Powell V McCormack - Oct 16
Powell V McCormack - Oct 16
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Facts: This tackles the case of the four legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur, wherein each district has populations of
over 250,000 thousand. In this regard, there was a law reapportioning
the composition of the first and second legislative districts in the
province of Camarines sur and thereby creating a new legislative
district from such reapportionment or the Republic Act 9716. Pursuant
to this law, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured to create an additional legislative district for the
province, which resulted in a decrease in the population of the first
district to 176,383. Petitioners then argued that RA 9716 is
unconstitutional contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a minimum population
of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. Accordingly,
petitioners contend the reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the
first district of Camarines Sur with less than 250,000 in population.
In respondents’ defense, they contended that the 250,000-population
requirement applies only to the creation of legislative districts in a
city, and not in provinces.
Issue: Whether or not the population of 250k an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province?
Ruling: No. In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995), the Court
clarified that while Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution requires a
city to have a minimum population of 250k to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250k to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why
the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts
in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250k to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Aldaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
Facts: This case revolves around the topic of Republic Act 9591 which
was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. The
Congress relied on the Certification of Alberto Miranda, Region III
Director, of the NSO, projecting that Malolos City's population in
2010 will reach more than 250,000 to satisfy the constitutional
threshold as established by Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
congress also employed the 2007 Census of Population Progress
Enumeration Report and Certification of the City of Malolos Water
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
District, both dated July 31, 2008, and August 22, 2008. The Comelec
maintains that these population indicators are reliable and
authoritative, and hence cannot be challenged in court.
Issue: Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to
judicial review?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that if laws creating legislative
districts are unquestionably within the ambit of its judicial review,
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfil
this obligation, the Court must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with
the constitutional limitation. It is well settled that the passage of
apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. To
deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to
contend that the Court has no power to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
Facts: As illustrated in this case, Angel Naval was elected and served
as a member of Sanggunian, Second from 2004 to 2010. Camarines Sur
district. RA 9716 was passed sometime in 2009, reapportioning the
legislative districts of Camarines was passed. Eight of the ten towns
were selected from Camarines Sur's second district. to establish a
third district. The second district included the remaining two towns
as well as the Gainza and Milaor are from the first district. Naval
campaigned and won as a Democrat in the 2010 elections. Sanggunian
from the third district. She ran again in 2013 and was re-elected to
the same position. position. When Naval's election was called into
question because to the three-term limit, she said that she was merely
there to help.
Issue: Whether Naval’s election for the year 2013 is valid?
Ruling: No. The Court held that RA 9716 created a new second district
for Camarines Sur, but it merely renamed the third district which
elected Naval into the position. Therefore, she was elected by the
same inhabitants in the same territorial jurisdiction. The three-term
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
(3) The court held that as to the guaranteed seats, yes; but, as to
the additional seats, no. The 2% threshold vote for additional seats
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. It
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec
5(2), Art VI of the Const. and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of
its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that there was no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of
non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-
sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto,
it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily the COMELEC En Banc imposed penalties.
As a matter of fact, how can SENIOR CITIZENS disobey when their
nominees didn't follow through on their commitment? There was
therefore no apparent breach of any election law, rule, or regulation.
Therefore, it is evident that SENIOR CITIZENS has been disqualified
and that its registration and accreditation have been revoked without
any legal justification.
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Facts: This case illustrates the time when the Senate held its
election of officers wherein Senator Fernan was declared duly elected
Senate President. Thereafter, the Senate failed to arrive at a
consensus on the matter of the Minority leader for which Senator Tatad
and Senator Guingona of the PRP and Lakas-NUCD-UMDP83 (both “minority”
parties, LAMP being the “majority”) respectively were being
considered. After 3 session days of debate on the issue, Senate
President Fernan formally recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader upon receiving information that all Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators
signed in agreement for the latter. Senators Santiago and Tatad of the
PRP instituted this present petition for quo warranto alleging that
Guingona had been usurping a position which, to them, rightfully
belongs to Tatad. They assert the definition of “majority” in Art VI,
sec 16(1) of the Constitution refers to a group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Sen. Pres. and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships, therefore those otherwise comprise the “minority.”
Accordingly, they are of the view that Guingona, having voted for
Fernan, belongs to the “majority.” In view thereof, they assert
Article VI, sec 16(1) has not been observed in the selection of the
Minority Leader.
Issue: Whether or not Guingona unlawfully usurp the position of
Minority Leader in the view that Art VI, sec 16(1) of the Constitution
was not observed?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that in dismissing the petition, the term
“majority” simply “means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total”. Art VI, sec 16(1) does not delineate who comprise
the “majority” much less the “minority”. Notably, the Constitution [in
Art VI, sec 16(1)] is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.
All that it says is that “each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred [to the House] xxx. In the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines xxx this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto.
Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
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Issue:
Ruling:
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
famously known as the RH Law. This law aims to inform and give free
access to every person in the country about contraception, women’s
health, population control, and the like. However, it was challenged
by different groups as, according to them, it violated various
constitutional rights (such as the rights to life, health, freedom of
religion and speech, and privacy). In this regard, through an order,
the Supreme Court prevented the law from going into effect pending a
final judgment.
Issue: Whether or not Whether the RH law is unconstitutional, with
regards to the Delegation of Authority to the FDA?
Ruling: NO. The RH Law is not unconstitutional with regards to the
delegation of authority to the FDA. The Court ruled that FDA does not
only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and
cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so.
Health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as “health products.”
Being the country’s premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety
of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped
with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant
to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to
the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.” From the
declared policy of the RH Law, Congress intended that the public be
given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the
permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government
and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated
problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and
the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
Facts:
Issue:
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Ruling:
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR