Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Assignment Cases
Assignment Cases
TRENT, J.:
The right to repurchase real estate sold under pacto de retro is subject to
execution and be sold at public auction to satisfy a judgment against the
owner of such a right. By virtue of the sheriff's sale of December 29, 1909,
question from Martin. In November or December, 1911, Del Rosario sold all
his interest to the appellants. The was the right to repurchase from Martin
because this was the only interest the Francisco had at that time. Francisco
repurchased the land several months before Del Rosario sold his interest to
the appellants. It is therefore clear that the appellants acquired no interest
whatever in the land unless the repurchase made by Francisco vested the title
in Del Rosario, the then owner of the right to repurchase. We think that
Francisco's right to repurchase was sold at public auction the judgment
against him was completely satisfied, and he was therefore a stranger to the
proceedings. But it is said that under the provisions of article 1158 of the Civil
Code the repurchase by Francisco was a payment for Del Rosario and that
the former may recover from the latter the price paid.
This article reads: "Any person, whether he has an interest or not in the
fulfillment of the obligation, and whether the debtor knows and approves it or
is not aware thereof, can make a payment. The person paying for the account
of another may recover from the debtor what he may have paid, unless he
has done it against his express will. In such case he can only recover from the
debtor in so far as the payment has been useful to him."
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed, with costs against the
appellants.
104 Phil. 36
DECISION
Plaintiffs brought this action in the Court of First Instance of Manila praying
that the defendant be ordered to execute a document releasing them from
their obligation and cancelling the mortgage executed by them to secure its
payment and to return to them the owner's certificates of title covering the
land from which the mortgage was constituted. The defendant in its answer
alleged that what was agreed upon between the parties was that,
notwithstanding the express provisions of the mortgage, said loan shall not be
paid except in genuine Philippine currency after the cessation of hostilities
between the United States and Japan, and that when in the month of
December, 1944 the plaintiffs sent the defendant two drafts, one for
P101,673.50 drawn on the Bank of Taiwan and the other for P101,505 drawn
on the Philippine National Bank for the purpose of paying the loan, the same
were rejected by defendant's president for the reason that: (1) they were not
legal tender, (2) even if they were so, the obligation which was purported to
be paid by the same had not become due, (3) the obligation sought to be paid
was joint and several and could not be split by the joint and several obligors
without the consent of the obligee, and (4) the banks upon whom said drafts
were purportedly drawn had been closed and did not have any funds with
which to meet the same. Defendant set up a cross-complaint praying that
plaintiffs be ordered to pay the loan of P101,000, with interest and damages,
and that, upon their failure to do so, the mortgage be ordered foreclosed in
accordance with law.
After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering defendant to execute in favor
of plaintiffs a deed releasing the latter from their obligation of P101,000, phis
interest, and cancelling the mortgage executed by plaintiffs to guarantee the
payment of the obligation, without pronouncement as to costs. The cross-
complaint of defendant was dismissed. On appeal taken by defendant, the
Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court on the ground that the
amount involved comes under its exclusive jurisdiction.
On August 31, 1943, plaintiffs entered into a contract with defendant whereby
the former acknowledged having received a loan of P101,000 from the latter
payable under the terms stipulated therein and to guarantee the payment of
said loan, plaintiffs constituted a mortgage on four parcels of land belonging to
them which are covered by certificates of title of the land records of the City of
Manila. The terms of payment stipulated in the contract are:
"6. Termino Que nos obligamos mancomunada y solidariamente a pagar y
devolver la expresada suma de ciento y un mil pesos (P101,000) en el
termino de diez (10) años, contados desde la fecha de esta escritura; pero, si
expirado ese termino de DIEZ (10) años, las presentes hostilidades entre
America y el Japon no hubiesen cesado aun, en ese caso el termino para
hacer el pago de dicho prestame sera hasta que la paz entre las citadas dos
naciones queda firmada: queda, sin embargo, especialmente convenido que
podremos pagar total o parcialmente nuestro citado debito de P101,000 en
cualquier tiempo y aun antes de la expiracion del termino de este contrato,
siempre y cuando que ese pago se efectue con sujecion a las condiciones
siguientes:
(a) Si ese pago total o parcial se hiciera antes del caso de las presentes
hostilidades entre America y el Japon, la condicion es que, ese pago total o
parcial se ha de realizar con un recargo o aumento de ciento por ciento
(100%) de su imparte:
(b) Si ese pago total o parcial se hiciera despues de firmada la paz entre las
citadas dos naciones, la condicion es que se tendra que dar aviso por escrito
a HEIRS OF D. TUAZON, INC. con treinta (30) dias de anticipacion."
On December 6, 1944, plaintiff Eduardo Paz E. Hidalgo sent a letter to Jose
M. Tuazon, president of defendant corporation, enclosing a check for the sum
of P101,673.50 drawn on the Bank of Taiwan payable to the Heirs of D.
Tuason, Inc. representing payment of his share in the obligation. The letter
was received by Tuason who on December 26, 1944 replied stating that he
could not accept the check for the reason that that mode of payment was
contrary to their agreement. On December 29, 1944, plaintiff Felipe R.
Hidalgo in turn deposited with the Philippine National Bank in Manila the
amount of P101,505 in cash and on the same date sent a letter to Jose M.
Tuason who was then residing in Baguio City enclosing a check for the same
amount payable to the Heirs of D. Tuason, Inc. drawn on the Philippine
National Bank, Baguio, Mt. Province, which letter was actually delivered on
December 30, 1944 by one Jose Sias to Nicasio A. Tuason, brother of Jose,
for the reason that the latter was not at home, and said Nicasio A. Tuason
actually received the letter and the draft and acknowledged receipt thereof in
a blank receipt already prepared for the purpose. From this date on
apparently no further action was taken, and when liberation came plaintiffs
instituted the present action.
The terms under which the obligation may be paid by the debtors have been
quoted elsewhere in this decision. It appears therein that the debtors may pay
totally or partially their indebtedness at any time before the expiration of the
term of the contract subject however to the following conditions: (1) if payment
is made before the termination of the hostilities between America and Japan,
the indebtedness should be paid with an increase of 100%; and (2) if payment
is made thereafter, thirty days notice in advance should be given to defendant
corporation. These terms are clear and admit of no ambiguity. The parties
seemed to have speculated on the incidence of war and on the fluctuation of
the Japanese currency. Apparently, defendant had imposed the condition of
100% increase in the payment of the indebtedness in the expectation that the
same would be enough to deter plaintiffs from paying the loan before the
termination of the war. That expectation betrayed defendant. It did not
materialize, and so it now tried to advance the theory that their agreement
was to pay the loan in genuine Philippine currency and after the termination of
the hostilities. The lower court was correct in not giving credence to this
pretense of defendant.
With regard to the draft which plaintiff Felipe R. Hidalgo tendered to Jose M.
Tuason on December 29, 1944, it is true that the same was accepted by
Nicasio A. Tuason in behalf of his brother Jose who was the legal
representative of the defendant and there is nothing to show that the draft was
rejected or returned. However, such tender cannot also have the effect of
payment that would extinguish the debtor's liability for under the law payment
made in check or draft has the effect of payment only when actually cashed
(Article 1170, old Civil Code). There is no showing that the draft has been
cashed. Nor is there a showing that it was impaired thru the fault of defendant
(Article 1170, Idem.). Verily it was not considering that at that time the
liberation forces were already hovering around the Island of Luzon. We
therefore conclude that plaintiff are still indebted to defendant for the amount
they had taken from it, or its equivalent, and unless they pay the same they
cannot ask for the cancellation of their mortgage.
Considering however that under the terms of their agreement plaintiffs were
allowed to pay the indebtedness either wholly or partially even before the
termination of hostilities between America and Japan, we are of the opinion
that they can only be made to pay the same subject to conversion under the
Ballantyne scale of values pursuant to a long line of decisions rendered by
this Court. Thus, in one case we held that "The Ballantyne schedule is
applicable to obligations contracted during the Japanese occupation where
said obligations are made payable on demand or during the said occupation
but not after the war or at a specified date or period which may indicate that
the parties were speculating on the continuation or cessation of the war at the
time the obligation was payable." (Wilson vs. Berkenkotter, 98 Phil., 918, 49
Official Gazette. No. 4, 1401 )[1] The conversion should be made taking as
basis the month of December, 1944 when plaintiffs tendered payment of their
obligation.
Issues:
1.) Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action?
2.) If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?
Held:
1.) An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-
and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100 (Art. 56, FC), by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108 (Art. 66, FC), by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation,
stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one
party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
.. When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the
marriage is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of
the spouse takes place during the course of the suit. The action
is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8,
1933, D. H. 1933, 332.")
From Article 106 (Art. 63, FC) it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property),
the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by
the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy
from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions
in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights
and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible.
Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished"
after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to
warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of
the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere
effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of
a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes
during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn. (Lapuz Sy
vs. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972)