Case # 1

People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, September 29, 2020.

Doctrine: For the guidance of the bench and the bar, this Court adopts the
following guidelines concerning pleas of guilty to capital offenses:

1. AT THE TRIAL STAGE. When the accused makes a plea of guilty to a

capital offense, the trial court must strictly abide by the provisions of Sec. 3,
Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In particular, it
must afford the prosecution an opportunity to present evidence as to the guilt
of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. Failure to comply
with these mandates constitute grave abuse of discretion.

a. In case the plea of guilty to a capital offense is supported by proof beyond

reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a judgment of conviction.

b. In case the prosecution presents evidence but fails to prove the accused's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a judgment of
acquittal in favor of the accused.

c. In case the prosecution fails to present any evidence despite opportunity to

do so, the trial court shall enter a judgment of acquittal in favor of the
accused.

In the above instance, the trial court shall require the prosecution to explain
in writing within ten (10) days from receipt its failure to present evidence.
Any instance of collusion between the prosecution and the accused shall be
dealt with to the full extent of the law.

2. AT THE APPEAL STAGE:

a. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense on the basis of his plea
of guilty, whether improvident or not, and proof beyond reasonable doubt
was established, the judgment of conviction shall be sustained.

b. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense solely on the basis of

his plea of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution was not given an opportunity to
present its evidence, or was given the opportunity to present evidence but the
improvident plea of guilt resulted to an undue prejudice to either the
prosecution or the accused, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside and
the case remanded for re-arraignment and for reception of evidence pursuant
to Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

c. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense solely on the basis of a

plea of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof beyond reasonable
doubt because the prosecution failed to prove the accused's guilt despite
opportunity to do so, the judgment of conviction shall be set aside and the
accused acquitted.

Said guidelines shall be applied prospectively.

Case # 2
People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, October 9, 2019

Doctrine: Depositions, however, are recognized under Rule 23 of the Rules

on Civil Procedure. Although the rule on deposition by written
interrogatories is inscribed under the said Rule, the Court holds that it may
be applied suppletorily in criminal proceedings so long as there is
compelling reason.

Verily, in light of the unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case,

the Court sees no reason not to apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23
of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the interest of substantial justice and
fairness. Hence, the taking of testimony of Mary Jane through a deposition
by written interrogatories is in order.

Case # 3
Uy v. Sps. Lacsamana, G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015;

Doctrine: Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the
property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid
marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage."Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a
party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda
v. Trias, we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by
one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at
the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
the fact of marriage.

Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of

Appeals, we held that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the
marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114, which is applicable to the
present case being the marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca
cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that
they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person
solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the
clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the
municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the
marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested
party regarding the solemnization of the marriage other than those
mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest,
or minister who solemnized the marriage.

Case # 4
Cambe v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 208643, December 16, 2016

Doctrine: From the foregoing, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs had not been
compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody
of the seized item from the time it was first discovered until it was brought
to the court for examination.27 The chain of custody rule requires the
identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the
purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal drugs
and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused
until the time they are presented in court.28

In these subject cases, the facts persuasively proved that the sachets of
shabu, including the drug paraphernalia presented in court, were the same
items sold/seized from appellants. The integrity and evidentiary value
thereof were duly preserved. The marking and the handling of the specimens
were testified to by PO1 Aguenido, SPO3 Calaor, SPO4 Gafate and P/Sr.
Inspector Agustina Ompoy. It must be noted that appellants admitted the
expertise of Police Senior Inspector Ompoy, the chemist who conducted the
laboratory tests. Hence, the aforesaid prosecution witnesses testified about
every link in the chain, from the moment the seized items were picked up to
the time they were offered into evidence in court.

Case # 5
Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas v. Feliciano P. Legaspi, G.R. No. 205966,
March 2, 2016

Doctrine: In holding that the courts cannot take judicial notice of the
assessed or market value of the land, the CA cited this Court's ruling in
Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals.15 This Court's ruling though in
Quinagoran is inapplicable in this case because in the former, the complaint
does not allege that the assessed value of the land in question is more than
P20,000.00 and that there was no tax declaration nor any other document
showing the assessed value of the property attached to the complaint. Thus,
in Quinagoran, the assessed value of the land was not on record before the
trial court, unlike in the present case.

Moreover, considering that the area of the subject land is four million eight
hundred thirty-eight thousand seven hundred and thirty-six (4,838,736)
square meters, the RTC acted properly when it took judicial notice of the
total area of the property involved and the prevailing assessed value of the
titled property, and it would also be at the height of absurdity if the assessed
value of the property with such an area is less than P20,000.00.

Case # 6
Dela Llana v. Rebecca Biong, G.R. No. 182356, December 4, 2013

Doctrine: The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries

Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before

the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any testimonial or
documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the
vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s
negligence caused her whiplash injury was not established because of the
deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect
that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause
whiplash injuries. This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine.
Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the
basis of the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal
arguments.

Case # 7
People v. Piad, G.R. No. 213607, January 25, 2016

DOCTRINE: Evidently, the law requires "substantial" and not necessarily

"perfect adherence" as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the
evidentiar value of the seized items were preserved as the same would be
utilized in determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In this case, the CA meticulously assessed how the prosecution complied

with the chain of custody rule. When Piad was arrested, PO1 Arevalo
marked the confiscated drugs at the crime scene. Likewise, when Villarosa,
Carbo and Davis were arrested, PO1 Bayot immediately mark the seized
items at the crime scene. The items were brought to the Pasig Ci Police
Station where PO1 Bayot was designated as evidence custodial. P/Insp.
Sabio then prepared the requests for laboratory examination and drug test,
which were brought by PO1 Bayot, together with the drugs, to the Eastern
Police District Crime Laboratory. PSI Ebuen, received the confiscated items
for examination. The said items tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Based on the foregoing, the Court satisfied that there was
substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule.

Case # 8
People v. Susan M. Tamano and Jaffy B. Gulmatico, G.R. No. 208643,
December 16, 2016;

DOCTRINE: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody

rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

Furthermore, the defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong

and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law
enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official
duties. The presumption that official duty has been regularly performed can
only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence showing either of
two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that
they were inspired by any improper motive.43

In the present cases, appellants failed to overcome such presumption. The

bare denial of the appellants cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
the prosecution witnesses44 that appellants are the persons who sold shabu.
As correctly stated by the RTC, the version of the appellants appeared to be
a well-rehearsed prefabricated story, not worthy of credence. It is not natural
that the friends of appellants would simply walk away while appellants were
accosted for no apparent reason. If indeed appellants were accosted for no
apparent reason, it was easy for their friends to intervene, as it happened in a
busy place and around noontime. They could have even reported the incident
to the barangay officials or to the nearest police station. It is hard to believe
that appellant Tamaño would simply receive a plastic bag from a friend
without knowing or verifying its contents, considering that the bag could be
easily opened and somewhat transparent. And that it was harder to believe
that appellant Tamaño would continue to hold on to the bag even if she
already suspected that the contents thereof are illegal.
Case # 9
Roberto Otero v. Roger Tan, G.R. No. 200134, April 15, 2015

DOCTRINE: Here, Tan, during the ex parte presentation of his

evidence, did not present anyone who testified that the said statements of
account were genuine and were duly executed or that the same were neither
spurious or counterfeit or executed by mistake or under duress. Betache, the
one who prepared the said statements of account, was not presented by Tan
as a witness during the ex parte presentation of his evidence with the MTCC.
Considering that Tan failed to authenticate the aforesaid statements of
account, the said documents should not have been admitted in evidence
against Otero. It was thus error for the lower tribunals to have considered the
same in assessing the merits of Tan’s Complaint.

A private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a

private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally
authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.
Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in
the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as
evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private document
is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is an
ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have
not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the
genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d)
when the document is not being offered as genuine.

The statements of account which Tan adduced in evidence before the

MTCC indubitably are private documents. Considering that these documents
do not fall among the aforementioned exceptions, the MTCC could not
admit the same as evidence against Otero without the required authentication
thereof pursuant to Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. During
authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document
presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed, or that the
document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or
under duress.
Case # 10
Virginia D. Calimag v. Heirs of Silvestre N. Macapaz, G.R. No. 191936,
June 1, 2016

DOCTRINE: "A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists

of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in public records (Civil Registry)
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar)."
Thus, being public documents, the respondents' certificates of live birth are
presumed valid, and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
in them.

Case # 11
Spouses Bonifacio and Lucia Paras v. Kimwa and Development Corp., G.R.
No. 171601, April 8, 2015

DOCTRINE: Contrary to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, petitioners

Spouses Paras pleaded in the Complaint they filed before the trial court a
mistake or imperfection in the Agreement, as well as the Agreement’s
failure to express the true intent of the parties. Further, respondent Kimwa,
through its Answer, also responded to petitioners Spouses Paras’ pleading of
these issues. This is, thus, an exceptional case allowing admission of parol
evidence.

Considering how the Agreement’s mistake, imperfection, or supposed

failure to express the parties’ true intent was successfully put in issue in
petitioners Spouses Paras’ Complaint (and even responded to by respondent
Kimwa in its Answer), this case falls under the exceptions provided by Rule
130, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Accordingly, the
testimonial and documentary parol evidence sought to be introduced by
petitioners Spouses Paras, which attest to these supposed flaws and what
they aver to have been the parties’ true intent, may be admitted and
considered.

In sum, two (2) things must be established for parol evidence to be admitted:
first, that the existence of any of the four (4) exceptions has been put in issue
in a party’s pleading or has not been objected to by the adverse party; and
second, that the parol evidence sought to be presented serves to form the
basis of the conclusion proposed by the presenting party.

Case # 12
Damaso T. Ambray v. Sylvia A. Tsourous, G.R. No. 209264, July 5, 2016

DOCTRINE: Records show that Estela died during the pendency of these
proceedings before the RTC or on August 15, 2002. Her death transpired
before the presentation of the parties' evidence could ensue. However, she
was able to testify on direct and cross-examination in the falsification case
and affirmed that the alleged forged signatures appearing on the Deed of
Sale were, indeed, hers and her deceased husband, Ceferino, Sr.'s. The
parties in the falsification case involved respondents and petitioners herein,
and the subject matter therein and in this case are one and the same, i.e., the
genuineness and authenticity of the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela.

Clearly, the former testimony of Estela in the falsification case, being

admissible in evidence in these proceedings, deserves significant
consideration. She gave positive testimony that it was Ceferino, Sr. himself
who signed the Deed of Sale that conveyed Lot 2-C to petitioners. She
likewise verified her signature thereon. By virtue of these declarations, she
confirmed the genuineness and authenticity of the questioned signatures.
Thus, it follows that the Deed of Sale itself is valid and duly executed,
contrary to the finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that it was of
spurious nature.

Case # 13
People v. Fabian Urzais, G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016

DOCTRINE: The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3

(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the
whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its
owner, is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or
that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of
independent evidence inconsistent thereto.26 In the instant case, accused-
appellant set-up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his
unrebutted version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to him by the
brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though the explanation is not seamless,
once the explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising
from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and the
burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would
render the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the
prosecution was unable to discharge.

Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-

appellant's explanation for his possession of the missing vehicle. The
possession having been explained, the legal presumption is disputed and
thus, cannot find application in the instant case. To hold otherwise would be
a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions necessarily require proof of
guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in the absence of
such proof, should not be solely based on legal disputable presumptions.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be
treated as an incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions
of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the
guilt of accused-appellant was not established beyond reasonable doubt.

Case # 14
Mayor Amado Corpuz, Jr., v. People, G.R. No. 212656-57, November
23, 2016

DOCTRINE: In sum, the circumstantial evidence presented by the

prosecution in this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to
warrant petitioner's conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt.31
Not only that, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.32 Accordingly, the prosecution failed to establish the elements
of falsification of public documents. With the prosecution having failed to
discharge its burden of establishing petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court is constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable
doubt persists, to acquit him.
Case # 15
Maria Cecilia Oebanda v. People, G.R. No. 208137, June 8, 2016

DOCTRINE: First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession

of some of the stolen items when the police officers flagged down his
motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a reasonable
explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of
the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises
acts of ownership over, is owned by him.

Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged
stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment which he had
control over, the disputable presumption of being the taker of the stolen
items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed to give
a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that
could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items.

Case # 16
Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. v. Albert Cruz, G.R. No. 199282, March
14, 2016

DOCTRINE: It has been held that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear
of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless
contradicted by other evidence." The rationale behind the presumption is
that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him.

Case # 17
Ng Meng Tan vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 214054, August 5,
2015

DOCTRINE: Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a

(a) government employee or official or (b) requested witness who is not the
(1) adverse party’s witness nor (2) a hostile witness. If this person either (a)
unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or (b) refuses without
just cause to make the relevant documents available to the other party and its
presentation to court, Section 5 allows the requesting party to avail of
issuance of subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the
Rules of Court. Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses being
excluded they are not covered by Section 5. Expressio unius est exclusion
alterius: the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies
the exclusion of all others.26redarclaw

Here, Yap is a requested witness who is the adverse party’s witness.

Regardless of whether he unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial
affidavit or refuses without just cause to present the documents, Section 5
cannot be made to apply to him for the reason that he is included in a group
of individuals expressly exempt from the provision’s application.

In Afulugencia v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,27 this Court stated that
“in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness stand
is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the
latter.”28 There petitioners Spouses Afulugencia sought the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to compel the officers of the
bank to testify and bring documents pertaining to the extrajudicial
foreclosure and sale of a certain parcel of land. Metrobank moved to quash
the issuance of the subpoenas on the ground of non-compliance with Section
6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. In quashing the issuance of the subpoena,
the Court reminded litigants that the depositions are a mechanism by which
fishing expeditions and delays may be avoided. Further written
interrogatories aid the court in limiting harassment and to focus on what is
essential to a case.

In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered
interrogatories to parties pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They
therefore complied with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. Before
the present controversy arose, the RTC had already issued subpoenas for
Yap to testify and produce documents. He was called to the witness stand
when China Bank interposed its objection for non-compliance with Section
5 of the JAR. Having established that Yap, as an adverse party witness, is
not within Section 5 of the JAR’s scope, the rules in presentation of adverse
party witnesses as provided for under the Rules of Court shall apply. In
keeping with this Court’s decision in Afulugencia, there is no reason for the
RTC not to proceed with the presentation of Yap as a witness.
In sum, Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application adverse
party and hostile witnesses. For the presentation of these types of witnesses,
the provisions on the Rules of Court under the Revised Rules of Evidence
and all other correlative rules including the modes of deposition and
discovery rules shall apply.

Case # 18
Janet Carbonell v. Julita A. Carbonell-Mendez, G.R. No. 205681, July 1,
2015

DOCTRINE: Besides, the Court finds no justifiable reason to deviate from

the finding of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the signature of
respondent was forged on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 2 April 1997,
which was clearly established by the evidence presented during the trial.
Under Section 22,13 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, among the methods of
proving the genuineness of the handwriting are through a witness familiar
with such handwriting or a comparison by the court of the questioned
handwriting and the admitted genuine specimens of the handwriting.

In this case, respondent, the purported writer or signatory to the Deed of

Absolute Sale, testified that her signature was forged. To prove the forgery,
respondent presented, among others, her Canadian and Philippine passports,
driver's license, citizenship card, and health card, showing her genuine
signature which was clearly different from the signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Comparing the genuine signature of respondent on these
documents with her purported signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
RTC found "significant differences in terms of handwriting strokes, as well
as the shapes and sizes of letters, fairly suggesting that the plaintiff [Julita A.
Carbonell-Mendes] was not the author of the questioned signature."
Signatures on a questioned document may be examined by the trial court
judge and compared with the admitted genuine signatures to determine the
issue of authenticity of the contested document.

It bears stressing that the trial court may validly determine forgery from its
own independent examination of the documentary evidence at hand. This the
trial court judge can do without necessarily resorting to experts, especially
when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity,
which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimen of the
questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. Section 22 of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to
make a comparison of the disputed handwriting "with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

Case # 19
People v. Ardo Bacero, G.R. No. 208527, July 20, 2016

DOCTRINE: Under the totality of circumstances test, the following factors

are considered: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of
certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of
the identification procedure.

Juliet identified accused-appellant out-of-court on two separate occasions,

viz: (1) when she saw accused-appellant in front of the latter's house after
roaming the vicinity and (2) at a police line-up conducted by SPO1 Tecson.
We rule that the out-of-court identifications made by Juliet satisfied the
totality of circumstances test. Juliet was at the scene of the crime when the
incident happened and she was able to see the faces of the assailants through
the loosely tied blindfold.

Accused-appellant posited the defense of mistaken identity which is

essentially in the nature of denial and alibi. It is established jurisprudence
that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses' positive identification of the
accused-appellant; more so where the defense did not present convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for accused-appellant to have
been present at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.

In accused-appellant's attempt to support his mistaken identity claim, the

defense presented the testimony of Chiong, accused-appellant's long time
friend. The RTC and CA correctly did not give credence to the testimony of
Chiong. When a defense witness is a close friend, courts should view such
testimony with skepticism,35 more so when the same is uncorroborated, as
in the case at bar.
Case # 20
People v. Urzais, G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016

DOCTRINE: The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where
the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional,
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.

The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the
evidence of the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-
appellant beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt, however, is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply
to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not
required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond a reasonable
doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by a
preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity
and persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion. What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused
with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test,
acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be
tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest
of his life.32 The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Case # 21
Corazon D. Ison v. People, G.R. No. 205097, July 8, 2016

DOCTRINE: "Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are

susceptible of two or more interpretations, one of which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused while the other may be compatible with the
finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the accused because the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for conviction."
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Ison misrepresented herself as the owner of the fishponds and entered
into the Contract to Sell without authority from Col. Vergara. It was likewise
not amply established that the private complainants were completely
unaware of the pertinent facts concerning the fishponds' ownership. Hence,
the essential element of reliance upon the misrepresentation, which should
have induced the private complainants to part with their money, is wanting.
Inevitably, the Court is constrained to uphold the presumption of innocence
in Ison's favor and acquit her.

As discussed above, Col. Vergara had asked Ison to look for a buyer.
Although there is no conclusive proof as to the exact extent or limit of the
authority granted to Ison, the fact remains that she acted upon a color
thereof. Col. Vergara's disinterest in prosecuting Ison for any unlawful acts
lends credence to the foregoing circumstance.
Other pieces of circumstantial evidence further cast a cloud of doubt upon
the private complainants' allegation of misrepresentation by Ison. As pointed
out by the defense, Jess was among the three agents, who introduced Ison to
the private complainants. Jess is the father of private complainant Edgar. It
is thus more logical to infer that Jess informed his son about matters
pertinent to the status and ownership of the fishponds. Besides, the private
complainants visited the fishponds and talked to Genodipa, the caretaker. It
can be presumed that Atty. Ramos knows the intricacies of the law, had
made the necessary inquiries as to the fishponds' ownership, and had
observed due diligence and precaution before agreeing to part with the
amount of P150,000.00 given to Ison.

Case # 22
Kyle Anthony Zabala v. People, G.R. No. 210760, January 26, 2015

DOCTRINE: It is a settled rule that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to

support a conviction, and that direct evidence is not always necessary. This
is but a recognition of the reality that in certain instances, due to the inherent
attempt to conceal a crime, it is not always possible to obtain direct
evidence.

Moreover, in Lozano v. People, this Court clarified the application of the

circumstantial evidence rule:
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that
the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The circumstantial
evidence must exclude the possibility that some other person has committed
the crime.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that the prosecution failed
to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of the
offense charged. We find that the pieces of evidence presented before the
trial court fail to provide a sufficient combination of circumstances, as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

To recall, the evidence of the prosecution purports to establish the following

narrative: first, that the complaining witness Alas hides P68,000 in cash in
his closet inside their house; second, that petitioner is aware that Alas hides
money in his bedroom closet; third, that on the night of the incident,
petitioner was with his then girlfriend, witness Piñon; fourth, that petitioner
climbed through the fence of Alas’s house, and was able to successfully gain
entrance to his house; fifth, that petitioner later went out of the house with a
bulge in his pockets; and sixth, that later that day, petitioner and Piñon went
shopping for a cellphone.

Case # 23
People v. Martin Nerio, Jr., G.R. No. 200940, July 22, 2015

DOCTRINE: It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is

essential. However, when the victim is a small child or, as in this case,
someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively testify as to the
details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort to
circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable. Circumstantial evidence,
sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive evidence, indirectly proves
a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the
evidence established.19 It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct
evidence.20 Resort to it is imperative when the lack of direct testimony
would result in setting an outlaw free. The Court reiterates that direct
evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court
may draw its finding of guilt.21 In fact, circumstantial evidence, when
demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may even be the sole basis of a
criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare denials or hackneyed
alibis.

Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Section 5, Rule

133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The following are the requisites for
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support conviction: (a) there is
more than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, is the one who committed the crime. Thus, to justify a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of
circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

Here, AAA was not presented to testify in court because she was declared
unfit to fully discharge the functions of a credible witness. The psychologist
who examined her found that her answers reveal a low intellectual sphere,
poor insight, and lack of capacity to deal with matters rationally. She could
hardly even understand simple instructions.24

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were not shown to have
any malicious motive to fabricate a story, positively identified Nerio as the
person seen alone with AAA in bed in the evening of February 26, 2003.
AAA, who was only in a sando and panties, had her head on the shoulder of
Nerio, who was naked and only had a blanket covering the lower portion of
his body. Although Nerio denied this because he allegedly slept downstairs,
while AAA slept with his mother and sisters upstairs, his testimony is
inconsistent with that of his mother, who testified that AAA and Nerio
actually slept in one (1) room, but she lay between the two.

Further, Dr. Navidad found a fresh hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitals.

He explained that it could not have been inflicted more than three (3) days
from the date he examined AAA. There was, likewise, no showing that AAA
met with another man during that three-day-period. Hence, the courts below
did not err when they held that these pertinent circumstances proven during
the trial form an unbroken chain of events leading to the conclusion that
Nerio had carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent.
Case # 24
People v. Noel Enojas, G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014.

DOCTRINE: As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC

admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be
proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused
Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify
and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the
mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such
messages and was competent to testify on them.

The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.
But, assuming that this was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of
the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken
from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest,
a point that is not in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—
the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating police officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest
had committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at
the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and
identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment
using this knowledge.

Case # 25
Jesse U. Lucas v. Jesus S. Lucas, G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011

DOCTRINE: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may
order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made
before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue
an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases
in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court
can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect

the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on
the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA

testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for
example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If
there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the
DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion,
disallow a DNA testing.

Case # 26
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
FRANCIS SAEZ, Petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO;
G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012.

DOCTRINE: Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and

Habeas Data is explicit that questions of fact and law can be raised before
the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a rule then,
the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court
which rendered the judgment in a petition for the issuance of the writs of
amparo and habeas data. Be that as it may, in the instant case, the Court
agrees with the CA that the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proof
imposed upon him by the rules to establish his claims. It cannot be
overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and
Habeas Data expressly include in their coverage even threatened violations
against a person’s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat and
intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of
bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security
in the sense of "freedom from threat".

It must be stressed, however, that such "threat" must find rational basis on
the surrounding circumstances of the case. In this case, the petition was
mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security
by reason of his inclusion in the military’s order of battle, the surveillance
and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation exerted upon
him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere
threats fall within the mantle of protection of the writs of amparo and habeas
data, in the petitioner’s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made
allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and
credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous grounds.

Case # 26
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID
SUZARA vs. ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE. G.R. No. 202666 September
29, 2014.

DOCTRINE: As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible
only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can
hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents
were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to
them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the
fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however,
neither the minors nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against
the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents

reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than
the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No.
CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s
informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors
enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy
settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without
proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit
of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.

Case # 26
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R.
ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA. G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013.

DOCTRINE: It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure
only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule
could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court
limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal
cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil
nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior
to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the
issues could not have been properly joined.

Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in

lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.

The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues
subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after.
A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party
litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted
for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these submissions
have different functions in facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.

Case # 27
In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data
in Favor of Noriel Rodriguez, 696 SCRA 290 (2013); [G.R. No. 191805,
April 16, 2013]

DOCTRINE: The writ of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that

requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. As explained in the Decision, it
is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of
evidence, or even administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence. The totality of evidence as a standard for the grant of the writ was
correctly applied by this Court, as first laid down in Razon v. Tagitis:

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise
inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the
admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the
most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue
at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus,
even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.

The CA found that respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG Verzosa, LT. Gen.
Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De Vera, and Lt. Col. Mina conducted a
perfunctory investigation which relied solely on the accounts of the military.
Thus, the CA correctly held that the investigation was superficial, one-sided,
and depended entirely on the report prepared by 1st Lt. Johnny Calub. No
efforts were undertaken to solicit petitioner’s version of the incident, and no
witnesses were questioned regarding it.17 The CA also took into account the
palpable lack of effort from respondent Versoza, as the chief of the
Philippine National Police.
Case # 27
Ng Meng Tam v. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 214054, August 5,
2015

DOCTRINE: In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD

officers caused her "enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their
action amounted to an "enforced disappearance" within the context of the
Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the respondent DSWD
officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina
obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum35 explicitly
stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition
for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers presented Baby
Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5,
2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the
context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from

her child and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without
complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for
adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but
asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the
issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who,
for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State,
the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.