Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Lee vs. Lee
Lee vs. Lee
~upreme Qt:ourt
:iflllanila
SECOND DIVISION
-versus-
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
On leave.
1
Miller v. Miller, G.R. No. 200344, August 2019,
'~:, :
On Febniary 3, 1993, Rita et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan a Petition for the Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the
Reco'rds of Birth7 under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court (1993 Petition).
8
This Petition prayed for the cancellation and correction of t1il,~1legedly.
false and erroneous entry in Emma's records of birth by deleting Keh Shiok
Cheng's (Shiok Cheng) name as her mother and substituting }fwit4 Tiu's
name, whom Rita et al. claim to be Emma's true mother. 9 ·
Such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable unde(r] the
circumstances are likewise prayed for. 11 ,.c..: 2: ·,n
I 'r,.:'l >1>, :J':-:.1;~'
Rita et al. alleged that Lee Tek Sheng (Tek Sheng) and Shiok Cheng
were married in China sometime in 1931. 14 They then migrated to the
Philippines. 15 Rita, Leoncio, Lucia, Julian, Martin, Victoriano, and Thomas
(collectively, the Lee siblings) claim to be the only marital 16 children ofTek
8
9
10
Id. Docketed as SP. PROC. NO. C-1674.
Id. at 52.
J
Id. at 59.
11
Id. at 52.
12
Id. at 54-58, 60, and 61. Docketed as SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692.
13
Id. at 54-58 and 60-{il.
14
Id. at 49.
15 Id, at 380.
16
In Aquino" Aquino, G.R. Nos. 208912 and 209018, December 7, 2021 [Per J. Leonen; E:n£anc], this
Court recognized the pejorative implication of using the "legitimate" or "illegitim'.·ate·?: 'dichotomy, as
this perpetnates a historical stigma. Thus, we noted that, whenever practicab]e"laii_d- ,not directly
referring to statnte and jurisprudence, the terms "legitimate" and "illegitimate" shali be replaced by
"marital" and "nonmarital," respectively. At every opportnnity, this Court ought to keep in mind the
dignity of every person in our use of terms and language. See also Edward Schumacher-Matos, Start
.,._ ·-'
.
Sheng .and Shiok Cheng. They were all born in the Philippines, except Rita,
who was born in China. 17 In November 1948, Tek Sheng allegedly brought
a yo\.ll)g girl, Tiu, from China to the Philippines. He introduced her to the
Lee siblings as their "housemaid." 18
According to them, Tek Sheng, had an affair with Tiu. Their relations
bore eight children, including Emma. 19
Acting on this report, Rita et al. filed their two Rule I 08 petitions, one
before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan and one before the Regional
. the Debate: Language, Legitimacy and a 'Love Child', NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, INC., July 12, 2011,
<https://www.npr.org/sections/publiceditor/2011107112113 779253 8/start-the-debate-language-
/
legitimacy-and-a-!ove-child> (last accessed on August 1, 2022); Edward Schumacher-Matos, Sty/ebook
Survey: Newsroom Policy on 'Illegitimate Children', NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, INC., July 18, 2011,
<https:/lwww.npr.org/sections/publiceditor/20 I 1/07118113 7861815/stylebook-survey-newsroom-
policy-on-illegitimate-children> (last accessed on August 1, 2022); and Mallary Jean Tenore, AP
Stylebook adds entry for 'illegitimate child,' advises journalists not to use it, POYTNER INSTITUTE,
February 13, 2012, <https://www.poynter.org/reporting-editing/2012/ap-stylebook-adds-eritry<for-
: _,s;i!Ji,gitimate-child-advises-journalists-not-to-use-it/> (last accessed on August 1, 2022).
;' .. ;Ji:!. at32.
"· · 1,fat 50.
/S 18(
20 ld.-
21 Id. at 50-51.
22
ld.at51.
23 . ld.,at 56.
2~ ' tfl: R~.- Petition for Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth, Emma Lee ·vs_ Court
iF of_-//.ppeals, 639 Phil 78, 81 (2010) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
Id.
°lth: ~-::: '._ -
Decision 5 G.R. No. 180802
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, (Lee (2001))3 3 this Court denied the Rule
45 Petition and sustained the Court of Appeals decision. It explained that
then-petitioners Rita et al.'s Rule 108 petitions could prosper because: (1)
they were not in the nature of actions to impugn legitimacy;, (2) those
petitions were "appropriate adversary proceeding[s];" 34 (3) a Rule 108
petition is the proper remedy to effect a substantial change in a civil registry
entry; 35 ( 4) Rita et al. had a valid cause of action; 36 (5) Rita t>t &-l.'s action
2,
27
Jd.
lee v. Court ofAppeals, 4 I 9 Phil. 392, 402 (200 I) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Divisiort].
I
2s Id. :·
29
Id.
30 Id. at 403.
,1 Id.
32
Id. at 404.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 405.
35
Id. citing Republic v. Valencia, 25 Phil. 408 (I 986) [Per J. Gutierrez Jr., En Banc].
Decision 6 G.R. No. I 808D2
had not prescribed; 37 and (6) Rita et al. were not engaged m forum
shopping. 38
On July 8, 2003, Rita et al. filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan a Motion for the Use of DNA Analysis to establish Emma's
supposed maternal relation with Tiu. 39 Their Motion was anchored on Rule
28, Sections 1 and 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, 40 governing
.physical and mental examination as a mode of discovery. They claimed that
these provisions authorize the Regional Trial Court, on motion, for good
cause shown and upon notice to the adverse party, to order one to submit to
physical or mental examination. 41
·:'[T]his Court takes extreme caution and restraint in granting the prayed for
2 ·., :: ·DNA analysis, especially in this case where no evidence has yet been
.presented which would at least tend to establish any filial relationship
1),, :o,. between Emma Lee and Tiu Chua.
36 ·
37
Jd. citing Babiera v. Catotal, 389 Phil. 34 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; and Benitez-
: Badua v. Court ofAppeals, 299 Phil. 493 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
Id. at 418, citing CIVIL CODE, art 1149.
I
38
Id. at 421.
39
Rollo, pp. 62--<i5.
40 Section 1. When examination may be ordered. - In an action in which the mental or physical
con~iition of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may in its discretion
order him to submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician.
Section 2. Order for examination. - The order for examination may be made only on motion for_ good
cause shown and upon notice to the party to be examined and to all other parties, and shall specify the
-. -;J:~t.i)ne,.-place, manner. conditions and scope of the examination and the person or persbn5 by whorti it is
~}j{;IJ1be made. ·
Rollo, p. 63.
42
· '1d: at 67-72.
45
· .Id. at 67--<i9.
44
,Id. at 79-80. Through Judge Antonio J. Fineza.
Decision 7 G.R. No. !80802
SO ORDERED. 45
Meanwhile, on June 10, 2005, Rita et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the Court of Appeals assailing the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan's
45
46
Id.
Id. at 104-105. Through Acting Presiding Judge Oscar P. Barrientos.
I
41
In Re: Petition for Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth, Emma Lee vs. Court
ofAppeals, 639 Phil 78, 81 (2010) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
48
RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, sec. 25 provides:
Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. ~ No person may be compelled to testify against his parents,
other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
49
In Re: Petition for Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth, Emma Lee vs. Court
ofAppeals, 639 Phil 78, 81 (2010) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
,o Id.
51
In Re: Petition for Cancellation and Correction of Entries in the Record of Birth, Emma-Lee vs. Court
ofAppeals, 639 Phil 78 (2010) [Per J. Abad, Second Division].
" Id. at 85.
53
Id.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 180802
In its assailed June 19, 2007 Decision,55 the Court of Appeals found
.. µo grave abuse of discretion on the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan's part
~· i~f4~nying Rita et al.' s Motion. It approved of the Regional Trial Court's
'. ·ot;~6'rvation that "no evidence has yet been adduced to establish a' connection
. ·,Jdl.
Petitioners assert that they are not precluded from impugning private
respondent's "legitimacy" 61 because they are respondent Emma's "half
brothers and sisters." 62 They maintain that DNA testing should be allowed,
as "there are sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence to prove that
K~h Shiok Cheng is not the mother of respondent Emma Lee" 63 and
considering that Lee (2001) had already made a binding ruling on
respondent Emma's parentage. 64
,; t;, Respondent Emma counters that DNA testing should not be allo'!l',ed
· . · hci;,3~µse petitioners have failed to establish a prima facie case concerning
• hetu'lp.atemal relation with Tiu. 65 She maintains that this lack of a prima
facie case belies DNA testing's capacity to serve any useful evidentiary
putpose. 66 She adds that Lee (2001) made no binding statements on her
parentage. 67
I
54
Rollo, p. 8, 31 and 34.
55
Id. at 31-38.
56
Id. at 37.
57
Id, at 3-25.
58 • Id . .at 313-346
59 !ct: at 365-375.
w Id. at 379-408 and 412-450.
61
Id. at 406.
62 · Id. at 404.
63 Id. at 385.
64
Id. at 400.
65
Id. at 428.
66 Id. at 434.
67
!J:L at 445.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 180802
For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the Court of
Appeals erred in sustaining the Regional Trial Court of Caloqclin;f rµ~ing
denying petitioners Rita et. al's motion to avail of DNA testingJto~~{Qut if
there is a maternal relation between Tiu Chuan and respondent Emma Lee.
In any case, even granting that their Rule 108 Petition can proceed,
the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan correctly
found that DNA testing cannot be allowed as petitioners have,.11s'y\'();,f(;liled
'' ·. ,. ·.. -_;-··. '""" ·-J
to adduce prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possi'oility of
respondent Emma's filiation with Tiu.
68
Id.
69 Miller v. Miller, G.R. No. 200344, August 28, 2019,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65639> [Per J. Leonen, T)\ir.df)\rision].
10 Id. . -; ,. i ,_.
•:-' . ~~:)
Decision 10 G.R. No. 180802
that John had duly recognized Joan as his daughter. Specifically, it stated
that, "due recognition of [a nonmarital] child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
.consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is
required[. ]" 71
,, , Dissatisfied, Glenn's heirs, who had substituted for him following his
" 'Eassing, filed a Rule 45 Petition before this Court. Several points on the
;;1 ,,S,~\lr\ts were raised, with this Court stating the main issue for resolution as
· . ""whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Regional Trial
Court Judgment allowing [Joan] to continue using the surname Miller." 73
· Although the principal issue for this Court's consideration was the
propriety of the Court of Appeals' and Regional Trial Court's rulings on the
merits, this Court pointed to a more basic flaw in the original Rule 108
Petition filed by Glenn, i.e., that "[t]he legitimacy and filiation of children
cartnot be collaterally attacked in a petition for correction of entries in the
certificate of live birth." 74 This Court explained:
·',u,
0
Thus, in its final disposition, Miller did not only sustain the dismissal
of Glenn's Rule 108 Petition, but it also "nullified and set aside" 76 whatever
'
·. ~~on9uncements the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court mad~ with
resp.ec't to Joan's legitimacy and filiation, without prejudice to the filmg of
' 111.e :ippropriate action before a proper court:
11 Id ..
72
: Id ..
73 Id.
74
• Id.
1s Id ..
'' Id.
Decision 11 G.R, "No. 180802
spouse of the deceased Pablo Si cad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), otherwise known as
"Pablito Sicad Braza." 79
In her Rule 108 Petition, Ma. Cristina prayed for the correction of the
entries in Patrick's birth record "with respect to his legitimation, the name of
the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name 'Braza,' [as
well as] the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in
his birth certificate and, for [that] purpose, the declaration of the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo as bigamous." 82 In addition to these, and similarly with
I
77
Id.
78
Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 622 Phil."654 (20-09) [Per J.
Carpio Morales, First Division].
79
Id.
80
Id. at 656.
s1 Id.
82
Id. at 657.
, ,
.. ti;iis. case, Ma. Cristina asked that Patrick be submitted to DNA testing "to
determine his paternity and filiation." 83
This Court found that Ma. Cristina's intentions exceeded the bounds
of what a Rule 108 petition may do. Thus, it sustained the Regional Trial
Court's prior dismissal of Ma. Cristina's Petition which reasoned "that in a
special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a
. family court ... has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test[.]" 84 This Court explained:
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly
,"'· ;;,. show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo , and
, _Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick's filiation in
·· .j' •,qonnection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected
· .' to a DNA test. · ·
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the
correction of Patrick's birth records and that the rest of the prayers are
merely incidental thereto.
83
Id.
s• Id.
85
Id. at658-659.
86 Richelle Busque Ordona v. The Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City and Allan D. Fulgueras, G,R. No.
215370, November 9, 2021, <https://elibrary,judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/68013> [Per J.
!~ting, En Banc],
' , · : ~1"PY'
Decision 13 OJ~- ijci'. 180802
This Court ruled that what Richelle sought was not a,mere:·clerical
change. Rather, she sought to impugn the filiation of a chitd:1' To reiterate
·- '
this Court has categorically ruled that the legitimacy and filiatii)ri ofchildren
' '
· declared against her child's legitimacy when she alleged that Alrich Paul
was the child of Allan.
j;:_ StLl.·_
Further, assuming arguendo that the Rule 108 petition filed in the
case is considered as the direct action to impugn Alrich Paul's presumed
legitimacy, the Rule 108 petition must still fail.
II
'<- -~:.
That Petition's ultimate objective is, in the words of its own prayer,
the "cancellation and correction of the false and erroneous entries in all
pertinent record/s of birth of private respondent." 89 That objective is
nominally in keeping with the purpose and scope of a Rule 108 petition, as
spelled out in Rule 108, Sections 1 and 2 of the Rules of Court:
Section l. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
. .Jii',en recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the .
· R, 1~ancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Court of
"_ ·_-F,ir~t Instance of the province where the corresponding civil registry_ is
.:o .. located. - .
cl'C
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. - Upon good and
-- .va.lid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled
0r corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
1
8'- Id.
" Subj~c:tofSP. PROC. NO. C-1674.
89 _Rollo, p. 52.
Decision 15
However, given the incidents in this case, this Court that rfin'di
pleading Shiok Cheng's repudiation to be "merely incidental''\:tmbtfu'ts"fo·a
disingenuous attempt at splitting hairs. Petitioners' specific representations,
as well as the quality and nature of the evidence on which they rely, reveal
their main inclination to repudiate respondent Emma's maternal relation
with Shiok Cheng, rather than positively establishing maternal relations with
Tiu.
This Court can further indulge petitioners and entertain the_ possibility
that these quoted representations are merely borne of an unfortu~atcichoice
of words or semantics. Yet, further into their MemorandU111, 'petitioners /
make a representation that is significantly more definite and is· replete with
90 Id.
91
Id. at 385.
92
Id. at 404.
93
Id. at 406.
Decision. · 16 G.R. No. 180802.
..··• .• •.·• 'Equally telling, the character of the actual evidence on which
p'etitioners rely on to support the assertion that "[t]here are sufficient
documentary and testimonial evidence to prove that Keh Shiok Cheng is not
the mother of respondent Emma Lee" 96 belies the positive identification of
Tiu as respondent Emma's mother to be petitioner's commanding intent.
100
Lee v. Court ofAppeals, 419 Phil. 392, 399-40 I (200 I) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
Decision 18 G.R. No. 180802
It appears unfounded for the report to conclude that Tiu was "most
probably" Marcelo et al.'s mother. To begin with, her name never even
appeared in the eight paragraphs that detailed the seeming errors in Marcelo
et al. 's birth records. More significantly, her specific circumstances were
never articulated, let alone scrutinized. There appears to be no other basis
for the conclusion other than Tiu's merely being younger than Shiok Cheng.
This· hardly qualifies as distinct proof of Tiu's maternal relation with
Marcelo et al.
Atty. Morales: When you referred to the other eight (8) children and you
. said were from a younger woman, that was your suspicion at that time, is
that correct?
A: Based on records.
Q: Whatrecords?
I
Q: What record is that?
.A: That is based on the Master Patient Records of the Chinese General
Hospital.
101 l(L
~;,,, •·:·.,-.,1,,
Decision 19 G.R. No. 180802
Atty. Morales: Now, on the basis of this entry on this document, you made
the conclusion that the next eight (8) children of Lee Tek Sheng sh0uld be:
by a younger woman, is that correct? '
A: Yes, ma'am.
. ,";:, ';''./'.;'!",'',
Q: Is there anywhere in this document where the identity of the suppqsi4
younger woman can be found, is there anywhere here? · · .
c' , - .
A: There is none.
'?',': f'
Q: Now, the subject matter of the case here is Emma Lee, is thff'e•anj)t'.
document that you found in the Chinese General Hospital that pertains
to Emma Lee?
A: None.
Q: And the actions that you took and the moves that you made were
initially based on the complaint, the allegations of the complaint
submitted to the NB! by Rita K. Lee, is that correct? ·
that it was completely impossible for a woman of such age to give birth. On
cross-examination, he was even noted to have conceded that "'highly
improbable' does not mean an 'absolute impossibility', and that the
improbability is decreased when the woman has given birth to children
earlier." 105
',' Even then, improbability with respect to Shiok Cheng does not
<rieeessarily translate to Tiu being Marcelo et al.'s mother. Petitioner's
~videfl.ce impugns filiation with one person, but is nowhere near positively
demonstrating Tiu to be respondent Emma's mother.
Atty. Fortun: Will you tell us whether you know respondent in this case,
Emma Lee?
'
' .,, ' "" - 1.. ' ,. .. - :: ~ ; ~-.
· .,~
n ->, ,,,.Atty Fortun: So how many children were born by Tiu Chuan in 1958, how
··"-•t:-~,~---'·' '
'g.,' · · ·•1·many did she have? ..
Atty Fortun: When Tiu Chuan gave birth to Emma in September of 1958,
will you tell us whether you came to know about the fact?
Witness: Before September, her family was kind of big. In September that
morning, I got off from duty from my internship at the Maternity and
Children's Hospital, right now is Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital.
I came home, my mother said "it's a good thing you weren't at hoirie, ·
otherwise, you have to deliver your father's child." ,, ~•c' ·
Atty Fortun: Will you tell us whether you came to know whether ;;i
s~_::·
Emma subsequently living in the same house where Tiu Chuan lived? · "
Atty Fortun: Will you tell us how you came to know that baby gir!Eni/iia?
III
It does not. escape this Court's attention that this present· Decision
comes in the wake of Lee (2001), which sustained the propriety of
petitioners' resort to a Rule 108 Petition, thereby ostensibly setting the law
of the case.
This Court had occasion to explain the doctrine of the law of the case
in Villa v. Sandiganbayan. 107 This discussion included the qualification that
the doctrine of the law of the case "will not be adhered to where its
application will result in an unjust decision." 108 Thus:
Less than a year later, on May 19, 1999, this Court promulgated its
Decision in China Banking Corporation v. Home Development Mutual
Fund. 113 This Decision nullified the 1995 Amendment to the R,ules and
Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7742, "insofar as [it] require[d]
that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan superior to
the retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund a..tJ.d a .housing pJan
superior to the Pag-IBIG housing loan program in order to qualifyfo!,:y;!;li~er
or suspension of fund coverage[.]" 114
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Mercury Group, but only for
the years 1997 onward. As to 1996, the Court of Appeals maintained that
this Court's June 22, 1998 Resolution in (LR. No. 132416 had become the
law of the case, thus, precluding Mercury Group's exclusion from Pag-IBIG
Fund coverage. At this, Mercury Group went to this Court anew on a Rule
45 Petition. 116
112
'.:":i
I
Id. at 514.
113 China Banking Corporation v. Home Development Mutual Fund, 366 Phil. 9'1'3 (] 999) [Per J.
Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division].
114
Jd. at 93 I.
11 ! Mercury Group of Companies, Inc. v. Home Development Mutual Fund, 565 Phil. 510 (2007) [Per J.
Carpio-Morales, Second Division].
116 .Id·.
·.··oecision 24 G.R. No. 180802
The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to the present
case vis a vis the decision of this Court in G.R. No. 132416. The present
case is not a subsequent proceeding of the same case - G.R. No. 132416.
This is an entirely new one which was commenced by petitioner's filing of
an original petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the
Court of Appeals against respondent.
?·:, '·,•.:.· At all events, the doctrine "is merely a rule of procedure and does
.,. ·. •.riot go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its
application will result in an unjust decision." To sustain respondent's
;efasal to grant a waiver of Fund coverage to petitioner on the basis of
amendments to implementing rules which had priorly been declared null
and void by this Court would certainly be unjust.
In fine, the doctrine of the law of the case cannot be made to apply
to the case at bar, hence, petitioner's application for waiver from Fund
coverage for the year 1996 must be processed by respondent. 117
(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
.,. To recall, Lee (2001) held that petitioners' Rule 108 petitions could
. prosper for several reasons:
legitimacy;
Second, citing Republic v. Valencia, 119 it noted that "a proceeding for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108
ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the characteristics of an
appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements
under Rule 108 are complied with[;]" 120
Third, crtmg Republic Act No. 9048, it explained that a. Rule 108
petition has since been a proper remedy to effect a substantial change in a
civil registry entry; 121 .
/"_'·.·,,,, ',/';,;-:'
Given the present determination that petitioners' Rule 108,Peiition is
principally aimed at impugning filiation, of particular interesf isjhe frrst of
the six bases invoked by Lee (2001). The entirety ofjl,~,.(2JJOJ)'s
explanation on this point reads: 3', -' ' · ,~,
Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is
improper since private respondents seek to have the entry for the name of
petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who
is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek
is not merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were
not born of Lee Tek Sheng's legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his
mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a "bastardization of petitioners." Petitioners
119
Republic v. Valencia, 225 Phil. 408 (1986) [Per J. Gutierez, Jr., En Banc].
120
Lee v. Court ofAppeals, 419 Phil. 392, 405 (200 l) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
121
It explained:
Republic Act No. 9048 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"SECTION l. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change;of First-',Name or
Nickname. ~ No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judiciat ~rc!er, except
for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which cah be·' corrected or
changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance, with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations."
The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to
be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar. or
consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing
of such errors in entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of opet.iti'oit of:Rule l 08
are substantial changes_ and corrections in entries of the civil register. This is prechfol)I ·the opposite of
f
what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of its genre had said, perhaps another indicati~fi: _tfia! _it was not
. sound doctrine after all. · , :·~· ·:)f :,
122
.Lee v. Court ofAppeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division]: '<.:;itingBabiera v.
Catotal, 389 Phil. 34 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division]; and Benitez-Badua. v. Court of
Appeals, 299 Phil. 493 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
123
Id. at 418, citing CIVIL CODE, art. 1149.
124
Id. at 421.
Decision 26 G.R. No. 180802
thus label private respondents' suits before the lower courts as a collateral
attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Sbiok Cheng ~s the
petitioners' mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is
their biological mother. Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the
petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated under Rule
108.126 .
In the intervening time since Lee (2001), this Court has mad~;defi:nite
determinations that collateral attacks on filiation could not be :done in, a Rule
I 08 Petition. As it was in Mercury, to insist on an earlier pronouncement-
even when jurisprudence has, in the interim, been more enlightened-.-is to
work an injustice by compelling respondent Emma to suffef 'ilie pdfential
consequences of Lee (2001)'s previous shortsightedness. · ,,;e, · ::c • · ·
''.bk:~ -.·t1;k>
,,,, ·'\i}'·;;
Recognizing the legal rights that belong to a child by virtue of a
1
positive finding of filiation, this Court is wary to disturb such status.
Caution is warranted since the benefits realizable from these legal rights may
be summarily taken away by an inordinate declaration negating filiation.
This approach is in line with the policy of protecting the best interests
of the child, as demonstrated in Aquino v. Aquino. 130 In that case,. this Court
adopted a construction of Article 992 of the Civil Code that enaj:,Ies children,
regardless of the circumstances of their births, qualified to inherit from their
126
Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 622 Phil. 654, 660 (2009) {
I
[Per J. Carpio-Morales, First Division].
121 Id.
128
Herrera v. Alba, 499 Phil. 185 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
129
Id. at 191.
130
Aquino v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 208912 & 209018, December 7, 2021,
<https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/68154> [Per J. Leanen, En Banc].
Decision 28 G.R. No. 180802.
.· " Moreover, this Court noted that it has consistently used this policy in
its previous rulings as a guide in navigating through controversies that affect
.,:, 'cMldreri and their rights such as in matters of custody; 133 filiation and
paiemity; 134 adoption; 135 crimes committed against them; 136 and their status
and nationality .137
· o;;nll,.-,, ,._.·
.131 , Id. ,
IM" United· Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, August 21, 1990, available at
, '<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx> (last accessed on August I, 2022).
Article 3 of this convention provides:
ArtiGle 3
I. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for· his or her
well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and
administrative measures.
133 Thornton v. Thornton, 480 Phil. 224 (2004) [Perl Corona, Third Division]; Perez v. Court of Appeals,
325 Phil. 1014 (1996) [Per J. Romero, Second Division]; Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals, 554
Phil. 264 (2007) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Second Division].
134 Dela Cruz v. Gracia, 612 Phil. 167 (2009) [Per J. Carpio Morales, Second Division]; Concepcion v
Cov.rt ofAppeals, 505 Phil. 529 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
135 Cang v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 129 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division]; In the Matter of the
. Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 494 Phil. 515 (2005) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Thlfd
Division]. .
130 People v.
Udang, Si:, 823 Phil. 4]1 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division]; People v. Ttt!agan, G.)'{.
)'{o" .227363, March 12, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65020> [Per
).Peralta, En Banc].
m Ddvid'v Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J, Leonen, En Banc].
138 , Ar.av. Pizarro, 805 Phil. 759 (2017) [Per J. Leanen, Second Division].
Decision 29 G.R. No. 180802
Further, the birth must be registered within 30 days from the time
of birth. Thus, generally, the rules require that facts of the report be
·certified by an attendant at birth, within 30 days from birth. The attendant
is not only an eyewitness to the event, but also presumably would have no
reason to lie on the matter. The immediacy of the reporting, combined
with the participation of disinterested attendants at birth, or of both
\ .;.parents, tend to ensure that the report is a factual reporting of birth. In
· other words, the circumstances in which registration is made obviate. the .
.possibility that registration is caused by ulterior motives. The law
· provides in the case of illegitimate children that the birth certificate shall
be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the
mother if the father refuses. This ensures that individuals are not falsely
named as parents. 139
IV
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
· choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA
!~sting teclmology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such
ci~trncized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits
.qfDNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This
case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
d6pendable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore
take this opportunity to forcefally reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a
valid means of determining paternity. 141 (Emphasis supplied)
Nevertheless, the mere validity and viability of DNA testing does not
m~e it a' readily available means which parties can obtain with judicial fiat
~ithefr convenience and mere instance.
139 Id.
140
Agustin v. Court ofAppeals, 499 Phil. 307 (2005) [Per J. Corona, Third Division].
141
Id. at_332.
Decision 31 G.R. No. 180802
Sec~io°: 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence 142 allows for DNA testing
upon apphcat10n of a proper party, including those in special proceedings, i 43
subject to certain conditions: ,·:cs, .
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce. new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior·com:ts
order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies;·:
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
[W]e find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on DNA Evidence to
aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in /
paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question of ~
whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a
DNA testing order.
142
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC.
143
Section 1 of the Rule on DNA Evidence provides:
Section I. Scope. - This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section J hereof, is
offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil ,actions _as ,well as
special proceedings.
144
Lucas v. Lucas, 665 Phil. 795 (2011) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
Decision 32 G.R. No. !8080~
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and
the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial
_system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements
for reiiability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary
laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available
objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively
:µid properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
· frnportantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public."
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be
issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.
Q: Now, the subject matter of the case here is Emma Lee, is there ap.y ,
document that you found in the Chinese General Hospital that;pei;ta,iJJSL
to Emma Lee?
/
145
Id. at 812-815,
146
Rollo, PP- 404---406. :1 ••
147
Lee v. Court ofAppeals, 419 Phil. 392,400 (2001) [Per J. De Leon, Jr,, Second Divisionl.
14s Id. :
Decision 34 G.R. No. 180802
A: None. 149
Dr. Novero's testimony also fails to attest to Tiu as the mother. It only
adverts to the greater likelihood of a relatively younger mother. For that
matter, his testimony~since it was concerned more with relative
improbability, rather than absolute impossibility-even fails to completely
negate the possibility that Shiok Cheng was the mother.
D,cc, :._Apart from these three pieces of evidence, petitioners also harp on Lee
(200l)'s recitals as supposedly "confirm[ing] that Lee Tek Sheng had two
(2) families, one of which produced children by Tiu Chuan, one of which is
[respondent Emma]." 150
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same
man but begotten of two (2) different mothers. One set, the private
respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife,
Keh Shiok Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly
: children ofLee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
149
p.
Rollo, 432--433.
150
Id.· at 400.
' 1• phr:-· :,: ':
· J:..,ce ·;_ ·:··,
Decision 35 G.RiNo:'i8'0802
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every i/n-iJ '··
Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the petitioners, their common fathir,' Lee
Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioneiis:;b:JF'
. making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng. 151 ,
(Emphasis supplied)
This Court fails to see how the quoted portions amount to a c:onclusive
narration of facts that immutably settled respondent Emma's maternal
relations with Tiu.
To begin with, had Lee (2001) done that, petitioners would have won
their case long ago. There would then be no need for them to insist on DNA
testing, and for the proceedings to drag to this stage. The presen!:Rule 45
Petition would be moot, and all things done by the parties and this. Court in
relation to it would be reduced to inconsequential, theoretical discussion.
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to
"direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common
ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
Article 965 thus provides:
Be that as it may, WE cannot but agree with the liberal view taken
by respondent Court of Appeals when it said:
156
Id. at' 120-121.
157 107 PhiL 685--689 (1960) [Per J, Labrador, En Banc].
Decision 39 G.K No. 180802
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the
child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the
following cases:
(!) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period
fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having
desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
The law reserves the right to impugn filiation only to the husband, or
to his heirs, only if the husband has availed of the right during his lifetime
and within the prescription periods set forth in Article 170 ofthe Family
Code:
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in
the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs,
should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or. was /
recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the
place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded,
the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and
three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or
was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from
the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier.
':,i ·' -,
>,,,,'
enacted Republic Act No. 11222 or the Simulated Birth Rectification Act,
which facilitates ~nesty 162 when a simulation of birth made prior to its
enactment was done in view of a child's best interest. As such, any
reckoning of liability must grapple with the terms set forth by Republic. Act
No. 11222.
The Petition subject of SP. PROC. No. C-1674 before: the Regional
Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 131 is ordered DISMISSE~I:\•
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
AMY ~0-JAVIER
Associate Justice
JHOS~OfJ?;<
Associate Justi~er
On leave
ANTONIO T. KHO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
CERTIFICATION
AL,ll(~~ G. GESMUNDO
/ '.XAw:'Cef
Justice ·