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110. Duties of the physician—His knowledge.—Knowledge is
an obligation in every profession; everywhere it is indispensable to
know the thing one is engaged in; but, in medicine, ignorance is of a
much more serious character: for it may end in manslaughter. How
can any one attend the sick if he knows nothing of the human body;
if he is ignorant of the symptoms of a disease? He has, it is true, the
resource of doing nothing; but might not this also be manslaughter?
Does he not then take the place of him who knows and might save
the patient?
2. Secrecy.—The physician is above all held to secrecy. He must not
make known the diseases which have been revealed to him. This is
what is called medical secrecy. This obligation may in certain cases
give rise to the most serious troubles of conscience; but, as a
principle, it may be said that secrecy is as absolute a duty for the
physician as it is for the father-confessor.
3. Courage.—The physician, we have seen, has his point d’honneur,
like the military-man; he often runs equally great dangers: he must,
if necessary, devote himself and risk his life. He requires also a great
moral courage, when he is brought before a serious illness where, at
the moment of a dangerous operation, when his hand must be as
firm as his mind, he needs all the self-possession he can command.
4. Duties toward the sick: Kindness and severity.—The physician
should be firm in the treatment of his patients; he should insist that
his prescriptions be unconditionally followed, for his responsibility
rests on this: he should rather give up the case than consent to a
dangerous disobedience. At the same time he must encourage the
patient, raise his strength by inspiring him with confidence, which is
half the cure. He must also, without deceiving it, uphold the courage
of the family. In some cases it may be necessary to tell the patient
the danger he is in.
111. Writers and artists.—The morality of writers and artists is,
as in all the preceding cases, determined by the object these
persons devote their lives to. The object of the writer and artist is
the realization of the beautiful, either in speech or writing
(literature), or through color and lines (painting, sculpture), or
through sound (music). In all these arts, the leading thought should
be the interests of the art one is cultivating. One should as much as
possible beware turning it into a trade—that is to say, into a
mercenary art, having gain only for its object. Certainly one must
live, and it is rare that writers, poets, artists, have at their command
resources enough to do without the pecuniary fruit of pen or hand;
but the attainment of the beautiful should be preferred to that of the
useful: study, the imitation of the great masters, contempt for
fashion, striving after all that is delicate, noble, pure, the avoiding of
all that is low, frivolous, factitious: such are the principles which
should regulate the morality of artist and writer. It is useless to add
that they should seek their success in what elevates the soul, and
not in what corrupts and degrades it. Coarseness, brutality, license,
should be absolutely condemned. Better to devote one’s self to a
useful and humble profession than employ one’s talent in depraving
morals, and degrading souls.
The duties of the poet have been eloquently expressed by Boileau in
his Art poétique.
1. It is a duty to devote one’s self to poetry and the fine arts only
when one has a decided vocation for them.
“Be rather a mason, if that be your talent.”
2. The poet should listen to good advice.
“Make choice of a solid and wholesome censor.”
3. The poet and artist should, in their verses and works, be the
interpreters of virtue.
“Let your soul and your morals, depicted in your works,
Never present of you but noble images.”
Love, then, virtue; nourish your soul therewith.
 “The verse always savors of the baseness of the heart.”
4. They must avoid jealousies and rivalries.
“Flee, above all, flee base jealousies.”
5. They must prefer glory to gain.
“Work for glory and let no sordid gain
Ever be the object of a noble writer.”
 CHAPTER IX.

DUTIES OF NATIONS AMONG THEMSELVES—

INTERNATIONAL LAW.

SUMMARY.
General principles of international
law.—They are the principles of the
natural law applied to the relations
nations sustain to each other.
Of war.—War founded on the right of
self-defense. The reasons for a just
war.
Defensive and offensive wars.—This
division does not necessarily
correspond to that of just or unjust
wars.—Precautions and
preparations.—Duties in times of
war: to reconcile as much as
possible the rights of humanity with
those of patriotism.—Rights of war
concerning the enemy’s property.—
Conquest.—Neutrality.
International treaties: their character;
their forms; their different species.—
Essential conditions for public
treaties: they are the same as for
private contracts.
 Observance of treaties.—Obligatory
character of treaties: testimony of
Cardinal Richelieu.
The human race being divided into divers particular societies called
States or nations, those different bodies stand toward each other as
individuals; they are subject to the primitive laws existing naturally
among all men, and they are obliged to practice certain duties
toward each other.
112. International law.—General principles.—It is this body of
laws which is called international law, and which is nothing more
than the natural law itself, or the moral law applied to nations.
It is by virtue of this natural law that the nations ought to consider
each other equals, and independent of each other; that they should
not injure each other, and should make each other, on the contrary,
reparation for injury done. Hence the right of self-defense in case of
attack, of repelling and restraining by force whatever violence may
threaten or oppress them.
When nations practice toward each other the prescriptions of the
natural law, they are in a state of peace with each other; when they
are obliged to resort to force to repel injustice, they are in a state of
war.
113. War.—It is evident that in all nations the ruler, whoever he be
(the people, nobles, or king), ought to have the right to carry on
war; for it is nothing else than the right of self-defense, and this
right is the same for the nation as for individuals. War is, then,
legitimate in principle; but in fact, it may be just or unjust according
as it takes place for good or bad reasons, and sometimes for no
reason at all.
114. Reasons of a just war.—It is not easy to say in advance and
in a general manner, what may be the reasons of a just war; for they
vary according to circumstances; they may be all reduced to one
fundamental principle, namely, the defense of the national territory
when threatened. Moreover, a war may be undertaken not only in
self-defense, but to protect allies when they are unjustly attacked.
As for the following reasons, more or less frequently alleged as
pretexts for war, good morality cannot justify them:
1. Thus, the fear of the powerful neighbor, giving, for example, as a
pretext that he erects new citadels on his lands, organizes an army,
increases his troops, etc., is not a sufficiently just reason for war.
2. Utility does not give the same right as necessity: for example,
arms could not legitimately be resorted to in order to gain
possession of a place which might suit our convenience, and be
proper to protect our frontiers.
3. The same may be said of the desire to change dwelling-place, to
leave marshes, deserts, in order to settle in a more fertile country.
4. It is no less unjust to make attempt upon the rights and liberties
of a people under pretext that they are less intelligent or less
civilized than we are. The cause of civilization is, then, not a cause
for just war so long as we have not ourselves been attacked by
barbarians.
5. Nor is it just to conquer a people under pretext that our conquest
may be to its advantage, bring it riches, or liberty, or morality, etc.
115. Defensive and offensive wars.—We distinguish two kinds
of war, defensive and offensive. The first consists in defending the
national territory, the second, in attacking the enemy’s territory.
It would be a mistake to confound defensive and offensive wars with
just and unjust wars, and to believe that only the defensive wars are
just, and all offensive ones unjust. This distinction has nothing to do
with the causes of the war, but concerns the manner of engaging in
it; sometimes one’s interest lies in allowing one’s self to be attacked,
sometimes in attacking. He who has done us injustice may very well
wait for us to come to him, instead of carrying arms to us; this does
not prove him to be in the right. He who, on the contrary, takes up
arms to obtain reparation for an injustice or an insult, does not
prove thereby that he is in the wrong.
116. Precautions and preparations.—Even in the case of just
causes, there are certain precautions and preparations necessary in
order that the war be called a just one.
1. The subject must be of great consequence. It is criminal, for a
frivolous cause, to expose men to all the evils that accompany a war,
even the most fortunate.
2. There must be some probability of success: for it would be
criminally rash to expose one’s self foolhardily to certain destruction
and, to avoid a lesser evil, throw one’s self into a greater.
3. If we had no gentler means at our disposal.
There are two ways of settling a dispute between nations, without
recourse to arms: 1, an amicable conference between the parties; 2,
the intervention of a disinterested third party, or arbitrament. A third
means, much rarer and now abandoned, is that of casting lots.
When all the means of settling the difficulty amicably have been
exhausted, there remains, before taking up arms, a final obligation,
namely, to declare to the enemy the resolution of employing the last
means: this is what is called a declaration of war.
117. Duties in times of war.—War having become a sad and
unavoidable necessity between nations, and the use of force
determined on, it behooves as much as possible to restrict it in its
effects, and to reconcile the rights of humanity with those of justice.
Hence, certain rules established by jurisconsults who have treated
these matters, and notably Grotius, the founder of international law.
The fundamental principle of the right of war is the following: All
that has a morally necessary connection with the purpose of the war
is allowed, but nothing more. In fact, it would be wholly useless to
have the right to do a thing, if, to accomplish it, one could not
employ the necessary means thereto; but, on the other hand, it
would not be just if, under the pretext of only defending one’s rights,
one should believe that everything is permitted, and should resort to
the last extremities.
From this general principle are deduced the following consequences,
which are only its applications:
1. It is certain that it is lawful to kill the enemy’s soldiers, and, in
fact, the purpose of the war being to constrain the enemy to
recognize the justice of our cause, it would be vain to take up arms
if one could not use them. It is then one of the cases where
manslaughter may be considered innocent, and justified by the right
of personal self-defense. (See above, Ch. iii., p. 50.)
2. However, the right of death upon the enemy has its limits. As a
principle, it only extends to those who carry arms, and not to private
individuals who do not defend themselves, arms in hand. Such can
only accidentally become the victims of the war: for instance, it is
impossible in a battle to protect the inhabitants of a disputed village
against the balls of either party; but we should not knowingly strike
dead those who do not defend themselves.
3. Strangers should be allowed to quit a country exposed to war;
and if obliged to stay, they should be no further exposed than to
share its inevitable perils with the other citizens.
4. Prisoners of war should be neither killed nor reduced to slavery,
but simply prevented from doing mischief.
As to the means employed to deprive an enemy of his life, humanity,
with just reason, interdicts the use of certain cowardly and
perfidious means; as, for instance, poisoned bullets, or too cruel
means of destruction, or lastly, assassination.
Thus, it would be odious to send traitors secretly charged to kill the
hostile general. There is, besides, no example of such attempts in
modern wars, and the human conscience would unanimously
reprove them.
Thus much concerning the rights war gives over the lives of
enemies. Let us consider now the duties regarding property.
1. War gives the right to destroy the property of the enemy; it is
what is called the right of ravage. But ravage should not be pursued
for its own sake, but only to weaken the enemy. Thus we should as
much as possible spare public monuments, works of art, etc.
2. It is a right of war to acquire and appropriate things belonging to
the enemy until agreement as to the moneys due, including the
expenses of the war.
3. It is by virtue of these principles that, in case of naval encounters,
it is justifiable to take possession of the enemy’s vessels, and not
only of men-of-war, but of merchant-men and the goods they carry.
4. This right upon the enemy’s property is only the sovereign’s; he
alone has a right to appropriate, in the name of the State, the
property of the invaded territory, by way of restitution or guaranty;
but war does not confer upon single individuals the right of taking
possession of people’s property and appropriating it: this is simply
pillage.
118. Conquest.—We call right of conquest the right which belongs
to a State to bring under its sovereignty the whole or part of another
State, by virtue of the right of war. Conquest, it will be seen, is but
the right of the strongest. It is contrary to the principle of modern
political societies, which requires that the State rest on the free
contract of citizens, and that a people should only be subject to laws
consented to.
It is not easy to have an official authentication of this consent; but it
is certain that there are annexations that are voluntary, and others
that are not. The latter, it must be hoped, will become less and less
frequent as the idea of justice among nations develops.
119. Neutrality.—We call neutrality the situation of States which,
in a case of war, side with neither the one nor the other of the
belligerents, but remain at peace with the two parties. They are,
therefore, obliged to practice toward them the laws of natural right
impartially: if, for example, they render to one a service of humanity,
they must not refuse the same service to the other. They must not
furnish means of hostility to either the one or the other, or they must
furnish them to both. They must lend their good offices for a
settlement if they have any chance of being listened to.
These rules are very simple; but, practically, the situation of neutrals
is a very delicate one, and gives rise to numerous difficulties, for the
solution of which, resort must be had to the special treatises on the
law of nations.
120. International treaties: their characters: their forms.—
We have seen that nations have among each other, the same as
individuals, obligations and rights which they derive from the natural
law. But there are other obligations and other rights which are no
longer based on nature, but on special contracts or usages. The
international law which bears on usages is called customary right;
that which comes from compacts, is called conventional right. The
compacts between States are called treaties.
Treaties are equal or unequal, according as they promise equal or
unequal things; personal or real, according as they relate only to
certain persons, and during their lives, or as they are independent of
persons and last as long as the State itself; pure and simple or
conditional; in the first case the stipulations are absolute; in the
second they depend on certain conditions.
There are different species of treaties according to their different
objects: treaties of alliance; treaties of boundaries; treaties of
cession; treaties of navigation and commerce; treaties of neutrality;
treaties of peace.
121. Essential conditions of public treaties.—As a principle, the
rules which govern international compacts are (with the exception of
a few differences) the same as those which govern private
compacts. There are three fundamental conditions: 1, the consent;
2, a licit cause; 3, the capacity of the contracting parties. (See
above, 92.)
The consent should be: 1, declared; 2, free; 3, mutual.
The licit causes are those which are physically possible or morally
legitimate; the illicit causes are those which are contrary to morality,
as, for example, would be the establishment of slavery.
The capacity of making a compact belongs to the sovereign of the
State alone; but it is necessary that this sovereign be really invested
with the power. A sovereign stripped of his sovereignty has no power
to make compacts, although he might have all the most legitimate
rights; and, on the other hand, a usurping power can legitimately
make compacts. The reason of this is, that foreign nations are not
capable to decide what with another people constitutes the
legitimacy or non-legitimacy of power: there is for them, therefore,
only the power de facto. Yet this is but the general rule. There may
be cases where a foreign government may refuse to recognize a
usurper’s power.
122. Observance of treaties.—The obligation to observe treaties
is based on the natural law. Whether compacts take place between
States or individuals, it matters little. The States, in respect to each
other, are like private individuals. Certain publicists, particularly
Machiavelli, have maintained that the obligation to observe treaties
only lasts as long as these accord with our interests. As much as to
say that one should not make any compacts. Besides, Machiavelli’s
opinion is in such disrepute that it is almost useless to discuss it. We
will content ourselves with setting against it the following beautiful
thought of a great politician:
Kings should be very careful in making treaties, but when
once made, they must observe them religiously. I know
very well that many politicians teach the contrary; but
without stopping to consider what Christianity has to say
regarding these maxims, I maintain that, since the loss of
honor is greater than that of life, a great prince should
rather risk his person, and even the loss of his State, than
break his word, which he cannot break without losing his
reputation, consequently, his greatest strength as a
sovereign. (Cardinal de Richelieu, Testament politique, 2e
partie, ch. vi.)
 CHAPTER X.

FAMILY DUTIES.

SUMMARY.
The family.—Origin and history of the
family.—The family originating in the
necessity of the perpetuation of the
species, has gradually gained in
morality until it has reached the
present state, namely, monogamy,
or marriage between one man and
one woman: a progress so far as the
dignity of woman and the equality of
the sexes are concerned.
Duties of marriage.—The duties of
marriage begin before marriage: to
be prudent in the choice of a
partner; to prefer the moral interests
to the material interests.
Mutual duties of the married couple:
fidelity founded: 1, on a free
promise; 2, on the very idea of
marriage.
Duties peculiar to the husband:
protection of the family, work, etc.
Celibacy and its duties.
Duties of parents toward children.—
Of the rights of parents.—Basis and
 limits of the paternal authority.—
Instituted in the interest of the
children, it is limited by that very
interest.
Parents have not, therefore, 1, the right
of life and death; 2, the right to
strike and maltreat; 3, the right to
sell; 4, the right to corrupt.
Duties of parents.—General duty of
affection without privileges or
preferences.—Duty of maintenance
and education.—Decrease of
parental responsibility in proportion
to the age of the children.—Three
periods in paternal authority.
Duties of children respecting their
parents and respecting each
other.—Filial duty.—Fraternal duty.
Duties of masters towards their
servants.
123. The family.—It is a law among all living beings to perpetuate
their species. This law is among animals subject to no moral law. Yet
are there certain species where between the male and female a kind
of society is established; and with nearly all animals the attachment
of the mother to her young, shows itself by most striking and
touching proofs. But this maternal interest does not usually last
beyond the time necessary to bring up the little ones and enable
them to provide for themselves. Beyond this time, the offspring
separate and disperse. They live their own life; the mother knows
them no longer. As to the father, he has scarcely ever known them.
Such are the domestic ties among animals: and, rude as they may
be, one cannot help already recognizing and admiring in them the
anticipated image of the family.
The family in the human species has the same origin and the same
end as in the animal species, namely, the perpetuation of the
species; but in the former it is exalted and ennobled by additional
sentiments: it is consecrated and sanctioned by laws of duty and
right to which animals are absolutely incapable of rising.
If we consider the history of the human race, we see the family rise
progressively from a certain primitive state, which is not very far
from the animal promiscuity, to the condition in which we see it to-
day in most civilized countries. Among savage nations, marriages
have little stability and duration: they are as easily broken as
formed. Female dignity and modesty are scarcely known among
them: woman is more a slave than a companion, and the freedom of
morals has scarcely any limits. Yet is there no society where
marriages are not subject to some sacred or civil formalities, which
shows that savages, ignorant as we may suppose them to be, have a
presentiment of duties which, under favorable circumstances, tend
to purify and elevate the relations of the sexes. Later, in other
societies, marriages take a more regular form and a more fixed
character; yet, admitting polygamy, more or less, as among the
ancients. In short, many circumstances have presided over the legal
relations of the two sexes, before, through the natural progress of
morals and Christian influence, monogamy became the almost
universal law of the family in civilized countries.
It has been seen, then, that as the moral sentiment became more
refined, the family, as it exists to-day, became more closely related
to the State; and it will always be safer, in order to establish the
legitimacy of such an institution and secure for it due respect, to
depend more on sentiment than on reasoning.
Besides, the family is a natural result of the necessary relations
which exist between mother, father, and child.
It is the birth of the children which is the end and raison d’être of
the family.
This fact, let it be well noted, already determines between mother
and child a relation of some duration. The child is altogether unable
to live and develop alone. The mother owes it its nourishment; and
nature, having herself prepared for the child in the breast of the
mother the sources of its subsistence truly indicated thereby that
they should be bound to each other by a positive and inevitable tie.
It is true the same tie exists also among the families of the animals
and their young (at least with mammalia); and we have seen that
there exist among them some germs of family. But let us not forget
that it takes only a little time for the young of the animal species to
reach that degree of strength which enables it to leave its mother
without danger. With the human species, on the contrary, it takes a
considerable time. Before the first or second year the child is unable
to walk; when it walks, it is still unable to walk alone, to find its
food, to develop in any way. Imagine a child two, three, five years
old, abandoned to himself in a desert island: he would die of hunger.
Besides, instinct is much less strong in man than in animals, and
much less certain; when an adult, man follows his own reason; in
childhood he needs the reason of others. What shall I say of his
moral education and intellectual development? The child needs a
teacher as well as a nurse. We see that the relations between
mother and child must naturally be prolonged far beyond those
between animals. The first natural and necessary relations will finally
create between these two beings habits of such a character that
they will never more separate, even when they can do without each
other. At least, this separation will not take place before man is
completely man; and although son and daughter may separate from
the family to become in their turn heads of families, there will always
exist between parents and children certain ties, certain relations, all
the closer, as they each follow the laws of nature. In short, children
can never be seen, as is the case in the animal species, becoming
complete strangers to their father and mother.
I have first considered the tie between the mother and the child,
because it is the most evident and the most necessary. But this
relation is not the only one. The child, we have said, needs
protection for a long time: does the mother’s protection suffice? To
judge from the way woman is constituted, one can see that she
needs protection herself. Her weakness and her sex expose her to
attacks; she is then but an insufficient protection to the feeble
creature she is united to by so many ties. Therefore must the family
have a protector; and who should be the natural protector of the
child, if not the father? of the wife, if not the husband? The
necessity of protection renders, then, man indispensable to the
family. We may add to this, the necessity of subsistence.
Undoubtedly the mother gives the child its first nourishment; but
later on, the common means of subsistence must come from work.
Now, without denying that woman is called to work the same as
man, and whilst admitting that in the simple and natural state she is
very much stronger than in the civilized state, it must, nevertheless,
be admitted that woman, in general, is less fitted for work than
man; that with more trouble, she produces less, and that a large
portion of her life is necessarily taken up with her peculiar cares.
Without the work of the head of the family, the common subsistence
would, therefore, be imperiled.
If we now consider the education of the children, it is beyond doubt
that the maternal education is insufficient. The mother represents in
the family, love, solicitude, serviceableness. In a solid education,
authority should be added to these. It may be noticed that in
children brought up by one of the parents only, there is in general
something incomplete. Those who have had the father only, lack
something in tenderness and delicacy of feeling which the graces of
maternity insensibly communicate to the child; those who have had
the mother only, are lacking in discipline and solidity of character:
they are capricious and of a more passionate willfulness. Nature,
then, appeals to the joint efforts of both father and mother in the
education of the child. Let us add now that this close tie, which on
one side attaches the child to the mother and on the other to the
father, should also attach parents to each other, far beyond the first
and transitory tie which first joined them. United in a common
undertaking, namely, to support and educate the being they have
brought into the world—it is impossible that they should not
continue to be more and more closely united.
124. Family duties.—This is the natural history of the family. It
was probably in a similar manner, with many vicissitudes, that it
gradually formed and then became transformed. Let us now see how
out of this association, founded by instincts, interests, and
circumstances, the principle of duty makes a sacred and indissoluble
institution.
There can be distinguished in the family four kinds of relations,
whence spring four classes of duties:
1. The relations between the husband and wife.
2. The relations of parents to children.
3. The relations of children to parents.
4. The relations of children to each other.
Whence conjugal duty, paternal or maternal duty, filial duty, and
fraternal duty.
To these four relations, there may be added a fifth: that of the head
of a family to his servants.
125. Duties of marriage.—The duties of marriage begin before
marriage: they begin with the mutual choice of the man and the
woman. For the woman, it usually happens, at least in our society
[in France], that the choice is determined by the parents. The
responsibility, then, falls upon them. Now, this choice should not be
made lightly and foolishly. It should be determined by a serious and
noble conception of the duties and end of marriage.
“Marriage,” our Code admirably says, “is an association between
man and woman, to share the pleasures and bear in common the
trials of life.”[68]
Marriage is, therefore, a compact entirely moral: it is not only a
union of bodies or fortunes, it is a union of souls. Life in common
and indissoluble, with all its possible accidents, is too heavy a
burden to be left to chance. A man should think not only of his own
happiness, but also of that of the woman whom he associates with
his destiny; if he does not consider himself strong enough to fulfill
toward her all the duties which such a connection imposes on him,
he should not unite her to himself by indissoluble vows; if he does
not think that he can love and respect her all through life, let him
spare himself and her a life-long misery. We may see by this how
important in conjugal union are a harmony of character, a just and
mutual esteem, and an enlightened affection. To marry rashly and
too hastily, and thus to risk future happiness, is already failing in a
first duty. One should, therefore, not rely too implicitly upon
indifferent or interested go-betweens.
It is said, indeed, that there is no way of knowing with certainty the
character and sincerity of men. Many a one who in society appears
amiable and estimable, is perhaps, in private life, selfish and
tyrannical; women, it is said, moreover, are particularly skilled, even
when young, in assuming qualities which they do not possess, and in
disguising their faults; that if one were constantly scrutinizing and
distrusting, marriage would be impossible; for the most sagacious
are deceived in them, etc., etc. All this, to a certain extent, is true;
and there could be nothing done without some sort of confidence;
but this confidence, when it is the result of precaution and prudence,
is much less often deceived than satirists would have it. Besides, if
there be room for deception, even after a reasonably long intimacy,
the chances are at least better than they would be if the parties
were to rush headlong into a future absolutely unknown to them.
Another grave error is that of seeing in marriage nothing but a union
of fortunes and names.
It is bringing what in reality is the noblest and most delicate of
contracts, down to a simple commercial act. Certainly one should not
propose to the inexperience of young people the union of two
poverties, as an ideal: it is well known that poverty is much harder
to bear when one has to share it with a wife and children, than
alone. But whilst in certain classes of society marriage could scarcely
be possible otherwise (workingmen having no capital to back their
marriage contracts), the classes that have some competency should
not make property the first consideration; character, mind, and merit
should by far outweigh it.
We distinguish generally two kinds of marriages: the reason-
marriages (mariages de raison) and the inclination marriages; and
much has been said for and against both. These are questions which
will never be solved, because experience shows that they are mostly
dependent on circumstances. It may be said that, as a principle, the
true marriage is the marriage based on inclination enlightened by
reason. What experience and wisdom condemn, are the foolish
inclinations—those, for example, that take no account of age,
education, social surroundings, necessities of life. These sorts of
passion scarcely ever stand the test of time and circumstances, and
are generally followed by a painful reaction. “There is,” says La
Bruyère, “hardly any other reason for loving no longer, than to have
loved too much.” But inclination is not always unreasonable; and
when it can be reconciled with the counsels of wisdom, which is no
rare thing, it is better than cold reason, and answers better to the
purpose of marriage: it is a surer guaranty of its dignity and
happiness.
A wise moralist, Mr. Adolphe Garnier, makes a very reasonable reply
to those who pretend that inclination disappears very fast in
marriage: “We reply,” he says, “that inclination will at least have
formed a true marriage whilst it lasted. It will leave for all the rest of
life a remembrance of the first years, which shall have been purified,
ennobled, sanctified by this heart-affection. This remembrance will
sweeten more than one bitter moment, will prevent more than one