THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147932. January 25, 2006.]

LAILA G. DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, MAGDALENA B. DACARRA, and
ERLINDA P. ORAYAN, respondents.

Pedro R. Lazo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRELIMINARY

INVESTIGATION; CLARIFICATORY HEARING IS OPTIONAL ON THE PART OF THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER. — A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable
during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a
clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as
evidenced by the use of the term "may" in Section 3 (e) of Rule 112. This
provision states: (e) If the investigating officer believes that there are
matters to be clarified he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. . . . The use of the word "may" in a statute commonly
denotes that it is directory in nature. The term "may" is generally permissive
only and operates to confer discretion. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 112, it is
within the discretion of the investigation officer whether to set the case for
further hearings to clarify some matters.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE AND PURPOSE THEREOF EXPLAINED. —
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were accorded
equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their respective evidence
during the preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an opportunity to
be heard. Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of due process since
she was given the opportunity of a hearing. She even submitted her counter-
affidavit to the investigating prosecutor on 18 January 2000. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits.
Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether the respondent is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion
for the full and exhaustive display of the parties' evidence. Hence, if the
investigating prosecutor is already satisfied that he can reasonably
determine the existence of probable cause based on the parties' evidence
thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and resolve the case.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECURING AUTOPSY REPORT DURING PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS NOT PROHIBITED. — Though the autopsy report is not part
of the parties' evidence, the Rules on preliminary investigation do not forbid
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 the investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law
requiring the investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before securing a
copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the causes of
Ronald's death, can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report
bolstered complainants' allegations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, DEFINED; EXEMPLIFIED IN CASE
AT BAR. — Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty of the crime. In the present
case, Ronald, a nine year-old student, died five days after his teacher,
petitioner in this case, allegedly banged his head against that of his
classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in the records showing petitioner's
specific denial of the occurrence of such act. Petitioner simply stated that
"the head-banging incident happened but [she] did not perpetrate it." In
effect, petitioner admits the occurrence of the head-banging incident but
denies committing it. The alleged intervening events before Ronald died,
namely: (a) the consultation with a quack doctor, and (b) the three-day
confinement in the East Avenue Medical Center, are not sufficient to break
the relation of the felony committed and the resulting injury. Were it not for
the head-banging incident, Ronald might not have needed medical
assistance in the first place.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT 7610; CHILD ABUSE AS DEFINED,
NOT AMBIGUOUS; RATIONALE. — Contrary to petitioner's contention, Section
10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610 is clear. This provision reads: (a) Any person
who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. Ambiguity is a
condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more
than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. A
statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. In
the present case, petitioner fails to show convincingly the ambiguity in
Section 10 (a), Article VI of RA 7610. Section 3 (b), Article VI of RA 7610
defines "child abuse" as the maltreatment whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes physical abuse and cruelty. Petitioner's alleged banging
of the heads of Ronald and Lorendo is clearly an act of cruelty.

DECISION

CARPIO, J : p

The Case
This petition for certiorari 1 assails the Resolutions dated 15 September
2000 and 19 April 2001 of the Secretary of the Department of Justice ("DOJ
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 Secretary") in I.C. No. 99-6254. 2 The DOJ Secretary 3 denied Laila G. De
Ocampo's ("petitioner") petition for review of the investigating prosecutor's
finding of probable cause against her for homicide 4 in relation to Section
10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 ("RA 7610") 5 and for violation of
the same provision of RA 7610. The DOJ Secretary 6 also denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
The present case arose from a sworn statement of respondent
Magdalena B. Dacarra ("Magdalena") executed before the Women's Desk of
the CPD Police Station in Batasan Hills, Quezon City on 10 December 1999.
Magdalena stated that on 4 December 1999, her nine-year-old son Ronald
complained of dizziness upon arriving home at about six in the evening.
Ronald then vomited, prompting Magdalena to ask what happened. Ronald
replied that petitioner, who was Ronald's teacher, banged his head against
that of his classmate Lorendo Orayan ("Lorendo"). Magdalena inspected
Ronald's head and saw a woundless contusion. Due to Ronald's continued
vomiting, Magdalena brought him to a quack doctor (arbularyo) on 5
December 1999. The following morning, Magdalena brought Ronald to the
East Avenue Medical Center where he underwent an x-ray. The attending
physician informed Magdalena that Ronald's head had a fracture. Blood
oozed out of Ronald's nose before he died on 9 December 1999.
Lorendo also executed a sworn statement narrating how petitioner
banged his head against Ronald's.
During the inquest proceedings on 14 December 1999, Assistant
Quezon City Prosecutor Maria Lelibet Sampaga ("inquest prosecutor") ruled
as follows:
Evidence warrants the release of the respondent for further
investigation of the charges against her. The case is not proper for
inquest as the incident complained of happened on December 4,
1999. Further, we find the evidence insufficient to support the charge
for homicide against the respondent. There is no concrete evidence to
show proof that the alleged banging of the heads of the two minor
victims could be the actual and proximate cause of the death of minor
Ronald Dacarra y Baluton. Besides, the police report submitted by the
respondent in this case states that said victim bears stitches or
sutures on the head due to a vehicular accident. There is no
certainty, therefore, that respondent's alleged wrongdoing
contributed or caused the death of said victim. 7
Subsequently, the case was referred to Assistant Quezon City
Prosecutor Lorna F. Catris-Chua Cheng ("investigating prosecutor") for
preliminary investigation. She scheduled the first hearing on 6 January 2000.
Respondent Erlinda P. Orayan ("Erlinda"), Lorendo's mother, attended
the hearing of 6 January 2000 and alleged that petitioner offered her
P100,000, which she initially accepted, for her and her son's non-appearance
at the preliminary investigation. Erlinda presented the money to the
investigating prosecutor.

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 On 7 January 2000, Jennilyn Quirong, who witnessed the head-banging
incident, and Melanie Lugales, who claimed to be another victim of
petitioner's alleged cruel deeds, filed their sworn statements with the Office
of the Quezon City Prosecutor.
On 18 January 2000, petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit.
Petitioner invoked the disposition of the inquest prosecutor finding
insufficient evidence to support the charges against her. Petitioner assailed
the omission in Magdalena's sworn statement about Ronald's head injury
due to a vehicular accident in November 1997. Petitioner pointed out the
absence of damage or injury on Lorendo as borne out by his medical
certificate. Petitioner contended that the head-banging incident was not the
proximate cause of Ronald's death, but the failed medical attention or
medical negligence. Petitioner also alleged that Jennilyn Quirong and
Melanie Lugales have immature perception. Petitioner further asserted that
the causes of death stated in Ronald's Death Certificate are hearsay and
inadmissible in the preliminary investigation. cTaDHS

Ronald's Death Certificate shows the immediate cause of his death as

"Cardio Pulmonary Arrest," the underlying cause as "Cerebral Edema," and
other significant conditions contributing to death as "Electrolyte imbalance
and vomiting." The Autopsy Report, obtained by the investigating prosecutor
from the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, states the cause of death as
"Intracranial hemorrhage secondary to traumatic injury of the head."
The investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against petitioner for the offenses charged. The dispositive portion of
the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that [petitioner] be charged with Homicide in relation
to Art. VI, Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610 and Violation of Art. VI, Sec. 10(a) of
R.A. 7610 with no bail recommended for the Homicide since par. 6 of
Art. VI of Sec. 10 of R.A. 7610 provides that:
"For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of
acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, par. 2 and 263,
par. 1 Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the
crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation and
serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age."
Bail recommended: No bail recommended — Homicide, in relation to
Art. VI, Sec. 10, R.A. 7610; and Twenty Thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) — Viol. of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. 7610 8

Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for review with the DOJ.

In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating
prosecutor showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and Erlinda
("complainants") for not conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally
procuring the autopsy report. Petitioner argued that the investigating
prosecutor erred in concluding that her alleged act of banging Ronald and
Lorendo's heads was the cause of Ronald's injury and that such was an act
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 of child abuse. Petitioner also alleged that it is the Office of the Ombudsman
which has jurisdiction over the case, and not the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office.
The Resolution of the DOJ Secretary
The DOJ Secretary denied the petition for review. The DOJ Secretary
held that there was no bias in complainants' favor when the investigating
prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procured
the autopsy report as nothing precluded her from doing so.
The DOJ Secretary upheld the investigating prosecutor's finding that
Ronald's injury was the direct and natural result of petitioner's act of banging
Ronald and Lorendo's heads. The DOJ Secretary stated that petitioner never
denied such act, making her responsible for all its consequences even if the
immediate cause of Ronald's death was allegedly the failed medical
attention or medical negligence. The DOJ Secretary held that assuming there
was failure of medical attention or medical negligence, these inefficient
intervening causes did not break the relation of the felony committed and
the resulting injury.
The DOJ Secretary rejected petitioner's claim that she is innocent as
held by the inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor did not dismiss the
case. She merely recommended petitioner's release for further investigation
since the case was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then
insufficient.
The DOJ Secretary further stated that the omission in Magdalena's
sworn statement about Ronald's head injury due to a vehicular accident in
November 1997 and the absence of any injury on Lorendo are
inconsequential.
Moreover, the DOJ Secretary ruled that whether the statements of the
causes of death in the death certificate and autopsy report are hearsay, and
whether Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales have immature perception,
are evidentiary matters which should be determined during trial. The DOJ
Secretary also sustained the investigating prosecutor's conclusion that the
banging of Ronald and Lorendo's heads is an act of child abuse.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 9 which the DOJ Secretary
denied in his Resolution dated 19 April 2001. 10
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:

1. Whether petitioner was denied due process during the

preliminary investigation; and

2. Whether there is probable cause against petitioner for

homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 and for
violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
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 The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Before resolving the substantive issues in this case, the Court will
address the procedural issue raised by the Office of the Solicitor General
("OSG"). 11 The OSG contends that instead of Rule 65, Rule 43 is applicable
to the present case. Thus, the OSG argues that the petition should be
dismissed outright for being filed with this Court, instead of with the Court of
Appeals, under a wrong mode of appeal. On the other hand, assuming Rule
65 applies, the OSG points out that the petition for certiorari should be filed
with the Court of Appeals.
Based on Memorandum Circular No. 58, 12 the resolution of the DOJ
Secretary is appealable administratively to the Office of the President since
the offenses charged in this case are punishable by reclusion perpetua. 13
From the Office of the President, the aggrieved party may file an appeal with
the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 43. 14
Even assuming that the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the assailed Resolutions amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed the instant petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals. Hence, on the issue alone of the propriety of the
remedy sought by petitioner, this petition for certiorari must fail. However,
considering the gravity of the offenses charged and the need to expedite the
disposition of this case, the Court will relax the rules and finally resolve this
case in the interest of substantial justice. aTHASC

Whether petitioner was denied

due process during the preliminary investigation
Absence of a clarificatory hearing
The Court rejects petitioner's contention that she was denied due
process when the investigating prosecutor did not conduct a clarificatory
hearing. A clarificatory hearing is not indispensable during preliminary
investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is
optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of
the term "may" in Section 3(e) of Rule 112. This provision states:
(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are
matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during
which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present
but without the right to examine or cross-examine. . . . 15
(emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "may" in a statute commonly denotes that it is

directory in nature. The term "may" is generally permissive only and
operates to confer discretion. 16 Under Section 3(e) of Rule 112, it is within
the discretion of the investigation officer whether to set the case for further
hearings to clarify some matters.
In this case, the investigating prosecutor no longer conducted hearings
after petitioner submitted her counter-affidavit. This simply means that at
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 that point the investigating prosecutor believed that there were no more
matters for clarification. It is only in petitioner's mind that some "crucial
points" still exist and need clarification. In any event, petitioner can raise
these "important" matters during the trial proper.
Petitioner was not deprived of due process since both parties were
accorded equal rights in arguing their case and presenting their respective
evidence during the preliminary investigation. Due process is merely an
opportunity to be heard. 17 Petitioner cannot successfully invoke denial of
due process since she was given the opportunity of a hearing. 18 She even
submitted her counter-affidavit to the investigating prosecutor on 18 January
2000.
Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits. 19 Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has
been committed and whether the respondent is probably guilty of the
crime. 20 It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the
parties' evidence. 21 Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is already
satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause
based on the parties' evidence thus presented, he may terminate the
proceedings and resolve the case.
Obtaining a copy of the autopsy report
Petitioner argues that she was denied the right to examine evidence
submitted by complainants when the investigating prosecutor unilaterally
obtained a copy of the autopsy report from the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Petitioner fails to persuade us. Though the autopsy report is not part of
the parties' evidence, the Rules on preliminary investigation do not forbid
the investigating prosecutor from obtaining it. Neither is there a law
requiring the investigating prosecutor to notify the parties before securing a
copy of the autopsy report. The autopsy report, which states the causes of
Ronald's death, can either absolve or condemn the petitioner. Unfortunately
for petitioner, the investigating prosecutor found that the autopsy report
bolstered complainants' allegations.
Moreover, there is nothing to support petitioner's claim that the
investigating prosecutor was biased in favor of complainants. There are
other pieces of evidence aside from the autopsy report upon which the
investigating prosecutor based her finding of probable cause. The autopsy
report is not the sole piece of evidence against petitioner. The sworn
statement of the other victim, Lorendo, and the eyewitness account of
Jennilyn Quirong, substantiate the charges against petitioner. Petitioner's
failure to deny the occurrence of the head-banging incident also
strengthened complainants' allegations.
Petitioner mistakenly cites Section 3(d) of Rule 112 22 in arguing that
the investigating prosecutor should not go beyond the evidence presented
by complainants in resolving the case. This provision applies if the
respondent cannot be subpoenaed or if subpoenaed fails to submit her
counter-affidavit within the prescribed period. Such is not the case here
where petitioner filed her counter-affidavit and both parties presented their
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 respective evidence.
Whether there is probable cause
for the offenses charged against petitioner
Existence of probable cause
Petitioner challenges the finding of probable cause against her for the
offenses charged arguing that the head-banging incident was not the
proximate cause of Ronald's death. Petitioner insists that efficient
intervening events caused Ronald's death.
We do not agree. There is probable cause for the offenses charged
against petitioner. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty of the crime. 23
In the present case, Ronald, a nine-year-old student, died five days
after his teacher, petitioner in this case, allegedly banged his head against
that of his classmate Lorendo. There is nothing in the records showing
petitioner's specific denial of the occurrence of such act. Petitioner simply
stated that "the head-banging incident happened but [she] did not
perpetrate it." 24 In effect, petitioner admits the occurrence of the head-
banging incident but denies committing it.
The alleged intervening events before Ronald died, namely: (a) the
consultation with a quack doctor, and (b) the three-day confinement in the
East Avenue Medical Center, are not sufficient to break the relation of the
felony committed and the resulting injury. Were it not for the head-banging
incident, Ronald might not have needed medical assistance in the first place.
These circumstances which allegedly intervened causing Ronald's
death are evidentiary matters which should be threshed out during the trial.
The following are also matters better left for the trial court to appreciate: (a)
the contents of the death certificate and autopsy report, (b) the medical
records of Ronald's accident in November 1997, (c) the perception of
witnesses Jennilyn Quirong and Melanie Lugales, and (d) the alleged lack of
medical assistance or medical negligence which caused Ronald's death.
To repeat, what is determined during preliminary investigation is only
probable cause, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. 25 As implied by the
words themselves, "probable cause" is concerned with probability, not
absolute or moral certainty. 26
Asserting her innocence, petitioner continues to invoke the disposition
of the inquest prosecutor finding insufficient evidence for the charges
against her. As correctly ruled by the DOJ Secretary, the inquest prosecutor
did not dismiss the case but merely recommended it for further investigation
since it was not proper for inquest and the evidence was then insufficient.
Moreover, petitioner's active participation in the preliminary investigation
without questioning the propriety of such proceedings indicates petitioner's
agreement with the recommendation of the inquest prosecutor for the
further investigation of the case. SaIEcA

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 Charges of Homicide and Child Abuse
Petitioner's single act of allegedly banging the heads of her students
had two distinct victims, namely Ronald and Lorendo. Therefore, petitioner
has to face prosecution for cruelty to each victim. For Ronald's death,
petitioner is being charged with homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code 27 in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610 punishable
b y reclusion perpetua. 28 However, this does not mean that petitioner is
being charged with the distinct offenses of homicide and child abuse for
Ronald's death. On the other hand, for her cruelty to Lorendo, petitioner is
being charged with violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610
punishable by prision mayor in its minimum period.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610
is clear. This provision reads:
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other conditions
prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not
covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being
understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at
the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one
interpretation. 29 In the present case, petitioner fails to show convincingly
the ambiguity in Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610.
Section 3(b), Article VI of RA 7610 defines "child abuse" as the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes physical
abuse and cruelty. Petitioner's alleged banging of the heads of Ronald and
Lorendo is clearly an act of cruelty.
In a petition for certiorari like this case, the primordial issue is whether
the DOJ Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The Court rules that the DOJ Secretary did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in finding that there is probable cause to charge
petitioner of the crimes of homicide and child abuse. The Court further rules
that the investigating prosecutor did not act with grave abuse of discretion
in securing motu proprio the autopsy report and in not calling for a
clarificatory hearing. This ruling does not diminish in any way the
constitutional right of petitioner to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proven.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions
of the Secretary of Justice dated 15 September 2000 and 19 April 2001 in I.C.
No. 99-6254. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.

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 Footnotes
1. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Subsequently became Criminal Cases No. Q-00-90184 and 85.
3. The DOJ Secretary then was Artemio G. Tuquero.

4. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

5. An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its
Violation, and for Other Purposes. This law is otherwise known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."
6. The DOJ Secretary was already Hernando B. Perez.
7. Rollo , p. 34.
8. Rollo , pp. 44-45.
9. Rollo , pp. 80-88.
10. Ibid., p. 89.
11. Representing the DOJ Secretary.
12. Reiterating and Clarifying the Guidelines Set Forth in Memorandum Circular
No. 1266 (4 November 1983) Concerning the Review by the Office of the
President of Resolutions Issued by the Secretary of Justice Concerning
Preliminary Investigations of Criminal Cases.

13. See Dee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111153, 21 November 1994, 238
SCRA 254.

14. Section 1 of Rule 43 provides:

SECTION 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or
final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final
orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil
Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification
Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657,
Government Service Insurance System, Employees' Compensation
Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission,
Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by
law. (Emphasis supplied)
15. Substantially reiterated in Section 3(e), Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
16. Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, Second Edition 1990, p. 239
citing Bersabel v. Salvador, G.R. No. 35910, 21 July 1978, 84 SCRA 176;
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 Dizon v. Encarnacion , 119 Phil. 20 (1963); Cabaluna v. Ventura and
Agoncillo, 47 Phil. 165 (1924); Castillo v. Sian, et al ., 105 Phil. 622 (1959).
17. Amarillo v. Sandiganbayan, 444 Phil. 487 (2003); Central Pangasinan
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Macaraeg, 443 Phil. 866 (2003).
18. Alauya, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 443 Phil. 893 (2003).
19. Reyes v. Camilon, G.R. No. 46198, 20 December 1990, 192 SCRA 445.
20. Section 1 of Rule 112, which is substantially reiterated in Section 1 of Rule
112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:
SECTION 1. Definition. — Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial.
21. Baytan v. COMELEC, 444 Phil. 812 (2003). See also Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No.
143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157 citing People v. CA , 361 Phil. 401
(1999).

22. Section 3 of Rule 112, which is substantially reiterated in Section 3 of Rule

112 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
SEC. 3. Procedure. — The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in
the following manner:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not
submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating
officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the
complainant.

23. Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915).

24. Rollo , p. 17.
25. See Rizon v. Desierto, G.R. No. 152789, 21 October 2004, 441 SCRA 115.
26. Ang v. Lucero, G.R. No. 143169, 21 January 2005, 449 SCRA 157 citing
Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 13 September
2004, 438 SCRA 224.

27. Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of article 246 shall kill another without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
28. The last paragraph of Section 10, Article VI of RA 7610 provides:

For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable
under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No.
3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder,
homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries,
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 respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age. . . .

29. Agpalo, Ruben E., supra note 16, p. 45 citing Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, p. 66 (1961).

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