CRIMINAL LAW 1 - A.

Y 2023-2024
Finals Case Digests

ARTICLE 12 - EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

People v. Taneo

KEYWORDS: Somnambulism, Sleep Walking, Legal Medicine

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Potenciano Tadeo
- Wife - wounded in abdomen upon meeting each other - died 5 days later with
fetus
- Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao - visitors were also attacked
- Mother and [Father] - attacked

CHARGE:
- Parricide, was sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500
and to pay the costs.

FACTS:
Potenciano Tadeo lived with his wife in his parent’s house. In January 1932, a fiesta
was being celebrated, and visitors were entertained in the house including Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao.

Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly
got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he
wounded her in the abdomen.
Taneo attacked Tanner and Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he
wounded himself. Potenciano’s wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five
days later as a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the
mother’s womb.

Taneo was charged with parricide. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.

It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of “tuba” with Enrique Collantes and Valentin
Abadilla.

On the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and
weak, and early in the afternoon he had severe stomachache.

The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was trying to
stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it
seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with
a bolo and left the room.

At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he
fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his
enemies seemed to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.

The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife,
but that he loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao,
or have any motive for assaulting them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Taneo is criminally liable
RULING:

NO. The Court concluded that the defendant acted while in a dream. His acts were not
voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

The Court took the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the
defendant’s own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that
the defendant tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection
he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as
may be inferred from the evidence presented, the Court found not only a lack of motive
for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor
stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind.

The Court found that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he
is charged, and it is ordered that he be confined in the Government insane asylum,
whence he shall not be released until the director thereof finds that his liberty would no
longer constitute a menace.

People v. Bonoan

KEYWORDS: Stabbing, Dementia Praecox

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant
 - Carlos Guison, victim
- Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist - first report
- Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital - second
report

CHARGE:
- Murder as there is treachery and premeditation
- The lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the
information above-quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

FACTS

Celestino Bonoan is charged with the crime of murder for stabbing Carlos Guison with a
knife, which caused his death three days afterwards. The accused stabbed the
deceased thrice on the left side and this was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco
who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife.

The case was called for arraignment, however the defense counsel objected on the
ground that the accused was mentally deranged and was at the time confined in the
Psychopatic Hospital.

For the third time the case was called again. However, the assistant alienist of the
Psychopathic Hospital rendered his report stating that the accused was not in a
condition to defend himself. Hence, the case was suspended indefinitely.

Few months later, the same Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the accused could
be discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered
case.”

After trial, the lower court found Bonoan guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
The defense now appeals, claiming the lower court made errors in finding Bonoan
suffered dementia only occasionally and intermittently, did not show any kind of
abnormality, that the defense did not establish the defendant’s insanity and found the
accused guilty.

ISSUE

W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty

RULING

YES. The Court finds the accused demented at the time he perpetrated the crime,
which consequently exempts him from criminal liability, and orders for his confinement in
San Lazaro Hospital or other hospital for the insane. This ruling was based on the
following evidence:

1. Uncontradicted evidence that accused was confined in the insane department of

San Lazaro Hospital and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before the
commission of the offense and recurrence of ailments were not entirely lacking of
scientific foundation
2. Persons with dementia praecox are disqualified from legal responsibility because
they have no control of their acts; dementia praecox symptoms similar to manic
depression psychosis
3. Accused had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia praecox, four
days prior to act according to Dr. Francisco
4. Accused was sent the Psychopatic hospital on the same day of crime and
arrest, indicating the police’s doubt of his mental normalcy
5. Defendant suffered from manic depressive psychosis according to Dr. Joson

People v. Formigones
KEYWORDS: Stabbed in the Back, Jealousy from His Wife and Brother

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Abelardo Formigones, defendant
- Julia - wife
- Zacarias - half brother

CHARGE:
- Parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs.

FACTS

In the month of November 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones, his wife Julia
Agricola and his five children were living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan, in the
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur.

They decided to transfer to the house of his half-brother, Zacarias, which is located in
the Barrio of Binahian in the same municipality, to find employment as harvesters of
Palay.

Then, on December 28, 1946, later in the afternoon, the defendant’s wife, Julia, was
sitting on the head of the stairs of the house. Without any provocation or previous
quarrel, the accused took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife in the
back.

The blade penetrated the right lung and caused a severe hemorrhage which resulted in
death not long after. Julia toppled down to the floor from the blow of the attack.
Immediately, the defendant Abelardo brought her up to the living room and laid down
beside her. He was found in this position by the rescuers who heard the shouts of help
from her eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed everything. Irene testified
against his father in the case.

During the investigation, Abelardo pleaded guilty to killing his wife. According to his
signed statement, he used to quarrel with his wife due to the latter’s increasing
closeness to his brother, Zacarias, while being indifferent to him.

This led him to suspect the two of being involved in an illicit relationship. It may also be
noted that observations made by the defendant in his written statement state that his
brother started sleeping over in their house even when he did not do the same when
they were not there before which solidified his belief of infidelity between the two.

After being convicted of Parricide and sentenced with reclusion perpetua, the
defendant’s counsel appealed the decision and brought two witnesses to prove that the
defendant is an imbecile, thereby exempt from criminal liability. The witnesses are the
guards from the provincial jail in which the defendant was held.

They stated that Abelardo would sometimes be indifferent to his surroundings; that he
would refuse to take a bath and wash his clothes unless forced by the guards; that
sometimes he would remove his clothes in front of his fellow inmates.

Dr. Francisco Gomez, the one who examined the defendant and is also a witness of the
latter, is of the opinion that Abelardo only has feeblemindedness and not imbecility and
that he could determine right from wrong.

ISSUE
Whether or not the defendant suffering from feeblemindedness be exempt from
criminal liability.
RULING
NO. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he
must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be

clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost
his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of
the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an
imbecile. According to the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has
not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an opinion that
He was or is an imbecile.

He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his
family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his
work.

A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measures to the extent of
killing his wife whom he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing
so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile.

The Court find the appellant guilty of parricide and affirmed the judgment of the
lower court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of
any preventive imprisonment he has undergone

People v. Puno
KEYWORDS: Insanity, Voluntary Surrender

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Ernesto Puno, 28, a jeepney driver
- Francisca Col (Aling Kikay), 72, a widow
- Hilaria de la Cruz (23) and Lina Pajes (27) a tenant, both witnesses
CHARGE:
- Murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting
circumstance of insanity.
FACTS

This is a murder case where the accused interposed as a defense the exempting
circumstances of insanity. At two o’clock in the afternoon, September 8, 1970 the
accused entered the bedroom of Francisca Col (70) a widow.

On seeing her Puno insulted her by saying she’s “mangkukulam” and “mambabarang”
then Puno repeatedly slapped her and struck her with a hammer until she was dead.
The assault was witnessed by Hilaria de la Cruz (23), who was in the bedroom with the
old woman, and Lina Pajes (27) a tenant of the adjoining room.

They testified that Puno’s eyes were reddish. His look was baleful and menacing. After
the killing, Puno went to the room of Lina, where Hilaria had taken refuge and Puno
made the following threat “Huwag kayong magkakamaling tumawag ng pulis at sabihin
ninyo na umalis kayo ng bahay at hindi ninyo alam kung sino ang pumatay sa
matanda.”

The defense contends that Puno was insane when he killed Francisca Col because he
had Chronic Schizophrenia since 1962: he was suffering from Schizophrenia on
September 8, 1970, when he liquidated the victim, and schizophrenia is a form of
psychosis which deprives a person of discernment and freedom of will. The Trial Court
convicted Puno of Murder, sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay the heirs of
the victim an indemnity of twenty-two thousand pesos. Because of this, the defendant
file for review of his death sentence.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Trial Court erred in their judgment

RULING

The death penalty is set aside and the accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua due
to the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender to the authorities.

The indemnity imposed by the Trial Court is affirmed.

The court held that Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless
victim. Puno was not legally insane when he killed the hapless and helpless victim.

The facts and the findings of the psychiatrists reveal that on that tragic occasion he was
not completely deprived of reason and freedom of will. But his mental illness (mild
psychosis or schizophrenic reaction) which diminished his will-power without depriving
him of consciousness of his acts and his voluntary surrender contributed in mitigating
the penalty.

People v. Dungo

KEYWORDS: Insanity, Testimony of Wife

PARTIES INVOLVED:
 - Rosalino Dungo, accused
- Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua, victim, DAR
- Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused and witness

CHARGE:
- Murder - the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the
crime of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:

1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;

2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)

- Conviction is affirmed

FACTS

On March 16, 1987 between the hours of 2 and 3:00 in the afternoon, a male person,
identified as the accused, Rosalino Dungo, went to the place where Mrs. Sigua was
holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga.

After a brief talk, Dungo drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed
Mrs. Sigua several times. Afterwards, he went down the staircase and out of the
DAR’s office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed
weapon.

Dungo tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission of the
offense and presented the testimony of his wife, Andrea Dungo.
According to her, her husband did not finish his two year contract in Saudi Arabia as a
welder because he was sick. He was confined for a week on his return and
underwent medical treatment.

Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987, Andrea Dungo noticed her husband to always be in
deep thought; maltreating their children when he hasn’t before; demanding another
payment from customers even if they had already paid; chasing any child when they
quarreled with their children.

On the day the offense was committed, her husband complained of stomach
ache however, he was immediately relieved of the pain and went back into the store.

Andrea followed him but he was no longer there. She got worried and
searched for him. She saw her husband in her parents-in-law’s house with people
milling about, along with barangay officials.

She instinctively asked him why he did it and Dungo answered that it was the only cure
for his ailment which is a cancer in his heart.

He further stated that if he would not be able to kill the victim in a number of
days, he would die. Dr. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center
for Mental Health also testified that Dungo was confined in the mental hospital.
Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Dungo was psychotic or insane
long before, during, and after the commission of the alleged crime and that his insanity
was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro- vascular
accident or stroke.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused was insane during the commission of the crime
RULING

NO. The Court was convinced that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act, was
sane. The evidence shows that Dungo was carrying an envelope where the fatal
weapon was hidden.

It is proof that he consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. Generally, in criminal
cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However in the defense of
insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in favor of insanity.

The burden of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. The
quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in confession and avoidance, and as such must
be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Note: Considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution of crime - The

starting premise is that the law presumes all persons to be sound of mind (Art. 800, Civil
Code) - Unless otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is
improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil 288)

People v. Rafanan

KEYWORDS: Estelita, Rape Case

PARTIES INVOLVED:

- Estelita Ronaya, only fourteen years old, hired as a househelper by the mother of
the accused
- Policarpio Rafanan, Jr., defendant- appellant
CHARGE:

- Crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify

complainant Estelita Ronaya in the amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral
damages, and to pay the costs.
FACTS

Complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only fourteen years old was hired as a
house helper by the mother of the accused.

On March 16, 1976, in the evening, after dinner, Estelita Ronaya was sent by the
mother of the accused to help in their store which was located in front of their house.

At 11:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused called the complainant to help him close
the door of the store and as the latter complied and went near him, he suddenly pulled
the complainant inside the store.

The accused held a bolo and pointed to the throat of the complainant threatening her
with said bolo should she resist.
Then, he forced her to lie down on a bamboo bed, removed her pants and after
unfastening the zipper of his own pants, went on top of complainant and succeeded
having carnal knowledge of her inspite of her resistance and struggle.

After the sexual intercourse, the accused cautioned the complainant not to report the
matter to her mother or anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her. The
complainant did not immediately report the matter and did not leave the house of the
accused that same evening.

The family of the accused learned what happened the night before in the store between
Policarpio and Estelita and a quarrel ensued among them prompting Estelita Ronaya to
go back to her house.

It was only the following morning on March 18, 1976 that the complainant told her
mother that she was raped by the accused. Upon knowing what happened to her
daughter, the mother, Alejandra Ronaya, immediately accompanied her to the house of
Patrolman Bernardo Mairina of the Villasis Police Force. The accused was later brought
to the police headquarters with the bolo, Exhibit "E", which the accused allegedly used
in threatening the complainant.

Appellant claimed that he is suffering from schizophrenia when he inflicted violent

intentions to Estelita.

The trial court suspended the trial and ordered his confinement to National Mental
Hospital in Mandaluyong.

After 2 years, he was reported to be behaved and in improved condition and in mental
condition to stand court in trial. Trial of case resumed.

ISSUE
Whether accused should be absolved from the crime charged against him
RULING

Appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind
immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that
inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately
before or at the very moment the act is committed.

Schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting because it does not completely deprive
the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be considered as a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e ., as an illness which
diminishes the exercise of the offender's will-power without, however, depriving him of
the consciousness of his acts.
Appellant should have been credited with this mitigating circumstance, although it would
not have affected the penalty imposable upon him under Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code: "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty (reclusion
perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the
amount of moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant

People v. Madarang

KEYWORDS: Schizophrenia, Parricide

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Fernando Madarang, husband and accused- appellant
- Lilia Madarang, wife
CHARGE:
- Charged with parricide for killing his wife LILIA MADARANG

FACTS
Fernando Madarang was charged with parricide for killing his wife Lillia Madarang. He
refused to enter a plea during arraignment, and so was entered as “not guilty” in
accordance to the rules of court.

Counsel for the accused manifested that his client had been observed exhibiting
abnormal behavior. Court decided to transfer accused to the National Center for Mental
Health, after refusal to answer any question.
Initial examination at NCMH revealed Fernando as suffering from schizophrenia. He
was detained and medicated at the hospital. He was discharged after 2 years, and
recommitted at the provincial jail after being found fit to face charges.

At the trial, it was established that the accused was legally married to the victim, and
their union resulted in 7 children. He worked as a seaman for 16 years, and thereafter
started a hardware store business. His venture failed, and he lost his entire fortune to
cockfighting.

Fernando, his wife, and the children, were forced to move in with his mother-in-law (
Avelina Mirador), because he could no longer support his family. Lillia was also heavily
pregnant with their 8th child, and was about to give birth.

On Sept. 3, 1993, Fernando and Lillia had because of jealousy. He was accusing her of
infidelity, and in the heat of the fight, stabbed her in front of the children. The children
were heard shouting and crying, and were brought out of the house by Avelina
Mirador’s nephew.

She mentions seeing the accused emerge from the house, with a bolo. She declares no
observation of anything peculiar about the accused before the event, nor does she
know of any reason why he killed Lillia, because she never saw the two engage in any
argument while living with her.

Accused declares no recollection of any relevant events. He was sentenced with

penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused appealed, insisting his criminal act was
involuntary.

ISSUE
The accused may claim exemption from liability for the crime he committed by pleading
insanity
RULING

No, He is not exempt. In the Philippines, the Courts have strict criteria to follow for
insanity as it is required that there should be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act.

In other words, the accused must be deprived of reason, acted with least discernment
or absence of discernment, and total deprivation of the will. The mere abnormality in the
brain shall not exclude imputability.

The establishment of proving insanity requires an expert witness such as psychiatrists

and the like and the accused should be insane on committing the act.

In the case at the bar the accused were diagnosed with schizophrenia at NCMH months
after he killed his wife.

According to the medical books, schizophrenia is defined as inability to distinguish

between fantasy and reality, often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. The
arguments advanced by the accused are speculative. None of the witnesses declared
that he exhibited symptoms during or before the act.

Also to take notice that schizophrenia has a lucid interval which means they are
capable of distinguishing right from wrong.

People v. Robinos

KEYWORDS:
PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Lorenza Robinos, wife
- Melencio Robinos, husband, appellant
CHARGE:
- Complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing him to
death
- “WHEREFORE, finding accused Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, this Court
hereby renders judgment sentencing him to suffer the penalty of DEATH by lethal
injection. He is also ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
the victim; and P22,800.00 s actual damages”
- Reduced to reclusion perpetua
FACTS

On March 25, 1995, at around seven o'clock in the morning, fifteen-year old Lorenzo
Robiños was at their home in Barangay San Isibro in Camiling, Tarlac cooking dinner,
heard his parents, appellant Melecio Robiños and Lorenza Robiños – victim, who were
at the sala, quarrelling. Lorenzo heard his mother saying, 'Why did you come home,
why don't you just leave?' After hearing what his mother said, Lorenzo, saw his father,
with a double-bladed knife, stab his mother on the right shoulder. Upon witnessing
appellant's attack on his mother, Lorenzo immediately left their house and ran to his
grandmother's house where he reported the incident. Benjamin Bueno, the brother of
the victim Lorenza Robiños, was was informed by his nephew of the incident
immediately called the police station and reported the said incident. The police, together
with Benjamin Bueno and some barangay officials proceeded to the scene of the crime.
When appellant failed to come out, the police, with the help of barangay officials,
detached the bamboo wall from the part of the house where blood was dripping. The
removal of the wall exposed that section of the house where they saw appellant, lying
on his side and holding a bloodstained double-bladed knife with his right hand,
embracing his wife, uttering the words, “I will kill myself, I will kill myself.” Lorenza, who
was lying on her back and facing upward, appeared to be dead. The police and the
barangay officials tried to pull appellant away from Lorenza's body, appellant tried to
resist the people who held him but was overpowered. The police, with the help of the
barangay officials present, tied his hands and feet with a plastic rope. However, before
he was pulled away from the body of his wife and restrained by the police, appellant
admitted to Rolando Valdez, a neighbor of his and a barangay kagawad, that he had
killed his wife. Appellant does not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that
he indeed killed his wife, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing the
defense of insanity.

BACKDROP IN COURTS: RTC Tarlac – Lorenza who was 6 mons. Pregnant at the time
of the killing, found Melecio Robiños guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentencing him to death.

ISSUE

WON APPELLANT WAS INDEED INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF

THE CRIME

RULING
NO. Testimonies from both prosecution and defense witnesses show no substantial
evidence that appellant was completely deprived of reason or discernment when he
perpetrated the brutal killing of his wife.

It was also admitted that a domestic altercation preceded the fatal stabbing. Thus, it
cannot be said that appellant attacked his wife for no reason at all and without
knowledge of the nature of his action. The bulk of the defense evidence points to his
allegedly unsound mental condition after the commission of the crime. ( Prison inmates
testified that he was not engaging, quiet, and seen talking to himself) – baka tanungin ni
sir, examples As to the contention of the defense of the testimony of Dr. Maria Mercidita
Mendoza, who examined accused, was still mentally ill; that accused was experiencing
hallucination and suffering from insanity. The court noted that when Dr. Mendoza, she
conducted the mental, physical and neurological examinations on the accused 7 months
after the commission of the offense. That span of seven 7 months has given the
accused an opportunity to contrive and feign mental derangement. Dr. Mendoza had no
opportunity to observed and assessed the behavior of the accused before, during and
immediately after the commission of the offense. Thus making her findings inconclusive.
*Side issue - As to the penalty imposed, although the RTC correctly rejected the
defense of insanity, it nonetheless erred in imposing the death penalty on appellant. It
imposed the maximum penalty without considering the presence or the absence of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Since appellant was convicted of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him
should be that for the graver offense which is parricide. The rules with respect to the
application of a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties are prescribed by Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code, the pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows: "In all
cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the
following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: xxx xxx xxx 2. When there
are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the
lesser penalty shall be applied." Hence, when the penalty provided by law is either of
two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances,
the lower penalty shall be imposed. Considering that neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances were established in this case, the imposable penalty should only be
reclusion perpetua.

People v. Opuran

CHARGE:

- Two counts of Murder

- Final: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding
appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No.
 4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer
reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from the ₱50,000 civil indemnity, he is
ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the amounts of (a)
₱50,000 as moral damages; (b) ₱25,000 as temperate damages; and (c)
₱25,000 as exemplary damages, or a total of ₱150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan
Dacles in the amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; and (b) ₱10,000 as
temperate damages, or a total of ₱110,000.

FACTS
Accused Anacito Opuran stabbed Allan Dacles. After more than an hour and a half,
Demetrio Patrimonio was seen walking on the National Highway of Catbalogan Samara
but was later stabbed by the accused as he emerged from where he was hiding. The
accusations were denied by the accused, claiming that he was never out that night
when the crime happened and that he was only resting in his house when policemen
came to arrest him.

Dr. Lyn Verona testified that she examined the accused 3 times through interviews and
confirmed her medical findings that the accused was psychotic before and during the
commission of the offense and even up to the present, that the accused was suffering
from schizophrenia.

However, when the trialcourt still held Opuran guilty of murder and homicide, he
contends that he was suffering from a psychotic disorder and was therefore,
completely derived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims

ISSUE
Whether or not the accused Anacito Opuran can use the exempting circumstance of
insanity as a defense

RULING
No. Insanity must exist immediately before or during the moment of the commission of
the act.

Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving
it however, the accused failed to prove that he was insane at the precise moment or
before the commission of the offense.

Although the accused has defense testimonies that he was brought to the National
Center for Mental Health due to difficulty of sleeping and talking irrelevantly, that he was
prescribed thorazine and evadyne, it should be noted that there was no proof that
Anacito needed the medicine during the period where he ran out of stock.

Verdadero v. People

FACTS

In March 12, 2009, in the Province of Cagayan, Maynard Plata and his father Romeo
were at the Baggao Police Station. Together with Ronnie Elaydo, they went to report
that Solomon Verdadero had stolen the fan belt of the irrigation pump.

After the confrontation at the plolice station, accused Solomon Verdadero, armed with
Rambo knife, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, stabbed Romeo
Plata, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on different parts of his body which
caused his death.

Vedadero was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. During his pretrial, he invoked the
defense of insanity but did not consent to a reverse trial. The defense stated that the
accused was previously diagnosed with schizophrenia and was given medication for his
mental illness.

RTC finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Homicide. CA
hereinafter affirmed the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE
W/N Verdero can invoke insanity

RULING

People v. Genosa
FACTS
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but
apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and
sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever
beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On
the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted
having killed the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through
the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of her unborn child.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the
penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and
the re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial
re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of
the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan
and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE
1. Can the appellant be granted the justifying circumstance of Self-defense?

2. May the appellant herein validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as
constituting self defense?

RULING

1. NO, without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of

aggression does not warrant complete or incomplete self-defense. Unlawful aggression
is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof on the life or safety of a person.

In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a
sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal
attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and
escape to their children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended
altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer
sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish
the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that
the one who resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril
sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the
Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery
usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an obvious,
deadly attack before she can defend her life “would amount to sentencing her to ‘murder
by installment.’ Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous
battering episodes) prior to the defendant’s use of deadly force must be shown.
Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.
Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be
appreciated.

People v. Doquena

FACTS

Between 1-2 pm of Nov. 19, 1938, Juan Ragojos and Epifanio Rarang were
playing volleyball in the yard of their school in Sual, Pangasinan. Valentin Doquena, the
accused, intercepted the ball, and threw it a Ragojos, who was hit in the stomach.

Miffed, Ragojos chased Doquena, and upon catching him, slapped Doquena on the
nape, and punched him in the face. After doing this, Ragojos went back to Rarang to
resume playing volleyball.

Insulted, Doquena looked for something to throw at Ragojos, finding none, he got his
cousin's (Romualdo Cocal) knife, and confronted Ragojos. Ragojo's denied Doquena's
request for a fight and resumed playing.
Doquena stabbed the unaware Ragojos in the chest, thereby killing the latter. The court
held that in committing the act, the accused acted with discernment and was
conscious of the nature and consequences of his acts, therefore his defense that he
was a minor was untenable (given that the Doquena was a 7th grade pupil, one of the
brightest in his class, and was an officer in the CAT program), and thus convicted him of
the crime of homicide.

The court ordered him to be sent to the Training School for Boys until he reaches the
age of majority. Thus, the appeal by the accused, stating that to determine whether or
not there was discernment on the part of the minor, the following must be taken into
consideration:

a) The facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act

Committed.
b) The state of mind at the time the crime was committed
c) The time he had at his disposal
d) The degree of reasoning of the minor

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused acted with discernment

RULING

Decision affirmed. Yes, the accused acted with discernment. Accused mistakes the
discernment for premeditation, or at least for lack of intention, as a mitigating
circumstance.

However, the DISCERNMENT that constitutes an exception to the exemption from

criminal liability of a minor under 15 years but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his MENTAL CAPACITY to understand the difference
between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the
records in each case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very
comportment and behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of
the act, but also after and even during the trial.

Ortega v. People

FACTS

At the time of commission of rape, the accused was only 13 years old, while the victim
AAA was 6, both minors. It was alleged that petitioner raped her three times on three
different occasions in 1996.

The lower courts convicted him of rape with criminal and civil liability imposed. The case
was pending when Republic Act 9344 (R.A. No. 9344) or the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted amending the age of criminal irresponsibility being
raised from 9 to 15 years old.

Said law took effect on May 20, 2006. At the time of the promulgation of judgment, the
accused already reached the age of majority.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claimed that petitioner is not exempt from
criminal liability because he is not anymore a child as defined by R.A. No. 9344.

The OSG further claimed that the retroactive effect of said law is applicable only if the
child-accused is still below 18 years old
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is exempt in the crime alleged by
reason of minority

RULING

Yes, the petitioner is exempt from criminal liability. For one who acts by virtue of any of
the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence
of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal
liability arises.

Hence, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. By virtue of the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. 9344), the age of criminal irresponsibility
has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. Petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of
the commission of the alleged rape.

The first paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly provides that, a child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program
pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.

The Court gives retroactive application insofar as it favors the persons guilty of a felony.
While the law exempts the petitioner from criminal liability, however, he is not exempt
from civil liability. For this reason, petitioner and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA civil
indemnity.

People v. Mantalaba

FACTS
Task Forcer Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report that Mantalaba who was 17 yrs old was selling shabu. After a buy-bust
operation, two informations was filed against Mantalaba which was later on
consolidated. Mantalaba pleaded not guilty.

RTC found Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was penalized of reclusion
perpetua to death and fine of 500k for selling shabu and (2) for illegally possessing
shabu, Mantalaba was penalized, in application of the ISL, 6 yrs and 1 day as minimum
and 8 yrs as maximum of prision mayor and fine of 300k. CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the RTC. Thus, the present appeal.

Mantalaba: the lower court gravely erred in convicting him and that there was no
evidence of actual sale between him and the poser-buyer during the buy-bust operation.
He also claims that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.

ISSUE

Whether Mantalaba is guilty of drug trafficking and possession.

RULING

The petition is without merit.

The buy-bust operation was valid, establishing the following: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefore. From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was
well established that the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the
poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the
marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear
as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long
as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accused arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

As to his minority, Mantalaba was minor during the buy-bust operation but was of legal
age during the promulgation of the decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect
after the promulgation of the RTC's decision against Mantalaba. The RTC did not
suspend the sentence in accordance with PD 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) and
Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law that were applicable at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment. However, as ruled in People vs Sarcia, suspension of
sentence can still be applied but NOT when the offender upon the promulgation of
judgment is 21 yrs old. or older. Mantalaba is now 21 yrs old, therefore his suspension
of sentence is already moot and academic.

But as to the penalty, CA must have appreciated Mantalaba's minority as privileged

mitigating circumstance in fixing the penalty. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the
proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion
temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated.
Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor
and the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal,
there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.

Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City

FACTS
As part of the Presidential Mandate to implement a nationwide curfew on minors, “Oplan
Rody” was implemented by several local governments in Metro Manila.

“Oplan Rody” was a strict implementation of curfew ordinances on minors through the
enforcement of the police. Manila, Navotas and Quezon City ordinances enforcing
curfew on minors are put in question for their alleged infringement of fundamental rights
of minors.

Petitioners, spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) -

an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society,
in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors - filed this
present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they:

(a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
vagueness
doctrine;
(b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours;
(c)deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process; and
(d) deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.

In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as

amended by RA 10630.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order to declare the curfew ordinances as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act
No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," and as unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear
their children.
ISSUE

Whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.

RULING

Petitioners are NOT CORRECT that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the
youth without substantive due process.

In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors
will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors.

Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State,
the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the
rights of parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when
actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the
child, the state may act to promote these legitimate interests.
“Thus, "in cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public
safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."

Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a vis other parties.

Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare.

This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set
forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State.

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in
their role of promoting their children's well-being.

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when
the minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents.

This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of
parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-rearing.

Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct during
curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only
aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to
allow minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the
curfew hours.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence
children to spend more time at home.

Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a more
active role in their children's upbringing.

People v. Tanedo

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS

Cecilio Tanedo (accused), a landowner, went with some workers to work on the dam on
his land, carrying with him a shotgun and a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the
accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens. On his way, he met Feliciano
Sanchez (victim) and the latter’s mother and sick uncle. The accused asked the victim’s
uncle for the best place to hunt for the wild chickens, but since the latter was sick, the
victim answered for him and pointed to a general direction in the forest. Upon the
victim’s recommendation, the accused then went to the forest to continue his search for
the wild chickens. When the accused saw one, he shot it, and simultaneously heard a
human cry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was shot (in the heart. NO JOKE),
Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one Bernardino Tagamba (Tagampa) to help
him hide the body. They did so by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, and later
burying the body in an old well and covering it with burnt cogon grass. Only one shot
was heard that morning, and it isn’t contested that a chicken was killed by a gunshot
wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene of the crime, as well, and there is no
enmity between the accused and the victim. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all
knowledge of the crime, but later confessed during the trial that he buried the victim’s
body. The lower court found the accused guilty of homicide, and sentenced him to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, accessories, indemnification and
costs. The accused appealed to the Court.

ISSUE

W/n the accused is guilty of homicide

RULING

NO. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the victim would be
a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt, which is negated by the fact that the
chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having only one shot fired.
According to Article 8 subdivision 8 of the Penal Code, “he who, while performing a
legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or intention
of causing it.” It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or accident while in
the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability. In this case, there is absolutely no evidence of
negligence on the part of the accused. Neither is there any question that he was
engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred. Neither is there
any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The
only thing in the case at all suspicious on the part of the accused are his concealment
and denial, and no sufficient evidence was found to support the judgment of conviction.

People v. Castillo
FACTS
In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant came home drunk and
angry. His father-in-law (Guillermo) tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the
former to leave the house. As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and
arrow. Consorcia, the accused’s wife, was heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the
accused-appellant was seen carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out of the house
and was later taken to the hospital but to no avail. Cause of death was the cut jugular
vein caused by a fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed instrument like a nail.”
Appellant was charged with parricide for allegedly shooting his wife with a dart from a
rubber sling, hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. In his
defense, the accused said that he had no intention of killing his wife and that he was
practicing the use of the weapon when his wife was accidentally hit by the arrow.
However, the trial court nonetheless found him guilty on the ground that the evidence
showed that the infliction of the fatal injury upon his wife was preceded by a quarrel
between her and the appellant, thus negating the latter’s defense. The same was
affirmed on appeal. In the present petition, the appellant contends that assuming that he
was the one who killed his wife the same was accidental and not intentional.

ISSUE

W/N the exempting circumstance of accident applicable in the instant case

RULING

No. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides: ART. 12. Circumstances
which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability:
Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it. 2. "Accident" is an affirmative defense
which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The
defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for
this exempting circumstance, are: i. A person is performing a lawful act; ii. With due
care; iii. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; iv. Without fault or intention of
causing it. 3. By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and
arrow be considered as performing a "lawful act." 4. Thus, on this ground alone,
appellant's defense of accident must be struck down because he was performing an
unlawful act during the incident. 5. Also, the fact that the accused-appellant disappeared
while his wife was in the hospital is unbecoming of a husband with a dying wife. 6.
Accused was found guilty of the crime of Parricide wherein the court imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People v. Retubado

FACTS

ISSUE
RULING

Pomoy v. People

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

US v. Caballeros

CHARGE
- Sentence by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of
presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or
 murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis
A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because,
without having taken part in the said crime as principals or as accomplices, they
took part in the burial of the corpses of the victims in order to conceal the crime.
- Judgment appealed from is reversed , defendants are acquitted.

FACTS
Four American teachers were murdered by a band of persons. Baculi and Caballeros
(defendant) were charged as accessories to the crime including failure to report to the
authorities the perpetration of the crime. The defendants alleged that they were forced.
Baculi confessed and was affirmed by the eyewitness that he buried the corpses
because he was forced by the band by striking him with the butts of their guns, but he
was not present when the Americans were killed. Caballeros also confessed to the
crime due to a promise that nothing shall be done to them.

ISSUE
Whether or not the accused are liable as accessories to the crime

RULING
No. The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason
of irresistible force (par 9,Art.8); in this case Baculi acted under such circumstances.

Testimonies from witnesses that Caballeros was not present in the crime and that his
confession was due to a promise that nothing shall be done to them proved that he did
not take part in any way in the execution of the crime. Confessions which do not appear
to have been made freely and voluntarily , without force, intimidation, or promise of
pardon, can not be accepted as a proof on trial (Sec. 4, Art No. 619 of the Phil.
Commission)
Failure to report to the authorities the perpetration of the crime is not punished by the
Penal Code and therefore cannot render the defendants criminally liable.

People v. Loreno

CHARGE:
- LC Ruling: Loreno – Robbery wth double rape, Jan. 7, 1978.
FACTS

Elias was at his house along with his daughters Monica (14), Cristina (22, married),
Rachel (4 mos.) wife Beata, sons Mario (11) and Nilo (13), and farm helper Fabie.

While Francisco was at the balcony, he saw four men with flashlights approaching. He
then heard one of them calling Elias that a he has a letter from the chief hepe.

He then called Elias, who went out to the balcony where a man in dark sweater (DS)
handed him the letter. Because it was too dark for the letter to be read, Elias invited the
man inside the sala.

Once inside, he called Monica to fetch his reading glasses and subsequently, read the
letter: "Kami mga NPA." Monica, scared (shitless), ran to her mother. Cristina attempted
to get a bolo from the kitchen but was held back by the DS guy and threatened her no to
make any ruckus.

When Elias went to the kitchen to see the commotion, a gun was pointed at his back by
the DS guy who ordered everyone inside to be on the floor. Meanwhile, another man in
a red shirt (RS), who stayed with Francisco in the balcony, asked Mario for a glass of
water.
Mario did not obey so Francisco himself went inside to get a glass, only to be followed
by the RS guy. When he reached the sala, a gun was pointed at his back and a knife at
his neck.

Francisco then recognized RS guy as Loreno -- who was also recognized by Monica
and Cristina who were lying flat on their stomachs on the floor. Marantal (recognized by
Francisco) stayed as lookout outside the house.

DS guy then instructed Loreno to tie all their victims on the floor (hands behind backs)
which he complied. DS guy then got a hold of Monica and dragged her to a room where
she was asked where her piggy bank is.

When she said there was none, he then forcibly removed her pants. She screamed for
help to her parents, only to be boxed. Despite the struggle, he managed to remove her
panties and successfully had sex with her.

After this, he dragged Monica back to the sala and proceeded to do the same to Cristina
While of this was happening, the other men then proceeded to ransack the house and
found and took a lot of valuables.

Thereafter, Loreno entered the room where Cristina was lying on the floor and
proceeded to kiss and touch her vagina. Suddenly, he was called to hurry up because
someone was approaching the house.

When he went back, DS guy warned everyone not to tell anyone, got their valuables,
and left.

They managed to untie themselves eventually and after positively affirming the identities
of their malefactors, along with Elias finding out the sexual abuse his daughters
suffered, filed a report against the robbery-rape incident.
After substantial examination to his daughters and initial investigation, the accused were
detained, charged, and found guilty. Accused are before the SC claiming that they acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force and/or under the impulse of uncontrollable
fear of equal or greater injury.

Marantal admitted that they were in the house of Elias Monge on the night of January 7,
1978, but they were only forced by a man wearing black sweater and his five
companions who claimed to be members of the New People's Army (NPA), operating in
the locality, with the threat that if they did not obey, appellants and their families would
be killed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the act was done under force/uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury. NO.

RULING
Guilty of robbery with double rape. A person who acts under the compulsion of an
irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse or uncontrollable fear of equal or
greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom.
The force must be irresistible to reduce him to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death of serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future
injury is not

enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the

accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat (People vs. Villanueva, 104 Phil.
450).

In the case at bar, it does not met the requirements of under compulsion of irresistible
force or under the impulse of uncontrollable fear. A perusal of the appellants' statement
of the robbery-rape incident as, summarized in their joint brief, showed that they
admitted their participation in the commission of the crime of robbery and rape against
Elias Monge and his family on January 7, 1978. Further established were facts
inconsistent with appellant's claim of having acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force and/or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury. The records likewise revealed that on the two occasions Eustaquio Loreno
brought Beata Monge to the master's room and the teacher's room where he made her
open the trunk and the "aparador" with her keys and got the contents which he brought
and poured on the floor of the sala, appellant Loreno acted alone, without the threat and
assistance of the man in dark sweater. And after the man in the dark sweater
consummated his lust on Cristina Monge in the teacher's room and seeing Cristina
Monge lying on the floor, Loreno embraced her and tried to kiss her and touch her
private parts.

Marantal, who was standing at the gate of the house below, must have heard the shouts
of Monica Monge for help and must have known by then that Monica Monge was being
abused by his two companions who earlier went up the house. As a "lookout" or guard,
Marantal gave his companions effective means and encouragement to commit the
crimes of robbery and rape. There was no showing that he raised a voice of protest or
did an act to prevent the commission of the crimes. All these demonstrated the
voluntary participation and the conspiracy of the appellants. The foregoing acts, though
separately performed from those of their unidentified companions, clearly showed their
community of interest and concert of criminal design with their unidentified companions
which constituted conspiracy without the need of direct proof of the conspiracy itself.
Conspiracy may be inferred and proven by the acts of the accused themselves and
when said acts point to joint purpose and concert of action and community of interest,
which unity of purpose and concert of action serve to establish the existence of
conspiracy, and the degree of actual participation petition by each of the conspirators is
immaterial. Conspiracy having been establish, all the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in
contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.
 People v. Del Rosario

FACTS

Joselito del Rosario y Pascual, Ernesto Marquez alias Jun, Virgilio Santos alias Boy
Santos and John Doe alias Dodong were charged with special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot
and killed her.

Arrested by raid and not by In flagrante delicto and Hot Pursuit. The decision of the
court a quo find accused Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-principal in the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of the
victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages.

Thus, an automatic review by the higher court.

ISSUE

W/N the court erred in their judgment

RULING

there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the offense was
committed and the time of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be
secured.
Aside from the sense of immediacy, it is also mandatory that the person making the
arrest must have personal knowledge of certain facts indicating that the person to be
taken into custody has committed the crime.

Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not comply with these requirements since, as
earlier explained, the arrest came a day after the consummation of the crime and not
immediately thereafter. As such, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time the
accused was arrested. Likewise, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense since they
were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became
aware of his identity as the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial
investigation.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City convicting
accused JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO Y PASCUAL of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing him to death, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the accused is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. His immediate RELEASE from confinement is
ordered unless held for some other lawful cause. In this regard, the Director of Prisons
is directed to report to the Court his compliance herewith within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.

People v. Bandian

FACTS

At about 7 o’clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar saw his
neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature.
Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood
both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the
bed. He called on Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn
babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments
before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno declared that the appellant
gave birth in her own house and threw her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court
gave credit to Dr. Nepomuceno’s rendering a conviction of reclusion perpetua for the
crime of infanticide.

ISSUE
Whether or not Bandian is guilty of infanticide

RULING

NO. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed

willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free
act or omission.

The evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one way
or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently.
She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a
former lover, which was not unknown to her Luis Kirol, his present lover. A mother who
a the time of childbirth was overcome by sever dizziness and extreme debility, and left
the child in a thicket where said child died, is not liable for infanticide, because it was
physically impossible for her to take home the child. The severe dizziness and extreme
debility of the woman constitute an insuperable cause as provided by Subsection 7,
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. By going into the thicket to pee, she caused a
wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not
because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong
dizziness and extreme debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by
mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from liability any
person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances. As provided in Subsection
4, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, she falls under a person who performed a
lawful act with due care but causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention
of causing it. The said appellant was under the fourth and the seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor.

Ruling Appellant is hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had been accused and
convicted, with costs de oficio, and as she is actually confined in jain in connection with
this case, it is ordered that she be released immediately. So ordered.

—------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ARTICLE 13 - MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

People v. Jaurigue

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
 People v. Narvaez

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

People v. Ulep

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS

ISSUE
RULING

Guillermo v. People

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

People v. Ural

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

People v. Gonzales

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

People v. Pagal

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:
FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

Urbano v. People

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:

CHARGE:

FACTS

ISSUE

RULING

People v. Benito

CHARGE:

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

Bacabac v. People

CHARGE:
- Murder qualified by treachery
- WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the appellate court's decision is
AFFIRMED.
FACTS

On Dec. 23, 1990, 2 groups of people were at a dance hall in Purok 4, San Joaquin,
Iloilo City; Hernani (victim), Eduardo and Melchor and the 2nd group, Jonathan and
Edzel. On their way home, the 2 groups had a misunderstanding.

Jesus, who was also at the dance hall, witnessed Melchor "hugging" Edzel, and "tying"
Jonathan "with his hands." Also saw the victim hit Edzel with a "stick." He told Group 1
that Edzel is the son of Councilor Jose Talanquines, Jr. Eduardo told Jesus to go away
for they might shoot him.

Jesus thus left and went to Edzel's residence to report to his father what he had
witnessed. Edzel and Jonathan managed to flee.

Group 1 headed back home but they again encountered Group 2. This time, Group 2
was with their uncle Ricardo Bacabac (a policeman), and Edzel's father, Jose, his
mother, and 2 sisters.
Bacabac and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were
carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively. Jesus pointed to Group 1 and told
Group 2 companions that they were the ones who man-handled Jonathan and Edzel.

The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and
Edzel for other persons. Jesus blurted out: "You are just bragging that you are brave.
You are only bullying small children."

Bacabac fired his armalite into the air. Jose also fired his armalite, but directed at Group
1, "as if spraying his rifle from right to left." He hit Jonathan in the thigh as he moved to
strike the victim with a piece of wood.

Eduardo and the victim fell. As the victim was raising his hands in surrender, Jose shot
him again. Melchor escaped. The victim, Eduardo, and Jonathan were brought to the
hospital. Victim pronounced dead on arrival. Eduardo died 2 hours later.

RTC convicted Bacabac, Jose, Edzel, Jonathan, and Jesus of murder qualified by
treachery. However, there was a mitigating circumstance. Immediate vindication for
Jose and Jesus. Voluntary surrender for Bacabac. Bacabac argued that there was no
conspiracy to kill:

He merely fired a warning shot into the air to respond to a public disturbance, to avert
further acts of violence, in pursuance of his duty as police officer to keep peace in the
community.

ISSUE

Whether or not Bacabac can invoke mitigating circumstance upon his case.

RULING
No. the Supreme Court held that For such mitigating circumstance to be credited, the
act should be, following Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, “committed
in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito),
his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters,
or relatives by affinity within the same degree.”

Hence, since uncles and nephews are not embraced within article 13, they may invoke
such in the present case.

US v. Hicks

KEYWORDS: Mistress

CHARGE:
- Murder, penalty of death
- the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided,
however, that the death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force,
and that in the event of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the
accessory penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the same be expressly
remitted in the pardon. So ordered.
FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

US v. Dela Cruz

KEYWORDS: Querida, Homicide

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Querida, victim
- HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant
CHARGE:
- Homicide
- Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the
reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment of
conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
FACTS

ISSUE
RULING
 People v. Gelaver

KEYWORDS: Stabbing, Paramour

PARTIES INVOLVED:
 - EDUARDO GELAVER, accused-appellant
- VICTORIA GELAVER Y PACINABAO, wife
CHARGE:
- Parricide (Art. 246, Revised Penal Code) and sentencing him to "suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of his wife, Victoria
Pacinabao, in the amount of P30,000.00."
- Final: WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED except with the
MODIFICATION that the indemnity, be increased to P50,000.00 (People v. Sison,
189 700 [1990]
FACTS

ISSUE
RULING
 People v. Bello

KEYWORDS: Widower, Common-law wife Alicia

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Guillermo Bello, widower and common-law husband
- Alicia Cervantes, common-law wife
CHARGE:
- Crime of Murder
- Final: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision should be, and hereby is, modified.
This Court finds the accused-appellant, Guillermo Bello, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, attended by two (2) mitigating
circumstances: (a) passion and obfuscation, and (b) voluntary surrender, and,
therefore, imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to a maximum of ten (10) years
 of prision mayor; orders him also to personally indemnify the heirs of Alicia
Cervantes in the amount of P6,000.00, and to pay the costs. So ordered.
FACTS
Guillermo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Guillermo was a 54 year old widower, and Alicia’s senior by 30 years. Prior to Alicia’s
employment at Maring’s Place, the couple led a ‘blissful’ life. Due to poverty, Alicia
became an entertainer/public hostess at the said bar, and Guillermo used to watch her
there everyday; very much smitten by her beauty[1].

However, on May 16, Guillermo saw Alicia enter the Gumaca theater with a man, and
surprised the man caressing her inside the movie house. Guillermo dragged her
outside.

Two weeks later, Guillermo visited Maring’s Place to ask Alicia for money, but the owner,
Maring (who was fantastically creative enough to name the bar after him), told him to go
home and to leave Alicia alone because he was an old invalid. He proceeded to walk
home empty handed, but upon passing Bonifacio Street, he came across the Marasigan
brothers who mocked him with the above stated remark. The self-loathing Guillermo
proceeded to Paty’s place and downed give glasses of Tuba.

By nighttime of the same day, Guillermo returned to Maring’s Place and did then and
there stab Alicia several times. Realizing what he had done, he ran to Gumarca and
surrendered to the police there. He was found guilty by the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City of murder attended by the aggravating circumstances of nighttime,
alevosia, and abuse of confidence and ungratefulness; The penalty for which is death;
thus the automatic review of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE
Whether or not the victim should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
passion or obfuscation, albeit his relationship with the victim being merely a
common-law marriage?
RULING
YES. By stare decisis, passion or obfuscation on the part of the offender must arise
from legitimate and moral sentiments. Since common-law marriages are considered
unlawful in the Philippines, Obfuscation, when relationship is illegitimate, cannot be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

To answer this question, we must first differentiate the circumstances of this case with
that of U.S. v Hicks. In the said case, the common-law wife of Mr. Hicks terminated her
relations with the American, and contracted new relations with a certain corporal. Mr.
Hicks shot his ex-common-law-wife when she refused to go home with him and resume
their relationship. Since they were not married, she was entitled to do so. What she did
– cruel as it may be – was legal in the eyes of law. Passion and obfuscation were not
appreciated in such a case, since:

1. The common-law wife had a right to leave her common-law husband, as

they were not united in holy matrimony. He had no right to compel her to
go with him. Remember that the first requirement of passion or
obfuscation is that there be an unlawful act, sufficient to produce
diminution of self-control or the exercise of will power.

Returning now to the case at hand, what Guillermo was asking from Alicia was that she
(1) quit her job as a hostess; an ill-reputed profession corroborated by her promiscuous
relations with other men, and (2) resume her job as a hostess.

The Supreme Court held that Alicia’s flat out refusal was an exhibition of immorality
itself. A monogamous illegitimate relationship is definitely of higher standing than illicit
relationship for the sake of gain – or gainful promiscuity as the court put it.

This, coupled with the cruel words against him were enough to constitute passion and
obfuscation in the old soul. Thus, he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance.
 People v. Amaguin

KEYWORDS: Murder

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Willie, Gildo and Celso Amaguin “Brothers”
- Hernando Oro, a younger brother of Pacifico and Diosdado
- Pacifico and Diosdado Oro, Victim
CHARGE:
- Murder
- Final: WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding the
accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO AMAGUIN guilty in Crim.
Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042 is MODIFIED as follows:
- (a) accused-appellant WILLIE AMAGUIN is found guilty of HOMICIDE in Crim.
Case No. 8041 and is sentenced to six (6) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, and of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE in Crim. Case No. 8042 and is sentenced to six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to
eight (8) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor as maximum,
to be served successively;.
- (b) accused-appellant GILDO AMAGUIN is found guilty of two (2) separate
crimes of HOMICIDE in Crim. Cases Nos. 8041 and 8042 and is sentenced to six
(6) years two (2) months and one (1) day of prision mayor minimum as minimum,
to twelve (12) years, six (6) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal
minimum as maximum, for each homicide, to be served successively;
- (c) in Crim. Case No. 8041, accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO
AMAGUIN are declared jointly and severally liable to the heirs of Diosdado Oro
for P50,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with prevailing jurisprudence; and,
 - (d) in Crim. case No. 8042, accused-appellant GILDO AMAGUIN is liable to the
heirs of Pacifico Oro for P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
- Costs against accused-appellants WILLIE AMAGUIN and GILDO AMAGUIN in
both cases.
- SO ORDERED.

FACTS

ISSUE
RULING

People v. Dela Cruz

KEYWORDS:

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Francisco de la Cruz, a habitual delinquent, defendant-appellant (convicted once
of the crime of theft and twice of the crime of estafa, by virtue of final judgments
rendered by competent courts)
- Yu Wan, victim
CHARGE:
- slight physical injuries
- Final: Wherefore, eliminating the additional penalty by reason of habitual
delinquency, considering the presence of an aggravating circumstance in the
commission of the crime without any mitigating circumstance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is sentenced to the penalty of from
 six months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six years, ten months and one
day of prision mayor, as maximum, affirming the appealed sentence in all
other respects, with the costs. So ordered.
FACTS

ISSUE

RULING
 Canta v. People

KEYWORDS: Cow

PARTIES INVOLVED:
- Exuperancio Canta, petitioner
- Narciso Gabriel, owner of the cow
- Erlinda Monter, half-sister
- Generoso Cabonce, first care-taker of cow
- Maria Tura, second care-taker of cow
- Gardenio Agapay, third care-taker of cow
- Florentino Canta, brgy. Captain of Laca and father of Canta
CHARGE:

- Violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974, and sentencing him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
- Final: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the modification that petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to
suffer a prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccionalmaximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum, as maximum.

FACTS
Narciso Gabriel owns a cow that was passed on from one person to another and each
person was responsible for the care and custody of the said cow. At the time the cow
got lost, it was under the care and custody of Gardenio Agapay.

Agapay took the cow in the mountain of Pilipogan, 40 meters away from his hut, at
around 5:00 in the afternoon. When he came back to get the cow at past 9 in the
evening, the cow was gone.

However, Aagapay saw footprints that led to the house of Filomeno Vallejos. Vallejos
told Agapay that Exuperancio Canta took the cow. Agapay and Maria were instructed by
Narciso to get the cow and on their way to Florenitno Canta's house, they saw
Exuperancio.

The latter told them that if it was really Narciso who was the owner of the cow, he
should get it himself. Exuperancia accompanied the two to his father's house and both
recognized the cow but Florentino was not home. Exuperancio told Maria and Agapay
that he would call them the next day to talk about the matter with his father.
Exuperancio never called. The matter was reported to the police and Narciso and
Exuperancio were called for investigation. Exuperancio admitted taking the cow but
claims that he was the real owner of the cow and that it was lost on December 3, 1985.

However, Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed

by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and
female.

Then, the petitioner also presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated
February 27, 1985 and a statement executed by Franklin Telen, who was the janitor at
the treasurer's office of the municipality, that he executed the certificate of ownership in
favor of Exuperancio. The trial court rendered its decision finding the petitioner guilty of
the offense charged.

Exuperancio filed a Motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of Appeals
and affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lower courts were correct in sentencing Exuperancio to ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5)
months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay
the costs?

RULING

NO. The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of
violation of §2(c) of P. D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor,
as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law and
applied §1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that "if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law
and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
However, as held in People v. Macatanda, P. D. No. 533 is not a special law.

—------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ARTICLE 14 - AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

1. People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, 20 April 2001

2. People v. Capalac, G.R. No. L-38297, 23 October 1982
3. People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. 73489, 25 April 1994
4. People v. Tiongson, G.R. No. L-35123-24, 25 July 1984
5. People v. Magdueño, G.R. No. L-68699, 22 September 1986
6. People v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-89, 26 February 1990.
7. People v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-24002, 21 January 1974.
8. People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000
9. People v. Daniel, G.R. No. L-40330, 20 November 1978
10. People v. Apduhan,G.R.No.L-19491,30August 1968
11. People v. Mandolado, G.R. No. L-51304-05, 28 June 1983
12. People v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30449, 31 October 1979
13. People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881, 28 August 2007
14. People v. Damaso, G.R. No. L-30116, 20 November 1978
15. People v. Baldera, G.R. No. L-2390, 24 April 1950
16. People v. Melendrez, G.R. No. 39913, 19 December 1933
17. US v.Manalinde,G.R.No.5292,28August1909
18. People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No. 94308, 16 June 1994
19. People v. Bibat, G.R. No. 124319, 13 May 1998
20. Peoplev.Empacis,G.R.No.95756,14May1993
21. People v. Bigcas, G.R. No. 94534, 2 July 1992
 22. People v. Sangalang, G.R. No. L-32914, 30 August 1974
23. People v. San Pedro, G.R. No. L-44274, 22 January 1980
24. People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282, 20 April 1998
25. People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000
26. People v. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, 4 April 2003
27. People v. Villonez, G.R. Nos. 122976-77, 16 November 1998
28. People v. Guzman, G.R. No. 169246, 26 January 2007
29. People v. Torriefel CA-GR. No. 659-R, 29 November 1947
30. People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, 6 February 1971
31. People v. Butler, G.R. No. L-50276, 27 January 1983
32. People v. Saylan, G.R. No. L-36941, 29 June 1984
33. People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000,
34. People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, 19 September 2000
35. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, 29 June 2007

People v. Legaspi, G.R. Nos. 136164-65, 20 April 2001

PARTIES INVOLVED:
●

FACTS:
In the case before the court, the accused, armed with a bladed weapon, forcibly
engaged in sexual intercourse with Honorata Ong Y Guevarra against her will and
without her consent. Additionally, the accused, again armed with a bladed weapon,
committed robbery by forcefully taking P500.00 in cash from Honorata. The incident
occurred while Honorata was sleeping with her three daughters, and she was awakened
by the sound of the door opening, initially thinking it was her husband. However, she
was confronted by the accused wielding a knife, who proceeded to sexually assault her
and later demanded money under threat of violence.
Honorata, having identified the accused during the trial and reported the incident to the
barangay captain with her husband, testified against him. The accused, in his defense,
offered denial and alibi, claiming he was at home sleeping at the time of the alleged
incident. He hinted at a conspiracy involving relatives of a past homicide victim,
suggesting they conspired with Honorata to frame him. Despite the accused's defenses,
the trial court found him guilty of rape and robbery, imposing the death penalty for the
rape charge and an indeterminate penalty for the robbery charge. The court's decision
was based on the severity of the crimes, aggravated by factors such as dwelling and
nighttime.

ISSUE:
The accused-appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction, asserting that the prosecution
failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and highlighting alleged
inconsistencies in complainant Honorata's testimony. He maintains his innocence,
emphasizing an alibi and asserting insanity as an exempting circumstance. The
accused disputes Honorata's statement that she did not know him or his family before
the incident, alleging falsehood. Furthermore, he contends that the trial court made an
error in not recognizing his entitlement to the exempting circumstance of insanity.

RULING:
The accused-appellant's argument that the absence of spermatozoa in Honorata's
organ disproves rape is dismissed, as the presence or absence of spermatozoa is
deemed immaterial in rape cases, with penetration being the critical factor. The defense
of alibi presented by the accused-appellant, asserting he was asleep at his home during
the incident, is deemed unreliable and weak. The accused failed to demonstrate both
that he was elsewhere during the crime and that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the crime scene. Despite the defense's attempt to establish insanity by referring to
the accused's prior confinement at the National Center for Mental Health, the court
rejected this defense, emphasizing that mere prior confinement does not prove the lack
of reason at the time of the incident. The trial court's decision, based on the credibility of
Honorata's testimony, found the accused guilty of rape and imposed the death penalty,
considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling.

People v. Capalac, G.R. No. L-38297, 23 October 1982

PARTIES INVOLVED:
 ●

FACTS:
On September 20, 1970, at a licensed cockpit in the City of Iligan, an incident unfolded
where the aggressor, Mag-aso, attempted to escape but was confronted by two brothers
of Moises, Jesus Capalac and appellant Mario Capalac. Despite Mag-aso's attempt to
surrender by raising his hands, he was pistol-whipped by Mario Capalac, sustaining
blows to the head and face. Subsequently, Jesus Capalac stabbed Mag-aso multiple
times in the chest. Mag-aso was taken to the hospital but succumbed to his injuries,
with the coroner attributing the cause of death to "hemorrhagic shock due to a wound of
the heart." Following a trial, Mario Capalac was convicted of murder. The lower court
determined that the crime involved evident premeditation and treachery, and it
additionally held that Mario Capalac, a police officer, took advantage of his position,
employing means that added ignominy to the natural effects of his actions. As a result,
the lower court sentenced him to death, leading to an automatic review by the higher
Tribunal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of
position as a police officer, and a means employed or brought about to add ignominy to
the natural effects of the act are present? (NO)

RULING:

The lower court made an error in attributing aggravating circumstances, such as evident
premeditation, means adding ignominy, and the offender taking advantage of his official
position, to the case. The appellate argument contends that aggravating circumstances
must be as fully proven as the crime itself, quoting Justice Mapa's precedent in United
States v. Alvarez from 1903. The court rejects the notion of evident premeditation,
emphasizing that there is no clear evidence that the accused had resolved to commit
the crime prior to its execution. The court further argues that the brothers' actions were
driven by a desire to avenge their brother, not to deliberately add ignominy to the act.
The fact that appellant Mario Capalac is a police officer is deemed irrelevant to
establishing the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of his official position, as
he acted instinctively as a brother and not with a deliberate reliance on his police status.
The court concludes that his role as a policeman is not relevant in assessing his
criminal responsibility.
 People v. Gapasin, G.R. No. 73489, 25 April 1994

PARTIES INVOLVED:
●

FACTS:
The appellant appeals a Regional Trial Court (RTC) decision that found him guilty of
murder qualified by treachery, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
and the aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of public position and evident
premeditation. The incident occurred on October 6, 1979, after a religious service
attended by the appellant, the victim, and witnesses. The victim, Jerry Calpito, was shot
by the appellant, Gapasin, with an armalite rifle. Co-accused Amor Saludares then
planted a .22 caliber revolver on the victim. When Faustina Calpito, the wife of the
victim, approached, she was threatened by co-accused Nicanor Saludares, leading to a
confrontation with the relatives of the victim. Gapasin claimed self-defense, asserting he
had a mission order to investigate armed men in the area. He confronted Calpito, who
allegedly drew a firearm, leading to an exchange of gunfire. The police arrived 15
minutes later, taking Calpito's body to the morgue, and Gapasin was brought to the P.C.
Headquarters for investigation.

ISSUE:
Is the crime committed homicide?

RULING:
RTC RULING: The crime committed was murder attended by the aggravating
circumstances of (1) ignominy, the accused having stepped and kicked the body of the
deceased; (2) abuse of superior strength, and (3) taking advantage of public position,
with respect to the accused CIC Loreto Gapasin who is a PC soldier. - Gapasin
contends that only homicide was committed.

SC RULING (J. Quiason): No, murder was indeed committed. Treachery attended the
commission of the crime. The two conditions to constitute treachery were present in the
case at bench, to wit: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
who is attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. This can be gleaned from his act of
waiting for the victim behind the hollow-block fence of Nicanor Saludares and shooting
the victim from his right side. Appellant’s resolution to carry out the criminal intent during
the space of time sufficient to arrive at a clear judgment was shown. The information
alleged three other generic aggravating circumstances: ignominy, abuse of superior
strength and taking advantage of public position. The trial court correctly ruled out
ignominy on the strength of the autopsy conducted by the doctor who failed to find any
other injuries such as bruises and contusions which may indicate that the victim was
kicked by his assailants. The trial court properly appreciated taking advantage of public
position as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant, a member of the Philippine
Constabulary, committed the crime with an armalite which was issued to him when he
received the mission order. ADDITIONAL NOTES Voluntary surrender may be
considered in appellant’s favor but this is offset by the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of public position. Therefore, only the generic aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation may be appreciated against appellant.

People v. Tiongson, G.R. No. L-35123-24, 25 July 1984

PARTIES INVOLVED:
●

FACTS:
On the 26th day of October, 1971, at 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, inside
of the MunicipalBuilding, of the Municipality of Bulalacao, Province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, RUDY TIONGSON, conspiring and confederation with George de la Cruz and
Rolando Santiago, and under the pretext that they would answer the call of nature,
convinced Police First Class Patrolman Zosimo Gelera to allow them to go out from
their being confined and detained in the Municipal Jail Of same Municipality by virtue of
a previous offense,and while still hardly out of said jail ganged up said Zosimo Gelera,
took the latter’s service pistol and with it, with treachery, shot point blank said police
officer at his right cheek, tragically resulting to the victim’s instantaneous death and
thereafter, made good their escape.
On the same day, at 6:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Rizal, of the
Municipality of Bulalacao,Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RUDY TIONGSON,
conspiring andconfederating with Rolando Santiago and George de laCruz, who are
both at large by reason of their forcedescape, and with treachery, wilfully, unlawfully
andfeloniously waited in ambush, waylaid and shot oneConstable 2nd Class AURELIO
 Pulie Force in
towfu/ district
-
M. CANELA, a member of the local Philippine Constabulary Command, while the latter
was in hot pursuit of said accused who had earlier escaped from custody, thus fatefully
resulting in the instantaneous death of the victim.

Both offenses were qualified by the circumstance of treachery, and aggravated by the
circumstances of evident premeditation, in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities and with abuse of superior strength. The second murder is also aggravated
by the circumstance of its commission in an uninhabited place.Upon arraignment, the
said accused, assisted bycounsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to both informations.

ISSUE:
WoN there is treachery
WoN there is an aggravating circumstance

RULING: ⑱
&
The court rejects the application of treachery in the case since PC Constable Canela
had prior knowledge of the appellant's presence, eliminating complete surprise.
Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, contempt or insult to public
authorities, commission in an uninhabited place, and abuse of superior strength are not
&
present. Evident premeditation is dismissed due to the lack of proof of a deliberate plan
preceding the crimes, especially considering the short time between the accused's
-
escape and the killing of PC Constable Canela. The crimes were not committed in
-
contempt or insult to public authorities as the victims were the authorities themselves.
&
-
The allegation of an uninhabited place is refuted, as there is no evidence that the
&
offense occurred in a location far from human habitation. Additionally, the abuse of
-
superior strength is dismissed, as there is no direct evidence that the accused used
superior strength against the victims. The accused is found guilty of homicide, and the
--
-

sentence is modified to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to
-
-
fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, for each
&
-

homicide. The indemnity for the victims' heirs is increased to P30,000.00 in each case.
The court affirms the judgment with these modifications.

People v. Magdueño, G.R. No. L-68699, 22 September 1986

PARTIES INVOLVED:
●

FACTS:
The facts have been established following the testimonies of three eyewitnesses.
According to them, Fiscal Dilig had just sat in the driver seat of his car, parked outside
his house. They heard a shout saying “Fiscal” then two successive gun shots from a
guy. As soon as the shooting ended, the guy ran, still holding his gun. At trial, the
witnesses identified the shooter as Magdueño who was a stranger in the area.

Magdueño said that he acted because of the reward posed by two other people. It was
also found that he carried an unlicensed gun.

RTC found Magdueño guilty of murder with AC of treachery.

ISSUE:
Is AC of treachery present? -Yes

RULING:
Treachery is present because the situation met the two requisites of treachery. As per
law, for there to be treachery, the attacker must: (1) deliberately and consciously adopt
means and ways of committing the crime, and; (2) have insured its execution without
risk to himself. In the instant case, Magdueño deliberately adopted means of carrying
out the crime as he had an unlicensed gun with him. This is proof that the crime was
planned. More than that, Magdueño shot Dilig when Dilig had no chance to protect
himself or make ilag. There was no risk on Magdueño because he shot Dilig many
times. These said, the AC of treachery applies.

People v. Tac-an, G.R. Nos. 76338-89, 26 February 1990.

PARTIES INVOLVED:
●

FACTS:
The accused, Renato Tac-an y Hipos, was found guilty of violating Section 1, paragraph
(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1866. He unlawfully possessed an unlicensed firearm, a
SMITH & WESSON Airweight .38 revolver, and used it to shoot and kill Francis Ernest
Escaño. Renato entered a plea of not guilty but was convicted of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with Murder and Murder under the Revised Penal
Code. The crimes involved evident premeditation, treachery, influence of drugs, use of
an unlicensed firearm, and insult to a person in authority. The incident occurred during a
Mathematics class, where Renato shot Francis multiple times, leading to his death.
After the shooting, Renato took hostages but eventually surrendered to authorities. The
appeal argued against the retroactive application of P.D. No. 1866, stating it was not
intended for the duration of martial law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.

RULING:
The court agrees with the trial court's conclusion that Renato Tac-an y Hipos shot and
killed Francis Ernest Escaño III under treacherous circumstances. However, the court
rejects the notion that the use of an unlicensed firearm can be considered an
aggravating circumstance in a homicide or murder case. The court also disputes the
finding that Renato acted under the influence of drugs, stating that the evidence
presented was insufficient to support this claim. Additionally, the court disagrees with
the trial court's characterization of the crime as having been committed with contempt of
or insult to public authorities. The court clarifies that teachers and professors are
considered persons in authority only for specific articles of the Revised Penal Code and
not in the context applied by the trial court. As a result, the court decides to delete
certain aggravating circumstances, both generic and special, and imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua on Renato.

People v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-24002, 21 January 1974.

PARTIES INVOLVED:
●

FACTS:
Francisco Diaz and Gerardo Diaz were convicted of murder by the Court of First
Instance of Samar for the killing of Quintin Tadia. The incident stemmed from an earlier
assault by Francisco on Remegia Carasos, which led to Tadia planning to file a
complaint against Francisco. On September 5, 1963, Francisco and Gerardo ambushed
Tadia, with Gerardo shooting him and Francisco subsequently stabbing him multiple
times.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Francisco Diaz's plea of self-defense and Gerardo's alibi are credible.
2. Whether the brothers conspired to kill the victim.
3. Whether treachery and evident premeditation should qualify the killing as murder.

RULING:
1. The court found Francisco's self-defense claim incredible and Gerardo's alibi
unconvincing.
2. The court inferred conspiracy based on the antecedents and circumstances
surrounding the killing, indicating the brothers acted in concert to prevent Tadia
from filing a complaint.
3. The court ruled that the killing was murder qualified by treachery, given the
deliberate surprise attack and the brothers' waiting in ambush. Evident
premeditation was considered for Francisco but not for Gerardo.

Francisco was sentenced to reclusion perpetua, considering the mitigating circumstance

of voluntary surrender. Gerardo was also sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The
indemnity to be paid to the heirs of Quintin Tadia was increased to P12,000. The trial
court's judgment was modified, affirming it in most respects, with costs against the
appellants. The benefits of preventive imprisonment under Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code may be extended to the appellants if the conditions laid down in Republic
Act No. 6127 are satisfied.

People v. Arizobal, G.R. No. 135051-52, 14 December 2000

PARTIES INVOLVED:
●

FACTS:
On March 24, 1994, Clarito Arizobal, Erly Lignes, and others committed a robbery with
homicide, targeting Laurencio Gimenez and his son Jimmy Gimenez in Cataingan,
Masbate. The victims were robbed, forcibly taken from their homes, and subsequently
killed. The accused were charged with Robbery in Band with Homicide.

ISSUE:
The primary issue involved the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly the
identification of the accused and the consistency of their testimonies. Additionally, the
court considered whether aggravating circumstances, such as treachery, nighttime, and
dwelling, were present.

RULING:
The trial court found Clarito Arizobal and Erly Lignes guilty of robbery with homicide and
sentenced them to death. The decision was affirmed on appeal with modifications.
While some inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies were acknowledged, they
were deemed minor and did not undermine the overall identification of the accused.
However, the court clarified that treachery is not a valid aggravating circumstance in
robbery with homicide and that nighttime must be intentionally sought by the accused to
be considered aggravating. The penalties and indemnities were maintained, and the
case records were ordered to be forwarded to the President for possible exercise of
pardoning power. Costs were imposed against both accused. The convictions of Clarito
Arizobal and Erly Lignes for robbery with homicide were affirmed, with modifications on
the aggravating circumstances. The case records were forwarded to the President for
potential pardon consideration, and costs were imposed against the accused.

People v. Daniel, G.R. No. L-40330, 20 November 1978

FACTS:
On or about September 20, 1965, in Baguio City, Philippines, Amado Daniel, armed with
a sharp instrument, allegedly raped 13-year-old Margarita Paleng in her own room. The
complaint accused Daniel of having carnal knowledge of Paleng against her will.

ISSUE:
The issue revolves around the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to act on an appeal in a
criminal case certified to it by the Court of Appeals. The question is whether the
Supreme Court can acquire jurisdiction when the Court of Appeals certifies a case
without imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant.

RULING:
The Court of Appeals found Amado Daniel guilty of the crime but noted that the
sentence imposed was not in accordance with Republic Act No. 4111, which amended
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The case was then certified to the Supreme
Court for appropriate proceedings. The Supreme Court discussed the jurisdictional
question and concluded that it had jurisdiction based on the certification, even if the
penalty of reclusion perpetua or death was not explicitly imposed by the Court of
Appeals.

On the merits of the appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction,
finding that the evidence supported the rape charge. Due to the lack of a majority vote
for the death penalty, the Court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Amado
Daniel. Additionally, Daniel was ordered to indemnify Margarita Paleng for moral
damages.

People v. Apduhan,G.R.No.L-19491,30August 1968

FACTS:
Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior, Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson were charged
with the crime of Robbery With Homicide.

The accused pleaded guilty having in mind that such act would constitute as a
mitigating circumstance so that the penalty of death be not imposed.

However, the Court of First Instance of Bohol (Judge Hipolito Alo presiding) convicting
Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to death and “to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the amount of P6,000.00, to
indemnify the heirs of the other deceased Norberto Aton in the same amount of
P6,000.00 x x x”

The case was subject for automatic review. Atty. Alberto M. Meer, the accused’s counsel
de oficio in the present review, contended that the use of unlicensed firearm, if ever
appreciated in the case at bar, must be considered a generic aggravating factor which
“may be off-set by the existence of mitigating circumstances so that the penalty to be
imposed should be the penalty of reclusión perpetua.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the use of an unlicensed firearm be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance.
RULING:
No. The passage of Republic Act 373 did not only jettison the first two subdivisions of
art. 294 from the periphery of art. 295 but also removed the said subdivisions (which
pertain, inter alia, to the offense of robbery with homicide) from the effective range of
art. 296.

Notwithstanding that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm

cannot be appreciated in the instant case, in the final analysis, to observe that the
imposition of the death penalty on the accused Apduhan would appear to be a logical
legal consequence, because as against the attendant mitigating circumstances the
aggravating circumstances numerically and qualitatively preponderate.

People v. Mandolado, G.R. No. L-51304-05, 28 June 1983

FACTS:
Martin Mandolado was sentenced to death for the 1977 shooting of Nolasco Mendoza
and the murder of Herminigildo Fajardo Tenorio. The crimes involved aggravating
circumstances of treachery, premeditation, and superior strength. Mandolado, along
with others, got drunk on a bus trip, and he later fired a .30 caliber machine gun, injuring
several people. In an attempt to escape, Mandolado and his accomplice Ortillano were
arrested before boarding a ship to Manila. The defense argued that guilt was not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, pointing out the lack of evidence linking empty shells to
Mandolado's gun at the crime scene.

ISSUE:
1. W/N the trial court failed to acknowledge Ortillano and Mandolado's drunkenness
-YES]
2. W/N the trial court correctly qualified the crime as murder -YES
3. W/N the trial court correctly found that the aggravating circumstances of (a)
advantage was taken of being a draftee in the Philippine army and (2)
abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness were present in the
commission of the crime -NO

RULING:
1. The drunkenness of both appellants were put into consideration as a
mitigating circumstance. Consequently, the Court decided to reduce their
sentences.
 2. It is murder because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution.
3. While it is true that they were draftees, there is no evidence that when
they stopped the jeep, the accused already intended to shoot the occupants of
the vehicle. Simply stated, there was no proof that they intended to take
advantage of being a draftee in order to commit the crime. They also cannot
be charged with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence because
there was no proof that the victims had a "relation of trust and
confidence" with the accused. As stated in People vs. Comendador, in
order for abuse of confidence to be considered an aggravating circumstance,
it is necessary that "there exists a relation of trust and confidence between the
accused and the one against whom the crime was committed and the accused
made use of such relationship to commit the crime."

People v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-30449, 31 October 1979

FACTS:
Antonio Garcia y Cabarse alias "Tony Manok" and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza alias
"Rene Bisugo" appealed the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal, which
found them guilty of murder and sentenced them to death. The case revolved around
the killing of Apolonio Dioquino Jr., with the prosecution relying on the testimony of the
lone eyewitness, Corazon Dioquino Paterno, the sister of the deceased. Corazon
testified that she saw the accused chasing her brother, leading to a fatal attack.

ISSUE:
The key issue was the credibility of the eyewitness testimony and whether the accused
were proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

RULING:
The court modified the judgment, finding that the crime was homicide, not murder. While
the accused voluntarily surrendered, mitigating their sentence, two aggravating
circumstances (abuse of superiority and nocturnity) remained. As a result, Antonio
Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza were sentenced to undergo an
indeterminate imprisonment of 10 years as a minimum to 18 years as a maximum, with
all other aspects of the decision affirmed. The court concluded that treachery and
evident premeditation were not proven, and abuse of superiority, along with nocturnity,
aggravated the offense.

People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881, 28 August 2007

FACTS:
● Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. were charged with the murder of Titing
Asenda in Siayan, Zamboanga del Norte.
● Accused, along with Charlito and Jose Jr., were armed with a hunting knife,
firearm, chako, and bolo during the attack at a benefit dance.
● Eyewitnesses Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot testified that Charlito stabbed
Titing, Armando clubbed him, and Jose Rodas, Jr. hacked him with a bolo.
● The victim died due to multiple wounds.

ISSUE:
Whether Armando Rodas and Jose Rodas, Sr. are guilty of murder.

RULING:
● The trial court found appellants guilty of murder, a decision affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
● The Court upheld the credibility of eyewitnesses, rejected the defenses of denial
and alibi, and affirmed the presence of treachery in the attack.
● The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in
treachery.
● Damages were modified, and appellants were sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

People v. Damaso, G.R. No. L-30116, 20 November 1978

FACTS:
On the night of November 21, 1959, in the Municipality of Victoria, Province of Tarlac,
the accused, armed with various weapons, forcibly entered the house of Donata
Rebolledo. They robbed the victims of valuables and brought two daughters of Donata
Rebolledo, Catalina Sabado and Susana Sabado, to a sugarcane field. There, the
accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, stabbed and killed the two women.

ISSUE:
1. Whether robbery was committed.
2. Whether the homicides were committed by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.
3. Whether the aggravating circumstances of armed band, treachery, and
uninhabited place were present.
4. Whether the trial court erred in its appreciation of the evidence.

RULING:
1. Robbery was clearly established based on the victims' testimonies and the
accused's own admissions in their separate statements.
2. The motive for the killings, initially stated as vengeance, was later changed to
eliminating witnesses to the crime. The Court held that the dual intent of robbery
and vengeance did not preclude conviction for the complex crime of robbery with
double homicide.
3. The aggravating circumstances of armed band, treachery, and uninhabited place
were present. The accused acted in concert, treacherously killed the victims with
bound hands, and chose a secluded area for the crime.
4. The trial court's appreciation of the evidence was upheld. The confessions were
deemed voluntary, corroborated by the reenactment, and supported by
circumstantial evidence.
The Court affirmed the trial court's decision, upholding the death penalty for Fausto
Damaso, Victoriano Eugenio, Lorenzo Alviar, and Bonifacio Espejo for the crime of
robbery with double homicide. The related case against Lorenzo Alviar for illegal
possession of a firearm was also affirmed.

People v. Baldera, G.R. No. L-2390, 24 April 1950

FACTS:
● On December 23, 1947, at around 4 a.m., a Casa Manila bus traveling from
Batangas to Manila was held up by a group of five or six armed men in barrio
Calansayan, municipality of San Jose, Batangas.
 ● The appellant, Pedro Baldera, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, fired a shot,
resulting in injuries to several passengers, including Jose Cabrera, Jose Pastor,
and Francisco Mendoza.
● After the shooting, Baldera boarded the bus, threatened passengers with his gun,
and stole money from Jose Pastor and Ponciana Villena.
● The wounded passengers were later taken to the hospital, and Jose Cabrera
succumbed to his injuries the following day.

ISSUE:
The primary issue is the identification of Pedro Baldera as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery in band with homicide and physical injuries.

RULING:
● Pedro Baldera was found guilty of robbery in band with homicide and serious and
less serious physical injuries by the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
● The lower court sentenced Baldera to death, but on appeal, the Supreme Court
reduced the sentence to life imprisonment.
● The Court affirmed Baldera's guilt, citing evidence including a confession made
by Baldera after his arrest and the identification of Baldera by a witness who was
a victim of the robbery.
● The Court rejected the argument that Baldera's confession was inadmissible,
stating that there was no proof that it was taken through force and intimidation.
● The Court acknowledged an error in appreciating recidivism against Baldera, as
the previous conviction for theft occurred after the robbery in question.
● Baldera was sentenced to life imprisonment, with an increased indemnity to be
paid to the heirs of the deceased Jose Cabrera amounting to P6,000.
The Supreme Court affirmed Baldera's guilt for the crime but modified the sentence to
life imprisonment, considering the evidence and addressing errors in the lower court's
judgment.

People v. Melendrez, G.R. No. 39913, 19 December 1933

FACTS:
● Accused Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto and Elias Martinez were charged with
forcibly breaking into an inhabited house in Pasay, stealing various items from
the owner, Tin Bun Boc, including money, a watch, a ring, a hat, cigarettes, and
canned goods.
 ● Ricardo Melendrez y Nieto, a habitual delinquent with prior convictions for theft
and estafa, pleaded guilty during the trial.

ISSUE:
● Whether the lack of instruction on the part of the appellant should be considered
as a mitigating circumstance.
● Whether the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into
account.

RULING:
● Lack of instruction was raised as a mitigating circumstance, but the court rejected
the argument, stating that lack of instruction cannot be considered a mitigating
circumstance in crimes of robbery.
● The appellant's plea of guilty upon arraignment was considered a mitigating
circumstance in his favor.
● The fiscal argued for the aggravating circumstance of recidivism to be
considered. The court held that recidivism should be taken into account in
imposing the principal penalty in its corresponding degree, notwithstanding the
additional penalty for being a habitual delinquent.
● The crime committed was robbery without the use of arms in an inhabited house,
with the value of the stolen items being less than P250. The prescribed penalty,
according to article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its
medium degree.
● Due to the concurrence of one mitigating and one aggravating circumstance, the
penalty was imposed in its medium degree.
● The principal penalty imposed upon the appellant was two years, eleven months,
and eleven days.
● The judgment appealed from was affirmed, with costs.

US v.Manalinde,G.R.No.5292,28August1909

FACTS:
On January 19, 1909, the Moro Manalinde attacked and killed a Spaniard, Juan Igual,
and a Chinaman, Choa, in Cotabato, Moro Province. Manalinde, carrying a concealed
kris, approached Igual seated in front of a store and attacked him from behind, then
assaulted Choa as he was placing a load on the ground. Manalinde fled the scene, and
both victims were taken to the hospital, with Choa dying within an hour.
ISSUE:
Whether Manalinde is guilty of the crime of murder.

RULING:
● Manalinde pleaded guilty and confessed to the crime, stating he acted on the
order of Datto Rajamudah Mupuck.
● The court rejected Manalinde's claim that he was not responsible due to following
orders, as it was not a proper act of obedience.
● The court considered the crime one of murder, committed with deceit and
treachery, as Manalinde attacked unsuspecting victims.
● Aggravating circumstances of promise of reward and premeditation were
present, justifying the imposition of the death penalty.
● Manalinde's assertion that he would have killed more if not for the order did not
excuse his barbarous act.
● The court affirmed the judgment, directing the execution of the penalty according
to the relevant laws, and in case of a pardon, imposition of accessory penalties.

People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No. 94308, 16 June 1994

FACTS:
On November 5, 1987, Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles discovered the decapitated body of
Nestor de Loyola in a grassy area on Tinio St., Sta. Maria Phase I, Balibago, Angeles
City. Nestor de Loyola had suffered forty-three stab wounds and slight burns. Ruben E.
Ilaoa and Rogelio E. Ilaoa, among five charged individuals, were accused of the murder.
The trial court found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder based on circumstantial
evidence, sentencing them to "life imprisonment."

ISSUE:
Whether the circumstantial evidence presented during the trial is sufficient to establish
the guilt of Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
The court affirmed Ruben Ilaoa's guilt for homicide, not murder, as the evidence proved
his involvement in the crime. However, the court reversed Rogelio Ilaoa's conviction due
to the insufficiency of evidence linking him to the murder. The court emphasized the
importance of meeting specific criteria for the use of circumstantial evidence in securing
a conviction. It clarified that abuse of superior strength, cruelty, and evident
premeditation were not adequately proven against Ruben, leading to the classification
of the offense as homicide rather than murder. Ruben Ilaoa was sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term, and the civil indemnity for the death of Nestor de Loyola was
increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00. Rogelio Ilaoa was acquitted due to the lack
of evidence.

People v. Bibat, G.R. No. 124319, 13 May 1998

FACTS:
● Accused Gari Bibat is appealing a judgment from the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch IV, finding him guilty of Murder in Criminal Case No. 93-123648.
● The Information filed on July 23, 1993, accused Bibat of conspiring to murder
Lloyd del Rosario on October 14, 1992, in Manila. The victim was stabbed and
later died in a hospital.

ISSUE:
● Whether the trial court erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
the eyewitnesses Nona Avila Cinco and Rogelio Robles.

RULING:
● The Court affirms the trial court's decision, finding no basis to disturb the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
● The defense's reliance on alibi is rejected, considering it an inherently weak
defense.
● The presence of evident premeditation is established based on the testimony of
witnesses and the circumstances surrounding the crime.
Summary of the Ruling:

1. Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses:

a. The Court upholds the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, emphasizing the trial court's advantage in personally hearing
the testimony.
b. Fear of reprisal is acknowledged as a valid reason for delayed reporting
by a witness, and Nona Cinco's detailed recollection is considered
reasonable given the circumstances.
2. Defense of Alibi:
 a. Alibi is deemed a weak defense, and the appellant fails to prove that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene during the
commission of the murder.
b. Positive identification by prosecution witnesses prevails over alibi and
denial.
3. Evident Premeditation:
a. The Court concludes that evident premeditation is proven based on the
witnesses' testimonies and the circumstances leading up to the crime.
b. The retraction of a witness does not render the initial testimony false if it
appears credible and worthy of belief.
Decision:
The Court affirms the decision of the trial court, finding Gari Bibat guilty of Murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with other monetary
penalties imposed.

Peoplev.Empacis,G.R.No.95756,14May1993

CASE DIGEST
Title: People of the Philippines v. Crisologo Empacis
G.R. No.: 95756
Date: May 14, 1993

FACTS:
Charge: Crisologo Empacis and four others were charged with robbery with homicide under
Article 294 (1) in relation to Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code.
Incident: On September 16, 1986, at approximately 9:00 PM, the accused, armed with
carbines and bladed weapons, conspired to attack and kill Fidel Saromines in Barangay
Kanguha, Municipality of Dumanjug, Cebu.
Criminal Act: The accused, with intent to kill, assaulted Fidel Saromines, stabbing him
multiple times, resulting in his death. They also stole P12,000 from him.

ISSUE:
Whether the evidence presented proves Crisologo Empacis' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

RULING:
 Crisologo Empacis was found guilty of robbery with homicide by the Trial Court.
The Trial Court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua due to the abolition of the death penalty,
with additional penalties and ordered payment of P30,000 as death indemnity to the heirs of
Fidel Saromines.
Empacis appealed, claiming insufficiency of evidence.

COURT'S ANALYSIS:
Identification: The court considered the testimony of the victim's widow and son, which was
corroborated by a neighbor and even by Empacis himself.
Crime Details: The prosecution's narrative described how the accused, posing as customers,
attacked Fidel Saromines after finishing a meal at his store, robbing and killing him.
Conspiracy: The court found evidence of a conspiracy between Empacis and Romualdo
Langomez, noting their coordinated actions, knowledge of Fidel's money, and escape from
the crime scene together.
Aggravating Circumstances: The court acknowledged the aggravating circumstances of craft
or fraud, nighttime, superior strength, and commission of the crime in the dwelling of the
victim.

APPEAL DISPOSITION:
The court affirmed the Trial Court's decision, finding no reversible error.
The death indemnity was increased from P30,000 to P50,000.
The court ordered restitution of the stolen P12,000, which the Trial Court omitted.

CONCLUSION:
Crisologo Empacis' appeal was denied, and the Trial Court's decision was affirmed with

modifications to the death indemnity and the addition of restitution for the stolen amount.

People v. Bigcas, G.R. No. 94534, 2 July 1992

FACTS:
On July 25, 1988, in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Pilar, Province of Bohol,
Rodrigo Bigcas and Quiliano Butron were accused of murdering Ambrocio Palapar. The
Regional Trial Court of Bohol found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt, imposing the
penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" and ordering them to pay the
victim's heirs legal indemnity, actual damages, loss of earnings, and costs.

The prosecution's version was based on eyewitness testimonies, primarily from Rosito
Doydoy and Jesus Calape. According to their accounts, the appellants attacked
Palapar, with Butron hitting him twice with a piece of wood and Bigcas stabbing him with
a bolo. The chase and assault continued until Palapar succumbed to his injuries. The
defense, however, presented a different narrative, claiming that Palapar initiated a
confrontation, leading to Butron defending himself and later surrendering to the police.

ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in finding Rodrigo Bigcas and Quiliano Butron guilty of
murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
The Court affirmed the trial court's decision but modified the penalty. It held that the
findings of fact by the trial judge, who observed the witnesses' demeanor, are generally
not disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial oversights affecting the case's
outcome.

The defense, arguing self-defense, failed to establish it with clear and convincing
evidence. The Court emphasized that for self-defense to prosper, the accused must
prove unlawful aggression by the victim, the reasonable use of force to repel it, and the
lack of sufficient provocation on their part. Even if Butron claimed to have disarmed
Palapar, the subsequent pursuit and lethal attack negated any justifiable self-defense
claim.

The Court rejected the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, as witnesses confirmed

sufficient visibility during the incident. It also found no evidence of abuse of superior
strength, as the prosecution failed to prove appellants deliberately intended to take
advantage of such strength.

While the Court acknowledged the existence of conspiracy, it concluded that the
appellants committed homicide, not murder. It found no proof of treachery or abuse of
superior strength, instead recognizing the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The sentence was modified to ten to fourteen years of imprisonment, and the
death indemnity was increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing case law.

People v. Sangalang, G.R. No. L-32914, 30 August 1974

FACTS:
On June 9, 1968, at around 6 o'clock in the morning, Ricardo Cortez was gathering tuba
from a coconut tree near his nipa hut in Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang, Cavite. He
was struck by a volley of shots and fell to the ground. His wife, Flora Sarno, heard three
successive shots and saw five men armed with long firearms firing at her husband from
a distance of about twenty-five meters. Cortez was already wounded and lying on the
ground at the base of the coconut tree. Flora recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of
the armed men and identified the others as Conrado Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino
Canuel, and Eleuterio Cuyom.

Ricardo Sarno, brother of Flora, witnessed the incident from his own nipa hut, about ten
meters away. He saw Sangalang using a Garand carbine to shoot Cortez. Flora ran
towards her husband, shouting, but the men fired at her. She retreated for cover, and
after the attackers left, she found her husband dead. Cortez sustained twenty-three
gunshot wounds, resulting in his death.

Sangalang was arrested, posted bail, and subsequently appealed his conviction for
murder. He asserted an alibi, claiming he was in Sampaloc, Manila, during the incident.

ISSUE:
Whether the eyewitness testimonies of Flora Sarno and Ricardo Sarno are sufficient to
overcome the alibi presented by Laureano Sangalang.

RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, convicting Laureano Sangalang of
murder. The Court rejected Sangalang's alibi, noting that his witnesses failed to
interpose the defense during the police investigation and preliminary investigation.

Despite minor discrepancies in the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, Flora Sarno and
Ricardo Sarno, the Court found their identification of Sangalang as one of the assailants
to be clear and consistent. These discrepancies did not indicate falsehood or a coached
testimony but rather deficiencies in observation and recollection. The Court concluded
that the prosecution successfully proved Sangalang's complicity in the killing.

The Court also noted that the deliberate and surprise attack on the unarmed and
defenseless victim, who was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree, established the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. Consequently, the killing was categorized as
murder. The trial court's imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang
was affirmed.
Disposition:
The decision of the trial court convicting Laureano Sangalang of murder and imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was affirmed with costs against the appellant.

People v. San Pedro, G.R. No. L-44274, 22 January 1980

FACTS:
The case involves the automatic review of the death penalty imposed on
defendant-appellant Artemio Banasihan by the Court of First Instance of Laguna. The
crime in question is robbery with homicide, committed on June 2, 1970. The victim,
Felimon Rivera, a jeepney driver, was found dead with 23 lacerated and stab wounds,
and multiple abrasions on his body. The assailants stole Rivera's jeep, which was later
sold for P2,000. Rodrigo Esguerra, one of the culprits, admitted his involvement and
named his companions, including Banasihan. In his statement, Banasihan confessed to
planning the robbery and killing with his co-accused.

Banasihan, apprehended in 1972, raised questions of law in his appeal, particularly

challenging the degree of culpability and seeking a reduction of the death penalty to
reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of craft is absorbed by treachery and whether
the resulting single aggravating circumstance of treachery should be offset by the
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

RULING:
The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, upholding the death penalty imposed
on Banasihan. The appellant's admission of the accuracy of the factual findings of the
trial court limited the appeal to questions of law.

The legal issue raised by Banasihan concerned the absorption of the aggravating
circumstance of craft by treachery. The Court rejected this argument, emphasizing that
craft was directed towards facilitating the robbery, separate from the homicide. The
Court cited precedents where craft and treachery were considered separate aggravating
circumstances.

Regarding the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, the Court held that it did not
apply to crimes of theft, robbery, and homicide. Banasihan's alleged lack of intelligence
was not proven, and the trial court did not consider it as a mitigating circumstance. The
Court affirmed the death penalty and the indemnity awarded.

Disposition:
The decision of the trial court, imposing the death penalty on Artemio Banasihan for
robbery with homicide, was affirmed.

People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 120282, 20 April 1998

FACTS:
On May 25, 1993, Antonio Dometita was fatally stabbed in Quezon City. The
prosecution, through witnesses Eulogio Velasco and Melinda Mercado, presented a
narrative that Castillo, without warning, attacked and stabbed Dometita, who later died
from his injuries. The defense, on the other hand, proposed an alternate scenario where
two unidentified assailants attacked Dometita. The trial court accepted the prosecution's
version, and Castillo was convicted of murder.

ISSUE:
1. The trial court's failure to appreciate the defense's evidence regarding a stabbing
incident involving two unknown assailants.
2. The trial court's alleged failure to consider medical findings and discrepancies in
witness testimonies.
3. Alleged judicial bias.

RULING:
First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses

The Supreme Court held that the trial court's appreciation of the prosecution's evidence
was correct. Witness testimonies were consistent, and the defense failed to show any
significant discrepancy or flaw in the evidence presented. The court emphasized the
importance of giving weight to the trial court's assessment of credibility, as it had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses.
Second Issue: Partiality of the Trial Judge

The Court rejected the claim of judicial bias. It explained that judges have the right to
ask clarificatory questions during trials, and such questions were not indicative of bias.
The appellant failed to show any prejudice resulting from the judge's inquiries.

Alibi Defense

Castillo's alibi defense was dismissed as it failed to demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene. The Court emphasized that the defense of
alibi must meet the stringent requirement of proving physical impossibility.

Aggravating Circumstances

The trial court's findings regarding evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
were not upheld, but the Court affirmed the qualification of the killing as murder due to
treachery.

Damages

While the Court affirmed the indemnity award, it deleted the awards for actual and moral
damages due to a lack of evidentiary basis.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court denied the appeal, affirming the trial court's decision. The
conviction of Robert Castillo for murder was upheld, emphasizing the correctness of the
trial court's assessment of evidence and rejecting claims of bias. The awards for actual
and moral damages were deleted due to insufficient supporting evidence.

People v. Escote, G.R. No. 140756, 4 April 2003

FACTS:
On September 28, 1996, at past midnight, a Five Star Passenger Bus with Plate No.
ABS-793 was en route from Pasay City to Bolinao, Pangasinan. In Camachile,
Balintawak, six passengers, including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr.,
boarded the bus. While traveling on the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan fired his gun
upward to intimidate passengers, and Victor followed suit. The two then accosted
passengers, robbed them of money and valuables, and specifically divested the bus
conductor, Romulo, of collected fares.

During the incident, Juan and Victor targeted a police officer among the passengers,
taking his identification card and service gun. They threatened to kill him, despite his
pleas for mercy. Ignoring the officer's pleas, they shot him, resulting in six entrance
wounds. After the robbery, the perpetrators ordered the bus driver, Rodolfo, to stop the
bus on an overpass in Mexico, Pampanga, where Juan and Victor alighted.

Later, Juan admitted to police investigators that he and Victor (alias Victor Arroyo)
staged the robbery on the Five Star Bus and were responsible for the death of SPO1
Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan. Based on the evidence and Juan's confession, they were
found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
(1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with
homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be appreciated against
Juan and Victor

RULING:
In the ruling of the case, the court determined that treachery is considered a generic
aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, which is a special
complex crime and a single and indivisible offense. However, treachery is not an
element of robbery with homicide and does not constitute a crime specifically
punishable by law, nor is it inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide.

The court clarified that when applying treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance
to robbery with homicide, it focuses on the constituent crime of "homicide," which is a
crime against persons, rather than on the constituent crime of "robbery," which is a
crime against property. Treachery is applied to the crime of homicide in the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Importantly, the court emphasized that the classification of robbery with homicide as a
crime against property or as a special complex and single indivisible crime remains
unchanged, even when treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Treachery serves to increase the penalty for the crime in accordance with Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code, provided there are no generic mitigating circumstances.
However, in the specific case at hand, the court ruled that treachery cannot be
appreciated against the defendants, Juan and Victor, because it was not alleged in the
Information. The court acknowledged that while, at the time the crime was committed,
generic aggravating circumstances did not need to be alleged in the Information, the
general rule had been applied retroactively. Thus, if treachery is not alleged in the
information, it cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime, even if proven during the
proceedings.

People v. Villonez, G.R. Nos. 122976-77, 16 November 1998

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Regando Villonez, Ruel Santos, and Emerlito Santos sought to
reverse their conviction for murder by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon, Metro
Manila. They were charged with the murder of Gerardo Longasa, which allegedly
occurred on May 3, 1994, in Malabon. The prosecution asserted that the accused
conspired and attacked Longasa with treachery, superior strength, and bladed
weapons, resulting in his death.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight to the testimony of prosecution
witness Edgar Jimenez.
2. Whether there was an error in finding Regando Villonez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
3. Whether conspiracy existed in the case.
4. Whether treachery was present in the commission of the crime.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC's decision, convicting Regando Villonez and
Emerlito Santos of murder and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. Ruel Santos,
being a minor at the time, received an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision
mayor as a minimum to seventeen years of reclusion temporal as a maximum.

Analysis:
The Court held that the credibility of Edgar Jimenez, the lone eyewitness, was sound.
While accused-appellants attacked his credibility, the Court found Edgar's consistent
account trustworthy. The inconsistencies in his testimony were explained adequately,
and the Court emphasized that his criminal record did not automatically make him an
incredible witness.

Regarding the defense of alibi, the Court rejected it, as positive identification by Edgar
Jimenez prevailed. The Court also upheld the finding of conspiracy, as the accused
acted with a common purpose during the attack on Longasa.

However, the Court disagreed with the RTC's assessment that treachery was absent. It
held that the overwhelming number of attackers, their use of weapons against an
unarmed victim, and restraining the victim's hands behind him constituted treachery,
even though Longasa was engaged in a previous fight.

The Court affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for Regando and Emerlito and an
indeterminate penalty for Ruel Santos, along with the monetary awards for the victim's
heirs.

Key Legal Concepts:

1. Conspiracy: The Court affirmed the presence of conspiracy based on the

coordinated actions of the accused during the attack on the victim.
2. Treachery: The Court held that treachery was present due to the overwhelming
force used by the accused, making it impossible for the victim to defend himself.
3. Credibility of Witnesses: The Court emphasized the trial court's unique position to
assess the credibility of witnesses, and absent arbitrariness, its findings are
generally respected on appeal.

People v. Guzman, G.R. No. 169246, 26 January 2007

FACTS:
After attending a worship service at the Iglesia ni Kristo church in his barangay, Michael
proceeded home. While Michael was casually walking along the corner of Sto. Nino
Street andMactan Street, appellant and his two companions, who were drinking nearby,
suddenly approachedand surrounded Michael. Appellant positioned himself at the back
of Michael while his twocompanions stood in front of Michael. In an instant, they
grabbed the shoulders of Michael andoverpowered the latter. One of the appellant's
companions, whom the prosecution witnesses describedas a male with long hair, drew
out a knife and repeatedly stabbed Michael on the stomach.Unsatisfied, the appellant's
other companion, whom the prosecution witnesses described as a malewith flat top hair,
took the knife and stabbed Michael on the stomach. As the finale, appellant went infront
of Michael, took the knife and also stabbed Michael on the stomach. When Michael fell
on theground, appellant kicked him at the body. Upon noticing that the bloodied Michael
was no longermoving, appellant and his two companions fled the scene. The appellant
was convicted by the trialcourt with the crime of murder. On appeal, appellant contends
that even if he were held liable for thedeath of Michael, there was no treachery which
will qualify the killing as murder. According to him,there is no evidence to show that
appellant and his two companions had deliberately and consciouslyadopted their mode
of attack to ensure its execution without risk to themselves. The stabbing
incidentoccurred in a place that was properly lighted. There were many people in the
area then walking indifferent directions. He claims that if he and his two companions
wanted to ensure that no risk wouldcome to them, then they could have chosen another
time and place to attack Michael.

ISSUE:
Can treachery be properly appreciated in the instant case?

RULING:
In this case, the ruling emphasizes the concept and essential elements of treachery as
an aggravating circumstance in the context of a murder charge. Treachery is defined as
a sudden and unexpected attack that renders the victim unable and unprepared to
defend themselves. Two essential elements are required for treachery to be
appreciated: the use of means that ensure the offender's safety and a deliberate or
conscious choice of execution. The court determined that treachery was properly
alleged in the case, and during the trial, all essential elements were established and
proven.

The victim, Michael, was described as defenseless, vulnerable, and without means of
escape during the attack. The court highlighted the suddenness and unexpectedness of
the assault, emphasizing that Michael was unarmed, young, and outnumbered by the
three assailants. The attackers took advantage of their size, number, and weapon,
adopting deliberate means and methods to ensure the cruel death of Michael. The court
rejected the argument that the presence of lighting and people in the vicinity negated
treachery, emphasizing that the essence of treachery lies in the unexpected attack on
an unsuspecting victim without provocation, especially when the assailant is an adult
and the victim is a minor. The ruling concluded that treachery existed in this case,
supporting the murder charge against the appellant and his two companions.
 People v. Torriefel CA-GR. No. 659-R, 29 November 1947

FACTS:
Torrefiel and Ormeo, at about 5:00 pm in the afternoon of December 17, 1942, passed
by Eady’s residence while on their way to the USSAFE headquarters in the mountains.
They talked to him at the balcony to ask for khakis but unfortunately Eady had none
except for what he had on. Caferina Cordero also went to the balcony to inquire bout
their mission. She scolded Torrefiel and Ormeo because all their belongings have been
looted by USSAFE soldiers which resulted to Torrefiel threatening and slapping her then
brought out a revolver. Subsequently, Eady and Cordero were taken to the USSAFE
headquarters and were charged with being fifth columnists as they refused to give aid to
them. On their way to the headquarters. Eady was able to escape leaving Cordero to
the two accused leaving Cordero with Torrefiel. As Cordero was about to urinate,
Torrefiel pushed her and carried her to a log and laid her on it. Torrefiel unbutton his
pants and wound cogon leaves around his genitals and proceeded to have intercourse
with Cordero. Ormeo also took advantage of her. The soldiers brought her back to their
house instead of bringing her to their headquarters. Upon Eady’s return,she inform her
about the abuse she suffered from Torrefiel.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ignominy as an aggravating circumstance is present in this case?

RULING:
Yes. When the accused raped Calderon after winding cogon grass around his genital
organ before raping the victim, he thereby augmented the wrong done by increasing the
pain and adding moral disgrace thereto.

People v. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, 6 February 1971

FACTS:
On June 26, 1967, four (4) principal- accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., alias
“Boy”, Eduardo Aquino Alias “Eddie” and Rogelio Cañal; together with Wong Lay
Pueng, Silverio Guanzon and Jessie Guion as accomplices, conspired together,
confederated with and mutually helped one another, then and there, to willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to forcibly abduct Magdalena “Maggie” de la
Riva, 25 years old and single, a movie actress by profession at the time of the incident,
where the four principal accused, by means of force and intimidation using a deadly
weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and brought her to
the Swanky Hotel in PasayCity, and hence committed the crime of Forcible Abduction
with Rape.Wherefore, the court finds that the accomplices Pueng, Guanzon and Guion,
on the ground that theprosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against
them, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case
dismissed against them.

ISSUE:
What kind of rape was committed?

RULING:
In this case, the ruling is that the appellants, Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and
Eduardo P. Aquino, are found guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with
rape, as well as three separate counts of rape. The court has sentenced each of them
to four death penalties. The crimes involve the rape of a woman under various
aggravating circumstances, including the use of force and intimidation, the victim being
deprived of reason or unconscious, and the victim being under twelve years of age. The
court notes that the crime was attended by aggravating circumstances such as
nighttime, abuse of superior strength, ignominy, and the use of a motor vehicle. One of
the appellants, Pineda, is credited with the mitigating circumstance of a voluntary plea
of guilty. The court also dismisses the case against appellant Rogelio Cañal, who died
in prison before the judgment. The appellants are ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the complainant and pay one-fourth of the costs. The court modifies the
judgment by setting aside the confiscation of the car used in the crime and orders its
possession to be delivered to Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation.

People v. Butler, G.R. No. L-50276, 27 January 1983

FACTS:
In this case, the accused-appellant, Michael Butler, was seen with the victim, Enriquita
Alipo (Gina Barrios), at Colonial Restaurant in Olongapo City. Witnesses observed them
leaving together, and the victim's housemaid testified that Gina came home with
Michael, going into her bedroom. The next morning, the housemaid found Gina dead,
naked from the waist down, with a broken figurine nearby, and immediately reported it to
the authorities.

An investigation identified Michael as a crew member of the USS Hancock. He

confessed to engaging in sexual intercourse with the victim and disclosed a physical
altercation over missing money, during which he strangled Gina and struck her head
with a statue of Jesus Christ before leaving the house.

Medical examination revealed that anal intercourse occurred post-mortem, and the
cause of death was asphyxia due to suffocation from extreme pressure on the head,
pressing the nose and mouth against the mattress. The accused was found guilty of
murder with aggravating circumstances of treachery and ignominy.

The accused, invoking minority status at the time of the offense, claimed entitlement to
the suspension of the sentence as per P.D. 603, Art. 192 before its amendment by P.D.
1179.

ISSUE:
1.WON there’s abuse of superior strength to qualify the killing to murder
2.WON there’s treachery.
3.WON there’s ignominy
4.WON there’s privilege mitigating circumstance of minority

RULING:
1. Yes. The SC held that there was an abuse of superior strength attendingthe
commission of the crime. Crime is qualified therefore to murder.It isnot only the
notorious advantage of height that the accused had over hishapless victim, he
being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girlwas only 4 ft 11 inches tall,
but also fits strength which he wielded instriking her with the figurine on the head
and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed
mattress, which pressure musthave been very strong and powerful to suffocate
her to death and withoutrisk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that
she may have takento defend herself or retaliate since she was already struck
and helpless onthe bed, that convinced us to find and rule that the crime
committed ismurder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.2.

2. No, there was no treachery. The evidence on record, however, is notsufficient to

show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended thecommission of the
 crime since there was no eyewitness account of thekilling. The extra-judicial
confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "Ithought she was going to do
something dangerous to me so I grabbed her,and we started wrestling on the
bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that
was sitting on the bedside stand andI hit her in the head. She fell flat on her
face." Although the figurine wasfound broken beside her head, the medical
report, however, do not showany injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of
intracranial hemorrhage3.

3. Yes, there was ignominy or outraging/scoffing at the corpse of thedeceased since

it is established that the accused mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of
the victim by having anal intercourse with her after shewas already dead. The
fact that the muscles of the anus did not close andalso the presence of
spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr.Angeles Roxas, the
medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive inthe Laboratory Report,
Exhibit "B1 ", clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in
having anal intercourse with the womanafter killing her is, undoubtedly, an
outrage at her corpse.
4. Yes, the accused is a minor and is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority which reduces the penalty one degree lower. He should
also have been entitled to suspension of judgment of murder.

People v. Saylan, G.R. No. L-36941, 29 June 1984

FACTS:
Rafael Saylan was accused of raping Eutropia Agno on January 23, 1972, at Sitio
Craser, Malinao, Gingo City, using a dagger to force and intimidate her. The prosecution
argued that the rape was attended by aggravating circumstances, including abuse of
superior strength, nighttime, uninhabited place, ignominy, and reiteration. After a trial,
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental found Saylan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape, imposed the death penalty, and ordered him to indemnify the victim with
P6,000.00. The trial court considered the rape as having occurred in an uninhabited
place due to the secluded location where the crime transpired.

ISSUE:
The appellant raised two issues in his appeal:
 1. The court erred in finding that the sexual intercourse was against the will and
consent of the complainant.
2. The court erred in finding that aggravating circumstances accompanied the
commission of the offense.

RULING:
The Supreme Court, while affirming the trial court's conviction, modified the penalty to
reclusion perpetua instead of death and increased the indemnity to P20,000.00. The
Court rejected the appellant's claim of consensual intercourse, emphasizing the
implausibility of such a claim given the victim's subsequent complaint to her husband
and the authorities. The Court also upheld the trial court's finding of aggravating
circumstances, including abuse of superior strength and the commission of the crime in
an uninhabited place. However, it disagreed with the trial court on the existence of
reiteration, as another offense committed by the accused, namely robbery in band,
occurred after the rape.

Additionally, the Court dismissed the alleged disregard of rank as an aggravating

circumstance, as there was no deliberate intent to offend or insult the victim's rank. The
modified decision concluded that the trial court's judgment was in accordance with the
facts and the law, but it could not be affirmed completely due to the lack of the
necessary number of votes.

People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 132470, 27 April 2000,

FACTS:
On June 2, 1997, at 9:00 PM, Juditha Bautista was accosted by Fernando Sultan on her
way home. He robbed her of a wristwatch, ring, earrings, necklace, and cash at
knifepoint. Subsequently, he sexually assaulted her, using intimidation and an ice pick.
After the incidents, he allowed her to leave and "elope" with him. Juditha reported the
incident to her family, leading to Sultan's arrest.

ISSUE:
1. Sultan disputes the robbery charge, arguing lack of evidence and questioning
why the victim didn't seek restitution later.
 2. Sultan denies the rape charge, claiming lack of proof of force or intimidation,
consent from the victim, and uncertainty about him being armed during the rape.

RULING:
Robbery:
The court upholds the robbery conviction, stating the victim's credible testimony
suffices. The failure to seek restitution doesn't negate the robbery, as Article 293 of the
Revised Penal Code considers any act of taking personal property with violence or
intimidation as robbery.

Rape:
Sultan's arguments against the rape charge are rejected. The court emphasizes the
victim's credibility, emphasizing that force wasn't necessary; intimidation was sufficient.
Sultan used an ice pick, threatened to kill the victim, and instilled fear, justifying her lack
of resistance.

Penalty:
Sultan is sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the special complex crime of robbery with
rape. The court notes that additional rapes committed during the robbery don't
aggravate the penalty, following recent precedent. Civil indemnity is modified to include
an additional P50,000.00 in damages.

Conclusion:
The trial court's decision is affirmed with the modification of civil indemnity. Sultan is
found guilty of robbery with rape and sentenced accordingly.

People v. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, 19 September 2000

FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit:
1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and
3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following information was
provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded
to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met
by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of the said house. They saw that it
was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where
they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant
jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently
arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house. Also
found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant
yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess
firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.

RULING:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully
possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was
committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not
homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance.

Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, 29 June 2007

FACTS:
● Two separate informations were filed against petitioner Angel Celino, Sr. before
the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City.
 ● Charges included violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 6446
(gun ban) and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 8294 (illegal
possession of firearm).
● The charges stemmed from an incident on May 12, 2004, in the City of Roxas,
where the petitioner allegedly carried an armalite rifle colt M16 with two long
magazines loaded with live ammunitions during the election period without the
proper authority.
● Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the gun ban violation charge but filed a Motion to
Quash in the other case, arguing that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearms if charged with violating the Comelec gun ban under the
same set of facts.

ISSUE:
Whether the filing of an information for gun ban violation necessarily bars the
prosecution for illegal possession of a firearm under the same set of facts.

RULING:
The petition is dismissed.

Rationale:

1. The trial court and Court of Appeals denied the Motion to Quash, affirming that
the offense charged under the gun ban is not one of those enumerated under
R.A. 8294.
2. The petitioner failed to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
opting for a petition under Rule 65 beyond the reglementary period, which the
court did not find justified.
3. The interpretation of R.A. 8294's proviso, "If no other crime was committed by the
person arrested," is crucial. The court distinguished cases like Agote and
Ladjaalam, where the accused were exonerated because another crime was
committed, from the present case, where the petitioner was accused only of
violating the Comelec gun ban.
4. The court held that when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated
under R.A. 8294, the information for illegal possession of a firearm should be
quashed. Conversely, if the other offense is not enumerated, the separate case
for illegal possession of a firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
5. The court emphasized that accusation is not synonymous with guilt, and there is
no showing that the petitioner committed the other crime charged.
6. The denial of the motion to quash is generally subject to trial on the merits, and
certiorari lies only in cases of grave abuse of discretion, which was not present in
this case.