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MOTION To Dismiss Indictment, Based On Unconstitutional Vagueness by Donald J. Trump
MOTION To Dismiss Indictment, Based On Unconstitutional Vagueness by Donald J. Trump
DONALD J. TRUMP,
WALTINE NAUTA, and
CARLOS DE OLIVEIRA,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................2
DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................................3
I. Applicable Law ................................................................................................................... 3
A. Vagueness Doctrine ........................................................................................................ 3
B. Section 793(e) ................................................................................................................. 4
II. Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 5
A. The Authorization Clause: “Unauthorized Possession” ................................................. 7
B. The NDI Clause: “Relating To The National Defense”.................................................. 8
C. The Entitlement Clause: “Entitled To Receive” ........................................................... 11
D. The “Willfully” Mens Rea Element Cannot Save Counts 1 – 32 ................................. 15
E. Count 19 Must Be Dismissed Because President Trump Maintained The Required
Security Clearance ................................................................................................................ 16
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................18
i
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INTRODUCTION
President Donald J. Trump respectfully submits this motion to dismiss Counts 1 through
President operating within the framework of the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”), who (1) acted
as the ultimate Original Classification Authority based on Article II of the Constitution and under
Executive Order 13526, (2) has recourse to the executive privilege, and (3) is entitled to immunity
for his official acts. Since at least 1941, courts in cases with less vexing features than this one
have acknowledged grave infirmities in the language of § 793(e) and endeavored to “save” the
statute. That approach is inconsistent with the due process principles and separation-of-powers
It is not for Article III judges to address deficiencies in language chosen by elected officials,
particularly where, as here, the legislative record strongly suggests that there was no consensus
meaning attributed to the problematic language. Judicial efforts to “save” § 793(e) by attaching
broad interpretations to a criminal statute in order to reach the conduct of defendants hauled into
court by overzealous and politically motivated prosecutors is contrary to the Rule of Lenity. The
Supreme Court recently applied this logic in three cases striking so-called “residual clauses” in the
Armed Career Criminal Act, Immigration and Nationality Act, and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). E.g.,
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323 (2019). The Court should do so here as well.
Finally, whatever the term “unauthorized” means in § 793(e), it does not encompass the
document charged in Count 19. For that document, President Trump possessed a valid security
1
President Trump reserves the right to supplement this motion and file any other motions based
on discovery provided as a result of the motions to compel. See ECF No. 314.
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clearance during the time period alleged in the Superseding Indictment. Therefore, following the
discovery on this issue sought in the Defendants’ motions to compel, the Court should resolve any
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
A. Vagueness Doctrine
“In our constitutional order, a vague law is no law at all.” Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2323. The
vagueness doctrine “rests on the twin constitutional pillars of due process and separation of
powers.” Id. at 2325. First, “[v]ague laws contravene the first essential of due process of law that
statutes must give people of common intelligence fair notice of what the law demands of them.”
Id. (cleaned up). Second, “[v]ague laws also undermine the Constitution’s separation of powers
and the democratic self-governance it aims to protect.” Id.; see also Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.
Ct. 1204, 1212 (2018) (“[T]he [vagueness] doctrine is a corollary of the separation of powers—
requiring that Congress, rather than the executive or judicial branch, define what conduct is
“To satisfy due process concerns, Congress must ensure that a criminal law not only
provides the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits
but also that it does not authorize or “even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
United States v. Di Pietro, 615 F.3d 1369, 1371 (11th Cir. 2010). “[P]reventing discriminatory
law enforcement is the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine.” United States v. Biro,
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B. Section 793(e)
18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (emphasis added). This motion focuses on the three bolded statutory phrases:
the Authorization Clause (“Unauthorized Possession”), the NDI Clause (“relating to the national
Section 793(e) and its neighbor, § 793(d), “are undoubtedly the most confusing and
complex of all the federal espionage statutes.” Harold Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The
Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 929, 998 (1973)
(hereinafter Espionage Statutes); see also United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 613 (E.D.
Va. 2006) (noting that “[o]ver the years, numerous commentators have criticized [Section 793] as
statute.” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 754 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
“The legislative drafting is at its scattergun worst precisely where greatest caution should have
Section 793’s “progenitor” was “the Defense Secrets Act of 1911.” Rosen, 445 F. Supp.
2d at 611. The 1911 Act “prohibited the willful communication of knowledge concerning
‘anything connected with the national defense’ to one ‘not entitled to receive it.’” Id. at 612. The
statute “did not make mere retention criminal.” Espionage Statutes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. at 1002.
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In the Espionage Act of 1917, Congress enacted “predecessor provisions of 793(d) and (e)
. . . as a single section, 1(d).” Espionage Statutes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. at 1005. Section 1(d)
prohibited
40 Stat. 217, 218 (1917). “The legislative history raises serious doubts as to whether Congress
had even a vague understanding of subsection 1(d) by the time the final votes were cast.”
In the Espionage Act of 1950, Congress split § 1(d) into two sections, added attempt and
aiding and abetting language, and supplemented the list of document types with “information . . .
the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of a foreign nation.” Espionage Statutes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. at 1021 (quoting 64 Stat.
1003 (1950)). “[R]eview of the 1950 legislative record shows that for the third time in as many
attempts, Congress had virtually no understanding of the language and effect of 793(d) and (e).”
Id. at 1022.
II. Discussion
States v. Marte, 356 F.3d 1336, 1342 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[V]agueness challenges must be evaluated
in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” (cleaned up)); Espionage Statutes, 73 Colum. L. Rev.
at 1000 (“[T]he broad literal meaning of the subsections is almost certainly unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, [and] the statutory language does not point toward any one confined reading
as a means of saving them.”). In this case, the statute’s vagueness is subject to exacting scrutiny
because the Special Counsel’s Office is seeking to prosecute President Trump based in part on
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protected speech relating to the documents at issue.2 See Di Pietro, 615 F.3d at 1371 n.2 (“[W]hen
the statute infringes on constitutionally protected rights, such as the right to free speech or of
association, the Supreme Court has said that a more stringent vagueness standard should apply.”);
see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (“Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided by
a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First
Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”).
Section 793(e) is one of the vague statutes that “threaten[s] to hand responsibility for
defining crimes to relatively unaccountable police, prosecutors, and judges, eroding the people’s
ability to oversee the creation of the laws they are expected to abide.” Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2325.
As discussed in more detail below, some courts have tried to save § 793(e) and its predecessors
from its unconstitutional vagueness through “judge-made” rules and “judicial glosses.” However,
“the role of courts under our Constitution is not to fashion a new, clearer law to take its place, but
to treat the law as a nullity and invite Congress to try again.” Id. at 2323. “It would certainly be
dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave
it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at
large.” United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875). Because that is what Congress has done
with § 793(e)—three times—and because the judicial efforts to keep the statute on the books are
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s vagueness reasoning in Davis, Dimaya, and Johnson, the
Court should reject these authorities and find the statute void for vagueness under the
2
See Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 23-24, 37 (“TRUMP’s Public Statements on Classified
Information”); id. ¶¶ 34-35 (describing alleged statements during interview); id. ¶ 36 (describing
alleged statements during meeting).
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because the pertinent language fails to provide guidance regarding its scope and permits arbitrary
enforcement. See United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963) (“Void for
vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not
There is far too much indeterminacy around the meaning of “unauthorized possession”
with respect to President Trump and the types of documents at issue. See United States v. Williams,
553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (reasoning that the relevant issue is not “that it will sometimes be difficult
to determine whether the incriminating fact [the statute] establishes has been proved; but rather
the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is”). The documents that are the focus of Counts 1
through 32 are only allegedly classified because of President Trump’s Original Classification
Authority, which is a power derived from Article II of the Constitution, wielded pursuant to the
people’s mandate in 2016, and delegated as President Trump saw fit for use pursuant to Executive
Order 13526. See New York Times, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“If the
Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs
and the maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have
the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise that power successfully.”). “[P]ast presidents routinely took national security files,” Hur
Report at 192 (cleaned up), and no one suggested that their possession and retention was
prosecution.
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prior to this case, presidential discretion to designate records as personal under the PRA adds
additional ambiguity for the reasons set forth in President Trump’s motion to dismiss based on the
PRA. See United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[C]riminal
responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated
conduct is proscribed.”). The non-criminal nature of the PRA’s exclusive remedy for collecting
Presidential Records added yet another layer of ambiguity for the application of a criminal statute’s
did not—the vagueness of the phrase “unauthorized possession” under these circumstances also
gives rise to an impermissible risk of arbitrary enforcement, which is reflected by the numerous
examples of cases involving similar situations where prosecutors brought no charges, as discussed
in President Trump’s selective and vindictive prosecution motion. See United States v. Matchett,
837 F.3d 1118, 1122 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Arbitrary enforcement means that a law leaves government
actors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in
The NDI Clause “unfortunately provide[s] no guidance on the question of what kind of
information may be considered related to or connected with the national defense.” United States
v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 576 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (reasoning
that the NDI Clause is “quite broad and potentially too broad since, especially in time of war, any
information could conceivably relate to the national defense”). Congress has made no effort to
provide such guidance in connection with its amendments to the statute. See Holder v.
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Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 21 (2010) (rejecting vagueness challenge where “Congress
also took care to add narrowing definitions to the material-support statute over time”). Elected
officials have failed to agree on language that provides the notice required by the Constitution, and
it is not for the Court to “save” this prosecution from that defect.
There is no binding authority to address the defective NDI Clause under the circumstances
presented. Whereas § 793(e) derives from § 1(d) of the Espionage Act of 1917, the Supreme Court
interpreted different provisions of that Act, § 1(b) and § 2(a), in Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S.
19 (1941). The Gorin Court’s vagueness analysis turned on distinct language from those
provisions:
[W]e find no uncertainty in this statute which deprives a person of the ability to
predetermine whether a contemplated action is criminal under the provisions of this law.
The obvious delimiting words in the statute are those requiring ‘intent or reason to believe
that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the
advantage of any foreign nation.’
312 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added). Section 793(e) contains similar language: “reason to believe
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation . . .”
However, prosecutors typically argue that this “injury” language does not apply to charges based
on “documents” rather than “information.” See, e.g., United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909,
917 (D. Md. 2011); but see United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Kiriakou, 898 F. Supp. 2d 921, 923 (E.D. Va. 2012). 3 Assuming the Special
3
In Kiriakou, which involved a § 793(e) charge relating to information rather than documents, the
court observed in dicta that “in prosecutions under both the documents and the information clauses,
the government must show that the disclosed NDI ‘relate[s] to the national defense,’ meaning that
it is ‘closely held’ and that its disclosure ‘would be potentially damaging to the United States or
might be useful to an enemy of the United States.’” 898 F. Supp. 2d at 923 (quoting United States
v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1988)). President Trump does not concede that
Counts 1 through 32 relate to documents, alone, and reserves the right to seek appropriate jury
instructions on any counts that survive pretrial motions at the appropriate time.
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Counsel’s Office adheres to that position, Gorin does not address the vagueness defect in the NDI
Clause.
Four years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Gorin, the Second Circuit explained that
the NDI Clause could not be taken literally: “It seems plain that the section cannot cover
information about all those activities which became tributary to ‘the national defense’ in time of
war; for in modern war there are none which do not.” United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813, 815
(2d Cir. 1945).4 Congress failed to address these vagueness concerns in connection with the
Espionage Act of 1950, which included § 793(e). See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 747 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (“It is not for this Court to fling itself into every breach perceived by some
Government official nor is it for this Court to take on itself the burden of enacting law, especially
outside the Eleventh Circuit have applied a “judge-made” requirement in a strained effort to save
§ 793(e) from the fatal vagueness problems that it presents. United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 600 F.
Supp. 2d 362, 386 (D. Conn. 2009); see also Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (“[C]ourts have
carefully cabined the phrase’s scope in two ways.”). These rulings are in significant tension with
4
Heine involved a separate statute, codified at the time at 50 U.S.C. § 32, which prohibited
transmission of certain types of documents “or information relating to the national defense,” “with
intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation.” See 151 F.2d at 814 n.1. Thus, like Gorin, Heine is inapposite because it
involved language relating to “injury” to the United States that the Special Counsel’s Office will
likely argue does not apply to the documents charges under § 793(e) in this case.
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Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2333; see also Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 604 (2015) (rejecting
dissent invitation to “save the residual clause from vagueness by interpreting it”); United States v.
Caldwell, 655 F. App’x 730, 732 (11th Cir. 2016) (reasoning that the rule of lenity “creates a
related but distinct limitation” that serves as a “junior version of the vagueness doctrine” (cleaned
up)).
Thus, “it might have been a good idea for Congress” to limit § 793(e) in the manner Gorin
discussed, but that “doesn’t tell us whether Congress actually wrote such a clause.” Davis, 139 S.
Ct. at 2327. The NDI Clause that Congress wrote is unconstitutionally vague because we live “in
an era when every facet of civilian life may have an important bearing on the nation’s military
capabilities.” Espionage Statutes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. at 969; see also Heine, 151 F.2d at 969
(“[E]very part in short of the national economy and everything tending to disclose the national
mind are important in time of war, and . . . ‘relate to the national defense’”). Accordingly, the NDI
Clause is fatally vague in its own right, cannot be saved through judicial gloss, and contributes
The phrase offers inadequate guidance, and no enforcement standards, with respect to who would
be “entitled” to “receive” records that a former president designated as personal under the PRA in
connection with an official act during his presidency that involved virtually unreviewable
Section 793(e) “provides no definition of the phrase ‘entitled to receive,’ nor does it
expressly delegate to the executive branch the authority to determine who is entitled to receive
national defense information.” Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 622. Rosen involved a transmission
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charge under § 793(e), as opposed to the retention charges here, and thus focused on a separate
phrase from the statute that prohibits transmission of national defense information “to any person
not entitled to receive it.”5 Despite the Rosen court’s observation about the lack of a definition or
express rulemaking delegation, the court improperly assumed legislative authority by extending a
“gloss” from what that court seems to have considered binding appellate precedent in United States
In Morison, the Fourth Circuit rejected an argument, not made by President Trump, “that
sections 793(d) and (e) were not intended to be restricted in application to ‘classic spying.’” 844
F.2d at 1066. The Morison court asserted that “the classification system provided under 18 U.S.C.
App. 1”—i.e., CIPA—had “clarified” the “omission in the statute” relating to the phrase “not
entitled to receive it.” 844 F.2d at 1074. Because CIPA is simply a “procedural mechanism,” the
statute does no such thing. See, e.g., United States v. Trump, 2023 WL 7172026, at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 1, 2023). Perhaps recognizing this flaw, Rosen denied a vagueness motion on the basis that
“the rule regulating who is ‘entitled to receive’ is the Executive Order setting forth a uniform
The Court should reject the reasoning in Morison and Rosen, however, because those cases
involved much more than a “gloss.” For the “gloss” proposition, Rosen cited dicta from United
States v. Lanier: “[A]lthough clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial gloss on an
otherwise uncertain statute, due process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a
criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decision has fairly
5
Rosen involved two defendants who were not former government officials and lacked security
clearances; the defendants were alleged to have obtained sensitive information from U.S. officials
and “transmitted the information” to “members of the media, foreign policy analysts, and officials
of a foreign government.” 445 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
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disclosed to be within its scope.” 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court has
relied on the Lanier dicta to require a restrictive interpretation of a statute, which is consistent with
the Rule of Lenity. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010) (“Today’s decision
clarifies that no other misconduct falls within § 1346’s province.” (citing Lanier)). Whereas that
those bounds and violated the separation of powers by reading into the statute an implied
rulemaking delegation to the Executive Branch. See 844 F.2d at 1074. Such a delegation is only
valid where “Congress lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle” in the statute itself.
Consumers’ Rsch., Cause Based Com., Inc. v. FCC, 88 F.4th 917, 923 (11th Cir. 2023); see also
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (“The constitutional question is whether
Congress has supplied an intelligible principle to guide the delegee’s use of discretion. So the
answer requires construing the challenged statute to figure out what task it delegates and what
instructions it provides.”).
Congress plainly knows how to make such a delegation. In Duran, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected a vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 951 because the statute defines pertinent terms and
authorized rulemaking by the Attorney General, see id. § 951(b), (d), and the Attorney General
had promulgated regulations pursuant to that authority in order to provide further clarification, see
28 C.F.R. Part 73. Duran, 596 F.3d at 1291.6 On the other hand, Congress has not included such
a delegation in § 793 and, in fact, rejected the “gloss” discussed in Morison and Rosen. In
connection with the Espionage Act of 1917, President Wilson proposed a bill that included
rulemaking authority. See Espionage Statutes, 73 Colum. L. Rev. at 1008-09. Congress excised
6
See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 847; 18 U.S.C. § 926(a); 18 U.S.C. § 2346(a); 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d);
40 U.S.C. § 1315(c).
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the provision when competing Senate and House bills were reconciled in conference. See id. “In
view of this deletion, it is questionable whether the term can be given meaning by reference to
Even if the Court wished to do what Congress has not by looking to the Executive Branch
for guidance that it was not authorized to provide, Executive Order 13526 is insufficient. See
Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (“Legislatures may not . . . abdicate their responsibilities for setting the
standards of the criminal law.”). For individuals seeking to comply with § 793(e), the Executive
Order provides no relevant guidance concerning who is “entitled” to “receive” documents subject
to the statute. As relevant here, § 6.1(hh) of Executive Order 13526 excludes from the definition
of “records” materials that are designated as Presidential Records under the PRA. Therefore, the
Executive Order raises the same unreviewable question relating to President Trump’s designation
Defining the Entitlement Clause by reference to the Executive Order would also require
application of the term “need to know” as defined in § 6.1(dd). A person would not be “entitled
to receive” challenged documents without the “need-to-know the information” under § 4.1(a)(3).
As we have explained in connection with the motions to compel, that phrase is every bit as vague,
if not more so, than the problematic terms of § 793(e). Relying on the standardless “need to know”
convenient tool for ‘harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against
7
Legislators engaged in a “lengthy, and ultimately unedifying debate on section 1(a), and the
meaning of ‘lawfully entitled’ as there used” in the Espionage Act of 1917. Espionage Statutes,
73 Colum. L. Rev. at 1010. With respect to § 1(d), the predecessor to § 793(e), “[w]hether the
[‘]not entitled[’] language in 1(d) also had meaning independent of Presidential action under
section 6 [the excised rulemaking delegation] was never considered.” Espionage Statutes, 73
Colum. L. Rev. at 1010.
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particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.’” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360
(1983) (cleaned up); see also City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 63 (1999) (“That the police
have adopted internal rules limiting their enforcement to certain designated areas in the city would
Therefore, interpreting § 793(e) by reference to Executive Order 13526 is just another way
of conferring unfettered and wholly subjective enforcement discretion to the Executive Branch.
That is one of the principal evils that the vagueness doctrine was established to avoid. See
Williams, 553 U.S. at 306 (“[W]e have struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to . . .
wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal
The use of the term “willfully” in § 793(e) does not remedy the statute’s vagueness
problems. See United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (finding statute
impermissibly vague, despite use of term “willfully,” because the language “leave[s] open . . . the
widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no one
can foreshadow or adequately guard against”). Willfully “is a word of many meanings, its
construction often being influenced by its context.” Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497
(1943). Thus, “the presence of a bad purpose or evil intent alone may not be sufficient.” Screws
Here, even if the term “willfully” could be said to address the vagueness doctrine’s fair-
pillar—and it cannot—the intent requirement does not mitigate the arbitrary enforcement problem.
It is not enough to argue, as prosecutors have in other cases, that President Trump will only be
convicted if criminal intent is established at trial. See League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Fla.
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Sec’y of State, 66 F.4th 905, 947-48 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Although close cases should be addressed,
not by the doctrine of vagueness, but by the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
promise of due process later on does not obliterate the vagueness doctrine altogether.” (emphasis
in original) (cleaned up)). This is so because “[a]ll of the so-called court-created conditions and
standards still leave to the jury such broad and unlimited power . . . that the jurors must make
determinations of the crucial issue upon their own notions of what the law should be instead of
In Goguen, the statute left too much room for enforcement decisions based on protestors’
politics, and the Supreme Court held that “[w]here inherently vague statutory language permits
such selective law enforcement, there is a denial of due process.” 415 U.S. at 576. The record
demonstrates that § 793(e), as applied in this case, poses the same problems. Accordingly, Counts
Indictment was filed, the Special Counsel’s Office disclosed Energy Department records
indicating that President Trump maintained the “Q” clearance that is relevant to the document
charged in Count 19 during the time period alleged in that Count. See Compel Mot. at 38-42; id.
Authorization Clause does not prohibit possession of a document by the holder of a valid security
clearance, and someone who is cleared to the appropriate level cannot willfully violate the statute.
8
“Compel Mot.” refers to the Defendants’ motions to compel discovery. ECF No. 262. “Compel
Reply” denotes references to Defendants’ reply brief for their motion to compel (ECF No. 300).
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“Where the statutory definition contains generic terms, . . . the indictment may not simply
recite the generic terms but ‘must state the species, it must descend to particulars.’” United States
v. Diecidue, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558
(1875)). In addition to the ambiguities that require dismissal of all the § 793(e) charges, the
“particulars” around Count 19 provide an alternative basis for dismissal. For the reasons stated in
connection with the motions to compel, further disclosures (including a privilege log) and a hearing
are necessary to resolve factual disputes to the extent the Special Counsel’s Office opposes this
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, President Trump respectfully submits that § 793(e) is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to President Trump and Count 19 must be dismissed for the
additional reason that President Trump maintained the appropriate security clearance at the time
in question. Accordingly, the Court should resolve disputed issues of fact relating to Count 19
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Christopher M. Kise, certify that on February 22, 2024, I filed the foregoing document
and served it on the Special Counsel’s Office via email, or CM/ECF to the extent possible, as
required by the Court’s February 20, 2024 Order. ECF No. 320.
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