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MR. JAMES G. BLAINE, OF MAINE.
Among those who have in the public press been charged with
improper participation in Credit Mobilier stock is the present
Speaker, Mr. Blaine, who moved the resolution for this investigation.
The committee have, therefore, taken evidence in regard to him.
They find from it that Mr. Ames had conversation with Mr. Blaine in
regard to taking ten shares of the stock, and recommended it as a
good investment. Upon consideration Mr. Blaine concluded not to
take the stock, and never did take it, and never paid or received
anything on account of it; and Mr. Blaine never had any interest,
direct or indirect, in Credit Mobilier stock or stock of the Union
Pacific Railroad Company.
The committee find from the evidence that in the early part of the
second session of the Fortieth Congress, and probably in December,
1867, Mr. Ames agreed with Mr. Kelley to sell him ten shares of
Credit Mobilier stock at par and interest from July 1, 1867. Mr.
Kelley was not then prepared to pay for the stock, and Mr. Ames
agreed to carry the stock for him until he could pay for it. On the
third day of January, 1868, there was a dividend of 80 per cent. on
Credit Mobilier stock in Union Pacific bonds. Mr. Ames received the
bonds, as the stock stood in his name, and sold them for 97 per cent.
of their face. In June, 1868, there was a cash dividend of 60 per cent.,
which Mr. Ames also received. The proceeds of the bonds sold, and
the cash dividends received by Mr. Ames, amounted to $1,376. The
par value of the stock and interest thereon from the previous July
amounted to $1,047; so that, after paying for the stock, there was a
balance of dividends due Mr. Kelley of $329. On the 23d day of June,
1868, Mr. Ames gave Mr. Kelley a check for that sum on the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Kelley
received the money thereon.
The committee find that Mr. Kelley then understood that the
money he thus received was a balance of dividends due him after
paying for the stock.
All the subsequent dividends upon the stock were either in Union
Pacific stock or bonds, and they were all received by Mr. Ames. In
September, 1868, Mr. Kelley received from Mr. Ames $750 in
money, which was understood between them to be an advance to be
paid out of dividends. There has never been any adjustment of the
matter between them, and there is now an entire variance in the
testimony of the two men as to what the transaction between them
was, but the committee are unanimous in finding the facts above
stated. The evidence reported to the House gives some subsequent
conversations and negotiations between Mr. Kelley and Mr. Ames on
this subject. The committee do not deem it material to refer to it in
their report.
The case of Mr. Brooks stands upon a different state of facts from
any of those already given. The committee find from the evidence as
follows: Mr. Brooks had been a warm advocate of a Pacific Railroad,
both in Congress and in the public press. After persons interested in
the Union Pacific road had obtained control of the Credit Mobilier
charter and organized under it for the purpose of making it a
construction company to build the road, Dr. Durant, who was then
the leading man in the enterprise, made great efforts to get the stock
of the Credit Mobilier taken. Mr. Brooks was a friend of Dr. Durant,
and he made some efforts to aid Dr. Durant in getting subscriptions
for the stock, introduced the matter to some capitalists of New York,
but his efforts were not crowned with success.
During this period Mr. Brooks had talked with Dr. Durant about
taking some of the stock for himself, and had spoken of taking fifteen
or twenty thousand dollars of it, but no definite contract was made
between them, and Mr. Brooks was under no legal obligation to take
the stock, or Durant to give it to him. In October, 1867, Mr. Brooks
was appointed by the President one of the Government directors of
the Union Pacific road. In December, 1867, after the stock of the
Credit Mobilier was understood, by those familiar with the affairs
between the Union Pacific and the Credit Mobilier, to be worth very
much more than par, Mr. Brooks applied to Dr. Durant, and claimed
that he should have two hundred shares of Credit Mobilier stock. It
does not appear that Mr. Brooks claimed he had any legal contract
for stock that he could enforce, or that Durant considered himself in
any way legally bound to let him have any, but still, on account of
what had been said, and the efforts of Mr. Brooks to aid him, he
considered himself under obligations to satisfy Mr. Brooks in the
matter.
The stock had been so far taken up, and was then in such demand,
that Durant could not well comply with Brooks’s demand for two
hundred shares. After considerable negotiation, it was finally
adjusted between them by Durant’s agreeing to let Brooks have one
hundred shares of Credit Mobilier stock, and giving him with it
$5,000 of Union Pacific bonds, and $20,000 of Union Pacific stock.
Dr. Durant testifies that he then considered Credit Mobilier stock
worth double the par value, and that the bonds and stock he was to
give Mr. Brooks worth about $9,000, so that he saved about $1,000
by not giving Brooks the additional hundred shares he claimed. After
the negotiation had been concluded between Mr. Brooks and Dr.
Durant, Mr. Brooks said that as he was a Government director of the
Union Pacific road, and as the law provided such directors should
not be stockholders in that company, he would not hold this stock,
and directed Dr. Durant to transfer it to Charles H. Neilson, his son-
in-law. The whole negotiation with Durant was conducted by Mr.
Brooks himself, and Neilson had nothing to do with the transaction,
except to receive the transfer. The $10,000 to pay for the one
hundred shares was paid by Mr. Brooks, and he received the $5,000
of Pacific bonds which came with the stock.
The certificate of transfer of the hundred shares from Durant to
Neilson is dated December 26, 1867. On the 3d of January, 1868,
there was a dividend of 80 per cent. in Union Pacific bonds paid on
the Credit Mobilier stock. The bonds were received by Neilson, but
passed over at once to Mr. Brooks. It is claimed, both by Mr. Brooks
and Neilson, that the $10,000 paid by Mr. Brooks for the stock was a
loan of that sum by him to Neilson, and, that the bonds he received
from Durant, and those received for the dividend, were delivered and
held by him as collateral security for the loan.
No note or obligation was given for the money by Neilson, nor, so
far as we can learn from either Brooks or Neilson, was any account or
memorandum of the transaction kept by either of them. At the time
of the arrangement or settlement above spoken of between Brooks
and Durant, there was nothing said about Mr. Brooks being entitled
to have 50 per cent. more stock by virtue of his ownership of the
hundred shares. Neither Brooks nor Durant thought of any such
thing.
Some time after the transfer of the shares to Neilson, Mr. Brooks
called on Sidney Dillon, then the president of the Credit Mobilier,
and claimed he or Neilson was entitled to fifty additional shares of
the stock, by virtue of the purchase of the one hundred shares of
Durant.
This was claimed by Mr. Brooks as his right by virtue of the 50 per
cent. increase of the stock hereinbefore described. Mr. Dillon said he
did not know how that was, but he would consult the leading
stockholders, and be governed by them. Mr. Dillon, in order to justify
himself in the transaction, got up a paper authorizing the issue of
fifty shares of the stock to Mr. Brooks, and procured it to be signed
by most of the principal shareholders. After this had been done, an
entry of fifty shares was made on the stock-ledger to some person
other than Neilson. The name in two places on the book has been
erased, and the name of Neilson inserted. The committee are
satisfied that the stock was first entered on the books in Mr. Brooks’s
name.
Mr. Neilson soon after called for the certificate for the fifty shares,
and on the 29th of February, 1868, the certificate was issued to him,
and the entry on the stock-book was changed to Neilson.
Neilson procured Mr. Dillon to advance the money to pay for the
stock, and at the same time delivered to Dillon $4,000 Union Pacific
bonds, and fifty shares of Union Pacific stock as collateral security.
These bonds and stock were a portion of dividends received at the
time, as he was allowed to receive the same per centage of dividends
on these fifty shares that had previously been paid on the hundred.
This matter has never been adjusted between Neilson and Dillon.
Brooks and Neilson both testify they never paid Dillon. Dillon thinks
he has received his pay, as he has not now the collaterals in his
possession. If he has been paid it is probable that it was from the
collaterals in some form. The subject has never been named between
Dillon and Neilson since Dillon advanced the money, and no one
connected with the transaction seems able to give any further light
upon it. The whole business by which these fifty shares were
procured was done by Mr. Brooks. Neilson knew nothing of any right
to have them, and only went for the certificate when told to do so by
Mr. Brooks.
The committee find that no such right to fifty shares additional
stock passed by the transfer of the hundred. And from Mr. Brooks’s
familiarity with the affairs of the company, the committee believe he
must have known his claim to them was unfounded. The question
naturally arises, How was he able to procure them? The stock at this
time by the stockholders was considered worth three or four times its
par value. Neilson sustained no relations to any of these people that
commanded any favor, and if he could have used any influence he
did not attempt it; if he had this right he was unaware of it till told by
Mr. Brooks, and left the whole matter in his hands. It is clear that the
shares were procured by the sole efforts of Mr. Brooks, and, as the
stockholders who consented to it supposed, for the benefit of Mr.
Brooks. What power had Mr. Brooks to enforce an unfounded claim,
to have for $5,000, stock worth $15,000 or $20,000? Mr. McComb
swears that he heard conversation between Mr. Brooks and Mr. John
B. Alley, a large stockholder, and one of the executive committee, in
which Mr. Brooks urged that he should have the additional fifty
shares, because he was or would procure himself to be made a
Government director, and also that, being a member of Congress, he
“would take care of the democratic side of the House.”
Mr. Brooks and Mr. Alley both deny having had any such
conversation, or that Mr. Brooks ever made such a statement to Mr.
Alley. If, therefore, this matter rested wholly upon the testimony of
Mr. McComb, the committee would not feel justified in finding that
Mr. Brooks procured the stock by such use of his official position; but
all the circumstances seem to point exactly in that direction, and we
can find no other satisfactory solution of the question above
propounded. Whatever claim Mr. Brooks had to stock, either legal or
moral, had been adjusted and satisfied by Dr. Durant. Whether he
was getting this stock for himself or to give to his son-in-law, we
believe, from the circumstances attending the whole transaction, that
he obtained it knowing that it was yielded to its official position and
influence, and with the intent to secure his favor and influence in
such positions. Mr. Brooks claims that he has had no interest in this
stock whatever; that the benefit and advantage of his right to have it
he gave to Mr. Neilson, his son-in-law, and that he has had all the
dividends upon it. The committee are unable to find this to be the
case, for in their judgment all the facts and circumstances show Mr.
Brooks to be the real and substantial owner, and that Neilson’s
ownership is merely nominal and colorable.
In June, 1868, there was a cash dividend of $9,000 upon this one
hundred and fifty shares of stock. Neilson received it, of course, as
the stock was in his name; but on the same day it was paid over to
Mr. Brooks, as Neilson says, to pay so much of the $10,000 advanced
by Mr. Brooks to pay for the stock. This, then, repaid all but $1,000
of the loan; but Mr. Brooks continued to hold $16,000 of Union
Pacific bonds, which Neilson says he gave him as collateral security,
and to draw the interest upon all but $5,000. The interest upon the
others, Neilson says, he was permitted to draw and retain, but at one
time in his testimony he spoke of the amount he was allowed as
being Christmas and New Year’s presents. Neilson says that during
the last summer he borrowed $14,000 of Mr. Brooks, and he now
owes Mr. Brooks nearly as much as the collaterals; but, according to
his testimony, Mr. Brooks for four years held $16,000 in bonds as
security for $1,000, and received the interest on $11,000 of the
collaterals. No accounts appear to have been kept between Mr.
Brooks and Neilson, and doubtless what sums he has received from
Mr. Brooks, out of the dividends, were intended as presents rather
than as deliveries of money belonging to him.
Mr. Brooks’s efforts procured the stock; his money paid for it; all
the cash dividends he has received; and he holds all the bonds,
except those Dillon received, which seem to have been applied
toward paying for the fifty shares. Without further comment on the
evidence, the committee find that the one hundred and fifty shares of
stock appearing on the books of the Credit Mobilier in the name of
Neilson were really the stock of Mr. Brooks, and subject to his
control, and that it was so understood by both the parties. Mr.
Brooks had taken such an interest in the Credit Mobilier Company,
and was so connected with Dr. Durant, that he must be regarded as
having full knowledge of the relations between that company and the
railroad company, and of the contracts between them. He must have
known the cause of the sudden increase in value of the Credit
Mobilier stock, and how the large expected profits were to be made.
We have already expressed our views of the propriety of a member of
Congress becoming the owner of stock, possessing this knowledge.
But Mr. Brooks was not only a member of Congress, but he was a
Government director of the Union Pacific Company. As such it was
his duty to guard and watch over the interests of the Government in
the road and to see that they were protected and preserved. To insure
such faithfulness on the part of Government directors, Congress
wisely provided that they should not be stockholders in the road. Mr.
Brooks readily saw that, though becoming a stockholder in the Credit
Mobilier was not forbidden by the letter of the law, yet it was a
violation of its spirit and essence, and therefore had the stock placed
in the name of his son-in-law. The transfer of the Oakes Ames
contract to the trustees and the building of the road under that
contract, from which the enormous dividends were derived, were all
during Mr. Brooks’s official life as a Government director, must have
been within his knowledge, and yet passed without the slightest
opposition from him. The committee believed this could not have
been done without an entire disregard of his official obligation and
duty, and that while appointed to guard the public interests in the
road he joined himself with the promoters of a scheme whereby the
Government was to be defrauded, and shared in the spoil.
In the conclusions of fact upon the evidence, the committee are
entirely agreed.
In considering what action we ought to recommend to the House
upon these facts, the committee encounter a question which has
been much debated: Has this House power and jurisdiction to
inquire concerning offenses committed by its members prior to their
election, and to punish them by censure or expulsion? The
committee are unanimous upon the right of jurisdiction of this
House over the cases of Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks, upon the facts
found in regard to them. Upon the question of jurisdiction the
committee present the following views:
The Constitution, in the fifth section of the first article, defines the
power of either House as follows:
“Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish
its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of
two-thirds expel a member.”
It will be observed that there is no qualification of the power, but
there is an important qualification of the manner of its exercise—it
must be done “with the concurrence of two-thirds.”
The close analogy between this power and the power of
impeachment is deserving of consideration.
The great purpose of the power of impeachment is to remove an
unfit and unworthy incumbent from office, and though a judgment of
impeachment may to some extent operate as punishment, that is not
its principal object. Members of Congress are not subject to be
impeached, but may be expelled, and the principal purpose of
expulsion is not as punishment, but to remove a member whose
character and conduct show that he is an unfit man to participate in
the deliberations and decisions of the body, and whose presence in it
tends to bring the body into contempt and disgrace.
In both cases it is a power of purgation and purification to be
exercised for the public safety, and, in the case of expulsion, for the
protection and character of the House. The Constitution defines the
causes of impeachment, to wit, “treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors.” The office of the power of expulsion is so
much the same as that of the power to impeach that we think it may
be safely assumed that whatever would be a good cause of
impeachment would also be a good cause of expulsion.
It has never been contended that the power to impeach for any of
the causes enumerated was intended to be restricted to those which
might occur after appointment to a civil office, so that a civil officer
who had secretly committed such offense before his appointment
should not be subject upon detection and exposure to be convicted
and removed from office. Every consideration of justice and sound
policy would seem to require that the public interests be secured, and
those chosen to be their guardians be free from the pollution of high
crimes, no matter at what time that pollution had attached.
If this be so in regard to other civil officers, under institutions
which rest upon the intelligence and virtue of the people, can it well
be claimed that the law-making Representative may be vile and
criminal with impunity, provided the evidences of his corruption are
found to antedate his election?
In the report made to the Senate by John Quincy Adams in
December, 1807, upon the case of John Smith, of Ohio, the following
language is used: “The power of expelling a member for misconduct
results, on the principles of common sense, from the interests of the
nation that the high trust of legislation shall be invested in pure
hands. When the trust is elective, it is not to be presumed that the
constituent body will commit the deposit to the keeping of worthless
characters. But when a man whom his fellow-citizens have honored
with their confidence on a pledge of a spotless reputation, has
degraded himself by the commission of infamous crimes, which
become suddenly and unexpectedly revealed to the world, defective
indeed would be that institution which should be impotent to discard
from its bosom the contagion of such a member; which should have
no remedy of amputation to apply until the poison had reached the
heart.”
The case of Smith was that of a Senator, who, after his election, but
not during a session of the Senate, had been involved in the
treasonable conspiracy of Aaron Burr. Yet the reasoning is general,
and was to antagonize some positions which had been taken in the
case of Marshall, a Senator from Kentucky; the Senate in that case
having, among other reasons, declined to take jurisdiction of the
charge for the reason that the alleged offence had been committed
prior to the Senator’s election, and was matter cognizable by the
criminal courts of Kentucky. None of the commentators upon the
Constitution or upon parliamentary law assign any such limitation as
to the time of the commission of the offense, or the nature of it,
which shall control and limit the power of expulsion. On the contrary
they all assert that the power in its very nature is a discretionary one,
to be exercised of course with grave circumspection at all times, and
only for good cause. Story, Kent, and Sergeant, all seem to accept and
rely upon the exposition of Mr. Adams in the Smith case as sound.
May, in his Parliamentary Practice, page 59, enumerates the causes
for expulsion from Parliament, but he nowhere intimates that the
offense must have been committed subsequent to the election.
When it is remembered that the framers of our Constitution were
familiar with the parliamentary law of England, and must have had
in mind the then recent contest over Wilkes’s case, it is impossible to
conclude that they meant to limit the discretion of the Houses as to
the causes of expulsion. It is a received principle of construction that
the Constitution is to be interpreted according to the known rules of
law at the time of its adoption, and therefore, when we find them
dealing with a recognized subject of legislative authority, and while
studiously qualifying and restricting the manner of its exercise,
assigning no limitations to the subject-matter itself, they must be
assumed to have intended to leave that to be determined according
to established principles, as a high prerogative power to be exercised
according to the sound discretion of the body. It was not to be
apprehended that two-thirds of the Representatives of the people
would ever exercise this power in any capricious or arbitrary manner,
or trifle with or trample upon constitutional rights. At the same time
it could not be foreseen what necessities for self-preservation or self-
purification might arise in the legislative body. Therefore it was that
they did not, and would not, undertake to limit or define the
boundaries of those necessities.
The doctrine that the jurisdiction of this House over its members is
exclusively confined to matters arising subsequent to their election,
and that the body is bound to retain the vilest criminal as a member
if his criminal secret was kept until his election was secured, has
been supposed by many to have been established and declared in the
famous case of John Wilkes before alluded to. A short statement of
that case will show how fallacious is that supposition. Wilkes had
been elected a member of Parliament for Middlesex, and in 1764 was
expelled for having published a libel on the ministry. He was again
elected and again expelled for a similar offense on the 3d of
February, 1769. Being again elected on the 17th of February, 1769,
the commons passed the following resolution: “That John Wilkes,
Esq., having been in this session of Parliament expelled this house
was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this
present Parliament.” Wilkes was again elected, but the House of
Commons declared the seat vacant and ordered a new election. At
this election Wilkes was again elected by 1,143 votes, against 296 for
his competitor, Luttrell.
On the 15th of April, 1769, the house decided that by the previous
action Wilkes had become ineligible, and that the votes given for him
were void and could not be counted, and gave the seat to Luttrell.
Subsequently, in 1783, the House of Commons declared the
resolution of February 17, 1769, which had asserted the incapacity of
an expelled member to be re-elected to the same Parliament, to be
subversive of the rights of the electors, and expunged it from the
journal. It will be seen from this concise statement of Wilkes’s case
that the question was not raised as to the power of the house to expel
a member for offenses committed prior to his election; the point
decided, and afterward most properly expunged, was that expulsion
per se rendered the expelled member legally ineligible, and that
votes cast for him could not be counted. Wilkes’s offense was of
purely a political character, not involving moral turpitude; he had
attacked the ministry in the press, and the proceedings against him
in Parliament were then claimed to be a partisan political
persecution, subversive of the rights of the people and of the liberty
of the press. These proceedings in Wilkes’s case took place during the
appearance of the famous Junius letters, and several of them are
devoted to the discussion of them. The doctrine that expulsion
creates ineligibility was attacked and exposed by him with great
force. But he concedes that if the cause of expulsion be one that
renders a man unfit and unworthy to be a member, he may be
expelled for that cause as often as he shall be elected.
The case of Matteson, in the House of Representatives, has also
often been quoted as a precedent for this limitation of jurisdiction. In
the proceedings and debates of the House upon that case it will be
seen that this was one among many grounds taken in the debate; but
as the whole subject was ended by being laid on the table, it is quite
impossible to say what was decided by the House. It appeared,
however, in that case that the charge against Matteson had become
public, and his letter upon which the whole charge rested had been
published and circulated through his district during the canvass
preceding his election. This fact, we judge, had a most important
influence in determining the action of the House in his case.
The committee have no occasion in this report to discuss the
question as to the power or duty of the House in a case where a
constituency, with a full knowledge of the objectionable character of
a man, have selected him to be their Representative. It is hardly a
case to be supposed that any constituency, with a full knowledge that
a man had been guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude, would
elect him. The majority of the committee are not prepared to concede
such a man could be forced upon the House, and would not consider
the expulsion of such a man any violation of the rights of the electors,
for while the electors have rights that should be respected, the House
as a body has rights also that should be protected and preserved. But
that in such case the judgment of the constituency would be entitled
to the greatest consideration, and that this should form an important
element in its determination, is readily admitted.
It is universally conceded, as we believe, that the House has ample
jurisdiction to punish or expel a member for an offense committed
during his term as a member, though committed during a vacation of
Congress and in no way connected with his duties as a member.
Upon what principle is it that such a jurisdiction can be maintained?
It must be upon one or both of the following: that the offense shows
him to be an unworthy and improper man to be a member, or that
his conduct brings odium and reproach upon the body. But suppose
the offense has been committed prior to his election, but comes to
light afterward, is the effect upon his own character, or the reproach
and disgrace upon the body, if they allow him to remain a member,
any the less? We can see no difference in principle in the two cases,
and to attempt any would be to create a purely technical and
arbitrary distinction, having no just foundation. In our judgment, the
time is not at all material, except it be coupled with the further fact
that he was re-elected with a knowledge on the part of his
constituents of what he had been guilty, and in such event we have
given our views of the effect.
It seems to us absurd to say that an election has given a man
political absolution for an offense which was unknown to his
constituents. If it be urged again, as it has sometimes been, that this
view of the power of the House, and the true ground of its proper
exercise, may be laid hold of and used improperly, it may be
answered that no rule, however narrow and limited, that may be
adopted can prevent it. If two-thirds of the House shall see fit to
expel a man because they do not like his political or religious
principles, or without any reason at all, they have the power, and
there is no remedy except by appeal to the people. Such exercise of
the power would be wrongful, and violative of the principles of the
Constitution, but we see no encouragement of such wrong in the
views we hold.
It is the duty of each House to exercise its rightful functions upon
appropriate occasions, and to trust that those who come after them
will be no less faithful to duty, and no less jealous for the rights of
free popular representation than themselves. It will be quite time
enough to square other cases with right reason and principle when
they arise. Perhaps the best way to prevent them will be to maintain
strictly public integrity and public honor in all cases as they present
themselves. Nor do we imagine that the people of the United States
will charge their servants with invading their privileges when they
confine themselves to the preservation of a standard of official
integrity which the common instincts of humanity recognize as
essential to all social order and good government.
The foregoing are the views which we deem proper to submit upon
the general question of the jurisdiction of the House over its
members. But apart from these general views, the committee are of
opinion that the facts found in the present case amply justify the
taking jurisdiction over them, for the following reasons:
The subject-matter upon which the action of members was
intended to be influenced was of a continuous character, and was as
likely to be a subject of congressional action in future Congresses as
in the Fortieth. The influences, brought to bear on members were as
likely to be operative upon them in the future as in the present, and
were so intended. Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks have both continued
members of the House to the present time, and so have most of the
members upon whom these influences were sought to be exerted.
The committee are, therefore, of opinion that the acts of these men
may properly be treated as offenses against the present House, and
so within its jurisdiction upon the most limited rule.
Two members of the committee, Messrs. Niblack and McCrary,
prefer to express no opinion on the general jurisdictional questions
discussed in the report, and rest their judgment wholly on the
ground last stated.
In relation to Mr. Ames, he sold to several members of Congress
stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when it was worth
double that amount or more, with, the purpose and intent thereby to
influence their votes and decisions upon matters to come before
Congress.
The facts found in the report as to Mr. Brooks, show that he used
the influence of his official positions as member of Congress and
Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad Company, to get
fifty shires of the stock of the Credit Mobilier Company, at par, when
it was worth three or four times that sum, knowing that it was given
to him with intent to influence his votes and decisions in Congress,
and his action as a Government director.
The sixth section of the act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. United
States, 171, is in the following words:
“If any person or persons shall, directly or indirectly, promise,
offer, or give, or cause or procure to be promised, offered, or given,
any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or any
promise, contract, undertaking, obligation, or security for the
payment or delivery of any money, goods, right in action, bribe,
present, or reward, or any other valuable thing whatever, to any
member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United
States, after his election as such member, and either before or after
he shall have qualified and taken his seat, or to any officer of the
United States, or person holding any place of trust or profit, or
discharging any official function under or in connection with any
Department of the Government of the United States, or under the
Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, after the
passage of this act, with intent to influence his vote or decision on
any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may then be
pending, or may by law, or under the Constitution of the United
States, be brought before him in his official capacity, or in his place
of trust or profit, and shall thereof be convicted, such person or
persons so offering, promising, or giving, or causing or procuring to
be promised, offered, or given, any such money, goods, right in
action, bribe, present, or reward, or any promise, contract,
undertaking, obligation, or security for the payment or delivery of
any money, goods, right in action, bribe, present, or reward, or other
valuable thing whatever, and the member, officer, or person who
shall in anywise accept or receive the same, or any part thereof, shall
be liable to indictment as for a high crime and misdemeanor in any
of the courts of the United States having jurisdiction for the trial of
crimes and misdemeanors; and shall, upon conviction thereof, be
fined not exceeding three times the amount so offered, promised, or
given, and imprisoned in the penitentiary not exceeding three years;
and the person so convicted of so accepting or receiving the same, or
any part thereof, if an officer or person holding any such place of
trust or profit as aforesaid, shall forfeit his office or place; and any
person so convicted under this section shall forever be disqualified to
hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.”
In the judgment of the committee, the facts reported in regard to
Mr. Ames and Mr. Brooks would have justified their conviction
under the above-recited statute and subjected them to the penalties
therein provided.
The committee need not enlarge upon the dangerous character of
these offenses. The sense of Congress is shown by the severe penalty
denounced by the statute itself. The offenses were not violations of
private rights, but were against the very life of a constitutional
Government by poisoning the fountain of legislation.
The duty devolved upon the committee has been of a most painful
and delicate character. They have performed it to the best of their
ability. They have proceeded with the greatest care and deliberation,
for while they desired to do their full duty to the House and the
country, they were most anxious not to do injustice to any man. In
forming their conclusions they have intended to be entirely cool and
dispassionate, not to allow themselves to be swerved by any popular
fervor on the one hand, or any feeling of personal favor and
sympathy on the other.
The committee submit to the House and recommend the adoption
of the following resolutions.
“1. Whereas Mr. Oakes Ames, a Representative in this House from
the State of Massachusetts, has been guilty of selling to members of
Congress shares of stock in the Credit Mobilier of America, for prices
much below the true value of such stock, with intent thereby to
influence the votes and decisions of such members in matters to be
brought before Congress for action: Therefore,
Resolved, That Mr. Oakes Ames be, and he is hereby, expelled
from his seat as a member of this House.
2. Whereas Mr. James Brooks, a Representative in this House
from the State of New York, did procure the Credit Mobilier
Company to issue and deliver to Charles H. Neilson, for the use and
benefit of said Brooks, fifty shares of the stock of said company, at a
price much below its real value, well knowing that the same was so
issued and delivered with intent to influence the votes and decisions
of said Brooks, as a member of the House, in matters to be brought
before Congress for action, and also to influence the action of said
Brooks as a Government director in the Union Pacific Railroad
Company: Therefore,
Resolved, That Mr. James Brooks be, and he is hereby, expelled
from his seat as a member of this House.
The House, after much discussion, modified the propositions of
the committee of investigation, and subjected Oakes Ames and
James Brooks to the “absolute condemnation of the House.” Both
members died within three months thereafter.
The session was full of investigations, but all the others failed to
develop any tangible scandals. The Democrats demanded and
secured the investigation of the New York custom-house; the United
States Treasury; the use of Seneca sandstone; the Chorpenning
claim, and the Navy Department, etc. They were, as stated, fruitless.
The “Salary Grab.”
$2,753,327
72
1,029,500
00
The House passed a bill for the abolition of mileage, but in the
Senate it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service and
Retrenchment, and not again heard from. So that the increased pay
no longer obtains, the franking privilege only to the extent of mailing
actual Congressional documents, and mileage remains.
The following curious facts relating to these questions we take
from Hon. Edward McPherson’s admirable compilation in his
“Hand-Book of Politics” for 1874.
Statement of Compensation and Mileage.