Occasional Paper N°1 / 2024

January 2024

Has the African National Congress lost touch

with South Africans? The party over people

Author:

Professor Nicola de Jager

Department of Political Sciences, Stellenbosch University
[email protected]

This paper has been sponsored by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Country Office South Africa. These views
are those of the author and do not represent those of the University or the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.
Has the African National Congress lost touch with South Africans? The party
over people

Nicola de Jager, Department of Political Science, Stellenbosch University

[email protected]

Abstract

It was expected that the African National Congress (ANC) as part of South Africa’s
liberation movement would act in the best interest of South Africa and its citizens when
it took the political helm in 1994. However, electoral support for the ANC declined to
28% of the Voting Eligible Population (VEP) in the 2019 elections as did trust in the
party and its leaders. This has gone together with decreasing satisfaction with the
performance of the ruling party’s presidents. In this paper I present data from
Afrobarometer to illustrate the increasing chasm between the party and the people.
And I contend that part of the explanation for this chasm lies in the ANC’s pursuit of
the historical socialist tradition of the 1960s and the vanguard party, rather than the
historical constitutionalist tradition of its founders, and servant-leadership. Following
from this historical socialist tradition, the party has adopted partisan governance over
governing in the broader public interest, and macro-economic policy focused on
centralized state control rather than enabling an environment conducive to job
creation. The chasm is thus not unexpected since the ANC has pursued party over
people.

Introduction

2024 marks 30 years since South Africa’s democratization, which culminated in the
first democratic, non-racial, multi-party elections held on the 27th of April 1994. The
process of democratization of the 1990s was preceded by a process of liberalization
in the 1980s. It has been more than 40 years since then-President PW Botha revoked
much of the draconian apartheid legislation. Botha would run out of reformist steam,
and it was only under his successor, President FW de Klerk, that the African National
Congress (ANC) and others were unbanned in 1990 and the country moved towards

1
democratic elections. Since the euphoria of the 1990s and the vast collective trust and
good will South Africans placed in the ANC as their democratically elected political
representative, the country made some positive strides in the earlier years under the
ANC leadership, but has since been riven with corruption, stunted socio-economic
development, racial polarization and foreign policy alignment with human rights
abusers. As Fani Titi, Investec Bank’s Group Chief Executive Officer, said in a public
speech: ‘You have to have a half-decent government and I don't think at the moment
we are anywhere close…We are governed by guys in their late 60s and some in their
70s with no idea about how the world works’. 1

Since the former liberation movement was voted into public office its supporter base
has steadily declined as has trust in its presidents and the party itself. Its national
dominance has become increasingly tenuous with increasing expectations that 2024
may usher in coalition politics as the ANC dips below 50% of the vote. What has
happened? How did the ANC get here? This paper argues that the former liberation
movement has consistently made decisions for the party and not the people. The ANC
had two histories to tap into – the constitutional, servant-leadership approach of its
founders and the elitist, vanguard party approach of the 1960 communist influences.
Rather than reaching back into the values of the founders, it tapped into the latter.
Following from this historical tradition, the party adopted partisan governance and
patronage, rather than impartiality and governing in the broader public interest, and a
state-centered macro-economic policy focusing on the state as some kind of
beneficent distributor of social goods, rather than an empowering dispersion of power
through creating conducive conditions for employment. The ANC has become a party
that sees itself as the vanguard – the leader - but is out of touch with the interests and
needs of the citizens.

ANC performance, 1994-2023: The party without the people

Acknowledging that there are many possible measurements of performance (including

socio-economic indicators and levels of corruption) the intention of this paper is to give
focus to the perceptions of South Africans of the ruling party’s performance. To do this

1
SA should vote out 'useless' politicians, says Investec's Fani Titi | Business (news24.com)

2
these three indicators will be used: voting -election outcomes as a measure of social
support; trust- trust in the president and trust in the ruling party; and satisfaction-
satisfaction with the performance of the incumbent.

Declining electoral support

South Africa’s proportional representation electoral system translates into the number
of seats a party receives reflecting the proportion of votes gained during elections.
Thus, of the 400 National Assembly seats, the ANC has consistently garnered the
majority. This has meant that it can largely pass legislation as it so desires
(acknowledging though that opposition parties do play an important role in the
parliamentary committees where the draft bills are often robustly contested and
engaged with). Besides the 1994 elections all elections have been conducted using
voter registration, thus the official election results represent the proportion of those
who registered and then voted for the party. Up until 2019 the ANC consistently won
above 60% of the vote, with its highest outcome being nearly 70% in 2004, during the
Mbeki administration (see table 1). Following the Zuma administration (2009-2018)
and the so-called nine wasted years, the ANC fell below the 60% mark, receiving only
57.5% of the national vote in 2019. Together with the decline in the ANC’s support has
been a decline in voter turnout with 2019 being the election year in which more South
Africans (51%) eligible to vote, did not vote than those that did vote (see Table 2 for
the Voting Eligible Population 2 figures). In 2019 it became evident that more eligible to
vote South Africans opted out of the electoral system altogether (51%) than those that
voted for the ruling party (28%). While evidently dissatisfied with the ruling party, many
citizens have yet to use the ballot box to punish the ANC for poor performance by
shifting their support to another political party. 2024 will thus be a critical election in
terms of gauging the maturity of the electorate and whether or not, voters will turn up
and shift their vote. Key to this election is thus voter mobilization and reviving the
importance of elections in a healthy, vibrant democracy. The growing number of civil
society voter mobilization initiatives, such as Pledge to Vote 3, and My Vote Counts 4
points to the potential of getting voters back to the starting block of a democratic
system. With the potential of mobilizing the 51% - the non-voting but eligible-to-vote

2
The Voting Eligible Population (VEP) refers to all South African citizens, 18 years and older, who are
eligible to vote.
3 https://pledgetovote.co.za/
4 https://myvotecounts.org.za/

3
voters- the electoral and in turn the legislative landscape of South Africa has the
potential to change significantly.

Table 1: National election results, 1994-2019

Party 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

African % 62.65 66.35 69.69 65.90 62.15 57.5

National
Seats 252 266 279 264 249 230
Congress
(ANC) Votes 12 237 10 601 10 880 11 650 11 436 10 026 475
655 330 915 748 921

Democratic % 1.73 9.56 12.37 16.66 22.23 20.8

Alliance
Seats 7 38 50 67 89 84
(DA)/
Democratic Votes 338 426 1 527 337 1 931 201 2 945 829 4 091 584 3 621 188

Party (DP)

Economic % – – – – 6.35 10.8

Freedom
Seats – – – – 25 44
Fighters
(EFF) Votes – – – – 1 169 259 1 881 521

Total valid votes 19 15 15 17 680 72 18 402 17 436 144

533 498 977 142 612 671 9 497

Note: Not all parties are listed, thus the totals do not tally
Source: Compiled by author, data derived from www.elections.org.za

Table 2: Voter turnout as proportion of voting-eligible population (VEP), 1994–

2019

1994 1999 2004 2009 2014 2019

Estimated VEP 22 709 22 798 845 27 436 30 096 31 434 35 868

4
 152 926 466 035 190

% of VEP who 86 70 57 59 59 49
voted

% of VEP who did 14 30 43 41 41 51

not vote

% of VEP who 53.9 46.5 39.7 38.7 36.4 28

voted for ANC

% of VEP who 1.5 6.7 7 9.8 13 10

voted for
DP/DA

% of VEP who 30.6 16.9 10.2 10.2 10 11

voted for other
parties

Source: Compiled by author, derived from South African Institute of Race Relations
(2014), Fast Facts, www.irr.org.za and Schulz-Herzenberg (2019) 5

Declining trust and approval of performance

“Trusting societies are wealthy societies;” with empirical research having shown that
political and social trust encourages engaged citizenship, the implementation of public
services, a reduction in tax evasion, enabling political losers to lose well, and ensuring
a culture of political agreement and compromise. 6 Political trust is thus acknowledged
in the literature as important for effective democratic governance. 7 Where democratic
governance comprises rule of law, it is only as stable and effective to the extent that it
is considered legitimate and there is compliance, and trust acts as a ‘positive

5
Schulz-Herzenberg, C. 2019. The 2019 national election results. In Schulz-Herzenberg, C. and
Southall, R. (eds.) Election 2019. Auckland Park: Jacana; and the institute for Race Relations. 2014.
Fast Facts. Available at: https://irr.org.za/reports
6
Newton, K.; Stolle, D and Zmerli, S. 2018. Social and Political Trust. In Uslaner, E.M. (ed.) 2018. The
Oxford Handbook of social and political trust. Oxford University Press: Oxford, p. 38.
7 Uslaner, E.M. (ed.) 2018. The Oxford Handbook of social and political trust. Oxford University Press:

Oxford.

5
intervening factor’. 8 Data derived from the public attitude surveys from Afrobarometer9
is used to measure levels of trust in the ruling party (the ANC) and the various
presidents. Afrobarometer 10 is a pan-African, non-partisan research network, which
conducts public attitude surveys in 37 African countries on the topics of democracy,
governance, and other related issues. The results are based on nationally
representative random, stratified, area-probability cluster samples and face-to-face,
local-language interviews.

Four rounds were selected in alignment with the four terms of political office. Nelson
Mandela was president from 1994 until 1999, Thabo Mbeki 1999 until 2008, Jacob
Zuma 2009 until 2018, and Cyril Ramaphosa 2019 until 2024. Nelson Mandela’s
presidency was characterised by somewhat more distrust (52%) than trust (41%).
Considering his term was in the early days of South Africa’s democracy, and followed
the political violence of the 1980s and the authoritarian, apartheid regime, it is
unsurprising that there were fairly high levels of distrust (see graph 1). With Thabo
Mbeki’s presidency, trust was to significantly increase to 70%, the highest levels of
trust seen by any of the ANC’s presidential candidates. This trust would invert under
Jacob Zuma’s presidency with him receiving 66% for distrust and only 33% for trust.
And while Cyril Ramaphosa’s ‘new dawn’ presidency had the potential to turn trust
levels, trust has instead continued to decline with 71% of the respondents registering
distrust and 27% indicating trust – the lowest levels yet.

8 Moreno, Alejandro. 2011. ‘Social Trust’. In International Encyclopedia of Political Science, edited by:
Bertrand Badie, Dirk Berg-Schlosser & Leonardo Morlino, SAGE Publications, Inc.
9 See: https://www.afrobarometer.org/
10 See: https://www.afrobarometer.org/about/

6
 Graph 1: Trust in presidents
80
70 71
70 66

60
52
50
41 Distrust
40
33 Trust
28 27
30 Don't know
20 Linear (Distrust)

10 7
2 1 2
0
Mandela/ Mbeki Mbeki (2005/6) Zuma (2014/5) Ramaphosa
(1999/2001) N=2400 N=2388 (2021/3) N=1580
N=2200

Notes: The graph has been derived by the author using data from Afrobarometer. Round 1
(1999/2001), round 3 (2005/2006), round 6 (2014/ 2015) and round 9 (2021/2023) were
selected to largely coincide with the four different presidents. The question asked of the
respondents was: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough
about them to say: The President? There were five categories of possible answers. The first
two (Not at all and Just a little) were merged into ‘Distrust’ and the second two (Somewhat
and A lot) were merged into ‘Trust’. The third category was then Don’t know.

Following the period of state capture (2009-2018), which saw the repurposing of state
institutions for private purposes and the syphoning out of millions of rands from the
public purse, the ANC has not been able to redeem itself or regain the trust of South
Africans. Acting Director General of the South African National Treasury, Ismail
Momoniat, observed: ‘The worst legacy of state capture is that it not only changed the
culture of the public service …. but weakened the ability of the state to make and
implement decisions’. 11 Even though the ANC was voted into power again in 2019 with
Cyril Ramaphosa as president, the party had to effectively campaign against itself,
with Ramaphosa promising a ‘new dawn’. The continued decline in social support and

Momoniat, I. 2023. How and Why Did State Capture and Massive Corruption Occur in South Africa ?
11

Available at: https://blog-pfm.imf.org/en/pfmblog/2023/04/how-and-why-did-state-capture-and-

massive-corruption-occur-in-south-africa

7
trust in the ruling party indicates that many have not experienced this new dawn, but
instead have become disillusioned and even further distrustful of the ANC’s promises
(see graph 2).

Graph 2: Trust in the ruling party

80 75

70
60 61
60 56

50 43
40 34
32
30
22
20
8
10 5 3
1
0
Mbeki (2002/3) N=2400 Mbeki (2005/6) N=2400 Zuma (2014/5) N=2388 Ramaphosa (2021/3)
N=1580

Distrust Trust Don't know Linear (Distrust)

Notes: The graph has been derived by the author using data from Afrobarometer. Round 2
(2002/2003), round 3 (2005/2006), round 6 (2014/ 2015) and round 9 (2021/2023) were
selected to (largely) coincide with the four different administrations. The question asked of the
respondents was: How much do you trust the Ruling Party, or haven’t you heard enough about
them to say.

In round 1 of the Afrobarometer surveys the question, How much do you trust the
Ruling Party, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? was not asked, hence
the data from round 2 (2002/2003) was used instead (see graph 2). This was during
the early years of Mbeki’s administration. Even with using round 2, there are similar
patterns to graph 1’s measurements of trust in the presidents; an initial distrust in the
ruling party (and president), which shifted during the Mbeki presidency into increasing
levels of trust of the ruling party (from 32% up to 61%) and then the decline in trust
during Zuma’s administration, with distrust levels of 56% which continued to 75%
distrust in the ruling party during the Ramaphosa administration. The ANC thus
currently registers the highest levels of distrust since 2002. And the party (61%), as
with the president (70%), was most trusted during the Mbeki administration.

8
 Graph 3: Satisfaction with the President's Performance
90
80 77

70 65
62
60
50
50
40
40
32 30
30
19
20
10
10 4 5
2
0
Mandela/Mbeki Mbeki 2005/6 N=2400 Zuma 2014/5 N=2388 Ramaphosa 2021/3
1999/2001 N=2200 N=1550

Dissatisfied Satisfied Don’t Know Linear (Dissatisfied)

Notes: The graph has been derived by the author using data from Afrobarometer. Round 1
(1999/2001), round 3 (2005/2006), round 6 (2014/ 2015) and round 9 (2021/2023) were
selected to roughly coincide with the four different presidents. The question asked of the
respondents was: Do you approve (satisfied) or disapprove (unsatisfied) of the way that the
following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard
enough about them to say? President. There were five categories of possible answers. The
first two (Very unsatisfied/Strongly disapprove and Unsatisfied/ Disapprove) were merged into
‘Dissatisfied’ and the second two (Very satisfied/Strongly approve and Satisfied/ Approve)
were merged into ‘Satisfied’. The third category was then Don’t know.

The party support election data as well as the dis/trust data points to electoral support
and trust peaking during Thabo Mbeki’s presidency and administration, and then the
continuous decline in support and trust which plummeted during the Zuma period and
continued to decline into the Ramaphosa period. The rise and then continuous decline
in trust coincides with satisfaction or approval of the performance of the president. This
indicator goes beyond trust – which designates an expectation – to measure
perceptions of actual performance (see graph 3). The decline in approval of the various
presidents’ performance is thus indicative of the fulfilment of the declining
expectations. From a high of 77% approval of Mbeki’s performance as president,
approval plunged to 32% under Zuma and then 30% under Ramaphosa.

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From the election results and the survey research it appears that the ANC is a party
that no longer enjoys the majority of South Africans’ support, trust or approval of the
performance of its leaders. Considering its liberation history and promising start, how
did it get to this beleaguered point?

Historical traditions: Tapping into the socialist dispensation over the

constitutionalist dispensation

The ANC is not a monolithic party but has been influenced over the more than 100
years of its existence by different traditions and ideologies. Predominant amongst
these has been that of its founders – the constitutional dispensation - and then the
external influence during Africa’s proxy Cold War of the Soviet Union facilitated by the
South African Communist Party (SACP) – the socialist dispensation. Since it gained
access to political power in 1994, the ANC has had the option to reach back to either
of these traditions. Starting with Mandela at the helm, it looked like the ANC was
initially set to build on its constitutionalist history, but this was not to last, especially
with the recalling of Thabo Mbeki in September 2008. There is a deep irony in the
recalling of Mbeki and the reasons given by Jacob Zuma, speaking on behalf of the
ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC): ‘As the ruling party we need to sustain
the confidence of our people in the ANC and its government. Once this level of
confidence is weakened, the ANC has no alternative but to take action’. 12 Of all the
presidents, Thabo Mbeki was the most trusted by South Africans, and trust in the ruling
party reached its highwater mark during the Mbeki administration. He also received
the highest approval ratings. Furthermore, the ANC received the most votes in 2004,
nearly 70% (see Table 1) giving it a two-thirds majority under Mbeki’s second term of
office. The decision to recall Mbeki was thus not about ‘the confidence’ of the people
or their interest, but was more likely a placing of party (and personal interests) over
people. Mbeki had attempted to shift the locus of decision-making away from the
Tripartite Alliance – an arrangement which had enabled the voices of the left to strongly
influence the direction of the ANC and the country – to the governing structures of the
presidency. This was unacceptable to the other two members of the Alliance, the

12
Statement on Mbeki's recall, by Jacob Zuma on behalf of ANC NEC, 22 September. Available at:
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/news-and-analysis/jacob-zumas-statement-on-mbekis-recall

10
South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of Trade Unions
(COSATU).

The South African Native National Congress (SANNC), established in 1912 following
the 1910 Union of South Africa, was comprised of the African middle class –
professionals, property-owners and the educated kholwa (Christian converts), fruit of
the missionary schools. Considering that the terms of the Union would secure white
interests ‘at the expense of black interests’, 13 it was recognised that a national
organisation for the African people was needed. On the 8th of January 1912 chiefs and
leaders of local organisations gathered in Bloemfontein, heeding the call by Pixley ka
Izaka Seme – a graduate of the universities of Columbia and Oxford – to collectively
respond. This educated elite met to organise against racial discrimination and to
advocate for equal treatment before the law. The gathering culminated in the formation
of the oldest liberation movement on the African continent and what would become
the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC founders were constitutionalists and
active members of society – establishing schools, newspapers, and civil society
organisations in service of their communities. And, while legitimacy was attained and
respect afforded through the inclusion of prominent chiefs in honorary positions, the
key decision-makers were drawn from the kholwa – Christian converts. 14

As historians have noted this African participation in electoral and constitutional politics
goes back even further, and was largely influenced by the spread of education through
the missionary schools. 15 In the Eastern Cape alone by 1885 there were more than
700 missionary schools providing an education to over 15 000 African students. 16
These schools produced teachers, church ministers, lawyers, journalists, interpreters,
and clerks. This early generation of intellectuals placed great emphasis on rule of law
and the importance of a constitutional approach and would greatly influence political
life in South Africa as they began to challenge the unjust political order. As Andre
Odendaal, author of The Founders: The Origins of the African National Congress and
the Struggle for Democracy, profoundly notes, one need only consider: ‘the Dubes of

13
Odendaal, Andre. 2012. The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the struggle for democracy in
South Africa. Jacana Media: Auckland Park, p. 9.
14
Dubow, Saul. 2000. The African National Congress. Sutton Publishing: United Kingdom, p.4.
15
Dubow, Saul. 2000. The African National Congress. Sutton Publishing: United Kingdom.
16
Odendaal, Andre. 2012. The Founders: The Origins of the ANC and the struggle for democracy in
South Africa. Jacana Media: Auckland Park, p. 12-13.

11
Inanda, the Lutulis of Groutville, the Kumalos and Msanes of Edendale, the Morokas
of Thaba Nchu…to understand how the mission stations and schools became the
breeding grounds for twentieth-century African nationalism’. 17

Contra to the caricature of these early constitutionalists being engaged in ‘deferential

politics’, they engaged in realistic strategies that were African in nature. 18 While
attempting to participate in the formal political processes they were also closely
connected to their local communities and their issues – establishing community-based
organisations, supporting teachers, opposing forced removals, and protecting land
rights. They attempted to represent the interests of all Africans, irrespective of their
class. For example, the first president of the SANNC, John Dube also established the
Ohlange Institute – South Africa’s first independent, African-controlled school; and
founded and edited the newspaper Ilanga lase Natal (the Sun of Natal) – an important
mouthpiece for African opinion. Dube’s first wife, Nokutela Mdima (Dube), was
schooled at Inanda Seminary school for girls. Inanda Seminary established in 1869,
by the Women’s Board of the American Missionary Board, was a Christian school but
with an African tradition. 19 The school stimulated a philosophy of community
engagement and upliftment. 20 Nokutela Mdima would go on to study at the Union
Missionary Training Institute in Brooklyn, and then become a pioneer in music
education and start the choirs at Inanda.

These early founders, though deeply influenced by the missionary schools and
Christian ideals, ‘did not surrender their identities as Africans but proudly carried them
into the new colonial era, even while being uncompromisingly Christian’. 21 Their

17
Odendaal, 2012, p. 13.
18 Odendaal, 2012, p. 477.
19 Information received during a research visit to the Inanda seminary and museum, Inanda,

KwaZuluNatal, 14 March 2016; Scott Everett Couper (2015) ‘Where Men Fail, Women Take Over’:
Inanda Seminary's Rescue by its Own, South African Historical Journal, 67:1, 1-31.
20 Examples abound of learners from this institution who would go on to serve their communities. Other

alumni from the school include Sibusisiwe Violet Makhanya, who would become a pioneer in social
work. Following her schooling at Inanda she ran a night school from her home, then raised her own
funds and studied at Ohio and Columbia University. She returned to become the first black female social
worker. Constance Nokapana Makhanya studied domestic science at Inanda in 1920s and would go
on to become the first black teacher of this subject in Natal. She and her husband, a graduate of Adams
College (another missionary school) troubled by the illiteracy and poor health in the Makhanya clan, set
up a night school for herd boys. She then trained as a nurse at the American Board’s McCord Zulu
Hospital in Durban and graduated in 1932 with a certificate in mid-wifery. Together with her husband
they built and established a maternity ward as she became one of the first black female pioneers of
nursing.
21 Odendaal, 2012, p. 477.

12
political approach was informed by the values of African ubuntuism, Christianity and
political liberalism. 22 The founders called for the strategy of ‘shoot with the pen’, and
sought constitutional and inclusive ways to take the country forward, placing great
weight on human dignity. 23 The point of their stories is to illustrate a culture of
embracing education, self-improvement and then using these skills to serve and better
their communities. The constitutionalist dispensation was characterised by servant-
leaders cognisant of the needs of their communities. They educated and skilled
themselves so as to be constructive contributors to society.

In 1990 Nelson Mandela 24 requested to be released from prison on the 11th of

February. The date was specifically chosen to honour the founding president of the
SANNC, John Langalibalele Dube, who had died 11 February 1946. 25 And then, on
the occasion of South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, after having voted at
the Ohlange Institute (the school founded by Dube in 1901) Mandela visited Dube’s
grave to report: ‘Mission accomplished, Mr President’. 26 Mandela, as the first president
of democratic South Africa, was reaching back to and honouring a historical tradition
in the ANC – a Christian-imbibed culture of education, progress, responsible civic
engagement, and constitutionalism. While Mandela had been a card-carrying member
of the SACP, ostensibly for expedient purposes and had initially been swayed by the
SACP to move towards an armed struggle, he would moderate following his 27 years
of incarceration. As Mangcu poignantly notes ‘Mandela’s [political] triumph was … that
of a particular type of African nationalism – closer to the conservative modernisers
[early founders] than to the radical modernisers of his youth. The militant founder of
MK had transformed himself into a man of reconciliation’. 27

The second tradition – the socialist dispensation – arguably also finds its origins in
response to the 1910 Union of South Africa and the 1948 advent of apartheid. Where

22 Odendaal, 2012.
23 Odendaal, 2012, p. 484.
24 Mandela had been incarcerated for 27 years under the apartheid system, following the Rivonia Trial

(1963-1964).
25 Information received during a research visit to the Inanda seminary and museum, Inanda,

KwaZuluNatal, 14 March 2016.

26 Nelson Mandela, 1994, quoted in Odendaal, Andre. 2012. The Founders: The Origins of the ANC

and the struggle for democracy in South Africa. Jacana Media: Auckland Park, p. 483.
27 Xolela Mangcu, 2015, Edited by N de Jager, South African Politics: An Introduction, 2nd edition.

Oxford University Press of Southern Africa: Cape Town, p.70.

13
there had initially been signs of promise for greater involvement and recognition of an
emerging black middle class, going into the 1910 Union the white leadership of South
Africa instead closed upward mobility opportunities and sought to rather create a
cheap labour force of South Africa’s African citizens. Government policy would actively
stunt the education and development of the black intellectual, land ownership and
hence the middle class. 28 And in doing so, it would encourage more militant and radical
approaches including class-based protests and armed struggles informed by Marxism.
These culminated in the 1960s following the ANC’s banning during apartheid. The
SACP would introduce members of the ANC’s more militant Youth League to the
Soviet Union and its communist ideas, during the Cold War period.

South Africa had been a key focus in southern Africa for the Soviet Union. The Soviet
regime had hoped that through fermenting polarisation and radicalising the black
community, revolution would result. 29 The ANC’s close relationship with the Soviet
Union had been facilitated by the Communist Party of South Africa (later the South
African Communist Party) and reinforced with the decision to move towards an armed
struggle in 1961 and form the military arm Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). 30 The Soviet
Union's influence on the ANC grew following the party’s banning, making it more reliant
on the SACP. A key consequence of this increased reliance was certainly the move
from non-violence to violence in the 1960s31 and the transfer of communist ideology.
ANC members received training in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries,
becoming familiar with the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Amongst these ideas was the
German philosopher, Karl Marx’s understanding of the purpose of the state to act in
the special interests of the working class, and therefore it could never be neutral.
Instead, he argued that in the ‘political transition period … the state can be nothing but
the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat’. 32 This idea was further developed by
Lenin who argued for the need of a revolutionary or vanguard party to lead the working

28 Democratic theory points to the importance of the middle class in the development of and strength

of constitutional democracy, thus this is a low point in South Africa’s political history, and it certainly
contributed to the undermining of democratic development.
29 Seth Singleton, Final Report to National Council for Soviet and East European Research: The Future

of Soviet Influence in Africa (Harvard University, 1987).

30 Ellis, S. 2011. “The Genesis of the ANC's Armed Struggle in South Africa 1948–1961.” Journal of

Southern African Studies 37 (4): 657-676.

31 Gevisser, 2010, p. 149.
32 Karl Marx, “Critiquing of the Gotha Programme, Part IV” (1875), Accessed October 24, 2019. https://

www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/gotha/.

14
class towards revolutionary class consciousness. 33 Lenin believed that the working
class was controlled by the bourgeoisie and was thus unable to determine what was
in its best interests, hence the need for a vanguard party to lead it. If the vanguard
party is considered to act in the interest of the working class, it followed that anyone
or any party that dared to disagree then represented hostile interests. The Leninist
approach left behind a polarizing us-versus-them narrative, where the liberation
movements were conceived as the only true leaders, and any who would contend or
disagree being portrayed as counter-revolutionary and then later as anti-
transformation.

Besides the idea of the vanguard party, the socialist dispensation also infused within
the ANC the Soviet theory of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR). The NDR
which became part of the ANC’s Strategy & Tactics adopted at the Morogoro
Conference in 1969, has remained the ANC’s national project into the democratic
period. 34 Aligned with the NDR was the Soviet Union’s proposed two-stage revolution,
with the formation of a ‘black republic’ as the first stage and the establishment of
socialism as the second stage. 35 Jacob Zuma’s victory at the ANC’s 2007 national
conference was primarily the outcome of the banding together of Tripartite Alliance
members disgruntled with Mbeki’s interpretation of the National Democratic
Revolution (NDR) – an emphasis on presidential centralism (government over party)
often to the exclusion of the other two members within the Alliance – the SACP and
the trade union movement, COSATU. 36 This separation between party and state
effectively shut out these alliance partners from the spoils of office as well as the
strategic direction of the country– a situation they were not happy with. In the ANC’s
52nd national conference, the conference at which Thabo Mbeki was ousted from
power, the Building a National Democratic Society: Strategy and Tactics of the ANC
(2007) document was adopted. It argued that the party needed to prioritise the

33 Andrew Heywood, Political ideologies: An introduction, 5th Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,

2012), 122.
34
It's worth noting that with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the NDR theory was
largely abandoned by the Soviets.
35
Roger Southall, ‘The ANC for Sale? Money, Morality and Business in South Africa’, Review of African
Political Economy 35, no. 116 (2008): 105.
36 Booysen, Susan. 2011. The African National Congress and the Regeneration of Political Power.

Johannesburg: Wits University Press, p. 360.

15
involvement of ‘cadres in all centres of power’ 37 effectively placing cadre deployment
at the centre of the Zuma administration. 38 The deployment of loyalists – cadres- into
public administration and state-owned entities is another socialist import.

Zuma thus became state president in 2009, with the expectation that he would use
state machinery towards achieving partisan ends, but this time for the specified
interests of those who had put him in power. The control of state appointments and
resources were easily justified based on the rationale of the NDR and cadre
deployment towards the goal of ‘transformation’, thus serving Zuma’s system of
patronage well. As a reward to those who placed him into power Zuma inflated his first
cabinet, which included SACP representatives such as Blade Nzimande (Minister of
Higher Education and Training), Jeremy Cronin (Deputy Minister of Transport), and
COSATU representatives such as Ebrahim Patel (Minister of Economic
Development). 39

And while Zuma’s reign has since ended and state capture acknowledged as having
been disastrous for the country, the ANC continues to pursue the socialist tradition
and its features that created the very conditions for state capture. As evident in the
ANC’s 2022 policy conference, the party persists in the pursuit of the Soviet NDR as
its national project, referring to itself as the ‘vanguard of the National Democratic
Revolution’, and portraying those who contend with it or hold it accountable as
‘counter-revolutionary’ 40 and spreaders of ‘misinformation and false news’. 41
‘Vanguard’ infers that they see only themselves as qualified to lead and say as much
in their 2022 policy documents: ‘The reality is that the African National Congress
(ANC) remains the only viable vehicle with which meaningful economic transformation

37
ANC.2007.’Strategy and Tactics: Building a National Democratic Society’. As adopted by
the 52nd National Conference, 16–20 December 2007. Accessed14 June 2023. Available at:
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/2007-anc-national-policy-conference-report-
commission-strategy-and-tactics-30-june-2007, point 129.
38
Fredericks, Jordan & de Jager, Nicola. 2021. ‘An Analysis of the Historical Roots of
Partisan Governance within the ANC: Understanding the Road to State Capture’, Politikon,
49 (1): 21–42.
39
Calland, Richard. 2013. The Zuma Years: South Africa’s Changing Face of Power. Cape
Town: Zebra Press, p. 59-50.
40
ANC. 2022. Policy Conference Discussion Documents. https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/Umrabulo-Policy-Document-18th-May-2022.pdf p.24.
41
ANC. 2022. Policy Conference Discussion Documents. https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2022/05/Umrabulo-Policy-Document-18th-May-2022.pdf, p. 48.

16
and development of the South African state can be driven’. 42 The ANC elite regard
themselves ‘as an elect, embodying the will of the people, and uniquely able to
recognise their true interests’. 43 Thus fully embracing the Lenin understanding of the
vanguard party. In addition, despite the unconstitutional nature of deploying party
loyalists into public institutions which are constitutionally mandated to be impartial, this
strategy remains firmly intact. ‘Crony appointments’ into the state administration
without the requisite skills or capability will continue, as it has, to undermine ‘any
chance of building a capable state.’ 44

This choice of historical tradition has thus served to feed into the governance style of
the ANC and its macro-economic policy decisions. Both of which have taken the party
further away from the people as it closes ranks around its own interests.

Governance: Partisanship over non-partisanship

The state regulates relations to its citizens along two dimensions, namely the input
side, which concerns access to public authority, and the output side, the exercise of
public authority. 45 In a democratic regime public authority is accessed through
elections and requires political equality as its underlying legitimating principle. This
right to vote and elect one’s political representatives, irrespective of race, was hard
won by those who had opposed apartheid. While the input side speaks to how power
is accessed, the output side speaks to how political power is exercised and in whose
interest. Rothstein and Teorell46 argue that there is quality of government or good
governance when governance is exercised on the basis of impartiality. A public servant
should not be susceptible to bribery, should not decide cases in terms of friends or
relatives and should not favour any special (ethnic etc) interest when applying laws
and rules. Moving from the basis of impartiality public servants should be guided rather
by public interest rather than self-interest. The principle of impartiality is actually

42
ANC. 2022. 6th National Policy Conference Report. https://www.anc1912.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2022/09/6th-ANC-National-Policy-Conference-Reports-2022.pdf, p.37.
43
Myburgh, James. 2019. ‘Transformation is killing South Africa’.
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/transformation-is-killing-south-africa
44 Zille, H. 2016. Not without a fight. Penguin Books: Century City, p. 148.
45 Rothstein, B. & Teorell, J. 2008. “What is quality of government?: A theory of impartial government
institutions.” Governance: An International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions 21 (2):
165-190.
46 Ibid.

17
embedded in the South African Constitution. For example, sections 165 and 96
prescribe that all branches of government – the executive, legislature and judiciary –
are required to act ‘impartially’ (Republic of South Africa 1996). The judiciary is to be
‘independent and subject only to the Constitution and law, which they must apply
impartially and without fear, favor or prejudice’ (Republic of South Africa 1996, 2).
Quality of governance ensures procedures that demonstrate that state authorities can
be trusted as impartial guarantors and enforcers of democratic rules. Where there is
no such impartial guarantor then an environment of institutional and judicial uncertainty
and insecurity is created.

The Marxist understanding of ‘good’ governance stands in contrast to this as it not only
sees the state as partisan, but that it should be partisan, acting in the interests of the
proletariat or working class. 47 Reaching back to the socialist dispensation, the ANC
has persisted with the NDR as its national project. The main content of the NDR is the
‘national liberation of the African people in particular, and the black people in general’
with the goal of moving from socialism to communism. 48 The NDR not only proposes
democracy of a particular kind – where a partial and centralized system of governing,
led by the working class, is seen as necessary - but suggests that democracy itself
only constituted a transitional stage towards socialism and eventually communism. As
Chipkin argues the purpose of state transformation for the ANC government was to
shift the social bias from white minority to black majority; ‘Blacks in general and
Africans in particular’. 49 For some within the ANC, the aim was thus never to establish
a neutral state, but an ethnically-partisan state. It has thus pursued aggressively
racially discriminatory policies under the guise of transformation. This pursuit began
already in 1997 as the ANC drove ‘transformation’, as embodied in the dual
programmes of cadre deployment and demographic quotas. The White Paper on
Affirmative Action in the Public Service and the Employment Equity Act, adopted in

47 Jordan Fredericks & Nicola de Jager (2022) An Analysis of the Historical Roots of Partisan

Governance within the ANC: Understanding the Road to State Capture, Politikon, 49:1, 21-42.
48 See: The National Democratic Revolution in the O’Malley Archives.

https://omalley.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/site/q/03lv02424/04lv02730/05lv03005/06lv03132/07lv0
3140/08lv03145.htm
49 Chipkin I. 2012. “Corruption and the State.” Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation 67: 10–6;

ANC. 1999c. “Strategy and Tactics of the ANC: Building a National Democratic Society.”, adopted at
the 52nd National Conference of the ANC. Accessed 5 June 2020.
https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/strategy-and-tactics-anc-building-national-democratic-society-
revised-draft-anc-30-august

18
1998, and subsequent policies such as Black Economic Empowerment have kept alive
apartheid-era race categorisations.

This partisan governance approach has facilitated a system of corruption as argued

by Fredericks and de Jager. 50 With the partisan state, a framework for state capture
was set up through the pursuit of the NDR, overseen by the vanguard party and
implemented through cadre deployment. The foundations for a patronage network
were established in the NDR, a national policy that actively advocates for a partisan
state, and that could then easily be utilised by a compromised individual such as Jacob
Zuma and his personal connections. This partisan exercise of governance is hedged
from critical engagement through the argument that its actions are to ensure
transformation. Those who would contend or ask questions concerning such
‘transformation’ are silenced by being labelled racist or accused of being anti-
transformation.

This partisan system of governance would not only work in the limited interests of the
politically connected, but would work against the very people it was ostensibly
presented as being partial towards. This is aptly illustrated in the Vrede Dairy Farm
project and the public money set aside for this project which was instead diverted to
pay for the lavish private wedding of Gupta family members at Sun City in 2013. A
testimony presented at the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture lays out
how the wedding was funded using public funds channelled through the Free State
provincial government to Estina, a Gupta-owned company. 51 Estina had been
established as a front company to launder the money that had been intended for this
community project and the upliftment of local farmers. But the economic
consequences of the ANC’s governance have spread further than localised community
projects to hinder economic growth of the nation as a whole.

50 Jordan Fredericks & Nicola de Jager (2022) An Analysis of the Historical Roots of Partisan
Governance within the ANC: Understanding the Road to State Capture, Politikon, 49:1, 21-42.
51 See: State capture inquiry: Estina was 'used to launder cash' prior to initiation of dairy project |

News24

19
Macro-economic policy: State control over societal job creation
In their study of why some countries grow and others stagnate Roll and Tallbot focus
on the role of government in either encouraging or hindering development. 52 The
findings from their empirical study highlight indicators that improve and undermine
Gross National Income per capita (GNIpc). Amongst the indicators with the highest
levels of statistical significance were Property Rights – positively related with economic
development, and Excessive State Regulation - negatively related with economic
development. Political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of the press were also highly
significant, and positive for improving economic conditions. These findings thus
supported Milton Friedman’s claim that economic development and political freedom
are mutually supportive. 53 Their research points to the importance of a fair and just
system -namely good governance characterised by impartiality, and the avoidance of
radical policies such as expropriation and repudiation. This is consistent with the
longitudinal study of Latin America, from 1945 until 2005, of Mainwaring and Pérez-
Liñán. 54 In considering what contributed to long-term democratic stability, they found
that a key factor was the avoidance of radical policies. Policy moderation was key to
democratic longevity. A political environment where political and economic freedoms
are upheld and radical policies such as expropriation are avoided, encourages
investment, and the establishment of small businesses which have traditionally been
critical engines of growth. 55

The scholarship thus points to the importance of economic and political freedom, and
limited state regulation for economic growth and in turn increasing levels of
employment. A country’s macro-economic policy speaks to the way in which a
government orders and influences the economy of a country. It thus also concerns
state-society relations and determines the extent to which the state intervenes in the
market. From 1994 the ANC adopted a more interventionist and regulatory approach
with a strong focus on the demand side of the economy rather than supply. In 1994 it
adopted the Reconstruction and Development (RDP) programme focussing on

52 Richard Roll and John Talbott. 2003. Political Freedom, Economic Liberty, and Prosperity. Journal
of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 3: 75-89.
53 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
54 Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2014. Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America:

Emergence, Survival, and Fall. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.

55 In the United States more than two-thirds of the new jobs created each year come in industries

where small businesses predominated.

20
redistribution, social spending and strong state intervention. But it became increasingly
clear to Mandela and Mbeki that the concern with emphasising the demand side of the
economy is that it does not grow the economy – it spends. And, if the economy is not
grown, through jobs and investments, there are few taxes, and there is no money to
spend. Thus, the question became how could they grow to spend? In 1996 SA adopted
the Growth Economy and Redistribution (GEAR) policy which focused on the supply
side to create economic stability, to be more market-friendly and to encourage fiscal
discipline. The argument was that you could not have development without growth.
This more market-friendly approach, and thus enabling society to grow the economy,
was not popular with the socialist dispensation in the ANC and its Alliance partners.
And thus, while the economy grew during this period and with the Mbeki era being
characterized by fiscal discipline, it would be ideology that would triumph. Since
GEAR, SA has adopted a number of economic policies, characterised by an
aspirational move towards a developmental state – and hence greater state
intervention. The emphasis has thus been a return to the state, led by the ANC and its
loyal cadres, as the driver of the economy and less society, in the form of the free
market.

Unemployment has consistently been ranked the top problem for South Africans (see
graph 4). This has consistently been followed by crime and security. 56 Under Mbeki’s
pragmatic economic policy unemployment levels were steadily declining until 2009
(see graph 5). As South Africa moved into the neopatrimonial and partisan governance
period under Jacob Zuma, so unemployment levels inverted again and began
consistently increasing. A further worry noted by South Africans in the Afrobarometer
surveys, and which has become increasingly concerning over the years has been
education, ranked fourth in 2021 by 24% of the respondents. Education is linked to
employment as a connected concern is employability and being adequately prepared
for the workplace. In the 2021 Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
(PIRLS) 81% of South Africa’s grade 4 pupils did not attain the study’s already low
international benchmark. 57 Suggesting that many grade 4 children cannot read for

56 Afrobarometer Data, [South Africa], [Round 8], [Year 2019/2021], available at

http://www.afrobarometer.org
57 Wills, Gabrielle and Ardington, Cally. 2023. ‘Learning to read is a journey: a study identifies where

South African kids go off track’. In The Conversation, June 6, 2023. Available at:
https://theconversation.com/learning-to-read-is-a-journey-a-study-identifies-where-south-african-kids-
go-off-track-206242

21
meaning. The study placed South Africa last out of 57 participating countries. A
declining education system has not served to prepare and equip an employable
workforce. Combined with this are rolling blackouts.

Graph 4: Most important problems identified by South

Africans
50%
45%
45%
39%
40%
35%
30%
24% 25%
25%
20% 16%
15%
10% 8%

5%
0%
1999/2001 2014/15 2021/23

Unemployment Crime & Security

Notes: The graph has been derived by the author using data from Afrobarometer. Round 1
(1999/2001), round 6 (2014/ 2015) and round 9 (2021/2023) were selected. The survey asked:
What are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?
Which of these is most important. The graph thus indicates the top two problems identified by
the respondents.

Graph 5: Perceptions of government's handling the

economy
70%
58%
60%

50% 46%

40% 35% 35% 37%

29%31% 27%
30% 25%24% 24% 24%
19% 18%
20% 16% 15%
11%
10% 4% 6%
2%
0%
2005/2006 2008/2009 2014/2015 2016/2018 2021/2023

Very well Fairly well Fairly badly Very badly

22
Notes: The graph has been derived by the author using data from Afrobarometer.

Graph 6: Perception of government's handling of

employment
100
89 90
90
74 77
80
69
70
60
50
40 31
30 25 22
20
10 9
10 1 1 1 1
0
0
Mandela Mbeki (2005/6) Mbeki (2008/2009) Zuma (2014/5) Ramaphosa (2021/3)
(1999/2001) N=2200 N=2400 N=2373 N=2388 N=1577

Badly Well Don't know

Notes: The graph has been derived by the author using data from Afrobarometer.

South Africa’s unemployment rate is among the highest in the world and was recorded
at 32,9% in the first quarter of 2023. 58 The expanded definition of unemployment,
which includes unemployed and not looking for employment stood at 42,4%. It is
acknowledged that these figures do not capture those that are engaging in work
outside of the formal system. 59 On the other hand the country has one of the most
expansive systems of social grants with nearly 19 million of the 62 million population
receiving grants. This translates into 47% of the population receiving social transfers. 60
It is also a redistributive economy with the top 10% income earners contributing over

58 StatsSA. 2023. Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS), 1st Quarter 2023.
https://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1856&PPN=P0211&SCH=73571
59 https://theconversation.com/47-of-south-africans-rely-on-social-grants-study-reveals-how-they-use-

them-to-generate-more-income-203691
60 See: https://static.pmg.org.za/SASSA_2022-23_Annual_Performance_Plan.pdf#page=9

23
80% of the income tax. 61 In the long-term this is an unsustainable situation, even if the
social grants have been a key source of poverty alleviation and the thin wedge which
has kept many from plunging into abject poverty. While Personal Income Tax (PIT)
collection is the largest source of tax revenue in South Africa, there are only 5,2 million
individual taxpayers. This 9% of the population contributes 40% of South Africa’s total
tax revenue. 62 But it is only 2 million that are contributing to 80% of the PIT. 63 Unless
the economy grows this situation is unlikely to change. The ANC government leaning
on its socialist, state-interventionist dispensation is unable to grow the economy
presenting wealth as something to be redistributed but not grown. Inequality and
poverty sit downstream from unemployment, but so long as the government persists
in hamstringing the private sector this situation is unlikely to improve.

South Africa has a progressive tax system, high social spending and policies like
BBBEE, but the tax base needs to be increased. With 5.2 million PIT taxpayers, a
population of 62 million, and 19 million receiving social grants, it results in a
dependency ratio of approximately 3:1 Thus while social grants and social spending
help to alleviate poverty, this is not a sustainable solution, nor is it the solution that the
majority of South Africans want in the long-term. One explanation for unemployment
is an inflexible, highly regulated labour market and the power of trade unions facilitated
through COSATU’s position in the Tripartite Alliance. The 2023 Index of Economic
Freedom ranks South Africa as ‘mostly unfree’ placing it 116th out of 176 countries.
The Heritage Foundation presents an index which covers 12 freedoms – from property
rights to financial freedom – in 184 countries. The country’s property rights are below
that of the world average making it a risky environment in which to invest (see graph
7). Using the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) World
Competitiveness 2023 Annual Report South Africa is ranked 61 out of 64 countries,
thus indicating South Africa is uncompetitive. 64 The report uses a combination of
statistics and survey data to compute countries’ rankings, and uses 330

61 Gabriela Inchauste, Nora Lustig, Mashekwa Maboshe, Catriona Purfield and Ingrid Woolard. 2015.

The Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy in South Africa Poverty Global Practice Group &
Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice Group. Policy Research Working Paper
7194
62 https://www.ey.com/en_za/tax/the-shrinking-pit-tax-base--what-s-next-
63 https://dailyinvestor.com/finance/4748/just-2-million-south-africans-pay-80-of-all-personal-income-

tax/
64 https://www.imd.org/centers/wcc/world-competitiveness-center/rankings/world-competitiveness-

ranking/2023/

24
competitiveness criteria which can be grouped under economic performance,
government efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure.

Graph 7: Index of Economic Freedom in South Africa

Notes: Graph derived by the author using the Index of Economic Freedom in South Africa,
https://www.heritage.org/index/visualize?cnts=southafrica&type=8.

Graphs 5 & 6 indicate that the respondents do not consider the ANC government’s
handling of the economy and unemployment favourably. As graph 6 indicates 90% of
the respondents in the latest survey round consider the government’s handling of the
employment as ‘badly’, while 58% consider the government's handling of the economy
as ‘very badly’. In light of unemployment being the number one concern of South
Africans, the surveys again show the depth of the fissure between the ANC and the
people. And instead of using the state capture moment to self-reflect and to re-
consider its governance style and economic policies, the party has rather stubbornly
dug in its heels and committed itself to more of the same.

Conclusion

During the 2023 World Rugby Cup South Africans en mass donned green and gold,
and diarised and prioritised each successive match. There was a collective
understanding that the rugby game was much more than a sports game as its
communication strategy of #strongertogether took flame in the hearts and

25
imaginations of South Africans. The response of South Africans spoke to a desire for
hope, to be united, our resilience and the enormous potential to build on the social
capital that exists in the country. Having been 30 years at the political helm of South
Africa the ANC had not been able to do (or likely did not have the will do it) what a
rugby campaign had – unite its country. The successive election results, the surveys
measuring trust and satisfaction all point to the citizenry’s hopes that have been
persistently dashed.

If South Africans take a deep breath and a hard look they will realise that the country’s
future still rests with them, but they will need to acknowledge that the ANC of today is
not the ANC of its founders. The dispensation of servant-leaders and constitutionalists
has long ended. But South Africa is still a democracy and the voice of its citizens can
still be heard through the ballot box, not through opting out, but through opting in and
shifting their support wisely. Lessons also need to be learnt in terms of what grows a
country’s democracy and economy and in turn creates an environment of good
governance and job growth. It is good governance, when those who hold political
power use it not for partisan or personal ends, but in the broader public interest. It is a
government that acknowledges that society too has a role to play and gives the private
sector the breathing space to do what it does best – create jobs. The future of South
Africa is not in the hands of corrupt leaders with fingers in the public purse but in the
citizens and the moment to be stronger together is in the 2024 elections – it’s time to
kick the scoundrels out.

26
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung NPC

Gregor Jaecke
Resident Representative, Country Office South Africa
European and International Cooperation
www.kas.de/southafrica

[email protected]

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Creative Commons license: “Creative Commons
Attribution- Share Alike 4.0 international” (CC BY-SA 4.0),
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