1

G.R. No. 149453 unloaded by Justice Callejo, Sr. and re-raffled to

October 7, 2003 any other member of the Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF The Court resolves to deny the respondent’s
JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE motion for lack of merit.
NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR
JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER The records show that as early as May 24, 2002,
L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND the respondent filed an urgent motion for the
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR CONRADO M. recusation of Justices Renato C. Corona and Ma.
JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON Alicia Austria-Martinez for the reason that they
CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, were appointed to the Court after the February
19, 2002 oral arguments and did not participate
vs. in the integral portions of the proceedings.
Justices Corona and Austria-Martinez refused to
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent. inhibit themselves and decided to participate in
the deliberation on the petition.6 On March 18,
RESOLUTION 2003, the respondent filed a motion with the
Court for the recusation of Justice Romeo J.
CALLEJO, SR., J.: Callejo, Sr. on account of his voluntary inhibition
when the case was pending before the Court of
Before the Court are the following motions of Appeals.
the respondent, to wit: (a) Omnibus Motion;1
(b) Motion for Reconsideration;2 (c) On March 25, 2003, this Court issued a
Supplement to Motion for Reconsideration;3 resolution denying the respondent’s Motion
(d) Motion To Set for Oral Arguments.4 dated March 18, 2003. The respondent
thereafter filed his motion for reconsideration
The Omnibus Motion of the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court in
which he prayed, inter alia, for the inhibition of
The respondent seeks the reconsideration of Justice Callejo, Sr. under A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC
the April 29, 2003 Resolution of this Court which and that the case be re-raffled to another
granted the petitioners’ motion for member of the Court who had actually
reconsideration. The respondent thereafter participated in the deliberation and the
prays to allow Associate Justices Renato C. rendition of its May 28, 2002 Resolution. The
Corona, Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, Conchita C. respondent likewise sought the inhibition of
Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S.
Azcuna to voluntary inhibit themselves or, Azcuna, again for the reason that they were
absent their consent, rule that such inhibition is appointed to the Court after the oral arguments
in order and to recuse them from further on February 19, 2002 and after the case had
deliberating, discussing or, in any manner, already been submitted for decision.
participating in the resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplement to Motion On April 29, 2003, this Court issued a resolution
for Reconsideration. The respondent points out denying the aforesaid motions of the
that the aforenamed members of the Court respondent.7 The Court ruled that A.M. No. 99-
were appointed by President Gloria Macapagal- 8-09-SC is applicable only to cases assigned to
Arroyo after the February 19, 2002 oral the divisions of the Court:
arguments and after the case at bar was
submitted for the decision of the Court. He The respondent’s reliance on Supreme Court
asserts that although A.M. No. 99-8-09-SC5 Circular No. 99-8-09 is misplaced. As admitted
specifically provides that it applies only to the by the respondent, the said circular is applicable
divisions of the Court, it should likewise apply to only to motions for reconsideration in cases
this case, in light of the April 1, 2003 Resolution assigned to the Divisions of the Court. For cases
of this Court which set aside its Resolution assigned to the Court En Banc, the policy of the
dated May 28, 2002, apart from the Court had always been and still is, if the
constitutional issues raised by the respondent in ponente is no longer with the Court, his
his motion for reconsideration and its replacement will act upon the motion for
supplement. As such, according to the reconsideration of a party and participate in the
respondent, the instant case should be deliberations thereof. This is the reason why
 2

Justice Callejo, Sr. who had replaced retired objection of this sort after a decision has been
Justice De Leon, prepared the draft of the April rendered.11
1, 2003 Resolution of the Court.8
The Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments
The Court also ruled that there was no need for
its newest members to inhibit themselves from The Court denies the motion of the respondent.
participating in the deliberation of the The parties have already extensively discussed
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration: the issues involved in the case. The
respondent’s motion for reconsideration
Although Justices Conchita Carpio-Morales, consists of no less than a hundred pages,
Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and Adolfo S. Azcuna were excluding the supplement to his motion for
not yet members of the Court during the reconsideration and his reply to the petitioners’
February 18, 20029 oral arguments before the comment on his motion. There is no longer a
Court, nonetheless they were not disqualified to need to set the instant case for oral arguments.
participate in the deliberations on the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the The Issue as to the Application of the Time-bar
May 28, 2002 Resolution of the Court or of the under Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
instant motion for reconsideration. Neither is Criminal Procedure – Whether Prospective or
Justice Callejo, Sr. disqualified to prepare the Retroactive
resolution of the Court on the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent. When the The respondent seeks the reconsideration of
Court deliberated on petitioners’ motion for the April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court and
reconsideration, Justices Conchita Carpio- thereafter reinstate its Resolution of May 28,
Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Adolfo S. 2002.
Azcuna were already members of the Court.
He asserts that pursuant to a long line of
It bears stressing that transcripts of jurisprudence and a long-standing judicial
stenographic notes taken during the February practice in applying penal law, Section 8, Rule
18, 2002 hearing and oral arguments of the 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
parties are parts of the records of this case. Said (RRCP) should be applied prospectively and
transcripts are available to the parties or to any retroactively without reservations, only and
member of the Court. Likewise, Attys. Rene A.V. solely on the basis of its being favorable to the
Saguisag and Felix Carao, Jr. may not yet have accused. He asserts that case law on the
been the counsel of the respondent on February retroactive application of penal laws should
18, 2002 but by reading the said transcripts and likewise apply to criminal procedure, it being a
the records of this case they are informed of branch of criminal law. The respondent insists
what transpired during the hearing and oral that Section 8 was purposely crafted and
arguments of the parties.10 included as a new provision to reinforce the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
It is thus clear that the grounds cited by the disposition of his case. It is primarily a check on
respondent in his omnibus motion had already the State to prosecute criminal cases diligently
been passed upon and resolved by this Court. and continuously, lest it loses its right to
The respondent did not make any new prosecute the accused anew. The respondent
substantial arguments in his motion to warrant argues that since Section 8 is indubitably a rule
a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolutions. of procedure, there can be no other conclusion:
the rule should have retroactive application,
Besides, the respondent sought the inhibition of absent any provision therein that it should be
Justices Conchita C. Morales and Adolfo S. applied prospectively. Accordingly, prospective
Azcuna only after they had already concurred in application thereof would in effect give the
the Court’s Resolution dated April 1, 2003. Case petitioners more than two years from March 29,
law has it that a motion for disqualification must 1999 within which to revive the criminal cases,
be denied when filed after a member of the thus violating the respondent’s right to due
Court has already given an opinion on the process and equal protection of the law.
merits of the case, the rationale being that a
litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon The respondent asserts that Section 8 was
the action of the Court, only to raise an meant to reach back in time to provide relief to
the accused. In this case, the State had been
 3

given more than sufficient opportunity to 2001. The State had reasonable opportunity to
prosecute the respondent anew after the March refile the cases before the two-year bar but
29, 1999 dismissal of the cases by then Judge failed to do so because of negligence; and
Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. and even before the RRCP perhaps institutional indolence. Contrary to the
took effect on December 1, 2000. According to petitioners’ contention, the respondent posits
the respondent, the petitioners filed the that the revival of the cases contemplated in
Informations with the RTC in Criminal Cases Section 8 refers to the filing of the Informations
Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the two- or complaints in court for trial. The operational
year bar, in violation of his right to a speedy act then is the refiling of the Informations with
trial, and that such filing was designed to derail the RTC, which was done only on June 6, 2001,
his bid for the Senate. clearly beyond the two-year bar.

In their comment on the respondent’s motions, The Court finds the respondent’s contentions to
the petitioners assert that the prospective be without merit.
application of Section 8 is in keeping with
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 First. The Court approved the RRCP pursuant to
Constitution, which provides in part that the its power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph
rules of procedure which the Court may 5 of the Constitution which reads:
promulgate shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantial rights. While Section 8 (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
secures the rights of the accused, it does not and enforcement of constitutional rights,
and should not preclude the equally important pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
right of the State to public justice. If such right the admission to the practice of law, the
to public justice is taken away, then Section 8 Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
can no longer be said to be a procedural rule. underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
According to the petitioners, if a procedural rule simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
impairs a vested right, or would work injustice, speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
the said rule may not be given a retroactive all courts of the same grade, and shall not
application. They contend that the right of the diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
accused to a speedy trial or disposition of the Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
criminal cases applies only to outstanding and judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
pending cases and not to cases already disapproved by the Supreme Court.
dismissed. The petitioners assert that the
"refiling of the cases" under Section 8 should be The Court is not mandated to apply Section 8
taken to mean as the filing of the criminal retroactively simply because it is favorable to
complaint with the appropriate office for the the accused. It must be noted that the new rule
purpose of conducting a preliminary was approved by the Court not only to reinforce
investigation, and not the actual filing of the the constitutional right of the accused to a
criminal complaint or information in court for speedy disposition of the case. The time-bar
trial. Furthermore, according to the petitioners, under the new rule was fixed by the Court to
the offended parties must be given notices of excise the malaise that plagued the
the motion for provisional dismissal of the cases administration of the criminal justice system for
under Section 8 since the provision so expressly the benefit of the State and the accused; not for
states. Thus, if the requisite notices to the heirs the accused only. The Court emphasized in its
of the deceased would be taken into assailed resolution that:
consideration, the two-year period had not yet
even commenced to run. In the new rule in question, as now construed
by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year
In his consolidated reply to the comment of the or two years for the revival of criminal cases
petitioners, the respondent asserts that the provisionally dismissed with the express
State is proscribed from refiling a criminal case consent of the accused and with a priori notice
if it can be shown that the delay resulted in a to the offended party. The time-bar may
violation of the right of the accused to due appear, on first impression, unreasonable
process. In this case, there was an inordinate compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
delay in the revival of the cases, considering Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-
that the witnesses in the criminal cases for the bar, the Court balanced the societal interests
State in March 1999 are the same witnesses in and those of the accused for the orderly and
 4

speedy disposition of criminal cases with general spirit and policy of the rule. It should be
minimum prejudice to the State and the construed so as not to defeat but to carry out
accused. It took into account the substantial such end or purpose.17 A statute derives its
rights of both the State and of the accused to vitality from the purpose for which it is
due process. The Court believed that the time approved. To construe it in a manner that
limit is a reasonable period for the State to disregards or defeats such purpose is to nullify
revive provisionally dismissed cases with the or destroy the law.18 In Cometa v. Court of
consent of the accused and notice to the Appeals,19 this Court ruled that "the spirit
offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the rather than the letter of the statute determines
Court must be respected unless it is shown that its construction; hence, a statute must be read
the period is manifestly short or insufficient that according to its spirit or intent."20 While we
the rule becomes a denial of justice.12 may not read into the law a purpose that is not
there, we nevertheless have the right to read
In criminal litigations concerning constitutional out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing
issue claims, the Court, in the interest of justice, so, we defer not to the "letter that killeth" but
may make the rule prospective where the to the "spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the
exigencies of the situation make the rule lawmaker’s will."21
prospective. The retroactivity or non-
retroactivity of a rule is not automatically In this case, when the Court approved Section 8,
determined by the provision of the Constitution it intended the new rule to be applied
on which the dictate is based. Each prospectively and not retroactively, for if the
constitutional rule of criminal procedure has its intention of the Court were otherwise, it would
own distinct functions, its own background or defeat the very purpose for which it was
precedent, and its own impact on the intended, namely, to give the State a period of
administration of justice, and the way in which two years from notice of the provisional
these factors combine must inevitably vary with dismissal of criminal cases with the express
the dictate involved.13 consent of the accused. It would be a denial of
the State’s right to due process and a travesty of
Matters of procedure are not necessarily justice for the Court to apply the new rule
retrospective in operation as a statute.14 To retroactively in the present case as the
paraphrase the United States Supreme Court respondent insists, considering that the criminal
per Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the Court in cases were provisionally dismissed by Judge
defining the limits of adherence may make a Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999 before the new
choice for itself between the principle of rule took effect on December 1, 2000. A
forward operation and that of relating retroactive application of the time-bar will
forward.15 result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State and to the victims of
The Court approved Section 8 pursuant to its crimes and their heirs.
power under Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5
of the Constitution. This constitutional grant to Consider this scenario: the trial court (RTC)
promulgate rules carries with it the power, inter provisionally dismissed a criminal case with the
alia, to determine whether to give the said rules express consent of the accused in 1997. The
prospective or retroactive effect. Moreover, prosecution had the right to revive the case
under Rule 144 of the Rules of Court, the Court within the prescriptive period, under Article 90
may not apply the rules to actions pending of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On
before it if in its opinion their application would December 1, 2000, the time-bar rule under
not be feasible or would work injustice, in which Section 8 took effect, the prosecution was
event, the former procedure shall apply.16 unable to revive the criminal case before then.

The absence of a provision in Section 8 giving it If the time-bar fixed in Section 8 were to be
prospective application only does not proscribe applied retroactively, this would mean that the
the prospective application thereof; nor does it State would be barred from reviving the case for
imply that the Court intended the new rule to failure to comply with the said time-bar, which
be given retroactive and prospective effect. If was yet to be approved by the Court three years
the statutory purpose is clear, the provisions of after the provisional dismissal of the criminal
the law should be construed as is conducive to case. In contrast, if the same case was dismissed
fairness and justice, and in harmony with the provisionally in December 2000, the State had
 5

the right to revive the same within the time-bar. cases against respondent or that it was
In fine, to so hold would imply that the State negligent for not reviving them within the two-
was presumed to foresee and anticipate that year period under the new
three years after 1997, the Court would approve rule.1a\^/phi1.net As the United States
and amend the RRCP. The State would thus be Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix
sanctioned for its failure to comply with a rule Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People, 351 US 12
yet to be approved by the Court. It must be (1956):
stressed that the institution and prosecution of
criminal cases are governed by existing rules We should not indulge in the fiction that the law
and not by rules yet to exist. It would be the now announced has always been the law and,
apex of injustice to hold that Section 8 had a therefore, that those who did not avail
platonic or ideal existence before it was themselves of it waived their rights …
approved by the Court. The past cannot be
erased by a capricious retroactive application of The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for
the new rule. the benefit of both the State and the accused. It
should not be emasculated and reduced by an
In holding that the petitioners had inordinate retroactive application of the time-
until December 1, 2002 within which to revive bar therein provided merely to benefit the
the criminal cases provisionally dismissed by accused. For to do so would cause an "injustice
Judge Agnir, Jr. on March 29, 1999, this Court of hardship" to the State and adversely affect
explained, thus: the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.23
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to
apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two- Further quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter’s
year period commenced to run on March 31, opinion in Griffin v. People,24 he said, "it is
1999 when the public prosecutor received his much more conducive to law’s self-respect to
copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. recognize candidly the considerations that give
dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with prospective content to a new pronouncement
the intendment of the new rule. Instead of of law. That this is consonant with the spirit of
giving the State two years to revive provisionally our law and justified by those considerations of
dismissed cases, the State had considerably less reason which should dominate the law has been
than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. luminously expounded by Mr. Justice Cardozo
dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q- shortly before he came here and in an opinion
99-81689 on March 29, 1999. The new rule took which he wrote for the Court."
effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied
the new time-bar retroactively, the State would Parenthetically, the respondent himself
have only one year and three months or until admitted in his motion for reconsideration that
March 31, 2001 within which to revive these Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have been expected to
criminal cases. The period is short of the two- comply with the notice requirement under the
year period fixed under the new rule. On the new rule when it yet had to exist:
other hand, if the time limit is applied
prospectively, the State would have two years 99. Respondent submits that the records are
from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, still in the same state of inadequacy and
2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in incompletion. This however is not strange
consonance with the intendment of the new considering that Section 8, Rule 117 had not
rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent existed on March 29, 1999, when the criminal
injustice to the State and avoid absurd, cases were dismissed, and then Judge Agnir did
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and not have its text to guide his actions. How could
wrongful results in the administration of justice. the good judge have complied with the
mandate of Section 8, Rule 117 when it yet had
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, to exist?25
199922 should be excluded in the computation
of the two-year period because the rule Statutes regulating the procedure of the
prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time courts will be construed as applicable to actions
and the State could not be expected to comply pending and undetermined at the time of their
with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that passage. In that sense and to that extent,
the State waived its right to revive the criminal procedural laws are retroactive.26 Criminal
 6

Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 had long Due process has never been and perhaps can
been dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. before the never be precisely defined.1a\^/phi1.net It is
new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. not a technical conception with a fixed content
When the petitioners filed the Informations in unrelated to time, place and circumstances. The
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 on phrase expresses the requirement of
June 6, 2001, Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 fundamental fairness, a requisite whose
and Q-99-81689 had long since been meaning can be as opaque as its importance is
terminated. The two-year bar in the new rule lofty.30 In determining what fundamental
should not be reckoned from the March 29, fairness consists of in a particular situation,
1999 dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99- relevant precedents must be considered and
81679 to Q-99-81689 but from December 1, the interests that are at stake; private interests,
2000 when the new rule took effect. While it is as well as the interests of the government must
true that the Court applied Section 8 of Rule be assessed. In this case, in holding that the
11027 of the RRCP retroactively, it did so only new rule has prospective and not retroactive
to cases still pending with this Court and not to application, the Court took into consideration
cases already terminated with finality. not only the interests of the respondent but all
other accused, whatever their station in life may
The records show that after the requisite be. The interest of the State in the speedy,
preliminary investigation conducted by the impartial and inexpensive disposition of criminal
petitioners in accordance with existing rules, cases was likewise considered.
eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 were filed with the RTC on The Respondent Failed to Comply with the
June 6, 2001, very well within the time-bar Essential Prerequisites of Section 8, Rule 117 of
therefor. The respondent cannot argue that his the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
right to due process and to a speedy disposition
of the cases as enshrined in the Constitution The respondent argues that the issue involved
had been violated.28 in the Court of Appeals is entirely different from
the issue involved in the present recourse;
The respondent’s plaint that he was being hence, any admissions he made in the court
singled out by the prospective application of the below are not judicial admissions in this case.
new rule simply because before the Court He asserts that the issue involved in the CA was
issued its April 1, 2003 Resolution, he whether or not he was placed in double
announced his candidacy for the presidency of jeopardy when he was charged with murder in
the Republic for the 2004 elections has no Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
factual basis whatsoever.29 The bare and despite the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
irrefutable fact is that it was in this case where 99-81679 to Q-99-81689; whereas the issue in
the issue of the retroactive/prospective this Court is whether the prosecution of
application of the new rule was first raised Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
before the Court. The ruling of the Court in its was barred by Section 8, Rule 117 of the RRCP.
April 1, 2003 Resolution and its ruling today The respondent avers that the proceedings in
would be the same, regardless of who the party the appellate court are different from those in
or parties involved are, whether a senator of this Court.
the Republic or an ordinary citizen.
The respondent posits that this Court erred in
The respondent’s contention that the giving considerable weight to the admissions he
prospective application of the new rule would made in his pleadings and during the
deny him due process and would violate the proceedings in the CA. He stresses that judicial
equal protection of laws is barren of merit. It admissions may only be used against a party if
proceeds from an erroneous assumption that such admissions are (a) made in the course of
the new rule was approved by the Court solely the proceedings in the same case; and (b) made
for his benefit, in derogation of the right of the regarding a relevant fact, pursuant to Section 4,
State to due process. The new rule was Rule 129 and Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules
approved by the Court to enhance the right of of Evidence. He contends that contrary to the
due process of both the State and the accused. ruling of the Court, when he filed his motion for
The State is entitled to due process in criminal the judicial determination of probable cause in
cases as much as the accused. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
he thereby prayed for the dismissal of the said
 7

cases. His motion carried with it, at the very his petition for certiorari in the CA, again
least, the prayer for the dismissal of the criminal invoking his right against double jeopardy,
cases. Absent a finding of probable cause, Judge praying that:
Agnir, Jr. had no recourse but to dismiss the
criminal cases. Moreover, the respondent avers 13. Inasmuch as the case subject of the
that his motion included the general prayer "for "preliminary investigation" was dismissed for
such other reliefs as may be equitable in the the reasons mentioned, there currently exists
premises." The respondent also points out that no complaint upon which a valid investigation
the public prosecutor agreed to the averments can be had in light of the clear provisions of
in his motion as the latter did not even file any Rule 110 which requires the existence of a
motion for the reconsideration of Judge Agnir, "sworn written statement charging a person
Jr.’s order dismissing the cases. with an offense" as basis for the
commencement of a preliminary investigation
The respondent further contends that the Court under Rule 112.1awphi1.nét
is not a trier of facts. It has no means to
ascertain or verify as true the contrasting claims For petitioner, the investigation covers exactly
of the parties on the factual issues, a function the same offenses over which he had been duly
best left to the trial court as the trier of facts. arraigned and a plea validly entered before the
He posits that there is a need for the case to be Sandiganbayan (in Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to
remanded to the RTC to enable him to present 57) before its remand to the QC RTC. Hence, to
evidence on whether or not Judge Agnir, Jr. proceed therewith on similar charges will put
complied with the notice requirements of him in jeopardy of being twice punished
Section 8. Echoing the May 28, 2002 ruling of therefor (Article III, §21, Constitution).34
this Court, the respondent contends that it is
not fair to expect the element of notice under The respondent (petitioner therein) contended
Section 8 to be litigated before Judge Agnir, Jr., that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
for the said rule was not yet in existence at the 81679 to Q-99-81689 by Judge Agnir, Jr.
time he filed his motion for a determination of amounted to a judgment of acquittal; hence, he
probable cause. could no longer be charged and prosecuted
anew for the same offense without violating his
The respondent avers that the requirement for right against double jeopardy. However, the
notices to the offended parties under Section 8 respondent filed a second amended petition
is a formal and not an essential requisite. In wherein he invoked for the first time Section 8
criminal cases, the offended party is the State of Rule 117 of the RRCP:
and the role of the private complainant is
limited to the determination of the civil liability (e) the new criminal cases for Murder filed by
of the accused. According to the respondent, respondents against petitioner and the other
notice to the prosecution provides sufficient accused on June 6, 2001 (docketed as Criminal
safeguard for the private complainant to Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112) and
recover on the civil liability of the accused based pending before respondent Judge Yadao (Annex
on the delicts; after all, the prosecution of the B) is dismissible on its face as they involve
offense is under the control and direction of the exactly the same accused, facts, and offenses
public prosecutor. which had previously been dismissed by the QC
RTC in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to 89 on
The contentions of the respondent have no March 29, 1999, hence, can no longer be
merit. revived two (2) years after such dismissal in
accordance with the clear provisions of Section
First. The issue posed by the respondent in the 8, Rule 117.35
CA and in this Court are the same. To recall, in
Civil Case No. 01-100933,31 the respondent32 Indeed, the CA granted the respondent’s
sought injunctive relief from the RTC of Manila petition based on Section 8, Rule 117 of the
on his claim that in conducting a preliminary RRCP. In this case, the respondent invoked the
investigation in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 same rule and the Constitution. Thus, during the
to 01-101112, the petitioners thereby placed oral arguments in this Court, the respondent,
him in double jeopardy under Section 7, Rule through counsel, admitted that he was indeed
117 of the RRCP.33 When the RTC denied his invoking Section 8 anew and the provisions of
plea for injunctive relief, the respondent filed the Constitution on double jeopardy:
 8

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You are saying that Sen. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: What you are saying is
Lacson can no longer be prosecuted forever for the effects, I am not asking about the effects, I
that crime, for the killing of the 11 in 1995? will ask that later.

ATTY. FORTUN: That is my submission, Your ATTY. FORTUN: They are two different
Honor. (interrupted)

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Let us see your reason JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Later, I am asking about
for it? doctrines. Since you are not invoking the
doctrine of double jeopardy you are resting
ATTY. FORTUN:36 First, are you saying that your case win or lose, sink or sail on the
double jeopardy applies or not? application of 8,117?

JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:37 Allow me to qualify ATTY. FORTUN: On the constitutional right of

the effects of double jeopardy occur with the accused under Section 16 of Article 3 which
permanent dismissal that is my submission. is speedy disposition of cases which
implemented 8,817, that is our arguments in
ATTY. FORTUN:38 No, no, I am not talking of the this bar.
effects, I am talking of the doctrine, you are not
invoking the doctrine of double jeopardy? JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Are you not resting on
8,117?
ATTY. FORTUN: Your Honor, double jeopardy
does not apply Section 8, 117 they are ATTY. FORTUN: That and the constitutional
(interrupted) provision, Your Honor
.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: That is right. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: So, you are resting on
8,117?
ATTY. FORTUN: They are two different claims.
ATTY. FORTUN:Not exclusive, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: That is what I am trying
to rule out so that we do not have to discuss it. JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: And the Constitution?

ATTY. FORTUN: Very well, Your Honor. ATTY. FORTUN: The Constitution which gave life
to 8,117.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: You are not invoking
double jeopardy? JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: To speedy disposition?

ATTY. FORTUN: As I mentioned we are saying ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
that the effects of a permanent dismissal vest
the effects (interrupted) JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: Can a Court, let us see
your theory then – your theory rest on two
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: No, I am not talking of provisions: first, the Rules of Court 8,117 and
the effects, I am asking about the application, Second, the Constitution on speedy disposition?
you are not asking the Court to apply the
doctrine of double jeopardy to prevent a ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.39
prosecution of Mr. Lacson? Second. The respondent’s answers to the
questions of Madame Justice Josefina Salonga
ATTY. FORTUN: Because the element of double during the hearing in the CA where he admitted,
jeopardy cannot apply 8, 117. through counsel, that he gave no express
conformity to the dismissal of the cases by
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: So, the answer is yes? Judge Agnir, Jr., were in relation to Section 8 of
Rule 117 and not to Section 7 of Rule 117 on
ATTY. FORTUN: No, Your Honor, we were saying double jeopardy, thus:
that precisely a permanent dismissal vests the
rights of double jeopardy upon the accused who JUSTICE SALONGA: Do we get it from you that it
invokes it. is your stand that this is applicable to the case
at bar?
 9

ATTY. FORTUN: It is my submission, that it is, The respondent, through counsel, even
Your Honor. In addition, of course, to my admitted that despite his plea for equitable
proposition that Mr. Lacson is covered by the relief in his motion for a judicial determination
rule on double jeopardy as well, because he had of probable cause in the RTC, he did not agree
already been arraigned before the to a provisional dismissal of the cases. The
Sandiganbayan prior to the case being respondent insisted that the only relief he
remanded to the RTC. prayed for before Judge Agnir, Jr. was that
warrants for his arrest be withheld pending a
JUSTICE SALONGA: You are referring to those finding of probable cause. He asserted that the
cases which were dismissed by the RTC of judge did not even require him to agree to a
Quezon City. provisional dismissal of the cases:

ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. JUSTICE ROSARIO: You were present during the
proceedings?
JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is your stand that the
dismissal made by the Court was provisional in ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
nature?
JUSTICE ROSARIO: You represented the
ATTY. FORTUN: It was in that the accused did petitioner in this case?
not ask for it. What they wanted at the onset
was simply a judicial determination of probable ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. And
cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge there was nothing of that sort which the good
Agnir, [Jr.] upon the presentation by the parties Judge Agnir, [Jr.] who is most knowledgeable in
of their witnesses, particularly those who had criminal law, had done in respect of provisional
withdrawn their affidavits, made one further dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing
conclusion that not only was this case lacking in to the provisional dismissal of the case.
probable cause for purposes of the issuance of
an arrest warrant but also it did not justify JUSTICE GUERRERO: Now, you filed a motion,
proceeding to trial. the other accused then filed a motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause?
JUSTICE SALONGA: And it is expressly provided
under Section 8 that a case shall not be ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor.
provisionally dismissed except [if] it is with the
express conformity of the accused. JUSTICE GUERRERO: Did you make any
alternative prayer in your motion that if there is
ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. no probable cause what should the Court do?

JUSTICE SALONGA: And with notice to the ATTY. FORTUN: That the arrest warrants only be
offended party. withheld. That was the only prayer that we
asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular
ATTY. FORTUN: That is correct, Your Honor. motion, and if I may read my prayer before the
Court, it said: "Wherefore, it is respectfully
JUSTICE SALONGA: Was there an express prayed that (1) a judicial determination of
conformity on the part of the accused? probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution be conducted, and for this
ATTY. FORTUN: There was none, Your Honor. purpose, an order be issued directing the
We were not asked to sign any order, or any prosecution to present private complainants
statement which would normally be required by and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for
the Court on pre-trial or on other matters, that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest
including other provisional dismissal. My very of the accused be withheld, or, if issued,
limited practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, recalled in the meantime until resolution of this
had taught me that a judge must be very careful incident."
on this matter of provisional dismissal. In fact,
they ask the accused to come forward, and the JUSTICE GUERRERO: There is no general prayer
judge himself or herself explains the for any further relief?
implications of a provisional dismissal.40
 10

ATTY. FORTUN: There is but it simply says other contradicted only by showing that it was made
equitable reliefs are prayed for. through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Don’t you surmise Judge
Agnir, [Jr.] now a member of this Court, A judicial admission is a formal statement made
precisely addressed your prayer for just and either by a party or his or her attorney, in the
equitable relief to dismiss the case because course of judicial proceeding which removes an
what would be the net effect of a situation admitted fact from the field of controversy. It is
where there is no warrant of arrest being issued a voluntary concession of fact by a party or a
without dismissing the case? party’s attorney during such judicial
proceedings, including admissions in pleadings
ATTY. FORTUN: Yes, Your Honor. I will not made by a party.43 It may occur at any point
second say (sic) yes the Good Justice, but what during the litigation process. An admission in
is plain is we did not agree to the provisional open court is a judicial admission.44 A judicial
dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any admission binds the client even if made by his
assent to the provisional dismissal. counsel.45 As declared by this Court:

JUSTICE GUERRERO: If you did not agree to the ... [I]n fact, "judicial admissions are frequently
provisional dismissal, did you not file any those of counsel or of attorney of record, who
motion for reconsideration of the order of is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his
Judge Agnir, [Jr.] that the case should be client. When such admissions are made ... for
dismissed? the purpose of dispensing with proof of some
fact, ... they bind the client, whether made
ATTY. FORTUN: I did not, Your Honor, because I during, or even after the trial."46
knew fully well at that time that my client had
already been arraigned, and the arraignment When the respondent admitted that he did not
was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the move for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated 99-81679 to Q-99-81689 in his motion for a
to benefit me, and therefore I did not take any judicial determination of probable cause, and
further step in addition to rocking the boat or that he did not give his express consent to the
clarifying the matter further because it probably provisional dismissal of the said cases, he in fact
could prejudice the interest of my client. admitted that one of the essential requisites of
Section 8, Rule 117 was absent.
JUSTICE GUERRERO: Continue.41
The respondent’s contention that his
In his memorandum, in lieu of the oral admissions made in his pleadings and during the
argument filed with the Court of Appeals, the hearing in the CA cannot be used in the present
respondent declared in no uncertain terms that: case as they were made in the course of a
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a different proceeding does not hold water. It
decision declaring the Sandiganbayan without should be borne in mind that the proceedings
jurisdiction over the cases. The records were before the Court was by way of an appeal under
remanded to the QC RTC. Upon raffle, the case Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, from
was assigned to Branch 91. Petitioner and the the proceedings in the CA; as such, the present
others promptly filed a motion for judicial recourse is but a mere continuation of the
determination of probable cause (Annex B). He proceedings in the appellate court. This is not a
asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. new trial, but a review of proceedings which
He did not move for the dismissal of the commenced from the trial court, which later
Informations, contrary to respondent OSG’s passed through the CA. The respondent is
claim.42 bound by the judicial admissions he made in the
CA, and such admissions so hold him in the
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of proceedings before this Court. As categorically
Court reads: stated in Habecker v. Clark Equipment
Company:47
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. – An admission,
verbal or written, made by a party in the course ... [J]udicial admissions on issues of fact,
of the proceedings in the same case, does not including those made by counsel on behalf of a
require proof. The admission may be
 11

client during a trial, are binding "for the purpose Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
of the case ... including appeals." with reasonable dispatch. The Court notes,
however, that in Administrative Order No. 104-
While it may be true that the trial court may 96, it designated six branches of the RTC of
provisionally dismiss a criminal case if it finds no Quezon City53 as special courts, exclusively to
probable cause, absent the express consent of try and decide heinous crimes under Rep. Act
the accused to such provisional dismissal, the No. 7659. Since the accused in the said cases
latter cannot thereafter invoke Section 8 to bar are charged with murder, which under Rep. Act
a revival thereof. Neither may the accused do so No. 7659, is classified as a heinous crime, the
simply because the public prosecutor did not above cases should be consolidated and re-
object to a motion of the accused for a judicial raffled by the Executive Judge of the RTC of
determination of probable cause or file a Quezon City to a branch thereof designated as a
motion for the reconsideration of the order of special court, exclusively to try and decide
dismissal of the case. Even a cursory reading of heinous crimes.
the respondent’s motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause will show that IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent
it contained no allegation that there was no Panfilo M. Lacson’s Omnibus Motion and
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant for Motion to Set for Oral Arguments are DENIED.
the respondent’s arrest as a prayer for the The respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
dismissal of the cases. The respondent was only and its Supplement are DENIED WITH FINALITY.
asking the court to determine whether or not The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
there was probable cause for the issuance of a of Quezon City is hereby DIRECTED to
warrant for his arrest and in the meantime, to CONSOLIDATE Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
hold in abeyance the issuance of the said 01-101112 and to RE-RAFFLE the same with
warrant. Case law has it that a prayer for dispatch to one of the branches of the Regional
equitable relief is of no avail, unless the petition Trial Court of Quezon City designated as a
states facts which will authorize the court to special court, exclusively to try and decide
grant such relief.48 A court cannot set itself in heinous crimes.
motion, nor has it power to decide questions
except as presented by the parties in their SO ORDERED.
pleadings. Anything that is resolved or decided
beyond them is coram non judice and void.49 Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Third. There is no need for the Court to remand and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
the instant case to the trial court to enable the
respondent to adduce post facto evidence that Puno, J., maintains his dissent.
the requisite notices under Section 8 had been Vitug, J., maintains his dissent and reiterate his
complied with by Judge Agnir, Jr. The Court has opinion on the Court’s resolution of 28 May
thoroughly examined the voluminous records 2002.
from the Sandiganbayan and the RTC50 and Ynares-Santiago, J., see separate dissenting
found no proof that the requisite notices were opinion.
even served on all the heirs of the victims. The Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see dissenting opinion.
respondent himself admitted that, as held by Carpio, J., no part.
this Court, in its May 28, 2002 Resolution, Corona, J., on leave.
"Judge Agnir, Jr. could not have complied with Tinga, J., no part.
the mandate under Section 8 because said rule
had yet to exist."51

One final matter. The records show that

Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112
were assigned, through the customary raffle of
cases, to Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City,
the same branch which dismissed Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-81679 to 99-81689.52 In the
April 1, 2003 Resolution of the Court, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 81 of the RTC of
Quezon City was directed to try and decide