PAULINO ALITEN, G.R. No.

168931
Petitioner,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
U-NEED LUMBER & HARDWARE, Promulgated:
and COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents. September 12, 2006
On the first issue, we agree with petitioners contention that the appellate
court committed a serious error and misapprehended the facts when it ruled that he
abandoned his work instead of being illegally terminated by his employer.
Abandonment, as a just and valid ground for dismissal, requires the deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or
failure to report for work is not

enough to amount to such abandonment. There must be a concurrence of the

intention to abandon and some overt acts from which an employee may be
deduced as having no more intention to work. The contemplation to discontinue
the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified, a fact that herein private respondent failed to evince.

To reiterate, abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be

presumed from certain equivocal acts. There must be clear proof of deliberate and
unjustified intent to sever the employment relationship. Certainly, the operative act
is still the employees decisive act of putting an end to his
employment. Additionally, it must be stressed that the burden of proving the
existence of just cause for dismissing an employee, such as abandonment, rests on
the employer, a burden private respondent failed to discharge.

Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that for abandonment of work to exist,

it is essential that (1) the employee must have failed to report for work or must
have been absent without valid and justifiable reason; and (2) there must have been
an indisputable intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested
by some overt acts, with the second element as the more determinative factor.
 We hold that the above twin-requirements are not present in the case at bar.
Petitioners absence was not without justifiable reason. As admitted by
Virginia Tan, petitioner requested for a weeks vacation leave which she granted,
albeit reluctantly. The mere fact that petitioner failed to report for work right after
the end of his vacation leave is not enough reason to conclude that he had decided
to abandon his work. Besides, settled is the rule that the mere absence or failure to
report for work does not amount to abandonment.

Private respondent cannot rely on its report to the DOLE because as held by
the Labor Arbiter:

Respondent [herein private respondent] considered him dismissed as

of May 2, 1992. And, even if complainant had a valid application for leave, the
report was that, complainant was considered absent without leave from May 2,
1992 to May 13, 1992. Such kind of exaggeration, cannot aid the respondent in
any case, but can only lead to the inevitable conclusion that, the dismissal is
unjustified.

Clearly, the notice requirement regarding monthly dismissals under Section

7, Rule XXIII, Book V of Department Order No. 9, series of 1997, or the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code was not followed.

We reject private respondents reliance on the certification signed by petitioner to

prove that the latter had effectively abandoned his job. Petitioner merely requested
for a 15-day vacation leave; however, Edwin Tan, Virginia Tans nephew-in-law,
specifically indicated in the typewritten certification that in case petitioner failed to
report to work after his vacation leave, his employment would be deemed
automatically terminated. Private respondent failed to explain why petitioner
would make such a declaration; there is likewise no showing that the consequence
of the issuance of the certification was explained to petitioner. Incidentally, Edwin
Tan was not presented by private respondent to testify on the certification.
Indeed, it is incredible that petitioner would agree to the automatic termination of
his employment if he failed to return after his week-long vacation, considering that
he very well knew that he would not be able to return for work within one-week
from May 4, 1992. The declaration attributed to petitioner in the certification is
belied by Virginia Tans own report to the DOLE where it appears that the
employment of petitioner was terminated effective May 13, 1992, after an absence
without leave on May 2, 1992. However, the records show that petitioner did not
take a leave of absence on that day, and in fact even received his salary. Since
petitioners one-week vacation expired on May 12, 1992, he was absent only
on May 13, 1992 when Tan submitted her report to the DOLE.

Petitioners filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal on May 27, 1992, or
approximately two days after his return from his hometown, likewise negates the
private respondents charge of abandonment. It is highly inconsistent for an
employee to abandon his employment and thereafter file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Abandonment is not compatible with constructive dismissal.

In fine, we find that petitioner did not abandon his job but was illegally
dismissed by private respondent.

Since petitioner was illegally dismissed from work, the Agabon ruling
cannot find application in the case at bar. Considering that petitioners employment
has been terminated without just or valid cause, private respondent violated his
right to security of tenure and constitutional right to due process for not serving
him with the requisite written notices of such termination.

To effectuate a valid dismissal of an employee, the law requires not only the
existence of a just and valid cause but likewise prescribes the employer to give the
employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Procedurally, if the
dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity
to be heard is requested by the employee before terminating the employment. The
notices must consist of the following: a notice specifying the grounds for which
dismissal is sought, a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, and after hearing or
opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss.

Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly

dismissed is entitled to reinstatement, without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, and to the payment of his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

However, the state of affairs obtaining in this case do not justify the
reinstatement of petitioner. Discernible resentment and animosity caused a severe
strain in the relationship between him and the private respondent. A more equitable
disposition would be an award of separation pay equivalent to at least one month
pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher (with a
fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year), in addition to
his full backwages, allowances and other benefits.

>>>>>>>>

MA. MELISSA A. GALANG, G.R. No. 174173

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
-versus- BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
JULIA MALASUGUI,
Respondent. March 7, 2012

The basic issues are, first, whether or not Malasugui is an employee of

Galang; and second if she is an employee, whether or not Malasugui was
constructively dismissed.

All three, Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA ruled that there was an
employer-employee relationship between Galang and Malasugui. We do not see
any reason to rule otherwise. This Court is not a trier of facts and does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties for the factual findings of the labor officials who have acquired
expertise in their own fields are accorded respect and even finality if affirmed on
appeal to the Court of Appeals.[28]

Such principle cannot, however, apply to the finding of illegal dismissal

against Galang. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC both ruled that there was no
illegal dismissal, but the Court of Appeals reversed such findings. We find a need
to look into the decision of the CA.
 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court [in this case the
administrative bodies of Labor Arbiter and NLRC];
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)[29]

That said and done, we conclude that there was indeed an illegal dismissal of
the respondent by the petitioner.

We proceed from the premises that (1) as found by the labor arbiter, the
NLRC and the CA, there is an employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and respondent; and (2) it is a fact that there was a severance of employment.

The dispute is on the reason for the severance. Petitioner pleads that there
was abandonment. Respondent, as she had charged petitioner at the outset, submits
that there was illegal dismissal.

Jurisprudence provides that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal
was for a just cause is on the employer.

Petitioner alleged that respondent packed her bags and left the property after
being scolded due to her non-appearance at the medical examination arranged by
the petitioner. The submission is that respondent left the premises and abandoned
her work.
 Abandonment is a form of neglect of duty, one of the just causes for an
employer to terminate an employee. It is a hornbook precept that in illegal
dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proof. For a valid termination of
employment on the ground of abandonment, the employer must prove, by
substantial evidence, the concurrence of the employees failure to report for work
for no valid reason and his categorical intention to discontinue employment.[30]

There is in this case no substantial evidence that will prove respondents

categorical intention to discontinue employment. On the contrary, the story of
abandonment is simply doubtful. The Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that:

xxxx

It is not in accord with normal human experience and too flimsy a reason for
petitioner so circumstanced, to just pack up her things and vacate the Pangi
property after being queried on why she did not show up at the appointed time
with the radiologist. The allegation that private respondent was displeased after
incurring expenses for petitioners medical check-up remained unrebutted. Hence,
petitioners testimony that she was prevented entry into the Pangi property
appeared more credible.

xxxx[31]

Respondent has been in the employ of petitioner for six years when the
alleged abandonment happened. Being scolded, if it were true, is hardly a reason
for a gardener of six years to just pack up and leave the work premises where she
was even allowed to reside, at a time when she was ill and needed medical
attention. Indeed, the alleged scolding is itself incredible. The given reason was
that respondent failed to show up at her arranged appointment with the
radiologist. It is hard to believe that a sick gardener, certainly of minimal means,
would refuse the offer of medical services. In fact, the basic allegation in
respondents complaint for illegal dismissal was that petitioners treatment to her
became sour especially when she requested that she be examined by a doctor for
her cough.[32] And, completely belying the petitioners assertion that respondent
failed to show up at the appointed time with the radiologist are two certificates
issued by Radiologist Susan R. Gaspar stating that on 30 January 1999 and on 1
February 1999 respondent had her chest x-ray taken at the Radiology Section of
the Polyclinic Davao.[33]
 In the case of Garcia v. NLRC correctly relied upon by the Court of Appeals,
we emphasized that there must be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and
some overt acts from which an employee may be deduced as having no more
intention to work.[34] Such intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by
clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.[35]

In the instant case, the overt act relied upon by petitioner is not only a doubtful occurrence but is, if it did transpire, even
consistent with the dismissal from employment posited by the respondent. The factual appraisal of the Court of Appeals is
correct. Petitioner was displeased after incurring expenses for respondents medical check-up and, it is credible that, thereafter,
respondent was prevented entry into the work premises. This is tantamount to constructive dismissal.[36]

Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because

continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an
offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.[37] Constructive
dismissal is a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to
appear as if it were not.[38] In constructive dismissal cases, the employer is,
concededly, charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action or the
transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine
business necessity.[39]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the incredibility of petitioners

submission about abandonment of work renders credible the position of respondent
that she was prevented from entering the property. This was even corroborated by
the affidavits of Siarot and Mendoza which were made part of the records of this
case.

The dismissal of respondent places upon petitioner the burden of proof of

legality of dismissal.

In AMA Computer College-East Rizal v. Ignacio [40] as reiterated in Gurango

v. Best Chemicals and Plastics, Inc.,[41] the Court ruled that:

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that
the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal
cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of
illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was
for a valid or authorized cause. And the quantum of proof which the employer must
discharge is substantial evidence. An employees dismissal due to serious
misconduct must be supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
 support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise.[42]

In this case, petitioner, instead of proving the legality of dismissal, relied entirely
on the defense of abandonment. When such defense fell and failed, illegal
dismissal was left undisputed.

Having disposed of the basic issues and found that there is an employee-employer
relationship between the parties and that respondent was illegally dismissed, the
rest of the disposition of the Court of Appeals will have to be, consequently,
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 18 April 2006 Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62700 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No
cost.

SO ORDERED.
>>>>>>>>>>>

JOSAN, JPS, SANTIAGO CARGO G.R. No. 190794

MOVERS, and MARY GRACE S.
PARUNGAO,* Present:
Petitioners,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
VILLARAMA,*
versus PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.
EDUARDO RAMOS ADUNA,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 22, 2012

Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from

certain equivocal acts, especially during times of hardship.[6] Thus, we have ruled
in a series of cases that there are two elements that must concur in order for an act
to constitute abandonment: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship.[7] The second element is the more determinative factor, which must be
manifested by some overt acts.[8] Mere absence or failure to report for work does
not, ipso facto, amount to abandonment of work.[9] To prove abandonment, the
employer must show that the employee deliberately and unjustifiably refused to
resume his employment without any intention of returning.[10]

The NLRC and the CA found that the true reason why respondent did not
report for work for about 50 days was that he had been told by petitioners to lie
low. This is a finding of fact, which we shall no longer disturb. Thus, when
respondent realized that he was no longer going to receive work assignments, he
wasted no time in filing a case for illegal dismissal against petitioners. Employees
who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned
their work.[11] A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate
filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.[12] The filing thereof is proof enough of
ones desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.[13]

Respondent must therefore be deemed to have been constructively

dismissed. There is constructive dismissal when continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely.[14] In this case, although Aduna agreed to lie
low because of the incident, it became clear that petitioners no longer had the
intention to give him future assignments. In fact, they already deemed the issuance
of the Certificate of Employment as a sign of abandonment of work. The continued
failure of petitioners to offer him a new assignment makes the former liable for
constructive dismissal.[15] Clearly, the instruction to temporarily lie low was meant
to be for a permanent cessation from work. With the absence of any proof of dire
exigency that would justify the failure to give further assignments, the only logical
conclusion is that respondent was constructively dismissed.[16]

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer, who
has to prove that the dismissal of an employee was for a valid cause. [17] Since
petitioners based their defense on abandonment by respondent, it is likewise
incumbent upon them, as employers, to prove that he clearly, voluntarily, and
intentionally abandoned his work.[18] As previously discussed, it is clear from the
evidence on record that petitioners failed to discharge this burden.[19] As we have
consistently affirmed, if the evidence presented by the employer and the employee
are in equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
[20]
Accordingly, the finding of illegal dismissal must be upheld.[21]

Article 279 of the Labor Code provides that an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges; to his full back wages, inclusive of allowances; and to
other applicable benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. [22] However, in
recognition of the strained relations between petitioners and respondent, the former
are instead liable to give separation pay as found by the CA.

WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED. The 21 October 2009 Decision

and 16 December 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
108996 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[1]
Both the Decision and the Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 108996 were penned by CA Associate Justice Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose Catral Mendoza and Romeo F. Barza.
[2]
Petition for Review on Certiorari, p. 2; rollo, p. 10. However, records are inconsistent as to the true form of the
business organization of petitioner-entities. A perusal of respondents Position Paper, as quoted in the labor arbiters
Decision, indicates that the entities are duly organized domestic corporations. It also mentioned that the business
names JO-SAN Trucking Corporation and JPS Santiago Cargo Movers, Inc. are, in fact, the former or alternative
names of the business entity Santiago Cargo Movers, Inc. (See respondent-complainants Position Paper, pp. 2-
3; rollo, pp. 54-55).
[3]
LA Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 80-81.
[4]
NLRC Decision, pp. 4-6; rollo, pp. 100-102.
[5]
CA Decision, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 37-38.
[6]
Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506 (2003).
[7]
Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, 389 Phil. 441 (2000).
[8]
Id.
[9]
Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., supra note 6.
[10]
Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 7.
[11]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, G.R. No. 160940, 21 July 2008, 559 SCRA 110.
[12]
Icawat v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 7.
[13]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11.
[14]
Philippine Wireless, Inc. (Pocketbell) v. NLRC, 369 Phil. 907 (1999); Ledesma & Co. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 316 Phil. 80 (1995).
[15]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11.
[16]
See Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, 497 Phil. 621 (2005).
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Lactao, supra note 11.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

G.R. No. 188711 July 8, 2013

TAN BROTHERS CORPORATION OF BASILAN CITY THROUGH ITS OWNER/MANAGER,

MAURO F. TAN,PETITIONERS,
vs.
EDNA R. ESCUDERO, RESPONDENT.

The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, it bears stressing that, in petitions for review on certiorari like the one at bench, the scope of this Court’s
judicial review of decisions of the CA is generally confined only to errors of law16 and does not extend to a
reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination.17Whether Escudero has abandoned her job or was illegally dismissed are questions of fact better left
for determination by quasi-judicial agencies18 which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters.19 Corollarily, the rule is settled that the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are accorded not only great respect but also finality, and are deemed binding upon this
Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.20 Time and again, we have reiterated the dictum that the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this applies with greater force in labor cases.21

As defined under established jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment.22 It constitutes neglect of duty and is a just cause for termination of employment under
paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code.23 To constitute abandonment, however, there must be a clear and
deliberate intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two elements must
concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever
the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested
by some overt acts.24 Otherwise stated, absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact
that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.25 It has been ruled that the employer has the burden of
proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of
returning.26
1âwphi1

Repeating its defense of abandonment, Tan Brothers argues that Escudero unilaterally stopped reporting for work in
July 2003. In addition to the latter’s prolonged absence from work, Tan Brothers calls our attention to Escudero’s
supposed appropriation of the corporation’s typewriter and records which supposedly evinced her intention to sever
the parties’ employer-employee relations. It is argued that, having committed the foregoing infraction to get even with
her employer, it would have been unthinkable for Escudero to plan on further reporting for work. Considering that the
complaint did not pray for reinstatement and was filed only on 1 September 2004 or more than one year after
Escudero’s supposed last attendance at work, Tan Brothers also fault the CA for applying the rule that abandonment
is negated by the employee’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Ultimately, Tan Brothers maintains that the
award of backwages and separation pay should have been disallowed in view of Escudero’s abandonment of her
employment.27

On the theory that the same is proof enough of the desire to return to work,28 the immediate filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal – more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement – has been held to be totally inconsistent with
a charge of abandonment.29 While it is true that Escudero’s complaint prayed for separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, Tan Brothers loses sight of the fact, however, that it had the burden of proving its own allegation that
Escudero had abandoned her employment in July 2003. As allegation is not evidence, the rule has always been to
the effect that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence30 which has been
construed to mean such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.31Confronted with Escudero’s assertion that she reported for work despite irregular payment of her salaries
and was forced to stop doing so after her wages were not paid in May 2004, the record shows that Tan Brothers
proffered nothing beyond bare allegations to prove that Escudero had abandoned her employment in July 2003.

It is, on the other hand, doctrinal that abandonment is a matter of intention32 and cannot, for said reason, be lightly
inferred, much less legally presumed from certain equivocal acts.33 Viewed in the light of Escudero’s persistence in
reporting for work despite the irregular payment of her salaries starting July 2003, we find that her subsequent failure
to do so as a consequence of Tan Brothers’ non-payment of her salaries in May 2004 is hardly evincive of an
intention to abandon her employment. Indeed, mere absence or failure to report for work, even after a notice to return
work has been served, is not enough to amount to an abandonment of employment.34 Considering that a notice
directing Escudero to return to work was not even issued in the premises, we find that the CA committed no
reversible error in ruling out Tan Brother’s defense of abandonment.

The same may be said of the CA’s rejection of the employer’s contention that the employee signified her intention to
sever the parties’ employer-employee relationship when she illegally appropriated for herself the corporation’s
typewriter and took its payrolls, vouchers and other material documents. Since unsubstantiated accusation, without
more, is not synonymous with guilt,35 the CA correctly brushed aside Escudero’s supposed infraction which Tan
Brothers reported to the barangay authorities of Seaside, Isabela City only on 6 September 2004 or after the filing of
the complaint a quo. In order to terminate an employee’s services for a just cause, moreover, it is essential that the
two-notice requirement must be complied with by the employer, to wit: a) a written notice containing a statement of
the cause for the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires; and b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of the
employee, the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reason
therefor.36 The requirement of these notices is not a mere technicality, but a requirement of due process to which
every employee is entitled.37
Neither are we inclined to disturb the CA’s finding that Escudero was constructively dismissed by Tan Brothers which,
as employer, had the burden of proving that said employee was dismissed for a just and valid cause.38Constructive
dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option
but to quit.39 The test is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up
his position under the circumstances.40 Much though Tan Brothers may now be inclined to disparage the same as
mere alibis, the fact that Escudero was deprived of office space, was not given further work assignment and was not
paid her salaries until she was left with no choice but stop reporting for work all combine to make out a clear case of
constructive dismissal.

Having been constructively dismissed, Escudero was correctly found entitled to backwages and attorney’s fees by the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA. Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, employees who have been
illegally terminated from employment are entitled to the twin reliefs of reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and to the payment of full back wages41 corresponding to the period from their illegal dismissal up to actual
reinstatement.42 Reinstatement is a restoration to the state from which one has been removed or separated,43 while
the payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of the unlawful
dismissal.44 Proper where reinstatement is not advisable or feasible as when antagonism already caused a severe
strain in the relationship between the employer and the employee,45 separation pay may also be awarded where, as
here, reinstatement is no longer practical or in the best interest of the parties or when the employee decides not to be
reinstated anymore.46

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 01028-MIN is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.