No.

XX-XX

In the Supreme Court of the United States

MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.
JENNIFER VANDERSTOK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
BRIAN H. FLETCHER
Deputy Solicitor General
NICOLE FRAZER REAVES
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
SEAN R. JANDA
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
[email protected]
(202) 514-2217
 QUESTIONS PRESENTED
In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq.,
Congress imposed licensing, background-check, record-
keeping, and serialization requirements on persons en-
gaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or
dealing in firearms. The Act defines a “firearm” to in-
clude “any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or
may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the ac-
tion of an explosive,” as well as “the frame or receiver
of any such weapon.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). In
2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Ex-
plosives issued a regulation clarifying that certain prod-
ucts that can readily be converted into an operational
firearm or a functional frame or receiver fall within that
definition. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (cod-
ified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)).
The Fifth Circuit held that those regulatory provisions
are inconsistent with the Act. The questions presented
are:
1. Whether “a weapon parts kit that is designed to
or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or
otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action
of an explosive,” 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a “firearm” regu-
lated by the Act.
2. Whether “a partially complete, disassembled, or
nonfunctional frame or receiver” that is “designed to or
may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or oth-
erwise converted to function as a frame or receiver,” 27
C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a “frame or receiver” regulated by
the Act.

(I)
 PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners were the defendants-appellants below.
They are the U.S. Department of Justice; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF);
Merrick B. Garland, in his official capacity as Attorney
General of the United States; and Steven Dettelbach, in
his official capacity as Director of ATF.
Respondents include the plaintiffs-appellees below.
They are Jennifer VanDerStok; Michael G. Andren;
Tactical Machining, L.L.C.; and Firearms Policy Coali-
tion, Inc. Respondents also include the intervenor
plaintiffs-appellees below. They are Blackhawk Manu-
facturing Group, Inc. (doing business as 80 Percent
Arms); Defense Distributed; Second Amendment Foun-
dation, Inc.; Not An L.L.C. (doing business as JSD Sup-
ply); and Polymer80, Inc.

(II)
 RELATED PROCEEDINGS
United States District Court (S.D. Tex.):
VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 22-cv-691 (July 5, 2023)
United States Court of Appeals (5th Cir.):
VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 23-10463 (appeal dis-
missed Aug. 14, 2023)
VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 22-11071 (appeal dis-
missed Sept. 6, 2023)
VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 22-11086 (appeal dis-
missed Sept. 6, 2023)
VanDerStok v. Garland, No. 23-10718 (Nov. 9, 2023)
Supreme Court of the United States:
Garland v. VanDerStok, No. 23A82 (Aug. 8, 2023)
Garland v. Blackhawk Manufacturing Group, Inc.,
No. 23A302 (Oct. 16, 2023)

(III)
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 2
Statutory and regulatory provisions involved ........................... 2
Statement:
A. Legal framework ............................................................. 2
B. ATF’s 2022 Rule .............................................................. 4
C. Procedural history ........................................................... 9
Reasons for granting the petition ............................................. 13
I. The decision below is incorrect .................................... 13
A. A weapon parts kit falls within the plain
meaning of the Act’s definition of “firearm” ........ 14
B. A partially complete or nonfunctional frame or
receiver that can readily be completed qualifies
as a “frame or receiver” .......................................... 21
II. The decision below warrants review ............................ 28
Conclusion ................................................................................... 31
Appendix A — Court of appeals opinion (Nov. 9, 2023) ...... 1a
Appendix B — District court memorandum opinion
and order granting vacatur
(June 30, 2023) .......................................... 67a
Appendix C — District court final judgment
(July 5, 2023) ........................................... 115a
Appendix D — Supreme Court order vacating
injunction pending appeal
(Oct. 16, 2023).......................................... 118a
Appendix E — Court of appeals order granting in
part and denying in part motion
to vacate injunction pending appeal
(Oct. 2, 2023) ........................................... 119a
Appendix F — District court opinion and order
granting injunction pending appeal
(Sept. 14, 2023)........................................ 126a
Appendix G — Supreme Court order granting stay
pending appeal (Aug. 8, 2023) ............... 179a

(V)
 VI

Table of Contents—Continued: Page

Appendix H — Court of appeals order partially
granting and partially denying stay
pending appeal (July 24, 2023) .............. 180a
Appendix I — District court order denying stay
pending appeal (July 18, 2023) .............. 184a
Appendix J — Declaration of Matthew P. Varisco
(July 14, 2023) ......................................... 186a
Appendix K — Excerpts from administrative record:
ATF letter (Apr. 20, 1978) ..................... 209a
ATF letter (June 11, 1980) .................... 214a
ATF letter (May 3, 1983) ....................... 216a
ATF letter (Dec. 4, 2020) ....................... 218a
Excerpts from affidavit of Tolliver
Hart (Dec. 9, 2020) ................................. 226a
Appendix L — Statutory and regulatory provisions........ 241a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:
Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) ...... 3, 20, 29
Biden v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023) .......................... 30
Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 (2022) ..................................... 30
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,
566 U.S. 399 (2012).............................................................. 20
District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570 (2008)................................................................ 8
Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund,
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) ......................................................... 28
Morehouse Enters., LLC v. ATF:
78 F.4th 1011 (8th Cir. 2023), reh’g en banc
denied, No. 22-2812, 2023 WL 7205512
(Nov. 2, 2023).............................................................. 30
No. 22-cv-116, 2022 WL 3597299 (D.N.D. Aug. 23,
2022), aff ’d, 78 F.4th 1011 (8th Cir. 2023) ............... 30
 VII

Cases—Continued: Page
Pugin v. Garland, 599 U.S. 600 (2023) ................................ 21
United States v. Ryles, 988 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 858 (1993) ....................................... 11
Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 141 S. Ct. 617 (2020) ........... 30
Statutes and regulations:
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq............ 12
Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq. ..................... 2
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) ................ 3, 6, 11, 13-17, 19, 20, 26
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(B) ........................................... 3, 13, 26
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(4)(C) ..................................................... 19
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25) ......................................................... 27
18 U.S.C. 921(a)(30)(B) ................................................... 27
18 U.S.C. 922 ...................................................................... 2
18 U.S.C. 922(t) .................................................................. 2
18 U.S.C. 923 ...................................................................... 2
18 U.S.C. 923(a) ................................................................. 2
18 U.S.C. 923(g)(1)(A) ....................................................... 2
18 U.S.C. 923(i) .................................................................. 2
18 U.S.C. 926(a) ................................................................. 3
15 U.S.C. 901(3) (1940) .......................................................... 19
26 U.S.C. 5845(b) ................................................................... 27
26 U.S.C. 5845(c) .................................................................... 27
26 U.S.C. 5845(d) ................................................................... 27
27 C.F.R.:
Section 478.11 ............................................. 6, 11, 13, 15-17
Section 478.12(c) .....................................7, 8, 13, 21, 24, 25
28 C.F.R. 0.130(a) .................................................................... 3
 VIII

Miscellaneous: Page
ATF:
National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking
Assessment (NFCTA): Crime Guns –
Volume Two, Part III (Jan. 11, 2023),
https://perma.cc/MQB6-4BJX .................................. 30
Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees:
Impact of Final Rule 2021-05F on Partially
Complete AR-15/M-16 Type Receivers (Sept.
27, 2022), https://perma.cc/S685-YJDY ................... 25
Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees:
Impact of Final Rule 2021-05F on Partially
Complete Polymer80, Lone Wolf, and Similar
Semiautomatic Pistol Frames (Dec. 27, 2022),
https://perma.cc/ZQ9Y-PAWV ............................ 22-24
33 Fed. Reg. 18,555 (Dec. 14, 1968) ....................................... 4
87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) ...... 3-9, 16, 17, 24, 25, 29
Tom Jackman & Emily Davies, Teens buying
“ghost guns” online, with deadly consequences,
Wash. Post, July 12, 2023, https://perma.cc/
TJE5-3WF2............................................................. 28, 29, 30
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (1969) ........................................................... 14, 16
The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language (1966) ........................................................... 14, 16
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language Unabridged (1968) ..... 14-17, 21, 27
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. XX-XX
MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS

v.
JENNIFER VANDERSTOK, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General, on behalf of Attorney General

Merrick B. Garland, et al., respectfully petitions for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The court of appeals’ opinion (Pet. App. 1a-66a) is re-
ported at 86 F.4th 179. The district court’s opinion and
order (Pet. App. 67a-114a) is not yet reported but is
available at 2023 WL 4539591. This Court’s order
granting a stay pending appeal (Pet. App. 179a) is re-
ported at 144 S. Ct. 44. The court of appeals’ order
granting in part and denying in part a stay pending ap-
peal (Pet. App. 180a-183a), is unreported but is availa-
ble at 2023 WL 4945360. The district court’s order
denying a stay pending appeal (Pet. App. 184a-185a) is
unreported.

(1)
 2

This Court’s order vacating the injunction pending

appeal (Pet. App. 118a) is reported at 144 S. Ct. 338.
The court of appeals’ order granting in part and deny-
ing in part the motion to vacate the injunction pending
appeal (Pet. App. 119a-125a) is unreported. The district
court’s opinion and order granting an injunction pend-
ing appeal (Pet. App. 126a-178a) is not yet reported but
is available at 2023 WL 5978332.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
November 9, 2023. The jurisdiction of this Court is in-
voked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions are
reproduced in the appendix to this petition. Pet. App.
241a-248a.
STATEMENT
A. Legal Framework
1. In the Gun Control Act of 1968 (Act), 18 U.S.C.
921 et seq., Congress imposed requirements on persons
engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or
dealing in “firearms.” 18 U.S.C. 922, 923. Such persons
must obtain a federal firearms license, keep records of
the acquisition and transfer of firearms, and conduct a
background check before transferring a firearm to a
non-licensee. 18 U.S.C. 922(t), 923(a) and (g)(1)(A). Im-
porters and manufacturers are also required to mark
firearms with a serial number. 18 U.S.C. 923(i).
“The twin goals” of the Act’s “comprehensive
scheme” are “to keep guns out of the hands of criminals
and others who should not have them” and “to assist law
enforcement authorities in investigating serious crimes.”
 3

Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 180 (2014).

The background-check requirement serves “Congress’s
principal purpose in enacting the statute—to curb crime
by keeping firearms out of the hands of those not legally
entitled to possess them,” including “felon[s].” Id. at
181 (citation and quotation marks omitted). And the
record-keeping and serialization requirements allow
“law enforcement to determine where, by whom, or
when” a firearm was manufactured and “to whom [it
was] sold or otherwise transferred.” 87 Fed. Reg.
24,652, 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022). That, in turn, “helps to
fight serious crime”: “When police officers retrieve a
gun at a crime scene, they can trace it to the buyer and
consider him as a suspect.” Abramski, 573 U.S. at 182.
Congress broadly defined “firearm” to include “any
weapon (including a starter gun) which will or is de-
signed to or may readily be converted to expel a projec-
tile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A).
Congress also included “the frame or receiver of any
such weapon,” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(B), thereby ensuring
that the key structural component of a firearm is sub-
ject to serial-number, background-check, and record-
keeping requirements even if it is sold alone. Congress
did not, however, define the terms “frame” or “receiver.”
2. Congress authorized the Attorney General to pre-
scribe “such rules and regulations as are necessary to
carry out” the Act. 18 U.S.C. 926(a). The Attorney Gen-
eral has delegated that authority to the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). 28
C.F.R. 0.130(a). In 1968, shortly after Congress passed
the Act, ATF’s predecessor agency promulgated a reg-
ulation defining “frame or receiver” as “[t]hat part of a
firearm which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or
breechblock, and firing mechanism, and which is usually
 4

threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel.”

33 Fed. Reg. 18,555, 18,558 (Dec. 14, 1968) (emphasis
omitted).
Although the 1968 regulations did not explicitly ad-
dress the issue, ATF has “long held” that a frame or re-
ceiver need not be complete or functional in order to
qualify as a “frame or receiver” under the Act. 87 Fed.
Reg. at 24,685. Instead, the agency recognized that “a
piece of metal, plastic, or other material becomes a
frame or receiver when it has reached a ‘critical stage
of manufacture’ ”—that is, when a product “is ‘brought
to a stage of completeness that will allow it to accept the
firearm components [for] which it is designed * * * ,
using basic tools in a reasonable amount of time.’ ” Ibid.
(citation omitted). In a 1978 classification letter, for ex-
ample, ATF found that a partially machined frame was
a firearm because it could “be readily converted to func-
tional condition.” Pet. App. 209a-210a. In 1980, ATF
explained that “an unfinished receiver” would “likely
qualify as a firearm” if it “could be converted to func-
tional condition within a few hours” using “common
hand tools.” Id. at 214a. And in 1983, ATF concluded
that a “basically complete” receiver was a firearm be-
cause it would require “[a]pproximately 75 minutes” of
work to become “functional.” Id. at 216a.
B. ATF’s 2022 Rule
1. In recent years, “technological advances” have
made it easier for companies to manufacture and sell
“firearm parts kits” and “easy-to-complete frames or
receivers” that allow anyone with basic tools and access
to Internet video tutorials to assemble a functional fire-
arm “quickly and easily”—often, in a matter of minutes.
87 Fed. Reg. at 24,652. For example, the “Buy Build
Shoot” kit marketed by respondent Polymer80 allows a
 5

purchaser to assemble a fully functional Glock-style

semiautomatic pistol in as little as 21 minutes. Pet. App.
236a-237a; see p. 18, infra (photograph). Similarly,
companies have marketed “partially complete or unas-
sembled frames or receivers” that can “readily be com-
pleted or assembled to a functional state”—for example,
by drilling a few holes or removing temporary plastic
rails. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,663; see Pet. App. 196a.1
Some manufacturers of those kits and parts asserted
that they were not “firearms” regulated by the Act, and
thus sold them without complying with the Act’s
requirements. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,655, 24,662-24,663.
Those firearms—commonly called “ghost guns” be-
cause of their lack of serial numbers—were widely
available online. Id. at 24,652; see id. at 25,665. And the
lack of serial numbers, records, and background checks
made ghost guns uniquely attractive to people who were
legally prohibited from buying guns or who planned to
use them in crime. Id. at 24,677.
As a result, police departments around the Nation
confronted an explosion of crimes involving ghost guns.
In 2017, law enforcement agencies submitted roughly
1600 ghost guns to ATF for tracing. Pet. App. 194a. By
2021, that number was more than 19,000—an increase
of more than 1000% in just four years. Ibid. And those
submissions to ATF have been largely futile because
the lack of serial numbers and transfer records makes
ghost guns “nearly impossible to trace.” Ibid. Out of
45,240 unserialized firearms recovered from crime
scenes from 2016 through 2021 that were submitted for

1
For pictures, see p. 23, infra. For a video of the assembly of
a frame parts kit that was cited in the Rule’s preamble, see
https://web.archive.org/web/20200331211935/https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ThzFOIYZgIg (cited at 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,686 n.106).
 6

federal tracing, ATF was able to complete only 445

traces to individual unlicensed purchasers—a success
rate of less than one percent. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,656,
24,659.
2. In 2022, after notice and public comment, ATF is-
sued the rule at issue here to update its interpretation
of the Act’s definition of a regulated “firearm” and var-
ious related requirements. See 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,652
(Rule). The Rule took effect on August 24, 2022. Ibid.
a. This case concerns two provisions of the Rule that
clarify the Act’s application to ghost guns.
First, the Rule reaffirms that the Act’s definition of
“firearm”—which encompasses any weapon that “may
readily be converted” into a functional firearm, 18
U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A)—includes certain weapon parts
kits. Tracking the statutory language, the Rule defines
“firearm” to “include a weapon parts kit that is designed
to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or
otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action
of an explosive.” 27 C.F.R. 478.11. The Rule defines
“readily” as “[a] process, action, or physical state that
is fairly or reasonably efficient, quick, and easy.” Ibid.
And the Rule draws on judicial decisions to codify “fac-
tors relevant in making this determination,” including
the “[t]ime,” “difficult[y],” “knowledge,” “skills,” and
“[e]quipment” needed to complete a firearm. Ibid.; see
87 Fed. Reg. at 24,663. ATF explained that kits covered
by the Rule fit within the natural reading of the statu-
tory definition of “firearm” and that the Rule simply
“makes explicit that manufacturers and sellers of such
kits” are “subject to the same regulatory requirements
applicable to the manufacture or sale of fully completed
and assembled firearms.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,662.
 7

Second, the Rule clarifies that the undefined term

“frame or receiver” in the Act’s definition of “firearm”
includes “a partially complete, disassembled, or non-
functional frame or receiver, including a frame or re-
ceiver parts kit, that is designed to or may readily be
completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted
to function as a frame or receiver.” 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c).
ATF noted that it had long interpreted the Act to cover
partially complete or nonfunctional frames and receiv-
ers that can be made functional “using basic tools in a
reasonable amount of time.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,685.
ATF acknowledged that, in applying that standard, it
had not previously considered “templates,” “jigs,” or
other materials sold with a partially complete frame or
receiver. Id. at 24,668. But ATF concluded that those
materials “serve the same purpose as indexing” or par-
tial machining on the frame or receiver itself, allowing
a buyer to “quickly” and “easily” complete a frame or
receiver with common tools. Ibid.
The Rule thus specifies that, in determining whether
a part qualifies as a “frame or receiver,” ATF will con-
sider “any associated templates, jigs, molds, equipment,
tools, instructions, guides, or marketing materials.” 27
C.F.R. 478.12(c). At the request of commenters seeking
additional clarity on ATF’s interpretation, the Rule ex-
plicitly excludes any “forging,” “casting,” or other “un-
machined body” that “has not yet reached a stage of
manufacture where it is clearly identifiable as an unfin-
ished component part of a weapon.” Ibid. ATF ex-
plained that this exclusion makes clear that “[c]ompa-
nies that sell or distribute only unfinished frame or re-
ceiver * * * blanks” of the sort typically purchased in
bulk by commercial firearm manufacturers “are not
 8

required to be licensed or to mark those articles” with

serial numbers. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,700.
The Rule also lists examples of products that fall
within its interpretation of “frame or receiver.” A kit
containing the necessary parts and “a compatible jig or
template” so that “a person with online instructions and
common hand tools may readily complete or assemble”
the parts “to function as a frame or receiver” is covered.
27 C.F.R. 478.12(c). So is a “partially complete billet or
blank of a frame or receiver”—that is, a machined,
molded, or manufactured frame or receiver structure—
“with one or more template holes drilled or indexed in
the correct location” so that “a person with common
hand tools may readily complete the billet or blank to
function as a frame or receiver.” Ibid. In contrast, a
“billet or blank” that lacks “index[ing], machin[ing], or
form[ing]” on “critical interior areas”—and is sold with-
out associated “instructions, jigs, templates, equipment,
or tools” that would enable it to “readily be completed”—
“is not a receiver.” Ibid.
b. The Rule’s interpretation of the Act does not pro-
hibit the manufacture of any firearm or the sale of a
firearm to any individual lawfully entitled to possess
one. Nor does it prohibit such a person from making a
firearm at home. Instead, the Rule simply clarifies that
the Act requires commercial manufacturers and sellers
of covered weapon parts kits and partially complete
frames or receivers to obtain licenses, mark their prod-
ucts with serial numbers, conduct background checks,
and keep transfer records. Those are the same “condi-
tions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,”
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008),
that around 80,000 manufacturers and distributors of
 9

firearms comply with in millions of transactions each

year, Pet. App. 203a.
c. In addition to the two clarifications at issue here,
the Rule made a variety of other updates to ATF’s reg-
ulations implementing the Act, such as tweaks to serial-
ization requirements, adjustments to record-keeping
timelines, and updates to other regulations to ensure
that they reflect recent developments in firearms tech-
nology. 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,735-24,739, 24,742-24,744,
24,746-24,747; see Pet. App. 6a-7a & 9a n.8. ATF spec-
ified that if “any provision” of the Rule “is held to be
invalid or unenforceable,” the remaining provisions
“shall not be affected” and should be given “the maxi-
mum effect permitted by law.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,730.
C. Procedural History
1. Respondents—two individuals, two advocacy or-
ganizations, and five entities that manufacture or dis-
tribute products that may be covered by the Rule—filed
or intervened in this suit. Pet. App. 74a-77a. As rele-
vant here, they challenged the provisions of the Rule
clarifying that certain weapon parts kits fall within the
Act’s definition of “firearm” and that the statutory term
“frame or receiver” includes certain partially complete
frames or receivers. Id. at 10a, 78a.
The district court granted respondents’ motions for
summary judgment, concluding that the two challenged
provisions of the Rule contradict the Act. Pet. App. 67a-
114a. The court held that the Act’s definition of “fire-
arm” does not “cover weapon parts, or aggregations of
weapon parts, regardless of whether the parts may be
readily assembled into something that may fire a pro-
jectile.” Id. at 107a. And it held that “[a] part that has
yet to be completed or converted to function as [a]
frame or receiver is not a frame or receiver.” Id. at
 10

103a. The court vacated the entire Rule, including its

unchallenged provisions. Id. at 111a-114a; see id. at
116a.2
2. The government appealed and sought a stay
pending appeal. The Fifth Circuit stayed the district
court’s vacatur of the unchallenged portions of the Rule
but otherwise denied relief. Pet. App. 180a-183a. This
Court then stayed the district court’s judgment in its
entirety pending appeal and, if necessary, the Court’s
consideration and disposition of a petition for a writ of
certiorari. Id. at 179a.
3. After this Court entered a stay, the district court
granted respondents Defense Distributed and Black-
hawk Manufacturing Group an injunction prohibiting
the government from applying the Rule to them and
their customers pending appeal, and, if necessary, this
Court’s consideration and disposition of a petition for a
writ of certiorari. Pet. App. 126a-178a. The Fifth Cir-
cuit narrowed the injunction to the parties but other-
wise left it in place. Id. at 119a-125a. This Court then
vacated the injunction in its entirety. Id. at 118a.
4. After briefing and argument, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s
judgment. Pet. App. 1a-66a.
a. The Fifth Circuit held that the Act’s definition of
“firearm” does not encompass “weapon parts kit[s] that
[are] designed to or may readily be completed, assem-
bled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a

2
The district court had previously entered preliminary injunc-
tions prohibiting the government from enforcing the challenged
provisions of the Rule against some respondents and their custom-
ers. Pet. App. 10a-11a. The government appealed those injunctions,
but dismissed the appeals after they were rendered moot by the dis-
trict court’s final judgment. Id. at 11a-12a.
 11

projectile by the action of an explosive,” 27 C.F.R.

478.11. See Pet. App. 19a-28a. The court noted that
other provisions of the federal firearms laws contain, or
previously contained, language expressly addressing
“parts” or “combination[s] of parts.” Id. at 20a-22a (ci-
tation omitted). That, in the court’s view, indicated that
Congress did not intend to include “aggregations of
weapon parts” in the definition of “ ‘firearm.’ ” Id. at
22a.
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it had previ-
ously held that a firearm is still covered by the Act even
if it is “disassembled” into its component parts. Pet.
App. 25a-26a (citing United States v. Ryles, 988 F.2d 13
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 858 (1993)). But the
court stated that “[a]ssembling a weapon parts kit takes
much longer than [the] thirty seconds” required to re-
assemble the weapon at issue in that case and “involves
many additional steps.” Id. at 26a. And the court held
that “[b]ecause of these differences,” weapon parts kits
cannot be “readily converted” into a functional firearm
and thus are not covered by the Act. Ibid. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
b. The Fifth Circuit also held invalid the provision of
the Rule defining “frame or receiver” to include a par-
tially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame
or receiver. Pet. App. 15a-19a. The court noted that
although “the first subsection” of the Act’s “definition
of ‘firearm’ ” includes “flexible language such as ‘de-
signed to or may readily be converted to expel a projec-
tile by the action of an explosive,’ * * * the subsection
immediately thereafter, which contains the term ‘frame
or receiver,’ does not include such flexibility.” Id. at 17a
(quoting 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A)). And the court believed
that the Rule improperly treated as “frames or
 12

receivers” items that are “not yet frames or receivers

but that can easily become frames or receivers” because
“ ‘a part cannot be both not yet a receiver and a receiver
at the same time.’ ” Id. at 17a-18a (citation omitted).
The Fifth Circuit also viewed the Rule’s definition of
“frame or receiver” as “materially deviat[ing] from past
definitions of these words to encompass items that were
not originally understood to fall within the ambit of the
[Act].” Pet. App. 16a. The court acknowledged that
ATF’s prior “understanding of ‘frame or receiver’ ” had
“closely tracked the public’s common understanding of
such terms at the time of enactment.” Ibid. But the
court rejected the government’s reliance on ATF’s 50-
year history of classifying certain partially complete
frames or receivers as frames or receivers, asserting
that “because ATF may have acted outside of its clear
statutory limits in the past does not mandate a decision
in its favor today.” Id. at 18a.
c. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the government’s
argument “that the district court’s universal vacatur of
the entire Final Rule (i.e., not just the two challenged
portions) was overbroad.” Pet. App. 31a. The Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that its “precedent generally sanctions vaca-
tur under the” Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
701 et seq., but it vacated the judgment and remanded
“for further consideration of the remedy” in light of its
“holding on the merits.” Pet. App. 31a-32a.
d. Judge Oldham concurred to discuss what he per-
ceived as “additional problems” with the Rule’s chal-
lenged provisions, including issues that had not been
raised by respondents or addressed by the district
court. Pet. App. 33a; see id. at 33a-66a.
 13
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The Fifth Circuit’s decision warrants review because
it contradicts the Act’s plain text and effectively nulli-
fies Congress’s careful regulatory scheme. Under the
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, anyone could buy a kit
online and assemble a fully functional gun in minutes—
no background check, records, or serial number re-
quired. The result would be a flood of untraceable ghost
guns into our Nation’s communities, endangering the
public and thwarting law-enforcement efforts to solve
violent crimes. This Court has previously recognized
the legal and practical significance of this case by twice
granting emergency relief to allow ATF to continue en-
forcing the Act as interpreted in the Rule. The Court
should now grant certiorari and reverse.
I. THE DECISION BELOW IS INCORRECT
Congress recognized that limiting the Act’s seriali-
zation, recordkeeping, and background-check require-
ments to completed or functional firearms would invite
evasion. It thus broadly defined “firearm” to include
“any weapon” that “will or is designed to or may readily
be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an
explosive,” as well as “the frame or receiver of any
such weapon.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). Con-
sistent with that text, the Rule makes clear that a
weapon parts kit that allows a purchaser to readily as-
semble an operational weapon is a “firearm.” 27 C.F.R.
478.11. And the Rule clarifies that a “frame or receiver”
includes “a partially complete, disassembled, or non-
functional frame or receiver” that may be readily con-
verted into a functional frame or receiver—by, for ex-
ample, drilling holes or removing plastic rails. 27
C.F.R. 478.12(c).
 14

Those provisions of the Rule reflect the plain mean-

ing of the relevant provisions of the Act. In holding oth-
erwise, the Fifth Circuit failed to meaningfully analyze
the statutory text, misread the Rule, and misunder-
stood ATF’s longstanding practices. And the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s interpretation would frustrate the Act’s design
and make it trivially easy to circumvent the central re-
quirements of the federal firearms laws.
A. A Weapon Parts Kit Falls Within The Plain Meaning Of
The Act’s Definition Of “Firearm”
1. Statutory text and context make clear that the
weapon parts kits covered by the Rule are “firearms”
under the Act. The Act defines “firearm” to encompass
“any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may
readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action
of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A). The plain
meaning of “convert” is “to change or turn from one
state to another: alter in form, substance, or quality:
transform, transmute.” Webster’s Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged
499 (1968) (Webster’s) (capitalization and emphasis
omitted).3 The Act thus includes items that may readily
be “transform[ed]” into a working firearm—or, put dif-
ferently, items that may readily be “change[d]” into a
functional firearm from a different “state” or “form.”
Ibid.

3
The definitions of “convert” in other contemporary dictionaries
are of a piece. See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language 291 (1969) (American Heritage) (“To change into
another form, substance, state, or product; transform; transmute.”)
(emphasis omitted); The Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 230 (1966) (Random House) (“[T]o change (something)
into something of different form or properties; transmute; trans-
form.”).
 15

The Rule’s inclusion of parts kits follows directly

from that plain-text reading. The Rule defines “fire-
arm” to “include a weapon parts kit that is designed to
or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or
otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action
of an explosive.” 27 C.F.R. 478.11. The terms “com-
plete[],” “assemble[],” and “restore[],” ibid., fit com-
fortably within the plain meaning of “convert”: all are
a type of transformation or change from one state or
form to another. When a buyer “complete[s]” a parts
kit, he transforms it from an unfinished state into a “fin-
ished” state. Webster’s 465 (defining “complete” as “to
bring to an end often into or as if into a finished or per-
fected state”) (emphasis omitted). When he “assem-
ble[s]” a parts kit, he “fit[s] together various parts” of
the weapon to make it into “an operative whole.” Id. at
131 (defining “assemble” as “to fit together various
parts of so as to make into an operative whole”) (empha-
sis omitted). And when he “restore[s]” a parts kit, he
“brings [it] back” to its “former or original state” as a
usable weapon. Id. at 1936 (defining “restore” as “to
bring back to or put back into a former or original
state”) (emphasis omitted). A weapon parts kit that
“may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or oth-
erwise converted” into an operational firearm, 27
C.F.R. 478.11, is thus a weapon that “may readily be
converted” into an operational firearm, 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(3)(A).
The Rule also mirrors the Act in its use of the term
“readily.” In the Act, the term “readily” modifies the
phrase “be converted.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A). In the
Rule, it modifies the equivalent phrase “be completed,
assembled, restored, or otherwise converted.” 27 C.F.R.
478.11. And the Rule’s definition of “readily” to mean
 16

“fairly or reasonably efficient, quick, and easy,” ibid.,

reflects both that word’s plain meaning and relevant
precedent. The plain meaning of “readily” is “with
fairly quick efficiency: without needless loss of time:
reasonably fast: speedily” and “with a fair degree of
ease: without much difficulty: with facility: easily.”
Webster’s 1889 (capitalization and emphasis omitted).4
And the factors listed in the Rule to guide the applica-
tion of that standard are “based on case law interpre-
tating” the term “readily” in Section 921(a)(3)(A) and
another similarly worded firearms statute. 87 Fed.
Reg. at 24,663.
Even setting aside the Act’s express inclusion of
items that can “readily be converted” into usable fire-
arms, a covered weapon parts kit qualifies as a firearm
as a matter of ordinary usage. If a State placed a tax on
the sale of home goods, such as tables, chairs, couches,
and bookshelves, IKEA surely could not avoid that tax
by claiming that it does not sell any of those items and
instead sells “furniture parts kits” that must be assem-
bled by the purchaser. So too with guns: An ordinary
speaker of English would recognize that a company in
the business of selling kits that can be assembled into
firearms in minutes—and that are designed, marketed,
and used for that express purpose—is in the business of
selling firearms.
2. The Fifth Circuit failed to justify its contrary con-
clusion.
a. As an initial matter, the Fifth Circuit misread the
Rule. It accused ATF of “strip[ping] the word ‘readily’
of its meaning” by “includ[ing] any objects that could, if

4
See American Heritage 1085 (defining “readily” as “[p]romptly”
and “[e]asily”) (emphasis omitted); Random House 1195 (defining
“readily” as “promptly; quickly; easily”) (emphasis omitted).
 17

manufacture is completed, become functional at some

ill-defined point in the future” and regulating “minute
weapon parts that might later be manufactured into
functional weapons.” Pet. App. 23a-24a, 27a. But the
Rule does not include “any objects” or “minute weapon
parts.” Id. at 23a, 27a. It does not extend to weapon
parts writ large, such as standalone triggers, barrels,
stocks, and magazines because those parts cannot
“readily be completed, assembled, restored, or other-
wise converted” into an operational weapon. 27 C.F.R.
478.11. Instead, the relevant part of the Rule reaches
only weapon parts kits that may “readily”—that is, by a
process that is “fairly or reasonably efficient, quick, and
easy”—“be completed, assembled, restored, or other-
wise converted” into a functional weapon. Ibid. Such
kits fall squarely within the statute because they can
“readily be converted” into operational firearms. 18
U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A).
To the extent the Fifth Circuit suggested that the
weapon parts kits covered by the Rule cannot be “read-
ily” assembled, see Pet. App. 23a-24a & n.19, that is in-
correct. As discussed, the Rule expressly incorporates
the Act’s “readily” limitation. And as ATF explained,
many weapon parts kits include all the parts and tools
necessary to assemble “a functional weapon within a
short period of time,” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,662; see id. at
24,692—in some instances under 30 minutes, id. at
24,686 n.106. Such a kit undoubtedly can be converted
into a functional firearm “with fairly quick efficiency”
and “a fair degree of ease.” Webster’s 1889.
That weapon parts kits can readily be converted into
fully functional firearms is apparent from pictures of
covered parts kits, which show how few parts need to be
assembled to build a functional firearm. For example,
 18

the first picture below is of respondent Polymer80’s

“Buy Build Shoot” Kit that enables a purchaser to as-
semble a fully functional Glock-style semiautomatic pis-
tol in as little as 21 minutes, while the second picture
shows that pistol after assembly:
 19

Pet. App. 232a, 238a; see id. at 236a-238a.

b. The Fifth Circuit’s reliance on other statutory
provisions was likewise misplaced. The court noted that
the Act’s predecessor statute regulated “any part or
parts of ” a firearm and that Congress removed that lan-
guage when it adopted the Act. Pet. App. 20a (quoting
15 U.S.C. 901(3) (1940)). But, as already explained, the
Rule does not include “any part or parts of ” a firearm;
instead, it includes only those aggregations of parts that
are designed to or may readily be assembled into a func-
tional firearm.
The Fifth Circuit also relied on other provisions of
the federal firearms laws, including a provision in the
Act defining “destructive device.” Pet. App. 21a-22a.
The Act defines “destructive device” to include “any
combination of parts either designed or intended for use
in converting any device into any destructive device
* * * and from which a destructive device may be read-
ily assembled.” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(4)(C). In the court’s
view, because that provision explicitly refers to combi-
nations of parts but Section 921(a)(3)(A) does not, the
latter provision cannot be read to include weapon parts
kits. Pet. App. 21a.
That is doubly wrong. First, Section 921(a)(4)(C)
serves a different function by expanding the definition
of “destructive device” to include parts “designed or in-
tended for use in converting any device into any de-
structive device,” not just combinations of parts that
themselves constitute a destructive device. 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(4)(C) (emphasis added). Second, and in any event,
Section 921(a)(3)(A)’s plain text encompasses weapon
parts kits because completing or assembling a kit is
a type of “conver[sion]” under the Act. 18 U.S.C.
921(a)(3)(A). It was thus unnecessary (and would have
 20

been superfluous) for Congress to include additional

language in Section 921(a)(3)(A). “Congress’s use of
more detailed language in another provision” provides
no reason to depart from the statute’s “most natural
reading.” Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk
A/S, 566 U.S. 399, 416 (2012). The same is true of the
other statutory provisions that on which the Fifth Cir-
cuit relied. See Pet. App. 21a-22a & n.15.
Ultimately, even the Fifth Circuit acknowledged
that the Act’s definition of “firearm” includes some col-
lections of firearm parts: The court reaffirmed its prec-
edent holding that a shotgun that had been “disassem-
bled” into its component parts was still a firearm. Pet.
App. 25a-26a (citation omitted). The only distinction the
court drew between that shotgun and the weapon parts
kits covered by the Rule is that assembling the kits
“takes much longer than thirty seconds” and “involves
many additional steps.” Id. at 26a. But the court made
no effort to ground that distinction in the statutory text,
and it could not plausibly have done so: Dictionary def-
initions, ordinary usage, and common sense confirm
that a kit can “readily be converted” into a functional
firearm, 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A), if the conversion can be
accomplished with common tools in less than half an
hour.
c. Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s reading of Section
921(a)(3)(A) would thwart the Act’s careful design. It
would allow respondents and others to circumvent the
Act’s serialization, recordkeeping, and background-
check requirements while producing and broadly dis-
tributing kits that anyone can easily assemble into fully
functional firearms. That would “undermine—indeed,
for all important purposes, would virtually repeal—the
gun law’s core provisions.” Abramski v. United States,
 21

573 U.S. 169, 179-180 (2014). Courts “should not lightly

conclude that Congress enacted a self-defeating stat-
ute.” Pugin v. Garland, 143 S. Ct. 1833, 1841 (2023) (ci-
tation omitted).
B. A Partially Complete Or Nonfunctional Frame Or Re-
ceiver That Can Readily Be Completed Qualifies As A
“Frame Or Receiver”
1. The Rule also correctly interprets the term
“frame or receiver” to include “a partially complete, dis-
assembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver, includ-
ing a frame or receiver parts kit, that is designed to or
may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or oth-
erwise converted to function as a frame or receiver.” 27
C.F.R. 478.12(c).
a. A “frame” or “receiver” need not be fully com-
plete or functional to fall within the meaning of those
terms. A “frame” is “the basic unit of a handgun which
serves as a mounting for the barrel and operating parts
of the arm.” Webster’s 902 (emphasis omitted). And a
“receiver” is “the metal frame in which the action of a
firearm is fitted and to which the breech end of the bar-
rel is attached” or “the main body of the lock in a breech
mechanism.” Id. at 1894 (emphasis omitted). A product
that is missing “a single hole necessary to install the ap-
plicable fire control component, or that has a small piece
of plastic that can easily be removed to allow installation
of that component,” Pet. App. 196a, does not cease to be
“the basic unit of a handgun” or its “receptacle or con-
tainer,” Webster’s 902, 1894. The Act likewise lacks any
language specifying that a “frame” or “receiver” must
be “complete,” “operable,” or “functional.”
Nor does ordinary usage support reading those
missing adjectives into the Act. A bicycle is still a bicy-
cle even if lacks pedals, a chain, or some other component
 22

needed to render it complete or allow it to function. So

too if the bicycle is shipped with plastic guards attached
to the gears or brakes that must be removed before op-
eration, or with a seat tube that the user must cut to
length before installing. No one would deny that a com-
pany selling and shipping products in any of those con-
ditions was engaged in selling “bicycles.”
Again, there is no reason in language or logic to treat
firearm frames and receivers any differently. Consider
images of two frames from a recent ATF document im-
plementing the Rule, which can be accessed at ATF,
Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees: Impact
of Final Rule 2021-05F on Partially Complete Poly-
mer80, Lone Wolf, and Similar Semiautomatic Pistol
Frames 4 (Dec. 27, 2022), https://perma.cc/ZQ9Y-
PAWV (Polymer80 Open Letter).
 23

The top two pictures depict the frame of a Glock-variant

handgun; no one disputes that it is a “frame” covered by
the statute. The bottom two pictures depict a partially
complete frame sold by respondent Polymer80. Id. at
7. The primary difference between the two is the pres-
ence of the “temporary rails or blocking tabs” that are
circled in red and highlighted in green in the bottom
 24

pictures. Id. at 6. Those plastic tabs “are easily remov-

able by a person with novice skill, using common tools,
such as a Dremel-type rotary tool, within minutes.”
Ibid. Once the tabs are removed, the Polmer80 product
is “immediately capable of accepting” the remaining
parts of a firearm. Ibid. And once a few holes are
drilled for the pins that hold those parts in place—
again, a task that anyone can complete in minutes—the
Polmer80 product is a fully functional frame. It is en-
tirely natural to refer to the Polymer80 product as a
“frame.” In fact, it is hard to know what else to call it.
The Rule thus accords with the natural reading of
the statute and ordinary usage. As ATF explained, “the
crucial inquiry is at what point an unregulated piece of
metal, plastic, or other material becomes a ‘frame or re-
ceiver’ that is a regulated item under Federal law.” 87
Fed. Reg. at 24,685. That is inevitably a question of de-
gree that cannot be reduced to bright-line rules that ad-
dress every firearm design. But the Rule’s focus on
whether a frame or receiver can “readily” be converted
to functional status incorporates a concept that is famil-
iar in the law and that accords with ordinary usage.
Some examples illustrate the point. On the one hand,
the Rule includes frames and receivers missing a single
hole or including an unnecessary piece of plastic that
can easily be removed. Pet. App. 196a. The Rule also
covers kits containing all necessary parts to rapidly as-
semble a frame or receiver using tools that are part of
the kit and common hand tools. 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c).
That includes “ ‘partially complete’ pistol frame prod-
ucts” like the Polymer80 pistol frame pictured above
that “incorporate temporary rails or blocking tabs that
are easily removable by a person with novice skill, using
common tools, * * * within minutes.” Polymer80 Open
 25

Letter 6. On the other hand, the Rule does not cover

products that are precursors to frames or receivers, but
lack indexing, tabs, or tools that would allow an individ-
ual to easily make the products functional (and are not
otherwise readily convertible to a functional frame or
receiver). See ATF, Open Letter to All Federal Fire-
arms Licensees: Impact of Final Rule 2021-05F on
Partially Complete AR-15/M-16 Type Receivers (Sept.
27, 2022), https://perma.cc/S685-YJDY. For example,
the Rule does not treat as a “frame or receiver” a
standalone “partially complete AR-type receiver with
no indexing or machining of any kind performed in the
area of the fire control cavity.” Id. at 1; see id. at 3-4
(photographs of products that are not frames or receiv-
ers under the Rule) (emphasis omitted); see also 27
C.F.R. 478.12(c) (identifying additional examples of the
Rule’s treatment of products).
b. The Rule’s understanding of “frame or receiver”
is consistent with ATF’s longstanding interpretation
and implementation of the Act. “ATF has long held that
a piece of metal, plastic, or other material becomes a
frame or receiver when it has reached a ‘critical stage
of manufacture’ ”—that is, when a product “is ‘brought
to a stage of completeness that will allow it to accept the
firearm components [for] which it is designed * * * ,
using basic tools in a reasonable amount of time.’ ” 87
Fed. Reg. at 24,685 (citation omitted). Indeed, since
shortly after Congress adopted the Act, ATF has con-
sistently determined that various products should be
treated as “frames or receivers” based on the manufac-
turing stage that those products have reached. See p.
4, supra (discussing ATF classification letters going
back to the 1970s).
 26

2. In concluding that the Act reaches only fully com-

plete or functional frames and receivers, the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not meaningfully engage with the Act’s text or
ATF’s historical practice.
a. The Fifth Circuit first emphasized that, when
Congress defined “firearm,” it expressly included items
that are “ ‘designed to or may readily be converted to’ ”
function as a firearm, but that Congress did not include
a similar phrase for frames and receivers. Pet. App. 17a
(quoting 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A)). In the court’s view,
that omission indicates that “frame or receiver” cannot
include readily completable frames and receivers.
See ibid. But that inference does not follow. Section
921(a)(3)(A) is part of the express statutory definition
of the term “firearm.” If Congress had limited that def-
inition to weapons that “will * * * expel a projectile by
the action of an explosive,” 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) (em-
phasis added), it would have departed from ordinary
meaning by including only functional firearms. Ex-
press language broadening the definition to include a
weapon that is “designed to or may readily be con-
verted” to expel a projectile, ibid., was needed to avoid
that result.
In contrast, Congress did not define “frame or re-
ceiver” in Section 921(a)(3)(B) or elsewhere. Accord-
ingly, those terms should be interpreted consistent with
their ordinary meaning, which is not limited to complete
or functional frames or receivers. And the fact that
Congress has repeatedly defined “firearm” and other
weapons-related terms to include non-operational
weapons or items that can easily be converted or re-
stored to an operational state only underscores that
ATF properly took the same approach in interpreting
the undefined terms “frame” and “receiver.” See, e.g.,
 27

18 U.S.C. 921(a)(25) and (a)(30)(B); 26 U.S.C. 5845(b),

(c), and (d).
The Fifth Circuit also noted that “ ‘a part cannot be
both not yet a receiver and a receiver at the same time’ ”
and faulted the Rule for treating items that are “not
yet frames or receivers” as frames or receivers. Pet.
App. 17a-18a (citation omitted). But the Rule does no
such thing. Instead, it defines the point in the manufac-
turing process at which an item becomes a “frame or
receiver”—and thus ceases to be a not-yet frame or re-
ceiver. Indeed, although the court acknowledged that
the dictionary definitions of “frame” and “receiver” dis-
cussed above are the “set, well-known definitions” of
those terms, id. at 15a, it failed to explain how those def-
initions exclude the partially complete frames and re-
ceivers the Rule covers. For example, the court never
explained how a frame missing a single hole necessary
to install a fire control component—or including a small
piece of plastic that must be removed before its
installation—is not “the basic unit of a handgun.” Web-
ster’s 902, 1894. Nor did the court explain how the Pol-
ymer80 product pictured above, see p. 23, supra, could
be anything other than “the basic unit of a handgun,”
Webster’s 902.
b. Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
ATF’s previous regulatory definition of “frame or re-
ceiver” reflected the ordinary meaning of those terms,
see Pet. App. 15a-16a, the court did not meaningfully
grapple with ATF’s decades-long practice of applying
that definition to include certain partially complete
frames and receivers. ATF’s recognition that certain
not-yet-functional frames and receivers have reached a
stage of manufacturing that permits them to be treated
as “frames or receivers” under the Act both comports
 28

with the Act’s plain meaning and is consistent with

ATF’s longstanding regulatory approach. See pp. 21-
25, supra. Contrary to the court’s conclusion, ATF has
acted within its “clear statutory limits” both “in the
past” and “today” in regulating partially complete
frames and receivers. Pet. App. 18a.
c. Finally, the Fifth Circuit’s reading of “frame or
receiver” would again thwart the Act’s manifest design
and invite circumvention through trivialities. It would
entirely excuse from the Act’s coverage products that,
but for a single hole or piece of plastic, are fully func-
tional frames and receivers. That would frustrate one of
the Act’s principal goals: ensuring that firearms trans-
fers are adequately vetted and recorded so that weap-
ons do not fall into the hands of prohibited persons (and,
when they do, that such persons can be prosecuted).
See pp. 2-3, supra. The Act should not be read “to cre-
ate such a large and obvious loophole” in its core provi-
sions. Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462,
1473 (2020).
II. THE DECISION BELOW WARRANTS REVIEW
This Court’s review is warranted because the Fifth
Circuit declared invalid key provisions of an important
regulation and adopted an interpretation of the Act that
would effectively nullify its central provisions by allow-
ing criminals and other prohibited persons to obtain un-
traceable firearms without background checks, serial
numbers, or transfer records.
A. The recent exponential increase in the availability
and use of ghost guns is a grave threat to public safety.
Ghost gun kits are available online to anyone with a
credit card—or, for that matter, an anonymous pre-paid
“debit card” bought at “7-Eleven.” Tom Jackman &
Emily Davies, Teens buying “ghost guns” online, with
 29

deadly consequences, Wash. Post, July 12, 2023 (Teens

Buying Ghost Guns) (citation omitted), https://perma.cc/
TJE5-3WF2. Minors in particular “have discovered the
ease with which they can acquire the parts for a ghost
gun” and “have been buying, building[,] and shooting
the homemade guns with alarming frequency.” Ibid.
Ghost guns provide a ready means for felons, minors,
and others who are prohibited from buying firearms to
circumvent the law—thwarting Congress’s “compre-
hensive scheme” intended to “verify a would-be gun
purchaser’s identity,” “check on his background,” and
thereby “keep guns out of the hands of criminals and
others who should not have them.” Abramski, 573 U.S.
at 180. And on the back end, the lack of records and
serial numbers means that ghost guns have “severely
undermine[d]” law enforcement’s ability to “determine
where, by whom, or when” a firearm used in a crime was
manufactured and “to whom [it was] sold or otherwise
transferred.” 87 Fed. Reg. at 24,652, 24,659; see id. at
24,655-24,660. That, in turn, has impaired law enforce-
ment’s ability to apprehend violent individuals who may
pose an ongoing threat to public safety. By ensuring
that ghost guns are regulated as what they actually
are—firearms—the two challenged provisions of the
Rule “prevent easy circumvention of the [Act’s] entire
regulatory scheme” and are thus “critical to public
safety.” Pet. App. 195a.
If left in place, the Fifth Circuit’s decision would give
the manufacturer and distributer respondents the
green light to resume unfettered distribution of ghost
guns without background checks, records, or serial
numbers. That would pose an acute threat to public
safety. Tens of thousands of ghost guns are being re-
covered by law enforcement each year—more than
 30

19,000 in 2021, a 1000% increase from 2017. Pet. App.

194a. And the public-safety harms caused by ghost
guns have only become more apparent as this litigation
has progressed: Between March 2023 and July 2023, for
example, 13,828 suspected ghost guns were recovered
by law enforcement and reported to ATF. C.A. Doc.
196, at 6 (Sept. 26, 2023). Police departments are also
confronting “the soaring use of ghost guns in violent
crimes.” Teens Buying Ghost Guns; see 87 Fed. Reg.
at 24,656-24,658.
B. The absence of a conflict in the courts of appeals
does not counsel against certiorari here. 5 Even in the
absence of a circuit conflict, this Court has often
granted certiorari to review decisions invalidating im-
portant federal regulations or policies. See, e.g., Biden
v. Nebraska, 143 S. Ct. 2355 (2023); Biden v. Texas, 597
U.S. 785 (2022); Wolf v. Innovation Law Lab, 141 S. Ct.
617 (2020). And here, there are especially strong prac-
tical reasons to grant review without delay. Respond-
ent Polymer80 appears to have manufactured and sold
more than 80% of identifiable ghost guns that have been
recovered at crime scenes in recent years. See ATF,
National Firearms Commerce and Trafficking Assess-
ment (NFCTA): Crime Guns – Volume Two, Part III,
at 22 (Jan. 11, 2023), https://perma.cc/MQB6-4BJX. If

5
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunc-
tion to other parties challenging the Rule, finding that none of those
parties had demonstrated irreparable harm; it therefore did not ad-
dress the merits. See Morehouse Enters., LLC v. ATF, 78 F.4th
1011, 1016-1018 (2023), reh’g en banc denied, No. 22-2812, 2023 WL
7205512 (Nov. 2, 2023). The district court in that case found that the
challengers were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their chal-
lenges to the Rule’s definition of “firearm” and “frame or receiver.”
Morehouse Enters., LLC v. ATF, No. 22-cv-116, 2022 WL 3597299,
at *5-*6 (D.N.D. Aug. 23, 2022), aff ’d, 78 F.4th 1011 (8th Cir. 2023).
 31

the decision below remained in place, Polymer80—

along with the four other respondents that manufacture
or distribute products regulated by the Rule—would be
able to continue to manufacture and sell ghost guns
online without complying with the Act’s serialization
and background-check requirements. That would dra-
matically undermine the Act nationwide.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
BRIAN H. FLETCHER
Deputy Solicitor General
NICOLE FRAZER REAVES
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
MARK B. STERN
SEAN R. JANDA
Attorneys
FEBRUARY 2024