Presidency (Part 1) - GROUP 3

GROUP REPORT
on
PRESIDENCY
GROUP 3
LIM, Bernadette
TAGUDAR, Val Laurence
TIZON, Monique Reilly
UY, Vanessa Marie
Submitted to:
Atty. Rene Gorospe
August 15, 2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for
President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections ……………………………………… 3
2. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal ………………………………………………………. 5

MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL ……………………………………… 7
3. Clinton v. Jones ………………………………………………………………………………………… 9
4. Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo ………………………………………………………………………... 12
5. De Lima v. Duterte ……………………………………………………………………………………… 14
6. De Leon v. Duterte ……………………………………………………………………………………… 15

SEPARATE OPINIONS ……………………………………………………………………………….. 17
7. Funa v. Ermita …………………………………………………………………………………………… 19
8. Funa v. Agra ……………………………………………………………………………………………... 22
9. Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita …………………………………………………………………………………. 25
10. Aguinaldo v. Aquino III ……………………………………………………………………………… 27

AGUINALDO v. AQUINO III 818 SCRA 2017 (2017) …………………………………………….. 30
AGUINALDO v. AQUINO (August 2017 Resolution) ……………………………………………… 32
11. Rufino v. Endriga …………………………………………………………………………………….. 34
12. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council …………………………………………………………… 38

Separate Opinion of Justice Brion ………………………………………………………………….. 41
14. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita ……………………………………………………………….. 47
15. Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the

Philippines …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 52
16. Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines

(TIDCORP) ………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 53
2 | Lim, Tagudar, Tizon, Uy

1. Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for
President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections
G.R. No. 163783, 22 June 2004
DOCTRINE: The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close
upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect
its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers.
FACTS:
Petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void
the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine
the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the
votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections
following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11, 2004.The said petition prays for
the issuance of a writ of prohibition direct the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing. He claimed that with the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by
the Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, its term terminated and expired on the said
day and the said 12th Congress serving the term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal
existence.
The Court assumed jurisdiction because of the importance of the constitutional issue
raised and to put to rest all questions regarding the regularity, validity or constitutionality of
the canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President in the recently concluded national
elections. The Court also has the power and duty "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the
same Article.
ISSUE: Whether or not the on-going canvassing by the Joint Committee should cease or
should be enjoined.
RULING:
NO, the on–going canvassing by the Joint Committee should not cease nor should
not be enjoined. Sec. 15, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which the petitioner cited, states
that:
“The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its
regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in
session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the
opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.”

This provision pertains to the Congress’ regular annual legislative sessions and the
mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power
of the President to call a special session at any time). It does not pertain to the term of
Congress, which Sen. Pimentel alleged when he said that the existence and proceedings of
the Joint Committee are invalid, illegal and unconstitutional “following the adjournment sine
die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on June 11, 2004”
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon
the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its
non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In
fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly
elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks.
Thus, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to
the Joint Committee completing the tasks.

2. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal
635 SCRA 783 (2010)
DOCTRINE: The PET, as a constitutional body, is independent of the three departments of
government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary – but not separate therefrom.
FACTS:
Atty. Macalintal filed an undesignated petition questions challenging the constitution of
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Section
4,2 Article VII of the Constitution. Stated wherein that, “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Macalintal argued that, (1) The creation of a “separate tribunal” complemented by its
own budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, violates
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. This argument was supported by the provisions of
the 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules), specifically: (a) Rule
3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices are designated as “Chairman and Members,” respectively; (b) Rule 8© which
authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and confidential employees of
every member thereof; (c) Rule 9 which provides for a separate “Administrative Staff of the
Tribunal” with the appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the
discretion of the PET, may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the
Tribunal; and (d) Rule 11 which provides for a “seal” separate and distinct from the Supreme
Court seal.
Macalintal also argued that, (2) The constitution of the PET, with the designation of
the Members of the Court as Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme
Court and of other courts established by law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
ISSUE: Whether the creation of PET with its own budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel
and confidential employees, violates Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and
unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it
has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. The creation of PET is constitutional.
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the
full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.

It is obvious that the PET was constituted in implementation of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive.
The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of the Chief
Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and Members of the Tribunal, respectively,
was designed simply to highlight the singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as
a special electoral court.
Further, petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in

contravention of Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that “the Members
of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions” is untenable.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution which provides that the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.” Consistent with our presidential system of
government, the function of “dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts
involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable” is
apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was
expanded to include “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” The power was expanded, but it
remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of
electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. It is also beyond cavil that
when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme
Court, in conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of
deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise
thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to
courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a
thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members
of the Court were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the
Constitution, is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial
department.

MACALINTAL v. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618 June 7, 2011
DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Necessary Implication; Under the doctrine of necessary implication,

the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the
means necessary to carry it into effect – Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional
jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect.
FACTS: Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B.

Macalintal of our Decision in G.R. No. 191618 dated November 23, 2010, dismissing his
petition and declaring the establishment of respondent Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET)
as constitutional.
Macalintal reiterates his arguments on the alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET: (a)
He has standing to file the petition as a taxpayer and a concerned citizen; (b) He is not
estopped from assailing the constitution of the PET simply by virtue of his appearance as
counsel of former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo before respondent tribunal; (c) Section
4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the PET; (d) The PET
violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
In order to support his arguments that the PET is an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality
of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro that the PTC is a public office which cannot be created by the
President, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner
submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC,
the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
The Office of the Solicitor General maintains in its Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration that: (a) Macalintal is without standing to file the petition; (b) Petitioner is
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET, (c) The constitution of the PET is “on firm
footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the [Supreme] Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.”
ISSUE: Whether the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Macalintal be granted.
RULING:
No. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

The Supreme Court reiterated that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution.
In this case, Petitioner invokes our ruling on the constitutionality of the Philippine Truth
Commission (PTC). Petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita de Castro that
the PTC is a public office which cannot be created by the President, the power to do so being
lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner submits that if the President, as head of
the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court, likewise, cannot
create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.
Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under
the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last
paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and
vice-presidential elections contests includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

3. Clinton v. Jones
520 U.S. 681 (1997)
DOCTRINE:
● The separation-of-powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private
actions against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the unique
importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that that
doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine provides a
self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the
three co-equal branches of Government at the expense of another.
● The principal rationale for affording President's immunity from damages actions based
on their official acts - i.e., to enable them to perform their designated functions
effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability -
provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for
acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.
FACTS:
Jones sued under 42 U. S. C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas law to recover
damages from Clinton, the current President of the United States, alleging, that while he was
Governor of Arkansas, Clinton made "abhorrent" sexual advances to her, and that her
rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at
the time. Clinton promptly advised the Federal District Court that he would file a motion to
dismiss on Presidential immunity grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and
motions be deferred until the immunity issue was resolved.
After the court granted that request, Clinton filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice
and to toll any applicable statutes of limitation during his Presidency. The District Judge
denied dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered
any trial stayed until Clinton’s Presidency ended. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of
temporary immunity to which Clinton was not constitutionally entitled. The court explained
that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens,
that no case had been found in which an official was granted immunity from suit for his
unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official immunity is inapposite where only personal,
private conduct by a President is at issue. The court also rejected the argument that, unless
immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch would
violate separation of powers.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Clinton's assertion of immunity should succeed.
2. Whether a court may compel the President's attendance at any specific time or place.

RULING:
1. No. Deferral of this litigation until Clinton’s Presidency ends is not constitutionally
required. Here, Clinton’s principal submission-that in all but the most exceptional
cases, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages
litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office-cannot be sustained
on the basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording President's immunity
from damages actions based on their official acts-i. e., to enable them to perform their
designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to
personal liability, and n. 32-provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct.
Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the
nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. The
Court is also unpersuaded by Clinton’s historical evidence, which sheds little light on
the question at issue, and is largely canceled by conflicting evidence that is itself
consistent with both the doctrine of Presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald,
and rejection of the immunity claim in this case. Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's ruling,
the District Court's stay order was not the "functional equivalent" of an
unconstitutional grant of temporary immunity. Rather, the District Court has broad
discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket.
Moreover, the potential burdens on the President posed by this litigation are
appropriate matters for that court to evaluate in its management of the case, and the
high respect owed the Presidency is a matter that should inform the conduct of the
entire proceeding. Nevertheless, the District Court's stay decision was an abuse of
discretion because it took no account of the importance of respondent's interest in
bringing the case to trial, and because it was premature in that there was nothing in
the record to enable a judge to assess whether postponement of trial after the
completion of discovery would be warranted.
2. Yes. A court may compel the President's attendance at any specific time or place. The
separation-of-powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private
actions against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the unique
importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that that
doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine provides a
self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the
three co-equal branches of Government at the expense of another. But in this case
there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any
function that might in some way be described as "executive." Jones is merely asking
the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and
controversies, and, whatever the outcome, there is no possibility that the decision
here will curtail the scope of the Executive Branch's official powers. The Court rejects
Clinton's contention that this case-as well as the potential additional litigation that an
affirmation of the Eighth Circuit's judgment might spawn-may place unacceptable
burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. That
assertion finds little support either in history, as evidenced by the paucity of suits
against sitting Presidents for their private actions, or in the relatively narrow compass
of the issues raised in this particular case. Of greater significance, it is settled that the

Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the
President's official conduct and may direct appropriate process to the President
himself. It must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of
the President's unofficial conduct. The reasons for rejecting a categorical rule
requiring federal courts to stay private actions during the President's term apply as
well to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay "in all but the most
exceptional cases." Further, the Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the
alleged risks that this decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated
harassing and frivolous litigation and that national security concerns might prevent the
President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance, and has confidence in
the ability of federal judges to deal with both concerns. If Congress deems it
appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation.

4. Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo
613 SCRA 233 (2010)
DOCTRINE: The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be
sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigation while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be
freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to
the performance of his official duties and functions.
FACTS:
On April 3, 2007, armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security
Squadron based in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City abducted Lourdes D. Rubrico, chair of the
Ugnayan ng Maralita para sa Gawa Adhikan, and brought to, and detained at, the air base
without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation, Lourdes was released but only
after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset.
The petitioners filed a petition and prayed that a writ of amparo issue, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of
the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also
prayed for damages.
Before the CA, respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon,
then AFP Chief of Staff, Police Director-General Avelino Razon and other respondents filed
through the OSG, a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. CA dropped the President as respondent in the case and denied
petitioners’ motion for a TPO. After due proceedings, CA dismissed the petition with respect
to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B.
Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the
Ombudsman.Nevertheless, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already commenced
are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Thus the petition for review under Rule 45. Petitioners claim that The 1987
Constitution has removed immunity from suit enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the Petition and
dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
RULING:

No. The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern
of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express
provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. The Court
subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that indeed the
President enjoys immunity during her incumbency because settled is the doctrine that the
President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade
the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into
court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any
form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance
of his official duties and functions.
Also, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential act
or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners’ protected rights. Therefore, the court
Affirmed the dropping of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the petition for a writ of
amparo.

5. De Lima v. Duterte
924 SCRA 292 (2019)
DOCTRINE: Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the
President. The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it
applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions
as President.
FACTS:
Rodrigo Roa Duterte, herein respondent, was elected as the 16th President of the
Philippines in 2016. A key agenda of this administration was the relentless national
crackdown on illegal drugs. This agenda was heavily criticized by several human rights
advocates including herein petitioner, Sen. De Lima. Petitioner then delivered a privilege
speech against alleged extrajudicial killings in the course of the crackdown which led
respondent to issue a number of public statements against petitioner denunciating her
corruption and immorality. Which ultimately led Sen. De Lima to file this petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondent. She concludes that taking all the public
statements of the President into consideration warrants the issuance of the writ of habeas
data because there was violation of her rights to privacy, life, liberty, and security.
Additionally, the petition argues that President Duterte is not entitled to immunity from suit
because his actions and statements were unlawful or made outside of his official conduct.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to immunity from suit.
RULING:
YES, respondent is entitled to immunity from suit. The petition argues that President
Duterte is not entitled to immunity from suit because his actions and statements were
unlawful or made outside of his official conduct is untenable. Principles established by the US
Supreme Court which the petitioner wants this Court to apply in this case though persuasive,
are not binding. Since the Philippine concept of Presidential immunity from suit diverged
from its foreign roots, from the time of the amendment of the 1973 Constitution. Presidential
immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President. The immunity
makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether or not the
acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as President. In this
case, it was alleged that such derogatory statements were done outside of his official conduct
is immaterial. Hence, the respondent is entitled to immunity from suit until the end of his
tenure either through resignation or removal by impeachment.

6. De Leon v. Duterte
G.R. No. 252118, 8 May 2020
[Read Also Separate Opinions of Justices Leonen and Caguioa]
DOCTRINE: The writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is
not his/her duty to do or which it is his/her duty not to do, to give to the applicant anything to
which the latter is not entitled by law. The writ will issue only if the legal right to be enforced is
well defined, clear, and certain
FACTS:
De Leon filed a Freedom of Information (FOI) Request under E.O. No. 2 (2016) with
the Office of the President. He alleged that the President has been absent from several
engagements due to health reasons and had prolonged absences from public view. He
averred that the president looked incoherent during the COVID-19 live press conference on
March 12, 2020. Seeking to be clarified on the status of the President’s health, De Leon
specifically asked for copies of the President’s latest medical examination results, health
bulletins, and other health records. De Leon allegedly failed to get a response from the
Malacañang Records Office after further inquiry and follow-ups on the availability of the
requested health records.
Thus, he filed a petition for mandamus seeking to: (a) compel respondents to disclose
all the medical and psychological/psychiatric examination results, health bulletins, and other
health records of the President ever since he assumed the Presidency; and (b) compel the
President to undergo additional confirmatory medical and psychological/psychiatric
examinations which shall be publicly disclosed in order to ensure the accuracy of the health
records to be released. De Leon anchors his alleged right to be informed on the basis of
Section 12, Article VII and Section 7, Article III, in relation to Section 28, Article II, of the
Constitution. From De Leon’s standpoint, Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution is a
self-executing command which states that in case of serious illness of the President, the
public shall be informed of the state of his health. De Leon argues that the illnesses
acknowledged by the President, i.e., Buerger’s Disease, Barrett’s Esophagus,
Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease, and Myasthenia Gravis, together with migraine and spinal
issues are serious illnesses within the ambit of Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution. He
also considers the psychological report (anti-social and narcissistic personality disorder)
submitted in the course of the trial court proceedings for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether the Extremely Urgent Petition for Mandamus should be granted.
RULING:
No. The outright dismissal of the petition is proper since on its face, the petition failed
to set forth his material allegations to establish prima facie case for mandamus. The
petitioner feel short of making a prima facie case for mandamus by failing to establish a legal
right that was violated by the respondents.

For a petition for mandamus to sufficiently allege a cause of action, petitioner must
satisfy the following elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of
the defendant to respect that legal right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant that
violates such right. The cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses,
expressly or impliedly, to comply with the duty.
Here, the averments and arguments in the petition failed to establish a prima facie
case for mandamus, ie., the reliefs sought constitute ministerial duties on the part of
respondents, and that there is a clear legal right on petitioner’s part to demand the
performance of these ministerial duties.
Further, as cited by the petitioner himself, the deliberations of the Constitutional

Commission on Section 12, Article VII states the following:
“We are called upon to be more trusting with respect to the Office of the President that
they will know what appropriate means to take in order to release this information to
the public in satisfaction of the public’s right to know of the presidency.”
“The state of health or analysis as to the actual condition of the President should be
left to the President and his doctor,” and that “the burden is left to the Office of the
President to choose the appropriate means of releasing the information to the public.”
The alleged illnesses and psychological disorders of the President are merely based
on what De Leon perceived from online news articles which are hearsay evidence, twice
removed. Hence, petitioner failed to establish the existence of a clear legal right that was
violated, or that he is entitled to the writ of mandamus prayed for.

SEPARATE OPINIONS
LEONEN, J. (dissenting) The public is entitled to know whether there are moments that the
President is even temporarily and involuntarily unable to discharge his duties, which may
cause the entire Executive to be run under the command of unelected officials. In my view,
the publication of a regular and official medical bulletin pertaining to the health of the Chief
Executive, who is also the Commander-in-Chief and the Head of State, especially during a
period of national emergency, is of such negligible burden for a President who ran under a
platform of persistent and courageous transparency.
During a public emergency, ordinary people who unwittingly become victims of COVID-19
disclose so much information about themselves which, during normal times, are private. Yet,
through our ruling in this case, we demand less of a sacrifice from a leader who is supposed
to represent those who ask for his official medical bulletin.
We cannot, without a comment, make a doctrinal pronouncement as to the propriety of a

petition for mandamus vis-å-vis the rights and duties emanating from Article VIl, Section 12 of
the Constitution.
The majority seems comfortable with addressing and settling a doctrinal issue without due
process of law and full adversarial deliberation between the parties. The majority, without
asking for a comment, dismissed the Petition for lack of merit and held that "petitioner fell
short of making a prima facie case for mandamus by failing to establish a legal right that was
violated by respondents. There cannot be a fair outright dismissal of the case without at least
a comment from respondents.
It is against the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court which requires more than an outright
dismissal when a new doctrine is to be established.
A comment is essential to garner a full exposition of the issues from both parties. the outright
dismissal of the Petition is highly irregular and constitutes a failure to carry out our
responsibility to properly and accurately interpret Article VIl, Section 12 of our Constitution in
relation to the sovereign's right to information on their government's capability to represent
them.
Aside from the absences due to health concerns, PDuts has also personally and publicly
admitted that he is suffering from the following medical conditions: a. Buerger's Disease;
b. Barrett's Esophagus; c. Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease; d. Spinal issues; e. Daily
migraines; and f. Myasthenia gravis.
The Petition has enough allegations to raise a reasonable concern about the President's true
state of health. The President's public admission of his illnesses, together with the other
stated manifestations, suggests that his current health may possibly be failing which, in a
way, could affect the faithful performance of his duties. The determination of whether his

alleged ailments are the kinds that the public ought to know entails our construing of what
comprises "serious illness” under the Constitution.
CAGUIOA, J. (dissenting) The Court has the duty to construe “serious illness” under Article
VII, Section 12. The Framers of the Constitution left the power to construe “serious illness” to
the Supreme Court.
Article VII, Section 12 is self-executing In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, the Supreme Court
ruled that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing.The language of Article
VII, Section 12 does not require further legislation. This is bolstered by the deliberations of
the Framers.
The public has the right to be informed of the health of the President Article VII, Section 12
must be read in conjunction with the right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern. The health of the President and his ability to govern the nation is indeed a matter of
public concern. This determines whether the Vice President must be deputized as Acting
President during the period of the President’s disability.
The disclosure can be compelled by a mandamus The duty of the Office of the President to
disclose is a ministerial duty. The OP can decide how to disclose but not whether or not to
disclose. The Supreme Court can compel the OP to disclose.

7. Funa v. Ermita
612 SCRA 308 (2010)
DOCTRINE: Presidency; Holding of Other Office; Evidently, from this move as well as in the
different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of
the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition of the President and his official family in
so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned.—Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the
constitutional provisions in question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to
impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other
offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
FACTS:
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), vice Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Transport of the department. On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then
MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
Thereafter, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and

lawyer, filed the instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice
President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other
office or employment. On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was
appointed Administrator of the MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her
duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Funa argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and

MARINA OIC is in violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, as interpreted
and explained by this Court in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary. He points out that
while it was clarified in Civil Liberties Union that the prohibition does not apply to those
positions held in ex officio capacities, the position of MARINA Administrator is not ex officio to
the post of DOTC Undersecretary, as can be gleaned from the provisions of its charter,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 474,7 as amended by Executive Order (EO) No. 125-A.8
Moreover, the provisions on the DOTC in the Administrative Code of 1987, sit does not
provide any ex officio role for the undersecretaries in any of the department’s attached
agencies. The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment naming her as OIC of
MARINA shows that she does not occupy it in an ex officio capacity since an ex officio
position does not require any “further warrant or appoint.” Funa further contends that even if
Bautista’s appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was intended to be merely
temporary, still, such designation must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition.

On the other hand, the Ermita et. al., argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are
not present in this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be
resolved in view of the appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator
effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic. Funa’s prayer
for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise moot and
Respondents also raise the lack of legal standing of Funa to bring this suit. Clear from the
standard set in Public Interest Center is the requirement that the party suing as a taxpayer
must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of public funds, and
more particularly, his personal and substantial interest in the case. Funa, however, has not
alleged any personal or substantial interest in this case. Neither has he claimed that public
funds were actually disbursed in connection with respondent Bautista’s designation as
MARINA OIC. It is to be noted that respondent Bautista did not receive any salary while she
was MARINA OIC. As to the alleged transcendental importance of an issue, this should not
automatically confer legal standing on a party.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with
the position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been
appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet
Members and their deputies and assistants.
RULING:
Yes. The designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport violated the constitution.
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads: Unless otherwise allowed
by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.”
Here, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or
employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the
primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants
may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section

7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants.
Hence, Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the
exception provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is
allowed by law or the primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein, without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said office. The reason is that
these posts do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
Apart from their bare assertion that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation
when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate clearly that her
designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary functions of
her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities and scope of administration of the Authority, we are hardly
persuaded by Ermita et. al.,' submission that respondent Bautista's designation as OIC of
MARINA was merely an imposition of additional duties related to her primary position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. It appears that the DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport is not even a member of the Maritime Industry Board.

8. Funa v. Agra
691 SCRA 196 (2013)
DOCTRINE: Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits the President,
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding
any other office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution. Complementing the prohibition is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the
1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive official from holding any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, unless otherwise
allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.
FACTS:
On March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the
Acting Secretary of Justice and on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the
Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity.
Funa, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced

this suit to challenge the constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments or designations,
claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The appointments being challenged were in acting or temporary capacities. The

petitioner submits that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
does not distinguish between an appointment or designation of a Member of the Cabinet in
an acting or temporary capacity, and one in a permanent capacity; and that Acting
Secretaries, being nonetheless Members of the Cabinet, are not exempt from the
constitutional ban. Funa, also emphasizes that the position of the Solicitor General is not an
ex officio position in relation to the position of the Secretary of Justice, considering that the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) is an independent and autonomous office attached to
the Department of Justice (DOJ). On the other hand, respondents contend that Agra’s
concurrent designations as the Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting Solicitor General were
only in a temporary capacity and was akin to a hold-over, the only effect of which was to
confer additional duties to him. Thus, as the Acting Solicitor General and Acting Secretary of
Justice, Agra was not "holding" both offices in the strict constitutional sense.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, violates the constitutional prohibition against dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants?
RULING:
YES. The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the
constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

In Funa v. Ermita, it was held that while all other appointive officials in the civil service
are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when
such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution
itself. Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective
and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be
given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution
itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par. (2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any
other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.

The text of Section 13, plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was
to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far as
holding other offices or employment in the Government or in government-owned or
government controlled-corporations was concerned. In this regard, to hold an office means to
possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of the office, which
implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to
apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is without
question that the avowed objective of Section 13, is to prevent the concentration of powers in
the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants. To construe differently is to "open
the veritable floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of
officials in the Executive Department and of limitations on the President’s power of
appointment in the guise of temporary designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies, instrumentalities, or
government-owned or controlled corporations."
In addition, Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting

Solicitor General did not come within the definition of an ex officio capacity. In Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary, it was explained that the term ex officio means "from office; by
virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex officio
likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and
without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex
officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and
without further warrant or appointment.

The powers and functions of the OSG are neither required by the primary functions
nor included by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the DOJ,
is not a constituent unit of the latter. The Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the OSG
is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9417, the Solicitor
General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment,
rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals. Also, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor
General are not related or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice.
In view of the application of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Agra did not
validly hold the position of Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his holding of the
position of Acting Solicitor General. Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de jure
officer for the entire period of his tenure as the Acting Secretary of Justice. The Court holds
that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was
his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer
legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect
the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates
from the State. Agra's official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not
limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of
Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the
prosecution of criminal cases.

9. Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita
472 SCRA 587 (2005)
DOCTRINE: The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It
is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily
appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her
choice could assume office.
FACTS:
While Congress is in their regular session, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr.,
Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H. Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa,
and Arthur C. Yap as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
Petitioners, as Senators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to declare unconstitutional the appointments.
The petition also seeks to prohibit respondents from performing the duties of department
secretaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of President Arroyo of respondents as acting

secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in
session is constitutional.
RULING:
YES, President Arroyo’s appointment is constitutional. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise of this
executive power except in those instances when the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. The scope of the legislature’s interference in the executive’s power to appoint is
limited to the power to prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office.
Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the

exercise of its powers is executive and not legislative. The Commission on Appointments
does not legislate when it exercises its power to give or withhold consent to presidential
appointments. EO 292 provides that the President may temporarily designate an officer
already in government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of
an office in the executive branch. The President may even appoint in an acting capacity a
person not yet in government service, as long as the President deems that person
competent.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It

is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of
the President, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress,

through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the
undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Thus, the office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress
is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence.

10. Aguinaldo v. Aquino III
811 SCRA 304 (2016)
DOCTRINE: The power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the
President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she
considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the
end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid.
FACTS:
Then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 1486, creating Sandiganbayan,
composed of a Presiding Judge and eight Associate Judges to be appointed by the
President, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and
corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees,
including those in government owned or controlled corporations. President Marcos also
issued PD 1606, which elevated the rank of the members of the Sandiganbayan from Judges
to Justices, co-equal in rank with the Justices of the Court of Appeals; and provided that the
Sandiganbayan shall sit in three divisions of three Justices each.
RA 79756 was approved into law and it increased the composition of the
Sandiganbayan from nine to fifteen Justices who would sit in five divisions of three members
each. RA 10660 created two more divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three Justices each,
thereby resulting in six vacant positions.JBC published in the Philippine Star and Philippine
Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an announcement calling for applications or
recommendations for the six newly created positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan. After screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to President
Aquino six shortlists contained in six separate letters.
President Aquino issued the appointment papers for the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices, namely: (1) respondent Musngi; (2) Justice Reynaldo P. Cruz (R. Cruz);
(3) respondent Econg; (4) Justice Maria Theresa V. Mendoza-Arcega (Mendoza-Arcega); (5)
Justice Karl B. Miranda (Miranda); and (6) Justice Zaldy V. Trespeses (Trespeses).
Petitioners Aguinaldo, et al., were all nominees in the shortlist for the 16th
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice. According to petitioners, the JBC was created under the
1987 Constitution to reduce the politicization of the appointments to the Judiciary. Petitioners
emphasize that Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous as to
the mandate of the JBC to submit a shortlist of nominees to the President for "every vacancy"
to the Judiciary, as well as the limitation on the President's authority to appoint members of
the Judiciary from among the nominees named in the shortlist submitted by the JBC. In this
case, the JBC submitted six separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for the six
vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, particularly, for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st
Associate Justices. Petitioners insist that President Aquino could only choose one nominee
from each of the six separate shortlists submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and
no other; and any appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a violation of the

Constitution. Hence, petitioners pray, among other reliefs, that the appointments of
respondents Musngi and Econg, who belonged to the same shortlist for the position of 21st
Associate Justice, be declared null and void for these were made in violation of Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether President Aquino was limited to appoint only from the nominees in the
shortlist submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy.
RULING:
No. The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the stakeholders
in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of appointments to the
Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities. The extent of the role of the
JBC in recommending appointees’ vis-a-vis the power of the President to appoint members
of the Judiciary was discussed during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
(CONCOM) on July 10, 1986. It is apparent from the CONCOM deliberations that nomination
by the JBC shall be a qualification for appointment to the Judiciary, but this only means that
the President cannot appoint an individual who is not nominated by the JBC. It cannot be
disputed herein that respondents Musngi and Econg were indeed nominated by the JBC and,
hence, qualified to be appointed as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to
restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone
whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As
long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment
is valid.
On this score, the Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint
one new Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by the
JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists encroached on
President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary from all those whom the JBC
had considered to be qualified for the same positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the position of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering of the nominees,
designate a numerical order of seniority of the prospective appointees. Part of the President's
power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to
determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by
controlling the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission
papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be
establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justices even before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto
itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.

Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for every
vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of
recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering impinges upon the President's
power of appointment, as well as restricts the chances for appointment of the qualified
nominees, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven
nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he
is proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other
vacancies. The said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of the
President's appointing power.
President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the
Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the
vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the
paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does
not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to
appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To
meet the minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per
vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein
because the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees.
All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of
nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the
appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity.

AGUINALDO v. AQUINO III
818 SCRA 2017 (2017)
DOCTRINE: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) cannot impair the President’s power to
appoint members of the Judiciary and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the
newly-appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
FACTS:
JBC successively filed a MR (with Motion for the Inhibition of the Ponente) and a
Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (of the decision dated 29 November 2016). The
motion stated, among others, that “The immediate concern of the JBC is this Court's
pronouncement that the former's act of submitting six lists for six vacancies was
unconstitutional. . . What the President did with the lists, for the purpose of this particular
dispute alone as far as the JBC is concerned, was the President's exclusive domain” The
JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting in
accordance with the clear and unambiguous mandate of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution for the JBC to submit a list for every vacancy and that its new practice of
"clustering," in fact, is more in accord with the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment
process to the Judiciary from political pressure as the President has to choose only from the
nominees for one particular vacancy. The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and
operational necessity for the JBC and the only safe standard operating procedure for making
short lists.
ISSUE: Whether the JBC complied with the Constitution in submitting the six "clustered” lists
to President Aquino III for the six vacancies of the Sandiganbayan.
RULING:
No. The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom, and maintains that it
deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution to
cluster the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice into six separate short lists. The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is
not without limits. It cannot impair the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary
and his statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed Sandiganbayan
Associate Justices. The Court cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII,
Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the
President’s appointing power.
The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can
only appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in
place the mechanism to protect the appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily
clustering the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the

appointment process and encroached on the President’s power to appoint members of the
Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, beyond its mandate under the 1987
Constitution. As the Court pronounced in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the power to
recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as
the latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the
vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints
someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines
the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court.
The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the
simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate
Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that
President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did not
require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as the issue of clustering of
the nominees to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was
concerned.

Aguinaldo v. Aquino III (August 2017 Resolution)
FACTS:
In November 29, 2016, the Court En Banc DECLARED the clustering of nominees by
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of
respondents Associate Justices Michael Frederick Musngi and Geraldine Faith Econg,
together with the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as
VALID.
The JBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Motion for the Inhibition of the
Ponente) on December 27, 2016 and a Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention (of the
Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February 6, 2017.
The Court, in a Resolution dated February 21, 2017, denied both Motions.
Presently for resolution of the Court are the following Motions of the JBC: (a) Motion
for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 21 February 2017 (MR-Resolution); and (b)
Motion to Admit Attached Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
21 February 2017 and the Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
21 February 2017 (Supplement-MR-Resolution).
The aforementioned MR-Resolution and Supplement-MR-Resolution lack merit given

the admission of the JBC itself in its previous pleadings of lack of consensus among its own
members on the validity of the clustering of nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in
the Sandiganbayan, further bolstering the unanimous decision of the Court against the
validity of such clustering. The lack of consensus among JBC members on the validity of the
clustering also shows that the ponente's decision in this case did not arise from personal
hostility - or any other personal consideration - but solely from her objective evaluation of the
adverse constitutional implications of the clustering of the nominees for the vacant posts of
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.
The JBC contends in its MR-Resolution that since JBC consultants receive monthly
allowance from the JBC, then "obviously, JBC consultants should always favor or take the
side of the JBC. Otherwise, there will be conflict of interest on their part." While the ponente
indeed received monthly allowance from the JBC for the period she served as consultant, her
objectivity would have been more questionable and more of a ground for her inhibition if she
had received the allowance and decided the instant case in favor of the JBC.
It bears to stress that the Court also unanimously held in its Resolution dated
February 21,2017 that there is no factual or legal basis for the ponente to inhibit herself from
the present case. Even though the ponente and the other JBC consultants were admittedly
present during the meeting on October 26, 2015, the clustering of the nominees for the six
simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was already fait accompli.
Questions as to why and how the JBC came to agree on the clustering of nominees were no

longer on the table for discussion during the said meeting. As the minutes of the meeting on
October 26, 2015 bear out, the JBC proceedings focused on the voting of nominees. It is
stressed that the crucial issue in the present case pertains to the clustering of nominees and
not the nomination and qualifications of any of the nominees. This ponente only had the
opportunity to express her opinion on the issue of the clustering of nominees for
simultaneous and closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts in her ponencia in the
instant case. As a Member of the Supreme Court, the ponente is duty-bound to render an
opinion on a matter that has grave constitutional implications.
Since all the basic issues raised in the case at bar had been thoroughly passed upon
by the Court in its Decision dated November 29, 2016 and Resolution dated February 21,
2017, the Court need not belabor them any further.
The Court denies for lack of merit the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
and Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the JBC.

11. Rufino v. Endriga
496 SCRA 13 (2006)
DOCTRINE:
● Presidency; Power of Appointment; Separation of Powers; Usurpation of this
fundamentally Executive power of appointment by the Legislative and Judicial
branches violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic
republican government; Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers—the first group refers to the heads of the
Executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, the second group refers
to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, and the third group
refers to all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law; Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-ranked
officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.
● The President’s power to appoint which is a self-executing power vested by the
Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions.
● The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to
all executive employees from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk, a
constitutional power that is self-executing and which does not require any
implementing law; Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s power of control
over the Executive branch.
● By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,” the
1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to control all
offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP—control is far greater than, and
subsumes, influence.
FACTS:
Presidential Decree No. 15 (PD 15) created the Cultural Center of the Philippines
(CCP) for the primary purpose of propagating arts and culture in the Philippines. The CCP is
to awaken the consciousness of the Filipino people to their artistic and cultural heritage and
encourage them to preserve, promote, enhance, and develop such heritage.
PD 15 created a Board of Trustees (“Board”) to govern the CCP. PD 15 mandates the

Board to draw up programs and projects that (1) cultivate and enhance public interest in, and
appreciation of, Philippine art; (2) discover and develop talents connected with Philippine
cultural pursuits; (3) create opportunities for individual and national self-expression in cultural
affairs; and (4) encourage the organization of cultural groups and the staging of cultural
exhibitions. The Board administers and holds in trust real and personal properties of the CCP
for the benefit of the Filipino people. The Board invests income derived from its projects and
operations in a Cultural Development Fund set up to attain the CCP’s objectives. The
consolidated petitions in the case at bar stem from a quo warranto proceeding involving two
sets of CCP Boards. The controversy revolves on who between the contending groups, both

claiming as the rightful trustees of the CCP Board, has the legal right to hold office. The
resolution of the issue boils down to the constitutionality of the provision of PD 15 on the
manner of filling vacancies in the Board.
On 25 June 1966, Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30 (EO 30) creating the
Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of Trustees of seven
members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. The original founding trustees, who
were all appointed by him. After the People Power Revolution in 1986, then President
Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees
and appointed new trustees to the Board. On 1998, Estrada appointed seven new trustees to
the CCP Board for a term of four years to replace the Endriga group as well as two other
incumbent trustees where Petitioner Rufino is a member. Thus, the Rufino group took their
respective oaths of office and assumed the performance of their duties in early January 1999.
Thereafter, the Endriga group (Appointed by Aquino) filed a petition for quo warranto before
this Court questioning Estrada’s appointment of seven new members to the CCP Board. The
Endriga group alleged that under Section 6(b) of PD 15, vacancies in the CCP Board “shall
be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular meeting.” In
case “only one trustee survive[s], the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving trustee acting
in consultation with the ranking officers of the [CCP].” The Endriga group claimed that it is
only when the CCP Board is entirely vacant may the President of the Philippines fill such
vacancies, acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Endriga group asserted
that when former President Estrada appointed the Rufino group, only one seat was vacant
due to the expiration of Ma osa’s term. The CCP Board then had 10 incumbent trustees.
President Estrada retained Fr. Perez, De los Angeles, Lazaro, and Angara as trustees.
Endriga’s term was to expires 1999. The Endriga group maintained that under the
CCP Charter, the trustees’ fixed four-year term could only be terminated “by reason of
resignation, incapacity, death, or other cause.” Presidential action was neither necessary nor
justified since the CCP Board then still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory
power to fill by election any vacancy in the Board.
The Endriga group refused to accept that the CCP was under the supervision and
control of the President. The Endriga group cited Section 3 of PD 15, which states that the
CCP “shall enjoy autonomy of policy and operation. The Court referred the Endriga group’s
petition to the Court of Appeals “for appropriate action” in observance of the hierarchy of
courts.
CA rendered the Decision under review granting the quo warranto petition. It declared
the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office as CCP trustees. On the other hand, the
appellate court’s Decision ousted the Rufino group from the CCP Board. In their MOR, the
Rufino group asserted that the law could only delegate to the CCP Board the power to
appoint officers lower in rank than the trustees of the Board. The law may not validly confer
on the CCP trustees the authority to appoint or elect their fellow trustees, for the latter would
be officers of equal rank and not of lower rank. Section 6(b) of PD 15 authorizing the CCP

trustees to elect their fellow trustees should be declared unconstitutional being repugnant to
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allowing the appointment only of “officers
lower in rank” than the appointing power. CA denied this MOR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether CA erred in not holding that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional

considering it effectively deprives the President of his constitutional power of control and
supervision over the CCP.
RULING:
Yes. CA erred in not holding that Section 6(b) of PD 15 is unconstitutional since
Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD 15
states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining
trustees. Should only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by the surviving
trustee acting in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board
become entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the President of the
Philippines acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the
remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term.
On the other hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to reelect fellow trustees for
more than two consecutive terms.
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank
of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under the same Section 16, there is
a fourth group of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The present case involves the
interpretation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to the
appointment of this fourth group of officers. The President appoints the first group of officers
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The President appoints the second
and third groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on Appointments. The
President appoints the third group of officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing
power, or if the law authorizing the head of a department, agency, commission, or board to
appoint is declared unconstitutional. Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the trustees of the CCP Board because the
trustees fall under the third group of officers.
Here, Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is thus irreconcilably inconsistent with Section 16,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 empowers the remaining
trustees of the CCP Board to fill vacancies in the CCP Board, allowing them to elect their
fellow trustees. On the other hand, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows

heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower in
rank” than such “heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.” This excludes a
situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him. Thus, insofar
as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees, Section 6(b)
and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional because it violates Section 16, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. Thus, the President’s power of control applies to the acts or decisions of
all officers in the Executive branch. This is true whether such officers are appointed by the
President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The power of
control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion. In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive
branch, and exercises “control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.” By
stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive offices, itempowers the
President not only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch,
including the CCP, control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence. Here, the CCP is part
of the Executive branch. No law can cut off the President’s control over the CCP in the guise
of insulating the CCP from the President’s influence. By stating that the “President shall have
control of all the executive x x x offices,” the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not
only to influence but even to control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.
Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

12. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
615 SCRA 666 (2010)
{Read also Separate Opinion of Justice Brion}
DOCTRINE:Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a
vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
FACTS:
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days
after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that
"vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least
three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy."
As a result of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) en banc meeting, JBC announces
the opening for application or recommendation, of the position of Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of
Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC has not yet decided on when to
submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy due to the
two constitutional provisions seemingly in conflict. Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the
Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety
(90) days from the occurrence thereof, and Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution
concerning the ban on Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term.
The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only among legal
luminaries, but also among non-legal quarters, and brought out highly disparate opinions on
whether the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice or not.
ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice
Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against
presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in
the Judiciary.
RULING:
Yes. The court held that Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the
framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such
meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the
Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to
reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. Article
VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of

Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 9 states that the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of
at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill
the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to
extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against
the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not
refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative,
operating to impose a duty that may be enforced - should not be disregarded. Thereby,
Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a
Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure
by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.
In Valenzuela, the Court observed that it appears that Section 15, Article VII is
directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those
made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two
months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election
offenses in the Omnibus Election Code. The second type of appointments prohibited by
Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. Section 15, Article
VII may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" appointments but
also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the
Presidential election. On the other hand, the exception in Section 15 of Article VII allows only
the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the
appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, there
is no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments
made in the Executive Department. The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to
appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting
the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and
deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight
appointments to the Judiciary.
Moreover, Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke

appointments made by an Acting President, and evidently refers only to appointments in the
Executive Department. It has no application to appointments in the Judiciary, because

temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due
to their being revocable at will. The letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that
independence. Also, there is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of
appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the
first and second level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may only be removed
for cause, but the Members of the Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment.

Separate Opinion of Justice Brion
Justice Brion agrees that the President can appoint the Chief Justice and Members of the
Supreme Court two months before a presidential election up to the end of the President’s
term, but disagrees with the conclusion that the authority to appoint extends to the whole
Judiciary.
History tells us that, without exception, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has always
been appointed by the head of the Executive Department.
Section 15 on its face disallows any appointment in clear negative terms (shall not make)
without specifying the appointments covered by the prohibition. From this literal reading
springs the argument that no exception is provided (except the exception found in Section 15
itself) so that even the Judiciary is covered by the ban on appointments. On the other hand,
Section 4(1) is likewise very clear and categorical in its terms: any vacancy in the Court shall
be filled within 90 days from its occurrence. In the way of Section 15, Section 4(1) is also
clear and categorical and provides no exception; the appointment refers solely to the
Members of the Supreme Court and does not mention any period that would interrupt, hold or
postpone the 90-day requirement.
Section 9 may offer more flexibility in its application as the mandate for the President is to
issue appointments within 90 days from submission of the list, without specifying when the
submission should be made. From their wordings, urgency leaps up from Section 4(1) while
no such message emanates from Section 9; in the latter the JBC appears free to determine
when a submission is to be made, obligating the President to issue appointments within 90
days from the submission of the JBC list. From this view, the appointment period under
Section 9 is one that is flexible and can move.
Thus, in terms of conflict, Sections 4(1) and Sections 15 can be said to be directly in conflict
with each other, while a conflict is much less evident from a comparison of Sections 9 and 15.
This conclusion answers the verba legis argument of the Peralta petition that when the words
or terms of a statute or provision is clear and unambiguous, then no interpretation is
necessary as the words or terms shall be understood in their ordinary meaning. In this case,
the individual provisions, in themselves, are clear; the conflict surfaces when they operate in
tandem or against one another.
The Valenzuela Ruling
Valenzuela should be read and appreciated for what it is – a ruling made on the basis of the
Court’s supervision over judicial personnel that upholds the election ban as against the
appointment of lower court judges appointed pursuant to the period provided by Section 9 of
Article VIII. Thus, Valenzuela’s application to the filling up of a vacancy in the Supreme Court
is a mere obiter dictum as the Court is largely governed by Section 4(1) with respect to the

period of appointment. The Section 4(1) period has an impact uniquely its own and different
from that created by the period provided for the lower court under Section 9.
A ruling involving the appointment of lower court judges under Section 9, Article VIII cannot
simply be bodily lifted and applied in toto to the appointment of Members of the Supreme
Court under Section 4(1) of the same Article.
Valenzuela rests on the reasoning that the evil that Section 15 seeks to remedy – vote
buying, midnight appointments and partisan reasons to influence the results of the election –
is so pervasive so that the Section 15 ban should prevail over everything else. The Court,
however, forgot in some statements in this case that hand in hand with Section 15 is Section
4(1) where the framers also recognized, in clear and absolute terms, that a vacancy in the
Court should be filled up because of the importance of having a Supreme Court with its full
and complete membership. Completeness has a heightened meaning when the missing
Member is the head of the Judiciary and the Court in the person of the Chief Justice. What
Valenzuela failed to consider, because it was looking at the disputed provisions from the
prism of two RTC judges, is that the reasons for the application of Section 15, Article VII may
not at all exist in appointments to the Supreme Court.
The Court should therefore direct the JBC to:
A. forthwith proceed with its normal processes for the submission of the list of nominees for
the vacancy to be created by the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, to be
submitted to the President on or before the day before the retirement of the Chief Justice;
B. in the course of preparing its list of nominees, determine with certainty the nominees’
readiness to accept the nomination as well as the appointment they may receive from the
President;
C. proceed with its normal processes for the preparation of the lists for the vacancies for the
lower courts, to be submitted to the Office of the President as soon as the election ban on
appointments is lifted; and
D. in all other matters not otherwise falling under the above, conduct itself in accordance with
this Decision.
In light of all the foregoing, I vote to:
a. Section 4(1), Article VIII is an exception to the coverage of Section 15, Article VII;
appointments to the Supreme Court are not subject to the election ban under Section 15,
Article VII so that the JBC can submit its list of nominees for the expected vacancy for the
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, on or before the vacancy occurs, for the
President’s consideration and action pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII ;
b. Reiterate our ruling in In re: Valenzuela and Vallarta that no other appointments of judges
of the lower courts can be made within the election ban period, pursuant to Section 15,
Article VII.

13. Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President
758 SCRA 414 (2015)
DOCTRINE: The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for
himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and
eligibility. It is a prerogative of the appointing power.
FACTS:
Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several
government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end
of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except
temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for
valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on
midnight appointments.Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public
safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception.
On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of
office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino
issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President
Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. - YES.
(2) Whether or not EO 2 is constitutional. - YES.
RULING:
The appointments of the petitioners are midnight appointments are in violation of
Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, therefore void. E.O. No. 2 is constitutional.
According to Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that takes
several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception
provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President
signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the
appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath
of office or his or her assumption to office.
The dissent insists that, during the prohibited period, an appointment should be viewed in its
"narrow sense." In its narrow sense, an appointment is not a process, but is only an
"executive act that the President unequivocally exercises pursuant to his discretion." The
dissent makes acceptance of the appointment inconsequential. The dissent holds that an
appointment is void if the appointment is made before the ban but the transmittal and
acceptance are made after the ban. However, the dissent holds that an appointment is valid,
or "efficacious," if the appointment and transmittal are made before the ban even if the
acceptance is made after the ban. In short, the dissent allows an appointment to take
effect during the ban, as long as the President signed and transmitted the appointment
before the ban, even if the appointee never received the appointment paper before the
ban and accepted the appointment only during the ban. The dissent's view will lead to
glaring absurdities.
The dissent's assertion that appointment should be viewed in its narrow sense (and is not a
process) only during the prohibited period is selective and time-based, and ignores
well-settled jurisprudence. For purposes of complying with the time limit imposed by the
appointment ban, the dissent' s position cuts short the appointment process to the signing of
the appointment paper and its transmittal, excluding the receipt of the appointment paper and
acceptance of the appointment by the appointee.
The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to differentiate
the exercise of the President's appointing power outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President to exercise the power of
appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and disallows
(subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of appointment
during the period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the
appointment process is admittedly required for appointments outside the appointment ban.
There is no justification whatsoever to remove acceptance as a requirement in the
appointment process for appointments just before the start of the appointment ban, or during
the appointment ban in appointments falling within the exception. The existence of the
appointment ban makes no difference in the power of the President to appoint; it is still the
same power to appoint. In fact, considering the purpose of the appointment ban, the
concurrence of all steps in the appointment process must be strictly applied on appointments
made just before or during the appointment ban.

The well-settled rule in our jurisprudence, that an appointment is a process that begins with
the selection by the appointing power and ends with acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee, stands.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be
understood as both complete and effective appointment: (1) authority to appoint and
evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of
the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements
should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just
before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should
always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process
lacks even one step. And, unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no need to further distinguish
between an effective and an ineffective appointment when an appointment is valid.
NOTES:
1. Appointing Authority
The President's exercise of his power to appoint officials is provided for in the
Constitution and laws. Discretion is an integral part in the exercise of the power of
appointment.49 Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power
necessarily exercises a discretion.
Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it
(Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate.
Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily
carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications
of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority,
directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the
qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment
effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an
irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
2. Transmittal
It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be
evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen
that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the
appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the
appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent
of its issuance.

For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the
appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President,
bar code, etc.) and must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO.)
3. An appointment can be made only to a vacant office.

An appointment cannot be made to an occupied office. The incumbent must first be
legally removed, or his appointment validly terminated, before one could be validly installed
to succeed him.
4. Acceptance by the Qualified Appointee

Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking
the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office.
Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very
evil which we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of
acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in the
breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire
appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint.

14. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita
469 SCRA 1 (2005)
DOCTRINE: When one speaks of the Secretary of Finance as the alter ego of the President,
it simply means that as head of the Department of Finance he is the assistant and agent of
the Chief Executive. The multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
secretaries of such departments, such as the Department of Finance, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. The Secretary of Finance, as
such, occupies a political position and holds office in an advisory capacity, and, in the
language of Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President's bosom confidence" and, in the
language of Attorney-General Cushing, is “subject to the direction of the President."
FACTS:
July 1, 2005 is the effectivity date of R.A. No. 9337. When said date came, the Court
issued a TRO, effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining
respondents from enforcing and implementing the law.
Petition 1
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., through a petition for prohibition, question the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the NIRC. These questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the
VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit: “. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent
(12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied: (i) Value-added tax collection
as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and
four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).”
They also argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by

Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of
the 1987 Constitution.
Petition 2
Pimentel et al argued that the so-called stand-by authority of the President to increase
the VAT rate to 12%, on the ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative
power, and that the conditions in the law amounts to violation of due process. They further
claim that the inclusion of a stand-by authority granted to the President by the Bicameral
Conference Committee is a violation of the “no-amendment rule” upon last reading of a bill
laid down in Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
Petition 3

Association of Pilipinas Shell Dealers believe that these provisions violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the law under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as the
limitation on the creditable input tax if: (1) the entity has a high ratio of input tax; or (2) invests
in capital equipment; or (3) has several transactions with the government, is not based on
real and substantial differences to meet a valid classification.
Petition 4
Escudero filed a petition on almost the same grounds as the first.
Petition 5
Gov. Garcia filed a petition for certiorari on the ground that the limitation on the creditable
input tax in effect allows VAT-registered establishments to retain a portion of the taxes they
collect, thus violating the principle that tax collection and revenue should be solely allocated
for public purposes and expenditures.
Respondents contend that the law is complete and leaves no discretion to the President but
to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two conditions provided therein arise.
ISSUE:
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
1. Whether Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108 of the NIRC, violate Article VI, Section 28(1) and Article VI, Section 28(2) of
the Constitution.
2. Whether Section 8 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 110(A)(2) and 110(B) of
the NIRC; and Section 12 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 114(C) of the
NIRC, violate Article VI, Section 28(1) and Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
PROCEDURAL ISSUE
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates Article VI, Section 24 and Article VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constituiton.
RULING: The law is constitutional.
Substantive
Concerning Article VI, Section 28(1): The 12% increase VAT rate does not impose an
unfair and unnecessary additional tax burden. Congress passed the law hoping for rescue
from an inevitable catastrophe. Whether the law is indeed sufficient to answer the state’s
economic dilemma is not for the Court to judge. the Court in this case will not dawdle on the
purpose of Congress or the executive policy, given that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.”
Concerning Article VI, Section 28(2): Petitioners argue that the VAT is a tax levied on the
sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of

services, which cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted
delegation as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to
the government and usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported. They
also argue that the law also effectively nullified the President’s power of control, which
includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary
of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance. Petitioners Pimentel, et al. aver that the President has ample
powers to cause, influence or create the conditions provided by the law to bring about either
or both the conditions precedent. petitioners Escudero, et al. find bizarre and revolting the
situation that the imposition of the 12% rate would be subject to the whim of the Secretary of
Finance, an unelected bureaucrat, contrary to the principle of no taxation without
representation.
There’s no undue delegation of legislative powers. The legislative does not abdicate its
functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of
his authority. Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to
determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the
operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe
sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. While the power to tax cannot be
delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an
exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of
facts on which its operation depends. The case before the Court is not a delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement
and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made
the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive.
It is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress, which cannot be evaded. In making
his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate.
He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will is to take effect. There is no undue delegation of legislative
power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible.
Concerning Article VI, Section 28(1): Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles
or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may
be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere
with all people at all times.
Petitioners contend that the limitation on the creditable input tax is anything but regressive.
The VAT is an antithesis of progressive taxation. By its very nature, it is regressive. The

principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT
paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same
regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income,
whether big or small.
Concerning Article III, Section 1: The input tax is not a property or a property right within
the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A VAT-registered person’s entitlement to
the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege.
The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. The equal
protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Procedural
Petitioners allege irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing
changes or deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills. The issue is whether the
bicameral conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby
remaining within the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress. This Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no
concern. If a change is desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee it
must be sought in Congress since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision
but is only an internal rule of each house.
Nevertheless, the Court observes that there was a necessity for a conference committee
because a comparison of the provisions of House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 on one hand, and
Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, reveals that there were indeed disagreements. There
being differences and/or disagreements on the foregoing provisions of the House and Senate
bills, the Bicameral Conference Committee was mandated by the rules of both houses of
Congress to act on the same by settling said differences and/or disagreements.
Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate Rules,
the Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the
disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The Bicameral Conference
Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill,
(b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the
disagreeing provisions. The changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference Committee on
disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize the disagreeing

provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly foreign to the subject embraced
by the original provisions.
Concerning Article VI, Section 24: Petitioners claim that the amendments to these
provisions of the NIRC did not at all originate from the House. They argue that since the
proposed amendments did not originate from the House, such amendments are a violation of
Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution. Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not
dealing directly with the value- added tax, which is the only kind of tax being amended in the
House bills, still within the purview of the constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to
propose or concur with amendments to a revenue bill that originated from the House?
R.A. No. 9337 does not violate Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution on exclusive
origination of revenue bills. To insist that a revenue statute – and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law – must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with
amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution
does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be
introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. As these house bills were transmitted to
the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of national perspective, can
introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways that would
soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden across
all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers.
Concerning Article VI, Section 26(2):Petitioners argue that the practice where a bicameral
conference committee is allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate
bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the “no amendment
rule”. However, R.A. No. 9337 does not violate Article VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution on
the “No-Amendment Rule”. Art. VI. § 26 (2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to
bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to the conference committee
report. The “no-amendment rule” refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house
of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is
transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment.

15. Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the
Philippines
465 SCRA 532 (2005)
DOCTRINE:
● Presidency; Delegation of Powers; Tariff Powers; Concerning as they do the foreign
importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the
ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
● Power of Control; The authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2),
Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos
of the President, such as department secretaries—for purposes of the President’s
exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the
Secretary of Finance who acts as his alter ego.
● Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the
purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which
possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative
authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose
such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard
measures under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be
properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as
a matter of right to the legislature.
FACTS:
Philcemcor, an association of at least eighteen (18) domestic cement manufacturers
filed with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on gray Portland
cement, in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure,
the application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to
Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine
whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement.
The Tariff Commission held public hearings and conducted its own investigation, stating that
the elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having been
established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be
imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement.
The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a
definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission.
After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA, the DTI
Secretary then promulgated a Decision wherein he expressed the DTI’s disagreement with
the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying
Philcemcor’s application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do
so in light of the Tariff Commission’s negative findings.
Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the CA a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as

well as the Tariff Commission’s Report. It prayed that the CA direct the DTI Secretary to
disregard the Report and to render judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued
that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to
adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is
predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology. CA
partially granted Philcemcor’s petition. It ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for
certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of
the Tariff Commission, it also held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual
findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they
fall within the ambit of the Secretary’s discretionary review. It determined that the legislative
intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff
Commission’s recommendation.
On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the CA has
no jurisdiction over Philcemcor’s petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with
the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on
the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard
measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the CA Decision had not
yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new
Decision wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate court’s Decision, there was no
longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcor’s application for definitive safeguard
measures. He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission,
the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.
Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland
cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for
three years on imported gray Portland Cement.
ISSUE:
1. Whether a Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an
Indispensable Requisite to the Imposition of General Safeguard Measures.
2. Whether the Decision of the DTI Secretary is appealable to the CTA or the Court
of Appeals.
RULING:
1. Yes. The DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard measure
absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The
fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the
required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly
enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to
impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the
Constitution. The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve
duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the
importation of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign
importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the

ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Without Section 28(2), Article VI,
the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies
involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did
not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that
it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The
constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and
should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President,
rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. The qualifiers mandated by
the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First,
there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail
which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to
impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last power,
the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations
and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices,
accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive
branch.
The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section
28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter
egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the
President’s exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is
generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA
provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is
tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such
measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of
the President, to levy tariffs and imports. Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff
Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as
part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and
imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard,
both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of
Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the
implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary
legislative power of taxation.

Here, There is no question that Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly
imposed by Congress on the presidential authority under the SMA to impose tariffs
and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an indispensable
requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it is the Tariff
Commission which makes such determination, are legal propositions plainly
expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for everyone but respondents.
Philcemcor attributes this Court’s conclusion on the indispensability of the positive
final determination to flawed syllogism in that we read the proposition “if A then B” as
if it stated “if A, and only A, then B.” Translated in practical terms, our conclusion,
according to Philcemcor, would have only been justified had Section 5 read “shall
apply a general safeguard measure upon, and only upon, a positive final
determination of the Tariff Commission.”
2. The decision of the DTI Sec is appealable to the CTA. The Court ruled that the Court
of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcor’s Petition, the proper remedy under
Section 29 of the SMA being a petition for review with the CTA; and that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative
determination of the Tariff Commission and could therefore impose the general
safeguard measures, since Section 5 of the SMA precisely required that the Tariff
Commission make a positive final determination before the DTI Secretary could
impose these measures.

16. Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines (TIDCORP)
692 SCRA 359 (2013)
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of
the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions
taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.
The doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the
President to the Cabinet. Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP
ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to
the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the
Board.
FACTS:
The Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was renamed Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to Republic Act
No. 8494 entitled An Act Further Amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, As Amended, by
Reorganizing And Renaming the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation,
Expanding Its Primary Purpose, and for Other Purposes. Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized
the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of appointments in accordance with the
reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-Demigillo was appointed as Senior Vice
President with permanent status, and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services
Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.
The Board of Directors passed a Resolution to approve a so-called Organizational

Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new organizational structure and staffing
pattern, a position classification system, and a new set of qualification standards. Demigillo,
albeit retaining her position as a Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial
and Credit Management Support Sector (RCMSS). Demigillo challenged before the Board of
Directors the validity of Resolution No. 1365 and of her assignment to the RCMSS. Petitioner
appealed to the CSC raising the same issues. President Valdes informed Demigillo of her
poor performance rating for the period from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2002 for
consistently behaving as an obstructionist in the implementation of the Corporate Business
Plan and for failure to adapt and respond to changes.
CSC ruled that the Organizational Refinements or Restructuring Plan of TIDCORP

had been valid for being authorized by Republic Act. No. 6656; that Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 8498 granted a continuing power to TIDCORPs Board of Directors to prescribe the
agency's organizational structure, staffing pattern and compensation packages; and that such
grant continued until declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction or revoked by
Congress.

The CA affirmed CSC ruling but rendered a legal basis different from the CSC. The
CA held that the President of the Philippines has the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. Hence, being the alter ego of the
President of the Philippines, the Board of Directors of the private respondent-appellee is
authorized by law to have a continuous power to reorganize its agency. The CA held that
Demigillo could not be reinstated to her previous position of Senior Vice President of the
LCSD in view of the legality of the 2002 reorganization being upheld and that TIDCORP
demoted her in the guise of "reorganization."
TIDCORP argues for the application of the doctrine of qualified political agency,
contending that the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP, an attached agency of the
Department of Finance whose head, the Secretary of Finance, was an alter ego of the
President, were also the acts of the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President
who had the continuing authority to reorganize TIDCORP.
RULING:
No. The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of
the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions
taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in
recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations
are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the
President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive Departments. The
doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President
cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.
But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the
appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No.
1080, as further amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the five ex officio members
were the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority, and the Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board,
while the four other members of the Board were the three from the private sector (at least
one of whom should come from the export community), who were elected by the ex officio
members of the Board for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President
of TIDCORP who was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members
sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function,
not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the
law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.

Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board of Directors effected the
assailed 2002 reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of
Directors of TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the President. We cannot stretch the
application of a doctrine that already delegates an enormous amount of power. Also, it is
settled that the delegation of power is not to be lightly inferred.

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GROUP REPORT

August 15, 2022

2. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal ………………………………………………………. 5

3. Clinton v. Jones ………………………………………………………………………………………… 9

4. Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo ………………………………………………………………………... 12

5. De Lima v. Duterte ……………………………………………………………………………………… 14

6. De Leon v. Duterte ……………………………………………………………………………………… 15

7. Funa v. Ermita …………………………………………………………………………………………… 19

8. Funa v. Agra ……………………………………………………………………………………………... 22

9. Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita …………………………………………………………………………………. 25

10. Aguinaldo v. Aquino III ……………………………………………………………………………… 27

11. Rufino v. Endriga …………………………………………………………………………………….. 34

12. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council …………………………………………………………… 38

14. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita ……………………………………………………………….. 47

15. Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the

16. Manalang-Demigillo v. Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines

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Further, petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in

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DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Necessary Implication; Under the doctrine of necessary implication,

FACTS: Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo B.

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ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to immunity from suit.

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Further, as cited by the petitioner himself, the deliberations of the Constitutional

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We cannot, without a comment, make a doctrinal pronouncement as to the propriety of a

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Thereafter, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and

Funa argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and

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Funa, in his capacity as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer, commenced

The appointments being challenged were in acting or temporary capacities. The

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It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in an acting or temporary capacity.

In addition, Agra’s concurrent designations as Acting Secretary of Justice and Acting

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ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of President Arroyo of respondents as acting

Even if the Commission on Appointments is composed of members of Congress, the

The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It

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818 SCRA 2017 (2017)

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The aforementioned MR-Resolution and Supplement-MR-Resolution lack merit given