FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 221586. September 14, 2021 ]

ZENAIDA D. ROA, PETITIONER, VS. SPS. ROBINSON K. AND MARY
VALERIE S. SY, MARIE ANTOINETTE R. FRANCISCO, AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the following
dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 135555:
1) Decision[1] dated May 21, 2015 which reversed the trial court's order denying respondents'
motion to dismiss the complaint below for cancellation of deeds of sale, annulment of title,
and reconveyance with damages; and
2) Resolution[2] dated November 25, 2015 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Antecedents

On March 19, 2013, petitioner (Zenaida D. Roa) filed the aforesaid complaint against
respondents Marie Antoinette R. Francisco (Francisco), Spouses Robinson K., and Mary
Valerie S. Sy (Spouses Sy), and Register of Deeds of Makati City (RD Makati). The case
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 66, Makati City.[3]

Petitioner averred that, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 133936,
she and her sister Amelia Roa (Amelia) are the legitimate owners of a property located at
73 Amorsolo Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati City. On August 5, 2012, she learned
from a relative that their title had been cancelled by the RD Makati, and by virtue of a
deed of sale, a new TCT No. 006-2012000849 was issued in the name of Francisco. The
deed of sale was purportedly executed between her and her sister Amelia, on the one
hand, and their niece Francisco, on the other.[4]

It was impossible for her to have signed the deed of sale since she was in Washington
D.C. at the time it was purportedly executed on July 6, 2012 and notarized on July 10,
2012. She left the Philippines on March 20, 2012 and returned only on August 24, 2012,
as evidenced by her arrival and departure record issued by the Bureau of Immigration. On
the other hand, her sister Amelia could not have signed the same on her own volition
since she had been suffering from Alzheimer's disease for the last ten (10) years already
prior to the supposed date of the sale.[5]

Francisco subsequently sold the property to Spouses Sy for P35,000,000.00 under Deed
of Sale dated July 20, 2012. Consequently, a new TCT No. 006-2012000889 was further
issued in the name of Spouses Sy.[6]

Francisco was able to secure a title in her name only on July 16, 2012, while the sale of
the same property to Spouses Sy was supposedly done on July 20, 2012. At the time
Francisco and Spouses Sy started negotiating on the sale, the latter already knew of the
existence of her title considering the close proximity between the date the sale to Spouses
Sy took place and the date Francisco secured a certificate of title in her name. During
respondents' initial negotiation, petitioner and Amelia were still the registered owners of
the property. This should have alerted Spouses Sy on the legality of Francisco's claimed
title. As part of their due diligence, they should have made further inquiries on the
identity of the legitimate owner of the property. More, the fact that the only handwritten
entry in the Deed of Sale dated July 20, 2012, was the property's title number should have
made Spouses Sy suspicious of Francisco's title. Spouses Sy, therefore, are not buyers in
good faith, hence, the sale of the property in their favor is void.[7] Accordingly, they ought
to return the property to its legitimate owners (she and Amelia).

Instead of filing an answer, Spouses Sy filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action. The complaint allegedly rested on conjectures and contained no
specific averments of bad faith on their part.[8] Spouses Sy further claimed that they acted
in good faith when they relied on Francisco's title and noted no suspicious circumstances
attending the sale transaction.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

By Order[9] dated August 7, 2013, the trial court denied Spouses Sy's motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. It noted that the complaint stated that petitioners were the registered
owners of the property. Francisco fraudulently registered the property in her name by
presenting a spurious and forged deed of sale. Ultimately, Spouses Sy purchased the
property from Francisco despite her fraudulent title.[10]

Spouses Sy's motion for reconsideration was denied under Order[11] dated March 26,
2014. Thereafter, they filed a "Motion for Bill of Particulars dated April 14, 2014 and
later an "Amended Motion for Bill of Particulars" dated April 15, 2014. They required
herein petitioner to answer the following questions:[12]

3.1 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that it was Marie Antoinette Roa Francisco,
Marie Celine Roa Francisco and/or Amelia Roa who had actual and physical possession
of the house and lot located at 73 Amorsolo Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati City (the
"Property") on 20 July 2012?

3.2 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that she did not have actual and physical
possession of the property on 20 July 2012?

3.3 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that it was her niece Marie Antoinette Roa
Francisco who was in actual and physical possession of the original owner's duplicate
title to the Property currently covered by TCT No. 006-201200889 on 20 July 2012?

3.4 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that she did not have actual and physical
possession of the original owner's duplicate title to the property currently covered by
TCT No. 006-201200889 on 20 July 2012?

3.5 Is plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa a US Citizen?

3.5 (sic) Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that she did not take any action before the
Register of Deeds for the protection of the public on or after December 2011, when "she
came across an Earnest Money Agreement purportedly executed by Antoinette Francisco
in favor of a certain Zoilo De La Cruz, the subject matter of which is the sale of the
Amorsolo property covered by TCT No. 133936, xxx"[?]

3.6 Did plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa file any action to cancel or to void the Earnest Money
Agreement between Marie Antoinette R. Francisco and Zoilo De La Cruz?

3.7 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that she never caused the title covering the
property to be annotated with a "lis pendens annotation" at the Register of Deeds when
according to par. 12 of her Complaint, she filed on 4 June 2012, a Petition to Surrender
Withheld Owner's Duplicate or To Cancel Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title and Issuance
of New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title under Section 107 of P.D. 1529 against
Antoinette, which had been docketed as LRC Case No. M-5668 before Branch 134 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City?

3.8 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that the case she filed, namely the Petition to
Surrender Withheld Owner's Duplicate or To Cancel Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title
and Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title under Section 107 of P.D. 1529
against Marie Antoinette Francisco, which had been docketed as LRC Case No. M-5668
x x x was dismissed?

3.9. Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that she did not annotate her alleged claim x x x
on the title covering the Property that would alert or put a prospective purchaser on
notice?
The trial court granted the motion under Order[13] dated September 16, 2014, and ordered
petitioner to submit her bill of particulars. Petitioner promptly complied.[14]

Meantime, on Spouses Sy's motion, the presiding judge of Branch 66 inhibited from the
case. Thereafter, the case got re-raffled to Branch 148.[15]

While the proceedings below were ongoing, Spouses Sy also pursued a petition
for certiorari under CA G.R. SP No. 135555, assailing the earlier denial of their motion
to dismiss.

The Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals

In CA G.R. SP No. 135555, Spouses Sy faulted the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion for denying their motion to dismiss notwithstanding that the complaint
purportedly failed to state a cause of action against them. The complaint was supposedly
based on mere conclusions or opinions and not on ultimate facts, hence, it failed to pass
the test of sufficiency of cause of action.[16] Spouses Sy, too, asserted they are buyers in
good faith.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its assailed Decision[17] dated May 21, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed.[18] It ruled
that petitioner failed to particularly allege when Spouses Sy started to negotiate with
Francisco for the purchase of the property. This is allegedly an ultimate fact necessary to
determine whether Spouses Sy exercised due diligence in ascertaining the genuineness of
Francisco's title. The lack of this particular averment supposedly calls for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action against Spouses Sy.[19] Further,
Spouses Sy were supposedly not obliged to look beyond the face of Francisco's title
which contained no annotation of any adverse claim. They had no notice of any defect in
her title, hence, they are essentially buyers in good faith.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied under Resolution[20] dated November
25, 2015.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now seeks affirmative relief from the Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
She maintains that her complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against Spouses Sy.
Any defect or uncertainty in her complaint had already been cured by the bill of
particulars she subsequently filed.[21] Even assuming her complaint was deficient, the
Court of Appeals, instead of ordering its dismissal, should have required her to file an
amended complaint.[22]
On the other hand, Spouses Sy reiterate that the complaint fails to sufficiently allege a
cause of action against them. It contains no particular allegation of any wrongful or
illegal act on their part that violated petitioner's right. Cause of action is to be determined
from the allegations of the complaint. Thus, the deficiency cannot be cured by their
subsequent filing of a bill of particulars. Lastly, they claim anew that they are buyers in
good faith.[23]

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it dismissed the complaint
against Spouses Sy on the ground that petitioner has no cause of action against them,
albeit what the latter actually pleaded was another ground, that is, failure to state a cause
of action?

Our Ruling

The Court of Appeals erred in

dismissing the complaint on the
ground of lack of cause of action

To begin with, Spouses Sy sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of failure
to state a cause of action against them. Hence, it is a reversible error for the Court of
Appeals to have motu proprio taken cognizance of an entirely different ground, i.e., lack
of cause of action, to justify the dismissal of the complaint.

In Colmenar v. Colmenar et al.,[24] petitioner Frank Colmenar filed a complaint for

declaration of nullity of deeds of extrajudicial settlement of estate, deeds of sale,
cancellation of titles, and damages against Property Company of Friends (ProFriends)
and other defendants. ProFriends invoked as affirmative defense petitioner's alleged lack
of cause of action against it, while the other defendants invoked the complaint's failure to
state a cause of action against them. The trial court eventually dismissed the complaint
against all the defendants on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, even as
against ProFriends. The Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint
against ProFriends on a ground entirely different from that which it actually raised in its
motion to dismiss.

While the courts may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint based on a ground or
grounds not pleaded by a party in a motion to dismiss or in the answer with affirmative
defenses, the same may be done under the following instances, viz.: (1) the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) there is another case pending between the same
parties for the same cause; (3) where the action is barred by res judicata; or (4) where the
action is barred by prescription.[25] Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of
action are not included in the enumeration. Hence, what is excluded is not deemed
included.

In any event, it has been repeatedly held that failure to state a cause of action and lack of
cause of action are distinct and separate grounds to dismiss a particular
action. Apostolic Vicar of Tabuk, Inc. v. Spouses Sison,[26] explained that failure to state
a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while lack
of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal
for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings
through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court[27] or raised as an
affirmative defense in an answer, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be
raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations,
admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff. Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Equitable PCI
Bank,[28] further ordained:

Failure to state a cause of action is not the

same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not
interchangeable. It may be observed that lack of cause of
action is not among the grounds that may be raised in a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
The dismissal of a Complaint for lack of cause of action is
based on Section 1 of Rule 33, which provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts
and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order
of dismissal is reversed, he shall be deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.
If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a
motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on
the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading.
On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of
action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the
plaintiff has rested its case.
In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, in the second
situation, the judge must determine the veracity of the allegations based on the evidence
presented.

xxxx

Hence, in order to resolve whether the Complaint lacked a cause of action, respondent
must have presented evidence to dispute the presumption that the signatories validly and
intentionally delivered the instrument.

xxxx

The test to determine whether a complaint states a cause

of action against the defendants is this: admitting
hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in
the complaint, may a judge validly grant the relief
demanded in the complaint? (Emphasis supplied)[29]
xxxx
To emphasize, lack of cause of action may only be
raised after the questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of stipulations or admissions or evidence
presented by the plaintiff. Before then, it cannot be raised
as a ground for dismissal; much less, can the court
dismiss the case on that ground.
The filing of the motion for a bill of
particulars, which in truth is a
request for written interrogatories
negates the claim of Spouses Sy that
the complaint states no cause of
action against them

A cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a

party violates a right of another.[30] A complaint states a cause of
action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law
it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or
omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an
action for recovery of damages.
If, however, the complaint contains ambiguity, indefiniteness, or
uncertainty, a party may move for a more definite statement or
for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with
sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him or her to
properly prepare his or her responsive pleading or to prepare for
trial.[31]

It is not the office of a bill of particulars to supply

material allegations necessary to the validity of a
pleading, or to change a cause of action or defense
stated in the pleading, or to state a cause of action or
defense other than the one stated. Also, it is not the
office or function of a bill of particulars to set forth
the pleader's theory of his cause of action or a rule of
evidence on which he intends to rely or to furnish
evidential information whether such information
consists of evidence which the pleader proposes to
introduce or of facts which constitute a defense. [32]

This means that when parties seek a bill of particulars, they in effect admit that the
complaint bears the ultimate facts comprising a valid cause of action. What they ask for
though is simply a specification of these ultimate facts to enable them to properly prepare
their responsive pleading or to prepare for trial.[33] Consequently, any challenge against
the complaint based on its supposed failure to state a cause of action is no longer feasible
after the parties have sought a bill of particulars. So must it be.

We now go to requests for written interrogatories. Under Section 1, Rule 25 of the Rules
of Court,[34] a request for written interrogatories is a mode of discovery by which a party
serves on the other party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served. It
seeks to elicit material and relevant facts from the adverse party.

Generally, modes of discovery enable parties to unmask their respective pieces of

evidence to facilitate trial on the merits. Parties are required to lay their cards on the table
so that justice can be rendered expeditiously.[35] A party defendant will not be inclined to
reveal evidentiary matters unless he or she recognizes the existence of the adverse party's
cause of action and anticipates the case to proceed with trial.[36]

It goes without saying, therefore, that when parties avail of any mode of discovery under
the Rules, in this case, a request for written interrogatories (albeit erroneously referred to
by Spouses Sy here as a bill of particulars), they are deemed to have recognized the
existence and sufficiency of the allegations of the adverse party's cause of action in the
complaint. They no longer put in issue the sufficiency of the allegations of the adverse
party's cause of action. Rather, they ask that evidentiary matters be unveiled so that better
preparation for the subsequent trial on the merits of the case may be had.[37]

Here, Spouses Sy filed their so-called motion for bill of particulars which in reality is a
request for written interrogatories. For the questions they posed were not meant to clarify
the averments or statements found in petitioner's complaint, much less, inquire into the
existence and sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action. In truth, their questions sought to
discover evidentiary matters relating to their defense that they are buyers in good faith
and that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable diligence in protecting her title to the
property. For context, we quote anew these questions, viz.:
3.2 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that she did not have actual and physical
possession of the property on 20 July 2012? Response: Although Zenaida was not in the
subject property on that date, she had constructive possession of the property as a
registered owner thereof. It was incumbent upon any supposed into the provenance of
Antoinette's title to the Property especially where Antoinette sold the Property to the Sps.
(sic) Sy on the same date that the title was released by the Register of Deeds on July 20,
2012.

xxxx

3.8 Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that the case she filed, namely the Petition to
Surrender Withheld Owner's Duplicate or To Cancel Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title
and Issuance of New Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title under Section 107 of P.D. 1529
against Marie Antoinette Francisco, which had been docketed as LRC Case No. M-5668
x x x was dismissed?

Response: LRC Case No. M-5668 was dismissed on August 31, 2012. It became moot
since Antoinette fraudulently transferred the title to the Property to her name on July 6,
2012 by forging the signatures of Amelia and Zenaida and later sold it to Sps. Sy on July
20, 2012 under circumstances indicating Sps. Sy were buyers-in-bad-faith - i.e.,

a.) All the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale dated July 20, 2012 were computer-printed
while the title number (sic) of the title (TCT No. 006-2012000849) in the "whereas" clause
was handwritten. This shows that at the time the Sps. Sy showed interest in and negotiated
for the sale of the subject property, the title to the property was still under the names of
Zenaida and Amelia Roa. Sps. Sy must have known that Marie Antoinette was not yet the
registered owner of the property. Otherwise, if at the time Sps. Sy. negotiated for the sale
and actually executed the Deed of Sale, the property was also registered in the name
Antoinette Roa Francisco under TCT No. 006-2012000849, then there is no reason why the
title number would also have been entered in the Deed of Sale and computer-printed, and
not (sic) handwritten.

b.) TCT No. 006-2012000849 in the name of Marie Antoinette Francisco was released only on
July 20, 2012, and yet, the Deed of Sale from Antoinette to Sps. Sy was executed and
notarized on the same day – July 20, 2012. This shows that at the time Sps Sy showed
interest and negotiated for the sale of the subject property, Sps Sy must have known that the
property was still registered in the names of Zenaida D. Roa and Amelia D. Roa; that this
should have alerted Sps. Sy to investigate the real owners of the property and the validity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale from Zenaida and Amelia Roa to Antoinette; that it is common
knowledge and practice before a sale of highly-priced properties such as this one involving
P35,000,000, (sic) negotiations and due investigation would have been done by the buyer
and human experience dictates that this could not have been done on the same day as the
title of the property of interest was released. This also explains why the title in the Deed of
Sale was "handwritten" instead of being computer-printed. This shows that at the time of the
negotiation for the sale and drafting of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the title was still under
 the names of Zenaida and Amelia Roa and the subsequent title number had to be hand-
written in the Deed of Absolute Sale when the title was released on July 20, 2012.

c.) The Sps. Sy or their agents, also required that Ma. Celine F. Abiera sign and indicate her
conformity to the Deed of Sale. However, there was no need for Celine to conform to the
Deed of Absolute Sale since she had no apparent or registered interest in the Property.
Celine, a businesswoman, would not have assented to the sale if there was nothing amiss in
the transaction which Sps. Sy sought to cover. Her conformity to the sale highlights the bad
faith of the Sps. Sy.

3.9. Does plaintiff Zenaida D. Roa deny that she did not annotate her alleged claim on the
Property on the title covering the Property that would alert or put a prospective purchaser
on notice?

Response: Zenaida need not annotate her claim on the property since she is a registered
co-owner of the property. More importantly, a purchaser, like defendant Sps. Sy, cannot
close their eyes to important facts above-described which would have created suspicion
on the validity and integrity of the sale of the property and transfer of the title from
Amelia and Zenaida to Antoinette and should have investigated the circumstances of the
transfer.[38]

As stated, these questions or the answers sought already delve on matters of evidence
which by law and jurisprudence would generally establish the good faith of a buyer in
purchasing a property.[39] Thus, by seeking answers to these interrogatories, Spouses Sy
effectively acknowledged the existence and sufficiency of the allegations in the
complaint pertaining to petitioners' cause of action against them. The filing of the request
for written interrogatories, therefore, is a supervening event which bars Spouses Sy from
pursuing their theory of failure to state a cause of action in CA G.R. SP No. 135555.

The complaint states a cause of

action against Spouses Sy

At any rate, the complaint contains sufficient allegations to support a cause of action
against Spouses Sy, thus:

21. The Deed of Absolute Sale [d]ated July 20, 2012 executed by Antoinette in favor of
Sps. Sy should also be declared null and void, and TCT No. 006-211200889 should also
be cancelled and declared without force and effect, considering that the Sps. Sy are
buyers-in-bad faith. A close examination of this Deed of Absolute Sale will show that all
the terms and conditions were computer-printed EXCEPT for the title number and
appearing in the first "whereas clause" in page one thereof. The title number is
handwritten. This fact would lead to an indisputable conclusion that at the time the Sps.
Sy showed interest and negotiated for the sale of the subject property, the title of the
property is still under the names of Zenaida and Amelia Roa. Sps. Sy must have known
that Marie Antoinette was not yet the registered owner of the property. Otherwise, if at
the time Sps. Sy negotiated for the sale and actually executed the Deed of Sale, the
property was already registered in the name Marie Antoinette Roa Francisco under TCT
No. 006-2012000849, then there is no reason why the title number would also have been
entered in the Deed of Sale and computer-printed, and not (sic) handwritten.

22. Also, the proximity of the date (July 20, 2012) of the Deed of Sale from Antoinette to
Sps. Sy with the date (July 16, 2012) of the release and issuance of TCT No. 006-
20122000849 to Antoinette, will lead to the reasonable conclusion that at the time Sps.
Sy showed interest and negotiated for the sale of the subject property, Sps. Sy must have
known that the property is still registered in the names of Zenaida D. Roa and Amelia D.
Roa. This should have alerted Sps. Sy to investigate the real owners of the property and
the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale from Zenaida and Amelia to Antoinette. It is
common knowledge and practice before a sale of highly priced properties such as this
one, negotiations and due investigation would have been done by the buyer and human
experience dictates that this could not be done simply in a matter of six days.

23. Even Atty. Tomas F. Dulay, Jr., the notary public who purportedly notarized the Deed
of Sale of Antoinette and Sps. Sy, has denied he notarized the same. Not being a public
document, the Deed of Sale could not have transmitted any right to the Sps. Sy and it
should have never been registered with the Register of Deeds. A copy of the Affidavit of
Atty. Dulay is attached hereto as Annex "R".

24. The fraudulent Deeds of Sale could not have vested any right in favor of Antoinette
and Sps. Sy over the subject property, including the transfer of its registration in their
names, to the prejudice of Zenaida and her co-owner Amelia. Antoinette and Sps. Sy
illegally transferred the property in their names and have the obligation to return it to the
true owners, Zenaida and Amelia.[40]

xxxx

In fine, petitioner essentially claims that: (a) she and Amelia are the legitimate owners of
the subject property; (b) Francisco acquired title to the property through fraud by forging
a deed of sale making it appear that she and Amelia sold the property to her; (c)
Francisco's title was issued only on July 16, 2012, and the sale in favor of Spouses Sy
was dated July 20, 2012, just days apart; (d) Spouses Sy were aware that at the time they
negotiated with Francisco for the sale of the property, the latter was not yet the registered
owner of the property as evidenced by the mere handwritten annotation in the title; and
(e) Spouses Sy are buyers in bad faith because despite the apparent irregularity in the
manner by which Francisco obtained title to the property, they turned a blind eye and did
not further investigate on the legality of the seller Francisco's title and her authority to
sell the property.
Here, assuming the foregoing allegations to be true, petitioner and her sister Amelia, as
registered owners of the property, have the right to the relief prayed for, i.e., to declare as
void the Deed of Sale of the property in favor of Spouses Sy who are buyers in bad faith.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 21, 2015 and
Resolution dated November 25, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135555
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated August 7, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court-Branch 66, Makati City in Civil Case No. 13-301 is REINSTATED. The
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court Branch 148, Makati City for further
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.