Hoover Institution | Stanford University

ENERGY POLICY

US Energy Superpower Status and

a New US Energy Diplomacy
Paul Dabbar

INTRODUCTION

A few months ago, we reached the fiftieth anniversary of the 1973 Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo, which inaugurated two generations of weakness
in US energy security and diplomacy. However, in the last decade, US energy posture has
shifted from one of weakness to one of strength.

The United States has become the global energy superpower. Once the world’s largest
importer of energy, it became a net energy exporter in 2019.1 It has become the largest pro-
ducer of both oil and natural gas, the largest exporter of natural gas, and the third-largest
exporter of oil.2 In addition, the United States has become the clear leader in the discovery of
new energy t­ echnologies. It has started to build upon its manufacturing leadership in areas
such as oil, gas, and power turbine equipment and is exploring new energy technology manu-
facturing. And the United States dominates capital raising for investments.3 No other country
comes close to that combination.

As a result of this production, technology, and capital leadership, the United States has become
the driver of several key achievements in the global energy markets. It has (1) been the global
leader in increasing energy production, (2) generated energy price deflation from its technology
innovation, (3) led the world in reduction of tons of emissions,4 and (4) been the global leader
in providing energy market stability and security. These energy strengths of the United States
require a new take on how it engages the world. New diplomatic policy is needed based on its
energy superpower status. Not only has US diplomacy not caught up with its leadership in these
individual areas, but it has also not grasped the power of the combination of these strengths.
Most current US energy diplomacy is still moored to the previous energy posture of weakness.

With its current energy posture significantly different than the 1973–2019 timeframe, US energy
diplomacy needs to shift to one of positive and engaging strength around topics such as
maximizing the energy security of the United States and its allies, energy market stability

A Hoover Institution Essay

 in an increasingly unstable world, global supply chains, emerging energy technologies, and
environmental policy.

HISTORY OF US ENERGY DIPLOMACY

US energy posture started from a position of strength pre–World War II. The United States
was a leading manufacturer of energy equipment and was largely energy self-sufficient. But
the early global energy markets were dominated by European colonial countries, who gave
oil concessions to their national energy companies in their respective colonial holdings.
The United States was largely shut out of energy concessions in those colonial possessions
through various diplomatic agreements, such as the 1920 San Remo Oil Agreement between
the United Kingdom and France.5

However, the United States had a strong domestic oil sector, with strong skill sets in drilling
technology and operations. As result, US oil companies started to prospect globally in areas
not in European spheres of influence. The first US efforts were in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and
the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.6 These efforts were led by US energy companies such as Standard
Oil of California (Chevron), the Texas Company (Texaco), Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon),
and Socony Vacuum (Mobil). These international commercial energy engagements led to US
strength in energy diplomacy.

A major inflection point of US energy diplomacy was the meeting of President Roosevelt
and King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia in 1945.7 At the time, there was a concern that grow-
ing demand for oil for the US economy after the end of the war might start taxing domestic
US production. Prospecting by the United States in Saudi Arabia showed promise for large
reserves in the country. In addition, there was a growing realization that UK and French
dominance in global engagement was likely to be significantly diminished due to the toll of
the war, and that would lead to a need for US leadership in global energy investment and
diplomacy.

President Roosevelt’s worry about the United States needing to import increasing amounts of
energy post–World War II was realized when the United States became a net-energy importer
in 1950.8 What occurred in the next two decades was a rush of US private sector energy invest-
ment and operatorship of oil production in the emerging markets, and this investment led to
parallel increased energy US diplomacy.

A smaller but still important portion of US energy diplomacy and global influence was
the growth of nuclear power, the first material energy technology innovation from the
US National Laboratories system. The United States invented nuclear power as a part of its
“Atoms for Peace” program and was the first country to deploy nuclear power plants.9 As a
result of that US technology leadership, US companies became global leaders in building
nuclear power plants. The diplomatic engagement on this topic was disproportionally higher
than its energy production contribution, because of the concerns around nuclear weapons
material proliferation.

2   PAUL DABBAR U US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS AND A NEW US ENERGY DIPLOMACY
During this time, to a large degree the United States set the global price of oil, exerting another
layer of global energy power. The Texas Railroad Commission effectively set the price of oil in
the United States, and significantly influenced global pricing, until the 1973 Oil Crisis.10

However, over the 1950s and 1960s, challenges to the US domination of global energy mar-
kets started appearing. Oil-producing nations started to demand higher payments from US
and other Western countries’ oil companies producing their oil. These demands accelerated
to the point that many operations were nationalized, complicating diplomacy.11 In addition,
several of the major oil-exporting countries formed OPEC in 1960 to gain greater energy
market control and joint diplomatic strength.12

By the mid-1960s, the Arab countries started to consider using their growing pro­duction capa-
bilities for power-projection purposes. The first big attempt was the 1967 Oil Embargo. The
major Arab oil-producing nations ordered oil sale curtailments on countries supporting Israel
during the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War. The embargo did not have a major impact on world oil avail-
ability due to lack of solidarity among the Arab countries. However, it helped those nations to
create the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and provide a frame-
work for how to successfully execute an oil embargo in the future.13

THE 1973 OIL CRISIS, US ENERGY POSTURE DISRUPTION, AND ENERGY

DIPLOMACY OF WEAKNESS
Nineteen seventy-three was a pivotal year for US energy diplomacy. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
generated a new national security opportunity for the Arab oil-producing nations to use
energy availability against the United States and other supporters of Israel. OAPEC had
learned from the ineffectual 1967 Oil Embargo execution and was able to organize much more
effectively in 1973. They drove oil prices up from ~$3/bbl to ~$10/bbl. This triggered signifi-
cant energy policy changes in the United States, including oil price controls, energy restric-
tions and production legislation, domestic private sector energy investment, and the creation
of the US Department of Energy.14

As a result of all those market and domestic policy changes, US energy diplomacy also
significantly changed. In the private sector, companies rushed to partner with p
­ roduction
opportunities outside of the OAPEC countries. For example, US companies started entering
into long-term supply agreements with Venezuela and built new refineries in Texas to specifi-
cally process Venezuelan heavy crude.15 The United States also refocused on the produc-
tion increase prospects from core allies, such as with the United Kingdom, Norway, and the
Netherlands in the North Sea.16

Subsequent to 1973, US diplomatic engagement in the Middle East also significantly

increased. President Carter highlighted the importance of Arab-Israeli peace as a corner-
stone to improving Middle East stability and, as a result, US energy security.17 US diplomatic
leadership and financial commitments around the 1978 Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords
were influenced by the degraded US energy security coming from potential Middle East
conflict.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY   3

 US energy imports dropped significantly in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to US efficiency
policy, but soon thereafter annual increases of imports returned, and were again setting records
almost every year.18 This added to the erosion of US energy diplomatic posture.

One additional factor for US energy diplomacy decline, which is still being felt today, was
nuclear power. As a result of the Three Mile Island accident, and a significant decline in the
domestic US nuclear construction leadership, the United States lost its position as driver of
the global nuclear industry.19

A significant event affecting US energy international engagement occurred in 1991 when Iraq
invaded Kuwait. Not only did the invasion disrupt Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil supplies, but it also cre-
ated the prospect that Iraq might intimidate or conquer Saudi Arabia, further adding to energy
supply challenges. The United States created a global coalition to push Iraqi out of Kuwait.
This energy-centric diplomatic and military endeavor had multiple ramifications that still
reverberate today. US military deployment in Saudi Arabia significantly influenced the growth
of al-Qaeda, the 9/11 attacks, the war in Afghanistan, the US-led invasion of Iraq, and the for-
mation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

US energy policy and new energy technology development floundered during the 1990s.
Energy policy devolved to the point of acceptance that it had to manage US decline of energy
security with ever-increasing prices. US energy posture reached a nadir around 2001. In that
year, the Bush administration conducted a review of the topic and published a detailed energy
policy report, including on energy diplomacy. The report was deeply dour, highlighting the poor
energy posture of the United States, and concluded that continued decline in energy security
was likely. As a part of that negative view, it recommended that the United States needed to
expand its relationships with countries that had prospects of shipping it more oil, including
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.20

It was also at this time that the United States was on a path to becoming a major importer of
­natural gas. US natural gas production reductions had reached a point that companies were
beginning to build liquefied natural gas (LNG) import facilities, further eroding energy security.21
However, in the 2001 report there were initial ideas of recommended policy changes that ulti-
mately led to big changes in energy posture. The authors called for accelerated investment in
new energy technologies and for changes in policy to encourage production of all energy types.22

THE PIVOT TO ENERGY STRENGTH

Soon after the 2001 energy policy review, prospects of strength started appearing in US energy
posture. There were three major drivers which started the shift:

• Significant energy technology advances: A wide array of energy technology discov-

eries led to major increases in energy production. For example, inventions in drilling
including 3D seismic imaging, directional drilling, and hydraulic fracturing, reliable
wind turbines, solar photovoltaics, the lithium-ion battery chemistry, and many others.23
Almost all of this technology discovery was driven in the United States.

4   PAUL DABBAR U US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS AND A NEW US ENERGY DIPLOMACY
 • Impactful all-the-above energy supply government policy: Examples include the
2005 Energy Policy Act, which expanded energy production prospects, including
renewables production, and delegated regulatory authority of unconventional drilling
to the states. 24 In 2011, the United States also approved the first LNG exports in over
a generation, which stimulated even more natural gas production in the country.25 The
2016 budget agreement allowed crude exports for the first time since the 1973 Oil Crisis,
which led to a dramatic rise in US oil production, and it also extended renewable tax
credits.26 Those bipartisan compromises can be summarized as follows: “If you give
me my pro-supply policies, I will give you your pro-supply policies.”

• Large increases in private market investment into the new technologies: The private
capital markets flooded funding into the energy sector to take advantage of these new
technologies and policies. For example, North American upstream capital investments
went from approximately $50 billion annually in 2001 to $250 billion annually at its peak
in 2014.27

These three drivers led to significant energy production increases. For example, crude produc-
tion in the United States increased from a low of 4.0 mm bbl/day in 2008 to 12.9 mm bbl/day
in 2019 (and reached 13.2 mm bbl/day by the end of 2023).28 That 9 mm bbl/day US increase
was more than the total production of almost all the individual countries in OPEC+ (consisting
of OPEC members plus 11 other oil-producing countries). US innovation and investments led to
vast increases in wind, solar, advanced gas turbines, and the development of electric vehicle
technologies.

THE COMPONENTS OF US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS

The list of US energy posture strengths that built up this as a result of the 2001 energy policy
review was unique in the history of the world. US leadership positions included being the
top global producer of both oil (~13.2 million bbl/day) and natural gas (~102 bcf/day), the top
exporter of LNG (~12 bcf/day), and the third-largest exporter of oil (~5 million bbl/day), as well
as having the world’s largest capital markets for investment and leading basic research of
new energy science and technologies.29 The United States was also a leader in a reasonable
amount of energy industry manufacturing, in areas including nuclear power equipment, oil
and gas field services, electric vehicles, and turbines. It was also the leading country in emis-
sions reductions (on a tons-per-year reduction basis), based on successful development of
lower-emitting energy supplies and deploying new technologies.30

No other country in the world comes close to that combined set of strengths. Saudi Arabia
is strong in oil production, Qatar in LNG, Russia is a smaller player in both, China leads in
mostly appropriating US discovery science and efficiently building materials processing and
power equipment manufacturing capacity, and the United Kingdom is strong at capital mar-
kets. But none of these competitors have anything close to the combined strengths of the
US energy posture.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY   5

 As a result of this uniquely strong energy posture, an interesting set of global energy engage-
ments and events have occurred this century that begin to show the new power of the
United States on the global energy stage. Examples include:

• OPEC tried to raise oil prices in 2015 by reducing production, but they ended up giving
significant market share to the United States, who filled the gap with unconventional
drilling production.31

• US oil producers were cutting shale-lifting costs annually during the 2010s.32 And given
US production was the marginal-cost barrel on the global market, the country generated
oil price deflation for consumers globally.

• The United States was able to impose oil sale embargoes on Venezuela and Iran for
national security reasons without negatively impacting global oil prices.33

• When Iran attacked Saudi Aramco facilities in 2019, oil prices barely moved, due in large
part to the markets believing US production could cover for Saudi production losses.34

• When the United States decided to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, the Trump
administration knew that OPEC could not retaliate with oil market moves like it had in 1973.

• During the late 2010s, the United States was able to help organize the Central European
Three Seas Initiative, which was developed to support member countries to reduce
dependence on Russian energy imports.35 This turned out to be very helpful for those
participating countries when the Russia-Ukraine War erupted.

• The United States became a net energy exporter to a Persian Gulf emirate, Abu Dhabi,
for several years, exporting LNG for its power sector.36 And the LNG was partially
regasified on US-owned floating regasification units.37

• The United States was a key leader of stabilizing the global energy markets in 2020 when
they were disrupted as a result of COVID-19 demand destruction. It used its Strategic
Petroleum Reserve capacity to help place excess global oil.38 The United States also led
the global oil production negotiations, resulting in an agreement among OPEC+ mem-
bers to cut production, which was announced by the White House.39 As a result, OPEC+,
including Saudi Arabia and Russia, asked the United States to continue to partner with it
on an ongoing basis on production coordination, which the latter declined to do.40

• The United States took the lead at providing replacement oil and natural gas supplies to
Europe needed as a result of the Russia-Ukraine War.41

• In the last year, the United States and Canada achieved a combined natural gas and
crude oil production level that overtook the combined Persian Gulf production, a dra-
matic shift in energy production power to North America that author Dan Yergin calls
“the great rebalancing.”42

6   PAUL DABBAR U US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS AND A NEW US ENERGY DIPLOMACY
A NEW POLICY FOR US ENERGY DIPLOMACY BASED ON
STRENGTH

As a result of this great rebalancing, a large shift is required on how the United States engages
with the world on energy. Several steps need to be taken to both optimize that diplomatic
power and then develop and implement new engagement policy.

DEVELOP DOMESTIC AWARENESS OF US ENERGY LEADERSHIP STATUS AND

ITS VALUE
The first challenge of shifting diplomatic policy is an acknowledgment by US policymak-
ers that the United States is no longer a weak energy nation, and it has significant posture
strengths that can be used individually or in combination. While the newly emerged combined
energy strengths of the country might appear obvious, much of the US energy policy commu-
nity still believes that the United States is in a weak position. US policymakers need to broadly
recognize that their country is the leading energy power in the world.

In addition, diplomatic policymakers should become aware of the various strengths of the US
energy posture and the value of combining them. Currently, energy diplomacy tends to focus
on one-off narrow topics, such as LNG exports or a certain technology. The United States
should develop policy on how to use the combination of its strengths for global engagement.

IMPLEMENT DOMESTIC ENERGY POLICIES THAT MAXIMIZE ITS DIPLOMATIC

POSTURE
While the United States is clearly the dominant energy power in the world, it can improve its
domestic energy posture by acting on the following recommendations:

• Return to all-the-above energy policy positions to maximize energy production pros-

pects. Recent US government policies have deviated from previous multi-administration
all-the-above energy positions, and some in the energy industry have had to overcome
near-term policy impediments.

• Improve all-the-above energy production, markets, and transportation prospects, includ-

ing easing siting restrictions under the National Environmental Policy Act, and reforming
the Federal Power Act, Natural Gas Act, and various acts focused on the Environmental
Protection Agency.

• Create a mechanism to allow for easier and more rapid-swing production of oil and gas.

• Continue to execute on reshoring manufacturing of energy equipment.

• Reform the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and Inflation Reduction Act to prevent subsidiz-
ing adversary nations’ energy companies and technologies.

• Develop new policies to support domestic critical minerals mining and processing.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY   7

 • Accelerate investment in both early-stage energy R&D and product innovation.

• Create better mechanisms for national laboratories and universities to accelerate

moving technology discovery to deployment.

• Pass legislation that would ease exports of energy, such as amending the Natural Gas Act
to allow LNG exports to US allies.

ALIGN THE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA,

AND MEXICO
The US and Canadian energy markets are very integrated and complementary. Power, natural
gas, and oil markets are linked as a result of energy transmission infrastructure. Most of the oil
that the US imports is from Canada, and subsequently refined and/or re-exported. In addition,
the two countries’ transportation manufacturing industries are highly intertwined, and Canada
has significant critical minerals mining prospects. The United States and Canada have simi-
lar policies on emissions and environmental topics. Ownership of many of the energy assets
is held by companies with significant holdings in both countries. And as of the end of 2023,
combined US and Canadian oil and gas production exceeded that of the Persian Gulf.

The United States and Canada could take further steps beyond the current provisions of the
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement around reducing barriers between the two coun-
tries such as easing cross-border approvals for energy infrastructure. The two countries could
develop joint investment and regulatory approval mechanisms for additional mining and pro-
cessing of critical materials. Finally, they could create a mechanism for regular dialogue on all
global energy issues and seek to align energy diplomacy positions.

While the domestic politics of energy in Mexico has a long history and energy is a strategic
sector of the economy, the energy markets between the United States and Mexico are also
quite integrated. After Canada, Mexico is the second-largest exporter of crude oil to the
United States. Further diplomatic support for cross-border natural gas investment can be
accelerated to increase oil and refining infrastructure and power generation investment. And
subject to Mexican sensitivities, an alignment on diplomatic positions on the energy sector
globally could be pursued.

NORWAY ALIGNMENT, AND A NORTH ATLANTIC PETROLEUM EXPORTING

COUNTRIES FORUM
During the last fifty years, arguably the largest influencer of global energy has been OPEC.
With oil being the largest globally traded energy commodity, and with OPEC+ representing
almost 50 percent of global oil production, OPEC has been the keystone of global energy
diplomacy. However, with the United States tripling its oil production from its post-1973 lows
and achieving the status of top global producer, OPEC’s position has dramatically changed.

The United States and its close allies that are also leaders in oil production can now provide
a counterbalance to OPEC. The three largest democratic, free market oil-producing countries

8   PAUL DABBAR U US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS AND A NEW US ENERGY DIPLOMACY
currently are the United States, Canada, and Norway. To a large degree, Norway has similar
national security worldviews, and energy and environmental standards and policies to the
United States and Canada. As a result, having a regular G7-style forum for the three coun-
tries to discuss oil and related production, investment, and environmental policy alignment
could be productive. With production representing approximately half of OPEC+’s, it would
represent a material portion of the global market. While this potentially named “North Atlantic
Forum of Petroleum Exporting Countries” (NAFPEC) would not be a production cartel, this
joint forum could be another voice around that important global market.

ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES

The OPEC nations have a few key policy goals: (1) oil market stability; (2) keep oil prices high
but not to the point of significant demand destruction; (3) maximize revenues for their national
budgets; and (4) diversify their economies away from reliance on the oil sector.

There is no bigger shift in the global energy posture of the United States than its relative
change in the area of oil production. As a result of this shift, there has been a dramatic change
in its energy security position vis-à-vis OPEC. US oil imports from OPEC nations have been
significantly reduced. And OPEC is increasing exports to Europe, India, and China. OPEC
is still a major driver of international oil prices, and that affects the US economy. But the
United States has far more impact on international oil prices than when it was only producing
4.0 mm bbl/day. In some respect, it has more flexibility on oil policy than OPEC countries,
which have limitations on their policy based on the importance of oil revenues for their
national budgets. And given that the global-leading US oil industry also benefits from market
stability and predictability, the United States now has a partially aligned interest with OPEC
on that topic.

The net impact of all these changes is significantly to the benefit of US energy diplomacy pos-
ture. As a result, a significant shift in diplomacy with OPEC, in particular with the large Arab
members like Saudi Arabia, is deserved. The United States is now a peer of Saudi Arabia on
oil, and should engage with the country on that basis, rather than as a weakly positioned cus-
tomer and price-taker. It is clearly a leader in many other areas of the energy sector that inter-
est OPEC members as well.

However, the shifts in the individual components of diplomacy between the United States and
the OPEC producers are not all in the positive direction for this country. As a result of these
changes, the Biden administration has felt emboldened to criticize the leader of Saudi Arabia
around human rights, which has not had a positive impact on energy diplomacy, and likely
helped trigger oil market actions by Saudi Arabia opposite to those the Biden administration
desired. These US diplomatic steps likely influenced Saudi Arabia to reconcile with Iran with
the help of China, which may not be attractive to US national security interests.

Saudi Arabia has also taken a series of energy market and diplomacy steps in the direction
of China as it absorbed the reduction of aligned interests due to the United States importing
less Middle East crude. Saudi Arabia is discussing with China the possibility of using yuan-
denominated oil sales contracts, undermining the dollar’s dominance in international trade.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY   9

 And Saudi Arabia has been accelerating discussions about China investing in their country,
including in energy.

The United States now has a much wider set of tools to engage with most of the OPEC mem-
bers than it had before 2019. It should therefore develop new diplomatic policy, in particular for
the large Arab members, that can be much more advantageous to it on various topics, including
further efforts on Arab-Israeli peace efforts, regional conflict management, and Iran policy.

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND

CLOSELY ALLIED NATIONS
The most multifaceted energy engagement of the United States globally is with the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations. Some of these
countries are fellow net energy exporters, like Australia; some are significant importers, like
Japan and Germany; but all care about emissions policy and related clean technology supply
chains, innovation, and deployment.

The United States is in a position with the countries that have energy deficits to negotiate
new energy agreements that combine energy exports, preferred energy supply chain agreements,
new technology innovation and manufacturing policy, and emissions policy. US leadership
across these areas allows the United States to offer much more diplomatically than previously.

This posture strength can also enable this country to lead proposals with OECD countries
on joint energy policy and diplomacy with other countries around energy policy, both with
friends in the emerging markets and adversaries such as Russia and China.

ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND GLOBAL EMISSIONS DIPLOMACY

One of the largest implications of the dramatic shift in US energy posture is related to clean
energy and emissions. The United States can arguably claim it is the leader in the combined
efforts around clean energy. US drilling innovation significantly reduced emissions as a result
of natural gas use replacing coal. In addition, the United States is the leader in discovery of
new energy technologies. Historical leadership in areas such as discovering the lithium-ion
chemistry, first commercial-performing solar photovoltaic systems, and first-generation elec-
tric vehicles is clear. And current US discovery leadership is also widening that historical gap,
in areas such as beyond-lithium-ion batteries, advanced fission, and commercial fusion. In
addition, the US private and public capital markets dominate investment into new discovery
developments, such as the venture capital and private equity markets.

The United States can leverage this clean technology leadership in its diplomatic policies,
including enhancing supply chains with critical mineral mining countries, entering into agree-
ments with fellow OECD countries, and policies to remove China’s dominance in certain sec-
tors of their leadership.

The United States can also use this leadership to drive discussions on balanced all-the-above
sources and technologies to address emissions policy. Its leadership of emissions reduction

10   PAUL DABBAR U US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS AND A NEW US ENERGY DIPLOMACY
success versus China’s significant increase in emissions allows it to take the offense, along
with its allies, to address China’s and others’ poor emissions trends.

EMERGING MARKETS: LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, INDIA

The United States was the leader of energy investments in the emerging markets up until
recently. Today, it could re-engage with the emerging markets, now with a much broader port-
folio of energy sector options. It can now combine its strengths in energy export capacity,
new technology products, and export finance to provide a much broader set of options than
any other country can offer.

In addition, much of the minerals needed for clean energy technologies come from emerging
market countries. As a growing manufacturer and large customer of those products, and the
leader in investing in the energy sector, the United States can use these positions in mutually
beneficial ways. For example, it can jointly negotiate preferred critical mineral agreements
with individual countries while concurrently including terms around investment, processing,
products, and technology.

MINING AND CRITICAL MATERIALS POLICY

While much has been written about the need to secure various metals required for new
energy and related transportation technologies, including the national security implications
of international supply chains of these materials, little has been done to implement recom-
mended changes.

The United States has general consensus that continuing importing these materials from
adversarial nations is poor for national and economic security. As a large consumer of these
raw and processed materials, as well as the end products from these materials, the country
has significant power to select where it purchases those materials.

While a shift to procuring certain materials from China and Russia, such as processed lithium
or enriched uranium, will take time, the United States should negotiate preferential agreements
with friendly supplier nations, including off-take agreements and investment, while increasing
restrictions on adversarial nations over time.

These materials and processes supply chains took a long time for US adversaries to build.
It will take time to use diplomacy to create a new playing field to allow for a shift in produc-
tion. But the United States should not let the scope and duration of that shift dissuade it, and
should concurrently pursue domestic production expansion as much as possible.

ACTIVE ADVERSARIES: RUSSIA, VENEZUELA, IRAN

The combined energy posture of the United States towers over its adversaries. But up until
now it has not used this strength to its full extent.

Venezuela and Iran have been affected by diplomatic actions enabled by new US energy leader-
ship. The United States was able to impose oil export bans on both countries, in large part

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY   11

 because its domestic oil production increases obviated the need for those countries supplies
on the global market. And when Iran attacked the Saudi oil production facilities in 2019, global
oil prices barely moved, due to market stability provided by the increased US oil production.

The adversary most impacted by active US energy diplomacy since it achieved energy leader-
ship has been Russia. The United States was able to support Europe’s rapid shift away from
Russian oil and gas imports as a result of the Russia-Ukraine War. Given that Europe was able
to weather this large energy supply rupture with Russia because of alternative supplies from
this country, and as a result was able to support Ukraine’s defense, Ukraine’s successful abil-
ity to repulse the Russian invasion was in part achieved because of US energy leadership. The
United States could continue to take advantage of its enhanced energy posture by taking fur-
ther actions as needed against Russia, Venezuela, and Iran.

CHINA
China is a complicated adversary on many fronts, including around energy. China has signifi-
cant weaknesses in its energy sector: when it comes to energy sources, domestic coal is its
largest source of energy, and it is exposed to imported energy, in particular oil and natural gas.
China is also not particularly strong in discovery of new energy technologies. None of the cur-
rent new wave of clean energy technologies, such as solar, wind, electric vehicles, or batteries
were discovered by researchers in China. And much of the next wave of clean energy technol-
ogy discovery is also primarily coming from the United States, such as advanced nuclear tech-
nology like fusion, beyond lithium-ion battery chemistries, and carbon capture. China is also
exposed to significant imports of metal ore needed for its energy equipment manufacturing.

However, China has positioned itself very well on manufacturing new clean technologies, and
processing critical materials needed for that manufacturing. These technologies are in increas-
ing demand around the world, and as a result China is penetrating energy markets globally with
these products. Before this current wave, China had never been a large global player in energy
equipment and products. As a result, this is eroding a portion of US energy posture.

The United States should develop energy policy engagement further around the implica-
tions of China becoming increasingly dependent on imported energy (including from the
United States) and create policy options that could advantage the United States economically
and strategically, including in conflict scenarios.

China is also the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, emitting more than all the OECD coun-
tries combined. And while the United States has led the world in the last decade in reducing
annual carbon emissions from energy by 635 million metric tons/year, China has more than
overcome that achievement by increasing its annual emissions by 1,729 million tons/year.43
US energy diplomacy can be much more aggressive to address this significant China environ-
mental position.

The United States needs to develop both greater awareness of and more aggressive policies
around China and new energy technologies, including those to prevent China’s appropriation

12   PAUL DABBAR U US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS AND A NEW US ENERGY DIPLOMACY
of US innovation, to more aggressively reduce new China’s penetration of US clean technol-
ogy product markets, and to further onshore or friend-shore critical material supply chains
and processing.

DOMESTIC AND MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: EXPORT-IMPORT

BANK, WORLD BANK, AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
The United States has not effectively used its diplomatic power for financing international
energy infrastructure construction for quite some time. Historically the Export-Import Bank
has been supportive of all-the-above energy infrastructure construction by US companies,
but that effort has receded over the past generation. The United States could look at resusci-
tating that effort, which would have positive implications for bilateral diplomacy, US economic
interests, national security, and countering China’s much more aggressive financing efforts
under its Belt and Road Initiative.

In addition, the United States should regain policy leadership at the World Bank. In many
respects, the institution has been more supportive of China’s energy developments in the
emerging markets than those sponsored by the United States and its allies, notwithstand-
ing the United States has a much larger shareholding interest in the bank than China. The
United States and its allies should use their leadership position at the World Bank and at
the International Monetary Fund to better position OECD members’ efforts versus China’s.

CONCLUSION

Overall, the United States now has the top global energy position. Its combined leadership in
innovation, historical all-the-above policies, and capital has catapulted it to all-time heights of
energy strength. Its newly achieved energy superpower status gives it energy diplomacy
options that it has never had in the past, and it is now in the position to drive global energy
policies in an increasingly complex world. At the same time, however, the United States
needs to revamp its energy diplomacy to match its newfound strength.

NOTES
1. ​US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “US Energy Facts Explained: Imports and
Exports,” August 9, 2023, https://­w ww​.­eia​.­gov​/­energyexplained​/­us​-­energy​-­facts​/­imports​-­and​-­exports​.­php.
2. ​See US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “International Energy Production,”
accessed January 23, 2024, https://­w ww​.­eia​. ­gov​/ ­international​/­data​/ ­world; Melissa Pistilli, “Top 10 Countries
for Natural Gas Production,” Investing News Network, October 25, 2023, https://­investingnews​.­com​/ ­top​
-­natural​-­gas​-­producers​/­; and Seair Exim Solutions, “Top 10 Oil Exporting Countries in 2023,” March 31,
2020, https://­w ww​.­seair​.­co​.­in​/­blog ​/­top​-­10 ​-­oil​-­exporting​-­countries​-­in​-­2 023​.­aspx.
3. ​Companies Market Cap, “Countries Ranked by Market Cap,” accessed January 23, 2024, https://­
companiesmarketcap​.­com​/­all​-­countries​/­; WSJ Moneybeat, “Investment Banking Scorecard,” accessed
January 23, 2024, https://­graphics​.­wsj​.­com​/­investment​-­banking​-­scorecard​/­.
4. ​BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2022, https://­w ww​.­b p​.­com​/­content ​/­d am​/­b p​/­b usiness​-­s ites​/­en​
/­global​/­corporate​/­p dfs​/­energy​-­economics​/­s tatistical​-­review​/­b p​-­s tats​-­review​-­2 022​-­f ull​-­report​.­p df.
5. ​US State Department, “The 1928 Red Line Agreement,” accessed January 23, 2024, https://­history​.­state​
.­gov​/­milestones​/­1921​-­1936​/­red​-­line.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY   13

 6. ​Dan Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991).
7. ​Yergin, The Prize.
8. ​US Department of Energy, “Imports and Exports of Primary Energy, 1950–2014,” February 2015, https://­
www​.­energy​.­gov​/­eere​/­vehicles​/­articles​/­fact​-­8 64​-­march​-­16​-­2 015​-­imports​-­primary​-­energy​-­have​-­declined​
-­sharply​-­peak.
9. ​US Department of Energy, The History of Nuclear Energy (Washington, DC: US Department of Energy, 1988).
10. ​David F. Prindle, “Railroad Commission,” Texas State Historical Association, June 1, 1995, https://­w ww​
.­tshaonline​.­org ​/­handbook ​/­entries​/­railroad​-­commission.
11. ​Yergin, The Prize.
12. ​Yergin, The Prize.
13. ​Frank Verrastro and Guy Caruso, “The Arab Oil Embargo—40 Years Later,” Center for Strategic &
International Studies, October 16, 2013, https://­w ww​.­csis​.­org ​/­analysis​/­arab​-­oil​-­embargo​-­4 0 ​-­years​-­later.
14. ​Yergin, The Prize.
15. ​Amelia Cheatham and Diana Roy, “Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate,” Council on Foreign
Relations, December 22, 2023, https://­w ww​.­cfr​.­org ​/­backgrounder​/­venezuela​-­crisis.
16. ​R. W. Ferrier and J. H. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 1, The Developing
Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
17. ​Office of the Historian, “US State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States 1977–1980, Vol. 18,
Doc. 45: Editorial Note,” https://­history​.­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1977​-­8 0v18​/­d 45.
18. ​US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Total Energy by Year,” September 2012,
https://­w ww​.­eia​.­gov​/­totalenergy​/­data​/­annual​/­showtext​.­php​?­t​=­ptb0501a.
19. ​Francois Leveque, “The International Trade of Nuclear Power Plants,” Revue d’economie industrielle 148:
55–68, https://­journals​.­openedition​.­org ​/­rei​/­pdf​/­5 927.
20. ​National Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy: Reliable, Affordable, and
Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future, May 2001, https:// ­w ww​.­nrc​.­gov​/­d ocs​/ ­M L0428​
/­M L042800056 ​.­p df.
21. ​US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “The Global Liquified Natural Gas
Market,” December 2003, http://­large​.­stanford​.­edu​/­courses​/­2 012 ​/­ph240​/­mao1​/­docs​/­eia​_­0 637​.­pdf.
22. ​N ational Energy Policy Development Group, National Energy Policy.
23. ​On hydraulic fracturing, see Rahul Kapoor and Johann Peter Murmann, “The Organizational and
Technological Origins of the US Shale Gas Revolution,” Industrial and Corporate Change, June 19, 2023,
https://­academic​.­oup​.­com​/­icc​/­advance​-­article​/­doi​/­10​.­1093​/­icc​/­dtad021​/ ­7202170.
24. ​US Congress, “Energy Policy Act of 2005,” August 8, 2005, https://­w ww​.­congress​.­gov​/ ­109​/­plaws​/­publ58​
/­PLAW​-­109publ58​.­pdf.
25. ​US Department of Energy, “Sabine Pass Liquefaction, LLC - FE Docket. No. 10-111-LNG,” accessed
January 23, 2024, https://­fossil​.­energy​.­gov​/­ng​_­regulation​/­s abine​-­pass​-­liquefaction​-­llc​-­fe​-­dkt​-­no​-­10 ​-­111​-­lng.
26. ​US Congress, “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016,” December 18, 2015, https://­w ww​.­congress​.­gov​
/­bill​/­114th​-­congress​/­house​-­bill​/­2 029​/­text.
27. ​Matthew Andrea and Rene Santos, “Spotlight: Oil Project Sanctioning Is Picking Up on the Back of Higher
Oil Prices,” S&P Global, June 23, 2021, https://­w ww​.­spglobal​.­com​/­commodityinsights​/­en​/­market​-­insights​
/­latest​-­news​/­oil​/­0 62321​-­spotlight​-­oil​-­project​-­sanctioning​-­is​-­picking​-­up​-­on​-­the​-­back​-­of​-­higher​-­oil​-­prices.
28. ​US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Weekly US Field Production of Crude Oil,”
accessed January 23, 2024, https://­w ww​.­eia​.­gov​/­dnav​/­pet ​/­hist ​/­LeafHandler​.­ashx​?­f​=­W&n​= ­PET&s ​=­WCRFPUS2.
29. ​See, respectively, BP, Statistical Review of World Energy; US Department of Energy, Energy Information
Administration, “Today in Energy,” September 12, 2023, https://­w ww​.­eia​.­gov​/­todayinenergy​/­detail​.­php​?­id​
=­6 0361; Curtis Williams, “US Was Top LNG Exporter in 2023 as Hit Record Levels,” Reuters, January 3, 2024,
https://­w ww​.­reuters​.­com​/­business​/­energy​/­us​-­was​-­top​-­lng​-­exporter​-­2023​-­hit​-­record​-­levels​-­2024​- ­01​- ­02 ​/­;
US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Weekly US Exports of Crude Oil”, accessed
January 23, 2024, https://­w ww​.­eia​.­gov​/­dnav​/­pet ​/­hist ​/­LeafHandler​.­ashx​?­n​= ­PET&s ​=­WCREXUS2&f​=­W; and

14   PAUL DABBAR U US ENERGY SUPERPOWER STATUS AND A NEW US ENERGY DIPLOMACY
US House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space and Technology, “The United States, China and
the Fight for Global Leadership: Building a US National Science and Technology Strategy,” February 28, 2023,
https://­republicans​-­science​.­house​.­gov​/­​_­cache​/­files​/­1​/­a​/­1a5a5929 ​-­970e​-­4 a69 ​-­8 906​-­5 5cb4a5b142a​/­20556CC
7F84517C72244424599BF5501​.­2023​- ­02​-­28​-­hsst​-­hearing​-­charter​-­us​-­competitiveness​-­and​-­s​-­t​-­strategy​.­pdf.
30. ​BP, Statistical Review of World Energy.
31. ​Matt Muenster, “Energy Market Trends 2020: How the Energy Evolution of the 2010’s Influences 2020
Market Dynamics,” Breakthrough, January 31, 2020, https://­w ww​.­breakthroughfuel​.­com​/ ­blog​/­energy​
-­market​-­trends​-­2 020​/­.
32. ​World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects,” January 2018, https://­openknowledge​.­worldbank​.­org​/­server​
/­api​/­core​/­bitstreams​/­da2c5a6b​-­5 650​-­5 76b​-­8 e43​-­add85378e6bd​/­content.
33. ​US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB,”
accessed January 23, 2024, https://­w ww​.­eia​.­gov​/­dnav​/­pet ​/­hist ​/­RWTCD​.­htm.
34. ​US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “Cushing.”
35. ​See “Three Seas Story,” Three Seas Initiative, accessed January 23, 2024, https://­w ww​.­3 seas​.­eu​/­about​
/­threeseasstory.
36. ​US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, “US Natural Gas Exports to UAE,”
accessed January 23, 2024, https://­w ww​.­eia​.­gov​/­dnav​/­ng ​/­NG​_­MOVE​_­POE2​_­DCU​_­NUS​-­NTC​_ ­A ​.­htm.
37. ​Excelerate Energy, “Ruwais LNG Terminal,” accessed January 23, 2024, https://­excelerateenergy​.­com​
/­projects​/­ruwais​-­lng​-­terminal​/­.
38. ​US Department of Energy, “US Department of Energy to Make Strategic Petroleum Reserve Storage
Capacity Available to Struggling US Oil Producers,” April 2, 2020, https://­w ww​.­energy​.­gov​/­articles​/­us​
-­department​-­energy​-­make​-­strategic​-­petroleum​-­reserve​-­storage​-­capacity​-­available.
39. ​Benoit Faucon, Summer Said, and Tim Puko, “US, Saudia Arabia, Russia Lead Pact for Record Cuts in Oil
Output,” Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2020, https://­w ww​.­wsj​.­com​/­articles​/­opec​-­allies​-­look​-­to​-­resolve​-­saudi​
-­mexico​-­standoff​-­and​-­seal​-­broader​-­oil​-­deal​-­11586695794​?­.
40. ​Paul Dabbar, “How the US Turned the Tables on OPEC,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2022, https://­w ww​
.­wsj​.­com​/­articles​/­trump​-­us​-­energy​-­independence​-­opec​-­russia​-­war​-­ukraine​-­iran​-­nuclear​-­deal​-­fracking​-­lng​
-­oil​-­energy​-­cost​-­price​-­2 020 ​-­lockdown​-­11654808889​.
41. ​David Uberti and Bob Henderson, “War in Ukraine Drives New Surge of US Oil Exports to Europe,”
Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2023, https://­w ww​.­wsj​.­com​/­articles​/­u​-­s​-­regains​-­its​-­energy​-­clout​-­as​
-­ukraine​-­war​-­enters​-­second​-­year​-­2b910ff ​?
42. ​Daniel Yergin, “Meet the Shrewdest Operators in Today’s Energy Markets,” The Economist, January 3,
2024, https://­w ww​.­economist​.­com​/­business​/­2 024​/­01​/­0 3​/­meet​-­the​-­shrewdest​-­operators​-­in​-­todays​-­oil​
-­markets.
43. ​BP, Statistical Review of World Energy.

The publisher has made this work available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs
license 4.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0.

Copyright © 2024 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University

The views expressed in this essay are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the staff, officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

30 29 28 27 26 25 24    7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Author photo credit: Andrea Starr | Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY   15

 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PAUL DABBAR
Paul Dabbar is a former under secretary at the US Department of Energy, where
he served from 2017 to 2021 as the department’s principal advisor on funda-
mental energy research, energy technologies, science, and commercialization
of technologies. A senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy
at Columbia University and CEO of Bohr Quantum Technology, Dabbar is a grad-
uate of the US Naval Academy and Columbia University.

The George P. Shultz Energy Policy Working Group

The George P. Shultz Energy Policy Working Group takes a balanced approach toward sustaining the
economic, environmental, and security dimensions of energy policy. Rapid advances in technologies
and resources put the United States in a position of strength with respect to our energy system. Having
grown accustomed to reacting to external energy dependencies, however, we find ourselves without an
energy strategy of our own. Now is a time for US businesses and policymakers to prioritize how we use
these strengths to meet emerging social and geopolitical energy goals.

Hoover Institution, Stanford University Hoover Institution in Washington

434 Galvez Mall 1399 New York Avenue NW, Suite 500
Stanford, CA 94305-6003 Washington, DC 20005
650-723-1754 202-760-3200