Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?

)
Richard A. Posnert

I have been interested in the topic of judges' writing styles

since I became a judge in 1981, and have written a fair amount
about it.' But rereading what I have written I find that it lacks
system and I welcome this opportunity to begin to repair the
lack.
I shall start by trying to explain the elusive concept of "style"
and to distinguish it from related concepts, notably "rhetoric." I
shall also try to distinguish "good" from "bad" style and then,
abstracting from the question of quality, sketch the two funda-
mental judicial styles. Borrowing a distinction from Robert Penn
Warren, I call these styles the "pure" and the "impure" and
associate them with two fundamental jurisprudential stances, the
"formalist" and the "pragmatist." Formalists tend to prefer the
pure style, pragmatists the impure. Last I consider whether
judicial style has more than symptomatic significance-that is,
whether it has significance independent of the clues (not always
reliable, as we shall see) that it provides to the jurisprudence of
the writer.

I. WHAT IS "STYLE"?
"Style," even when confined to writing (as distinct from a
tennis player's or a dandy's "style"-or for that matter Oliver
Wendell Holmes's "style," if one is thinking of the whole person
or persona, rather than just the writing; or even "style" as a
synonym for culture), is one of those words that we are entirely

t Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in
Law, The University of Chicago. I thank Guido Calabresi, William Domnarski, Frank
Easterbrook, Ward Farnsworth, Robert Ferguson, William Landes, Lawrence Lessig,
Martha Nussbaum, Cass Sunstein, and Erika Vanden Berg for their very helpful com-
ments on a previous draft.
' See, in particular, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 107-15, 230-36 (Harvard,
1985); Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chi L Rev 1343 (1986); Law and Literature: A
MisunderstoodRelation 281-99 (Harvard, 1988); Cardozo:A Study in Reputation, 33-57,
125-43 (Chicago, 1990). Interest in the subject is, I think, growing. See, for recent exam-
ples, Haig Bosmajian, Metaphor and Reason in Judicial Opinions (Southern Illinois,
1992); Mark Tushnet, Style and the Supreme Court'sEducationalRole in Government, 11
Const Commentary 215 (1994).
2 The sense in which it is used in Peter Gay, Style in History (Basic Books, 1974),

1421
1422 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

comfortable in using but that is a devil to define. We can think of

it most broadly as the specific written form in which a writer
encodes an idea, a "message," that he wants to put across. His
tools of communication are, of course, linguistic. But they include
not only vocabulary and grammar but also the often tacit princi-
ples governing the length and complexity of sentences, the orga-
nization of sentences into larger units such as paragraphs, and
the level of formality at which to pitch the writing. These tools
are used not just to communicate an idea but also to establish a
mood and perhaps a sense of the writer's personality.
The disadvantage of so broad a definition of "style" is that it
merges style with rhetoric, and the two terms, although close in
meaning, are best kept apart. "Rhetoric" is both broader and
narrower than "style." It is broader because it has, since Aristot-
le, connoted a process of reasoning as well as the medium of
verbal expression, a process that Aristotle contrasted with logic
and other modes of exact reasoning as being the mode appropri-
ate for debate and deliberation over matters of deep uncertain-
ty.' Some modern defenders go further and equate rhetoric with
right reason, but we need not follow them.4
As a description of the medium of expression, however, "rhet-
oric" is narrower than "style," because its focus is on persuasion
and that is only one function of expression. A judge might crack a
joke in an opinion merely to amuse, or to show off, or to grip the
reader's attention and thus make the opinion more likely to be
remembered. The joke would affect the style of the opinion but it
might not be intended to induce agreement with the out-
come-though then again it might, by making the reader more
receptive, as with the conventional speaker's opening joke.
Here is another stab at definition: "style" is what is left out
by paraphrase. It thus is ornamental (which is not to say unim-
portant), or at least optional, dispensable'-or if not entirely

and in Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition:Deciding Appeals (Little, Brown,
1960). "'[Sltyle' for this book refers to style of work, of craftsmanship, of doing, not to indi-
vidual or period literary style." Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition at 464.
' For a recent analysis of legal rhetoric in the Aristotelian sense, see Lawrence
Douglas, ConstitutionalDiscourse and Its Discontents:An Essay on the Rhetoric of Judi-
cial Review, in Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns, eds, The Rhetoric of Law 225 (Michi-
gan, 1994).
See references in Posner, Law and Literature at 271 (cited in note 1).
5 Evidence that style is indeed dispensable at least in some forms of writing is that a
badly written article by an economist is no less likely to be accepted for publication in a
premier economic journal than a well written one. David N. Laband and Christopher N.
Taylor, The Impact ofBad Writing in Economics, 30 Econ Inquiry 673 (1992).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1423

dispensable, then an envelope that can come in different shapes

and thicknesses. Students of trademark law will recognize the
analogy to "trade dress." The very possibility of paraphrase dem-
onstrates that content is compatible with a variety of styles and
is therefore separable from any particular one, separable even in
a sense from style itself. Some writings, it is true, are not effec-
tively paraphrasable. This is true of most (short) poems. Whatev-
er function poems serve, or at least whatever use we moderns
make of poems, it is not to encode messages that can be para-
phrased. So style is not optional in poetry. Two poems written in
different styles might have the same paraphrasable content
(about love, or nature, or God) but they would not have the same
meaning. Some judicial opinions-those written by the mas-
ters-would lose something, and maybe a lot, in being para-
phrased. But their essential meaning would not be lost. Even the
best, the most distinctive, the most eloquent judicial opinion
could be rewritten in a very different style and yet convey enough
of the meaning of the original to be considered a close substitute
for it.'
This notion of style as the range of options for encoding the
paraphrasable content of a writing7 is useful for my purposes, as
is the related notion of style as "good" writing. Once we acknowl-
edge that there are different ways to "write up" an idea or other
message, we open up the possibility that there is a better and a
worse way. We enter the domain of handbooks of style, which
contain all sorts of useful precepts8 that judges-and their ghost-

' The contrary view (that judicial writing is as unparaphrasable as poetry-is indeed
a form of poetry), the view of Richard Weisberg, is effectively criticized in Note, Reading
Literature/ReadingLaw: Is There a Literary Jurisprudence?,72 Tex L Rev 135, 141-44
(1993).
7 "Style" is used in approximately this sense in the discipline of stylistics, which
studies writing styles, often with aid from statistics on sentence length, sentence type,
and frequency of parts of speech. See, for example, Lucy Pollard-Gott and Lawrence T.
Frase, Flexibility in Writing Style: A New Discourse-Level Cloze Test, 2 Written Communi-
cation 107, 108-09 (1985).
See, for example, Joseph M. Williams, Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace
(Scott, Foresman, 2d ed 1985). The best style "handbook," though, is still George Orwell's
essay, Politics and the English Language, in Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus, eds, 4 The
Collected Essays, Journalismand Letters of George Orwell 127 (Camelot, 1968). There are
actually handbooks of judicial style. They more or less parallel the general style hand-
books, and are largely ignored-even, I think, unknown. See, for example, American Bar
Association, JudicialOpinion Writing Manual: A Productof the Appellate Judges Confer-
ence, Judicial Administration Division 37-64 (West, 1991) (chapter entitled "Writing
Style"); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing 177-225 (West, 1990) (last part of book, enti-
tled "Writing Style"); Federal Judicial Center, Judicial Writing Manual 21-26 (US GPO,
1991); Joyce J. George, Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook 261-362 (William S. Hein, 3d
1424 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

writers, the law clerks-regularly ignore. Such precepts as: go

easy on adjectives, adverbs, italics, and other modifiers, qualifi-
ers, and intensifiers; alternate (irregularly, not metronome style)
long and short sentences; don't end a paragraph with a prepo-
sition; don't use agentless passives; go easy on parenthetical and
other qualifying phrases; try to begin and end sentences with
important words, because the first and the last positions in a
sentence are the most emphatic; avoid jargon and clich6s; punc-
tuate for clarity rather than to conform to grammarians' fusty
rules for the placement of commas and other punctuation marks;
be clear; go easy on quotations, especially long block quotations;
pay some attention to the music of one's sentences; don't bust a
gut to avoid ever splitting an infinitive; disregard deservedly
obscure and unobserved rules, such as never begin a sentence
with 'But" or "And."
Many judges and lawyers are disdainful of "fine" writing.
They think it unprofessional, "literary," affected, overrefined.
They are mistaken. One can be as "professional" as one likes yet
still write well in the sense of avoiding stylistic "mistakes" that
obscure readability with no offsetting benefit to any purpose of
the writer.
Style as discretionary (as underdetermined by content, by
meaning) and style as writing well, point to a third sense of
style-style as "literary." Writings count as literature when they
are detachable from the specific setting in which they were creat-
ed--when, in other words, they have something (no one is quite
sure what) that enables them to become or to be made meaning-
ful to an audience different from the one for which they were
written. Style is one of the features of written expression that
facilitates this portability, for style is often less local, less time-
and place-bound, than content (though sometimes more: style can
be an impediment to understanding). We might have lost interest
in a particular legal issue discussed in a judicial opinion, but the
style of the opinion may make us want to read the opinion any-
way; and then the opinion will have outlived the occasion of its
creation.
The effect of style on portability is an important factor in the
reputation of judges. Even a brilliant analysis of yesterday's legal

ed 1993) (chapter entitled "Writing Effectively"); Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for
Lawyers, 66 Cal L Rev 727 (1978).
' John M. Ellis, The Theory of Literary Criticism:A Logical Analysis 42-53 (Califor-
nia, 1974).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1425

problems is unlikely to hold much current interest, especially

since a major effort at historical reconstruction may be required
to determine that the analysis is brilliant. The sparkling, vivid,
memorable opinion is not so chained to the immediate context of
its creation. It can be pulled out and made exemplary of law's
abiding concerns.
There is still a fourth sense of style that I need to bring
before the reader: style as signature, or "voice." We "recognize" a
person by his "voice," in both the literal and the figurative senses
of these words. At a time when judges were thought to be (and
perhaps thought themselves to be) oracles in almost a literal
sense, the ideal judicial voice would have sounded something like
the voice of God. But here I begin to stray into the issue of the
relation between judicial style and judicial philosophy, and that
is for later.
The idea of style as voice plays a rationalizing role with
respect to the contemporary scandal (as some think it to be) of
delegating opinion writing to law clerks. If you try to embarrass
a professor of constitutional law by saying, 'What are you doing
teaching 'opinions' written by your last year's law students? Why
not just teach the answers they gave to your exam questions?"
the professor will reply defensively: "I know that Justice X and
Justice Y delegate much of the opinion writing in their chambers
to their law clerks, and yet each chambers has a distinctive
'voice.' X's opinions don't sound like Ys-they sound like X's,
even though written by a constantly reshuffled deck of law clerks.
The voice of the judge is audible." Everything in this imaginary
quotation is true except the last sentence. Law clerks often pre-
pare for their job by reading a bunch of their boss's old opinions
(sometimes the judge tells them to do this), and then model their
own style on that of the opinions they read. By this process, a
chambers style, not perhaps very distinctive but distinctive
enough to be recognizable, does indeed evolve. All that this
shows, however, is that style can be a corporate characteristic.
One can imagine styles that are quite similar but that can
still be ranked by quality, either because the better writer has
avoided the pitfalls against which the handbooks warn or be-
cause he or she is a gifted writer-one who writes well without
regard to, and often while defying, the codified rules. But one can
also imagine styles that differ not in quality but in kind-styles
that have different vocabularies, diction, "tone," and so forth, and
yet are equally good from a stylistic standpoint (that is, apart
1426 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

from their content). This possibility, which is fundamental to the

question of judicial style, is explored in the next Part.

II. THE PURE AND THE IMPURE JUDICIAL STYLE

Anyone who has read a large number of judicial opinions
from different courts and different eras, and who is sufficiently
interested in style to have registered the stylistic aspects of the
opinions, will have noticed that judicial style is not uniform. I am
speaking here of uniformity of kind rather than of quality,
though there obviously is great variance in the latter as well.
Some opinions have a lofty, formal, imperious, impersonal, "re-
fined," ostentatiously "correct" (including "politically correct"),
even hieratic tone, while others tend to be more direct, forthright,
"man to man," colloquial, informal, frank, even racy, even
demotic.
Tone depends on many things, notably though not only the
choice of words and phrases and the decision to embrace or avoid
contractions, colloquialisms, humor, and jargon. By "jargon" I do
not mean the names of legal doctrines, which could hardly be
dispensed with in judicial opinions. I mean turns of phrase char-
acteristic of legal writing but avoided in good writing-such
words or phrases as "absent" (when used as a preposition), "im-
plicate" (to mean relate to or invoke, as in "the due process
clause implicates privacy concerns"), "ambit," "chilling effect" (to
describe the effect of the regulation of speech on the marketplace
of ideas and opinions), "-based" (as in "autonomy-based justifica-
tion"), "habeas" (for habeas corpus), "construction" (to mean inter-
pretation), "instant" (for present, as in "the instant case"), "facial-
ly" (to mean "on its face"), "impeach" (to mean "contradict"), "even
had we agreed that. . ." (for "even if we had agreed that..."),
"mandate" (as a verb meaning to order or require), "prong" (to
describe one element of a multifactor test or standard), and
"progeny" (cases that follow or derive from an earlier case are the
earlier case's "progeny"). These usages are eminently avoidable.
If they were not, they would not mark a style; styles are optional.
These usages mark prose as legalese and impart a tone of high
professional gravity. Nominalizing-that is, using nouns as adjec-
tives (as in "privacy concerns" or "social security disability bene-
fits claim")-works in a similar way by turning phrases that a
lay person might have used into specialized terms. The disap-
pearance of an older legal jargon, with its "aforesaids" and its
substitution of "one" for a first name ("a witness, one Jones, testi-
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1427

fled that.. ."), allows modern judges to think that their opinions
are free from jargon. They should think again.
Tone is also shaped by the length and structure of sentences.
Suppression of ornamentation and parentheticals, simplicity and
brevity, and short sentences and sentence fragments all tend,
generally, to "lower" the tone of a writing, to make it more like
speech. But the qualification implicit in "generally" is important.
The elimination of all ornamentation may impart an impersonal,
bureaucratic, and hence formal tone to a writing, while an excess
of brevity may lend it an oracular, dogmatic, imperative, and
thus, again, a formal tone. And a string of short sentences can
create0 the impression of a harangue-the "Brandeisian jackham-
mer."
The avoidance of headings and subheadings (and of course of
footnotes) has a "lowering" effect as well. The absence of these
"scholarly" appendages marks an opinion as informal, even con-
versational; no one speaks in footnotes and headings. Coordinate
sentence structure, in which clauses are connected by "but" and
"and," lowers tone, too, while the arranging of clauses in hierar-
chies by means of subordinating or concessive conjunctions such
as "although" raises it. A proclivity for technical terms and acro-
nyms raises tone; a fondness for everyday speech lowers it. Tone
is raised by polish, lowered by candor, "straight talking," and
spontaneity (or the pretense of these things), as we can see in the
contrast between Brutus's and Antony's funeral orations in Jul-
ius Caesar. Oddly, a predilection for rare words that are not
terms of legal art can raise tone by making an opinion seem
pompous and learned yet equally can lower it by making the
opinion seem self-indulgent, even frivolous. Personality generally
lowers, impersonality raises (with an important qualification
noted later); so frequent use of "I" marks an opinion as "low"-or
would but for a pretty unshakable convention that a majority
opinion, which is to say an opinion joined by more than one
judge, is styled as jointly authored ("we hold," never "I hold").
Certitude raises tone; dubiety or tentativeness lowers it. Config-
uring an opinion as a story, debate, or exploration lowers; config-
uring it as dogmatic announcement, de haut en bas, raises. The
"high" style is declaratory, the "low" exploratory.
I have been using the metaphor of height to contrast what I
contend are the two basic styles of judicial writing, as of writing
generally. The problems with this metaphor are that the pejora-

" Posner, Cardozo at 44 (cited in note 1).

1428 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

tive connotations of "low" are well-nigh unshakable and that the

judges such as Holmes who have used what I have been calling
the "low" style are by and large the judges who were intimate
with high culture, fussy about their style, aristocrats of writing
and thought, judicial Coriolanuses even. I shall substitute a par-
allel contrast, that between "pure" and "impure," proposed by
Robert Penn Warren in a famous essay on poetry. 1 It should be
a little easier to persuade that an "impure" style of writing might
surpass a "pure" style.
Warren was writing at a time when the most celebrated
modern poets, such as Yeats and Eliot, were in self-conscious
revolt against the characteristic style of much nineteenth-century
Romantic and, particularly, Victorian poetry. Tennyson's poetry,
for example, is very refined, like Victorian culture general-
ly--"correct," smooth, polished, sonorous, and proper. He was,
after all, the poet laureate of Victoria's England. "Pure" poetry as
exemplified by Tennyson avoids "low" subjects and diction, up-
holds conventional values, expresses conventional emotions, is
self-consciously "poetic" and "elevated." As a corollary of all these
things, it lacks a certain tang and texture, as well as conversa-
tional immediacy. As Warren puts it, "[T]he pure poem tries to be
pure by excluding, more or less rigidly, certain elements which
might qualify or contradict its original impulse. In other words,
the pure poems want to be, and desperately, all of a piece."'
Tennyson was a very great poet, but it is possible also to
enjoy, or even to prefer, a "rougher," sometimes even bawdy,
sometimes startlingly direct, freer-form poetic style, one that is
more concrete, more personal, franker, wittier, more intellectual
and that has a wider emotional register and range of subject
matter and employs a more varied diction, one closer to that of
everyday life (to prose, even). It is the style of Shakespeare,"3 of
Donne and the other "metaphysical" poets, of Byron, and among
modern poets of T.S. Eliot (despite the evident resemblances
between Eliot and Robert Browning, one of Tennyson's contempo-
raries), Wallace Stevens, Yeats (after 1910 or so), and Auden, to
name a few. Warren speaks of "resistances," of "the tension be-
tween the rhythm of the poem and the rhythm of speech... ;

" Pure and Impure Poetry, in Robert Penn Warren, Selected Essays 3 (Random
House, 1958) (1942 essay).
12 Id at 16.
" As Samuel Johnson put it, Shakespeare's "dialogue is level with life." Prefaceto the
Plays of William Shakespeare, in R.D. Stock, ed, Samuel Johnson'sLiterary Criticism 139,
143 (Nebraska, 1974).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1429

between the formality of the rhythm and the informality of the

language; between the particular and the general, the concrete
and the abstract;.., between the beautiful and the ugly; be-
tween ideas."14 Other "New Critics" speak of irony, paradox,
complexity, polysemy, ambiguity.15
No one I suppose considers Shakespeare, and few consider
even Eliot, inferior to Tennyson. They are merely different. And
it is a difference echoed in judicial opinions. Most judicial opin-
ions are carefully drafted to emphasize the difference between
their diction and that of ordinary speech, which is just the sort of
difference that poets like Shakespeare, Byron, and Eliot like to
blur. Yet no careful reader, making due allowance for differences
in linguistic conventions between the nineteenth century and
today, will fail to note the personal, direct, and conversational
tone of judges like Holmes and Learned Hand, which is so differ-
ent from the usual tone of judicial opinions.
Judicial opinions in the pure style tend to be long for what
they have to say, solemn, highly polished and artifactual-far
removed from the tone of conversation-impersonal (that matter
of "voice" again), and predictable in the sense of conforming close-
ly to professional expectations about the structure and style of a
judicial opinion. If we had a judicial laureate, that is how he or
she would write. The standard "pure" opinion uses technical legal
terms without translation into everyday English, quotes heavily
from previous judicial opinions, includes much detail concerning
names, times, and places, complies scrupulously with whatever
are the current conventions of citation form, avoids any note of
levity, conceals the author's personality, prefers familiar and
ready-made formulations to novelties, and bows to the current
norms of "political correctness" (corresponding to the euphemisms
for which the Victorians became notorious) at whatever cost in
stilted diction. The familiarity of the pure style makes it invisible
to practitioners of the style and to the intended audience of law-
yers. But it is not at all a plain or transparent style. Its artifi-
ciality is revealed by a comparison with the prose of a nonlawyer
dealing with a similar issue-for example, a philosopher writing
about intention compared to a judge in a criminal case writing

Warren, Pure and Impure Poetry at 27 (cited in note 11).

15 See, for example, Cleanth Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure
of Poetry (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1947); W.K. Wimsatt, Jr., The Verbal Icon: Studies
in the Meaning of Poetry (Noonday, 1954).
1430 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

about intention-as well as by a comparison with the less com-

mon "impurd' style of judicial opinions.
Impure stylists like to pretend that what they are doing
when they write a judicial opinion is explaining to a hypothetical
audience of laypersons why the case is being decided in the way
that it is. These judges eschew the "professionalizing" devices of
the purist writer-the jargon, the solemnity, the high sheen, the
impersonality, 6 the piled-up details conveying an attitude of
scrupulous exactness, the fondness for truisms, the unembar-
rassed repetition of obvious propositions, the long quotations
from previous cases to demonstrate fidelity to precedent, the
euphemisms, and the exaggerated confidence corresponding to
the declamatory mode of "pure" poetry. These and other devices
constitute what Robert Ferguson has felicitously summarized as
the "rhetoric of inevitability."'7
The handful of impure judicial stylists prefer the bolder
approach (to critics, brazen) of trying to persuade without using
stylistic devices intended to overawe, impress, and intimidate the
reader. They like to be conversational, to write as if it were for
the ear rather than for the eye. They like to avoid quoting previ-
ous decisions so that they can speak with their own
tongue-make it new, make it fresh. (Avoidance of the ready-
made was an important element of the "wit" that Eliot admired
in the metaphysical poets.) They like to be candid and not pre-
tend to know more than they do or to speak with greater confi-
dence than they feel. They eschew unnecessary details, however
impressive the piling on of them might be. They like to shun
clich6s, to be concrete, to entertain; to seem to enjoy writing; to
imitate the movement of thought-unfriendly critics call their
style "stream of consciousness." Of the impure stylists we may
say, as Warren did of Eliot and other moderns, "they have tried,
within the limits of their gifts, to remain faithful to the complexi-
ties of the problems with which they are dealing.., they have
refused to take the easy statement as solution." 8
Paradoxically, the impure judicial stylists generally take
more pains over style than the pure stylists do. Unless one is a
particularly gifted writer, it takes much effort to make an opinion

" Compare Arthur L. Palacas, Parentheticalsand PersonalVoice, 6 Written Commu-

nication 506, 512 (1989).
1 Robert A. Ferguson, The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre, 2 Yale J L & Hum
201, 213-16 (1990). See also Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the
JuridicalField, 38 Hastings L J 805, 820 (1987) (Richard Terdiman, trans).
18 Warren, Pure and Impure Poetry at 30 (cited in note 11).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1431

seem effortless! The pure style, despite its artificiality, comes

more easily to a legally trained person than the impure style. For
one of the things that law school and legal practice teach, all
unconsciously but not the less effectively for that, is to forget how
one wrote before one became a lawyer.
"Voice" goes with "ear." We should therefore expect the
choice of styles to be influenced by the "implied audience" for a
judicial opinion-the audience at which the judge seems particu-
larly to be aiming. For many judges the implied audience consists
primarily of the judge or judges of the lower court whose decision
is being reviewed and the lawyers for the parties. Anyone else is
an (authorized) eavesdropper. The lawyers and the lower court
judge are the most knowledgeable and interested professional
consumers of the appellate court's opinion. Consummate insiders,
they are adepts in reading (including reading between the lines
of) a "pure" judicial opinion. The author wants to persuade them
that in reaching its result the court has carefully considered all
the points in the case and has not deviated from "the law" in the
typical sense in which the lawyers and the lower court judge will
have conceived it-has not pulled any rabbits out of hats. For
this rhetorical purpose, the "pure" style is the best because this
tiny, focused, professional audience has settled expectations con-
cerning the appropriate diction and decorum of a judicial opinion,
just as the Victorian public had settled expectations concerning
poetic diction and decorum.
At the other extreme of the stylistic spectrum, the primary
implied audience of the most boldly impure judicial stylist con-
sists not of legal insiders but of those readers, both laypeople and
lawyers, who can "see through" the artifice of judicial pretension.
Here is to be found the "one in a thousand" for whom Holmes
once said that he wrote. Now, one in a thousand may add up to a
larger number than the lawyers and lower court judge in a single
case, especially if the potential audience includes lay people. The
impure judicial stylist may have a larger audience than the pure,
just as Shakespeare has a larger audience than Tennyson.
I have overdone the contrast between the two styles. There
are few completely pure stylists among judges and even fewer
completely impure ones, if complete impurity is even an intelligi-
ble concept. The difference between the styles can be subtle. The
author of the impure opinion, being in a minority so far as stylis-
tic preference is concerned, may have to pull his punches in order
to persuade the other judges to join his opinion. (Holmes used to
complain a lot about the changes in his opinions that his fellow
1432 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

Supreme Court Justices forced him to make.) And there are plen-
ty of judges who seem to fall right in the middle. For the pure
and the impure do not divide up the whole world of judicial opin-
ions between them. They mark the ends of a spectrum.
The pure tendency is illustrated by the opinions of Cardozo,
Brandeis (especially his majority opinions), Frankfurter,
Brennan, and the second Harlan, and is characteristic of the vast
majority of opinions written by law clerks, which means most
opinions in all American courts today. The pure style is the in-
veterate style of law review editors, from whose ranks most of
the clerks are drawn. On the impure side can be found most
opinions of Holmes, Douglas, Black, Jackson, and Learned
Hand. 9 In the middle, the most notable opinions may be those
of Henry Friendly. Inclusion of Douglas in the list of impure judi-
cial writers should make clear that impure judicial opinion writ-
ing is not always superior to pure, any more than all impure
poetry is superior to all pure poetry. Cardozo, mostly a purist,
was one of the finest judicial writers in our history.

III. STYLE AND STANCE

Let me try to redeem my promise to relate the two styles to
two jurisprudential stances, which I call formalist and pragmat-
ic.' ° By the use of the term "formalist" I mean to emphasize the
logical, impersonal, objective, constrained character of legal rea-
soning. The formalist firmly believes in right and wrong, truth
and falsehood, and believes that the function of a judicial opinion
is to demonstrate that the decision is right and true. The prag-
matist, while not doubting that right and wrong and true and
false have useful roles to play in a variety of "language games," is
inclined to doubt that the decision of cases sufficiently finely
balanced, or at least nonroutine, to have been appealed to and to
require decision by means of a published opinion is consistently
one of those games. The pragmatist thinks that what the judge is
doing in deciding the nonroutine case is trying to come up with
the most reasonable result in the circumstances, with due regard
for such systemic constraints on the freewheeling employment of

'" Don't be fooled by the florid character of some (not all, or even most) of Hand's
prose. It reflects the culture in which he grew up. He was born in 1872. With a similar
adjustment in perspective, John Marshall's opinions can be seen as notable examples of
the impure style.
" I discuss these at length in my book The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard,
1990).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1433

"reason" as the need to maintain continuity with previous deci-

sions and respect the limitations that the language and discern-
ible purposes of constitutional and statutory texts impose on the
interpreter.
I suspect that formalists fool themselves when they think, as
some of them do, that judges can really decide difficult cases with
the tools of formalism. Still, it is a common enough delusion,
although in this country one more common among law professors
and law students than among judges and practicing lawyers.
Either way, the pure style fits naturally with formalist content.
Yet there are exceptions. Hugo Black wrote with great (some-
times too great) simplicity, yet often in defense of formalist posi-
tions, such as his conception of free speech as an "absolute" or his
belief that the draftsmen and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had intended to make every single right in the Bill of
Rights fully effective against the states. Yet one does not sense
much distance between his personal and his judicial views, so
perhaps in his case the impure style and the formalist content
were both mirages. Another exception is Cardozo, who was a
pragmatic judge, a master of narrative, and generally a graceful
writer, but who cultivated an artifactual, highly polished, "profes-
sionally" smooth legal insider's style too quirky to satisfy the
most fastidious purist but instantly distinguishable from the
"craggier," more colloquial, racier style of a Holmes, a Hand, or a
Jackson.2 In Hynes v New York Central R.R. Co.,22 Cardozo ac-
tually wrote a paean to legal realism in what might be thought
the prose counterpart to the style of Tennyson's poetry.' To
complete the picture, I point out that the pure style is an excel-
lent disguise for the shy pragmatist or, for that matter, the will-
ful or partisan judge.
In repeatedly complaining about the impersonality of the
pure style, I run the risk of seeming to endorse the very emotion-
ality, sentimentality, and egoism that was characteristic of much
Romantic and Victorian poetry and that T.S. Eliot and other
modernists denounced. The arch-sentimentalist, and some might
even say the arch-egoist, of the American judiciary is the recently

" For examples, see Hand's opinions in Nichols v Universal Pictures Corp, 45 F2d
119 (2d Cir 1930), and Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 154 F2d 785 (2d Cir
1946); and Jackson's opinions in West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319
US 624 (1943), and Johnson v UnitedStates, 333 US 10 (1948); and almost any opinion of
Holmes-I will give an example shortly.
231 NY 229, 131 NE 898 (1921).
See Posner, Cardozo at 48-55 (cited in note 1).
1434 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

retired Justice Blackmun. Blackmun did not try to disguise or

discipline the strong feelings that many of the Court's cases
aroused in him; he seemed (not only in his opinions but also in
his public comments about the Court) to have insisted on "letting
it all hang out." Although his opinions in these cases depart from
the professional norms that I am associating with the "pure"
style and are certainly not lacking in "voice," the departure is not
in the direction of the school of Donne or Eliot. The "voice" is
rather that of Joyce Kilmer or Norman Rockwell. Whatever the
merit of Blackmun's positions on such matters as abortion, capi-
tal punishment, sexual equality, the exemption of baseball from
the antitrust laws, or the duty of states to protect people from
private violence, the opinions in which he expressed his heartfelt
views on these subjects are embarrassing performances precisely
because they seem the unmediated expression of self. They are
maudlin (DeShaney 24 ), melodramatic (Webster"), unreasoned
26 27
(Roe, Callins ), narcissistic (Casey"), sophomoric (Roe's his-

2 "Poor Joshua!" DeShaney v Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489

US 189, 212, 213 (1989) (dissenting opinion). Blackmun's dissent bizarrely implies (surely
unintentionally) that if Joshua DeShaney's mother had been allowed to seek damages
under federal law, rather than just under state law (where the damages would have been
lower and the plaintiff's attorney's fees would not have been reimbursable), the irre-
versible brain damage inflicted on Joshua by his father might have been reversed.
' Webster v Reproductive Health Services, 492 US 490, 537 (1989) (concurring and
dissenting opinion).

I fear for the future. I fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women who
have lived and come of age in the 16 years since Roe was decided.

For today, at least, the law of abortion stands undisturbed. For today, the
women of this Nation still retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the signs
are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows.
Id at 538, 560. His fear proved unwarranted.
26 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). On the rhetorical ineptitude of the opinion, see
Richard A- Posner, Sex and Reason 337 (Harvard, 1992).
Callinsv Collins, 114 S Ct 1127, 1128 (1994) (dissenting opinion). As Justice Scalia
pointed out, Justice Blackmun's belief that the death penalty cannot be administered con-
stitutionally is based in significant part on the existence of inconsistent lines of Supreme
Court decisions, and the Court could eliminate the inconsistency by choosing between the
lines. Id at 1127-28 (Scalia concurring).
' PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 112 S Ct 2791 (1992).

I fear for the darkness as four Justices anxiously await the single vote necessary to
extinguish the light.

I am 83 years old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step
down, the confirmation process for my successor well may focus on the issue before
us today.
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1435

tory of abortion from ancient Persia on 9 and the ode to baseball

in Flood v Kuhn3 1), and gratuitously indecorous (Michael M.31 ).
A narcissistic style is different from a pure style, but it is
similar in having what might be called an inward orienta-
tion-albeit inward toward the judge, rather than inward toward
the professional culture. The impure style points outward, toward
the world outside statutes and opinions. Dr. Johnson contrasted
great poets such as Shakespeare who write about life, with lesser
poets who write about the work of their predecessors. The for-
mer:
take their sentiments and descriptions immediately from
knowledge. The resemblance is therefore just; their descrip-
tions are verified by every eye and their sentiments ac-
knowledged by every breast. Those whom their fame invites
to the same studies partly copy them, and partly nature, till
the books of one age gain such authority as to stand in the
place of nature to another; and imitation, always deviating a
little, becomes at last capricious and casual. Shakespeare,
whether life or nature be his subject, shows plainly that he
has seen with his own eyes; he gives the image which he
receives, not weakened or distorted by the intervention of
any other mind; the ignorant feel his representations to be
just and the learned see that they are complete.32
Most judges, like most poets, "copy" the work of their predeces-
sors. They make small additions to the swelling corpus of judicial
opinions, which now number in the millions. A few judges, while
not unmindful of the constraints imposed and the resources sup-
plied by this corpus, look outward to the world of action that law
regulates and the world of thought from which the ideas and
values of the law ultimately derive. These few try to conform
their decisions to this outer world. They need a style suitable to
it and not merely to a professional discourse.
I have said that particular styles seem to cohere with partic-
ular jurisprudential stances. But I have also indicated that

Id at 2844, 2854-55. Mistaken again.

410 US at 130-47.
30 407 US 258, 260-64 (1972).
31 Michael M. v Superior Court, 450 US 464, 483 n * (1981) (concurring opinion)
(extended quotation, irrelevant and in places obscene, from the transcript of a statutory
rape case).
' Johnson, Preface to the Plays of William Shakespeare at 163 (cited in note 13). I
have regularized the spelling and punctuation in this passage.
1436 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

stance cannot automatically be inferred from style. This raises

the question of authenticity. A writing has an implied author (a
"voice" in a sense that goes beyond signature) as well as an ac-
tual author. The implied author is the author whose character
and values we infer from the writing itself, as distinct from the
character and values that we might infer from a personal ac-
quaintanceship with the author or from a good biography of
him.33 As is well known, the actual and the implied author of a
work are often divergent, sometimes shockingly so. (They seem
shockingly convergent in the case of Justice Blackmun.) Why
shouldn't this be equally true of judicial writing? A comparison of
Holmes's correspondence with his opinions or Hand's
preconference memoranda with his opinions shows these two
famously "impure" opinion writers' assuming a loftier, more
formal, more "grown-up" tone in their opinions than in their
private writings. Style is artifice. We cannot exclude the possibili-
ty that if the impure style suddenly became popular, perhaps
because pragmatism had become the orthodox jurisprudence,
formalist judges would employ that style. This seems unlikely,
though, for it implies, somewhat dubiously, both that a consistent
formalist approach to judging is possible and that law clerks can
be taught to write in the impure style. A livelier possibility is
that, as I have already suggested, some nonformalist judges mas-
querade as formalists by employing the pure style. There may
even be a few formalist judges who employ the impure style be-
cause their brand of formalism is unorthodox.
This analysis suggests a warning to judicial biographers and
other observers of the judiciary: do not infer a judge's jurispru-
dential stance from the judge's style without a consideration of
both the content and form of the judge's opinions. Or the judge's
character. All that a choice of style infallibly communicates is
what the judge thinks an admirable character for a judge to
have.

' The creation of the implied author corresponds to the ethical appeal in classical
rhetoric-that is, to the devices by which a speaker tries to convince his audience that he
is the kind of person who is worthy of belief.
Willard Hurst rightly notes Holmes's "irreverence toward judicial pretense"-a sa-
lient characteristic of Holmes's opinions. See Who Is the 'Great'AppellateJudge?,24 Ind L
J 394, 398 (1949).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1437

IV. A CASE STUDY: UNITED STATES V MORRIS

Judge Patricia Wald of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit is an experienced judge and one who
is reflective about opinion writing. 5 Moreover, she is the only
other judicial participant in this Special Issue. I shall illustrate
the modern "pure" style of judicial opinion writing with an opin-
ion, United States v Morris," drawn essentially at random from
Judge Wald's decisions, and I shall then contrast it with a rather
obscure opinion by Holmes.
The principal issue in Morris was whether the defendant had
used a gun "during and in relation to a drug trafficking of-
fense."" The jury found that he had, and he appealed, challeng-
ing both that conviction and his conviction for the underlying
drug offense, possession of cocaine with intent to sell it. The third
sentence of the opinion announces: "We reject both challenges
and affirm the judgment below."" "Impure" stylists generally
avoid beginning their opinions with the conclusion. It gives the
impression that the opinion is just the rationalization of a preor-
dained decision, rather than an exploration leading up to a con-
clusion that might be changed in the course of writing-which
does happen from time to time. And starting with the punchline
rather spoils the story; the impure style is more dramatic, the
pure more discursive. I imagine that Judge Wald would deem
these considerations frivolous.
The next section of the Morris opinion (after the conclusion)
is captioned "I. Background," and consists of a meticulous state-
ment of the crimes and the course of the trial. The defendant was
arrested in a one-bedroom apartment in which were also found
one hundred small ziplock bags containing cocaine, and three
loaded pistols. Two of the guns were found under the cushions of
the living room couch where Morris was sitting when the officers
entered, and the third was found in a nightstand in the bedroom.
The bags of cocaine were hidden in ducts in the bedroom ceiling.
We learn the date on which Morris was arrested and his apart-
ment searched. We even learn the street address of the apart-
ment.3 9 These details of time and place are extraneous but con-

' See, for example, Patricia M. Wald, How I Write, 4 Scribes J Legal Writing 55
(1993).
(9 977 F2d 617 (DC
Cir 1992).
", Id at 618.
Id.
Id at 619.
1438 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

tribute to the sense that the court is in command of all the facts
and hence is more likely to be right.
There follows a brief, unexceptionable, but also not strictly
necessary statement of the standard of appellate re-
view-unnecessary because it is well known and because nothing
in the case turns on it-and then comes a discussion of Morris's
first ground of appeal, that there was not enough evidence to
convict him of possession of the drugs." "Possession, of course,
can be either actual or constructive."4 "Constructive possession"
is actually a rather tricky concept, so we may suspect that the "of
course" is a bit of whistling in the dark. It does not help much to
be told that constructive possession "requires evidence supporting
the conclusion that the defendant had the ability to exercise
knowing 'dominion and control."'42 Or that "[a] jury is entitled to
infer that a person exercises constructive possession over items
found in his home."' The opinion reviews the facts and finds
"ample evidence from which the jury could infer that Morris lived
alone in the apartment and exercised constructive possession
over its contents.""
One begins to sense that an elephant gun is being discharged
against a mouse. Morris was found in an apartment fairly burst-
ing with drugs, and there was plenty of evidence that he was the
only resident of the apartment. He testified, it is true, that he
was just a visitor, that he had in fact, by an unhappy coinci-
dence, showed up just a few minutes before the police raid. The
jury did not have to believe this and obviously did not. It believed
he was the tenant, so the drugs must have been his, since no
theory was advanced as to who else might have owned the drugs
if Morris was indeed the tenant. There is really no more that the
opinion needed to say about the drug conviction. Indeed, I find
the notion of "constructive" possession of the contents of one's
own apartment extremely weird. Morris was sitting on his couch
when the police entered. Was he in merely "constructive" posses-
sion of the couch? If so, then what is "actual" possession?
The bulk of the opinion is given over to Morris's challenge to
his conviction for having used or carried a gun during and in

Quite rightly, the opinion deals summarily with the question whether, if Morris
possessed the cocaine found in the apartment, he possessed it with the intention of selling
it. That was obvious from the quantity and packaging of the drugs. See id at 620.
41 Id at 619.
42 Id.
43 Id at 620.
Id.
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1439

relation to his drug dealings.4 5 The opinion says that the court
is going to analyze this as a "use" rather than a "carry" case. But
a footnote toys with the alarming possibility-the sort of thing
that makes the laity wonder about the legal mind-that Morris
could have been found to be "carrying" the two guns found under
the couch on which he was sitting when the officers entered the
apartment.4 6 And here is a warning against footnotes in judicial
opinions: although the "carry" footnote says the guns were under
the couch, the statement of facts with which the opinion had
begun (well, almost begun) had said that they were in the couch,
under the seat cushions,47 which if true (it is repeated later, so I
shall assume it is true) makes the idea that Morris committed
the carrying offense a little more plausible.
In the text we are told that the test for the "use" offense is
whether "the gun facilitated or had a role in the trafficking of-
fense"---but this is just a restatement of "use"--and that to
help in applying the test, "this court has identified a number of
factors.... We discuss only some of them here, recognizing that
courts have identified and will identify others."49 This is faintly
alarming. Multifactor tests are notoriously difficult to apply, and
the difficulties are not reduced by leaving the list of factors open-
ended. More to my present point, multifactor tests invite tedious,
,meandering opinions.
The first factor discussed is possession. But while stressing
its importance, the opinion also expresses puzzlement about how
someone could use a gun that he did not possess. The obvious
answer, though it is not mentioned, is that he could threaten to
use a gun that was not his-and that he would never have tried
to grab-but that was within his reach, making his threatening
gesture credible.
The opinion says that "[miere possession of a gun even by a
drug trafficker does not violate the statute" but that the statute
does reach "any case in which the gun facilitated or had a role in
the trafficking offense."" This means that "the defendant's pos-
session of the gun is an important factor," and "[p]ossession, of
course [of course], encompasses joint, as well as constructive

See 18 USCA § 924(c)(1) (Supp 1995).

4' Morris, 977 F2d at 620 n 1.
4' Id at 619.
Id at 621.
49 Id.
0 Id.
1440 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

possession." 1 It begins to look as if, despite the initial denial,

mere possession of a gun by a drug dealer is use during and in
relation to the drug offense. But maybe not, if it is in a safe-de-
posit box, for "[a] gun kept close at hand is more likely being
used for protection than a gun packed away in a hard-to-reach
spot."5 2 But drug dealers, like the rest of the armed population,
have little use for guns other than protection, so why would they
ever pack their guns away in hard-to-reach spots?
Other factors are discussed. One is the "proximity of the gun
to the drugs."53 I think it is correct that, other things being
equal, the closer the gun is to the drugs the more likely they are
intended for conjoint use. So I was surprised to find the court say
that proximity can cut either way. The court gives the curious
example of a case in which the gun and the drugs were found
together in the pocket of a raincoat in the defendant's closet; the
inference was therefore that the gun was intended only to be
used for some future sale, when he put on his coat and went
outside.54 But it wasn't the proximity of the gun to the drugs
that tended to show that the gun was not intended for use in
connection with a current sale; it was the fact that both the gun
and the drugs were in a raincoat in a closet.
The next factor discussed is "whether the gun is loaded."
"[T]he number and type of guns" are then brought in as factor
number five.55 These two, really three, factors seem not to have
much heft. The opinion makes clear that one unloaded gun of
ordinary design accessible to Morris would have been quite
enough for his conviction to be sustained, especially since the
government's expert witness testified to "the well-nigh universal
use of guns to protect such [drug-trafficking] operations."55
The purest makeweight factor discussed is whether the gun
is on "open display."57 If it is, this suggests "a deterrent to
poachers.... This is not to say, however, that a gun that is with-
in reach, though out of sight, does not also strongly suggest its
intended use for protection of the drugs."" Heads the govern-
ment wins, tails the defendant loses.

51 Id.
52 Id.
Id at 622.
United States v Bruce, 939 F2d 1053 (DC Cir 1991).
Morris, 977 F2d at 622.
Id at 622.
57 Id.
Id at 622-23.
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1441

Trudging patiently through all the factors mentioned in pre-

vious cases (well, not all-just nine, by my count, although the
opinion stops counting at five) conveys an impression of deliber-
ateness, of moving step by step, of leaving no stone unturned. It
is a reassuring style, not only because it gives the impression of
great thoroughness but also because it enables the opinion to be
padded with a number of propositions of unchallengeable truth,
propositions of the kind that such-and-such a factor was men-
tioned in such-and-such a case. Padding is an important part of
most judicial opinions. Judges are not comfortable writing opin-
ions to the effect that, "We have very little sense of what is going
on in this case. The record is poorly developed, and the lawyers
are lousy. We have no confidence that we have got it right. We
know we're groping in the dark. But we're paid to decide cases,
and here goes." Nevertheless, this is the actual character of many
appellate cases that are decided in published opinions.59 The
simplest cases are not brought, or not appealed, or are decided in
unpublished opinions (sometimes with no opinion-just with the
word "affirmed"). A substantial fraction of published appellate
opinions are in close cases, and another substantial fraction are
in cases that do not seem close but that are in a muddle of one
sort of another. The unnecessary details and truisms that stud
most judicial opinions create a soothing facade of facticity.
But this style, appealing as it is (not wholly for bad reasons)
to the judicial mind, obscures the issue in some cases, possibly
including the "use or carry" gun cases. Americans love guns and
fear violent crime. A vast number of perfectly law-abiding Ameri-
cans, including-perhaps especially including-the residents of
big-city slums, keep loaded guns in their homes to protect them-
selves from intruders." Some of these people are not law-abid-
ing6 yet keep loaded guns in their homes for reasons unrelated
to their illegal activities, in fact for the same reasons as the law-
abiding people. The challenge for the courts in administering the
"use or carry" statute is, one might have thought, to distinguish

' As Learned Hand acknowledged: "The fact that we are ourselves not agreed
cautions us that we should not be too sure of our conclusion; and obviously the really
important matter is that the question should reach the Supreme Court as soon as pos-
sible." Fishgold v Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 154 F2d 785, 791 (2d Cir 1946).
' A careful recent study estimates that 10 percent of all U.S. households contain a
loaded and unlocked-that is, an immediately usable-firearm. David Hemenway, Sara J.
Solnick, and Deborah R. Azrael, FirearmTrainingand Storage, 273 JAMA 46, 48 (1995).
", These would be in addition to the 10 percent in the survey referred to in the pre-
ceding footnote. It was a telephone survey, and 27 percent of those called refused to be
interviewed. Id at 47. Undoubtedly the non-law-abiding were among the nonrespondents.
1442 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

between having a gun for self-protection and having it for the

protection of one's drug business, or of oneself in one's capacity
as a drug dealer. The Morris opinion does not relate the factors
that it discusses to this task of distinguishing between these two
possible inferences from defendants' having loaded guns lying
about, and the relation is not obvious. It would be absurd to
suppose, for example, that the concept of "possession" could help
distinguish between a gun kept for self-protection and a gun kept
for the defense of illegal drugs; or that whether the gun was
loaded, working, accessible to the owner, and strategically placed
for defense of self and property could do so. As the size of the
arsenal grows, as the arsenal takes on a more "professional"
character, as the proximity of the arsenal to the drugs increases,
the inference that the guns are being used to defend drugs rather
than (just) person or other property grows. The decisive factor in
Morris's case, I think, was that he had stuffed two guns under
the cushions of his couch-an extraordinary location for a home-
defense arsenal. Rather than zero in on this critical fact, the
court actually forgot it in the "carry" footnote.
I admit that it is a critical fact only if I have got the purpose
of the statute right, and I may not have. Maybe the purpose is
simply to punish drug dealers who, having guns at hand, could
use them in their drug business. The language of the statute is
not entirely consistent with such an interpretation-it does, after
all, say "use" rather than "could use"--but many of the cases
nonetheless interpret it this way.62 I do not want to get any deep-
er into the question of what the statute means. 63 That is not my
subject, and the opinion in the Morris case does not so much as
hint that there might be an interpretive question.
My point is that the style of the opinion retards the search
for meaning. With its patient marshaling of factors and facts and
its dense citation of previous cases (twenty-five in all, mostly con-
cerned with the gun charge), the opinion is calculated to sweep
the reader along to a confident conclusion that Morris was guilty
of the gun offense as well as of the drug offense. It is highly ef-
fective rhetoric.6 That is one reason why the "pure" style of ju-

6 See, for example, United States v Edwards, 36 F3d 639, 644 (7th Cir 1994).
63 Judge Wald's court has discarded the multifactor approach to gun cases in favor of
a much simpler approach, in which proximity of the guns to the drugs and accessibility of
the guns to the defendant are the only factors to be considered. United States v Bailey, 36
F3d 106 (DC Cir 1994) (en banc). Judge Wald dissented, as did several other judges. None
of the opinions, however, discusses the theory of the statute that I expound above.
' See Duangkamol Chartprasert, How Bureaucratic Writing Style Affects Source
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1443

dicial opinion writing is dominant, the other reason being that it

is the style that comes naturally to the pen of a person who is
legally trained. I have not been picking on a weak opinion, or on
a heterodox one.
I connect the style of Morris with Judge Wald's comment
that "[f]ormer academicians... sometimes feel a compulsion to
reinvent the wheel,"6 5 and her comment that Holmes, whom she
describes as one "of our best opinion writers in the late 19th cen-
tury,""s "wrote elegantly, but he also made mistakes."" I think
she thinks that the time for elegance, for "the judge shut away in
a library by herself,"" has passed. I imagine she thinks that
after so many opinions have been written about the "use and
carry" provision, it would be impertinent to suppose the basic
meaning of the statute unsettled, the wheel uninvented; and that
Holmes is a charming fossil.
I hope she's wrong.

V. SPEAK, FosSIL!
Stack v New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. 9 is not one of Holmes's
best-known opinions. It was written in 1900, when Holmes was
still on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. It deals with
a personal injury suit. Shortly before trial, two doctors selected
by the defendants conducted a medical examination of the plain-
tiff. After trial began and the plaintiff completed the presentation
of his evidence, and after the two doctors had testified for the
defense, the defendant asked the court to order the plaintiff to
submit to another medical examination, by a third doctor selected
by the defendant. The plaintiff objected on the ground that his
relations with that doctor were unfriendly, but offered to submit
to an examination by any other doctor selected by the defendant.
The defendant declined the offer. The judge refused to order the
examination, "ruling that [he] had no power or right to make

Credibility, 70 Journalism Q 150 (1993), finding that a writer who employs a bureaucratic
style, marked by passive voice, nominalization, abstraction, and jargon, is likely to be
rated by readers as having greater expertise than a writer who employs a
nonbureaucratic style to say the same thing. Compare Tushnet, 11 Const Commentary at
225 (cited in note 1).
Wald, 4 Scribes J Legal Writing at 61 (cited in note 35).
Id at 62. He was not appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court until 1902.
67 Id at 60.
68 Id.

' 177 Mass 155, 58 NE 686 (1900). The opinion is less than two pages long, so I shall
not pinpoint cite my quotations from it.
1444 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

[such an order] under the circumstances." The defendant ap-

pealed.
All this is stated in a short paragraph, no longer than my
paraphrase; and without further preliminaries we are in the
heart of the opinion, where Holmes first considers whether
the words "under the circumstances" so far cut down the
seemingly absolute denial of power in the first part of the
ruling that it meant only to state emphatically the plain
injustice and outrage which it would have been to make the
order proposed.
Holmes thinks that this is probably the correct interpretation of
the ruling, and remarks,
When the plaintiff coupled with his objection an offer to
accept any other doctor whom the defendant might choose to
send, bearing in mind the large possibilities that were open
by telegraph and rail, he had a plain right to have his per-
sonality respected to the small extent that he asked. If that
is all that ruling meant, as it certainly was all that was
needed to dispose of the matter, in our opinion it was right.
There are no citations as yet; none is needed. There are no
names or dates. There are no footnotes and no headings. There is
not an ounce of fat.
Holmes could have stopped with the sentence I just quoted,
but he decided to go on. The words that immediately follow that
sentence are, "But, if the ruling requires the decision of a broader
question, we agree with... [other courts] that the power does
not exist." Three cases are cited in support, and two more go the
other way, but none is discussed. The statement of authorities is
merely an introduction to Holmes's discussion of the issue, which
begins with the common-sense observation that "the need of the
power [of compulsory examination] easily may be exaggerated,
because, if, contrary to usual experience, a plaintiff should dare
to refuse a reasonable examination, it would be the subject of
just comment to the jury." But Holmes has bigger fish to fry. His
next point is that the power claimed is contrary to the traditions
of the common law, which "was very slow to sanction any viola-
tion of or interference with the person of a free citizen." And this
is true. For example, a money judgment, the standard remedy in
a case at law, operates against the defendant's goods; it is not an
order that he pay, disobedience to which might be punishable as
contempt.
19951 Judges' Writing Styles 1445

Holmes moves now to his largest point, which is political or

jurisprudential in character, and which he justifies introducing
because "[w]e agree that, in view of the great increase of actions
for personal injuries, it may be desirable that the courts should
have the power in dispute." And Holmes acknowledges-pretty
daringly for 1900--t'hat in a clear case it might be possible even
to break away from a line of decisions in favor of some rule gen-
erally admitted to be based upon a deeper insight into the pres-
ent wants of society." That, however, is a power to be exercised
with great caution:
[T]he improvements made by the courts are made, almost
invariably, by very slow degrees and by very short steps.
Their general duty is not to change, but to work out, the
principles already sanctioned by the practice of the past. No
one supposes that a judge is at liberty to decide with sole
reference even to his strongest convictions of policy and
right.... No one supposes that this court might have antici-
pated the legislature by declaring parties to be competent
witnesses, any more than today it could abolish the require-
ment of consideration for a simple contract. In the present
case we perceive not such pressing need of our anticipating
the legislature as to justify our departure from what we
cannot doubt is the settled tradition of the common law, to a
point beyond that which we believe to have been reached by
equity, and beyond any to which our statutes dealing with
kindred subjects ever have seen fit to go.
The ability demonstrated by Holmes in the Stack opinion of
embedding the particular issue presented by a case in a much
broader context, here consisting both of the common law tradition
and of the institutional role of courts in the scheme of American
government, is characteristic of great judges." It not only lends
resonance to an opinion but also connects what may be a narrow
technical issue of interest only to lawyers-and often to precious
few of them-with concerns shared by a broader educated public
that in Stack would include historians and political scientists. An
opinion so crafted speaks in the language of the general intellec-
tual community to that community. And this ascent from a
pinched professional discourse to a sunnier upland of general
culture can fairly be described as a stylistic characteristic of the

"' See Paul A. Freund, Foreword:Homage to Mr. Justice Cardozo, 1 Cardozo L Rev 1,
2 (1979).
1446 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

opinions of the great judges. It is combined in Stack as in

Holmes's opinions generally (allowing for the slightly musty fla-
vor of 1900-vintage judicial prose to the modern palate) with an
utter simplicity and economy of expression and a determined
refusal to overpower the reader with a parade of learning. The
opinion cites a total of eight cases, two statutes, and one treatise.
Have we outgrown Holmes's style of opinion writing? Does it
belong to some primitive era of judicial expression, before law
clerks and the Bluebook? Does it deserve Judge Wald's conde-
scension? Is it somehow unavailable to modern judges dealing
with modern issues?7 I answer all these questions "no." Case-
loads are heavier, but judges have far more help, both mechani-
cal and human. Certainly the docket of the modern judge is no
less interesting than dockets in 1900. If the modern judge is less
interesting, who is to blame?

VI. THE EFFECT OF STYLE ON CONTENT

I have noted the affinity of the pure style to formalist con-
tent. I want now to consider whether a judicial writing
style-which might be adopted for reasons independent of one's
jurisprudential stance (because one could not write any other
way, because of one's aesthetic principles, or because a particular
style was in fashion)-can affect content. I think it can, even if
one concedes as I do that judicial writing is effectively para-
phrasable. While it is possible to formulate a position in prag-
matic terms to oneself and then wrap it in formalist wrapping
paper, as Cardozo appears to have done in MacPherson v Buick
Motor Co.,72 there is a danger that the wrapping will make it
more difficult for the writer as well as for the reader to come to
grips with the essential questions.
That may have happened in the Morris opinion. In its preoc-
cupation with enumerating and applying a series of factors men-
tioned in previous cases, it seems, I respectfully suggest, to have
lost sight of what may have been the essential question about the
gun charge (depending on one's view of the statute's purpose,
about which the opinion is silent): whether Morris would have
possessed the same armory identically deployed had he not been
a drug dealer. It is easier to grasp that question as a gestalt than

1 The power to compel a medical examination of an opposing party is no longer open

to doubt. See FRCP 37; Sibbach v Wilson and Co., 312 US 1 (1941).
217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050 (1916). See Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning 14-18 (Chicago, 1949); Posner, Cardozo at 108-09 (cited in note 1).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1447

to reformulate it as whether enough of the previously identified

factors were present to warrant an inference that the guns were
intended for the protection of Morris's drug dealing. The gestalt
approach brings more quickly and surely into view the critical
fact (as it seems to me)-that there were two guns under the
cushions in the sofa. It is possible that the court posed the ques-
tion to itself in functional terms but decided not to write the
opinion in those terms. But there is no hint of that in the opin-
ion, whereas reading between the lines in MacPhersonone gets a
fairly broad hint of the practical concerns that motivated
Cardozo.
We tend to believe that words enable thought. But words can
also substitute for thought. The pure style is an anodyne for
thought. The impure style forces-well, invites-the writer to dig
below the verbal surface of the doctrines that he is interpreting
and applying. What he may find is merely his own emotions, as I
have suggested may be the case with a number of Blackmun's
opinions. It is also true of many of Black's and Douglas's opin-
ions. But if the judge is lucky, he may find, when he digs beneath
the verbal surface of legal doctrine, the deep springs of the law.
The idea of punishing drug dealers more heavily for (in some
sense) using guns in connection with their drug dealing is not
senseless or inoperable. But its sensible application is not ad-
vanced by chanting a litany of relevant factors.
There is a further point. It has to do with the difference be-
tween thinking and writing (with informal speaking in the mid-
dle). In thinking about a case, a judge might come to a definite
conclusion yet find the conclusion indefensible when he tries to
write an opinion explaining and justifying it. The reason is that
we do not think entirely in words, and certainly not entirely in
sentences and paragraphs. Inarticulable or even unconscious
feelings and impressions fill in around the sentence fragments
that form in our minds as we think about a problem. This silent,
incompletely verbalized thinking can be insightful, as I implied
in my reference to approaching an issue as a gestalt rather than
analytically. But it can also be muddy, with the result that when
we try to systematize it in sentences and paragraphs that are
unmistakable because written down and not just imperfectly
remembered, we may find that our confident conclusion is wrong;
it "will not write." Reasoning that seemed sound when "in the
head" may seem half-baked when written down, especially since
the written form of an argument encourages some degree of criti-
cal detachment in the writer, who in reading what he has written
1448 The University of Chicago Law Review [62:1421

will be wondering how an audience would react. Many writers

have the experience of not knowing except in a general sense
what they are going to write until they start writing. A link is
somehow forged between the unconscious and the pen. The link
is lost to the judge who does not write.
The difference between what is merely thought in silence
and what is written down is a reason for having judicial opinions
rather than blind announcements of results. It also cautions
against allowing law clerks to draft judicial opinions. The law
clerk will be reluctant to confess to the judge or even to himself
that the outcome that the judge told him to write up will not
write (and he may think it due to his own inexperience), while
the judge, by not writing, will be spared a painful confrontation
with the inadequacy of the reasoning that supports his decision.
The judge could be thought to be delegating the dirty work of de-
fending an unprincipled decision to the clerk. Delegating imple-
mentation is a traditional method of avoiding having to confront
the consequences of one's decisions. I am not suggesting that it is
a conscious strategy of judges. The judge does not know the opin-
ion will not write, and the law clerk will not tell him.
I said when discussing Cardozo that it is possible to be a
pragmatic judge yet write one's opinions in the conventional
"pure" style. But it is difficult. If you are the kind of judge who
thinks that the considerations that bear on a judicial decision
range far beyond the canonical materials of formalist legal
thought-if you think that values (not just "feelings"), history,
and policy are legitimate considerations-you will find the "pure"
style confining because it is not designed for the expression of
those considerations. To the impure poet, "nothing that is avail-73
able in human experience is to be legislated out of poetry."
Substitute "law" for "poetry" and we have the credo of the "im-
pure" judicial stylist.
There is a striking example in Hand's opinion in Fishgold v
Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp7 4 The issue was whether the
veterans' reemployment statute gave the returning veteran more
seniority than any nonveteran in his job classification. Among the
considerations that persuaded Hand and his colleagues that the
answer was "no" was the following:

73 Warren, Pure and Impure Poetry at 26 (cited in note 11).

74 154 F2d 785 (2d Cir 1946).
1995] Judges' Writing Styles 1449

When we consider the situation at the time that the Act was
passed-September, 1940-it is extremely improbable that
Congress should have meant to grant any broader privilege
than as we are measuring it. It is true that the nation had
become deeply disturbed at its defenseless position, and had
begun to make ready; but it was not at war, and the issue
still hung in the balance whether it ever would be at war. If
we carry ourselves back to that summer and autumn, we
shall recall that the presidential campaigns of both parties
avoided commitment upon that question, and that each
candidate particularly insisted that no troops should be sent
overseas. The original act limited service to one year, and it
was most improbable that within that time we should be
called upon to fight upon our own soil; as indeed the event
proved, for we were still at peace in September, 1941. Con-
gress was calling young men to the colors to give them an
adequate preparation for our defence, but with no forecast of
the appalling experiences which they were later to undergo.
Against that background it is not likely that a proposal
would then have been accepted which gave industrial priori-
ty, regardless of their length of employment, to unmarried
men ....75
This effort "to reconstruct... the purpose of Congress when it7
used the words in which [the provisions in issue] were cast"
owes nothing to distinctively "legal" methods of reasoning and
could not, I think, be adequately expressed in a style designed for
the articulation of those methods. It may be a good or a bad ap-
proach to statutory interpretation, but that is not the issue.
Judges whose thought carries-rightly or wrongly-beyond the
conventional categories of legal thinking need a style equal to the
range of considerations that they consider relevant. They need a
style that is increasingly rare.

' Id at 788-89.
76 Id at 789.