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Powell V McCormack - Oct 16 11 Am
Powell V McCormack - Oct 16 11 Am
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Facts: This tackles the case of the four legislative districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur, wherein each district has populations of
over 250,000 thousand. In this regard, there was a law reapportioning
the composition of the first and second legislative districts in the
province of Camarines sur and thereby creating a new legislative
district from such reapportionment or the Republic Act 9716. Pursuant
to this law, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured to create an additional legislative district for the
province, which resulted in a decrease in the population of the first
district to 176,383. Petitioners then argued that RA 9716 is
unconstitutional contending that it is contrary to Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prescribing a minimum population
of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. Accordingly,
petitioners contend the reapportionment by RA 9716 will leave the
first district of Camarines Sur with less than 250,000 in population.
In respondents’ defense, they contended that the 250,000-population
requirement applies only to the creation of legislative districts in a
city, and not in provinces.
Issue: Whether or not the population of 250k an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province?
Ruling: No. In Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211 (1995), the Court
clarified that while Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution requires a
city to have a minimum population of 250k to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250k to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why
the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional
district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts
in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district created
within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
250k to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is
entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and
regardless of its population.
Aldaba v Comelec, 611 SCRA 147 (2010)
Facts: This case revolves around the topic of Republic Act 9591 which
was enacted to create the legislative district of Malolos City. The
Congress relied on the Certification of Alberto Miranda, Region III
Director, of the NSO, projecting that Malolos City's population in
2010 will reach more than 250,000 to satisfy the constitutional
threshold as established by Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
congress also employed the 2007 Census of Population Progress
Enumeration Report and Certification of the City of Malolos Water
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
District, both dated July 31, 2008, and August 22, 2008. The Comelec
maintains that these population indicators are reliable and
authoritative, and hence cannot be challenged in court.
Issue: Whether or not the population indicators can be subject to
judicial review?
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that if laws creating legislative
districts are unquestionably within the ambit of its judicial review,
then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions
impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfil
this obligation, the Court must inquire into the authoritativeness and
reliability of the population indicators Congress used to comply with
the constitutional limitation. It is well settled that the passage of
apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the political power of
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. To
deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review over RA 9591 is to
contend that the Court has no power to determine whether there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, a duty mandated under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Naval v Comelec, 729 SCRA 299 (2014)
Facts: As illustrated in this case, Angel Naval was elected and served
as a member of Sanggunian, Second from 2004 to 2010. Camarines Sur
district. RA 9716 was passed sometime in 2009, reapportioning the
legislative districts of Camarines was passed. Eight of the ten towns
were selected from Camarines Sur's second district. to establish a
third district. The second district included the remaining two towns
as well as the Gainza and Milaor are from the first district. Naval
campaigned and won as a Democrat in the 2010 elections. Sanggunian
from the third district. She ran again in 2013 and was re-elected to
the same position. position. When Naval's election was called into
question because to the three-term limit, she said that she was merely
there to help.
Issue: Whether Naval’s election for the year 2013 is valid?
Ruling: No. The Court held that RA 9716 created a new second district
for Camarines Sur, but it merely renamed the third district which
elected Naval into the position. Therefore, she was elected by the
same inhabitants in the same territorial jurisdiction. The three-term
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
(3) The court held that as to the guaranteed seats, yes; but, as to
the additional seats, no. The 2% threshold vote for additional seats
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the 2% threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the
permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. It
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec
5(2), Art VI of the Const. and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests
in the House of Representatives.”
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on account of
its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that there was no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this
Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of
non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served his term as a
member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-
sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto,
it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily the COMELEC En Banc imposed penalties.
As a matter of fact, how can SENIOR CITIZENS disobey when their
nominees didn't follow through on their commitment? There was
therefore no apparent breach of any election law, rule, or regulation.
Therefore, it is evident that SENIOR CITIZENS has been disqualified
and that its registration and accreditation have been revoked without
any legal justification.
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Facts: This case illustrates the time when the Senate held its
election of officers wherein Senator Fernan was declared duly elected
Senate President. Thereafter, the Senate failed to arrive at a
consensus on the matter of the Minority leader for which Senator Tatad
and Senator Guingona of the PRP and Lakas-NUCD-UMDP83 (both “minority”
parties, LAMP being the “majority”) respectively were being
considered. After 3 session days of debate on the issue, Senate
President Fernan formally recognized Senator Guingona as minority
leader upon receiving information that all Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators
signed in agreement for the latter. Senators Santiago and Tatad of the
PRP instituted this present petition for quo warranto alleging that
Guingona had been usurping a position which, to them, rightfully
belongs to Tatad. They assert the definition of “majority” in Art VI,
sec 16(1) of the Constitution refers to a group of senators who (1)
voted for the winning Sen. Pres. and (2) accepted committee
chairmanships, therefore those otherwise comprise the “minority.”
Accordingly, they are of the view that Guingona, having voted for
Fernan, belongs to the “majority.” In view thereof, they assert
Article VI, sec 16(1) has not been observed in the selection of the
Minority Leader.
Issue: Whether or not Guingona unlawfully usurp the position of
Minority Leader in the view that Art VI, sec 16(1) of the Constitution
was not observed?
Ruling: No. The Court ruled that in dismissing the petition, the term
“majority” simply “means the number greater than half or more than
half of any total”. Art VI, sec 16(1) does not delineate who comprise
the “majority” much less the “minority”. Notably, the Constitution [in
Art VI, sec 16(1)] is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.
All that it says is that “each House shall choose such other officers
as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who
will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred [to the House] xxx. In the absence of
constitutional or statutory guidelines xxx this Court is devoid of any
basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto.
Avelino v Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949)
Facts: The resolution was filed by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and
lists the charges against the Senate President Avelino and directing
an investigation into the matter. There were 24 senators in the
Senate; however, only 22 were present on the day of the session when
Senator Tañada was scheduled to deliver his one-hour privilege speech.
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
No court has ever held, and no court will ever hold that it possesses
the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any
particular action. Also, if the Court does not have any authority to
control the Philippine Senate, it has likewise no authority to control
the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the
same.
However, the Constitution has purposely withheld from the Legislature
and the Governor-General the power to suspend an appointive member.
Suspend is not included in the terms “punish” for the Legislature
(Organic Act section 18) and “remove” for the Executive (Organic Act
sections 16, 17). This is because punishment by way of reprimand or
fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House without depriving
the constituency or representation. Expulsion, the same, while giving
the constituency the opportunity to elect anew. But suspension
deprives the electoral district of representation without that
district being afforded means by which to fill the vacancy.
De Venecia v SB, G.R. No. 130240 (2002)
Facts: In this case, a Criminal Case No. 18857 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan
Del Sur for violation of section 3, paragraph e of Republic Act No.
3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. In this
regard, there was a filed Motion to Suspend the Accused Pendente Lite
after the Congressman pleaded not guilty. The Sandiganbayan granted
the mentioned motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the
Congressman. However, the Speaker did not comply and as a result, the
Sandiganbayan then issued a Resolution requiring him to appear and
show the reason why he should not be held in contempt of court.
Through his counsel, the Speaker filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can
only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to the
House Resolution No. 116. After this, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
Speaker in contempt of court.
Issue: Whether or not the Speaker was correct in invoking the
principle of Separation of Powers and claiming that he can only act as
may be dictated by the House as a body?
Ruling: In the case of Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled
that the principle of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. But the order of
suspension prescribed by such law is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. In
another case (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that the
suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is
different in terms of nature and purpose. Thus, it is imposed not as a
CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Balag, v Senate, G.R. No. G.R. No. 234608, July 03, 2018
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR
Ruling:
AMBROCIO, DANIELLE A.
JURIS DOCTOR