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Brief - Initial Brief - Scribd
Brief - Initial Brief - Scribd
vs
SARAH E. EGAN
Appellee
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii
INTRODUCTION 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW 20
ARGUMENT 21-29
CONCLUSION 29-34
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 34 - 32
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 32
2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Ange v. State
98 Fla. 538, 541, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929). 15,19, 23, 24, 27
Beck v. Lipkind,
681 So. 2d 795, 795 (Fl. 3d DCA 1996} 43, 15
Dadic v. Schneider,
722 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) 13,14, 15, 20, 26
DelMonico v. Traynor,
116 So. 3d 1205, 1213 (Fla. 20173) 11,15,19, 20,2427
Fariello v. Gavin
873 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA, 2004) 19, 24, 27
Fisher v. Payne,
113 So. 378, 380 (Fla. 1927) 19, 23,24,27
Fridovich v. Fridovich,
598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) 14,15, 19,23,27,36
Lipsig v. Ramiawi
760 So. 2d 170, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) 13,15
Myers v. Hodges.
44 So. 357 (1907) 42,14,15,19,20,21, 23, 27, 29,31
Ross v. Biank,
958 So. 2d 437, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) 13,15, 28
Schagrin v. Nachi,
683 So. 2d 1173 (Fla 4DCA 1998) 4
4
Sussman v. Damian.
355 So. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) 14,15,19,20,24,27
3
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(a) 7,9, 11
6
INTRODUCTION
endangered their safety to the extent the doctors had requested the Court's
protection, which Egan sought in twe filed motions, which were granted: the
The lower court judge, during the October 13, 2023 related hearing
an order commanding Allen to "stop harassing the CME doctor and his
2
staff" (R 40) whom Allen had yet to meet, thus accepting as truthful Egan's
strategic (since Allen had teld Egan that, per Rule 2.330(1), Allen would not
Egan, would not blatantiy violate Florida Bar Rule 4-8.4 by “engage[ing] in
badgered a doctor whom the self-represent litigant was ordered to see, the
succeeding judge told Allen that Allen was mistaken and had incorrectly
"Interpreted" Rule 2.330{); the Rule 2.330(!) allowed judges to exceed the
* Not only does Rule 2.330()) explicitly state that if a judge does not "take
action” on motion te recuse within 30 days, the motion is deemed granted.
thus unequivocally suggesting that the judge in question would be
disqualified, the Florida Supreme Court, in Tableau Fine Art Group, inc. v.
dacobeni, 853 So.2d 299 (Fla. 2003), affirmed the 30 days requisite
3
During an April 27, 2023 hearing, the succeeding judge denied
So. 2d 1173 (Fla 4DCA 1996) - a case where certiorari was granted in
relation to a defendant's vague CME order citation that "the scope of the
relating to the accident which is the subject matter of this lawsuit The
motion (R 36-37) and told Allen CME orders did not have to be specific
4
The related May 1, 2023 order, the trial court judge denied Allen's
defamatory claim that Allen harassed CME doctors and rejecting Allen's
vehement assertion, during the related hearing, to the contrary; the judge
endangering the safety of CME doctors, and patiently waited until CME
conducted their respective CMEs and issued their reports where both
denied (R 12, R - 54-57) that Allen had ever harassed them or endangered
their safety - before filing a legal complaint against Defense Counsel Egan
whether any malady alleged by Allen in her claim against Egan's client was
Considering the fact the rulings of the judge who succeeded the
disqualified judge, which include denying Allen's motion for the adherence
succeeded in derailing Allen's case and prejudicing Allen before the judge®
On July 13, 2023, Allen filed the instant defamation claim against
Attorney Sarah Egan (R 10-68) noting that "[i]t is undisputed that viciously
doctors, and (c) mentally unstable behavior, is not only malicious, but aiso
6
After several failed attempts by the Miami-Dade Sheriff's Office to
Scott Cole, emailed Allen imposing his "condition" for accepting the
ummons: that Allen agree to August 25, 2023 for Egan fo respond to th
complaint. Allen replied to Cole's "condition" stating: "| believe the proper
days, per Rule 1.140(a}(1), Allen filed a motion for Court Default on August
Strike Plaintiffs Motion for Default and Motion for Sanctions," (R 75-93)
where Appellee/ Defendant cited WLW. v. SPCP Group V_ LLC, 163 So.3d
518 (2015) to deceitfully implying that Rule 1.500(a), a Default by the Clerk,
and Ruie 1.500(b), a Default by the Court, were the same by suggesting
that a Court Default was inappropriate since Allen knew that Appellee/
case.” (R77)
7
Armando Cardona v. First BankPuerto Rico, 336 So. 3d, 418 (Fla. 3DCA
2022), where this Honorable Court affirmed its earlier notation in MW. v
SPCP Grp. V_ LLC, 163 So. 3d 518, 521 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) that: “In case
after case, the Florida courts have held that a party cannot obtain an ex
parte default when the party knows that the opposing side is represented
Strike Default, Allen explicitly cited this Court's reference to MW. v. SPCP
336 So. 3d, 418 (Fla. 3DCA 2022) (R 209-213) and made the distinction
between a Default by the Clerk and a Court's Default, wnen Allen wrote
8
During an August 24, 2023 related hearing, the trial court judge
denied Allen's motion for a court default without requesting that Appellee/
The Court issued an order denying entry of default a week later (R 219)
denying Allen's motion stated - which incorrectly claims that the court heard
from both parties (R 214) - “opposing counsel did not utter a word during
the August 30th, 2023 [regarding the applicability of M.W._v. SPCP Group
Allen noted that the fact the Court "forewent asking Counsel for a
response vis-4-vis Plaintiff's assertion that the citation ofa VW. iv. SPOP
Alten also referenced the judge's cryptic assertion, during the hearing, that
he was certain the appellate court would reverse his ruling if he were to
grant a court default since "courts value substance over style," (R 217)
thus suggesting that appellate courts would “look ihe other way" and grant
assumed that said appeal lacks "substance." Allen further noted that
5
While Plaintiff [Allen] understands that no lower court judge
wishes for an appeliate court to reverse the judge's
decision, [Allen] respectfully avers that a conceivable
reversal of this court's order granting piaintifi's motion
for an entry of default, would have been accompanied
by an explanation from the appellate court vis-a-vis the
conceivable lower court's “error" in granting a plaintiffs
motion for entry of default, directed at the court, filed
twenty one (21) days after opposing counsel accepted the
summons and filed days after opposing counsel accepted
the summons and filed a notice of appearance, but failed
tor file a response to the complaint. The appellate court's
explanation, in the event the appellate court overruled
the trial court's decision, would add to the “body of
knowledge" and clarify matters to the benefit of all. (R
217 - 218) (Emphasis part of the original)
The trial court judge ignored Allen's September 5, 2023 Motion for
litigant, and automatically side with the attorney, especially if the attorney
Allen proceed to appeal to this Court and was astonished when this
10
petition (3D2023-1745) on September 28, 2023, thus. sparing Appellee/
LLC, and its circuitous reference to a Clerk's Default, per Rule 1.500(a), to
94-102) citing Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) and
Gursky Ragan, P.A. v. Ass'n of Poinciana Villages, Inc., 314 So. 3d 594.
4213 (Fla. 2013) that: “the earnest though mistaken zeal of a litigant who
seeks to redress his wrongs and for the ardent and excited feelings of the
and excitedly” falsely claimed that the person whose automobile her client
to make her client's defense “her own" and thus convince the court that any
i
maladies claimed by Allen in her legal complaint against her client were
So. 357 (Fla. 1907), Echevarria, MeCalla. Raymer Barrett & Frappierv.
Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 383 (Fla. 2007), and James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d
1006, 1007 (Fla. ist DCA 2014} to deceptively claim that “the falsity or
had expressed fear for their safety, was] irrelevant to the application of the
absolute litigation privilege" (R 98) and to falsely suggest that the above:
noted cases did not impose restrictions when it comes to absolute immunity
and defamatory claims made in the course of litigation, but that case law
the cases: that defamatory statements are subject to absolute immunity “so
long as-the statements are relevant to the subject of inquiry," James _v.
Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006, 1007 (Fla. ist DCA 2014) It is undeniable thai’
doctors who feared for their safety, is pet relevant to the subject of inquiry
12
Appeliee/Defendant also deceitfully cited Dadic v. Schneider, 722 So.
2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) and Ross v. Blank, 958 So. 2d 437, 441
and as “the exact kind of case the Supreme Court of Florida had in mind
malicious claim that "Allen had endangered the safety of CME doctors who
were afraid for their safety" as “Demonstrably True Or Pure Opinion,” and
ited Beck v. Lipkind. 681 Se. 2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996);
Ozvesilpinar v. Reach PLC, 48 Fla. L. Weekly D1004 (Fla. 3d DCA May 17,
2023) and Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 184 (Fia, 3d DCA 2000) to
note that "[sltatements that are pure epinien are insufficient to sustain. a
13
389 (Fla. ist DCA 1999); Cape Publications, Inc, v. Reakes, 840 So. 2d
277, 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Readon v. WPLG, LLC, 317 So. 3d 1228.
1234 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) and Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat. Found., 731 So. 2d
702 (Fila. 3d DCA 1999) to superfiuously affirm the obvious: that truthful
false claim that "Plaintiffs continued communications with Dr. Busse and
trial court's judge, the alleged propriety of absolute immunity, when stating:
8 Again, possibly knowing the judge would accept its claims without
verifying their veracity and would overlook Appellee/Defendant's distortion
of facts, Appeliee/Defendsant audaciously cited non-existent information
there is nothing in {f] 35-43 of Allen's complaint (R 19-21) that remotely
suggests:Allen admitted to harassment. Additionally, Allen concludes her
complaint with 7 50; there are no. ff] 51-59 in the complaint. (R 22-23)
14,
Allen relied on in her responses’, one lawyer said to
another in a deposition, Sussman said to Damian, You, sir
are a darnn liar, quote/unquote Absolute immunity
attached to that according to the Third DCA because it was
made during the statement was made during a
deposition. And they were talking about discovery who
produced what, but it was thai state was made during a
deposition the Third DCA said absolute immunity attaches.
(R 268)
15
the instant case, where an attorney requested the court's assistance
ludicrous claim that since Allen noted in her claim that "the Court, in
motions for the Court's intervention in stopping Allen from ‘further harassing
CME doctors,' and issued two orders aimed at ensuring the doctors’ safety
Allen's complaint, also noted in fff 14 and 34, R 14 & R 79) the allegations
that Allen was a mentally unstable litigant and endangered the safety of
the Court also heard arguments from Plaintiff when stating that "the
16
As can be verified in the already-disqualified judge's November
15, 2023-issued order, “pro se Plaintiff, Isabel del Pino Allen, advising
she would not be appearing at the hearing and who in fact did fail to appear
and with Sarah Egan, Esquire, and Michael Brand, Esquire, counsel for
Defendant, Felipe Arencibia Chong both present, and the Court having
considered the record and hearing argument from Defense counsel at the
Regarding the April, 2023 order issued by the judge who succeeded
the disqualified judge, Allen noted the following regarding the successor
judge's following suit and reiterating what his disqualified predecessor did
The second time that it was you probably doubt whai I'm
saying that Mr. Oscar Rogriguez Fonts did not respond to
my -- respond to the motion to recuse within 30 days --he
was disqualified. But | would like you to check what I'm
saying, check the veracity of my claims. So, but the reason
I'm asking is because he’s an officer of the law. 1 am
nobody. | am just a regular person. So obviously you
tend to believe someone with authority’. So i would
ask you to verify this to say that it's true. (Emphasis added)
7
{The judge who succeeded the disqualified judge] doubted
that this man, that your colleague, Oscar Rodriguez Fonts
had continued ruling in a case in which he was disqualified
So he naturally granted the motion [requesting that
Allen be compeiled to “stop harassing CME doctors],
didn't ask for anything. He just believed [what Egan
stated in her motion: that Allen threatened the CME
doctors‘ safety]. (R 271-272)
to dismiss, the lower court judge correctly classified Appellee's claim that
Allen was mentally unstable and presented a threat to the safety of CME
to dismiss by stating
| Allen proffers that trial court judge's advice that the summary judgment
order be vague and simply state "forthe reasons stated on the record" (R
277) was intended to facilitate this Court's conceivable "P.C.A," in the event
Allen overlooked the "instructions" and failed to request a transcript of the
hearing. Appellee followed the trial judge's advice. (R 281)
18
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
So. 357 (1907), has been consistently affirmed in Fisher v. Payne, 113 So.
378, 380 (Fla. 1927); Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 540-541, 123 So. 916
917 (1929); Fridovich vy. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, 66, (Fla.1992); Levin.
ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla.1994); Fariello v. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243
(Fla. 5th DCA, 2004); James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. 1st DCA
2014); Sussman v. Damian, 355 Sa. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and
784.048(a\(b)&(c), Fla. Stats.) CME doctors who feared for their safety and
19
Allen, en passant, points out that Appellee/Defencdant Egan's
an already- disqualified judge, during a hearing Egan knew Allen would not
Allen would not contest the malicious claim, thus making it easy for the
the related October 13, 2023 hearing, that “absolute immunity does apply
STANDARD OF REVIEW
2013); Sussman vy, Damian, 355 So. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977);
Dadie v. Schneider, 722 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
20
ARGUMENT
23
Pro Se Appellant Allen, respectfully and most deferentially preffers
request (through two motions for judicial orders) the court’s intervention to
protect CME doctors who had expressed to counsel fear for their “safety
plaintiff to have been prompted by the reckless driving — even when the
requesting that Allen submit to CMEs - claiming that Allen was endangering
the CME doctors’ safety made the defamation “relevant or pertinent to the
venereal diseases and was putting potential sex partners at risk due
basis that any defamatory claim pertaining the plaintiff's health would
22
be "relevant"; would have some "relation to the proceedings,” or
538, 540-541, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929); Fisherv. Payne, 113 So. 378, 380
(Fla. 1927): Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 85, 66 (Fla.1992) Levin,
Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes& Mitchell, PA. v. United States Fire
23
ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla.1994); Fariellov. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243
(Fla. 5th DCA, 2004); James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. ist DCA
2014); Sussman _v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 809, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
in Ange v. State, 98 Fla. 538, 540-541, 123 So, 916, 917 (1929) the
Florida Supreme Court cited the caveat that grants absolute immunity when
it noted that the “privilege extends fo the protection of the judge, parties
counsel and witnesses, and arises immediately upon the doing of any act
purposely derailing a pro se litigant's case by prejudicing the lit gant before
a judge with claims of the pro se litigant's mental instability and “wacko
the
Florida Gourts' Construal of "Relevance"; "Relation to
Proceedings," and “Some Connection to the Matters which are
to jec
Sub t .
the Grievance
24
Florida's First District Court of Appeal cited criteria regarding whai
regarding racial tensions in the work place, and the union's allegedly faise
that "[Hope] collaborated in the death of the young black male killed by
friend of Clifford Hope] James Reese {and that it was] widely known that
weapon." /bid.
In its ruling, the appellate court explained why absolute immunity was
25
Unlike the preceding case - where the Court explicated why the faise
regarding racial tensions in the work place where Hope. was 4 supervisor
which implies Hope had a say regarding alleged racial harassment - if the
false claim that Allen habitually harassed CME doctors and endangered
Florida's Fourth Appellate Court shed further light into what ought to
2d 921, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) - a case involving, among others claims.
Unlike the preceding case ~ where the Court explicitly noted why
26
leave to withdraw from the case - Appellee/Defendant Attorney Egan
blatantly lied to the Court by falsely stating that she (Egan) had “no. choice
Considering the verifiable fact both CME doctors denied that Allen
had ever harassed them, let alone their alleged request for the Court's
that Florida courts’ intent in: Myers v. Hodges, 44 So. 357 (1907); Ange v.
State, 98 Fla. 538, 540-541, 123 So. 916, 917 (1929); Fisher v. Payne, 113
So. 378, 380 (Fla. 1927): Fridovich_v. Fridovich, 898 So.2d 65
66, (Fla.1992); Levin, Middiebrooks, Mabie, Thomas Mayes & Mitchell,
PA. y. United States Fire Ins Co., 639 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla.1994)
Sussman v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 8098, 811, (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
Fariello y. Gavin, 873 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); DelMonica
v. Traynor, 118 So.3d 1205 (Fla. 2013), and James v Leigh, 145 So. 3d
1006 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) was to give attorneys a sense of omnipotence by
27
allowing a nolens volens “legal strategy" to be used to gain an upper hand
must be made, in Ross v, Blank, 958 So. 2d 437, 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)
with Appellee Dr. Diane Blank that her statements concerning suspected
and that staternents made in compliance there with are immune from civil
Far from being “required” to fabricate the claim that Allen harassed
CME doctors who had expressed fear for their safety - in a case where
moral duty, per Florida Bar Rule 4-8.4, to not “engage in conduct in
28
onnection with the prectice of law that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice Unquestionably, an attorney's request that the Court issue
jucicial orders to restrain a pro se litigant by falsely
claiming that the pro se
litigant was habitually harassing CME doctors and causi
ng these to fear for
their safety, is prejudicial to the administration of justice
CONCLUSION
The facts exposed and the case law cited in this appeal, amply
demonstrate that the trial judge erred when ruling that
“absolute immunity
does apply as a matter of law under these c rcumstanices."
(R 277)
The criterion for the applicability of absolute inamaunity
to defamatory
words is that they be "connected with, or relevant or mater
ial fo, the cause
in hand or subject of inquiry Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 209, 44 So
357, 361 (1907). The applicability of absolute immunity is
inappropriate in the instant case Appellee/Defendant's defamatory claim
that Allen terrorized CME doctors who feared for their safety
, is immaterial
to the subject of inquiry pertinent to Attorney Egan's
defense intended to
prove that the injuries and ailments alleged by Allen in her complaint
against Egan's client were unrelated to Egan's client's reckless
driving
The Florida Supreme Court explicated the rationale
oehind absolute
29
immunity in Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas. Mayes & Mitchell, P.A.v.
United States Fire Ins, Co.Fridovich v. Fridovich, 598 So.2d 65, (Fla.1992}
free and full disclosure of facts in the conduct of judicial proceedings Ibid
by falsely stating that Allen endangered the safety of CME doctors whom
prove that
Allen had not yet met - in a case where Egan was attempting to
While the verifiable facts exposed in this appeal reveal that Appeliee/
Plaintiff
3 As noted herein, Egan's initial “Emergency Motion to Prevent
Doctor." maliciously
[Allen] from Continuing to Harass the CME
ding
established" the false claim that Allen harassed doctors. The succee
and the
judge's refusal to invalidate the disqualified judge-issued orders
ding judge
judge's subsequent similar order substantiates that the succee
paid credence to Appellee/Defendant's defamatory claim
30
unrelated to Attorney Egan's client-cause collision - which indicates that
Appellant, pro se, isabel del Pino Allen respectfully request that, after
perusing the facts noted in this appeal vis-a-vis the pertinent case law
which specifies that for an attorney to enjoy absolute immunity when
making a defamatory statement, "so long as the statements are relevant to
the subject of inquiry," James v. Leigh, 145 So. 3d 1008, 1007 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2014); Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197, 209, 44 So. 357, 364 (1907),
this Honorable Court grant Allen's appeal and issue remanding this case to
CERTIFIATE OF SERVICE
| hereby certify that on this 22nd day of December, 2023, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing has been sent to: Luke Savage, Counsels for
31
the Appellee at: [email protected]; francesca.ste' [email protected];
CERTIFICATE OF CONIPLIANCE
written in Arial 14-point font, complies with the requisites noted in Rule
32