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G.R. No. 164337 June 27, 2006

VICENTE S. CENZON vs. HON. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS.

FACTS:

As used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense, but
merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which
exceeds P22,000.00.26 (Underscoring supplied.)

The Court, in Hernando was just as succinct in pronouncing that the term reclusion perpetua as used in
Presidential Decree No. 818, merely describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the
fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos.27 As used in Presidential Decree
No. 818, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense.28

Moreover, the Court, thru an En Banc Resolution, dated 26 February 2002, in Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v.
People,29 pronounced that bail is allowed for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d), as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 818.30 Petitioners therein were charged with the offense of Estafa under Article 315,
par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, for having issued two
postdated checks involving the amounts of P365,750.00 and P429,000.00. We allowed aforesaid petitioners
to post bail in accordance with the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 74, dated 6 November 2001.

In Lim, we said that the intendment and provision of DOJ Circular No. 74 was to benefit the accused. Indeed,
it is a principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally construed in favor of the accused and
strictly against the State.31 In like manner, we must also apply DOJ Circular No. 74 to herein private
respondent Sia.

We find inapplicable the case of Reyes. In Reyes, the question was whether therein accused who was
convicted, inter alia, of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced therefore
to serve twenty-two years of reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties and liability for indemnification,
may be allowed to remain on bail during the pendency of her appeal from said conviction.32 Comparatively,
what is before us is an accused charged with Estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 316 of the Revised Penal
Code. Clearly, Reyes is not on all fours with the case at bar. Instead, it is the later case of Lim which finds
application.

Our Resolution in Lim, dated 26 February 2002, and issued by the Court En Banc settled the issue anent the
allowance of bail in cases involving Estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 316 of the Revised Penal Code. As
earlier stated, in Lim, we allowed the accused therein to post bail, and we upheld DOJ Department Circular
No. 74, citing Hernando. In the more recent case of Poblete v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court underscored
once more with definitive pronouncement the application of DOJ Department Circular No. 74 in cases
involving the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 818. Stare decisis et non quieta movera.

We said in Poblete, thus:

It was definitively resolved when the Court adopted Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 74 ordaining
that bail be allowed for the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d), as amended by P.D. 818, thru an En Banc
Resolution dated February 26, 2002 in the case of Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim v. People of the Philippines,
et al., G.R. No. 149276. The salient portion of the Resolution reads:

"(3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2(a) of the 2000
Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00 plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00."34
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We are similarly not impressed with petitioner Cenzon’s reliance on the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ.
Evidently, Department Circular No. 74 of the DOJ amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, the salient provisions
thereof, reads thus:

WHEREAS, under the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, no bail is recommended for estafa under Art. 315 2(d), RPC, as
amended by PD 818, as well as for Qualified Theft when the amount of fraud or the value of the property
involved is P32,000.00 or over;

WHEREAS, such policy has already been overtaken and rendered untenable by the new jurisprudence,
particularly the ruling in People vs. Hernando, 317 SCRA 621 (1999);

WHEREFORE, in estafa under Art. 315 2(d), as amended by PD 818, and Qualified Theft, the bail to be
recommended shall be governed by the following rules:

A. FOR ESTAFA (ART. 315, 2(d), RPC, as amended by PD 818:

1) Where the amount of fraud involved does not exceed P22,000.00, bail shall be computed based on the
applicable provisions of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide.

2) Where the amount of fraud involved is more than P22,000.00 but less than P32,000.00, bail shall be based
on the maximum period of the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal multiplied by P2,000.00.

3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2(a) of the 2000 Bail
Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of
P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00. (Underscoring
supplied.)

From the foregoing, if the amount of fraud is P122,000.00 or over, as in the case at bar, the amount of bail is
P60,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 26 February 2004 and Resolution dated 30
June 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72570, which affirmed the Orders dated 15 February
2002 and 17 June 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, allowing the amendment of the
informations in Crim. Case No. 01-2709-10, from NO BAIL RECOMMENDED to BAIL SET AT P60,000.00 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Villareal v. PP 02-01-12

Facts: fraternity/hazing

Points to remember: Classical Theory, Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. The
classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to
choose between good and evil. It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful
acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans
are rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and
pain. They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible
gain or advantage in committing the crime. Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral
blame of the actor. The identity of mens rea – defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or
criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.111 Thus, it is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In
order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice.
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DE JOYA, PETITIONER vs THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY 12-10-03

Facts: petitioner jumped bail during trial

Points to remember: However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine
penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of criminal
law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the social and economic
phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by
the indeterminate sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (impossible crime), Article
68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to mention Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and
quasi-heinous crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Among the
important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship
towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards society at
large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social
organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for
economic usefulness and other social ends. The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties
imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live
a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the community. The court has to
consider not only the primary elements of punishment, namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the
relation of the convict to the private complainant, the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or
the excuse for the crime - was it done by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the
extremity of his need? The court must also take into account the secondary elements of punishment, namely,
the reformation of the offender, the prevention of further offenses by the offender, the repression of
offenses in others. As Rousseau said, crimes can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties
which, from the benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on whom they are
imposed. There is also merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much
punishment of innocence.

TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES 02-04-05

Facts: BP 22

Ruling: In Magno v. Court of Appeals,27 it was held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law
was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user.
It was not intended to shelter or favor nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through the
manipulation and circumvention of the noble purpose and objectives of the law. Under the utilitarian theory,
the "protective theory" in criminal law affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protection of
the society against actual and potential wrong doers.

In the case at bar, petitioner could hardly be classified as a menace against whom the society should be
protected. The records show that from December 1988 when petitioner was informed of the dishonor, to the
filing of the information on April 1, 1991, she paid P423,354.00 to LIVECOR.28 Although petitioner has not
yet fully paid the loan, it cannot be denied that the previous payments fully covered the value of the
dishonored check. It would be unjust to penalize her for the issuance of said check which has been satisfied 2
years prior to the filing of the criminal charge against her.
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PP v. Ferrer 12-27-1972

Issue: Whether or not, REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law a bill of
attainder.

Ruling: A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is the
substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making
and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. History in perspective, bills of attainder
were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and
a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder.

In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder because it
"tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and
security of the country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By
means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial
magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial."
Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a
knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a
presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."

Lito Corpuz vs People of the Philippines G.R No. 180016 April 29, 2014

Facts: Application of harsh penalties

Ruling; In its decision about the punishment the Supreme Court stated that there seems to be a perceived
injustice brought by the range of penalties, but the high court said that they modify the penalties for that
would constitute judicial legislation and that such duty does not belong to the court but to the legislature.
Other Justices has their own opinion as to the punishment, some concurs with the ponente, others invoked
the art 5 of the RPC that in cases of excessive penalties the court shall render the proper decision and shall
report to the chief executive the reasons that such said act should be made subject of legislation and without
suspending the sentence. Justice Carpio in his dissenting opinion said that the first paragraph of article 315
should be held unconstitutional as it is against article 19(1) of the Constitution and that according to the
universal declaration of human rights "torture, cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment should be ban",
the Philippines was one of the approving State/community during the UDHR and although is a non binding
instrument, such UDHR forms part of the Philippine law for it is a generally accepted principle of
international law.

G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts: the defendants filed a complaint against the justice of peace to remove him from office. The latter filed
a complaint against them for libel.

Ruling: The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the
same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public
opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands
of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and
to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the
State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any
official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who
contributed so largely to the law of libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials
in whispers or with bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906],
113 App. Div., N. Y., 510.)

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply,
without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances.
The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.

Estrada v. Escritor

Facts: Religious Freedom as a Defense in Concubinage

Ruling: The Court found Escritor not administratively liable.

At the outset, it was clarified that the Decision dated August 4, 2003, constituted the law of the case. Thus,
the only issue left to be resolved was the factual basis of the Complaint, specifically the sincerity and
centrality of the religious belief and practice claimed by respondent. The resolution of this issue would allow
the government to present evidence on the State’s compelling interest to override her religious belief and
practice.

The Court reiterated the fact that, upon its finality, the Decision had to settle the question of what approach
should be taken in construing the religion clauses; that is, the proper test applicable in determining claims of
exemption based on freedom of religion. With respect to the intent and framework underlying those clauses
in our Constitution, applicable was the benevolent neutrality or accommodation test, whether mandatory or
permissive. In deciding respondent’s plea for exemption based on the “Free Exercise Clause,” however, the
compelling-state-interest test was applicable. The Court nevertheless revisited the highlights of the earlier
Decision; in particular the Old World antecedents and the development of the religion clauses in the context
of American jurisprudence.

DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
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Facts: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a
son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.
Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the
petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien.

Ruling: In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil
Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts
of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the
parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over
the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was
acquired upon his arrest.

Minucher vs. CA

Facts: Minucher was aquitted by the RTC for the charges against him. He then filed a civil case against Scalzo
but Scalzo invoked the doctrine of state immunity since he was acting in behalf of the united states in
apprehending persons suspected of transporting illegal drugs to the U.S.

Ruling: YES. According to the Court, a foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the
two sovereigns. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United
States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the “buy-
bust operation” conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to
support the “diplomatic status” of the latter, but they give enough indication that the Philippine government
has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who
would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as
the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case
against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help
contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of state immunity from suit.

Inmates of New Bilibid Prison vs Sec of Justice

Facts: retroactive and prospective application of penal law

Ruling: Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is
favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal.
These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.

In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched. It has been sanctioned since the old Penal Code.

Pulido vs. PP 07-27-21

Facts: What about an accused who had been convicted of bigamy notwithstanding a judicial declaration of
nullity of his marriage? May he invoke the Pulido doctrine?

Ruling: It is submitted that the accused may do so. It is axiomatic that a law should be given retroactive
effect if favorable to the accused. (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Judicial decisions favorable to an accused
should be given retroactive effect since such decisions form part of the law in accordance with Article 8 of
the Civil Code and so as not to infringe upon the constitutional right of the accused to equal protection of the
law. (Gumabon v. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). In such a case, the accused may file a petition for
habeas corpus to obtain his release from prison.

US vs. Ah Chong

Facts: Mistake of Facts:

Ruling: The Court holds that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the
alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In broader terms, ignorance or
mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under
the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an
acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions
touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of Article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act committed by
him, even though it be different from that which he intended to commit.

PP vs. Gervero

Facts: mistake of facts

Ruling: the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a
"mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which
is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime
where it negates the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires
proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at
all to the belief or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the
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mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability
required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect
to an element of the offense.

PP vs. Lalap

Facts: Proximate cause

Ruling: In Quinto v. Andres, the Court discussed that a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom unless there was an efficient intervening active
force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, thus:

Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. "Natural'"
refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a
rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.

There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect
being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is not altered or
changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las
condiciones patologica del lesionado), the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposition del
ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant
or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al
herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.

The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:

(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the
active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or

(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.

If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death
follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove
that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for the death of
the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim.

While the immediate cause of the victim's death as reflected in the Medical Certificate is cardiorespiratory
arrest, the stab wound that accused-appellant inflicted on the vital part of the victim's body is the proximate
cause of the victim's death. The stab wound is the cause which in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the victim's death, and without which the result would
not have occurred. Logically, there is a rational connection between the act of accused-appellant stabbing
the victim and the resulting death. Without the stab wound, the victim could not have been hospitalized and
late died therefrom.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that an efficient intervening active force, not connected with or absolutely
foreign to the stab wound, intervened during the nine-day period which could have caused the victim's
death. Thus, even if there was another factor but such is not an efficient intervening cause, accused-
appellant is still criminally liable for the death of the victim because his act of stabbing the victim accelerated
or contributed to the victim's death. The Medical Certificate does not indicate the occurrence of any efficient
intervening cause which broke the relation of the felony committed by accused-appellant and the resulting
death.

Furthermore, even for argument's sake that the victim was previously suffering a disease or ailment,
accused-appellant is still liable because his act of stabbing the victim hastened or accelerated the victim's
death.

Jacinto v. PP

Facts: impossible crime

Ruling: From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of
theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of petitioner receiving the
₱5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no longer necessary for the
consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince Baby Aquino to give cash as
replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been dishonored by the drawee bank. Since
the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of receiving the cash replacement should not
be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact that petitioner was caught receiving the
marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen proof of her intent to gain.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its
issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included or
covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused;
otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme could
have been another possible source of criminal liability.

Intod v. CA

Facts: impossible crime

Ruling: Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)

Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or the
aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already performed the
acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact that
the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because the means employed by
such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him, the court, having in mind the
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social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the penalty of
arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.

Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the
inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code was
further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or property
because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2) the means
employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an
impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.

PP V. Orande

Facts: Consummated stage

Ruling: Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he
actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act
necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a long line, of cases (People v. Oscar, 48
Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v. Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666;
People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for
the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the
male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559; People v. Rabadan, Et Al., 53 Phil. 694; United
States v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and
manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the
frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

Navaja V. De Castro

Facts: Continuing crime

Ruling: The petition is meritorious.

Section 1 of PD 1829 defines and penalizes the acts constituting the crime of obstruction of justice, the
pertinent portions of which read:

Sec. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates
 11

or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
committing any of the following acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any
offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force
or threats;

making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with
intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

The elements of the crime are: (a) that the accused committed any of the acts listed under Section 1 of PD
1829; and (b) that such commission was done for the purpose of obstructing, impeding, frustrating, or
delaying the successful investigation and prosecution of criminal cases.30

In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated
September 22, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 before the MCTC-Jagna for
allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing;31
and (b) an Information dated August 27, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law
before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit.32 While the Informations pertain to
acts that were done days apart and in different locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be
charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate,
were motivated by a single criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation
proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol.33 The
foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime
committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution.34 In Santiago v.
Garchitorena,35 the Court explained the principle of delito continuado as follows:

According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during
a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that
two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (II Derecho Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised
Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed)

Accordingly to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is
only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102;
Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).

Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution

The concept of delito continuado although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes
penalized under special laws, e.g. violation of [Republic Act] No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees for
services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits x x x.

Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the
latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.36 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In ruling that the acts imputed to petitioner are deemed separate crimes and thus, may be tried separately,
the CA cited the case of Regis v. People (Regis),37 wherein it was held that the malversation committed
through falsification of document performed on different dates constitute independent offenses which must
be punished separately.38 However, a closer perusal of Regis shows that its factual milieu is not on all fours
with the instant case. In Regis, the accused, then municipal treasurer of Pinamungahan, Cebu, signed payrolls
on two (2) different dates, i.e., April 30, 1931 and May 2, 1931, making it appear that certain workers worked
 12

as laborers in a municipal project when in truth, there were no such workers and that he and his co-accused
misappropriated the payroll amounts to themselves. The Court ruled that the accused may be held liable for
two (2) separate crimes, considering that when the accused committed the first act constituting malversation
committed through falsification of document, it did not appear that he was already predisposed to
committing the second act constituting the same crime.39 Clearly, when the accused in Regis falsified the
payroll of April 30, 1931, and later, the payroll of May 2, 1931, he -though committing similar acts - could not
be said to have been motivated by a single criminal impulse as he was working towards discernibly distinct
criminal objectives.

In contrast, petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a
preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a
single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the
preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito
continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed
either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case
No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same
case.40 However, since he was already charged - and in fact, convicted in a Judgment41 dated July 3, 2007 -
in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired in Jagna,
Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design. The Court's
pronouncement in Gamboa v. CA42 is instructive on this matter, to wit:

Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito continuado'" or
"continuous crime." This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution
or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of
right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual character, merely constitutes a
partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence or delictual acts is called a "delito
continuado." In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of acts performed separately during a
period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim."43

Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly
exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.

PP v. Jugueta

Facts: Composite Crimes

Ruling: In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the
RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:

In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog, this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more properly, a
composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Justice
Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros, explained that composite crimes are
"neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised
Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies
[compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit another [complex
crime proper]. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal
 13

possession of firearms, only a single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although
composed of two or more offenses."

In People v. De Leon, we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as follows:

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape,
intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be
robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony
committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used
in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its generic
sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion of the rape.
Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident
premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution, the same would
not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape with homicide. As in the
case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is to be considered as a generic
aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v. Macabales:

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes against
property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery as a generic
aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by appellants in defending
himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was stabbed with a knife by appellant
Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when
alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be
regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised Penal Code. Here,
treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual commission of the complex crime.
Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as generic aggravating circumstance, it helps
determine the penalty to be imposed.

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed
due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and
moral damages will be ₱100,000.00 each, and another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the
heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special
complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00
moral damages and ₱100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
 14

For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of the crime,
the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier. This is true, however,
only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere bystanders and not when those who
died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the crime of robbery with homicide may still be
committed even if one of the robbers dies. This is also applicable in robbery with rape where there is more
than one victim of rape.

PP v, Anticamara

Facts: In capsule, the main issue is whether the appellants are guilty of the crimes charged.

In Criminal Case No. 4498-R for Murder:

Circumstantial Evidence

The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early
morning of May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution
adduced sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the
perpetrators of the crime.

Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience .9 Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.10 A judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained
when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.11

In this case, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and taken together,
lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellants are responsible for the death of Sulpacio. The Court
quotes with approval the lower court's enumeration of those circumstantial evidence:

The testimony of AAA had clearly established the following facts:

1. At about 3:00 in the early morning of May 7, 2002, while she and the victim Abad Sulpacio were sleeping
inside the house of the Estrella family in Barangay Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan several persons entered to
rob the place;

2. Inside the house, she saw and recognized the accused Lando Calaguas and Dick Tañedo, and heard the
latter uttering "somebody will die";

3. Bringing her outside the house, Lando pushed her into the Revo where she saw inside Abad Sulpacio who
was blindfolded and with his hands tied;

4. Inside the Revo, she recognized the accused Dick Tañedo, Lando Calaguas, Marvin Lim, Roberto Tañedo,
Alberto Anticamara and Fred;

5. The Revo then proceeded towards the fishpond owned by the Estrellas in Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San
Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan;

6. The last time that she saw Abad Sulpacio was when he was dragged out from the vehicle by Lando, Fred,
Marvin and Al upon reaching Sitio Rosalia. At that, time Dick Tañedo stayed with her in the vehicle;
 15

7. Thereafter, when Fred returned to the vehicle, she heard him uttered (sic): "Make a decision now. Abad
has already four (4) bullets in his body, and the one left is for this girl."12

In addition to these circumstances, the trial court further found that AAA heard Fred utter "Usapan natin
pare, kung sino ang masagasaan, sagasaan." (Our agreement is that whoever comes our way should be
eliminated). Moreover, NBI Agent Gerald V. Geralde testified that on June 23, 2002, appellant Al admitted his
participation as lookout and naming his companions Dick, Lando, Fred, Marvin and Bet as the ones who took
AAA and Sulpacio from the house of the Estrellas and brought them to the fishpond. Al also pointed and led
the authorities to a shallow grave in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, where the
remains of Sulpacio were buried. The autopsy conducted on the body, prepared by the Medico Legal Officer
Dr. Bandonil, shows that several holes were found on various parts of the body of the victim and Dr. Bandonil
concluded that the cause of the victim's death was the gunshot wounds. The report also indicates that a
piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull, and another cloth
was also found tied at the remnants of the left wrist.

In the case at bar, although no one directly saw the actual killing of Sulpacio, the prosecution was able to
paint a clear picture that the appellants took Sulpacio away from the house of the Estrellas, tied and
blindfolded him, and brought him to another place where he was repeatedly shot and buried.

Conspiracy

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal
a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of
circumstances.13 To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the
execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may
appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common
criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.14

In the present case, prior to the commission of the crime, the group met at the landing field in Carmen,
Pangasinan and discussed their plan to rob the house of the Estrellas with the agreement that whoever
comes their way will be eliminated.15 Appellant Al served as a lookout by posting himself across the house of
the Estrellas with the task of reporting any movements outside. Fred then climbed the old unserviceable gate
of the Estrella compound and then opened the small door and the rest of the group entered the house of the
Estrellas through that opening.16 After almost an hour inside the house, they left on board a vehicle with
AAA and Sulpacio. AAA and Sulpacio were brought to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan.
In that place, Sulpacio was killed and AAA was brought to another place and deprived of her liberty. These
circumstances establish a community of criminal design between the malefactors in committing the crime.
Clearly, the group conspired to rob the house of the Estrellas and kill any person who comes their way. The
killing of Sulpacio was part of their conspiracy. Further, Dick's act of arming himself with a gun constitutes
direct evidence of a deliberate plan to kill should the need arise.

Appellant Al attempts to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was only forced to participate in the
commission of the crime because he and his family were threatened to be killed. Al's defense fails to impress
us. Under Article 1217 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under
the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater
injury, because such person does not act with freedom.18 To avail of this exempting circumstance, the
 16

evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and
imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed.19 For such
defense to prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of
such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.20

There is nothing in the records to substantiate appellant Al's insistence that he was under duress from his co-
accused while participating in the crime that would suffice to exempt him from incurring criminal liability.
The evidence shows that Al was tasked to act as a lookout and directed to station himself across the house of
the Estrellas. Al was there from 7:30 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.21 of the following day, while the rest of the group was
waiting in the landing field. Thus, while all alone, Al had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer
subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. However, he opted to stay across the house of the Estrellas
for almost six (6) hours,22 and thereafter returned to the landing field where the group was waiting for his
report. Subsequently, the group proceeded to the Estrellas’ house. When the group entered the house, Al
stayed for almost one (1) hour outside to wait for his companions. Later, when the group left the house
aboard a vehicle, Al rode with them in going to Sitio Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan,
bringing with them Sulpacio and AAA.23 Clearly, appellant Al had ample opportunity to escape if he wished
to, but he never did. Neither did he request for assistance from the authorities or any person passing by the
house of the Estrellas during the period he was stationed there. Clearly, Al did not make any effort to
perform an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent
the commission thereof that would exempt himself from criminal liability.24 Therefore, it is obvious that he
willingly agreed to be a part of the conspiracy.

Alibi and Denial

Appellant Lando denied having committed the crime charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims
that at the time of the incident he was in his house at Tarlac, together with his family. On the other hand, the
appellants were positively identified by AAA, as two (2) of the six (6) malefactors who forcibly took her and
Sulpacio from the Estrella house in the early morning of May 7, 2002. Both the trial court and the CA found
the testimony of AAA credible. The Court gives great weight to the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of
a witness because it had the opportunity to observe the facial expression, gesture, and tone of voice of a
witness while testifying; thus, making it in a better position to determine whether a witness is lying or telling
the truth.251avvphi1

Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the
appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight
in law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are
inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted.26 Denial cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to
testify against the appellants.27

As to the defense of alibi. Aside from the testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of
the incident, the defense was unable to show that it was physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene of
the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime.Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the
crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two
places.28 Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, the defense of
alibi must fail.29 During the trial of the case, Lando testified that the distance between his house in Brgy.
 17

Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac to the town of Rosales, Pangasinan is only around forty (40) kilometers. Such
distance can be traversed in less than 30 minutes using a private car and when the travel is continuous.30
Thus, it was not physically impossible for the appellant Lando to be at the locus criminis at the time of the
incident. In addition, positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it impotent, especially
where such identification is credible and categorical.31

Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances

In convicting the appellants, the courts a quo appreciated treachery in qualifying the killing to murder and
evident premeditation in imposing the penalty of death. There is treachery when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense that the
offended party might make.32 Two conditions must concur for treachery to exist, namely, (a) the
employment of means of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (b) the means or method of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted.33

In the case at bar, it was proven that when AAA boarded the vehicle, she saw Sulpacio tied and blindfolded.
Later, when they reached the fishpond, Sulpacio, still tied and blindfolded, was led out of the vehicle by the
group. When the remains of Sulpacio was thereafter found by the authorities, the autopsy report indicated
that a piece of cloth was found wrapped around the eye sockets and tied at the back of the skull and another
cloth was also found tied at the left wrist of the victim. There is no question therefore, that the victim's body,
when found, still had his hands tied and blindfolded. This situation of the victim when found shows without
doubt that he was killed while tied and blindfolded; hence, the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
treachery was present in the commission of the crime. In People v. Osianas,34 the Court held that:

x x x In the case at bar, the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the killing of the
victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves, was the act of tying the hands of
the victims. Teresita saw the accused-appellants hog-tie the victims and take them away with them. Later
that night, Dionisio Palmero saw the victims, still hog-tied, walking with the accused-appellants. The
following day, the victims were found dead, still hog-tied. Thus, no matter how the stab and hack wounds
had been inflicted on the victims in the case at bar, we are sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Jose, Ronilo
and Reymundo Cuizon had no opportunity to defend themselves because the accused-appellants had earlier
tied their hands. The fact that there were twelve persons who took and killed the Cuizons further assured the
attainment of accused-appellants' plans without risk to themselves.35

The aggravating circumstance of superior strength cannot be separately appreciated because it is absorbed
by treachery.36

The circumstance of evident premeditation requires proof showing: (1) the time when the accused
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.37 The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act
was preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a
space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.38 From the time the group met at the landing field at
around 6:30 p.m. of May 6, 2002, and discussed the possibility of killing anyone who stands on their way, up
to the time they took Sulpacio away from the Estrellas’ house and eventually killed him thereafter at around
past 3:00 a.m., more than eight hours had elapsed – sufficient for the appellants to reflect on the
consequences of their actions and desist from carrying out their evil scheme, if they wished to. Instead,
appellants evidently clung to their determination and went ahead with their nefarious plan.

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
 18

The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape, defined in and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code39 are: (1) the offender
is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of
the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.40

The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants Lando and Al,
both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the Estrellas and held her
captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby
she was deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention
consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any
manner of his liberty.41 For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going
home.42 Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the
intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.43 Although AAA was not confined in an enclosure, she was
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because every time appellant Lando and his wife went out of the
house, they brought AAA with them. The foregoing only shows that AAA was constantly guarded by appellant
Lando and his family.

The crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant
Lando brought her to a hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told
her to follow his orders, otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando
raped her.44 Clearly, for fear of being delivered to Fred and Bert and of losing her life, AAA had no choice but
to give in to appellant Lando's lustful assault. In rape cases, the credibility of the victim's testimony is almost
always the single most important factor. When the victim's testimony is credible, it may be the sole basis for
the accused's conviction.45 This is so because owing to the nature of the offense, in many cases, the only
evidence that can be given regarding the matter is the testimony of the offended party.46

The last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. In People v. Larrañaga,47 this provision gives rise to a special complex crime. Thus,
We hold that appellant Lando is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape in Criminal Case No. 4481-R.

However, the Court does not agree with the CA and trial court's judgment finding appellant Al liable for Rape
in Criminal Case No. 4481-R. In People v. Suyu,48 We ruled that once conspiracy is established between
several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape
committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he
endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape.49 Also, in People v. Canturia,50 the Court held that:

x x x For while the evidence does convincingly show a conspiracy among the accused, it also as convincingly
suggests that the agreement was to commit robbery only; and there is no evidence that the other members
of the band of robbers were aware of Canturia's lustful intent and his consummation thereof so that they
could have attempted to prevent the same. x x x

The foregoing principle is applicable in the present case because the crime of robbery with rape is a special
complex crime defined in and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and the
 19

crime of kidnapping with rape in this case is likewise a special complex crime as held in the case of People v.
Larrañaga.51 There is no evidence to prove that appellant Al was aware of the subsequent events that
transpired after the killing of Sulpacio and the kidnapping of AAA. Appellant Al could not have prevented
appellant Lando from raping AAA, because at the time of rape, he was no longer associated with appellant
Lando. AAA even testified that only Fred and appellant Lando brought her to Tarlac,52 and she never saw
appellant Al again after May 7, 2002, the day she was held captive. She only saw appellant Al once more
during the trial of the case.53 Thus, appellant Al cannot be held liable for the subsequent rape of AAA.

The Penalties

In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder. The
penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged and proven, the imposable penalty upon the
appellants is death, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.54 In view, however, of
the passage of R.A. No. 9346,55 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death is
reduced to reclusion perpetua,56 without eligibility for parole.57

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, the penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape is death. In view of R.A. No. 9346, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion
perpetua,58 without eligibility for parole.59 Accordingly, the imposable penalty for appellant Lando is
reclusion perpetua.

As to appellant Al, the prescribed penalty for serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in the
commission of the offense, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 6360
of the Revised Penal Code.

The Damages

In Criminal Case No. 4498-R, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.61 In People v. Quiachon,62 even if the
penalty of death is not to be imposed because of the prohibition in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is proper, because it is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the
fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission
of the offense. As explained in People v. Salome,63 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death, and the
offense is still heinous. Accordingly, the award of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is proper.

Anent moral damages, the same are mandatory in cases of murder, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim.64 However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes
where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the
award of moral damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00.65

The award of exemplary damages is in order, because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime.66 The Court awards the amount of
₱30,000.00, as exemplary damages, in line with current jurisprudence on the matter.67

Actual damages is also warranted. Modesta Abad, the spouse of victim Sulpacio, incurred expenses in the
amount of ₱57,122.30, which was duly supported by receipts.68lawphil

In Criminal Case No. 4481-R, AAA is entitled to civil indemnity in line with prevailing jurisprudence that civil
indemnification is mandatory upon the finding of rape.69 Applying prevailing jurisprudence, AAA is entitled
to ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity.70
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In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code,71 without the
necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the fact of rape.72 Moral damages is granted in
recognition of the victim's injury necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.73 Such award is
separate and distinct from the civil indemnity.74 However, the amount of ₱100,000.00 awarded as moral
damages is reduced to ₱75,000.00, in line with current jurisprudence.75

The award of exemplary damages to AAA in the amount of ₱50,000 is hereby reduced to ₱30,000.00 in
accordance with recent jurisprudence.76

As to appellant Al. In the absence of conspiracy, the liability of the accused is individual and not collective.77
Since appellant Al is liable only for the crime of serious illegal detention, he is jointly and severally liable only
to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. For serious illegal detention, the award of civil indemnity
is in the amount of ₱50,000.00, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.78

Along that line, appellant Al's liability for moral damages is limited only to the amount of ₱50,000.00.79
Pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. This
is predicated on AAA's having suffered serious anxiety and fright when she was detained for almost one (1)
month.80

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and
defendant-appellant.

The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and malversation
were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave
felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit malversation.

In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the falsification
was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate
offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000;
People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).

In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal treasurer
made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked as laborers
in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls,
P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such
work was done in the said street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any
labor.

It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime
because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each falsification and
each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished separately.

The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct penalties
were imposed.

In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and bridge
could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a
device to prevent detection of the malversation.
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The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal
impulse.

Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate
or distinct offenses

Wheel and Chain Conspiracy PP V. Sandiganbayan

There are two structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle conspiracy and chain conpiracy.
Under the wheel or circle conspiracy, there is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with
two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"). Under the chain conspiracy, usually involving the
distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in
much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer (Fernan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 145927, August 24,
2007). An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy
alleged in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former
President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed
the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition
of ill-gotten wealth (GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, Bersamin).

PP V. Salga

The Prosecution did not credibly establish the conspiracy between John and Ruel

In ruling on whether or not there was conspiracy between Ruel and John, the CA observed:

In the instant case, conspiracy was clearly manifested in the concerted efforts of the malefactors. Appellants
and their unidentified cohort simultaneously barged inside the gate of the Zulitas. And, while Salga and his
unidentified cohort accosted Joan Camille and demanded for her to open the vault inside her room and turn
over the money inside the vault, Namalata was outside standing watch. After taking the valuables inside the
house, appellants and their unidentified cohort ran towards a waiting motorcycle and escaped together.

To the CA, Ruel was the fourth member who had stood outside the home of the victims to serve as the
lookout while John and the two unidentified individuals committed the robbery inside the Zulitas' abode.

The conviction of John and Ruel by the RTC was based on the testimonies of the Joan and Constancio. Joan
positively identified John as one of the three persons who had entered the yard and then pointed a gun at
her. Ruel was seen by Constancio after the robbery driving the green motorcycle with John and an
unidentified person on board. Affirming theRTC, the CA declared that a conspiracy to commit the robbery
against the Zulitas had existed among Ruel, John and the two unidentified persons.

The declaration of the existence of the conspiracy among Ruel, John and the two unidentified persons lacked
firm factual foundation.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Where the several accused were shown to have acted in concert at the time of the
commission of the offense, and their acts indicated that they had the same purpose or common design and
 22

were united in the execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. The State must show at the very least that
all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common
purpose or design to commit the felony. To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, therefore,
the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself, or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal
plan.

Conformably to the foregoing, we consider the findings of the lower courts on the existence of the
conspiracy to be factually and legally unwarranted. Joan, although present at the scene of the crime, never
identified Ruel as part of the group of robbers. In fact, no witness placed him at the crime scene during the
entire period of the robbery. If we have always required conspiracy to be established, not by conjecture, but
by positive and conclusive evidence, then it was plainly speculative for the CA to count Ruel as the fourth
member of the group of robbers and even to name him as the robbers' lookout outside the house despite
the absence of evidence to that effect. On the contrary, the records bear out that only Constancio saw Ruel,
but such sighting of Ruel was after the robbery when he was already driving the green motorcycle with John
and another person on board. This was not the overt act necessary to make Ruel a part of the conspiracy.

The character of the overt act as the essential predicate for criminal liability has been explained in People v.
Lizada:

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etre for
the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting
merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his
declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which
may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment
of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act
should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first
or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations
are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however,
that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts
must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

We need to stress, too, that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one;20 and
that conspiracy transcends mere companionship. Hence, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the
crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

In view of the foregoing, Ruel's mere act of driving of the motorcycle with John and the unidentified person
on board did not amount to an overt act indicating his having conspired in committing the robbery with
homicide. Consequently, he was not John's co-conspirator. He must be acquitted, for the evidence of the
Prosecution to establish his guilt for the robbery with homicide was truly insufficient.