PFR Cases JSP Onwards
PFR Cases JSP Onwards
The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted Articles 175,
178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement between her and the
private respondent was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the
initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her . They never
agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement was
repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned to him at Dumaguete City and,
he refused to accept her.
Doctrine: Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent
never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in
the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There
must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the
intention of perpetual separation. This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted
provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when
he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning.
Art 135 par 6. Separation for at least 1 year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Issue: Art 135. par. 4 and 6 (abandonment and separated for at least 1 year and
reconciliation is highly improbable)
Doctrine: While actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the
spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to
the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends
that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Novera.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one
year, the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should
be granted.
Causes of the action here are for the judicial appointment of Angelina as
administratrix of the conjugal partnership arising from her marriage to Alberto; for
the accounting of the conjugal partnership; for the forfeiture of Alberto's share in
the co-owned property acquired during his illicit relationship with Imelda
Doctrine: If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with
his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for
receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property.
After Perpetua's death, there was no liquidation of the conjugal property of Teodulo
and Perpetua within the one-year period provided in Article 130. It must be recalled
that respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estates of Teodulo and
Perpetua only after Teodulo's demise wherein the subject property was given to
Jesus. As it stands, the subject property is now registered in the name of Jesus.
Issue: Whether the CA erred when it ignored the clear provisions of Articles 92 and
103 in relation to Article 145 of the Family Code authorizing the surviving spouse to
dispose of his share in the conjugal property in the first marriage even without the
consent of his second spouse.
Doctrine: Petitioners invoke Article 103 of the Family Code, which provides that
should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without liquidation of
the prior marriage, then the mandatory regime of complete separation of property
will govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. petitioners assert that
Teodulo could validly dispose of his share in the property acquired during his first
marriage without needing to obtain the consent of his second spouse. They rely on
Article 145 of the Family Code which authorizes each spouse under the regime of
separation of property to dispose of his or her own separate estate, without need of
the consent of the other.
The Court ruled in Heirs of Go: the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners
without the consent of the other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights
of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer
(Servacio) a co-owner of Marta's share. This result conforms to the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally
possible to do so.
Issue: Whether the contract to sell entered by Teodulo Sison of his conjugal property
with his deceased first wife is entirely void for failure to effect liquidation.
No, In many instances, the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse
do not liquidate the conjugal properties and they keep them undivided. In such
case, a co-ownership is deemed established for the management, control and
enjoyment of the common property. Since the conjugal partnership no longer
subsists, the fruits of the common property are divided according to the law on co-
ownership; that is, in proportion to the share or interest of each party. That share or
part of the co-heir in the co-ownership prior to partition is pro indiviso, undivided or
abstract, not specific, delineated or demarcated by metes and bounds.
Hence, Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
!!! Issue: Whether the consent of the 2nd Wife is necessary to dispose of the
Conjugal Property of the First wife.
No, Article 130 of the Family Code provides that a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
liquidating the conjugal partnership property. Should the surviving spouse contract
a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property
relations of the subsequent marriage.
Short facts: Angelita and Georg entered into an agreement for the complete
separation of their properties.
Under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner cannot invoke Article 36 of the Family
Code unless there is a German law that allows her to do so. A fundamental and
obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of marriage is that it seeks a
relief improper under Philippine law in light of both Georg and Angelita being
German citizens, not Filipinos, at the time of the filing thereof. Based on the
Nationality Principle, which is followed in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad, it
was the pertinent German law that governed. In short, Philippine law finds no
application herein as far as the family rights and obligations of the parties who are
foreign nationals are concerned.
Doctrine: Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's
"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.
Yes. Upon the parties’ filing of a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage,
trial courts also acquire jurisdiction over matters incidental and consequential to the
marriage. Among these is the settlement of the parties’ common properties. By filing
another petition for the determination of which properties form part of the co-
ownership, a party commits forum shopping by splitting causes of action. Dolores
filed a separate Petition for Declaration of Paraphernal Property, asking a different
trial court to determine that the two parcels of land subject of the Property Case are
not conjugally owned. By doing so, Dolores committed forum shopping by splitting
causes of action.
Doctrine: As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry
each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their marriage is
void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil
Code, 89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code, are the pertinent provisions of
law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to
union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
absence of a marriage license." "Under this property regime, property acquired by
both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules
on equal co-ownership.
!!!Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.
Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation,
Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement which divided their
properties without court intervention.
Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina
through the execution of the Partition Agreement.