Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

TRESPASS TO PERSON
ASSAULT & BATTERY

Damage is not an essential element.

Common elements:
1. Intention to act:
• Letang v. Cooper: Intention is an essential element of trespass
to person.
• Fowler v. Lanning: No CoA for trespass to person if intent
or negligence is not established; either intention or
negligence must be proved to establish trespass; burden of
proof is on the plaintiff.
2. Direct interference with the rights of a person.
3. Absolute right; actionable per se.

Elements of Assault:
1. Conduct that creates apprehension of force.
2. Apprehension = reasonable expectation or
anticipation; fear of injury immaterial.
3. Attempt or threat to do corporeal harm in the form of
words/actions/gestures (not actual contact):
a. Allen v. Hannaford: Assault depends on the apprehensions
created in the mind of the P and not the intentions of D
(pointing an unloaded gun is assault).
4. Every threat is not an assault – not mere words, gestures must
accompany them to constitute a threat.
5. Imminent threat: actual not potential threat.
6. Extra-sensitive P: only D knew of his sensitivity and used it to
threaten him.
7. Apparent present ability to do the act- defendant must be capable of
performing the threatened act.
8. Conditional threats- not assault if they negate the threatening nature of the
gesture.

Elements of Battery:
1. Act- act and intention to cause act is necessary.
2. Contact- literal contact is not necessary; shooting also counts.
3. Hostile contact- intention to cause physical contact and not damage.
 Transferred intent: Individual who suffers contact need not be
the person whom the D intended to harm.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553
 Bodily contact is not actionable if it is generally acceptable in
the ordinary conduct of everyday life.
 Relationship between the two parties must be considered;
embrace between husband and wide- not battery.
4. Direct contact/ application of force (by the body or an object like gun).
5. Non-consensual contact
6. Harmful/offensive physical contact (contact is important, not damage)

• Cole v. Turner:
o Lightest angry touch constitutes battery.
o Forceful, reckless touch in close quarters is battery.
o Gentle touch in close quarters with no intention is not
battery; but even slight anger makes it battery.

• Vosburg v. Putney:
o D is liable for all injuries resulting directly from wrongful
act, whether or not they were foreseen.
o If the intended act is unlawful, the intention behind it is
necessarily unlawful.

Additional Info
• Battery includes assault.
• Separate offense for assault – rationale: To protect people’s mental
peace – imagine a world where you are disallowed to beat people but
allowed to threaten them.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS/ CASES OTHER

THAN TRESPASS

1. Intention to cause calculated harm: Wilkinson v. Downton

• Here, as a prank, wife was informed of her husband’s death
and this sent her into a shock.
• Not that D intended the harm, but rather he did an act whose
natural consequence (on reasonable person) was the harm.
• Likelihood of harm arising from behaviour + deliberate engaging
in such behaviour = D is taken to have meant to cause the harm.
• Thus, intention is imposed upon the defendant.
2. Extreme outrageousness of D’s conduct.
3. Consequential injury – emotional.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT

1. Total restraint of liberty – restriction of P’s freedom of movement

(not harmful or offensive); motion must be restricted from all
directions; degree of restraint matters- not allowing someone to
leave the country is not false imprisonment.
• Actual: enclosed somewhere
2. Unconsensual restraint
3. Intention to falsely imprison is important; else negligence
4. Unlawful detention:
• Murray v. Ministry of Defense:
o Period of detention is immaterial – she was falsely
imprisoned for half an hour.
o Not being informed of arrest amounts to unlawful detention.
 Other examples of unlawful detention:
o Detention period extends lawfully allowed period.
o Physical conditions of detention are inhumane.
5. Knowledge of being falsely imprisoned at the time it happened is
irrelevant (Murray v. Ministry of Defense)
6. Means of escape exists but P unaware- false imprisonment
7. Means of escape exists and should be reasonably deduced (try to
open the door), P unaware- no false imprisonment

• Arrest by public officer: (S. 41(i) CrPC) No liability when a person is

detained on reasonable suspicion, informed of the grounds for arrest,
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

and there is compliance with CrPC norms.

• Arrest by private person: (S. 43 CrPC) No liability when P has
committed a non-bailable cognizable offence and he is promptly
handed over to authorities.

Protection from Harassment Act, 1997

- Course of conduct- when a conduct, which the defendant ought to know

is harassment, is pursued more than once.
- Harassment is contextual; defendant ought to know that it is harassment
- Hayes v. Willoughby- harassment to prevent a crime is permissible
provided the harasser can prove that they acted rationally.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
TRESPASS TO IMMOVABLE PROPERTY (LAND)

1. Intention – not to trespass but to be present on or interfere with the

possession of P’s land.
2. Direct interference with the possession of P’s land
• Entering upon P’s land- intentional entry is required (involuntary
entry not act
• Remaining there beyond stipulated time; after entry has
ceased or trespass ab initio (authorized entry but
committing wrongful act once there.)
• Any act affecting the sole possession by P
 Damage is not required – actionable per se (Dougherty v.
Stepp)
3. Without lawful justification: Dougherty v. Stepp “every
unauthorized, therefore unlawful entry, is trespass
regardless of damage.:
4. Possession – P must be in possession of the land (not ownership, just
possession).

Vertical dimensions of trespass: he who owns the soil owns to the edge of
the heavens and the depth of the earth.

TRESPASS TO MOVABLE PROPERTY (CHATTELS)

Direct physical interference with goods which are in P’s possession

without any lawful justification – by seizure, removal or a direct act
causing damage to the goods.

1. Intention to handle the chattel or physically interfere with it.

• Even if D erroneously believes it to be his own.
• Wrongful motive or negligence need not be proven (Poggi v.
Scott)
2. Direct physical interference: seizure, removal, or act causing
damage.
• Actionable per se – damage is not essential.
3. Without lawful justification
4. Possession – P must be in possession of the chattel (actual or
constructive)
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

Conversion:

1. D intends to claim ownership of goods for himself (Intention).

2. D treats goods as if they were his own (Direct interference) – exercises
dominion/control over it to the extent that it seriously interferes with
P’s right to control it; motive or negligence is immaterial. (Poggi v.
Scott).
• Sale
• Parting with goods
• Keeping
• Destruction
• Denial of right
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

DEFENSES TO INTENTIONAL TORTS

CONSENT (VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA)

• If P has consented to conduct by D that would otherwise be tortious or

run a risk of harm to P, D’s conduct is not wrongful or without
justification.
• Rationale: Gain to D is loss to P, but when P accepts D’s acts he
implicitly expects to receive some benefit from the act.

Elements:
1. Knowledge of risk
2. Voluntary agreement to risk:
• Express or implied consent
• Scope: Consent does not apply when its scope is exceeded
(Mohr v. Williams- plaintiff agreed to get right ear
operated, but left ear also got operated.)
• Free/voluntary: Consent should not be distorted by fraud,
duress, concealment, incompetency of P, illegal acts, etc.

Exceptions: (where consent can’t be used as a defense)

1. Unlawful acts: Hudson v. Craft- held boxing contest without due
permission.
2. Breach of statutory duty
3. Rescue cases
4. D was under a duty to prevent P’s act: McGuire v. Almy – If an
insane person is proven to have intent to establish contact with P, he
is liable for battery; consent does not always follow from intentionally
incurring the risk. Degree of danger, stress of circumstances,
expectation that others will perform their duties, etc. have to be
considered.

SELF DEFENSE

Courvoisier v. Raymond:
1. Reasonable apprehension:
• Reasonable belief that the use of physical force is necessary to
prevent attack.
• No need to show actual risk of bodily harm.
• Reasonability is situation-sensitive.
2. Honest force:
• Communication between P and D of alleged threat/force, i.e. P
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553
needs to show the threat was apparent.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

 Mistake of understanding:
o Subjectively honest but unreasonable mistake: no defense.
o Objectively reasonable and honest mistake is accepted.
3. Reasonable means:
• Equivalent force used – excessive force does not excuse.
 If there are two ways to deal with the threat, the one with lesser
damage should be chosen.
 If avenue for retreat/escape existed, D may still be liable.

DEFENSE OF PROPERTY

1. Proportionate force:
• Can’t use excessive or deadly force (Bird v. Holbrook- defendant
put spring water guns that go off upon any trespass).
• Where a person peaceably (not against will) captures chattel
from another, thelatter has no right to retake it by violence;
if one takes another’s chattel against his will, the latter may
retake possession through force (Kirby v. Foster).
• If D can avoid confrontation with a single demand, he must first
make that request before escalating conflict.

NECESSITY

All defenses include an element of necessity. Differences:

• In self-defense / defense of property, necessity stems from P’s wrong.
• Whereas necessity cases arise from natural events or violent acts of a
third party that imposes on D the necessity to do acts that harm P.

Ploof v. Putnam: (plaintiff tied boat to dock to survive storm)-

Trespass in necessity is not trespass. Necessity arose from natural
events.

Classification:
• Public necessity – absolute privilege: Risk to a large number of
people is reduced/eliminated by causing harm to P.
• Private necessity – conditional/qualified privilege: Risk to one party
is reduced/eliminated by causing harm to P.
• Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation: (D tied boat to P’s
dock to unload cargo; kept it tied to protect himself;
damages P’s dock in the process)- Private necessity
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

(arising out of self-interest) is notan absolute privilege. Private

necessity excuses D from liability for trespass, but not for
damage.

Elements:
1. Actual or apparent imminent danger to interest of D or others.
2. Reasonable steps taken to protect interest against danger.
3. D was not at fault for creating the threat.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

NEGLIGENCE
Elements:
1. Legal duty of care – obligation towards P to take
reasonable care inperforming an act/omission.
2. Breach of legal duty – when D’s conduct falls below the level of care
required of a reasonable man in D’s position, thereby creating an
unreasonable risk of injury to P. (Reasonable man test)
3. Consequential non-remote damage – D’s negligent act should be
the cause of P’s injury; pure economic loss is the loss of the deficient
product bought; consequential damage is what arises from the specific
damage of negligence; economic loss should be consequential upon
damage (if you pay for a product and that gets damaged, you can’t
recover the money paid for the product as its loss occurred anyway)

1. DUTY OF CARE

Question of law, not fact.

Three approaches to determine

a) Caparo Test
b) Assumed Responsibility Test- has defendant assumed responsibility.
c) Incremental Test- develop new categories of duty with analogy to well
established cases.

Caparo Industries v. Dickman: Ingredients that give rise to a legal

duty of care: Proximity, foreseeability, fair/just/reasonable.

i. Proximity between parties: Donoghue v. Stevenson

• The rule is that you must take reasonable care to avoid injury to
your neighbour.
• Proximity of ‘neighbour’ need not be confined to physical space.
• Proximity of relationship between parties: Neighbour: Persons so
closely and directly affected by D’s acts that D ought to keep
them in mind while performing acts/omissions.
ii. Reasonable foreseeability of relationship
• Reasonably foreseeable that claimant would be the one to get
injured.
• Specific harm irrelevant; fact that some harm occurred is enough.
iii. Fair, just and reasonable to impose duty

Duty must exist as per the facts of the case; difference exists between
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553
duty of care to patient in hospital and salesman in hospital.

Anns v. Merton- two layers to establish duty of care

- Proximity or neighbourhood
- Need to consider if there were any considerations that negatived or reduced
the extent of duty; example: duty of complete syllabus- but impossible-
limits your duty.

2. BREACH OF DUTY – Steps to assess breach of duty

i. Ascertain the qualities of a reasonable person; foreseeability of

harm to P should care not be taken
ii. Standard of care that a hypothetical reasonable man would exercise
in those circumstances:
• Fixed standard of care in light of factual considerations.
• Reasonable man – normal intelligence, aware of laws of nature.
• Vaughan v. Menlove: Standard of care is objective and not
based on the judgment of each individual.
• Brown v. Kendall: Standard of care varies with
circumstances; plaintiff can only sue if he can prove intent of
defendant to cause harm or if he shows that defendant did not
exercise reasonable care; applied ‘reasonable person’
standard.

• Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen: Obligations under standard of

care are correlative for P and D.
o Physical disability – Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen:
▪ Person under physical disability should use care
which a reasonable person under the same disability
would exercise.
▪ Authorities charged with public duties must exercise
care keeping in mind the safety of persons with
disabilities/handicaps.
o Age – Roberts v. Ring: Standard of care expected from
an infant is that of an ordinary boy of his age and
maturity; except where child is undertaking an adult
activity.
o A reasonable old man with infirmities would not undertake
activities that would put others at risk due to his infirmity.
o Beginner – would take precautions consistent with his skill.
o Insanity – reasonable insane person is cautious when there
is a reasonably foreseeable episode of incapacitation.
o Emergency situation requiring rapid decision would affect
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553
reasonable behaviour.
o Sudden Incapacitation- not liable for negligence unless D
knew about the tendency to get incapacitated suddenly.

How much care should a reasonable person take?

- Whether the risk of any injury occurring to the claimant was
foreseeable by the defendant.
- Decided on a case-by-case basis.
- Foreseeable does not mean imaginary or always probable. It should
be reasonably probable.
- Lesser the magnitude of risk, higher the probability that a reasonable
man would ignore it.
- Gravity of Risk- if some person, due to incapacity, has a higher risk
of damage; he should be accorded higher degree of care provided
that the defendant knew about the incapacity.
- Cost of Precautions- practicability of taking the necessary
precautions must be assessed.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

iii. Compare D’s conduct with standard of care. (burden of proof-

claimant)
• Vaughan v. Menlove: If D has acted in a contrary way to how a
reasonably prudent person would have under similar
circumstances, he is in breach of duty.
• United States v. Carroll Towing
o Unreasonable risk: D is liable only for the unreasonable risks
created by his conduct. If P is injured by reasonable risks,
the loss is his to bear alone.
o If the burden on D is greater than the probability of risk
multiplied by the injury- D is reasonably expected to meet
the reasonable standard of duty of care. If contrary- he is
not expected to meet that standard of duty.
o Risk-Benefit Formula of determining standard of care (use
when negligence arises in a commercial relationship):
▪ P = probability of harm
D = magnitude of damage
B = burden of precautions to reduce damage
▪ P x D > B = unreasonable risk
If precaution is cheaper and safer, D’s failure to use
it is regarded as standard of care not met.
▪ P x D < B = reasonable risk
If precaution is useless and expensive, failure to use
it is not regarded as breach of duty
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

3. CONSEQUENTIAL NON-REMOTE DAMAGE/ CAUSATION AND

PROXIMITY

Helps in determining scope and extent of liability.

Causation:
• Causation is important to establish because we need to see if D knew
or should have known of the potential consequences of his act.
• Causation in fact: P must establish that the harm of which he
complains resulted from D’s negligent conduct.
• But-For Test: Whether P would have suffered injury but for
D’s negligence?
o Counterfactual question that asks what would have
happened if D had not been negligent.
o But-for test isn’t sufficient, it must coexist with proximate
cause.
• Substantial Factor Test/ Material Contribution: Whether
D’s act/omission was a substantial factor in bringing about
P’s injury? How influential was it to P’s injury?
• Bailey v. MoD- two causes of damage- one tortious and one
not- held that since the tortious act materially contributed
to the damage, D is liable.
• Causation in law (Novus Actus Interveniens): Question of
intervening events which may severe the chain of causation.
• Intervening act may be:
o Act of nature
o P’s own conduct
o Act of third party
• These may absolve or reduce the defendant’s liability.
• Generally, D is not liable for all the ulterior harm as he did not
create a special risk of harm from that kind of contingency.
• Intervening causes should be foreseeable, otherwise the
chain of causation is broken.
• Scott v. Shepherd (burning squib thrown into crowd;
tossed from A to B to C and burst)- If injury arises from the
force of the original act, the chain of causation isn’t broken by
intervening acts.
• Baker v. Willoughby (1970) (D injured P’s leg; after this he
was shot in the leg in an independent incident; suffered
amputation and subsequent losses)- when two accidents
consecutively contribute to the same injury, the chain of
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

causation is not broken and original defendant would be liable

for the overall consequential injury.
• Multiple Causation- in case of divisible injury- defendant is
liable only for the part of injury caused by him; in case of
indivisible injury- defendants are liable wholly independently.
• Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks (water supply company
fitted plugs as per statutory requirement with reasonable
care; due to extreme cold fire plug came loose and water
flooded)- only such standard of care as a reasonable man
would take is required to be taken; excess of that is not
required; extreme cold was unforeseeable.

Proximity/Foreseeability/ Remoteness of Damage:

• Determines the extent to which D can be made liable for his act – D’s
act has to be a proximate cause of P’s injury- was the damage a
foreseeable consequence of D’s actions.
• Reasonable Foreseeability Test: If P’s injury was a foreseeable
result of D’s act/omission, the latter is a proximate cause for P’s injury.
• Bolton v. Stone (despite high fence, low likelihood event of
ball hitting glass occurred)- Danger couldn’t be foreseen, no
liability.
• Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts and Dock & Engineering
Co. Ltd.; Wagon Mount Test (D spilled oil in port; caused
minimal damage; metal fell into the water, met cotton waste
and ignited)- If harm is foreseeable, the un-foreseeability of
neither the extent of harm nor the manner in which it occurred
can be used as a defense. The damage was a direct result of the
D’s actions but it was not reasonably foreseeable; no liability.
• When the accident is caused by the intrusion of some new unforeseen
factor, the way in which the damage was caused becomes relevant.

• Egg-Shell Skull Rule:

• Must take P to be as they are.
• Claimant being especially susceptible to harm due to weakness
physically or mentally is no defence.
• Claimant need not be a ‘reasonable person’.
• Can claim damages for the entire harm, even if, by virtue of
some special bodily sensitivity, it is greater than what an
ordinary person would have suffered.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

INTERVENING ACTS/EVENTS
- Natural occurrence
- Act/omission of third party
- Act/omission of claimant

These will make the damage unforeseeable and the cause will be too remote.

PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

• Direct evidence
• Circumstantial evidence – res ipsa loquitur (Byrne v. Boadle-
barrel fell from shop): The mere occurrence of the accident is
sufficient to imply negligence. Events causing P’s injury must have
the following requirements:
• Ordinarily occurs because of negligence by someone in D’s
position.
• Instrumentality causing the injury must be within exclusive
control of D.
• No voluntary action/contribution by P.

DUTY IN SPECIAL CASES

Duties of Occupiers of Premises:

• Trespasser: No duty towards trespassers as entry is wrongful, unless
risk of harm is such that it is reasonable to expect help.
• Licensee: Liable for non-disclosure of known dangerous conditions.
• Invitee: Duty to warn about latent dangers and make the place safe.

Professional Negligence
• If D’s position implies skill, he must use it to exercise a greater
standard of care.
• Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee (Bolam Test):
• Standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to
have that skill.
• Corpus of knowledge, professional equipment, specialized
intelligence/skills, etc. of an ordinary member of the profession.
• If two general views are acceptable and both are professionally
endorsed; following either would not amount to negligence.
• Inapplicable when the course of action thus endorsed is
completely illogical
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

DAMAGE
• Personal
• Property
• Psychiatric: not temporary grief, medical evidence is required
• Economic

DEFENCES

1. Contributory Negligence
• It would be unfair to impose liability on D when P has negligently
contributed to his own injury. However, it is also unfair to completely
relieve D of liability because he was also, in effect, negligent.
• Contributory negligence involves lack of care on the part of P which
contributes to the damage caused by the negligence of D.
• Whichever party could have avoided the consequences of the other’s
negligence is liable for the injury.
• Elements:
1. Duty of care: P should avoid behaviour that results in injury to
himself or mitigate D’s liability.
2. Breach of duty:
o Standard of care of a reasonable man in similar
circumstances.
o Breach of duty when P does not take due care of his own
safety and thus contributes to his own injury.
3. Consequential damage: causation and proximity.
• Exceptions to contributory negligence:
• Safety statute: When D’s negligence consists of a breach of
astatute designed to protect P.
• Greater degree of blame on D.
• Last clear chance: If D had last clear chance to avoid injury to P.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

• Comparative negligence:
• Pure form: Apportionment of damages based on relative fault.
• Modified form: If P’s negligence > D’s negligence, D need not
pay damages.
• Vidya Devi v. M.P.R.T.C. (bus and two wheeler collided)-
Although there was contributory negligence, it was rejected as a bar to
relief and apportionment of damages was adopted instead.

2. Volenti non fit injuria/ Assumption of Risk (Consent)

• Smith v. Charles Baker & Sons: (plaintiff was employed at
stone drilling; got damaged by rock felling from crane)- One
who has assented to an act being done towards him cannot, when he
suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong. Here knowledge was there
but no consent; mere continuance of one’s employment activity is not
consent.
• Elements:
1. Knowledge of risk (reasonable man test is not sufficient)
2. Voluntary agreement to incur risk:
o Express or implied consent:
▪ Morris v. Murray: (P got onto a plane with a
drunk pilot)- Implied consent is consent (P got onto
the plane – implied consent).
▪ South Indian Industrial Ltd., Madras v. Alamelu
Ammal: (P, despite standing very far, got hit
by falling iron blocks)- He had knowledge but no
consent as it was unreasonably far; putting up a
warning sign does not amount to implied consent.
o Scope: Consent does not apply when its scope is exceeded
(Mohr v. Williams)
o Free/voluntary: Consent should not be distorted by fraud,
duress, concealment, incompetency of P, illegal acts, etc.
▪ Morris v. Murray: Consent must be free from
compulsions. Even though P was drunk, his consent
is considered voluntary.
▪ Smith v. Charles Baker & Sons: Consented to risk
of injury but not to lack of care by employers.
Continuation in service does not imply consent.
• VNFI can’t be used in rescue cases (Haynes v. Harwood- police ran
behind unattended horses of D, got damaged; D cannot use VNFI)
• Balakrishnan Menon v. T.C. Subramanian (highly explosive minnal
guddu was fired; went tangential instead of upright; exploded and
damaged people)- people present in a large ground cannot be expected
to consent to an explosive falling outside the area of cordon where they
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

originally fell; people who use extra hazardous objects like minnal guddu
are liable for the negligence of the independent contractors that they
employ; no VNFI.
• Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club (car flung into the crowd and
killed spectator)- issue was whether event organisers of highly
dangerous activities have to accord a more extensive duty of care- they
must take all reasonable precautions and guard against foreseeable risks;
they have no duty to guard against unforeseeable risks like a car flying
into the crowd- decided on negligence and not VNFI
NO DUTY OF CARE IN THE FIRST PLACE; NO SCOPE TO USE VNFI

3. Exclusion of Liability
• Liability can be excluded through contract between parties; A reserves the
right to deny entry/ remove B from an event.
• This cannot preclude liability for death.
• Can’t have unreasonable terms.

4. Insanity
• Breunig v. American Family Insurance: (person had sudden
mental delusion and had car accident) Insane person is negligent
if he/she has prior warning/knowledge of sudden incapacitation.

5. Illegality
• If P, himself, is engaged in an illegal activity, he has no action or claim
against the D.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

DEFAMATION
BACKGROUND INFO

• Definition: Statement that causes injury to the reputation of a

person.
• Objective: Protects reputation; balance between personal right to
reputation and freedom of speech.
• Forms (this distinction is not made in Indian context):
• Libel: Permanent (written) publication
• Slander: Verbal statement
• Who can sue? Any living person, corporation, government cannot
(democracy) but a servant can.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

1. Defamatory statement: Must cause injury to P’s reputation.

2. Referring to identifiable P: Directly or indirectly, as long as others
can reasonably infer that it’s about P.
3. Publication: Making known of a defamatory statement to a third
party.

1. DEFAMATORY STATEMENT

• Statement includes words (written or verbal), pictures, emblems,

actions, gestures, etc.
• Defamatory content:
• Injures the reputation of the plaintiff in the eyes of a third party:
o Exposes P to hatred, contempt or ridicule.
o Injures P in his trade/profession.
o Lowers P in the estimation of the community.
o Deters third persons from associating with P.
o Causes P to be shunned or avoided.
• Depends on how a reasonable third party would interpret it:
o Not naïve or unduly suspicious.
o Reads between the lines – may make loose interpretations.
o Should not select one defamatory meaning when other
non-defamatory meanings are available.
o Petra Ecclestone v. Telegraph Media Group Ltd.
▪ Petra said something about vegetarians; claims
were that they are defamatory to vegetarians and
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553
the celebrities she referred to.
▪ Reasonable reader does not give a newspaper item
analytical attention to draw defamatory meanings.
▪ It’s not about a particular section of
society, it is about ordinary, reasonable
people of society.
▪ Reasonable readers recognize strong, permissible
views that freedom of expression allows people to
express within its limits.
• Statement is assumed to be false until it is proven to be true.
• Without lawful justification.
 Intention/malice is not required- intention to defame is irrelevant;
intention to make the statement is what matters.
 Hasty expression (anger, insult) which no third party would interpret
as tainting the character is not actionable.
 Innuendo qualifies as a defamatory statement- article about
XYZ, describing him but not naming him and Indian Express v.
Jagmohan Mundra.
 Hough v. London Express Newspaper Ltd.
• Newspaper referred to come curly woman as a boxer’s
wide but she actually wasn’t; reasonable third person
would have believed and this would lower his reputation.
• Necessary when the imputation is made in an oblique way
(question, exclamation, conjecture, irony, etc.).

 Charleston v. News Group Newspaper

• Article has text and picture both; reasonable person would
look at both before thinking of person’s reputation.

 Radio 2UE Sydney v. Chesterton, 2009

• Test of defamation- GENERAL TEST- right thinking
members think less of the plaintiff.
• Applies to all aspects of a person’s reputation-
personal, business, professional, etc.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

2. REFERRING TO PLAINTIFF
• Directly or indirectly.
• In India, intent to refer to claimant is necessary- Ramasubha Iyer v.
Mohindeen.
• In UK too, intent to refer is necessary- Porter Committee and UK
Defamation Act.
• If the reasonable third party can reasonably infer that it refers to P, D is
liable.
• Defamation of deceased person is a criminal offence, not a tort.
• When defamatory statement refers to a group, an individual cannot sue
unless he can prove that it specifically relates to him.
• Defamation can be against a commercial body as well.
• Only the defamed can bring action.

 Indian ExpressNewspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v.

Jagmohan Mundhara
• Article about human trafficking; movie showed this and portrayed
author of article in bad light without direct reference.
• Natural/ordinary meaning is not prima facie defamatory.
• When understood with knowledge of special background facts or
with a latent/secondary meaning, it becomes defamatory.
• Necessary when the imputation is made in an oblique way
(question, exclamation, conjecture, irony, etc.).

3. PUBLICATION

- Must be conveyed to a third person, other than the claimant.

- Must be understood by the third person.
- Must be published intentionally or negligently.

• Knowingly or negligently making known of defamatory statement to a

third person (someone other than P).
 Huth v. Huth: (D sent a letter carrying a comment on his
children; read by butler in breach of his duty)- If it is not
natural and probable that the third party would hear the
information, i.e. if the third party hears it wrongfully, it’s not
considered publication.
 Spouses:
• Communication to a spouse is not publication- M.C. Verghese v.
T.J. Ponnan
• Communicating about one spouse to another is publication.
• Re-publication: Re-publication of a defamatory statement made by
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

another amounts to defamation, too; can be oral/written.

 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

• It is an open question whether the re-publisher is solely liable or

whether the blame should be shared with the original publisher.
• If the re-publisher knows of the falsity of the statement and
deliberately chooses to re-publish it, he is solely responsible.

DEFENSES

1. Justification by truth:
• D must show that the imputation was true as a whole and every
material part thereof.
• Not necessary to justify every detail, provided that the gist is
true and the unjustified details have no effect on the reader.
• If there is gross exaggeration, the defense will fail.
• Substantive truth > Precise truth (saying that D stole 10k whereas
he actually stole only 5k is acceptable)
• If one copies a statement; he has to prove its truth by finding
reasonable sources and not just the source that he copied from-
repetition rule.
• If D makes many statements, he can be sued for any or all-
common sting.
• Abdul Wahab Galadari v. Indian Express Newspaper- also no
interim injunction can be provided if D lists the sources that he
would produce.

2. Fair and bona fide comment:

• Must be a comment (opinion, not fact)
• Must be fair: Honest and relevant criticism (be it
exaggerated or prejudiced) based on correct facts.
• Must be of public interest.
• Abdul Wahab Galadari v. Indian Express Newspaper: (IE
accused Abdul of being linked to the ISI with reasonable
sources’ backing)- Fair comment on a matter of public
interest is no defamation if the D acted in a bona fide manner
with due care and caution; had reasonable sources; also no
interim injunction can be provided if D lists the sources that he
would produce.
3. Privilege: D’s relation with the facts is such that he is justified in
saying/writing something that would be defamatory for someone else.
• Absolute privilege: Not liable even if it is false, defamatory
and/or malicious.
o Parliamentary proceedings: MPs + publishers
o Judicial proceedings: judges, counsels, witnesses, parties
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

o State communications
• Qualified privilege: Not liable even if it is false and defamatory,
unless express malice (indirect and improper motive) is
proved.
o Ways to prove: D thought allegations were false, D was
moved by hatred/dislike, showing out anger/prejudice.
o Examples of qualified privilege:
▪ D has a duty to communicate it to a third party that
has a corresponding interest in receiving it; legal,
moral, social duty (parents)
▪ Confidential relationships (husband-wife).
▪ Info about crime/misconduct.
▪ Communications between persons in public position.

Police complaints are protected under qualified privilege; not

absolute.

Elements

- Privileged Occasion – legal, moral, social duty (parents-children); common

interest (discourse between partners about errant employee); fair reporting
of parliamentary and judicial proceedings.

- Absence of malice- Govind Shantaram Walaralkar v.

Pandharinath Shivaram Rege: (D said that P was doing
illegal activities at home)- Can’t take the defense of
qualified privilege as there was malicious intent.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS TO DEFAMATION/ DEFAMATION OF

PUBLIC FIGURES

• R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (Right to Privacy)

• No prior restraint or prohibition can be imposed by the state or
its officials upon the proposed publication of defamatory content.
• State or its officials cannot seek any remedy until it is published
and they can prove actual malice as public is permitted to opine
on state activities.
• No one can publish anything concerning matters that every
citizen has a right to safeguard under their right to privacy
(implicit in right to life and liberty, Art. 21) without consent,
unless it is in public interest.
• Anything that is already in the public domain (public
records) can be published.
• New York Times v. Sullivan (Freedom of Speech/Public Figures)
• Debate on public issues may include vehement, caustic and
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.
• Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate – statements
in public interest and about public figures must be protected if
freedoms of expression are to have breathing space
– unless the statement was made with actual malice.

OTHER RANDOM RULES

• Newspaper Rule (Nishi Prem v. Javed Akhtar): Press is not

compelled to disclose the source of information (to prove veracity of
defamatory statement) at an interim stage in an action for defamation.
• Exemption of Liability of Intermediary:
• An intermediary shall not be liable for third party defamatory
content on a link hosted by him if:
o His function is limited to providing access to a
communication system.
o He does not initiate transmission, select its receiver, or
modify its content.
o Due diligence is done.

• An intermediary is liable if:

o Abets, aids or induces the commission of wrongful act.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

o Does not take down defamatory publication upon its

knowledge- Tamiz v. Google.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

LIABILITY TORTS
STRICT LIABILITY

Background Info:
• No fault liability – prima facie liability of D for harm regardless of fault.
• Rationale: Foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of the activity.
• Actionable per se.

Elements – Rylands v. Fletcher:

1. Abnormally dangerous object/activity brought on D’s land–
factors laid down in Danny Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp.:
i. High degree of risk to others (person, land, chattels)
ii. Likelihood of great harm
iii. Inability to eliminate risk with reasonable care
iv. Activity is not a matter of common usage
v. Inappropriateness of activity to the place
vi. Whether or not the value to community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes
2. Brought onto land for special use; increased danger to
others- not ordinary use.
3. Object is for D’s own use (not commercial).
4. Non-natural use of land: Rickards v. Lothian (someone
maliciously blocked pipes; turned on and P’s house
flooded)- some special use (not ordinary or for the benefit of the
community) bringing with it increased danger to others; supplying
water to homes is not unnatural.
5. Escape of the dangerous object/activity to an area outside the
occupation and control of D; no escape, no strict liability–
Read v. J Lyons & Co. Ltd.
6. Consequential foreseeable damage- Cambridge Water Corporation
v. Eastern Leather
• The damage was too remote and unforeseeable; no liability as
foreseeability is essential.

Exceptions/Defenses:
1. P’s own Default
2. Act of God: Escape is caused through unforeseeable natural and
proximate cause; the Act of God must be the proximate cause.
3. Work for common benefit of P and D/ Consent of P (express or
implied): P has permitted D to accumulate the hazardous object
that escaped; water is laid on a plot where P and D both have
interest- cannot be brought under strict liability if escapes.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553
4. Act of Third Party: Danny Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp.: (fireworks
set off in public)- A third party’s act does not relieve D from strict
liability unless it was unforeseeable.
5. Statutory Authority: Exemption from strict liability is expressly
provided in the statute as long as they take reasonable care; if
done negligently then they are liable accordingly.

ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Strict liability without exceptions – only applies to industries.

Rationale:
• The judiciary tried to make a strong effort following the Bhopal Gas
Tragedy, 1984 (Union Carbide Company v. Union of India) to enforce
greater amount of protection to the public.
• Doctrine of absolute liability was therefore evolved in the Oleum Gas
Leak Case, 1987 to provide a strong legal tool against rogue
corporations that are negligent towards the safety of the public.
• Ensures stricter compliance to safety standards when enterprises are
engaged in inherently dangerous or hazardous industries.

Elements – M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case)

1. Enterprise/industry
2. Hazardous/inherently dangerous activity
3. Non-natural use of land
4. Accident/escape (escape not necessary)
5. Resultant damage
6. No exceptions as under strict liability: not even third party act or
unforeseeability/reasonable care.
• Enterprise is permitted to carry on a hazardous activity on the
condition that it will absorb the cost of any accident arising on
account of such activities.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

• In certain cases, one can be made liable for acts done by another –
only if there exists a certain kind of relationship connecting the two.
• Elements:
1. Relationship between person liable and tortfeasor
2. Wrongful act
3. During the course of employment
• Respondeat superior: “Let the superior be liable” – therefore state is
liable for the wrongful acts of its employees.

Liability of State / Constitutional Torts

• Constitutional/government torts: makes government liable for the tort

committed by the government or its instrumentality (employees).
• Sovereign function:
• Statutory functions referable to the exercise of sovereign powers
delegated to servants of the state.
• Such functions cannot be carried out by private individuals.
• Examples:
o Administration of justice
o Maintenance of law and order
o Repression of crime
• Liability when tortious acts are committed a public servant:
• State is not liable when public servant is carrying out sovereign
functions.
Kasturi Lal v. State of UP:
o Cop ran away with prisoner’s belongings kept in the
lockup.
o Sovereign function because private persons can’t access
lockup. State not liable due to sovereign immunity.
• Action for damages is maintainable only when the act is not a
sovereign function.
UoI v. Jasso & Ors.:
o Circumstances + nature of employment + tort should be
identical with circumstances + nature + tort of private
employment.
o State is liable as it is not a sovereign function.

Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar:

• P acquitted but released from jail 14 years later.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

• SC could not reverse the holding given in Kasturi Lal as that was a five
judge bench and this one was a three judge bench.
• Thus, sovereign immunity was ignored and relief was given under
Right to Life.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

RANDOM BUT VERY IMPORTANT INFO

• Councils
• Central consumer protection council
o Government’s Minister of consumer affairs + two others
(one must be a woman)
• State cpc
o Government’s Minister of consumer affairs + two others
(one must be a woman)
• District cpc
o Collector + two others
• Redressal Agencies: In case rights are violated, these agencies hear
the cases.
• National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
• State Commission
• District Forum
• Jurisdiction
• There are territorial & pecuniary (monetary) considerations to
establish jurisdiction.
• How to establish territorial jurisdiction (either of the following
options can be chosen to decide jurisdiction)
o Cause of action (where the problem arose)
▪ If partly at one place and partly at another – both
places have jurisdiction
▪ Wholly at one place – that place has jurisdiction
o Opposition party location (where the opposing party
resides/is registered)
• How to establish pecuniary jurisdiction: Monetary compensation
defines jurisdiction
o Compensation is decided on the value of the goods +
damages claimed (total compensation asked for)
o Jurisdictions for each forum:
▪ District forum – cases worth upto 20 lacs
▪ State commission – cases between 20 lacs and 1
crore
▪ National commission – cases above 1 crore
• NOTE: Limitation period is 2 years from when the cause of action
arises. This means that any claim made after 2 years will be rejected if
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

the court doesn’t deem the reasons given for the delay to be valid. The
consumer cannot sleep over his rights.
• Appellant jurisdiction:
• Appeal to higher forum must be filed within 30 days of the
decision
• If no appeal is made within 30 days, decision is final.

CONSUMER

Any person who:

1. Buys goods or hires/avails of a service
2. For a consideration (paid, promised, partly paid, partly promised, any
system of deferred payment).
• Byford v. S.S. Srivastava:
o Advert to buy a car to enter contest for plane tickets. P
wins contest but doesn’t get tickets.
o P is not a consumer as he didn’t pay a consideration for the
tickets, he only paid it for the car.
• Mayor, Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Tarapada
Chatterjee:
o Inadequate water supply.
o Municipal Corporation supplies water as part of a statutory
duty, not in lieu of tax.
o Taxes are not consideration, so he is not a consumer.
3. Any user of these goods (with the approval of buyer) or
beneficiary ofhired services.

Exception: Does not include a person who buys goods or avails of

servicesfor resale or commercial purposes.
• Commercial purpose excludes persons who are self-employed
and obtain goods/services for exclusively for earning a livelihood.
The good/service must be used by the buyer himself.

TRADER

• A person who sells or distributes goods for sale.

 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

• Includes manufacturer and packer.

MANUFACTURER

A person who:
1. Makes or manufactures any goods or parts of goods.
2. Assembles parts of goods made/manufactured by others.
3. Puts his own mark on goods made/manufactured by others.

Exception: When assembly/distribution/sale takes place at a branch office

maintained by the manufacturer, the branch office is not deemed to be a
manufacturer.

GOODS

• Every kind of movable property…

• …other than actionable claims and money.
• Includes stocks, shares, growing crops, grass, and things attached to
or forming part of the land which can be severed (satisfies the
movable criteria).

SERVICES

• Service of any description that is…

• …Made available to potential users, i.e. not just actual users but also
those who are capable of using it.
• Includes (but isn’t limited to) banking, insurance, transport,
processing, supply of electricity, boarding/lodging, housing,
construction, entertainment, amusement, purveying of news, etc.
• Does not include:
• Services that are free of charge.
• Service under a contract of personal service (master-servant).
To be distinguished from contract for personal service (doctor-
patient).
• Lease of immovable property.
• Public officials’ duties.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha

• Service:
• Service rendered by a medical practitioner to a patient for a fee.
• Service rendered at a government hospital / health center /
dispensary / non-governmental hospital / nursing home:
o For a fee paid by persons availing the services.
o Charges are paid by those who can afford and service is
rendered for free to those cannot afford.
• Medical practitioner / hospital / etc. render service free of charge
but the insurance company covers the fee.
• Employer covers medical bills of employee and family.
• Not service:
• Contract of personal service can include employment of a
medical practitioner for the purpose of rendering medical service
to the employer.
• Service rendered free of charge to everybody at a government
hospital / health center / dispensary / non-governmental hospital
/ nursing home (either by medical practitioner or otherwise).
Payment of a token amount does not alter the position.

Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjot Ahluwalia

• Minor’s father bought an injection for child as per doctor’s instructions.
It was administered to the child by a nurse without conducting any
sensitivity tests for reactions. Child suffered from cardiac arrest and
irreparable damage to the brain – even if he survived, he would be in a
vegetative state.
• Are the parents consumers? – Yes, the buyer (parent) and
beneficiary(child) both are consumers.
• Is the commission entitled to give them compensation? – Yes,
as they are also consumers.
• Should the parents get compensation for deficiency in services
sufferedby the child, or should only beneficiary get
compensation? – Yes, parents (who are established as consumers)
also suffered from mental agony due to deficiency in services; thus,
compensation for different injuries.

COMPLAINT

Any allegation in writing made by a complainant for:

i. Unfair Trade Practice or Restrictive Trade Practice.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

ii. Defective good(s)/service(s) bought or agreed to be bought.

iii. Price in excess of pre-determined price is charged.
iv. Goods/services are hazardous to life/safety when used or being offered
for sale:
• In contravention of safety standards under law.
• Trader knew the goods were unsafe by due diligence.

COMPLAINANT

i. Consumer
ii. Beneficiary of goods/services
iii. Voluntary consumer under any law
iv. Central/State government
v. Group of consumers having the same interest
vi. Legal heir/representative of deceased consumer
vii. Insurance company

DEFECT IN GOODS

• Fault, imperfection or shortcoming

• in the quality, quantity, potency, purity or standard
• which is required to be maintained by law for the time being in
force
• or under any contract, express or implied
• or as is claimed by trader
• in relation to any goods.

DEFICIENT SERVICES

• Fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy

• in quality, nature and manner of performance
• which is required to be maintained by law for the time being in
force
• or under any contract or otherwise
• in relation to any service.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICE

• Trade practice which

• manipulates price or conditions of delivery
• to affect flow of supplies in the market
• relating to goods and services
• to impose unjustified costs or restrictions
• on consumers

Such as:
• Delay beyond the period agreed upon in supplying goods/services,
leading to rise in price.
• Requiring consumers to buy, hire or avail of goods/services as a
condition precedent to buying, hiring or availing of other
goods/services.

SPURIOUS GOODS & SERVICES: Goods/services which are claimed to

be genuine but are not actually so.
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

CASES SUMMARY
ASSAULT & BATTERY
1. Letang v. Cooper: Intention is an essential element of trespass to
person.
2. Fowler v. Lanning: No CoA for trespass to person if intent is not
established.
3. Allen v. Hannaford: For threat, one must look at the apprehensions
created in the mind of P and not the intention of D.
4. Cole v. Turner: Lightest angry touch is battery.
5. Vosburg v. Putney: Liable for all the harm, whether or not foreseeable.

Assault:
Intention to do the act, attempt/threat to use force, apparent present
ability to use force
Battery: Intention to cause physical contact, direct application of physical
force (body or object), harmful/offensive physical contact

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

1. Wilkinson v. Downton: Intention to cause calculated harm
Intention to cause calculated harm, outrageousness of D’s conduct,
resultant emotional (+ other) damage

FALSE IMPRISONMENT
1. Murray v. Ministry of Defense: Duration + knowledge is immaterial,
not being informed of grounds for arrest is unlawful detention
Total restraint on mobility (liberty), unlawful detention, knowledge is
irrelevant

TRESPASS TO LAND
1. Dougherty v. Stepp: Damage is not required (actionable per se),
unauthorized therefore unlawful entry is trespass
Intention to be present there (not to trespass), direct physical
interference, without lawful justification, with P’s possession of land

TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
1. Poggi v. Scott: Wrongful motive need not be proven, D exercises
dominion/control over chattel to such an extent that it interferes with
P’s right to control it (conversion)
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

Trespass: Intention to handle chattel or interfere with it physically, direct

physical interference, without lawful justification, with P’s possession of
chattel
Conversion: To use it as one’s own, intention to claim ownership

DEFENSES TO INTENTIONAL TORTS

Consent:
1. Mohr v. Williams: Consent does not apply when its scope is exceeded
2. Hudson v. Craft: VNFI can’t be used for illegal activities
3. McGuire v. Almy: Consent is not assumed by incurring risk – other
factors such as likelihood of harm, duty, etc. must be taken into
account
Knowledge + voluntary agreement (scope, free, express/implied)
Self Defense:
1. Courvoisier v. Raymond: (i) reasonable apprehension, (ii) honest force
(communication of threat), (iii) reasonable means
Defense of Property:
1. Bird v. Holbrook: Can’t use excessive/deadly force – proportional to
the threat
2. Kirby v. Foster: If chattel was taken peaceably, you can’t use violence
directly. You must first make a peaceable demand and then escalate
conflict
Should be proportionate force.
Necessity
1. Ploof v. Putnam: Trespass in necessity is not trespass
2. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation- tied his boat to the P’s dock
because of a storm and when the storm took place P’s dock
got damaged: Private necessity (arising out of self interest)
is not an absolute privilege. Excludes liability for trespass but not
for damage
Actual imminent danger, posing a threat and creating a
necessity to D or others, must not be created by D.

NEGLIGENCE
1. Caparo Industries v. Dickman: Existence of legal duty has three
elements: (i) reasonability (ii) proximity of relationship (iii) fair, just
and reasonable to impose duty
2. Donoghue v. Stevenson: Proximity is not physical it’s about
relationship between P & D – neighbours closely affected by D’s acts
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

3. Vaughan v. Menlove: Reasonable man is an objective test, not based

on individual judgment. If D acts contrary to reasonable man, he is in
breach of duty
4. Brown v. Kendall: Standard of care varies with circumstances
5. Fletcher v. City of Aberdeen: Obligation is correlative, persons with
disabilities must take reasonable care, public authorities must keep
disabled persons’ safety in mind
6. Roberts v. Ring: Age and reasonable person
7. United States v. Carroll Towing: D is only liable for unreasonable risk,
risk-benefit formula (P * D > B)
8. Scott v. Shepherd: Intervening acts, when injury arises from the force
of the original act, D bears liability
9. Bolton v. Stone: Unforeseeable risk, remoteness of chance, not liable
10. Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd. v. Morts and Dock & Engineering Co.
Ltd.: If danger is foreseeable, extent or mechanism of danger is
immaterial and you are liable
11. Byrne v. Boadle: res ipsa loquitur – mere occurrence is sufficient to
imply negligence: (i)
12. Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee: Bolam test for
professional negligence – must use standard of care that an ordinary
member of that profession has (ordinary professional’s skill,
intelligence, knowledge, etc.)

DEFENSES TO NEGLIGENCE
Contributory Negligence:
1. Vidya Devi v. M.P.R.T.C.: Contributory negligence ignored,
apportionment of damages based on comparative negligence
Consent
1. Smith v. Charles Baker & Sons: Consent must be voluntary, consent to
continue in service is not implied consent to incur risk from negligence
2. Morris v. Murray: Consent must be free, even under the influence of
alcohol he could give consent. Consent may be implied since he sat in
the plane
3. South Indian Industrial Ltd., Madras v. Alamelu Ammal: Putting up
warning signs is not sufficient to infer implied consent
4. Haynes v. Harwood: Consent can’t be used as a defense in rescue
cases
Insanity
 Rishabh Jain, BBA-LLB(A), 22011553

1. Breunig v. American Family Insurance: Insane person is liable if he got

prior signals/warning of sudden incapacitation

DEFAMATION
1. Petra Ecclestone v. Telegraph Media Group Ltd.
2. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Jagmohan Mundhara
3. Hough v. London Express Newspaper Ltd.
4. Huth v. Huth
Defenses
1. Abdul Wahab Galadari v. Indian Express Newspaper
2. Govind Shantaram Walaralkar v. Pandharinath Shivaram Rege
Miscellaneous
1. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu
2. New York Times v. Sullivan- defamation of public officials
3. Nishi Prem v. Javed Akhtar- newspaper rule

STRICT LIABILITY
1. Rylands v. Fletcher
2. Danny Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp.
3. Rickards v. Lothian
4. Read v. J Lyons & Co. Ltd.

ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
1. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case)

VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF STATE

1. Kasturi Lal v. State of UP
2. UoI v. Jasso & Ors.
3. Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

1. Byford v. S.S. Srivastava
2. Mayor, Calcutta Municipal Corporation v. Tarapada Chatterjee
3. Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha
4. Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjot Ahluwalia