Ataturk and The Kurds

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Atatürk and the Kurds

Andrew Mango
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2006.
To cite this article: Andrew Mango (1999): Atatürk and the Kurds, Middle
Eastern Studies, 35:4, 1-25
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Atatürk and the Kurds
ANDREW MANGO
Is Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, the founding father of the Turkish Republic, to

blame for his country's troubled relationship with its Kurdish-speaking
citizens? In his foreword to Jonathan Rugman's fair-minded account of the
problem, John Simpson, foreign affairs editor of the BBC, wrote:
In terms of ethnicity and culture, Turkey is varied, complex and
intermixed. Yet the myth which Atatiirk bequeathed to his fellow-
countrymen insists that there is a single ethnic group, the Turks.
Nowadays the effects of this myth can be brutal; it can never, in the
long run, be successful. While Turkey gives no legal recognition to its
large Kurdish minority, the problem that dissident Kurds pose for the
Turkish state cannot be solved.1
The seriousness of the problem is undeniable. According to figures given at
the end of June 1998 by the head of the anti-terrorist department of the
Turkish police, the radical Kurdish nationalist organization PKK (Partiya
Karkeren Kurdistan - Kurdistan Workers Party), had by that time launched
nearly 19,000 attacks since the beginning of its armed campaign in 1984.
These caused the deaths of 5,121 members of the security forces and of 4,049
civilians, while 17,248 persons described as terrorists were killed.2 In spite of
repeated assurances by the security forces that the back of the insurrection
has been broken and that the PKK now numbers only 5,000 armed militants,
the death toll continues to mount. As Siikrii Elekdag, the former Turkish
Ambassador in Washington, has recently pointed out, 'the problem of the
south-east' (that is, the Kurdish problem) is acquiring a growing
international dimension and constitutes the main and most urgent threat
facing Turkey.3 In the circumstances, an elucidation of the genesis of the
problem is a matter of current political, as well as of historical, importance.
And since the actions and statements of Atatiirk remain a source of
inspiration of Turkish government policy, and tend to be used to legitimize
it, it is as well to be clear about Atatiirk's attitude towards the Kurds.
Mustafa Kemal Pa§a, as he then was, did not acquire first-hand
experience of Kurdish-speaking areas until April 1916, when he was
2 SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC
promoted Brigadier-General at the age of 35, and sent to Diyarbekir (now

Diyarbakir) at the head of the 16th corps, a part of the 2nd Ottoman army,
which was transferred from Thrace after the withdrawal of the Allies from
Gallipoli. Enver Pasa, the Ottoman deputy commander-in-chief
(theoretically, deputising for the elderly Sultan Mehmet V), had prepared an
ambitious plan, requiring the 2nd Army in the south-east and the 3rd Army
in the north-east to close in on the Russian troops, which had occupied
Erzurum and were fanning out to the west and south. The plan failed, but
Mustafa Kemal acquitted himself well, regaining the towns of Mus and
Bitlis in the Kurdish area in August 1916. A little later, a Russian counter-
offensive forced him out of Mus, and the front then remained more or less
stable until the Russian Revolution the following year. In November 1916,
Mustafa Kemal became deputy commander of the 2nd Army, when the
commander Ahmet izzet Pa§a, a general of Albanian origin, went on leave
to Istanbul. In March 1917, Ahmet izzet Pasa was made commander of all
the armies on the eastern front and Mustafa became substantive commander
of the 2nd Army. He remained in the area until July 1917, when he was
appointed commander of the 7th Army, part of the Lightning (Yildinm)
Group, brought together in Syria under the German general (Marshal in the
Ottoman army) Erich von Falkenhayn for the purpose of recapturing
Baghdad from the British.4
Mustafa Kemal kept a diary between 7 November and 24 December
1916 during his service with the 2nd Army.5 He records the books he read
(a French novel and two books on philosophy), his thoughts on army
discipline and on the emancipation of women, and a few impressions of the
ravaged countryside: Bitlis made him think of the ruins of Pompeii and of
Nineveh. There is a brief mention of a volunteer detachment, organized by
a local Naksibendi sheykh, of hungry Kurdish refugees, of a meeting with
the tribal leader Haci Musa who commanded the Mutki Kurdish militia.
Mustafa Kemal's tone is remarkably detached: he observes his surroundings
with the curiosity of an outsider. He does not express any views on the
Kurds.
His chief of staff, Lt. Col. izzettin (later General izzettin Cahslar) is
more forthcoming in his diary.6 'In the villages, there are many men capable
of bearing arms', he noted on 2 May 1916. 'The enemy is pressing hard
against their land. Yet most of them are not rushing to defend it. They will
have nothing to do with military service. They do not know Turkish. They
do not understand what government means. In brief, these are places which
have not yet been conquered. Yet one could make good use of these people.
They obey their tribal leaders and sheykhs, who are very influential in these
parts.'7 On 11 November 1916, izzettin commented: 'One must gradually
set up a military organization among the Kurds. One must begin by forming
ATATURK AND THE KURDS 3
units from among those who are comparatively more used to the
government and are more friendly. At the same time, the government must
organize to do more and increase its influence.'8 Like Mustafa Kemal,
izzettin notes the poverty and backwardness of local people. He hopes for a
transfer from 'these sorrowful surroundings' and says that anyone posted
from the west to the east faces a hard time.9
Mustafa Kemal had one close military supporter who had a good
knowledge of the Kurds. This was Col. Fahrettin (later General Fahrettin
Altay, the renowned cavalry commander in the Turkish War of

Independence). Born in Scutari in Albania, Fahrettin was posted to the 4th
Army in eastern Anatolia in 1904, after graduating from the staff college in
Istanbul.10 Fahrettin describes the posting as exile, saying that the regime of
Sultan Abdulhamit suspected him of holding liberal views." However, he
stayed on after the Young Turkish coup of 1908, and took part in a punitive
expedition against Kurdish tribes in the Dersim (now Tunceli) mountains,
west of Erzurum. The expedition was one of several mounted by the Young
Turkish regime against dissident tribes - Druzes, Arab tribes in the Yemen,
Albanians - which found the new constitutional order even less to their
liking than Abdiilhamit's absolutism, and which were, in consequence,
smitten harder than at the time of that manipulative sovereign.
Fahrettin accepted the submission of the Dersim Kurds, on condition
that they paid taxes and desisted from banditry. But the arrangement he
made with a tribal leader was disallowed. He comments in his memoirs: 'It
was that breakdown which made it necessary to mount another punitive
expedition in these parts 28 years later.'12 The reference is to the suppression
of the Dersim rebellion by the armed forces of the Turkish Republic in
1937. In 1909, Fahrettin was put in charge of the reorganization of the
Hamidiye Kurdish tribal regiments, which were renamed Tribal Cavalry
Regiments (As.iret Siivari Alaylan). He claims that he would have preferred
a Turkish name, such as 'Oguz regiments', on the grounds that some of
those who considered themselves Kurds were of Turkish origin, but that he
was overruled by the Ottoman War Minister, Mahmut §evket Pasa.13 In
1913, Fahrettin led some of these tribal forces against the Bulgarians in
eastern Thrace at the close of the second Balkan War. There were instances
of looting by the Kurds, as 'our soldiers, who did not know Turkish,
mistook local (Turkish) people for Bulgarians, on account of their dress'.14
Fahrettin says that he made the looters return stolen goods and saved them
from execution by firing squad. His views match those of Major izzettin:
the Kurds were rough diamonds, their land was a place of hardship for a
Turkish officer, but they could be managed if one knew how to approach
them. Civilization would come with education - in the Turkish language -
and would reinforce loyalty to the Ottoman state.
The same approach had been tried by Abdiilhamit, who, apart from
establishing the Hamidiye regiments (modelled on Rusian Cossacks), had
inspired the foundation of the Tribal School (Mekteb-i A§air or Asiret
Mektebi) in Istanbul.15 But the sons of Arab and of Kurdish chieftains came
to blows in the school, and it was closed down in 1907, apparently when the
authorities realized that the students were tending to a nationalist critique of
the administration.16 Abdiilhamit was brought down by the close link
between education, which he promoted, and disaffection, which he tried in
vain to contain. Nevertheless, the Young Turks, and Ataturk after them, kept
the faith in the merits of education in civilization, while redefining its

content.
The original source of inspiration of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, as of other
Young Turks, was Namik Kemal, the 'poet of liberty'. Namik Kemal had
written in 1878: 'While we must try to annihilate all languages in our
country, except Turkish, shall we give Albanians, Lazes and Kurds a
spiritual weapon by adopting their own characters? ... Language ... may be
the firmest barrier - perhaps firmer than religion - against national unity.'
Elsewhere, Namik Kemal said: 'If we set up regular schools... and carry out
the programmes which are now not fulfilled, the Laz and Albanian
languages will be utterly forgotten in twenty years."7
Mustafa Kemal did not have to deal with Kurdish tribes until 1916, but
he was aware of the experience of his fellow-officers and was imbued with
the ideology of Ottoman liberals among whom Turkish nationalism took
shape. He had also encountered other tribesmen in his military career. His
active military service had started in Syria in 1905-6, where he took part in
operations against rebellious Druzes and was threatened by Circassians.18
Then he saw service in the suppression of the Albanian revolt in 1910; and
he organized Cyrenaican Arab tribesmen against the Italians in 1911.
Immediately after his appointment as commander of the 7th army in Aleppo
in 1917, he criticized an agreement made by Kress von Kressenstein (Kress
Pasa), German commander in Gaza, with a local Arab tribal leader, Sheykh
Hajim. In a letter to the Lightning Group commander, von Falkenhayn,
Mustafa Kemal argued that while relations with tribal leaders were
necessary, it was dangerous to single out one leader for an agreement and
give the impression of downgrading the others. To allow officials to enter
into relations with individual sheykhs would only serve to create confusion.
He would, therefore, deal impartially with all tribal leaders and show no
preference to Sheykh Hajim.19
Mustafa Kemal's ability to orchestrate relations with tribal leaders - in
this case, Kurdish tribal leaders - was put to the test when he arrived in
Anatolia on 19 May 1919 and set about organizing Turkish national
resistance against the Allies. The signature of the armistice of Mudros on 30
October 1918 and the subsequent arrival of Allied troops in Istanbul and at
various points in Anatolia had inspired the hope among some Kurdish
leaders that they could advance their personal ambitions with British help.
Mehmet §erif Pasa, an Ottoman official of Kurdish origin, who had spent the
Great War as an exile in Paris, informed the British in May 1919 that he was
willing to become Amir of an independent Kurdistan.20 In Istanbul, a Kurdish
notable, Seyyit Abdiilkadir, became president of a Society for the Rise of
Kurdistan (Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti), which was supported by the Bedir
Khans (Bedirhanogullan), a Kurdish princely dynasty from the area round
Diyarbekir (Bohtan in Kurdish, Jazirat ibn-'Umar in Arabic, El-Cezire in

Ottoman Turkish).2' Another Bedir Khan, Siireyya, was the moving spirit of
the Committee for Kurdish Independence in Cairo, which appealed for
British help in January 1919.22 In Sulaimaniyya (Siileymaniye), Sheykh
Mahmud Barzinji, began co-operating with British troops as soon as they
arrived at the end of 1918. Kurdish tribal leaders of lesser importance sought
contact with the British elsewhere in south-eastern Anatolia.23
On 23 May 1919, four days after his arrival in Samsun as Inspector of
the 9th Army, Mustafa Kemal requested a situation report from Ahmet
Cevdet, deputy commander of the 13th corps in Diyarbekir. In his reply,
dated 27 May, Cevdet detailed the activity of the tribes and of the British in
his area, and said that the Kurdish club in Diyarbekir, working for Kurdish
independence, was co-operating increasingly with the club of the Ottoman
party Concord and Freedom (itilaf ve Hurriyet, known as Entente Liberale
in the West), whose policy was in conformity with that of the Istanbul
government. The army corps was following closely the anti-government
propaganda of the Kurdish club. This telegram and subsequent
communications to and from Mustafa Kemal on Kurdish affairs were
published in 1996 by the Military History Department of the Turkish
General Staff (ATASE - Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etiit Basjcanhgi), as part
of a series of extracts from Atatiirk's private archive.24 The book comprises
67 documents, from May 1919 to April 1920, with photocopies of the
original handwritten Ottoman Turkish texts, followed by transcription into
Latin characters. Twenty of them are signed by Mustafa Kemal, first as
Inspector of the 9th Army, then of the 3rd Army (when the 9th Army was
renumbered, following a reorganization), and later as 'former Inspector',
then as Chairman of the General Congress (in Sivas), and finally 'on behalf
of the Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye, i.e. permanent
executive)' of the Society for the Defence of (National) Rights in Anatolia
and Rumelia. These 20 telegrams give a clear idea of Mustafa Kemal's
tactics vis-a-vis the Kurds in the critical months which preceded the
formation of the government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in
Ankara in April 1920.
The first telegram from Mustafa Kemal in the collection was sent from
Havza (inland from Samsun) on 28 May 1919 to four Kurdish tribal leaders,
including Haci Musa of Mutki. In it he announces his appointment by 'our
master, the Sultan and Glorious Caliph' and expresses the hope of visiting
their area in the near future. In the meantime, he is certain that his
addressees would do all in their power to show to the world that the
independence of the country could be ensured if internal order was
maintained and if everyone was totally obedient to the state (pp. 10-11). On
the same day, Mustafa Kemal sent a telegram to Kamil, a deputy in the
Ottoman parliament, who was a member of the Kurdish club in Diyarbekir.

Again he speaks of his intention to visit his 'old friends' in Diyarbekir at the
earliest opportunity. Referring to reports that animosity had arisen between
the Kurdish club and Turks in Diyarbekir, Mustafa Kemal warns that this
could produce sad consequences for both 'brothers-in-race' (irk karde§). He
goes on to ask Kamil to urge on the Kurdish club that national unity was
essential and that to allow the external enemy to make use of 'problems
which should be settled within the family, such as those concerning the
principles of administration and the defence of the rights of the races' would
constitute the greatest treachery (p. 14). The word 'race' (irk) tended at the
time to be used to denote an ethnic community (ethnie).
The following day (29 May 1919) Mustafa Kemal asked the General
Staff in Istanbul to notify him where exactly the British were promoting the
cause of an independent Kurdistan. He notes that he had in the meantime
given the necessary advice to 'many famous Kurdish emirs, whose gratitude
and affection I had won fully during the war' (p. 19). The Chief of the
Ottoman General Staff, Cevat Pasa (Cobanh), replied on 3 June that it could
be deduced that the British wanted to set up a Kurdish government between
'Iraq, Armenia and Turkey'. As a result of pressure by General Allenby, the
General Staff had to agree to disband the 13th Army corps in Diyarbekir. It
would be redesigned as a gendarmerie unit. Presumably to safeguard this
fiction, Cevat Pasa asked Mustafa Kemal to be careful in his
communications with the 13th Corps and to make sure that his name was
not bandied around in its area (p.21).
Mustafa Kemal's message to the Kurds is particularly clear in the
telegram he sent on 11 June 1919 to a Diyarbekir notable, Kasim
Cemilpasazade. The plan to create an independent Kurdistan, he declared,
had been hatched by the British for the benefit of the Armenians. However,
'Kurds and Turks are true brothers [oz karde§, i.e. children of the same
father and mother] and may not be separated'. 'Our existence requires that
Kurds, Turks and all Muslim elements [anasir - ethnic components of the
state] should work together to defend our independence and prevent the
partition of the fatherland.' Mustafa Kemal went on: 'I am in favour of
granting all manner of rights and privileges (hukuk ve imtiyazat - the Latin
transcription substitutes three dots for imtiyazat) in order to ensure the
attachment [to the state - merbutiyet] and the prosperity and progress of our
Kurdish brothers, on condition that the Ottoman state is not split up' (p.33).
In a covering letter, Mustafa Kemal asks the 13th corps commander to
facilitate the visit to Sivas of men trusted by three named Kurdish notables
(p.35). In his reply of 25 June 1919, the commander, Ahmet Cevdet, objects
that the notables kept brigands in their suites, and that they were, in any
case, quarrelling among themselves: people would respond to Mustafa
Kemal's invitation only if it served their interests. However, delegates had

been elected to the congress which was to meet in Erzurum, and the Kurdish
club had been closed down. It was impossible to win over many of its
members. 'They do not want Ottoman rule, and prefer British rule,
believing that [their area] would [then] develop and become prosperous like
Egypt.' Ahmet Cevdet explained that the Cemilpasa family and their
friends, who made up the Kurdish club, wanted a change in government in
order to escape prosecution for their part in the expulsion and killings (of
Armenians) (pp.38-9).
Mustafa Kemal had in the meantime moved from Havza to Amasya for
a meeting with his nationalist comrades, Hiiseyin Rauf (Orbay), Ali Fuat
(Cebesoy) and Refet (Bele). The strongest Ottoman military force in
Anatolia at that time was the 15th Corps, commanded by General Kazim
Karabekir in Erzurum. On 16 June 1919, Mustafa Kemal sent him a
telegram from Amasya to explain his views on the Kurds (pp.40^1-). The
Kurdish club in Diyarbekir, he wrote, had been closed down because it
aimed at the formation of a Kurdistan under British protection. In any case,
the club had been formed by a few 'vagabonds' (serseri) and did not
represent the Kurds. However there was a problem: the people of the eastern
provinces which were threatened by Armenian bands realized the need for
unity. But in 'tranquil' parts of Anatolia, the position was different, as local
people, who had been made the plaything of politicians, were now unwilling
to join any organization. He had, therefore, made every effort to explain the
need for National Defence Societies, as an instrument of national unity.
Fortunately, the co-operation of military and civil officials in spreading his
message had borne fruit and he had received telegrams 'from everywhere'
showing that the people had seen the need to organize and that the work of
organizing (resistance to the Allies) had begun.
Mustafa Kemal told Karabekir that he was determined to 'grasp the
Kurds like true brothers' and thus unite the whole nation through the
Societies for the Defence of National Rights. Two days later, Mustafa
Kemal sent an optimistic telegram to Col. Cafer Tayyar, the nationalist
commander of the 1st Corps in Edirne (Adrianople in Turkish Thrace),
declaring 'British propaganda for the formation of an independent

Kurdistan under British protection, and supporters of this project, have been
eliminated. Kurds have joined forces with Turks' (p.54). On 23 June,
Mustafa Kemal wrote in the same vein to the Chief of the General Staff in
Istanbul, General Cevat (Cobanh). 'Important telegrams' he had received
from Diyarbekir and Mamuretiilaziz (now Elazig) proved conclusively, he
declared, that the idea of an independent Kurdistan under British protection
had been 'destroyed'. 'We are always ready to provide an administration
which would guarantee the prosperity and happiness of Kurdistan. We
expect important people from that area to come to Sivas soon', Mustafa
Kemal concluded (p.57).
This suggests that Mustafa Kemal did not expect any important Kurdish
personalities to turn up at the congress of eastern provinces, which had been
organized under the auspices of Kazim Karabekir in Erzurum. Events
proved him right. The provinces of Diyarbekir and Mamuretiilaziz (or
Harput) were not represented. It seems that supporters of the Society for the
Rise of Kurdistan prevented any election of delegates from Mamuretiilaziz
to the congress in Erzurum, and prevented delegates who had been elected
in Diyarbekir from going to Erzurum.25 True, the largely Kurdish provinces
of Bitlis and Van, and Kurdish districts of the province of Erzurum did send
delegates, but they were small fry: retired Ottoman officials, clerics, etc.26
The congress of Erzurum opened on 23 July; elected Mustafa Kemal to
be its chairman on the same day and on 7 August issued a proclamation,
which was to form the basis of the National Pact - the charter of the Turkish
nationalist movement in the War of Independence. The proclamation began
by stating that the Black Sea and East Anatolian provinces (including the
main Kurdish provinces of Diyarbekir, Mamuretiilaziz, Van and Bitlis) were
an inseparable part of the Ottoman community and that 'all Islamic
elements [i.e. ethnic communities], living in this area, are true brothers,
imbued with the sentiment of mutual sacrifice and respectful of their [i.e.
each other's] racial [i.e. ethnic] and social circumstances'.27 Article 6 of the
proclamation extended this principle to all Ottoman territories within the
lines of the armistice signed with the Allies on 30 October 1918, and
repudiated any partition of these lands 'inhabited by our true brothers, of the
same religion and race as ourselves, whom it is impossible to divide'
(yekdigerinden gayr-i kabil-i infikdk 6z karde^ olan din ve irkda§lanmizla
meskuri). The formulation conceals an ambiguity: the Kurds were a 'race'
(or ethnic community - irk), but Turks, Kurds and all other Muslims in
Anatolia and Eastern Thrace were of 'the same race' (irkdas).
The committee (or permanent executive) elected at the Erzurum
congress included two representatives of predominantly Kurdish areas:
Sadullah Efendi, the former Ottoman deputy for Bitlis, and the Kurdish
tribal leader Haci Musa of Mutki.28 However, neither served on the

committee: Sadullah Efendi excused himself on grounds of ill health, while
Haci Musa was unable to come because he was afraid of action by tribes
opposed to him.29 On 13 August 1919, Mustafa Kemal communicated the
decisions of the Erzurum congress to two Kurdish leaders, Seyh Abdiilbaki
Kiifrevi of Bitlis and Cemil Ceto of Garzan. In his telegram to the latter, he
regretted that conditions had not allowed him to realize his wish of visiting
the area (pralar) (p.69). Ceto was later to stage a brief rising (May-June
1920) against the young Nationalist government in Ankara.30
Although Mustafa Kemal's party felt threatened by Dersim Kurds as

they journeyed between Sivas and Erzurum,31 and then back again, the
Kurds did not impinge on the work of the Erzurum congress. The congress
which followed in Sivas was not so lucky. On 26 August 1919, the 13th
Corps commander Ahmet Cevdet had instructed military authorities in
Malatya to arrest a number of Kurdish notables who had been charged with
trying to establish a Kurdish state under British protection.32 In fact, four of
these notables, including Celadet and Kamuran of the Bedirhan family,
turned up in Malatya on 3 September, in the suite of Major E.M. Noel, who
was indeed promoting the proposal put forward to the British government
by Colonel (later Sir) Arnold Wilson, acting British commissioner for the
Persian Gulf, that an independent Kurdistan should be formed under British
auspices.33 Two days before Noel's arrival, the provincial governor (vali) of
Harput (Mamuretiilaziz), Ali Galip, had instructed the district governor of
Malatya, who was a member of the Bedirhan family, to collect a small force
of Kurdish cavalry. On 7 September, Major Noel noted that Ali Galip
intended to despatch the Kurds against the Turkish nationalists assembled in
Sivas.34
The Sivas congress had opened in the meantime on 4 September. It was
meant to represent Societies for the Defence of National Rights throughout
the country - from eastern Thrace to eastern Anatolia. However, only 38
delegates turned up, including Mustafa Kemal and his party. There was no
delegate from any of the Kurdish areas. But a former Ottoman governor
(and supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress), Mazhar Miifit
(Kansu), was present as delegate of Hakkari, and a delegate of Diyarbekir,
Ihsan Hamit (Tigrel), arrived after the congress had ended.35 Mustafa Kemal
co-opted Ihsan Hamit into the Representative Committee, the permanent
executive of the countrywide society which became the source of his
authority until he was elected president of the Grand National Assembly on
24 April 1920. As the nine members of the committee elected earlier in
Erzurum were transferred en bloc, Sadullah Efendi and Haci Musa of Mutki
also became members of the new 16-member nationwide Representative
Committee formed at Sivas.36 But they remained sleeping members.
The proclamation issued by the Sivas congress on 11 September 1919,

refined the terms used in Erzurum. It declared in its first article that: 'All
Islamic elements living in the abovementioned domains [the Ottoman lands
within the armistice lines] are true brothers, imbued with feelings of mutual
respect and sacrifice for each other, and wholly respectful of racial and
social rights and local conditions' (Memalik-i mezkurede ya$ayan bilciimle
anasu-i islamiye yekdigerine kar§i hilrmet-i miitekabile ve fedakdrlik
hissiyatiyle me§hun ve hukuk-u irkiye ve igtimaiyeleriyle §erait-i
muhitiyelerine tamamiyle riayetkar 6z karde§tirler).v The wording would
seem to imply that Kurdish ethnicity and Kurdish customs would be

respected.
Some time during the Sivas congress, Mustafa Kemal was informed of
Major Noel's presence in Malatya and of Ali Galip's intention of recruiting
Kurdish tribesmen to raid Sivas. On 11 September, the day on which the
congress issued its proclamation, Ahmet Cevdet, the corps commander in
Diyarbekir, was informed by the 3rd Corps in Sivas that the plot had been
hatched by the Interior and War ministers in Istanbul. Ahmet Cevdet had by
then decided to reinforce his troops in Malatya and had ordered the arrest of
the district governor and of Major Noel's Kurdish companions, although not
of Major Noel himself.38 Having heard of the order, Major Noel and his
party left Malatya on 10 September. The following day Major Noel noted
that Ali Galip had produced a decree {irade) from the Sultan ordering him
to raise a force of Kurdish cavalry against Mustafa Kemal in Sivas. Pressed
to assist in the project, Major Noel claims to have refused to commit himself
publicly. A day later, 12 September, Major Noel noted that Ali Galip had
decided to disperse the Kurdish tribal gathering, as the idea of marching on
Sivas was too risky.39
As Ahmet Cevdet's measures, supported by Kazim Karabekir in
Erzurum, put a quick stop to Ali Galip's half-baked and half-hearted plan
and secured the flight of Major Noel and his Kurdish companions, Mustafa
Kemal sent a trusted and adventurous young officer, Lt. Recep Zuhtii, on a
special mission to Malatya in order to rally local support.40 Some Kurdish
leaders hastened to send messages of support to Sivas. On 15 September, in
a telegram to Cemil Ceto in Siirt, Mustafa Kemal expressed the thanks of
the congress for 'the loyalty of all our Kurdish brothers to this religion and
state and their attachment to the sacred institution of the caliphate' (p.101).
The following day, he congratulated the mayor of Malatya for having seen
through the plot financed with 'British gold' (p. 108).
Mustafa Kemal made maximum use of the Ali Galip plot to discredit the
government of Damat Ferit, who had to resign on 30 September 1919 and
was succeeded by Ali Riza Pasa, a general sympathetic to the Turkish
national movement.4' On 6 November, as elections were being organized for
the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, Mustafa Kemal sent a circular

telegram to governors of five provinces in Eastern Anatolia, regretting
claims made in the capital that the Kurds opposed the Turkish national
movement, and asking that 'our Kurdish brothers, who are a noble
[constituent] element of [the people of] Eastern Anatolia, should express
their support for [Turkish] 'national forces' [kuva-yi milliye] and their
opposition to the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan' (p. 155). Messages of
support duly followed. Replying on 3 December 1919 to one such message
from the much-cited Haci Musa of Mutki, Mustafa Kemal declared that 'the
whole world knows that the noble Kurdish people [Kurt kavm-i necibi] feels
a religious attachment to the sacred institution of the caliphate and
constitutes an indivisible heroic mass with its Turkish brothers' (p. 168). On
15 January 1920, Mustafa Kemal thanked a number of Kurdish tribal
leaders for the telegrams which they had sent to the government and to
representatives of foreign powers in Istanbul to express their solidarity with
their Turkish brethren, considering that 'Kurdistan is an indivisible portion
of the Ottoman community' (p. 192). In another telegram sent on the same
day, Mustafa Kemal spoke of Turks and Kurds as 'two true brothers joining
hands in their determination to defend their sacred unity' (p. 195).
On 20 February 1920, on the eve of the dissolution of the last Ottoman
Chamber of Deputies in Istanbul and the subsequent opening of the Grand
National Assembly in Ankara, Mustafa Kemal sent a private letter to the
exiled Young Turk (CUP) triumvir Talat Pas.a. It began with these words:
'The national unity created under the aegis of the Society for the Defence of
[National] Rights in Anatolia and Rumelia aims at saving Turkey, as
bounded by the national borders of the Turks and Kurds [Turk ve Kurt milli
hudutlariyle tahdid edilen Tiirkiye'yi] ... in accordance with the principles
established at the general congresses in Erzurum and then in Sivas.'42
Mustafa Kemal put his views in a more general framework in his first
long speech to the GNA on 24 April 1920. The Erzurum congress, he said,
had marked out the borders of the country by claiming the territory within
the line along which the armistice had been declared on 30 October 1918, a
line which encompassed the province of Mosul. This was not only a
military, but a national frontier. 'However it should not be imagined',
Mustafa Kemal went on, 'that the Islamic elements within this frontier all
belong to the same nation. There are within it Turks, Circassians and other
Muslims. This is, however, the national frontier of brotherly nations living
together and genuinely sharing the same aims. But in addition, every one of
the Muslim elements living within the borders of this fatherland has its own
specific environment, customs and race, and privileges relating to them
have been accepted and confirmed, mutually and in all sincerity. Naturally,
these have not been detailed, because this is not the time for it. The matter
will be settled and resolved between brothers when our existence is

assured...'43 Mustafa Kemal did not mention the Kurds specifically in this
passage. But when he returned to the subject of frontiers on 1 May 1920, he
said: 'The gentlemen making up your august assembly are not only Turks,
or Circassians or Kurds. They are a sincere gathering of all Islamic
elements.' He went on: 'There are Kurds as well as Turks north of Kirkuk.
We have not distinguished between them.'44
However, the ambiguity about race (irk) persisted. In his speech opening
the third session of the GNA on 1 March 1922, Mustafa Kemal said, 'The
people of Turkey is a social entity united in race, religion and culture,

imbued with mutual respect and a sense of sacrifice and sharing the same
destiny and interests.'45 Nevertheless, the expression 'people of Turkey'
(Tiirkiye halki) rather than 'Turkish people' {Turk halki) is significant, and
Mustafa Kemal used it again when welcoming the French writer Claude
Farrere in Izmit on 18 June 1922.46
Unlike the congresses of Erzurum and Sivas, the GNA which first came
together on 23 April 1920 had genuine Kurdish members. The most
colourful was Diyap Aga of Dersim, one of several tribal leaders elected to
the assembly. The first constitution (lit. Law of Fundamental Organization,
Tefkildt-i Esasiye Kanunu), which the GNA adopted on 20 January 1921
extended the powers and status of local government, which had been
established on the French model in the Ottoman state. Article 11 of the
constitution declared that provinces were autonomous in local affairs.
Provincial councils, elected for two years, were given the right to administer
pious foundations, educational and health services, public works, farming
and economic affairs generally, in accordance with the laws of the GNA.47
Moreover, the term used for these councils was changed significantly from
meclis to f ura. Chosen originally by Ottoman reformers as an indigenously
Islamic term for a consultative assembly, §ura acquired after the Bolshevik
revolution the connotation of 'soviet' (in modern Persian showra, showravi
are the standard translations of the noun and adjective 'Soviet',
respectively). The government which the Ottoman army left behind when it
was forced to evacuate Kars after the armistice was called 'Kars Milli Islam
§urasi', which, I believe, can be rendered as Kars National Muslim Soviet.
There was another example of Soviet inspiration in the 1921 constitution:
the term used to designate the Ankara government was '/era vekilleri
heyeti\ an exact translation of 'committee of executive commissars'
(shortened in Russian as Ispolkom), the name of the Bolshevik government
in Moscow. In French texts vekil was translated as commissaire (Halide
Edib in The Turkish Ordeal uses the word 'Commissary').
Mustafa Kemal referred to the constitutional provisions on local
government in the instructions he sent to Nihat Pasa (Anilmis), who had
been appointed commander of the southern (El-Cezire) front in June 1920.48

The instructions deserve to be quoted in full:
1. Our domestic policy requires the gradual establishment in the
whole country and on a vast scale of local administrations in which
popular masses will be directly and effectively involved. As for areas
inhabited by Kurds, we consider it a necessity both of our domestic
and of our foreign policy to set up a local government gradually.
2. The right of nations to determine their destinies by themselves is a

principle accepted worldwide. We too have accepted this principle. It
is expected that the Kurds will by that time have completed the
organization of their own local government, and that their leaders and
notables will have been won over by us in the name of this objective;
when they express their votes, they should, therefore, declare that they
prefer to live under the administration of the Grand National
Assembly, where they are already masters of their own destiny. The
command of the El-Cezire front is responsible for directing all the
work in Kurdistan in line with this policy.
3. The general lines of accepted policy include such objectives as to
raise by means of armed clashes to a permanent level the animosity of
the Kurds in Kurdistan against the French and particularly the British
on the border with Iraq, to prevent any accord between the Kurds and
foreigners, to prepare gradually for the establishment of local
government bodies and thus win for us the hearts of the Kurds and to
strengthen the links which bind Kurdish leaders to us by appointing
them to civil and military positions.
4. Domestic policy in Kurdistan shall be coordinated and administered
by the command of the El-Cezire front. The front command will
address its communications on the matter to the office of the president
of the GNA. Leading civil officials will report on the subject to the
front command, since the latter will regulate and cordinate action by
provincial authorities.
5. The El-Cezire front command shall propose to the government such
administrative, judicial and financial changes and reforms as it deems
necessary.49
Nihat Pa§a did not win the hearts and minds of Kurdish notables, at least
not of all Kurdish notables, in his area. Some of them complained to the
Assembly in Ankara, accusing him of high-handed and illegal activity.
Having heard his defence, the judicial committee of the Assembly reported
that no action should be taken. The report was accepted on 22 July 1922, in
spite of loud protests by some deputies, notably Feyzi Efendi of Malatya.

Nihat Pas,a was, however, transferred to Ankara where he was appointed
president of the military court of appeal.50 Mustafa Kemal did not intervene,
as he had done in an earlier case concerning 'bearded' Nurettin Pa§a who,
as commander of the central army, had repressed the rising of the Kocgiri
Kurds on the northern edges of the Dersim mountains between April and
June 1921.
Nurettin Pasa's severity and, particularly, his use of the irregulars led by
the notorious Lame Osman (Topal Osman) of Giresun, were condemned in
a motion by Emin Bey, deputy for Erzincan in whose constituency the rising
had taken place. Speaking at a secret session of the assembly on 4 October
1921, Emin Bey declared that the punitive action taken against the people
of Dersim would be unacceptable even for 'barbarians in Africa', and that
such atrocities had not been committed even against the Armenians.51 The
Assembly decided to send a commission of inquiry, which was also to look
into the consequences of Nurettin Pasa's behaviour during the deportation
of Greeks from Samsun. The Assembly wanted to put Nurettin Pa§a on trial,
but in the secret session on 16 January 1922, Mustafa Kemal argued that
although Nurettin had been relieved of his command, the accusations
against him needed further investigation. This was accepted,52 and the trial
never took place. There was no love lost between Mustafa Kemal and
Nurettin, but, as Mustafa Kemal said in a telegram to Kazim Karabekir on
13 November 1921, he was worried by attacks in the assembly against
military commanders he needed for the prosecution of the war."
Robert Olson54 says on the strength of British intelligence reports that, in
addition to the Kocgiri commission, another commission drew up a bill
concerning the administration of Kurdistan, which, it was decided, was to
be debated at a secret session on 10 February 1922. The bill, whose text is
given in British documents, was apparently rejected by 373 votes to 64,
most Kurdish deputies voting against it. David McDowall speaks of a
debate on Dersim at a secret session of the GNA on 9 October 1921,
followed by a decision on 10 February to establish 'an autonomous
administration for the Kurdish nation in harmony with their national
customs'.55 But according to the published minutes, there were no secret
sessions of the GNA either on 9 October 1921 or on 10 February 1922.
There was a debate on the Koggiri rebelion (and Dersim) on 3 October,
when a five-member committee of inquiry was elected. The debate was
continued on 4 and 5 October. On the last day, the commissioner (or
minister) for the Interior, Refet (Bele) Pa§a, argued against requests he had
received from the people of Dersim that their district should acquire
separate administrative status, and said that it was much better off as part of
the richer province of (Mamuret) Elaziz.56 On 16-17 January 1921, when
the GNA debated the possible committal for trial of Nurettin Pasa, a
member of the committee of inquiry, Yusuf Izzet Pasa, said that the
committee had completed its work, but was awaiting the return of two of its
five members to draw up its report. In the meantime, he claimed that
Nurettin Pasa had not exceeded his authority.57 There is no reference in the
debate either to a second committee or to any autonomy plan for Kurdistan.
The report of the committee of enquiry seems to have sunk without
trace. Neither is there any reference to any autonomy plan in the long
defence submitted by the El-Cezire front commander, Nihat Pa§a, who says
simply that 'the provinces of Kurdistan can be won over to the national
government only by the hand of totally uncorrupt officials'.58 Unless
evidence to the contrary is found, I would suggest that the British reports
quoted by Olson and McDowall concerning the existence of a precise
Turkish plan for the autonomy of Kurdistan are inaccurate, like so many
other British intelligence reports. The information was probably obtained
from Kurdish sources, possibly Seyyit Abdiilkadir, in Istanbul and was
based either on documents having no legal validity, or simply on wishful
thinking.
That Mustafa Kemal had not changed his mind - and continued to think
of Kurdish autonomy in the framework of local government throughout the
country - emerges clearly from his reference to the Kurds in the briefing he
gave to journalists in Izmit on 16/17 January 1923, at a time when the
Lausanne conference was in recess. Once again, the statement deserves to
be quoted in full. Mustafa Kemal said:
There can be no question of a Kurdish problem, as far as we, i.e.
Turkey, are concerned. Because, as you know, the Kurdish elements
within our national borders are settled in such a way that they are
concentrated only in very limited areas. As their concentration
decreases and as they penetrate among Turkish elements, a[n ethnic]
frontier has come about in such a way that if we wished to draw a
border in the name of Kurdishness [Kiirtliik] it would be necessary to
destroy Turkishness and Turkey. It would, for example, be necessary
to have a frontier extending to Erzurum, Erzincan, Sivas and Harput.
One should not forget also the Kurdish tribes in the Konya desert.
Therefore, rather than envisage Kurdishness as such, local autonomies
of a sort will in any case come about in accordance with our
constitution [lit. Law of Fundamental Organization]. As a result,
wherever the population of a district [liva] is Kurdish, it will govern
itself autonomously. Aside from this, whenever one speaks of the
people of Turkey [Tiirkiye'nin halki], they [i.e.the Kurds] should also
be included. If they are not included, it is always possible that they
would make a grievance of it. Now, the Turkish Grand National

Assembly is made up of empowered representatives both of Turks and
of Kurds, and the two elements have joined their interests and
destinies. They know that this is something held in common. To try
and draw a separate frontier would not be right.59
The same line was taken by Ismet (inb'nii), as head of the Turkish
delegation at the Lausanne conference, as he defended his country's claim
to the province of Mosul, arguing that the government of Turkey was the
government of the Kurds as well.60 But I think it would be wrong to attribute

Mustafa Kemal's attitude to the governance of the Kurds of Turkey to the
hope of regaining Mosul, for in the same briefing to journalists in izmit, he
expressed his personal opinion that it was impossible to take Mosul by war,
in other words by fighting the British (Musul'u harben almak gayr-t
mumkundiir), even although he said that the British wanted to set up a
Kurdish government in Mosul, and that, if they did so, the idea might spread
to the Kurds within Turkey's borders.61
In an immensely long address to the people of Izmir on 2 February 1923,
Mustafa Kemal referred once again to Turkey's multiethnic character,
saying, 'There is a primary element which has established the Turkish State.
Then there are [other] elements which have joined their endeavours and
their histories with those of this primary element. There are citizens from
these elements too.'62 The example which Mustafa Kemal gave this time
was not Circassians or Kurds, but Jews, who certainly came more readily to
the mind in Izmir, since their neighbourhood in the city had survived the
great fire the previous year, and the Jewish community had allowed
delegates to the first Economic Congress, held later that month, to lodge in
its orphanage.63
The Turkish Socialist politician and publicist Dogu Perincek who has
drawn our attention both to Mustafa Kemal's instructions to Nihat Pasa and
to his Izmit statement on the Kurds, wonders what happened after 1923 to
prevent the incorporation of Mustafa Kemal's ideas in the 1924
constitution.64 Why, in other words, was not a solution sought within the
framework of the constitutional provisions on local government and on the
basis of the recognition of the Kurds and of other ethnic elements in
Turkey?
Elections were held soon after Mustafa Kemal's statements in izmit and
Izmir. Mustafa Kemal opened the first session of the second Grand National
Assembly on 13 August 1923 with a speech in which he stressed the
establishment of order as the first duty of the government. But he also said
that the new Turkish state was a people's state.65 The Assembly elected a
committee to draw up a new constitution (Kanun-u Esasi Enciimeni). Its
chairman was the journalist Yunus Nadi, a Turkish nationalist with radical
ideas - ideas which were left-wing in the sense that Fascism was, at the
start, a left-wing movement. Another influential member was Ahmet
Agaoglu, an intellectual born in Azerbaijan and formerly active in the CUP.
He tended to a liberal nationalist position. Sabiha (Sertel), who describes
herself at the time as a Utopian Socialist and who had newly returned from
the United States, observed the discussions of the committee when she went
to Ankara to join her husband Zekeriya, who had been appointed Director
General of the Press.66 Mustafa Kemal, she says, often took part in the work
of the constitutional committee, which met in the stationmaster's house in

Ankara. According to Sabiha Sertel, there was an intense argument on the
article 4 (of the 1921 constitution) which stated 'The Grand National
Assembly is made up of members elected by the people of the provinces'.67
It appears from her account that the word 'province' was taken to mean
'chief town of a province', and that objectors argued that the people of
smaller towns and villages should also be represented. She argues that
behind the objections lay the fear that the provincial elites - military
commanders, notables, landowners - were largely in Mustafa Kemal's
pocket and that the members of the assembly they would elect would
strengthen his position as a dictator. However that may be, the text was
changed to 'the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is made up of deputies
elected by the nation in accordance with the relevant law'.68
Sabiha Sertel also claims that she complained to one of Mustafa Kemal's
close companions, Mazhar Miifit (Kansu), who was at the time deputy for
Denizli,69 saying that there was nothing in the constitution about land reform
and workers' rights, to which Mazhar Miifit replied: 'Mustafa Kemal wants
to carry out many reforms. On land reform, he has talked here to landowners
[aga], particularly Kurdish landowners and to Kurdish deputies such as
Feyzi Bey.70 This problem of reform is very difficult. It is impossible to
explain land reform to the agas. Tackling the reform means losing all the
agas and notables. So for the moment we have closed the book on land
reform.'71
Sabiha Sertel's testimony should be seen in the light of her subsequent
commitment to the communist cause. But it is a fact that there were
landowners from the south-east in the second GNA: two deputies from
Malatya are identified as aga,11 and none as a tribal leader, a designation
which had been applied to several deputies in the first Grand National
Assembly.73 The main point at issue in the deliberations of the constitutional
committee and then of the GNA, when the draft constitution was debated,
was the power of the president, Mustafa Kemal, and matters which had a
bearing on it. Local government, within whose structure Kurdish ethnicity
was to have been accommodated, attracted no attention. According to
Professor Suna Kili, 'there was very little discussion on the section of the
Constitution which was devoted to the administration of the provinces'.74 In
the GNA debate one deputy, Halis Turgut of Sivas (who was hanged in 1926
for his alleged complicity in the plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in
Izmir)75 complained that provincial councils (modelled on the French
conseils generaux des departements) had no real powers, and that provinces
should be able to run their own affairs.76 It made no difference. The term
'autonomy' (muhtariyet) was dropped from the provisions of local
government; so was the term §ura for council. The six articles on local
government in the 1921 constitution were reduced to two brief articles in

1924: article 90 'Provinces, cities, towns and villages are legal entities', and
article 91, 'Provincial affairs are administered in accordance with the
principles of extending (delegated) powers and distiguishing between
functions [tevsi-i mezuniyet ve tefrik-i vezaif esasi\' J1 The constitution was
adopted by a near-unanimous vote of the Assembly on 20 April 1924.78
At the time there was no official opposition in the Assembly, most of
whose members had been hand-picked by Mustafa Kemal. But this had not
prevented successful moves to limit the president's powers in such matters
as the dissolution of parliament and sending back laws for reconsideration.
One of the deputies who spoke against giving the power of veto to the
president was the lawyer Feridun Fikri (Diisunsel), deputy for the
predominantly Kurdish province of Dersim,79 who later became a member
of the opposition Progressive Republican Party.80 But neither he nor anyone
else referred to the idea, discussed by Mustafa Kemal a year earlier, of
granting predominantly Kurdish provinces the right to self-government
within the framework of devolved local government. The plan had
completely dropped out of the public debate. Why should this have been so?
The Mosul question was still unresolved, and, therefore, the need to
secure the support of the Kurdish population of northern Iraq still remained,
at least in theory. But as has been noted, the izmit briefing in January 1923
suggests that Mustafa Kemal had written off Mosul. One could say
cynically that the question of Kurdish self-government within Turkey was
pushed aside as soon as the Lausanne treaty was signed on 24 July 1923,
and the Turkish government's sovereign rights over its territory were
recognized. But this does not explain the failure of the legal opposition and
of the opposition press to pay any attention to the multiethnic character of
the country's population, which Mustafa Kemal had recognized during the
War of Independence.
I would suggest that the answer to the always difficult question why the
dog did not bark - in this instance why Kurdish self-government dropped
out of Ankara and Istanbul politics in 1924 - lies in the fact that priorities
had changed. For Mustafa Kemal the priority was to create a modern,
secular Turkey. He needed absolute power to do it. Any kind of provincial

self-government would have been an obstacle to his designs, particularly
self-government in what he, along with the entire Turkish elite, considered
to be a backward region. For the liberal opposition, the priority was to curb
Mustafa Kemal's power. For the radical left, as witness Sabiha Sertel,
Kurdishness or Kurdish nationalism (Kiirtgiiluk) served the interests of
landlords, feudal tribal leaders and other 'reactionaries'. It is beyond the
scope of this study to examine at what stage Lenin's and then Stalin's
adoption of what one could call phoney federalism, but what was called
officially the nurturing of cultures national in form but socialist in content,

was taken on board by Turkish Communists and Marxisants. But it was not
a factor in the crucial year of 1924.
After 1923 Mustafa Kemal's principal intervention in the Kurdish
question occurred in February/March 1925 at the time of the rebellion of the
Kurdish Seyh Sait. The government of Fethi (Okyar) declared martial law
and put in train military measures against the rebels. The opposition
Progressive Republican Party supported these government measures. But
Mustafa Kemal decided that a firmer hand was needed. He summoned his
trusted lieutenant ismet (inonii) from Istanbul and saw to it that his People's
Party disowned Fethi and brought Ismet to power to take drastic action to
put down the rebellion. When ismet's draconian Maintenance of Order Law
was endorsed by the Assembly on 4 March 1925, by 122 votes to 22, 37 of
the deputies representing Kurdish provinces voted with the government and
only seven with the opposition.81
In his proclamation on 7 March 1925, Mustafa Kemal attributed the
rebellion to certain notables, who had been found guilty by the courts
(kanunen miicrim olan bazi miiteneffizan) and who used the mask of
religion to conceal their purposes. He went on to declare that law and order
would be safeguarded as the foundation of social and economic life.82
Opening the new session of the Assembly on 1 November 1925, he
described the rebellion simply as a 'reactionary incident' (irtica hadisesi).
The opposition Progressive Republican Party was closed down in the
aftermath of the Seyh Sait rebellion. Yet the party's leader General Kazim
Karabekir had already in 1922/23 expressed the view that religious
fanaticism had been used as an instrument to incite the Kurds to rebellion.
Saying that what was important about the Kurds was not their number but
the extent of the territory they occupied, Karabekir had proposed a
characteristically idiosyncratic solution. Kurdish sheykhs, he said, should
be replaced by intellectuals trained in the faculties of theology and law in
Istanbul and taught Kurdish, and two Turkish corridors should be
established, horizontally and vertically, around lake Van, thus ensuring that
the government should dominate Kurdistan, militarily, politically and
religiously.83 Mustafa Kemal, Fethi (Okyar) and Kazim Karabekir disagreed

on methods for tackling Kurdish risings. But they all took it for granted that
the writ of the central government should run throughout the country.
As the government was preparing to ban the opposition Progressive
Republican Party, a friend of Rauf (Orbay), who had been one of Mustafa
Kemal's original companions in Anatolia but had become by then a political
opponent, was questioned by the police about his links with the Kurds. The
friend's name was Omer Fevzi Mardin. He was a retired officer who had
been assigned by Enver Pasa to assist Rauf in his clandestine mission in Iran
at the beginning of the Great War. Omer Fevzi Mardin told his questioners
that his mother was the daughter of Bedirhan Pa§a. This, he said, was his
only link with the Kurds. But as an officer he had always served the cause
of the unity under one flag of all the races (irk) — we would say ethnic
communities - living in the country.84 Mustafa Kemal had spoken in similar
terms during the War of Independence. But times had changed.
On 8 December 1925, the Ministry of Education issued a circular
banning the use of such divisive terms as Kurd, Circassian and Laz,
Kurdistan and Lazistan.85 Mustafa Kemal explained the new thinking in the
manual of civics which he dictated in 1930 to his adopted daughter Afet
Inan. The relevant paragraph reads:
Within the political and social unity of today's Turkish nation, there
are citizens and co-nationals who have been incited to think of
themselves as Kurds, Circassians, Laz or Bosnians. But these
erroneous appellations - the product of past periods of tyranny - have
brought nothing but sorrow to individual members of the nation, with
the exception of a few brainless reactionaries, who became the
enemy's instruments. This is because these individual members of the
nation share with the generality of Turkish society the same past,
history, concept of morals and laws.86
There is no specific mention here of common ethnic origin. But in the
same year, Mustafa Kemal approved the publication of an Outline of
Turkish History (Turk Tarihinin Ana Hatlari) — a title reminiscent of
Atatiirk's favourite history book, The Outline of History by H.G. Wells. The
Turkish Outline formulated the Turkish historical thesis which claimed that
many if not most civilizations had been created by people of Turkish origin.
The claim included some at least of the Medes,87 whom the Kurds consider
as their ancestors, as well as the Achaemenians and Parthians.
Then, on 14 June 1934, the Law of Resettlement (iskan Kanunu)88 made
assimilation (temsil) of all the country's citizens to Turkish culture - note
the word 'culture' — official government policy. The insistence on 'culture'
can, of course, be traced to Ziya Gokalp, one of the main ideologists of
Turkish nationalism. The model was, as ever, France, where Bretons,

Occitanians, Savoyards, Flemings, etc. had all been assimilated to French
culture. The government of the Turkish republic was determined not to
repeat the mistake deplored the previous century by Namik Kemal when
programmes - for education in Turkish - were not carried out. This time,
there would be no negligence (ihmal).
Ataturk did not disapprove of this policy. Otherwise he would have
stopped it. But his interests lay elsewhere - in the great project of
modernization. Law and order was the province of ismet inonii's
government, and Ataturk let him get on with it. As laws and institutions
were changed and difficulties emerged, Ataturk made repeated tours of the
provinces. But Diyarbekir and the south-east, which he promised to visit in
1919, were left out of his travels until the last year of his life. Finally, on 12
November 1937, Ataturk left Ankara by train for Diyarbekir in the company
of his new prime minister Celal Bayar. On the way, he visited the building
site of a new textile mill in Malatya on 14 November. The following day he
attended a concert at the People's House in Diyarbekir. 'After an interval of
twenty years,' he said, 'here I am again in Diyarbekir, listening to beautiful
modern music in one of the world's most beautiful and modern buildings, in
the presence of civilized people, in this people's house.'89 The following
day, he inaugurated the work of extending the railway link through
Diyarbekir to Iran and Iraq. He then stopped briefly at Elaziz
(Mamuretiilaziz): the authorities had made sure that the leaders of the last
Dersim rising were executed before the visit.90 Atatiirk's adopted daughter,
the military pilot Sabiha Gokcen, had earlier taken part in bombing raids
against the rebels.
On 18 November, Ataturk was already in Adana. His stay in the south-
east had lasted five days.91 But it left a lasting mark, for during it he decreed
that Diyarbekir should be renamed Diyarbakir and Elaziz should become
Elazig in accordance with the Sun Theory of Language which found
Turkish roots for all and any words of foreign origin. On his return, Ataturk
declared that he had been happy to see all the people of the eleven provinces
he had visited give willingly to the state treasury, without any hesitation and
in a spirit of self-sacrifice, all that was surplus to their daily needs, for the
sake of a rich, strong and grandiose Turkish republic.92
Asim Us, a People's Party deputy and journalist, noted in his diary
that, during his trip to the east, Ataturk had ordered the construction of
military roads in Dersim (which was renamed Tunceli). But he cancelled
the allocation of four million liras for the building of schools and of
one million liras for the repair of damage done by bandits, on the grounds
that it would be better to resettle mountain people in the fertile plains of
the eastern provinces.93
To sum up, during the years of the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal
recognized specifically the multiethnic character of the Muslim population
of Turkey, while insisting on its fraternal unity. He also promised that local
government would accommodate ethnic specificity. After 1923, any idea of
the self-rule of individual Muslim ethnic communities dropped out of the
Turkish political agenda. Mustafa Kemal devoted his energy to the
consolidation of his power and to his cultural revolution. He had little time
for the Kurds. Did he change his views and, as John Simpson of the BBC
suggests, did he propagate the myth that the Turks were the only ethnic
group in Turkey? I would say that he did so only in the sense that since
everyone of note in history was of Turkish origin, so too were the Kurds.
The ideology which has shaped the policy of the governments of the
Turkish republic towards its Kurdish citizens antedates Atatiirk. His main
contribution was to manage the Kurdish problem successfully during the
War of Independence. Thereafter, the requirements of creating a modern
nation state took precedence. It is true that Atatiirk's cultural revolution was
an additional obstacle to the preservation of distinct ethnic cultures, let
alone to the introduction of local self-rule. But there was no vocal demand
in Turkish society for either. In the circumstances, Atatiirk could delegate
the management of the Kurds to his government.
Today the Turkish historical thesis has been dropped together with the
Sun Theory of Language. The diverse ethnic roots of the people of Turkey
are openly discussed, and the word 'mosaic' has become a cliche in
describing the country's ethnic picture. We are thus back to the language
which Mustafa Kemal (Atatiirk) used and the ideas which he put forward
during the War of Independence. Hence the importance of recording and
analysing what the pragmatic founding father of the Turkish Republic said
during that crucial period of Turkish history.
NOTES
1. Atatiirk's Children: Turkey and the Kurds (London, 1996), p.11. The book was reviewed in
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.30, No.l (January 1997), pp. 155-6.
2. Milliyet, 30 June 1998, p.8.
3. 'Giineydogu Sorunu' [The Problem of the South-East] in Milliyet, 10 August 1998, p.19.
4. Details in Celal Erikan, Komutan Atatiirk [Atatiirk as a Commander] (Ankara, 1972),
pp.184-217.
5. Extracts in Ulug igdemir, Atatiirk'Un Yasanu [Atatiirk's Life], Tiirk Tarih Kurumu (Ankara,
1980), pp.79-87.
6. Izzettin (jahslar, Atatiirk 'le ikibuguk Yil [Two and a half years with Atatiirk] (Istanbul, 1993).
7. Cahslar, op. cit., p. 102.
8. fahslar, op. cit., p. 134.
9. (jalislar, op. cit., p.130.
10. ATASE [Military History Dept. of Turkish General Staff], Turk istiklal Harbine Katilan
Tiimen ve Doha Ust Kademelerdeki Komutanlarm Biyografderi [Biographies of Divisional
and More Senior Commanders in the Turkish War of Independence], 2nd ed. (Ankara, 1989),
pp.113-15.
11. Fahrettin Altay, On Yil Savas (1912-1922) ve Sonrasi [Ten Years of War (1912-1922) and
After] (Istanbul, 1970), p.29ff.
12. Altay, op. cit., p.53.
15. Selim Deringil, The Well-Protected Domains (London, 1998), pp.101-4.
16. Ana Britannica, 1st ed. (Istanbul, 1986-87), Vol.11, p.471.
17. Quoted by Masami Arai, Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era (Leiden, 1992), p.3.
18. Afetinan, Ataturk Hakktnda Hatiralar ve Belgeler [Reminiscences and Documents
Concerning Atatiirk] (Istanbul, 1984), pp.43-51.

19. Text of letter in Salih Bozok, Hep Atatiirk'un Yamnda [Ever at Atatiirk's Side] (Istanbul,
1985),pp.l82-3.
20. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London, 1996), p.121.
21. Ibid., p.123; Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1958), Vol.1, p.871; Ana Britannica,
Vol.XIV,p.l85.
22. McDowall, op. cit., p.122.
23. McDowall, op. cit., pp. 121-3.
24. ATASE, Atatiirk Ozel Arsivinden Secmeler [Extracts from Atatiirk's Private Archive], Vol.IV,
Genelkurmay Basimevi [General Staff Press] (Ankara, 1996). Ahmet Cevdet's first report on
pp. 1-8.
25. Mahmut Gologlu, Shvas Kongresi [The Sivas Congress] (Ankara, 1969), p. 120.
26. Full list of delegates in Mahmut Gologlu, Erzurum Kongresi [The Erzurum Congress]
(Ankara, 1968), pp.78-80.
27. Text in Gologlu, Erzurum Kongresi, pp.201-2.
28. Kemal Ataturk, Nutuk: Vesikalar [Speech: Documents], Atatiirk Kultiir, Dil ve Tarih Yiiksek
Kurumu, Ataturk Arastirma Merkezi, Ankara 1991, Document No.41, p.643.
29. Mazhar Mufit Kansu, Erzurum'dan Oliimiine Kadar Atatiirk'le Beraber [At Atattirk's Side
from the Erzurum Congress to His Death] (Ankara, 1988), Vol.11, pp.112-13.
30. Erikan, Komutan Ataturk, p.585.
31. Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, Tek Adam [The Only Man] (Istanbul, 1984), Vol.11, p.89; Mazhar
Mufit Kansu, pp.198-203.
32. Date in Diary of Major Noel (Basra, 1919), p.19. Charge mentioned in Ahmet Cevdet's
telegram of 12 September to Grand Vizier, copy 3rd Corps in Sivas (ATASE, p.78).
33. Diary of Major Noel, p.l.
34. Diary of Major Noel, p.21.
35. Gologlu, Sivas Kongresi, pp.74, 124.
36. Mahmut Gologlu, Sivas Kongresi, p.110.
37. Text in Gologlu, Sivas Kongresi, pp.232—4.
38. ATASE, p.79.
39. The Diary of Major Noel, p.24.
40. Recep Ziihtii's telegrams to 3rd corps in Sivas in ATASE, pp.91-7.
41. Sina Ak$in, Istanbul Hukumetleri ve Milli Mucadele [The Istanbul Governments and the
National Struggle] (Istanbul, 1992), Vol.1, p.589.
42. Ilhan Tekeli and Selim tlkin, 'Kurtulus, Savas,inda Talat Pa§a ile Mustafa Kemal'in
Mektuplasmalan' [Correspondence between Talat Pasa and Mustafa Kemal during the
Liberation Struggle], Belleten (Ankara, 1980), Vol.XLIV, No.174, p.321.
43. Atatiirk'un Soylev ve Demecleri {ASD) [Atatiirk's Speeches and Declarations], Ataturk Kultiir,
Dil ve Tarih Yiiksek Kurumu, Ataturk Ara§tirma Merkezi (Ankara, 1989), Vol.1, p.30.
44. ASD, Vol.1, pp.74-5.
45. ASD, Vol.1, p.236.
46. ASD, Vol.11, pp.37, 39.
47. Original wording of the text in Rona Aybay, Karsilastirmali 1961 Anayasasi [Comparative
(Text) of 1961 Constitution] (Fakulteler Matbaasi, Istanbul, 1963), p.199.
48. ATASE, p.69.
49. TBMM Gizli Celse Zabitlan [Minutes of Secret Sessions of the Grand National Assembly]
(Ankara, 1985), Vol.III, p.551.
50. ATASE,p.69.
51. TBMM Gizli Celse Zabitlan, Vol.11, p.270.
53. Kazim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz [Our War of Independence] (Istanbul, 1969), pp.978-9.
54. Robert Olson, The Emergence pf Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion,
1880-1925 (Austin, TX, 1989), pp.38-9.
55. McDowall, pp. 187-8.
56. TBMM Gizli Celse Zabitlan, pp.248-80. The context shows that the word miistakil
(independent) refers to miistakil sancak or liva (separate district or province) rather than full
state independence.
58. TBMM Gizli Celse Zabitlan, Vol.III, p.559.
59. Dogu Perincek (ed.), Mustafa Kemal: Eskisehir-lzmit Konusmalan (1923) [Mustafa Kemal:
Speeches in Eskisehir and izmit (1923)] (Istanbul, 1993), p.104.
60. Stephen Evans, The Slow Rapprochement: Britain and Turkey in the Age of Kemal Atatiirk,
1919-38 (Walkington, England, 1982), pp.85-6.
61. Eskisehir-lzmit Konusmalan, pp.94—6.
62. Sadi Borak (ed.), Ataturk'iin Resmi Yayinlara Girmemis Sb'ylev, Demec, Yazisma ve
Soylesileri [Atatiirk's Speeches, Declarations, Correspondence and Interviews Which Have
Not Been Included in Official Publications] (Istanbul, 1997), p.225.
63. Mahmut Gologlu, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti 1923 [The Republic of Turkey: 1923J, p.94.
64. Eskisehir-lzmit Konusmalan, p. 13.
65. ASD, I, 337, 338.
66. Sabiha Sertel, Roman Gibi [Like a Novel] (Istanbul, 1969), pp.68-78.
67. Sabiha Sertel calls this article 4 of the draft. In fact it was article 4 of the 1921 constitution
(see Aybay, op. cit., p.99).
68. Aybay, op. cit., p.99.
69. Gologlu, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, p.320.
70. She probably means Fevzi (Pirincci), deputy for Diyarbekir (Gologlu, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti,
p.320).
71. Sabiha Sertel, p.76.
72. Gologlu, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, p.324.
73. Gologlu, Uctincu Mesrutiyet [The Third Constitutional Period)], gives the tribal affiliations
of three deputies from Dersim (p.328), one from Erzincan (p.329) and one from Van (p.343).
74. Suna Kili, Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961, Robert College
Research Center (Istanbul, 1971), p.60.
75. Feridun Kandemir, Izmir Suikastinin icyu'zii [The Inside Story of the Izmir Assassination
Attempt], Ekicigil Matbaasi (Istanbul, 1955), Vol.1, p. 107.
76. Gologlu, Devrimler ve Tepkileri [Reforms and Reactions To Them] (Ankara, 1972), p.38.
77. Aybay, p.200.
78. Gologlu, Devrimler ve Tepkileri, p.49.
79. Gologlu, Devrimler ve Tepkileri, pp.37-8.
80. Mete Tuncay, T.C.'de Tek-Parti Yonetimi'nin Kumlmasi [The Establishment of the Single-
Party Regime in the Turkish Republic] (Istanbul, 1981), p.108.
81. Ismail Goldas, Takrir-i Siikun Gb'riismeleri [The Debates on the Maintenance of Order Law]
(Istanbul, 1997), pp.470, 491.
82. ASD, IV, pp.562-3.
83. Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, p. 1034.
84. Rauf Orbay (ed. by Ismet Bozdag), Cehennem Degirmeni: Siyasi Hatiralarim [The Mill of
Hell: My Political Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1993), Vol.11, p. 190.
85. Sami Ozerdim, Atatiirk Devrimi Kronolojisi [Chronology of Atatiirk's Reforms] (Ankara,
1996), p.93.
86. Nuran Tezcan (ed.), Ataturk'iin Yazdigi Yurttashk Bilgileri [Civics (Manual) Written by
Atatiirk] (Istanbul, 1994), p.23.
87. Turk Tarihinin Ana Hatlan [An Outline of Turkish History], reprinted in 1996 with an
introduction by Dogu Perin9ek (Istanbul), p.289.
88. Law No.2510, published in Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette] on 21 June 1934.
89. ASD, Vol.11, p.328.
90. ihsan Sabri f aglayangil, Atulanm [My Reminiscences] (Istanbul, 1990), pp.46-55.
91. Ozel §ahingiray (ed.), Atatiirk'un Not Defteri [Atatiirk's Logbook] (Ankara, 1955),
pp.672-4.
92. ASD, Vol.IV, pp.678-9.
93. Asim Us, 1930-1950 Hatira Notlan [Notebooks 1930-1950] (Istanbul, 1966), p.234. ismet
inonii says in his memoirs that, on the contrary, he had concentrated on education in Dersim
and that by 1950, when he left the office of president, it had more primary schools than any
other Turkish province. In the end, says inonii, railways solved the problem of Dersim.
Roads were later built to link the area to the rest of the country (ismet inonii, Hatiralar
(Ankara, 1987), Vol.II. p.269.)

Ataturk and The Kurds

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Middle Eastern Studies

Atatürk and the Kurds

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Is Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, the founding father of the Turkish Republic, to

promoted Brigadier-General at the age of 35, and sent to Diyarbekir (now

Altay, the renowned cavalry commander in the Turkish War of

the faith in the merits of education in civilization, while redefining its

Diyarbekir (Bohtan in Kurdish, Jazirat ibn-'Umar in Arabic, El-Cezire in

Ottoman parliament, who was a member of the Kurdish club in Diyarbekir.

Kemal's invitation only if it served their interests. However, delegates had

declaring 'British propaganda for the formation of an independent

tribal leader Haci Musa of Mutki.28 However, neither served on the

Although Mustafa Kemal's party felt threatened by Dersim Kurds as

The proclamation issued by the Sivas congress on 11 September 1919,

seem to imply that Kurdish ethnicity and Kurdish customs would be

the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, Mustafa Kemal sent a circular

will be settled and resolved between brothers when our existence is

people of Turkey is a social entity united in race, religion and culture,

been appointed commander of the southern (El-Cezire) front in June 1920.48

2. The right of nations to determine their destinies by themselves is a

spite of loud protests by some deputies, notably Feyzi Efendi of Malatya.

would make a grievance of it. Now, the Turkish Grand National

government of the Kurds as well.60 But I think it would be wrong to attribute

of the constitutional committee, which met in the stationmaster's house in

government in the 1921 constitution were reduced to two brief articles in

secular Turkey. He needed absolute power to do it. Any kind of provincial

officially the nurturing of cultures national in form but socialist in content,

religiously.83 Mustafa Kemal, Fethi (Okyar) and Kazim Karabekir disagreed

Turkish nationalism. The model was, as ever, France, where Bretons,

Concerning Atatiirk] (Istanbul, 1984), pp.43-51.

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