EGC Conflict of Laws Reviewer (COMPLETE)
EGC Conflict of Laws Reviewer (COMPLETE)
1. Universal in character – which is proven by the fact that States conceive such norm as legally
binding.
2. Must be of mutual concern to states – that the States are acting out of a sense of mutual concern,
the nations of the world have made it their business, both through international accords and
unilateral action, demonstrating their intention.
3. Must be of specific character that is definite in content – that the norms are no less definite in
content than the historical paradigms when it was enacted.
Abdullahi v. Pfizer
Pfizer had an experimental antibiotic, Trovan, which it administered to young patients in Nigeria without
the getting the informed consent of the children nor their guardians. Thereafter, these children were
victims of the adverse side effects such as death, blindness, deafness, paralyzed, or brain damaged. In
holding the same as violation of international law and making Pfizer liable thereof, the court held that,
there is:
1. Universality against the non-consensual experimentation because it is specific, focused, and
accepted by nations around the world without significant objection. The same was
manifest because several similar prohibitions were incorporated in treaties signed by States.
2. Specificity, as States uniformly and unmistakably prohibit medical experiments on human
beings without their consent, thereby providing concrete for the norm.
3. Mutual concern, as States had entered into the binding treaties, namely, International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine.
Conflict of Laws
It is the inconsistency or difference between the laws of different states or countries, arising in the case of
persons who have acquired rights, incurred obligations, injuries or damages, or made contracts, within the
territory of two or more jurisdictions.
Foreign Element
It is the most important component of a conflicts of law problem. It is anything which is not domestic and
has a foreign component to it. It could be a foreigner, foreign corporation, an incident happening in a foreign
country, or a foreign law chose by parties.
Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122191, [October 8, 1998], 358 PHIL 105-129
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more
states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social
and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of their
birth or conception.
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist
in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract
between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign
element may assume a complex form.
Note: The three phases are separate from each other and a defense in one phase is not a defense in other
phases. It is important to analyze the real issues in a conflicts problem for the purpose of utilizing the
appropriate approach to a contractual dispute.
Extraterritoriality of laws
Note that as a general rule, laws are territorial in application. The question of whether the law is territorial
or extraterritorial depends on legislative intent. It is within the right of the legislature of a country to provide
that its laws apply outside the territorial boundaries of the state on matters within the competence of the
legislature to legislate upon. Thus, its determination of extraterritoriality involves the examination of
the legislative intent.
It is a concept in private international law and was devised to combat the "less
than honorable" reasons and excuses that litigants use to secure procedural
advantages, annoy and harass defendants, avoid overcrowded dockets, and
select a "friendlier" venue.
Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, [January
14, 2015], 750 PHIL 791-846
Definition
Magis Notes:
The doctrine provides that a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or available
forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Bank of America v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120135, 2003
It may be that the chosen forum, or the place where the suit is filed, has no
substantial connection to the parties or to the dispute that it becomes very
inconvenient to litigate the suit in the chose venue, or the parties to the case
are not residents to the forum, or that the witnesses are located somewhere
else, in a jurisdiction which offers a more convenient forum to litigate the case.
Rationale
Forum non conveniens is soundly applied not only to address parallel litigation
and undermine a litigant's capacity to vex and secure undue advantages by
engaging in forum shopping on an international scale. It is also grounded on
principles of comity and judicial efficiency. Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia)
v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, [January 14, 2015], 750 PHIL 791-846
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, "a court, in conflicts of law
cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most
'convenient' or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking
remedies elsewhere. Id.
Puyat v. Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536, [February 26, 2001], 405 PHIL 413-434
Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of
jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to entertain a
Discretion of the case for any of the following practical reasons:
Court 1. The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere,
either because the main aspects of the case transpired in a foreign
jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence there;
2. The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice
known as forum shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages
or to convey or harass the defendant
3. The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or
aliens when the docket may already be overcrowded;
4. The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right
sought to be maintained; and
5. The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.
Forum non conveniens finds no application and does not operate to divest
Philippine tribunals of jurisdiction and to require the application of
foreign law. Forum non conveniens relates to forum, not to the choice of
Limitations governing law. That forum non conveniens may ultimately result in the
application of foreign law is merely an incident of its application. Saudi
Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio, G.R. No. 198587, [January 14,
2015], 750 PHIL 791-846
As defense:
Considerations for the propriety of the choice Considerations for assumption of jurisdiction
of a forum by Philippine tribunals
Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio, Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio,
G.R. No. 198587, [January 14, 2015], 750 PHIL G.R. No. 198587, [January 14, 2015], 750 PHIL
791-846 791-846
1. The availability and adequacy of recourse 1. All the parties are based in the Philippines
to a foreign tribunal and all the material incidents transpired in
2. The question of where, as between the this jurisdiction.
forum court and a foreign court, the 2. Philippine tribunal are in a position to make
balance of interests inheriting in a dispute an intelligent decision as to the law and the
weighs more heavily. facts.
3. Philippine tribunals are in a position to
Stated otherwise: enforce their decisions.
1. The vinculum which the parties and their
relation have to a given jurisdiction
2. The public interest that must animate a
tribunal, in its capacity as an agent of the
sovereign, in choosing to assume or
decline judgment.
Thus:
CHOICE OF LAW
Choice of Law Principles
Section 6 of the U.S. Restatement (Second) of Laws
1. A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on
choice of law.
2. When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
include:
a. The needs of the interstate and international systems
b. The relevant policies of the forum
c. The relevant polices of other interested states and relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue
d. The protection of justified expectations
e. The basic policies underlying the particular field of law.
f. Certainty, predictability and uniformity of result
g. Ease in the determination and application of the law.
Stated otherwise:
1. Local law
2. Needs of the Interstate and International Systems
3. Relevant Policies of the Forum
4. Relevant Polices of Other Interested States
5. Protection of Justified Expectations
6. Basic Policies Underlying the Particular Field of Law
7. Certainty, Predictability, and Uniformity of Result
8. Ease in the Determination and Application of the Law to be Applied
The general rule and it provides the local law to be the default law that will govern the relationship of the
parties to a dispute. Thus, if the civil code of that jurisdiction have conflict of laws rule specified, it must be
applied first. When such specification exists, the directive must be followed.
Penal laws and those of public security All those who live or sojourn in
Territoriality
and safety shall be obligatory upon all Philippine territory
Principle
who live or sojourn in Philippine
(Penal Laws)
territory, subject to the principles of
public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (8a)
Principle of Nationality
Doctrine of Renvoi
Basic Concept: A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign
law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. Aznar
v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-167479, [January 31, 1963]
While a state has to follow its statutory directive as to choice of law, there are times when the statutory
directive, instead of applying local law, actually directs the application of a foreign law on the matter.
Thus, there is renvoi when a local law requires the forum court to apply a foreign law to the case in dispute
and the foreign court, in turn, directs the application of the laws of the forum court to the case under
consideration. If it directs back o the local court, the court must now apply the law.
It is a method disposing of a Conflict of Laws problem by referring a matter for judgment or consideration
to another State, either the forum (remission), or a third state (transmission).
Test of renvoi: Do the conflict of law rules require the application off its laws or the laws of some other
country?
If after, the conflict-of-law rules of the foreign court refers to the law of forum court, the law of the
forum must be applied.
In a situation where there is no conflict of laws, it is obvious that renvoi would not apply.
Bellis v. Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678, [June 9, 1967]
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the United States from the state of Texas. He had several properties.
Amos was a national of Texas and had the domicile there at the time of his death. There is no need to
apply Philippine laws on succession as it is the laws of Texas which should govern.
Courts must consider the needs of the interstate and international systems in determining the applicable
law. Generally, it must consider technological advances and free trade. The application of the local law to
favor the interest of the forum state may operate to the disadvantage of economic growth.
Courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy.
Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, G.R. Nos. L-104776, 104911-14, and 105029-32, [December 5,
1994]
In a suit against termination of employment, Article 156 of Amiri Decree No. 23 cannot be applied in the
forum court’s law as it contravenes public policy. The Constitution explicitly provides that it is the policy
of the State to promote social justice and protect labor. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of
such Decree would contravene the public policy on the protection of labor.
When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the same shall not be applied.
Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, [December 29, 1999], 378 PHIL 1279-
1304
A mortgage-creditor waives its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted over a third party
mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan
before foreign courts. To allow otherwise would contravene the proscription on the splitting up of a single
cause of action under the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dacasin v. Dacasin, G.R. No. 168785, [February 5, 2010], 625 PHIL 494-513
An agreement for the joint custody of a child contravenes Philippine law as the State provides that a child
under the age of seven should be awarded to the custody of the mother. Stephanie was under the age
of seven when Harold and Susan severed marital ties.
Courts compare the laws and interests of two states, determine if there is a real conflict, and if a
real conflict exists, apply the law of the state whose interest is more impaired.
When parties intend to have the laws of a particular jurisdiction to govern their relationship, courts must
enforce this choice of law, unless it is contrary to a statutory directive of the forum court, or
contravenes public policy.
Courts must look at justified expectations in adjudicating a case as parties may have reasons why they
choose a particular law as their choice of law or why they choose a particular forum in litigating their case.
If the contract clearly provides remedies for work-related personal injuries, the rule is to follow
the place or the law it specifies.
Reason and objectives of the laws in question should be given consideration. Courts should look to the
type of law involved because by looking at the particular laws involved, courts may be in a better position
to decide which rights to uphold and protect.
Judicial systems favor stability in judicial decisions. In fact, stare decisis was considered as a compelling
argument in maintaining the doctrine.
Simplicity remains a virtue in determining which law to apply. If it is bound by stare decisis , it is usually
simpler for the court to apply the same doctrine in future cases. No more need to adopt new and more
complicated analyses for what only needs to be done is to apply the law which has been applied before.
SECTION 24. Proof of Official Record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his or her deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody.
If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, which is a contracting party to a treaty or
convention to which the Philippines is also a party, or considered a public document under such treaty
or convention pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 19 hereof, the certificate or its equivalent shall be in
the form prescribed by such treaty or convention subject to reciprocity granted to public documents
originating from the Philippines.
For documents originating from a foreign country which is not a contracting party to a treaty or convention
referred to in the next preceding sentence, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the
seal of his or her office.
A document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate or its equivalent being prima facie evidence of the due execution and
genuineness of the document involved. The certificate shall not be required when a treaty or convention
between a foreign country and the Philippines has abolished the requirement, or has exempted the
document itself from this formality. (24a)
SECTION 25. What Attestation of Copy Must State. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct
copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he or she be the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court. (25a)
The failure to plead and prove foreign law means that the foreign law is the same as the law of the
forum.
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119602, [October 6, 2000], 396 PHIL 383-
405
In a suit for damages due to negligence of an official pilot of Venezuela filed by Wildwalley Shipping
Company, Ltd, the failure to properly plead Venezuela law to hold Philippine President Lines, Inc for
negligence caused by the pilot cannot make such law applicable. A foreign law is considered to be pleaded
if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of the foreign law, its import and legal
consequence on the event or transaction in issue.
For a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) It
must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must
be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804, [February 19, 2003], 445 PHIL 770-
783
The citations of US court decision do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the US
courts. Moreover, mere attachment of copies the same cannot operate to comply with Section 24 of Rule
132.
EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 145587,
[October 26, 2007], 563 PHIL 1-36
The employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor laws will govern matters not
provided for in the contract. Being the law intended by the parties to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor
laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of Gran. However, the failure to prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter gives operation to the doctrine of the processual presumption, thus, it will be the
Labor laws of the Philippines which should apply.
Apostille Convention
The practical effect of the Apostille Convention is that it eliminates the need for legalization of documents
to be used abroad. Documents originating from another Apostille country do not need to be authenticated
anymore with Philippine consulates before the documents could be used here in the Philippines. An
Apostille certificate need only to be attached and the public document may be used in the Philippines.
Administrative agencies may take foreign laws by way of judicial notice because they are not
bound by the technical rules on evidence.
Norse Management Co. v. National Seamen Board, G.R. No. L-54204, [September 30, 1982], 202
PHIL 810-817
In granting that Singapore law should apply to claims of Abordo for death compensation benefits of her
husband, the National Seamen Board is justified in taking judicial notice of and in applying Singapore law
as it is familiar with the same.
CONTRACTS
Primacy of Contractual Stipulations
The stipulations comprise the agreement of the parties to govern their contractual relations. As such, the
terms and conditions, constitute the law between the parties to be applied in case of dispute. They are
expected to follow the same in pacta sunt servanda unless the same are contrary to law, good order, or
public policy.
Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 66006,
[February 28, 1985], 219 PHIL 790-793
As a rule, it is the shipboard employment contract is controlling.
Atienza v. Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply, G.R. No. 71604, [August 11, 1989], 257 PHIL
334-339
The computation of death benefits should be based on Philippine law as there was no stipulation made
in the Crew Agreement that the employee would be entitled to whichever greater insurance benefits were
offered by either Philippine law or foreign law
Pakistan International Airlines Corp. v. Ople, G.R. No. 61594, [September 28, 1990], 268 PHIL 92-
106
Pakistani law cannot be made as the applicable law of the contractual dispute since the relationship
between the PIA and the employee is governed by public interest being the same as in contravention
with the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Waiver of Renvoi
Parties may waive the application of renvoi in case the same is provided for by a foreign law. It therefore
follows, that the rules of private international law will find o application once a foreign law is chose by the
parties. This is because renvoi is a complicated doctrine requiring the parties to look to the totality of foreign
law in determining their rights and obligations, hence the need to exclude the same.
Scrivener’s Error
It is the failure of the agreement to express the intention of the parties. It could be attributed to wrong
terminology, missing terminology, or clerical error. As there is no embodiment of the clear intent of the
parties, such chosen law will be disregarded in a course of action which the parties would have
contemplated or wanted and the agreement is to be interpreted according to its plain or obvious meaning.
Ambiguity with the intention to establish an exclusive forum selection clause will render the same
not exclusive.
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Sherman, G.R. No. 72494, [August 11, 1989], 257 PHIL
340-348
Despite providing the terms “shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore” the same cannot operate to divest Philippine
courts of jurisdiction to entertain the collection suit. The intention to establish exclusivity is not apparent.
In the absence of the specific extent of the applicability of their chosen law, the chose law will normally
apply the following concerns:
1. Interpretation;
2. Rights and obligations arising from the contract;
3. Performance and the consequences of non-performance, including the assessment of damages;
4. The various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation periods;
5. Validity and the consequences of invalidity of the contract;
6. Burden of proof and legal presumptions; and
7. Pre-contractual obligations.
Reason: The focus of the parties are on the law of the place of execution when they
enter into contracts. The absence of which presumes that it is the local law which
should govern.
Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 129584, [December 3,
1998]
The Philippines follows the lex loci contractus approach in setting choice of law
problems in contracts. Thus, courts are obliged to apply the law of the place of
execution of the contract in case a conflict of laws dispute concerning contracts is
Lex loci brought to the courts. A contract executed in the Philippines, and the contract
contractus specifies no choice of law, the governing law will be Philippine law.
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Edmund D. Heffernan II, 925 A.2d 636 (Md. 2007)
While the insurance contract with Erie Insurance considered as a Maryland contract,
lex loci contractus cannot be applied because nature of the action was based on tort,
thus requiring the courts to look into the law of the place where the tort occurred,
which is in Delaware. Maryland law provides that when a conflict of law situation
arose where the events giving rise to a tort action occur in more than one State, the
law of the State where the injury, the last event required to constitute the tort
occurred. Thus, the incorporated phrase “entitled to recover” is a reference to tort
law, in this case, the substantive tort law of where the accident occurred applies to
the issues of fault and damages.
The law of the place with the most connection the dispute.
State of the Reason: A matter of convenience and practicality as it seeks to apply the law of the
most significant place that has the most connecting factors to the contract. The more factors
relationship connecting the case to a particular state, the easier it will be to determine the rights
rule and obligations of the parties to the contract.
Connecting Factors to be considered in the absence of an effective choice of law (Section 188.
Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties)
1. Place of contracting
2. Place of negotiation of the contract
3. Place of performance
4. Location of the subject matter of the contract
5. Domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties
Concept of dépeçage
Buchanan v. Doe, 246 Va. 67, 431 S.E.2d 289 (1993)
Dépeçage is a process whereby different issues in a single case arising out of a single set of facts may be
decided according to the laws of different states. This has always been the process when procedural
matters were held to be governed by forum law and substantive questions by some other law, even when
matters characterized as procedural had substantial outcome-determinative effect. It has always been
understood also that different substantive issues could properly be decided under the laws of different
states, when the choice-influencing considerations differ as they apply to the different issues.
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Elements of a quasi-delict:
1. The damages suffered by the plaintiff
2. The fault or negligence of the defendant or some other persons to whose act he must respond
3. The connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and
4. That there must be no preexisting contractual relations between the parties.
Concept of Negligence
Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, [September 11, 2009], 615 PHIL 653-667
It consists in the omission of the that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place.
The traditional rule that employs the law of the place of injury. This is based on the
vested rights theory since the rights of the parties vested in the place of injury and
nowhere else.
When someone is wronged in a particular place, the rights of the parties arise from
that jurisdiction whose law must be then be applied to determine the parties’ rights
and liabilities. The state where the damage or injury is sustained has as much
interest in redressing the wrongs committed within its jurisdiction.
Thus, it should be laws of Illinois should be followed as “people do not take the laws
of their home state with them when they travel but are subject to the laws of the state
in which they act.”
This requires that courts compare the laws and interests of two states, determine if
there is a real conflict, and if a real conflict exists, apply the law of the state whose
Governmental interest is more impaired. There is importance to consider the interest of other
interest analysis states since commercial transactions involve people located in several jurisdictions
approach which have conflicting interests in the transaction.
An approach where the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the law
of the forum.
Lex fori
Atty Bangoy: A method of last resort which is similar to lex loci delicti.
Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122191, [October 8, 1998],
358 PHIL 105-129
The place where the tort happened was in the Philippines as it is where Saudia had
deceived Milagros Morada. What is important is the place where the over-all harm
or the fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing, and
human rights of complainant had lodged. The Philippines adheres to the most
Most significant significant relationship approach.
relationship
approach First National Bank in Fort Collins v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (1973)
Stare decisis does not compel a court to apply the rule of lex loci delicti without
regard to the facts and circumstances in the particular cause. Instead, the court must
decide, as a matter of first impression, as to which approach should be applied.
Lankenau v. Boles, 119 A.D.3d 1404, 1405, 990 N.Y.S.2d 394 (2014)
If conflicting conduct-regulating laws are at issue, the law of the jurisdiction where
the tort occurred will generally apply because that jurisdiction has the greatest
interest in regulating behavior within its borders. Conversely, where the conflicting
laws serve only to allocate losses between the parties, such as vicarious liability or
comparative negligence rules, the jurisdiction where the tort occurred has only a
minimal interest in applying its own law.
Winter v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 739 F.3d 405, 410–11 (8th Cir. 2014)
Missouri is the place where the injury occurred, making it presumptively the state
with the most significant relationship. Missouri is where Novartis's sales
representatives failed to warn Baldwin's doctor, making it also, at least in part, the
state of the conduct causing the injury. New Jersey may have an interest in its
corporations being governed by its punitive damages provisions, but as the district
court held, Missouri has a strong interest in applying its punitive damages laws to
deter conduct by corporations doing business in Missouri that harms Missouri
residents. New Jersey's interest, balanced against Missouri's, does not overcome
Missouri's presumption that the law of the place of injury should apply. The district
court did not err in applying Missouri punitive damages law.
FutureSelect Portfolio Mgmt., Inc. v. Tremont Grp. Holdings, Inc., 180 Wash.
2d 954, 331 P.3d 29 (2014)
In holding that there was sufficient allegation that the firm acted as parent's agent
so as to support personal jurisdiction over parent, exercise of personal jurisdiction
over parent complied with due process, and that Washington law, rather than New
York law, applied to dispute, the court would adopt Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws section clarifying the general most significant relationship test for fraud and
misrepresentation context, thus, under Section 148, to determine the jurisdiction
with the most significant relationship to the dispute, courts must consider:
1. the place where plaintiff acted in reliance on the representations;
2. the place where the plaintiff received the representations;
3. the place where the defendant made the representations;
4. the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of
business of the parties;
5. the place where a tangible thing, which is the subject of the transaction
between the parties, was situated at the time; and
6. the place where the plaintiff is to render performance under a contract that
he has been induced to enter by the false representations of the defendant.
Importance of Citizenship
- It serves as source of rights, benefits, duties, and obligations.
- Citizens owe full allegiance to their country and must abide by the rules specified in their country’s
laws and constitution. Only citizens are allowed to serve in the army of a state.
- It defines voting rights and the right to hold public office as the right to suffrage is only available to
Filipino citizens and only Filipino citizens may be elected or appointed to public office.
Derivative Citizenship
- Benefit derived from being the child or spouse of a citizen of a state. The alien wife or alien child of
a citizen may enjoy certain privileges not ordinarily enjoyed by the foreigners in the country, like
the right to work or stay in the Philippines.
Marriage of an alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically bestow upon him the privilege to
enter and to stay in the Philippines.
Djumantan v. Domingo, G.R. No. 99358, [January 30, 1995], 310 PHIL 848-860
The marriage between Djumantan, an Indonesian national to Bernard Banez, a Filipino working in
Indonesia does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. There is no law guaranteeing aliens married
to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of the immigration
laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens. Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband
does not ipso facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from
the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien. Under Section 9 of the Immigration
Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit any alien who applies for a visitor's visa. Once
admitted into the country, the alien has no right to an indefinite stay.
Acquisition of Citizenship
- It is acquired either at birth or by naturalization.
Citizenship at Birth
- There are two guiding principles respecting acquisition of citizenship at birth.
- The Philippines follow the principle of jus sanguinis.
SECTION 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
Naturalized Citizen
Those who become Filipino citizens through naturalization.
Naturalization
The acquisition of citizenship by performance of some positive act, like applying with the appropriate
authorities to become a citizen of that state. It is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, or the Revised
Naturalization Law, and Republic Act No. 530.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, [May 26, 1999], 367 PHIL 132-153
Eduardo Manzano was born in the United States of Filipino parents. Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The results
of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification
filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a
dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective position.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of
the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.
Expatriation
- It is the commission of an act that results in the loss of citizenship.
- Section 3 of Article IV of the Constitution sanctions the expatriation of Philippine citizens by the
commission of expatriating acts.
- It must be emphasized that under Philippine law, there is no requirement for voluntariness. It is the
mere commission of an expatriating act results in the loss of citizenship.
Prolonged stay from the Philippines and recognition by an alien father are not expatriating acts.
Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Callano, G.R. No. L-24530, [October 31, 1968], 134 PHIL
901-912
Private respondents Beato Go Callano, Manuel Go Callano, Gonzalo Go Callano, and Julio Go Callano
were the children of Go Chiao Lin, Chinese citizen, and Emilia Callano, a Filipino citizen. In 1946, the
private respondents and their parents went to Amoy, China, for a vacation.
The Board of Immigration Commissioner’s finding that even if the private respondents were considered
to be Filipino citizens when they left the Philippines in 1946, they lost that citizenship, firstly, by staying
in China for a period of fifteen years, and secondly, because they have become citizens of the Republic
of China in accordance with the Chinese Nationality Law, arising from the recognition accorded them by
their common-law father.
Recognition of the petitioners by then alien father is not among the grounds for losing Philippine
citizenship under Philippine law, and it cannot be said that the petitioners lost their former status by
reason of such recognition. About the only mode of losing Philippine citizenship which closely bears on
the petitioners' case is renunciation. But even renunciation cannot be cited in support of the conclusion
that petitioners lost their Philippine citizenship because the law requires an express renunciation, which
means a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication;
a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from that which is inferred
from conduct.
The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines.
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, [March 8, 2016],
782 PHIL 292-1305
All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church
in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would
be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more
than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of
a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect
Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under
Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of
the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly,
the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or
the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935
Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
Repatriation
- Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time;
4. marriage of a||.
- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.
- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, [May 7, 2001], 409
PHIL 633-672
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen."
Teodoro Cruz was born to Filipino parents in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960. While
subsequently, he joined the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States in
1985, the moment he took the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired
at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 142840, [May 7, 2001], 409
PHIL 633-672
The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen."
Teodoro Cruz was born to Filipino parents in San Clemente, Tarlac on April 27, 1960. While
subsequently, he joined the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the United States in
1985, the moment he took the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same
in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent
Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired
at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover,
or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
The execution of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath is sanctioned by Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225.
The failure of a candidate to make a personal and sworn renunciation operates to disqualify him
to run as candidate. The oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is
substantially similar to the one contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not
constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No.
9225.
Jacot v. Dal, G.R. No. 179848, [November 27, 2008], 592 PHIL 661-680
Nestor A. Gacot is a natural-born Filipino, naturalized in the United States on December 13, 1989. He
applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship under RA 9225 where he took his took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines after the issuance of an Order of Approval by the Philippine
Consulate General of Los Angeles on June 19, 2006. On March 26, 2007, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy as Vice Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin. Dal filed a petition to disqualify Jacot on the ground
that he never has renounced his foreign citizenship. In ruling in favor of the disqualification, the Court
maintained the findings of the COMELEC.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are
already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. By the oath dictated in the afore-
quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his
renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized
as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to
take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking
elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of
their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
The sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship in Section 5(2) of RA 9225 is not a mere pro-forma
requirement.
Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 198742, [August 10, 2012], 692 PHIL 407-
431
Sobejana-Condon is a natural-born Filipino citizen, naturalized in Australia on December 13, 1984. On
December 2, 2005 she applied to reacquire her Philippine citizenship. He took the oath on December 5,
2005. On September 18, 2006, she filed an unworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship.
She ran for Vice Mayor of Caba, La Union which then was riddled with quo warranto proceedings on the
ground that she is a dual citizenship who failed to renounce her foreign citizenship. She alleged that her
execution of the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship sufficiently complied with the
requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 and her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment
of her Australian citizenship. She was disqualified by the RTC and affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
The language of Section 5 (2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its
categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship
at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and
held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of
the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship.
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal, when we held that Filipinos re-acquiring or retaining
their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they
wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines.
The "sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with respect
to the re-acquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of the principle
that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship. Never was it mentioned
or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino
citizenship and thereafter run for public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of
renunciation.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for ceremonial purposes; it
would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary allegiance from government officers when the
Constitution and the legislature clearly demand otherwise. It is an additional qualification for elective
office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office.
The use of a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation which undoes an earlier representation.
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, [April 16, 2013], 709 PHIL 408-477
Arnado was a natural-born Filipino citizen who naturalized in the United States. He applied for repatriation
under RA 9225. He executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his US Citizenship before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Norte in the 2010 elections. Balua filed a
petition to disqualify Arnado on the ground that Arnado was not a resident of Kauswagan and that he
was a foreigner as evidence by a certification from Bureau of Immigration indicating that his nationality
as “USA-American”. Balua further stated that Arnado continued to use his US passport even after he
renounced his American citizenship. The COMELEC disqualified Arnado on the grounds that the
consistent use of the US passport operates to revert its status.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one's nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only
to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship
and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the
citizenship.
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado
of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen
by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado's bid for
public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
The failure to comply with the requirements of RA 9225 is fatal to one’s electoral bid.
Arnado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 210164, [August 18, 2015], 767 PHIL 51-147
Under Section 4 (d) of the Local Government Code, a person with "dual citizenship" is disqualified from
running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, it was clarified that the phrase "dual
citizenship" in said Section 4 (d) n must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Subsequently,
Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to
enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the requirements of the law. They may now run
for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and, (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath prior to or at
the time of filing of their CoC.
Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225 because, as held
in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed
withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit. Consequently, at the time he
filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections, Arnado had yet to comply
with said second requirement. The Comelec also noted that while Arnado submitted an affidavit dated
May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the same would not suffice for having
been belatedly executed.
The law makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.
David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113, [March 18, 2015], 756 PHIL 278-294
While Section 2 declares the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country
shall be deemed "not to have lost their Philippine citizenship," such is qualified by the phrase "under the
conditions of this Act." Section 3 lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born Filipinos
referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country who shall re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph
covers those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is
required for both categories of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country,
but the terminology used is different, "re-acquired" for the first group, and "retain" for the second group.
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens
before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. Although the heading of Section 3 is "Retention of Philippine
Citizenship", the authors of the law intentionally employed the terms "re-acquire" and "retain" to describe
the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident
from the title of the law using both re-acquisition and retention.
In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have re-acquired
their Philippine citizenship, which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which naturalization in a foreign
country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. As its title declares, R.A.
9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old law which takes away Philippine
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing
dual citizenship, and also provides for the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship.
In the case of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under
the new law.
Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he
belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos under the first paragraph of Section 3 who lost
Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law allows dual citizenship, he
was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance.
Practice of Profession
Filipinos are preferred in the practice of profession in our country such that foreigners should not displace
them if there is a sufficient number of Filipinos who can fill the vacancy. Certain professions are impressed
with public interest, with some requiring a certain sense of patriotism and loyalty, that only Filipinos are
allowed to engage in that profession.
The right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person
who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for
a license or permit to engage in such practice.
4. States may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality
such person also possesses.
5. A person in a third State with more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one.
6. A person with two nationalities acquired without any voluntary act on his part may renounce one of
them with the authorization of the State whose nationality he desires to surrender.
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57, 78 S. Ct. 568, 575, 2 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1958)
Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the
effective regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in the law-
making organ of the Nation. The restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the powers
expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our
relations with other nations. Since Congress may not act arbitrarily, a rational nexus must exist between
the content of a specific power in Congress and the action of Congress in carrying that power into
execution. More simply stated, the means—in this case, withdrawal of citizenship—must be reasonably
related to the end—here, regulation of foreign affairs. The inquiry—and, in the case before us, the sole
inquiry—into which this Court must enter is whether or not Congress may have concluded not
unreasonably that there is a relevant connection between this fundamental source of power and the
ultimate legislative action.
Experience amply attests that in this day of extensive international travel, rapid communication and
widespread use of propaganda, the activities of the citizens of one nation when in another country can
easily cause serious embarrassments to the government of their own country as well as to their fellow
citizens. We cannot deny to Congress the reasonable belief that these difficulties might well become
acute, to the point of jeopardizing the successful conduct of international relations, when a citizen of one
country chooses to participate in the political or governmental affairs of another country. The citizen may
by his action unwittingly promote or encourage a course of conduct contrary to the interests of his own
government; moreover, the people or government of the foreign country may regard his action to be the
action of his government, or at least as a reflection if not an expression of its policy.
It follows that such activity is regulable by Congress under its power to deal with foreign affairs. And it
must be regulable on more than an ad hoc basis. The subtle influences and repercussions with which
the Government must deal make it reasonable for the generalized, although clearly limited, category of
‘political election’ to be used in defining the area of regulation. That description carries with it the scope
and meaning of its context and purpose; classes of elections—nonpolitical in the colloquial sense—as to
which participation by Americans could not possibly have any effect on the relations of the United States
with another country are excluded by any rational construction of the phrase. The classification that
Congress has adopted cannot be said to be inappropriate to the difficulties to be dealt with. Specific
applications are of course open to judicial challenge, as are other general categories in the law, by a
‘gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.
Before a person could be stripped of his citizenship, two requisites must concur. First, there must
be the commission of an expatriating act, and second, there must be an intent to renounce or
abandon one’s citizenship. It must be the citizen himself who will ultimately decide whether he
will abandon his citizenship.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267–68, 87 S. Ct. 1660, 1668, 18 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1967)
The entire legislative history of the 1868 Act makes it abundantly clear that there was a strong feeling in
the Congress that the only way the citizenship it conferred could be lost was by the voluntary renunciation
or abandonment by the citizen himself.
Citizenship is no light trifle to be jeopardized any moment Congress decides to do so under the name of
one of its general or implied grants of power. In some instances, loss of citizenship can mean that a man
is left without the protection of citizenship in any country in the world—as a man without a country.
Citizenship in this Nation is a part of a cooperative affair. Its citizenry is the country and the country is its
citizenry. The very nature of our free government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law
under which a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their
citizenship. We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of
this Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color, or
race. Our holding does no more than to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to
remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.
Section 301 does not impose a biological relationship requirement is consistent with the
legislative history of the INA, which “clearly indicates that the Congress intended to provide for
a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of keeping families of United
States citizens and immigrants united.”
Dvash-Banks v. Pompeo
Section 301 does not require a person born during their parents' marriage to demonstrate a biological
relationship with both of their married parents.
The Ninth Circuit held that “[a] straightforward reading” of the “born of parents” language in Section 301
“indicates ... that there is no requirement of a blood relationship.” The Ninth Circuit also held that “[i]f
Congress had wanted to ensure” that a person born to married parents only one of whom was a U.S.
citizen “actually shares a blood relationship with an American citizen,” “ ‘it knew how to do so,’ ” as it had
done in Section 309.
DOMICILE
Domicile
- It is the relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality or country.
- It is the place where he has true, fixed, permanent home and principal establishment, and to which,
whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, and from which he has no present intention
of moving.
- It implies something more permanent.
Kinds of domicile
Domicile of origin The domicile of a person’s parents, the head of his family, or the
person on whom he is legal dependent at the time of his birth.
Domicile of choice The place chosen by a person to replace his former domicile.
Domicile by operation of law The domicile assigned or attributed by law to a person. This may
result from the relation of husband and wife or parent and child.
Residence in fact, coupled with the purpose to make the place of residence one's home, are the
essential elements of domicile; a person can have a residence that is not his or her domicile. The
motive behind the intent to establish a domicile is immaterial.
Schill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2014-Ohio-4527, 141 Ohio St. 3d 382, 24 N.E.3d 1138
James's regular work activity in Ohio does not contradict an intent to make Florida his permanent
residence, nor does it change the fact of his residence in Florida. James's clear intent was to work part-
time in Ohio and be domiciled in Florida. He has meticulously ordered his life to make that so.
James's time in Ohio was devoted almost entirely to work. He rose each morning at 4:00 a.m., went to
the ChemTechnologies office, returned to Auburn Township by 7:00 in the evening, and retired to bed
by 8:00 p.m. He testified that after coming to Ohio, he always returns to Florida, which he considers his
home.
The nature of his contact with Ohio is transient—he works and then he leaves. He has stated that he
intends to return to Ohio to work for as long as he is physically able. This means that he will stop coming
to Ohio when he is physically unable to work; at that point, he will remain in Florida. Undoubtedly, he
works in Ohio. But Florida is his domicile.
Insured was domiciled in Florida, rather than in Ohio, for purposes of coverage for resident relatives in
automobile coverage provisions of umbrella insurance policy, despite his motive for moving to Florida for
tax reasons; insured's clear intent was to work part-time in Ohio as long as he was physically able to
work and be domiciled in Florida, and he meticulously ordered his life to make that so.
Loss of Domicile
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, [September 18, 1995], 318 PHIL
329-466
A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words: Animus non-revertendi from the previous domicile and animus manendi and revertendi to
the new domicile.
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, [September 18, 1995], 318 PHIL
329-466
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. 'Residence' is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile' denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place
and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention
to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile."
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte (Tacloban City).She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she
graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word
University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte
Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-
President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as
a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacañang Palace and registered as
a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu,
Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President
of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Imelda Marcos held various residences for different purposes during the past four decades. None of
these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve
his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in
business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire
to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other
reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers
himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the opportunity
to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken
him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of
origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for
another.
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191970, [April 24, 2012], 686 PHIL 563-570
Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in 1981 when
he was eight years old and there acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he
decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother, Romeo, Jr., in Barangay Veteran's Village,
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the
Bureau of Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian citizenship, executing a
sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9225.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
The Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it
be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.
Caballero v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 209835, [September 22, 2015], 770 PHIL 94-140
Cabellero was a Canadian citizen who benefited from RA 9225. He took his oath of allegiance on October
3, 2012 and executed an affidavit of renunciation of his Canadian citizenship on October 1, 2012. He ran
for mayor in Uyugan, Batanes where a disqualification case was filed against him on the ground that he
made false representation by declaring that he was eligible to run for mayor despite being a Canadian
citizen and not a resident therein. He was disqualified. He argued that there was no abandonement of
his domicile because he merely left Uyugan for a better chance in life.
RA 9225 does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on
the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. The term "residence" is to be understood
not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi)." A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile
of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This
holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of
Canadian citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation
from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
The retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September
13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from
the time he made it as such.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating, the entering into
a country with the intention of residing in it. "An immigrant is a person who removes into a
country for the purpose of permanent residence. The waiver of such immigrant status should be
as indubitable as his application for it.
Caasi v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508, [November 8, 1990], 269 PHIL 237-247
Merito Miguel is a green card holder of the United States. He, however, contends that he applied for a
green card only for convenience so he can go to the United States for medical consultation and to visit
his children. He maintained that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan and that he voted
there in the twin elections of 1987. Miguel was elected mayor of Bolinao in the January 18, 1988
elections. His qualification was challenged on the ground that he was a permanent resident of the United
States and not Bolinao.
Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating, the entering into a
country with the intention of residing in it. "An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence.
The moment he entered the United States and as evidenced by his application for an immigrant’s visa
where he answered that “permanently” in the length of stay. On its face, the green card that was
subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration
Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN.
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there, he entered the United States with the intention to live there
permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based
on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to
reside there permanently.
Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a
green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as
indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for
said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
Naturalization abroad which results to the lost of Philippine citizenship and loss of residence in
the Philippines.
Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 151914, [July 31, 2002], 434 PHIL 861-879
Coquilla was born and resided in Oras, Eastern Samar until he joined the US Navy in 1965 where he
was subsequently naturalized as a citizen of the United States. He returned to the Philippines in 1998
and applied for repatriation under RA 8171 where the same was approved after taking an oath on
November 10, 2000. He registered as voter and the same was approved on January 12, 2001. He filed
his certificate of candidacy claiming that he has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for two years.
Alvarez sought for the cancellation of Coquilla’s certificate on the ground that he misrepresented his
residency. Coquilla won as mayor but his certificate of candidacy was cancelled.
He is disqualified as he does not possess the requisite resident requirement, Coquilla lost his domicile
of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and
until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any
right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor
or as a resident alien.
In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine citizenship and
with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10,
2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, [March 8, 2016],
782 PHIL 292-1305
Her father's untimely demise made them decide to return to the Philippines. She claims to have returned
to the Philippines on May 24, 2005 to settle here for good. For this purpose, she and her husband
purchased a condominium unit and enrolled her children in Philippine schools. She made a quick trip to
the United States in February 2006 to dispose of their properties then promptly returned to the Philippines
in March 2006.
In the process of settling here, they sold their house in the United States and informed the U.S. Postal
Service of the abandonment of their United States address. Her husband resigned from his job in the
United States and Started working for a Philippine company. They bought a lot in Corinthian Gardens
and built their house therein. Grace applied for repatriation under Republic Act No.9225 and took her
oath of allegiance to the Philippines on July 7, 2006.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines.
There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a
change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good.
The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee
voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is
deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his
domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or
permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his
intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 157013, [July 10, 2003], 453 PHIL 586-819
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising
act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent
resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the
execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes "provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because by their status
in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus,
without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to "resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another
country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause for the
removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia."
The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting
established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have
retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
Philippines.
R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under
its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It
cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible
all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter
under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. As such, they are entitled to vote as absentee
voters.
Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162759, [August 4, 2006], 529 PHIL 642-659
The "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed
to avail themselves of the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A.
9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered to allow them to vote
and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.
Nicolas-Lewis et.al are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225
which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national
and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to
be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department
of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003 they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to
their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter,
however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter's
registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals
who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
There is no provision in the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring "duals" to actually establish
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents, grants under
its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot
be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas
Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
conditions, are qualified to vote. As such, they are entitled to vote as absentee voters.
Jao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128314, [May 29, 2002], 432 PHIL 160-170
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died
intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over the properties left by their parents
and pending appointment of a regular administrator, moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue since the actual
residence of their parents was in Angeles City, Pampanga and stayed only in Quezon City for medical
treatment. Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo's house in Quezon
City at the time of their death and it was Rodolfo himself who supplied the entry appearing on the death
certificate of their mother. The trial court denied the motion filed by Rodolfo.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person's properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person's properties can be found mostly in the
place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that
where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No
generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual's choice and peculiarities.
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As
thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person's actual
residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Accordingly,
venue for the settlement of the decedents' intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, [February 6, 2007], 543 PHIL 275-298
There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of
fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in
another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time
of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1983
showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from
the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association and Ayala
Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at his
Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol,
Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
PROPERTY
When a conflict of law situation arises
Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, [July 25, 1990], 265 PHIL 827-864
A conflict of law situation arises only when:
1. There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer,
or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and
2. A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on
the same matters.
Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, [July 25, 1990], 265 PHIL 827-864
[When] the issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the
property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose
of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (10a)
United Gas Corp. v. Fontenot, 241 La. 488, 501, 129 So. 2d 748, 753 (1961)
Under the mobilia maxim, held their situs to be the domicile of the owner of the intangible and usually
taxable there, Unless there existed a specific law to the contrary. Thus, under this fiction, identification
and association in the mind of intangibles with their owners (as in the case of movable tangibles and
personalty) gave them, in the law, a ‘situs' at the legal domicile of the owner.
When can a court in another jurisdiction subject property to its power and authority
1. When it has jurisdiction over the parties – it can order the parties to perform any act affecting the
title to or ownership of the property thereby effectively subjecting the property to its power and
tutelage.
2. When the parties agreed to.
A court of equity having jurisdiction over a person may act indirectly upon that person’s
extraterritorial real estate by ordering him or her to act or to cease to act in some particular way
in relation to the property
cause multiplicity of suit, and it would be difficult to imagine the chaos, inconvenience, inconsistency,
and jurisdictional issues that would result. Thus, a court with jurisdiction over the parties can affect an
equitable distribution of property and enforce that distribution through the use of contempt sanctions,
including incarceration pending compliance with its orders if necessary.
Philippine courts have power and authority over shares of stock held by a domiciliary
administrator.
Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. L-23145, [November 29, 1968], 135 PHIL 237-250
The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his
last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual
debts or to be distributed among his heirs. Ancillary administration is necessary or the reason for such
administration is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond
the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has
no authority in the Philippines.
Since, in the case at bar, there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in
New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary
administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost
and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under
the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled. Any other view
would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the uncontrolled
discretion of a party or entity.
A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has
received the imprimatur of the state acting according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it
will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot
legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary,
whenever called upon to do so. A corporation is not in fact and in reality a person, but the law treats it as
though it were a person by process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate
from its individual stockholders.
Notes:
- Prohibits the transfer of private lands to individuals, corporations, or associations who or which are
not qualified to hold lands of the public domain.
- It allows transfer to qualified individuals through hereditary succession, which is limited to intestate
succession only. As such, devises or agreements which have the effect of divesting Filipinos of
ownership of lands in favor of aliens cannot be given effect.
- The provision is intended to prevent Filipinos from transferring their landholdings to foreigners.
- It allows leases of private lands to aliens except when the terms make the lease one of sale or
conveyance such as one by:
o Making the lease perpetual; or
o Coupled with an option to buy.
Testamentary dispositions in favor of an alien violates the Constitution and cannot be given
effect.
Testate Estate of Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, G.R. No. L-27952, [February 15, 1982]
The Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for
a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens
which is proscribed by the Constitution.
An British citizen (alien) has no capacity or personality to question the lease of property by his
wife (spouse).
Matthews v. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584, [June 22, 2009], 608 PHIL 193-205
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being
an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering
that Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired
sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's claim that he provided the funds for
such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created
in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that
the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had
and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife
on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the
constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien
husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
An alien has no capacity nor personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property
by his/her spouse.
Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, [January 21, 1991], 271 PHIL 89-101
Thomas Cheesman, an American married to Criselda Cheesman acquired a parcel of land that was later
registered in the latter's name. Criselda subsequently sold the land to a third person without the
knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner then sought the nullification of the sale as he did not give his
consent thereto. The Court held that assuming that it was his (petitioner's) intention that the lot in question
be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
knowingly violated the Constitution; thus, the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the
theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal
property.
Aliens are allowed to lease private property so long as the lease do not operate to divest Filipinos
of ownership over the property in favor of the alien.
Llantino v. Co Liong Chong, G.R. No. L-29663, [August 20, 1990], 266 PHIL 645-652
A lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to buy real
property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the
Constitution from use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortune and misfortune, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid, is, if there are circumstances
attendant to its execution, which are used as a scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition.
If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of which the
Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes
clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages
not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi) — rights,
the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow the
use, the next day the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up
are consolidated in an alien
Notes:
- This allows former natural-born citizens of the Philippines to be transferees of private lands subject
only to area exceptions:
- This allows foreigners to own units in the condominium building, which the latter is owned bya
condominium corporation subject to ownership requirements of the Constitution.
- There is still need to comply with the 60-40 ownership ration in favor the Filipino citizens or
corporations.
SECTION 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or other space therein,
shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interests in the common areas or, in a proper
case, the membership or shareholdings in the condominium corporation: Provided, however, That where
the common areas in the condominium project are owned by the owners of separate units as co-owners
thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino
citizens, or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens,
except in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium project are held
by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the
appurtenant membership or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such
corporation to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws.
Yes. Our analysis of the district court's conclusion that the Jarvisons had a valid *1225 marriage requires
us first to examine what law would apply to the question of a marriage between two Navajo tribal
members who live completely within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation. Under Navajo tradition,
celebration of a traditional marriage ceremony and the knowledge thereof by the community were
sufficient to create a valid marriage. A marriage license or other documentation was unnecessary.
Current Navajo law allows parties to contract marriage through a traditional ceremony or by common-
law marriage within the Navajo Nation.
Cook v. Cook, 209 Ariz. 487, 496, 104 P.3d 857, 866 (Ct. App. 2005)
Alan and Peggy Cook were first cousins and they were married in Virginia where marriage between first
cousins are valid. They moved to Arizona in 1989, where at that time, their marriage was considered
void except where the laws where such marriage was contracted are valid.
The first question we must decide is whether the validity of the marriage should be determined under
Arizona or Virginia law. If determined under Virginia law, the marriage is valid; if determined under
Arizona law, we are presented with statutory and constitutional issues as to whether the marriage is
valid.
By construing the statute to apply prospectively only, we harmonize the 1996 amendments with Arizona's
constitutional prohibitions against retroactive legislation. We do not impair the legislature's expressly
recognized ability to declare as “void” marriages recognized as valid in other jurisdictions, so long as the
party asserting the right to the valid out-of-state marriage did not have a vested right as defined herein.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2015)
Same-sex couple brought action alleging that voter-approved Michigan Marriage Amendment (MMA),
which prohibited same-sex marriage, violated Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michiga, entered judgment in couple's favor, and state
appealed. Same-sex couples married in jurisdictions that provided for such marriages brought actions
alleging that Ohio's ban on same-sex marriages violated Fourteenth Amendment. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, entered judgment in couples' favor, and state appealed.
Same-sex spouses, who entered legal same-sex marriages in Maryland and Delaware, and Ohio funeral
director sued Ohio officials responsible for death certificates that denied recognition of spouses' same-
sex legal marriages after death of their partners, seeking declaratory judgment and permanent injunction.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, , entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor,
and state appealed. Same-sex couples validly married outside Kentucky brought § 1983 actions
challenging constitutionality of Kentucky's marriage-licensing law and denial of recognition for valid
same-sex marriages. The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, entered
judgment in couples' favor, and state appealed. Same-sex couples who were legally married in other
states before moving to Tennessee brought action challenging constitutionality of Tennessee's laws that
voided and rendered unenforceable in Tennessee any marriage prohibited in state. The United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, granted couples' motion for preliminary injunction, and
state appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Sutton, Circuit Judge, 772 F.3d
388, reversed. Cases were consolidated and certiorari was granted.
There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-
sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are
consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock
same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation's society, for they too may aspire to the
transcendent purposes of marriage.
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they
set forth independent principles; rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest
on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as
to the meaning and reach of the other, and in any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture
the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may
converge in the identification and definition of the right.
The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of
State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is
no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another
State on the ground of its same-sex character.
Civil Unions
Different from the traditional marriage relationships as they are a creation of statute where the rights and
obligations of the parties are governed by the law creating the relationship.
Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of New York, 25 A.D.3d 90, 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (2005)
Surviving partner, from same-sex civil union under Vermont law, brought wrongful death action
against hospitalat which now-deceased partner had received treatment. The Supreme Court, Nassau
County, John P. Dunne, J., 196 Misc.2d 440, 765 N.Y.S.2d 411,denied hospital's motion to dismiss, and
granted surviving spouse's motion for partial summary judgment on question of
standing. Hospital appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Lifson, J., held that: surviving
partner of same-sex civil union could not bring wrongful death action, and statutory exclusion of partners
in same-sex civil unions from classes of persons having standing to bring wrongful death suits did not
offend Equal Protection Clause.
Surviving partner of same-sex civil union was not “surviving spouse” within meaning of Estates, Powers,
and Trusts Law's definition of classes of decedents' distributees, and thus could not bring wrongful death
action arising from partner's death.
An action alleging wrongful death, unknown at common law, is a creature of statute requiring strict
adherence to the four corners of the legislation. The personal representative, duly appointed in this state
or any other jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees may maintain an action to
recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default which caused the decedent's death”. The term
“surviving spouse” did not include same-sex life partners.
The Supreme Court ruled that a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, obtained after the effectivity of
the present Civil Code, is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines. The Court also held that
the remarriage and cohabitation of the divorced wife with another man entitles the lawful husband to a
decree of legal separation. However, the Court found that there was no evidence of malice or unworthy
motives on the part of Vicenta's parents, and therefore, an action for alienation of affections against them
does not lie.
A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the new
Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines; and
neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to
the foreign decree of divorce entitled to validity in this country.
The petitioner, Alice Reyes Van Dorn, is a citizen of the Philippines, while the respondent, Richard Upton,
is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence
in the Philippines. They had two children together. In 1982, they were divorced in Nevada, United States,
and the petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, the respondent filed a suit against
the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, claiming that the Galleon Shop, a business owned
by the petitioner, is conjugal property and asking for an accounting of the business and the right to
manage the conjugal property. The petitioner moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the cause of action
is barred by the previous judgment in the divorce proceedings in Nevada. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss, stating that the property involved is located in the Philippines and therefore the divorce
decree has no bearing on the case. The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the dismissal
of the complaint filed by the respondent. The Court held that the divorce decree obtained in Nevada is
valid and binding on the parties. As an American citizen, the respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner under American law. Therefore, he has no standing to sue as the petitioner's husband and
exercise control over conjugal assets. The Court also stated that the respondent is estopped from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property because he had previously represented in the
divorce proceedings that there was no community property. The Court emphasized that the petitioner
should not be obliged to fulfill wife's obligations towards the respondent and should not be discriminated
against in her own country.
The Court based its decision on the principle that foreign divorces may be recognized in the Philippines
if they are valid according to the national law of the parties involved. In this case, the divorce obtained in
Nevada is valid and binding on the parties. The Court also emphasized the importance of respecting the
decisions of foreign courts and the principle of estoppel, which prevents the respondent from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property after representing in the divorce proceedings that there was
no community property. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, [February 6, 2007], 543 PHIL 275-298
This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis, a former governor of the
Province of Laguna in the Philippines. Felicisimo had three marriages during his lifetime. His first
marriage was with Virginia Sulit, with whom he had six children. His second marriage was with Merry
Lee Corwin, an American citizen, which ended in divorce. His third marriage was with respondent
Felicidad San Luis. After Felicisimo’s death, respondent filed a petition for letters of administration to
settle his estate.
Regarding the issue of legal capacity, the court cited the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., which
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen's alien spouse. The court held
that the divorce severs the marital bond and frees the Filipino spouse from their marital obligations. This
principle was subsequently applied in other cases, establishing the legal capacity of a Filipino citizen to
remarry after being divorced by their alien spouse abroad. Applying the above doctrine in the instant
case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, [June 30, 1989], 256 PHIL 407-421
The foreign spouse cannot maintain a criminal case against the former spouse on the ground
that he or she is no longer an interested party to the case.
This case involves Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national, who were married in Germany in 1979. After experiencing marital discord, Geiling initiated a
divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in 1983, which resulted in a decree of divorce in 1986.
Five months after the divorce decree was issued, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery against Pilapil
in Manila. The complaints were approved by the city fiscal and filed in the Regional Trial Court.
Pilapil filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice to dismiss the cases, arguing that Geiling, as a
foreigner and the complainant, did not qualify as an offended spouse since he had obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law. The Secretary of Justice upheld Pilapil's argument and directed
the city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Roehr v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, [June 20, 2003], 452 PHIL 608-620
Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction,
but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts
This case involves a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez
against Wolfgang O. Roehr before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The petitioner opposed
the petition and the case eventually reached the Court of Appeals, which remanded it back to the RTC.
Meanwhile, the petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. The petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the case with the RTC, which was granted.
However, the respondent filed a partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed to determine
the issues of custody of children and distribution of properties. The respondent judge partially set aside
her original order to tackle these issues. The petitioner argued lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in
our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children,
must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign
judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under
Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to
wit: SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific
thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person,
the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is essential that there should be an
opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions
in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie
evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent's participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither
has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, [October 5, 2005], 509 PHIL 108-117
The case involves the question of whether a Filipino spouse can remarry under Philippine law after their
foreign spouse obtains a valid divorce decree. The petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, challenges
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, which declared that the
respondent, Cipriano Orbecido III, is capacitated to remarry. The court a quo based its decision on the
provision of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, which states that if a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse, the Filipino spouse shall have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
The facts of the case are as follows: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva in 1981,
and they had two children together. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States and later obtained
American citizenship. In 2000, Cipriano learned that Lady Myros had obtained a divorce decree and
remarried an American citizen. Cipriano then filed a petition for authority to remarry, invoking Article 26
of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition, and the Republic, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, sought reconsideration but was denied.
Taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains as divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice. We state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner, and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as an American
citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, [August 11, 2010], 642 PHIL 420-438
This case involves a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree filed by Gerbert R. Corpuz,
a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. Gerbert married
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in 2005 but later discovered that his wife was having an affair. Gerbert
filed for divorce in Canada, and the divorce decree was granted in 2005. Two years later, Gerbert found
another Filipina to love and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. However, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that his marriage to Daisylyn still subsisted under Philippine law and that the
foreign divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court. Gerbert filed a
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC denied Gerbert's petition, ruling that only the Filipino spouse can
avail of the remedy under Article 26 of the Family Code to be able to remarry under Philippine law.
Gerbert appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign
decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in
another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this
rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion — i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens — with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the
civil registry — one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The Court held that the divorce obtained by the
respondent in Nevada should be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines. The Court
reasoned that while Philippine law does not allow for absolute divorces, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines if they are valid according to their national law. The
Court also cited previous rulings that recognized the legal effects of foreign divorces obtained by Filipino
spouses. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The Court further stated that the distinction made in the provision between a divorce
initiated by the alien spouse and a divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse is arbitrary and unfair. The
Court concluded that the provision violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and should be
interpreted in a manner that recognizes the residual effect of a foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses have been severed by divorce obtained abroad.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum,or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.
Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births: (b) marriage; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination
of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 524-558
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b)
of the Rules of Court. A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment
was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize
the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. In the recognition of foreign judgments,
Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign
law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity"
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that
needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
ARTICLE 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (n)
ARTICLE 779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the designation of an heir,
made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)
ARTICLE 783. A will is an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed
by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death.
(667a)
ARTICLE 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his
domicile in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the
will was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile at
the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. (n)
Notes:
therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the fact of its unauthorized destruction,
cancellation, or obliteration are established according to the Rules of Court. (n)
Notes:
The rule of revocation by operation of law recognizes that a will may be revoked
by the occurrence of certain circumstances not specifically mentioned in the
statutes which prescribe the methods of revocation.
The doctrine is that the revocation of a will is to be implied from certain changes
in the family or domestic relations of the testator, or in his property, or involving
the beneficiaries of his will, from which the law infers or presumes that he
intended a change, either total or partial, in the disposition of his property.
The rule is based on the theory that by reason of such changes, new duties
and obligations have accrued to the testator subsequent to the date of the will.
Virtue of an overt In order for this kind of revocation to operate there must be:
act
1. An overt act specified by the law
2. A completion at least of the subjective phase of the overt act
3. Presence of an animus revocandi or intent to revoke
4. The testator at the time of revoking must have capacity to make a will.
5. The revocation must be done by the testator himself, or by some other
person in his presence and by his express direction.
Virtue of revoking A will may be revoked by a subsequent will or codicil either notarial or
will or codicil holographic. However, it must be noted that the revoking will be itself a valid
will, otherwise there is no revocation.
Such revocation in the subsequent will must be a definite one. Mere declaration
that sometime in the future, the first would be revoked is not enough.
Conditional revocations are allowed and the revocation therein shall only take
place if the condition is fulfilled.
Accordingly, a second will referred to by the testator as his “last will” revokes
completely the first will, particularly if the provision of the two, as to who were
being instituted as heirs, are inconsistent. Bustamante v. Arevalo, G.R. No.
47305, [July 31, 1942], 73 PHIL 635-639
Principle of Instanter
The revocation is instant if the destruction was completely made, even though the testator subsequently
changed his mind; provided that, at the time of the performance of the over act, the testator must have had
the intent to revoke.
The revocation of a will by destruction or overt act was good only if this condition is fulfilled, namely, that
the revoking will was valid. If the condition is not fulfilled therefore the revocation by overt act did not
materialize.
This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to
make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or, if
made, fails of effect for some reason.
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the
court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at
least one identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If
contested, at least three identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost
or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample
handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.
RULE 77
Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder
Section 1. Will proved outside Philippines may be allowed here. — Wills proved and allowed in a foreign
country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper Court
of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2. Notice of hearing for allowance. — When a copy of such will and of the order or decree of the
allowance thereof, both duly authenticated, are filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by
the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and
place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance.
Section 3. When will allowed, and effect thereof. — If it appears at the hearing that the will should be
allowed in the Philippines, the shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge,
and attested by the seal of the court, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and
recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proves and allowed in such
court.
Section 4. Estate, how administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far
as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
Dalton v. Giberson, G.R. No. L-4113, [June 30, 1952], 91 PHIL 524-528
A foreign will may be reprobated in the Philippines. Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according
to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper [Regional Trial Court] in the
Philippines.
In our jurisdiction it is governed by Article 17 of the Civil Code of which I will no longer copy and paste,
providing a clear direction that it is the national law of the decedent which shall govern the intrinsic validity
of the will. It follows that processual presumption is applicable here. Foreign national law of the decedent
must be therefore properly proved.
Philippine Trust Co. v. Bohanan, G.R. No. L-12105, [January 30, 1960], 106 PHIL 997-1003
It was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had
selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence.. So the question at issue is whether the
testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by
the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to
dispose of all his properties by will. Under the Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be
governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the
national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator
to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the order of the court approving the
project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellants.
ADOPTION
In general
Adoptions are governed by the law of the place where the adoption is made, thus the validity is based on
the compliance with such laws. Adoptions made in one jurisdiction are usually recognized in other
jurisdiction to give full faith and credit to legal processes adopted in other countries, of which partakes as
a form of comity.
In the Philippines, adoptions made overseas are considered valid in our country so long as they are
compliant with the laws of the place where it is made. Therefore, the fact of adoption may be duly
registered in our civil registry.
Marcaida v. Aglubat, G.R. No. L-24006, [November 25, 1967], 129 PHIL 270-275
Where under the laws of Spain the procedure in adoption is for the court to approve a petition for adoption
and to grant authority, once the judgment becomes final to a Notary Public to execute a notarial document
embodying the order of adoption; and where such deed of adoption had been authenticated by the
Philippine Vice-Consul in Madrid, Spain, the local civil registrar of Manila cannot refuse to register such
deed upon the ground that under Philippine law adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding
not by notarial document of adoption; such officer can be compelled by mandamus.
Where tere is no suggestion in the record that prejudice to the state and adoptee, or any person, would
ensue from the registration of foreign adoption, the validity of which is not under attack, the rights of the
State and adoptee and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Art. 15 of the Civil Code which,
in terms explicit, provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though having abroad."
Limitation of registration of adoptions to those granted by Philippine courts is a misconception which a
broader view allows us not to correct. For, if registration is to be narrowed down to local adoptions, it is
the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out such limitation. We cannot carve out a prohibition
where the law does not so state. Excessive rigidity serves no purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of
our Civil Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable. Private international law offers no
obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created
by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is
given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own law.
It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will be
recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its
enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil Code
just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption "remains subject to local law." It is high
time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign adoptions. We hold that an adoption
created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil
register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall
be governed by the laws of this country.
Republic v. Miller, G.R. No. 125932, [April 21, 1999], 365 PHIL 634-639
An alien who is qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time
of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment
of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988,
will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become
vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by said law. Thus, even though
under the Family Code, he is denied, the petition filed under the prevailing law before the Family Code may
be continued.
Since the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the child that
the instant case be speedily disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for the determination
of whether petitioners are indeed qualified to adopt the child, instead of inappropriately referring the
instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB where the proceedings may have to start anew and might
be referred back to the trial court for the continuation of, the domestic adoption proceedings. Settled is
the rule that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount interest. It is a
settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out
the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
CORPORATIONS
When a conflict of law situation arises
It arises over issues on:
1. Administration
2. Incorporation
3. Nationality
4. Domicile
5. Ownership
Classifications of Corporation
Domestic corporations Organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
Foreign corporations Formed, organized or existing under any laws other than those of the
Philippines and whose laws allow Filipino citizens and corporations to
do business in its own country or State.
Pseudo-foreign corporations Coroprations incoropoated in one state and operate in another state.
The following acts shall not be deemed "doing business" in the Philippines:
1. Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to
do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor;
2. Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interest in such corporation;
3. Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in
the representative's or distributor's own name and account;
4. The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media;
5. Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed
by another entity in the Philippines;
6. Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of
products for export;
7. Collecting information in the Philippines; and
8. Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing
basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the
Philippines, servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental
services.
Cargill, Inc. v. Intra Strata Assurance Corp. , G.R. No. 168266, [March 15, 2010], 629 PHIL 320-335
A dispute between petitioner Cargill, Inc. and respondent Intra Strata Assurance Corporation regarding
the payment of a performance bond. Petitioner, a foreign corporation, entered into a contract with
Northern Mindanao Corporation (NMC) to purchase molasses. The contract was amended three times,
and respondent issued a performance bond to guarantee NMC's delivery of the molasses. However,
NMC was only able to deliver a small portion of the agreed amount. Petitioner filed a complaint against
NMC and respondent for payment under the performance bond. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner,
but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, stating that petitioner did not have the legal capacity to
sue in the Philippines as it was a foreign corporation doing business without the necessary license.
The Supreme Court held that the determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the
Philippines must be based on the facts of each case. In this case, the Court found that petitioner's
activities did not constitute doing business as they were not systematic and regular, but rather were
isolated transactions to fulfill the contract with NMC. The Court also noted that petitioner did not have an
office in the Philippines and imported products through a non-exclusive local broker.
The Court further explained that to be considered doing business in the Philippines, a foreign corporation
must actually transact business in the country on a continuing basis in its own name and for its own
account. Since petitioner was merely importing goods from a Philippine exporter without opening an
office or appointing agents, it did not meet the criteria for doing business in the Philippines.
There is no showing that the transactions between petitioner and NMC signify the intent of petitioner to
establish a continuous business or extend its operations in the Philippines.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7042 provide under Section 1 (f), Rule I, that "doing
business" does not include the following acts:
1. Mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly registered to do
business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor;
2. Having a nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; DTIACH
3. Appointing a representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in the
representative's or distributor's own name and account;
4. The publication of a general advertisement through any print or broadcast media;
5. Maintaining a stock of goods in the Philippines solely for the purpose of having the same processed
by another entity in the Philippines;
6. Consignment by a foreign entity of equipment with a local company to be used in the processing of
products for export;
7. Collecting information in the Philippines; and
8. Performing services auxiliary to an existing isolated contract of sale which are not on a continuing
basis, such as installing in the Philippines machinery it has manufactured or exported to the Philippines,
servicing the same, training domestic workers to operate it, and similar incidental services.
Steelcase, Inc. v. Design International Selections, Inc., G.R. No. 171995, [April 18, 2012], 686 PHIL
59-75
This case involves a dispute between Steelcase, Inc., a foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture
of office furniture, and Design International Selections, Inc., a Philippine corporation engaged in the
furniture business. Steelcase and DISI entered into a dealership agreement in the 1980s, granting DISI
the right to market, sell, distribute, install, and service Steelcase products in the Philippines. However,
the agreement was terminated in 1999 due to a breach. Steelcase filed a complaint for sum of money
against DISI, alleging an unpaid account of US$600,000. DISI, in its answer, sought the dismissal of the
complaint, arguing that Steelcase was doing business in the Philippines without the required license. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint, ruling that Steelcase was "doing business" in the
Philippines and lacked the legal capacity to sue. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.
The Court ruled in favor of Steelcase, finding that it was not doing business in the Philippines without a
license. The Court cited Section 3 (d) of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, which excludes from the
definition of "doing business" the appointment of a representative or distributor domiciled in the
Philippines who transacts business in their own name and for their own account. The Court found that
DISI was an independent distributor of Steelcase products, acting in its own name and for its own
account. The Court also noted that Steelcase's actions, such as canceling orders and not directly selling
its products to Philippine customers, indicated that it was not engaged in activities that could be
considered "doing business" in the Philippines. The Court also rejected DISI's argument that Steelcase
was estopped from challenging its legal capacity to sue. The Court held that DISI is estopped from
challenging Steelcase's legal capacity to sue. DISI entered into a dealership agreement with Steelcase
and benefited from it for 12 years. DISI never raised the issue of Steelcase's lack of license until it owed
Steelcase a significant amount of money. The Court cited previous cases that established the principle
that a party is estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after entering into a contract
with it.
The Court based its ruling on Section 3 (d) of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991, which excludes from
the definition of "doing business" the appointment of a representative or distributor domiciled in the
Philippines who transacts business in their own name and for their own account. The Court found that
DISI was an independent distributor of Steelcase products, acting in its own name and for its own
account. The Court also considered Steelcase's actions, such as canceling orders and not directly selling
its products to Philippine customers, as indications that it was not engaged in activities that could be
considered "doing business" in the Philippines. Regarding the issue of estoppel, the Court relied on
previous cases that established the principle that a party is estopped from challenging the personality of
a corporation after entering into a contract with it. DISI entered into a dealership agreement with
Steelcase and benefited from it for 12 years without raising the issue of Steelcase's lack of license. The
Court held that DISI's delay in raising the issue until it owed Steelcase a significant amount of money
constituted estoppel.
From the preceding citations, the appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to
constitute "doing business" unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation. On the other hand,
if the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes products, other than those of the
foreign corporation, for its own name and its own account, the latter cannot be considered to be doing
business in the Philippines. It should be kept in mind that the determination of whether a foreign
corporation is doing business in the Philippines must be judged in light of the attendant circumstances.
Residence of Corporation
A corporation may only have one domicile but it can be a resident of several states. The domicile of a
juridical person is the state of its incorporation. It may do business in other states and thus becomes a
resident thereof.
Resident foreign corporation A foreign corporation engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines.
Non-resident foreign corporation A foreign corporation not engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines.
State Investment House, Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., G.R. Nos. 79926-27, [October 17, 1991], 280 PHIL
9-28
Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do
business here, to the status of domestic corporations. Hence, if foreign corporations are considered
domestic corporations they should be considered residents. The idea that corporations cannot have a
residence separate from their domicile is therefore wrong and erroneous since domicile and residence
are two completely different doctrines.
This case involves a petition for involuntary insolvency filed by foreign banks against Consolidated Mines,
Inc. (CMI). The petitioning banks, Bank of America NT and SA, Citibank N.A., and Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, alleged that CMI had obtained loans from them and had committed acts
of insolvency. They also claimed that CMI had suffered its property to remain under attachment for the
purpose of hindering or delaying its creditors and had generally defaulted in the payment of its
obligations. State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI) and State Financing Center, Inc. (SFCI) opposed the
petition, arguing that the banks had unclean hands because they had received substantial payments
from CMI before filing the petition. They also claimed that the court had no jurisdiction over the case
because the alleged acts of insolvency were false and that the banks were not resident creditors of CMI.
CMI filed its answer to the petition, asserting that it was not insolvent. SIHI and SFCI filed an answer-in-
intervention and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
CMI insolvent because the petitioner banks were not resident creditors of CMI as required by the
Insolvency Law.
The court held that foreign banks authorized to do business in the Philippines are considered residents
of the country. The court also ruled that the failure of the banks to incorporate their branches in the
Philippines did not signify an intention to continue as residents of their respective states of incorporation.
The court found that the alleged acts of insolvency were not proven.
Courts have held that "a domestic corporation is regarded as having a residence within the state at any
place where it is engaged in the particulars of the corporate enterprise, and not only at its chief place or
home office;" that "a corporation may be domiciled in one state and resident in another; its legal domicile
in the state of its creation presents no impediment to its residence in a real and practical sense in the
state of its business activities. It is not really the grant of a license to a foreign corporation to do business
in this country that makes it a resident; the license merely gives legitimacy to its doing business here.
What effectively makes such a foreign corporation a resident corporation in the Philippines is its actually
being in the Philippines and licitly doing business here, "locality of existence" being, to repeat, the
"necessary element in . . (the) signification" of the term, resident corporation.
Rogers v. Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 130, 53 S. Ct. 295, 297, 77 L. Ed. 652 (1933)
New Jersey law is applicable. It has long been settled doctrine that a court—state or federal—sitting in
one State will as a general rule decline to interfere with or control by injunction or otherwise the
management of the internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another state but will
leave controversies as to such matters to the courts of the state of the domicile.
Court will decline jurisdiction of stockholders’ suits relating to internal affairs of foreign
corporation whenever considerations of convenience, efficiency, and justice favor courts of state
of domicile.
As the tobacco company, in addition to its registered office, has property, operates directly or through
subsidiary branch factories in New Jersey and carries on business there and in other states and
countries, it may not be deemed to have been organized in that state as a mere matter of convenience
for the purpose of carrying on all its business in another state or be deemed in New York to be a local
concern.
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959)
Action by former minority stockholders against corporation for rescission of sale of minority stock to
corporation on ground of alleged fraudulent conspiracy to liquidate corporate assets at tremendous profit
to remaining stockholders following corporation's purchase of minority stock as treasury stock and for an
accounting for former minority stockholders' share of proceeds of liquidation which followed the sale. The
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Benjamin C. Dawkins, Jr., J., 159
F.Supp. 104, entered decree adverse to corporation, and corporation appealed. The Court of Appeals,
263 F.2d 748, affirmed the decree. Upon petition for rehearing, the Court of Appeals held that evidence
sustained District Court's holding that the necessary intent had been established to constitute actionable
fraud under Louisiana law.
Where Louisiana's conflict-of-law rules were generally same as those in other states, but Louisiana law
was silent on question as to which law determines whether a fiduciary relationship inures from corporate
officers or directors or majority stockholders to minority stockholders, particularly concerning purchase
of stock from a minority stockholder in case of a foreign corporation, Court of Appeals would, in a diversity
case, look to the general law for conflict-of-law rule to be applied.
A number of cases have held that the conflict-of-laws rules of the forum require that court to refer to the
‘law of the State of incorporation to determine the extent and nature of relationship between corporation
and stockholder, corporate officer or director and stockholder and between stockholders inter sese,' while
the law of the place of the wrong determines the quantum of the breach of duty. Apparently, Delaware
imposes no fiduciary duty on the part of officers or directors or majority stockholders in buying stock from
the minority or individual stockholders.8 In strict logic, a strong case is made that, if this Court's opinion
is based exclusively on the breach of fiduciary obligations owed by directors and majority stockholders
of a foreign corporation to minority stockholders, and if literal compliance is given to those decisions
holding that the State of incorporation sets the standards for all personal relationships between persons
connected with the corporation, the opinion is faulty.
Those decisions are, however, in our opinion, either inapplicable or unsound where the only contact point
with the incorporating state is the naked fact of incorporation, and where all other contact points, such
as, residence of parties and actors, situs of property, lex loci delicti or contractus, place where corporation
is conducting its only or principal place of business, et cetera, are found in another jurisdiction. Certainly,
in such a situation the charter of the corporation and even non-repugnant statutory laws of the state of
incorporation limiting corporate powers should govern the internal affairs of the corporation. When,
however, the situation is such as here, where neither the charter nor the statutory laws of the
incorporating state are applicable, and all contact points are in the forum, we believe that the laws of the
forum should govern.
State of incorporation
By incorporating in a particular state, a corporation agrees that the laws of that state shall be the governing
law with respect to the internal affairs of the corporation. Internal affairs refer to matters relating to the
governance of the corporation as well as the rights and responsibilities of officers and stockholders.
Domicile of corporations
The place where their legal representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions.
The domicile of corporations is the place where they have their principal place of business as stated in the
articles of incorporation the principal place becomes the determining factor where suits will be filed for or
against the corporation. Regardless of several places of business, venue will still be the principal place as
indicated.
Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Goldstar Elevators Phils. Inc., G.R. No. 161026, [October
24, 2005], 510 PHIL 467-477
This case involves a dispute between two corporations, Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corporation
(Hyatt) and Goldstar Elevators, Phils., Inc. (Goldstar), regarding unfair trade practices and damages.
Hyatt filed a complaint against LG Industrial Systems Co. Ltd. (LGISC) and LG International Corporation
(LGIC), alleging that they terminated their exclusive distributorship agreement and caused damages to
Hyatt. Hyatt later amended its complaint to include Goldstar as a party-defendant, alleging that Goldstar
was being utilized by LGISC and LGIC in their unlawful acts against Hyatt. Goldstar filed a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the venue was improperly laid and that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action against Goldstar. The trial court denied Goldstar's motion to dismiss, ruling that
the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action and that the venue was properly laid. Goldstar filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Goldstar then filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA), alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
The SC explained that for corporations, their residence or domicile is determined by the place where
their principal place of business is located, as stated in their respective Articles of Incorporation. In this
case, both Hyatt and Goldstar stated in their Articles of Incorporation that their principal place of business
was in Makati. Therefore, the proper venue for the case should have been Makati, not Mandaluyong City
where the case was filed. The SC held that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Goldstar's motion to dismiss based on improper venue.
It now becomes apparent that the residence or domicile of a juridical person is fixed by "the law creating
or recognizing" it. Under Section 14(3) of the Corporation Code, the place where the principal office of
the corporation is to be located is one of the required contents of the articles of incorporation, which shall
be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
In the present case, there is no question as to the residence of respondent. What needs to be examined
is that of petitioner. Admittedly, the latter's principal place of business is Makati, as indicated in its Articles
of Incorporation. Since the principal place of business of a corporation determines its residence or
domicile, then the place indicated in petitioner's articles of incorporation becomes controlling in
determining the venue for this case. To insist that the proper venue is the actual principal office and not
that stated in its Articles of Incorporation would indeed create confusion and work untold inconvenience.
Enterprising litigants may, out of some ulterior motives, easily circumvent the rules on venue by the
simple expedient of closing old offices and opening new ones in another place that they may find well to
suit their needs.
Clavecilla Radio System v. Antillon, G.R. No. L-22238, [February 18, 1967], 125 PHIL 779-782
A complaint filed by New Cagayan Grocery against Clavecilla Radio System for damages. The complaint
alleges that a message sent by New Cagayan Grocery to Clavecilla Radio System's Bacolod Branch
Office was delivered to the Cagayan de Oro branch office with a crucial word omitted, causing damages
to New Cagayan Grocery. Clavecilla Radio System filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
that it states no cause of action and that the venue is improperly laid. The City Judge denied the motion
to dismiss and set the case for hearing. Clavecilla Radio System then filed a petition for prohibition with
the Court of First Instance to enjoin the City Judge from proceeding with the case, arguing that the suit
should be filed in Manila where its principal office is located.
The Court based its decision on Rule 4, Section 1(b)(3) of the New Rules of Court, which provides that
the venue of action based on tort is in the municipality where the defendant resides or may be served
with summons. Settled is the principle in corporation law that the residence of the corporation is the place
where its principal office is established. The defendant Clavecilla Radio System has its principal Office
in Manila, it follows that the suit against it may properly be filed in the city of Manila. The fact that it
maintains branch offices in some parts of the country does not mean that it can be sued in any of these
places. To allow an action to be instituted in any place where a corporate entity has its branch offices
would create confusion and work untold inconvenience to the corporation. The Court held that a
corporation can only have one residence at a time and that maintaining branch offices in different places
does not mean that the corporation can be sued in any of these places. The Court emphasized that the
laying of the venue of an action is regulated by the Rules of Court and is not left to the plaintiff's caprice.
Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc., G.R. No. L-23145, [November 29, 1968], 135 PHIL 237-250
This case involves the settlement of the estate of Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on
March 27, 1960. The ancillary administrator in the Philippines, Renato D. Tayag, sought to gain control
and possession of the stock certificates owned by Perkins in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. However, the
domiciliary administrator in New York, the County Trust Company, refused to surrender the stock
certificates. The lower court issued an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and requiring Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. to issue new certificates. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. appealed the order.
The court held that the ancillary administrator has the power to gain control and possession of all assets
of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. The court also stated that the stock certificates
can be considered lost since the domiciliary administrator in New York refused to surrender them. The
court emphasized that compliance with a valid judicial order should not depend on the discretion of a
party or entity. The court further explained that a corporation, such as Benguet Consolidated, Inc., is not
a person but an artificial being created by law and subject to the jurisdiction of local courts.
Nationality of corporations
This is relevant in determining compliance with laws prescribing minimum ownership requirements by
Filipinos for certain industries or activities under the Constitution.
Narra Nickel Mining & Development Corp. v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., G.R. No. 195580,
[April 21, 2014], 733 PHIL 365-490
This case involves a dispute between foreign corporations and a local corporation regarding the
entitlement of the foreign corporations to Mineral Production Sharing Agreements (MPSAs). The Court
of Appeals ruled that the foreign corporations are not entitled to MPSAs due to doubts about their
nationality. The Supreme Court affirmed this ruling, stating that allowing the issuance of MPSAs to foreign
corporations owned and controlled by a 100% foreign-owned corporation would violate the constitutional
provision that reserves the exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources to Filipino
citizens and corporations at least 60% owned by Filipino citizens. The Court used the Grandfather Rule
to determine the nationality of the foreign corporations, which looks into the citizenship of the individuals
who ultimately own and control the shares of stock of a corporation. The case highlights the importance
of complying with the constitutional requirement of Filipino ownership in corporations engaged in the
exploration and utilization of natural resources.
After a scrutiny of the evidence extant on record, the Court finds that this case calls for the application of
the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists in
the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino
equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since their common investor, the 100%
Canadian corporation — MBMI, funded them. However, petitioners also claim that there is "doubt" only
when the stockholdings of Filipinos are less than 60%.
In ending, the "control test" is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a
corporation is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
entitled to undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the
Philippines. When in the mind of the Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and
circumstances of the case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation, then it may
apply the "grandfather rule."
Capital defined
Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579, [June 28, 2011], 668 PHIL 1-118
This case involves a petition filed by Wilson P. Gamboa, a stockholder of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company (PLDT), seeking to prohibit the sale of shares of stock of Philippine
Telecommunications Investment Corporation (PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines
to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First Pacific).
Gamboa argues that the sale violates the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility.
In 1928, PLDT was granted a franchise to engage in telecommunications business. In 1969, General
Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE) sold 26% of PLDT's outstanding common shares to PTIC.
In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) became the owner of 111,415 shares of PTIC through Deeds of
Assignment. In 1986, the PTIC shares held by PHI were sequestered by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) and later declared to be owned by the Republic of the Philippines. In
1999, First Pacific acquired the remaining 54% of PTIC's outstanding capital stock. In 2006, the
government announced the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares through a public bidding. Parallax Venture
Fund XXVII emerged as the highest bidder, but First Pacific exercised its right of first refusal and bought
the PTIC shares. This increased First Pacific's common shareholdings in PLDT from 30.7% to 37%,
exceeding the constitutional limit on foreign ownership of a public utility.
Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be determined on the
basis of outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or not, but only such stocks which are
generally entitled to vote are considered. For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine
citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity.
Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential. Thus,
stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred to aliens cannot be
considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals. Individuals or juridical entities not
meeting the aforementioned qualifications are considered as non-Philippine nationals.
The court examines the historical context and purpose of the provision and concludes that the term
"capital" refers to the ownership of common capital stock. The court emphasizes that the purpose of the
provision is to reserve control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. The court also notes that the
respondents do not dispute the claim that foreigners hold more than 40 percent of PLDT's common
shares. Therefore, the court rules in favor of the petitioner and declares that the term "capital" in the
Constitution refers to common shares. This decision ensures that the control of public utilities remains in
the hands of Filipino citizens, as mandated by the Constitution. To construe broadly the term "capital" as
the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly
contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the "State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." A broad definition unjustifiably
disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public
utility.
TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
Climate change litigation
For conflicts involving the citizens of different countries, private international law comes into play. A citizen
of a country devasted by a violent storm could sue an oil company based in another country for damages
to life and property.
There must be a realization that environmental laws are entitled to a more liberal interpretation to work. If
we are to apply to the concepts of causation and redressability under torts law, it will only weaken the
system of compensation provided in environmental laws.
State of Ga. v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238, 27 S. Ct. 618, 619, 51 L. Ed. 1038 (1907)
Foreign corporations will be enjoined at the suit of the state of Georgia from so discharging sulphurous
fumes from their works in Tennessee as to pollute the air over large tracts of territory in Georgia, and to
cause and threaten wholesale damage to forests and vegetable life therein, if not to health.
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the air over its territory should not be
polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains, be they better or
worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have suffered, should not be further destroyed or
threatened by the act of persons beyond its control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be
endangered from the same source. If any such demand is to be enforced this must be notwithstanding
the hesitation that we might feel if the suit were between private parties, and the doubt whether, for the
injuries which they might be suffering to their property, they should not be left to an action at law.
This requires analysis and application of the law of the place where the damage
is suffered or inflicted. It looks to the domestic law of a state which shall be
applied to polluting activities whose sources are foreign.
As long as the effects are felt locally even if the source comes from outside the
country, domestic law may be applied to govern the act complained of.
The polluting entity can be held liable because if its operations extend
outside a country’s boundaries, it is reasonable for it to expect that it will
be held liable for its polluting activity.
Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006)
Citizen suit was brought under Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to enforce Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA) order that Canadian operator of Canadian smelting plant
conduct remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) of portion of river within
United States where slag from plant had come to be located. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Alan A. McDonald, J., 2004
WL 2578982,denied operator's motion to dismiss, and operator sought
interlocutory appeal.
CERCLA liability attaches when: (1) site at which there is actual or threatened
release of hazardous substances is “facility” within meaning of Act; (2) “release”
or “threatened release” of hazardous substance from facility has occurred; and
(3) party is within one of four classes of persons subject to liability.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, §§ 101(9), 107(a), (a)(4), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(9), 9607(a), (a)(4).
Area landowners brought action against owner of Maryland retail service station,
alleging that soil and groundwater in their District of Columbia neighborhood
were contaminated as result of the release of gasoline from the station's
underground storage tanks. Owner moved for partial summary judgment.
Applying these factors to the instant facts, the Court finds that between the
District of Columbia and Maryland, the District of Columbia has the greater
interest in the outcome of this litigation.3 While Chevron's conduct occurred
mainly in Maryland, where its former service station and USTs are situated, and
a handful of plaintiffs currently reside in that state, all of the alleged
contamination at issue in this litigation occurred in the District of Columbia, all of
the alleged injuries were sustained in the District of Columbia, and the
overwhelming majority of plaintiffs still reside in the District of Columbia.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that all of the tort claims asserted in these
consolidated cases are governed by the laws of the District of Columbia.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
When a conflict of law situation arises
It arises when:
1. Intellectual property rights are infringed beyond the territory of registration as the law protecting
them vary from one country to another.
2. While it may be enforceable in one country and in another, the problem arises when foreign laws
differ from domestic laws on intellectual property.
3. Conflict arises when states have different rules in respect to IP rights.
The national treatment principle bars the extraterritorial application of foreign copyright laws for it mandates
the application of local laws for the equal treatment of the rights of foreigner. It does not resolve conflict of
laws issues. It merely mandates that the same treatment be given to nationals of contracting parties to
international conventions.
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994)
Producers of animated movie filed copyright infringement action against
distributors concerning foreign and domestic videotape distribution of movie.
The United States District Court for the Central District of California, John G.
Davies, J., entered judgment in favor of producers. Distributors appealed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. On petition for rehearing en banc, the Court of
Appeals, D.W. Nelson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) allegation of mere domestic
authorization of extraterritorial acts of infringement did not state claim under
Copyright Act, and (2) longstanding presumption against extraterritorial
application of United States laws applied to action under Copyright Act
concerning alleged infringement occurring wholly outside United States.
Given the undisputed axiom that United States copyright law has no
extraterritorial application, it would seem to follow necessarily that a primary
activity outside the boundaries of the United States, not constituting an
infringement cognizable under the Copyright Act, cannot serve as the basis for
holding liable under the Copyright Act one who is merely related to that activity
within the United States.
We think it inappropriate for the courts to act in a manner that might disrupt
Congress's efforts to secure a more stable international intellectual property
regime unless Congress otherwise clearly has expressed its intent. The
Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen. Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381 (9th
Cir. 1995)
In order for U.S. copyright law to apply, at least one alleged infringement must
be completed entirely within the United States, and that mere authorization of
extraterritorial infringement was not a completed act of infringement in the United
States. Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1094, 1098. In this case, defendants either
initiated a potential infringement in the United States by broadcasting the
Showtime signal, which contained copyrighted material, or defendants
authorized people in Canada to engage in infringement. In either case, the
potential infringement was only completed in Canada once the signal was
received and viewed. Accordingly, U.S. copyright law did not apply, and
therefore did not preempt Allarcom's state law claims.
Most significant Same.
relationship
Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 91
(2d Cir. 1998)
Conflicts rule for issues of ownership. Copyright is a form of property, and the
usual rule is that the interests of the parties in property are determined by the
law of the state with “the most significant relationship” to the property and the
parties. See id. The Restatement recognizes the applicability of this principle to
intangibles such as “a literary idea.” Id. Since the works at issue were created
by Russian nationals and first published in Russia, Russian law is the
appropriate source of law to determine issues of ownership of rights. That is the
well-reasoned conclusion of the Amicus Curiae, Prof. Patry, and the parties in
their supplemental briefs are in agreement on this point. In terms of the United
States Copyrights Act and its reference to the Berne Convention, Russia is the
“country of origin” of these works, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “country of
origin” of Berne Convention work); Berne Convention, Art. 5(4), although
“country of origin” might not always be the *91 appropriate country for purposes
of choice of law concerning ownership.
Sarl Louis Feraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007)
French clothing designers, as judgment creditors, brought action to enforce
French default judgment against operator of Internet website on which
photographs of designers' products had been posted. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, Gerard E. Lynch, J., 406 F.Supp.2d
274, dismissed action. Creditor appealed.
Laws that are antithetical to the First Amendment will create such a situation.
Foreign judgments that impinge on First Amendment rights will be found to be
“repugnant” to public policy. ( “[I]f ... the public policy to which the foreign
judgment is repugnant is embodied in the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution or the free speech guaranty of the Constitution of this State, the
refusal to recognize the judgment should be, and it is deemed to be,
‘constitutionally mandatory.’ ”); holding unenforceable French judgment
rendered under law prohibiting Nazi propaganda because such law would violate
the First Amendment), rev'd on other grounds, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.2006) (in
banc). The district court in this case reached the conclusion that the French
Judgments were unenforceable because they impinged on Viewfinder's First
Amendment rights. In doing so, however, it appears not to have conducted the
full analysis for us to affirm its decision.
The district court's decision appears to rest on the assumption that if Viewfinder
is a news magazine reporting on a public event, then it has an absolute First
Amendment defense to any attempt to sanction such conduct. The First
Amendment does not provide such categorical protection. Intellectual property
laws co-exist with the First Amendment in this country, and the fact that an entity
is a news publication engaging in speech activity does not, standing alone,
relieve such entities of their obligation to obey intellectual property laws. While
an entity's status as a news publication may be highly probative on certain
relevant inquiries, such as whether that entity has a fair use defense to copyright
infringement, it does not render that entity immune from liability under intellectual
property laws.
Section 48 of Rule 39
Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order, is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
The only duty of our courts is to ensure that the judgment is genuine, authentic, and in accordance with
foreign law. If such are complied, the courts’ duty is only to enforce the foreign judgment and they are not
allowed to reopen the case, relitigate the issues, or review the correctness or appropriateness of the foreign
court’s decision as long as they do not violate public policy or prohibitive laws.
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, [June 26, 2013], 712 PHIL 524-558
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b)
of the Rules of Court. A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment
was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize
the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. In the recognition of foreign judgments,
Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign
law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity"
of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment
nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact that
needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the
recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.
Roehr v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, [June 20, 2003], 452 PHIL 608-620
No finding that there was no opportunity given to Rodriguez to challenge the judgment of the
German court.
This case involves a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez
against Wolfgang O. Roehr before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The petitioner opposed
the petition and the case eventually reached the Court of Appeals, which remanded it back to the RTC.
Meanwhile, the petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese. The petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the case with the RTC, which was granted.
However, the respondent filed a partial reconsideration with a prayer that the case proceed to determine
the issues of custody of children and distribution of properties. The respondent judge partially set aside
her original order to tackle these issues. The petitioner argued lack of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed
to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section
50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit: SEC. 50. Effect
of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent's participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither
has she commented on the proceedings nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. v. Grand International Airways, Inc., G.R. No. 140288, [October
23, 2006], 535 PHIL 757-765
This case involves a dispute between St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd. (petitioner), a foreign
corporation based in Singapore, and Grand International Airways, Inc. (respondent), a domestic
corporation engaged in airline operations. The petitioner and respondent entered into an agreement for
the maintenance and modification of an aircraft. The agreement stated that any disputes would be
governed by the laws of Singapore and submitted to the jurisdiction of Singapore courts.
The petitioner performed the contracted works but the respondent failed to pay the agreed-upon amount.
As a result, the petitioner filed a lawsuit in the High Court of Singapore, which issued a judgment by
default against the respondent. The petitioner then filed a petition for enforcement of the judgment in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasay City, Philippines.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The Court held that the Singapore court had acquired
jurisdiction over the respondent through proper service of summons and that the judgment by default
issued by the Singapore court is valid and enforceable in the Philippines.
1. Valid Service of Summons: The Court found that the extraterritorial service of summons on the
respondent's office in the Philippines was valid. The Court emphasized that under the Rules of
Court, extraterritorial service of summons is allowed when the defendant is a non-resident who
is not found in the Philippines. In this case, the respondent is a domestic corporation but the
service of summons was still valid because the respondent's office in the Philippines was
considered as its "dwelling house" for purposes of service of summons.
2. Jurisdiction of Singapore Court: The Court held that the Singapore court had acquired jurisdiction
over the respondent. The Court noted that the agreement between the petitioner and respondent
explicitly stated that any disputes would be governed by the laws of Singapore and submitted to
the jurisdiction of Singapore courts. The Court emphasized that parties to a contract may agree
to submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, and such agreement is valid and binding. In this
case, the respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Singapore court by entering
into the agreement.
3. Enforceability of Foreign Judgment: The Court ruled that the judgment by default issued by the
Singapore court is enforceable in the Philippines. The Court explained that under the Rules of
Court, a foreign judgment may be enforced in the Philippines if it is proven that the foreign court
had jurisdiction over the defendant and that the judgment is final and executory. In this case, the
Court found that the Singapore court had jurisdiction over the respondent and that the judgment
by default was final and executory.
Tropic Leisure Corp. v. Hailey, 251 N.C. App. 915, 796 S.E.2d 129 (2017)
Defendant filed motion for relief from foreign judgment, alleging that United States Virgin Islands small
claims court judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit. The District Court, Wake County, Debra
Sasser, J., denied the motion, and defendant appealed. Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that judgment
was issued in violation of defendant's due process rights.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that the judgment of the court of one state must be
given the same effect in a sister state that it has in the state where it was rendered. Because a
foreign state's judgment is entitled to only the same validity and effect in a sister state as it had in the
rendering state, the foreign judgment must satisfy the requisites of a valid judgment under the laws of
the rendering state before it will be afforded full faith and credit.
These cases demonstrate the constitutional invalidity of the statutory framework in the Virgin Islands for
handling small claims cases. Litigants in such cases are prohibited from securing the representation of
counsel in the small claims court and are not given the opportunity to either (1) opt out of the small claims
court entirely by removing the case to a trial court that permits representation by counsel; or (2) appeal
from a small claims court judgment for a trial de novo in a court that allows representation by counsel.
Instead, the only appeal allowed from the small claims court is to the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court where “[n]o additional evidence shall be taken or considered.”
Thus, there is no opportunity whatsoever for a small claims court litigant to be represented by counsel
during any portion of the critical fact-finding phase of the litigation. The utility to such a litigant of having
his attorney make purely legal arguments during the appellate phase of the proceeding is simply no
substitute for the opportunity to have his chosen counsel develop a factual record at trial. Thus, we
conclude that Defendant was denied “the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.
Mother brought divorce action against father, and after taking their child to Brazil she sought to enforce
a Brazilian court Hague Convention ruling that her child was not required to return to the United States.
The 308th District Court, Harris County, denied mother's plea to the jurisdiction, ordered father and
mother divorced, established possession and access of the child to father, and awarded child support,
damages, and attorney fees to father. Mother appealed.
When comity is an issue, a court begins its analysis “with an inclination to accord deference to” a foreign
court's decision of a related Hague petition. However, a court may decline to extend comity if the foreign
court “clearly misinterprets the Hague Convention, contravenes the Convention's fundamental premises
or objectives, or fails to meet a minimum standard of reasonableness.
Phil. Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. FASGI Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 137378, [October 12, 2000], 396
PHIL 893-914
In summary, this case involves a distributorship arrangement between FASGI and PAWI. FASGI filed a
lawsuit against PAWI for breach of contract and recovery of damages before the US District Court. The
parties entered into a settlement agreement, but PAWI failed to fulfill its obligations. FASGI filed a notice
of entry of judgment with the US District Court, and a certificate of finality of judgment was issued. FASGI
subsequently filed a complaint for enforcement of the foreign judgment before the Regional Trial Court
in Makati, but the case was dismissed. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision and ordered
the full enforcement of the California judgment. The main issue in this case is whether the foreign
judgment should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines. The court ruled in favor of FASGI and
upheld the decision of the appellate court, ordering the full enforcement of the California judgment.
The court ruled that a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized in this jurisdiction
as long as there has been a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction, regular
proceedings have been conducted, and there is no indication of prejudice or fraud in procuring the
judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding until a contrary showing is made. The
court also emphasized that a party cannot use the courts to relieve itself from the effects of an unwise or
unfavorable contract freely entered into.
There was no evidence of fraud or prejudice in the proceedings before the US District Court. PAWI's
argument that its representative, Mr. Thomas Ready, did not have authority to enter into the settlement
agreement was rejected because PAWI failed to promptly repudiate the agreement when it became
aware of it. The court also noted that PAWI had the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of the agreement
and should not be allowed to disown it now.
Apostille Convention
The practical effect of the Apostille Convention is that it eliminates the need for legalization of documents
to be used abroad. Documents originating from another Apostille country do not need to be authenticated
anymore with Philippine consulates before the documents could be used here in the Philippines. An
Apostille certificate need only to be attached and the public document may be used in the Philippines.