esteban and Francisca’s children; that they are in open,
actual, public and uninterrupted possession of a portion of Lot No. 1536-B for more
than 30 years; that their legal interests over the subject lot prevails over those of
petitioner and his coheirs.

ISSUE:

WON respondents are barred by prescription for having filed their complaint for
reconveyance only after more than eight years from the discovery of the fraud
allegedly committed by petitioner and his co-heirs

HELD:

No. There is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the subject property as
evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action against
respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents’
possession of the disputed property, it follows that their complaint for reconveyance
is, in fact, imprescriptible. As such, with more reason should respondents not be held
guilty of laches as the said doctrine, which is one in equity, cannot be set up to resist
the enforcement of an imprescriptible legal right. In their complaint for reconveyance
and damages, respondents alleged that petitioner and his co-heirs acquired the
subject property by means of fraud. Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides that a
person acquiring property through fraud becomes, by operation of law, a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years, the reckoning point
of which is the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find
that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil
Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title
thereto in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article
1144 of the Civil Code is applicable. Article 1144. The following actions must be
brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon a written
contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in
ten years and not otherwise. In the instant case, TCT No. T-12561 was obtained by
petitioner and his co-heirs on September 28, 1990, while respondents filed their
complaint for reconveyance on August 18, 1999. Hence, it is clear that the ten-year
prescriptive period has not yet expired. Respondents are not guilty of laches simply
because they are no longer parties to the case and, as such, have no personality to
assail the said judgment. Respondents’ act of filing their action for reconveyance
within the ten-year prescriptive period does not constitute an unreasonable delay in
asserting their right. Laches is recourse in equity. Equity, however, is applied only in
the absence, never in contravention, of statutory law. Moreover, the prescriptive
period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the
plaintiff is not in possession thereof. Otherwise, if the plaintiff is in possession of the
property, prescription does not commence to run against him.