Case Digest

Details
IN THE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Docket Number UDK-15143* Case Title AND FISCAL AUTONOMY MOVEMENT VS. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY
DEVELOPMENT FUND (JDF) AND REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY.

Facts
Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to
exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress.

In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges that he is "a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer[.]" He filed this
petition as part of his "continuing crusade to defend and uphold the Constitution" because he believes in the rule
of law. He is concerned about the threats against the judiciary after this court promulgated the Priority
Development Assistance Fund case on November 19, 2013, and Disbursement Acceleration Program case on
July 1, 2014.

The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of
these cases show a threat to judicial independence.

In the first week of July 2014, Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Fariñas filed House Bill No. 4690, which
would require this court to remit its Judiciary Development Fund collections to the national treasury.

A week later, or on July 14, 2014, Iloilo Representative Niel Tupas, Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 entitled "The
Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund (JSF) under the National Treasury, repealing for the purpose
Presidential Decree No. 1949."

On the same day, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III addressed the public, expressing concern over the
dispute between two equal branches of government, prompting the involvement of a third branch.

Petitioner argues that Congress "gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence
and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme Court."

Issue
Whether or not petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the petition and
issue a writ of mandamus - NO.

Held/Rationale
NO. Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright dismissal of this petition.
The petition does not comply with the requisites of judicial review.
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain limitations.
Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take cognizance of the
case.
The requisites are:

(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;

(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement;

(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and

(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23

One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence of an actual
controversy. This means that there must be "an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion."

Petitioner’s allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary
Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its powers granted under the Constitution. This
court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law.

Even assuming that there is an actual case or controversy that this court must resolve, the petitioner has no legal
standing to question the validity of the proposed bill. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will
sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial independence is
laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the constitutionality of a
proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary.

Lastly, the events feared by petitioner are contingent on the passing of the proposed bill in Congress. The threat
of imminent injury is not yet manifest since there is no guarantee that the bill will even be passed into law.
There is no transcendental interest in this case to justify the relaxation of technical rules.

HELD

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Other Information (if applicable)

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based.

Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary Development Fund, used to
augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly basis. The financial
reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website. These funds, however, are still not enough to meet
the expenses of lower courts and guarantee credible compensation for their personnel. The reality is that halls of
justice exist because we rely on the generosity of local government units that provide additional subsidy to our
judges. If not, the budget for the construction, repair, and rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department
of Justice.

As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low levels of budgetary
outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and the reliance on local government units
and the Department of Justice.

"Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a co-equal
department to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments are legal, not political. We are
best when we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts, interpretation of the law and understanding of
precedents. We are not trained .to produce a political statement or a media release."

"Because of the nature of courts, that is - that it has to decide in favor of one party, we may not have a political
base. Certainly, we should not even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding faith that we
should do what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no champions when it
comes to ensuring the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial independence."

For this reason, we appreciate petitioner's concern for the judiciary. It is often only through the vigilance of
private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the
remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he
seeks to be struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in
Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may have a similar enthusiastic
response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.