G.R. No. 230222
G.R. No. 230222
230222
Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
INTING, J.:
Assailed in this ordinary appeal is the Decision1 dated August 4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 37242 affirming with modification the Judgment2 dated September 26, 2014 of Branch 18, Regional Trial Court
(RTC), ██████████ Isabela in Criminal Case No. 5412. In the RTC Judgment, VVV (accused-appellant) was
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. In the assailed CA Decision, accused-appellant's conviction under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC was upheld; however, he was additionally found guilty of Rape through carnal
knowledge under paragraph 1(a) of the same Article.
The Antecedents
In an Information3 dated June 15, 2010, accused-appellant was charged with Rape as defined and penalized under
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 10th day of June, 2010, in the municipality of ██████████, province of Isabela, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd, designs, and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lay with, and have carnal knowledge with his
own daughter [AAA], who is a minor of 15 years old, by then and there inserting his finger in her private parts,
against her will and consent.
With the aggravating circumstances that the [victim] is a minor below 18 years old and that the accused is the father
of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.5 Pre-trial and trial on the merits ensued.
As established by the prosecution, on June 10, 2010, at around 9:00 p.m., AAA was attending the wake of her
grandmother at the latter's house in ██████████ Isabela. AAA was with her father, herein accused-appellant,
and her other siblings. Thereat, accused-appellant suddenly told AAA to get inside the room and give him a
massage. After AAA obliged, accused-appellant told her to lie down. He then started to mash her breast. After a 1âшphi1
while, he put his hands inside her shorts and touched her vagina. He then inserted his forefinger into her vagina and
made a push and pull motion for about three minutes. Thereupon, he pulled her right hand and placed it in his penis
for about five minutes. He told her not to tell anyone about what happened; otherwise, he would maul and kick her.
Afterwards, he took off her shorts and underwear, laid on top of her inserted his penis into her vagina, and made a
push and pull motion. He stopped after about five minutes and told her to sleep. Throughout the molestation, he was
holding a balisong (knife) in his left hand. He then left the room and proceeded to play tong-its.6
AAA also decided to go outside the room as she could riot sleep. At around 4:00 a.m. of June 11, 2010, she decided
to approach her aunt, BBB, who was then sitting near the coffin of her grandmother. She told BBB about the incident
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 1/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
as well as all the other sexual abuses that accused-appellant committed against her since 2008. BBB proceeded
to ██████████ Police Station and reported the incident. Thereafter, BBB, with AAA, went
to ██████████ Hospital for a medico-legal examination.7
Dr. Mary Grace Bartolome-Agcaoili (Dr. Agcaoili) examined AAA and found that her hymen was "crescentric, tanner
stage 4." While finding that AAA's private part had no bleeding, discharges, or lacerations in the hymen, Dr. Agcaoili
did not exclude the possibility of sexual abuse.8
For his part, accused-appellant interposed denial. He testified that in the evening of June 10, 2010, he brought his
children to the house of his in-laws to attend the wake of his mother-in-law. Thereat, he did not see where AAA and
her siblings were as he became busy drinking and playing cards.9
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charge of Rape against him and asserted that it was filed out of hatred.
He stated that he once scolded AAA for having a drinking spree in another barangay and that there were times that
she would not come home and sleep in their house.10
Accused-appellant also testified that he had quarrels with his wife regarding money matters, particularly on the fact
that she would send money to his in-laws for the purchase of medicines, and that he had a disagreement with his in-
laws when he disapproved of their wish to let his wife go to the United States of America (USA) in the hope that she
would also be able to help her brothers to go abroad.11 Moreover, accused-appellant stated that his in-laws did not
speak to him after he refused to let his wife go to the USA.12 He claimed that his in-laws, his wife, and his daughter
conspired for him to be put in jail.13
On September 26, 2014, the RTC rendered its Judgment14 finding accused-appellant guilty of sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. The RTC sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; and to indemnify AAA in the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Upon a reading of the Information, the CA observed that accused-appellant was charged with two offenses: (1) rape
through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1(a), and (2) rape as an act of sexual assault under paragraph 2, both
of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended. The CA found that accused-appellant was charged with having carnal
knowledge of AAA, his 15-year-old daughter, by means of force and intimidation; and, at the same time, he was
charged with committing an act of sexual assault against AAA by inserting his finger into her private part.15 The CA
noted that the Information merely lacked the conjunctive word "and."16 Furthermore, the CA found that the
prosecution was able to prove during trial the guilt of accused-appellant for the two charges of rape.
Thus, on August 4, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision17 affirming with modification the RTC
Judgment, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Judgment dated September 26,
2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilagan City, Isabela.
For rape through carnal knowledge/sexual assault under Art. 266-A paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole, and to pay AAA the amount of P100,000 as civil indemnity, P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000 as
exemplary damages.
For rape through sexual assault under Art. 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay AAA the amount of P30,000 as civil
indemnity, P30,000 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages.
Accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this decision until full payment.
SO ORDERED.18
Hence, the present appeal. Per the Court's Resolution19 dated August 7, 2017, both parties manifested that they
would no longer file a supplemental brief before the Court.
In his appellate brief before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 2/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT, DESPITE THE UNRELIABILITY
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES.
II
At the outset, the Court notes that the CA convicted accused-appellant for two counts of Rape, while only one
Information was filed against him. Duplicity of offenses charged contravenes Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) which states that "[a] complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses."
From a reading of the Information21 dated June 15, 2010, the Court agrees with the CA that accused-appellant was
charged with two offenses—the act of having carnal knowledge of AAA constitutes one offense, while the act of
inserting his finger into AAA's private part constitutes another. Section 3(f),22 Rule 117 of the Rules allows the
accused to move for the quashal of the information based on the ground of duplicity of the offenses charged.
However, under Section 9,23 Rule 117 of the Rules, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived any objection
based on this ground due to his failure to assert it before he pleaded to the Information. Thus, the CA was correct in
holding that accused-appellant can be convicted for the two offenses.
Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,24 known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
provides:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
The Court upholds the CA's finding that accused-appellant is guilty of the two offenses charged in the Information.
Thus, accused-appellant's conviction for Rape through carnal knowledge under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A [in
relation to Article 266-B]25 of the RPC is affirmed. With respect to the finding of Rape through sexual assault under
paragraph 2 of Article 266-A, however, there is a need to modify the nomenclature of the crime, its corresponding
penalty, and the award of damages. This is in light of the fact that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the
incident.
In the landmark case of People v. Tulagan (Tulagan),26 the Court pronounced that if the victim is 12 years old or
above but under 18 years old, or at least 18 years old under special circumstances, "the nomenclature of the crime
should be 'Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of RA 7610' with the iniposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua, but it should not make any reference to the RPC." The crime shall be called
"Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor only when
the victim of the sexual assault is 18 years old or above and not demented.27
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610,28 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," provides:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. — Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or
any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 3/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the [victim] is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period[.]
The following account, reveals that accused-appellant is guilty both of Rape through carnal knowledge under
paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC and of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610:
Q Miss Witness, during the last time, you said that your father told you to enter the room because he wanted you to
massage him, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then, when you entered, you saw him sitting down and then he stood up and made you lie on the bed, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said that he started mashing your breast and afterwhich, he placed his hand under your short pants
and took hold of your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q And after he placed his hand under your shorts and took hold of your vagina, what did he do next?
Q And when his finger was inserted into your vagina, what did he do next?
COURT:
Q Which hand?
Q May I interrupt, regarding the insertion...so he made his right hand in that act of inserting then which part of the
hand? which finger did he use?
A Forefinger, sir.
PROS. ERESE:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 4/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
A Five (5) minutes, sir.
Q By the way, Miss Witness, when he made you hold his penis, did he say anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q Anything more?
xxx
Q Did he tell you anything about what to do with his penis when you were holding it?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did he say? Can you still remember what he made you do with his penis?
A None, sir.
Q After holding his penis for about five minutes, what happened next?
xxx
Q When he inserted his penis inside your vagina, were you still wearing your shorts?
A No more, sir.
A My father, sir.
Q And when he inserted his penis inside your vagina, what were your relative positions?
Accused-appellant's act of inserting his penis into AAA's vagina through force and intimidation constitutes Rape
through carnal knowledge under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A of the RPC. Moreover, accused-appellant's acts of
intentionally holding AAA's vagina and inserting into it his right forefinger plainly constitute sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct as defined in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7610, known as the "Rules and
Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases," which pertinently provide:
Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in these Rules, unless the context requires otherwise —
xxxx
(g) "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child
to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children;
(h) "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia,
anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth,
of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person[.] (Italics supplied.)
In Quimvel v. People,30 the Court ruled that "force and intimidation" is subsumed under "coercion and influence" and
these terms are used almost synonymously, viz.:
The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation" as used
in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress" while "
[undue] influence" is defined as "persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will." On the other hand, "force"
refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end" while jurisprudence defines "intimidation" as
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 5/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
"unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear." As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously.
It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different.31
As can be gleaned from the testimony of AAA, accused-appellant, her own father, employed force, intimidation,
coercion, and influence upon her. He threatened to maul and kick her if she would make a report about what
happened.32 Also, he was holding a balisong (knife) in his left hand throughout the molestation.33
In Tulagan,34 the Court explained that the phrase "children exploited in prostitution," on the one hand, contemplates
four scenarios: (a) a child, whether male or female who, for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in
lascivious conduct; (b) a female child who, for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual
intercourse; (c) a child, whether male or female, who, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (d) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulges in sexual intercourse.
The phrase "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under
Section 3, Article I of RA 7610 and of "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the
Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. Child abuse" as defined in the former provision refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters; on the other
hand, "sexual abuse" as defined in the latter provision includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.35
Based on the facts of the case, it is undeniable that AAA was subjected to sexual abuse under the above definitions.
She is a child who, due to the coercion or influence of accused-appellant, was subjected to the latter's lascivious
conduct. It also bears stressing that accused-appellant is the father of AAA; as such, he has moral ascendancy over
AAA, his minor daughter. Where rape is committed by a relative, such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law
spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of "force and intimidation" as an essential element of rape.36
As previously mentioned, it is undisputed that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident. This fact was
alleged in the Information and shown in the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA.37 Under Section 3(a) of RA 7610, the
term "children" refers to persons below 18 years of age or those over, but unable to fully take care of themselves or
protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
Given that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident, instead of Rape through sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, accused-appellant should thus be held liable for Lascivious Conduct under
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. This is in addition to accused-appellant's conviction for Rape through carnal
knowledge under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC, which1 was correctly ruled
by the CA.
The Court rejects accused-appellant's contention that the charge of Rape against him was filed out of hatred.
"AAA's credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by [an] imputation of ill motives. It is highly unthinkable for the
victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or grudge."38 Furthermore, motives such as family
feuds, resentment, hatred, or revenge have never convinced the Court from giving full credence to the testimony of
a minor rape victim.39
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts
and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice
for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to
show that rape was indeed committed.41
The Court is also not swayed by accused-appellant's insistence that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
are unreliable.
Accused-appellant contends that it is "highly incredible and contrary to ordinary conduct and human experience"
that AAA kept silent for so many years if indeed he had been sexually assaulting her since 2008. He avers that his
wife came home for a vacation in 2008 and yet AAA did not tell her about any of his alleged sexual acts.42 He also
points out AAA's testimony that her siblings knew what was happening and yet no one dared to inform their mother
or other relatives about it.43
Furthermore, accused-appellant asserts that the place of the incident would be so unlikely for a sexual molestation
to happen.44 He specifically refers to AAA's description of the place and circumstances of the incident, which was
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 6/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
inside the only room of the house of her grandmother, with no light and no door and with only a curtain made of thin
material to cover it, while the wake of her grandmother was being held at the living room.45
Between the assertions of accused-appellant and the testimony of AAA, the latter deserves credence. Jurisprudence
has emphasized that "the trial court's evaluation and conclusion on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are
generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even finality, especially after the CA, as the intermediate
reviewing tribunal, has affirmed the findings."46 This applies in the absence of "a clear showing that the findings were
reached arbitrarily, or that certain facts or circumstances of weight, substance or value were overlooked,
misapprehended or misappreciated that, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case."47
Further, the Court finds no reason to rule that the delay on the part of AAA to report the alleged prior incidents of
sexual molestation puts a dent on the credibility of her testimony. The Court agrees with the CA that it is not
uncommon for young girls to conceal for some time the assault against their virtue; and it is not expected of a young
girl like AAA, as opposed to a mature woman, to have the courage and intelligence to immediately report a sexual
assault committed against her.
It is worthy to note that both the RTC and the CA found the testimony of AAA credible and persuasive. According to
1âшphi1
the CA, AAA's spontaneous, direct, and sincere manner of presenting her testimony on how she was raped by her
father bears the earmarks of credibility.48 The CA also noted the RTC's observation of AAA's demeanor at the
witness stand which was natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.49 As observed by the RTC, AAA was candid and truthful. Further, when asked to identify her father in court,
AAA approached accused-appellant "frontally and gave him a resounding slap on the face and cried out
unabashedly."50
"The credibility of the witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such
question, having heard them and observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling
examination."51 Considering that there is no evidence that the RTC's assessment on the credibility of the AAA's
testimony was tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of a fact, it is entitled to great weight, if not conclusive or
binding on the Court.52
Accused-appellant also questions AAA's medical certificate, which showed that she did not suffer any hymenal injury
despite the fact that she was examined a few hours after the alleged sexual molestation.53 He asserts that the lack
of physical manifestation of Rape by sexual assault weakens the case against him.54
The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not militate against
the claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth, honesty, and candor. It must be
stressed that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on the victim depends on the degree of force
employed by the accused to consummate the purpose which he had in mind to have carnal knowledge with the
offended woman. Thus, the force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such a character as could not be
resisted. It is only that the force used by the accused is sufficient to enable him to consummate his
purpose.56 (Italics in the original.)
In sum, the Court holds accused-appellant guilty of both Rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to
Article 266-B, of the RPC and Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
As regards the penalty and damages, the Court finds that the CA's imposition with respect to the crime of Rape
under paragraph 1(a), Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC conforms to recent
jurisprudence.57 Considering the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, the proper penalty would
have been death if not for the prohibition under RA 9346.58 As such, the CA correctly imposed reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of death. It also correctly ordered accused-appellant to pay AAA civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, each in the amount of P100,000.00, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
With respect to the offense of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, considering that AAA
was more than 12 years old but less than 18 years old at the time of the incident, the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal, in its medium period, to reclusion perpetua. Since the perpetrator of the offense is her own father, and this
was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, such relationship should be considered as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of increasing the period of the imposable penalty. There being no mitigating
circumstance to offset the alternative aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided shall be imposed in its
maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetual.59 This is also in conformity with Section 31(c),60 Article XII of RA 7610
which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the peipetrator is, among
others, the parent of the victim. Moreover, pursuant to People v. Jugueta61 and Tulagan,62 accused-appellant should
be ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, each in the amount of P75,000.00,
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 7/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. Furthermore, pursuant
to Section 31(f),63 Article XII of RA 7610, accused-appellant shall pay a fine in the amount of P15,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated August 4, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 37242 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant VVV is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of:
(1) Rape under paragraph 1(a) of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole,
and to pay the victim, AAA, the amounts of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages,
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(2)Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P15,000.00. He is further ordered to pay the
victim, AAA, the amounts of P75,000 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
All monetary awards so imposed are subject to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Hernando, and Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity, as well as those of her
immediate family or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, "An Act
Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation and For Other Purposes;" RA 9262, "An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and For Other Purposes;" Section 40 of Administrative Matter No. 04-10-11-SC, known as
the "Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children," effective November 15, 2004; People v.
Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006); and Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5,
2017, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation, Publication, and Posting on the Websites of
Decisions, Final Resolutions, and Final Orders Using Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
** Designated as additional member as per Special Order No. 2780 dated May 11, 2020; on leave.
1
Rollo, pp. 2-15; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang (now a member of the Court) with
Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez (now a member of the Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.
2
CA rollo, pp. 37-52; penned by Presiding Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon.
3
Records, pp. 1-2.
4
Id. at 1.
5
See Order dated July 5, 2010, id. at 15.
6
Rollo, p. 4.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 5.
9
TSN, August 27, 2013, pp. 6-8.
10
Id.
11
TSN, December 16, 2013, pp. 15-18.
12
Id. at 18.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 8/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
13
Id. at 19.
14
CA rollo, pp. 37-52.
15
Rollo, p. 7
16
Id.
17
Id. at 2-15.
18
Id. at 14-15.
19
Id. at 33-34.
20
CA rollo, p. 22.
21
Records, pp. 1-2.
22
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on tiny of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for various offenses
is prescribed by law.
xxxx
23
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of the accused
to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information,
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall
be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
24
Entitled "An Act Expanding the Definition of the Crime of Rape, Reclassifying the Same as a Crime Against
Persons, Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Penal
Code, and For Other Purposes," approved on September 30, 1997.
25
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:
Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
Following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
26
G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019.
27
Id.
28
Entitled "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination, Providing Penalties for its Violation and For Other Purposes," approved on June 17, 1992.
29
TSN, August 13, 2012, pp. 3-7.
30
808 Phil. 889 (2017).
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 9/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
31
Id. at 919. Citations omitted
32
TSN, August 13, 2012, p. 6.
33
TSN, January 7, 2013, p. 9.
34
Supra note 27.
35
Id.
36
Ramilo v. People, G.R. No. 234841, June 3, 2019.
37
Records p. 10.
38
People v. Zafra, 712 Phil. 559, 575 (2013), citing Peoplev. Acala, 366 Phil. 797, 814 (1999).
39
Dizon v. People, 616 Phil. 498, 515 (2009), citing People v. Audine, 539 Phil. 583, 605 (2006).
40
358 Phil. 664 (1998). Citations omitted.
41
Id. at 674.
42
CA rollo, p. 29, citing TSN, September 17, 2012, p. 6.
43
Id. at 29-30, citing TSN, August 13, 2012, p. 26.
44
Id. at 30.
45
Id. citing TSN, January 7, 2013, p. 4.
46
People v. Ganaba, G.R. No. 219240, April 4, 2018, 860 SCRA 513, 524, citing People v. Domingo, 810 Phil.
1040, 1046-1047 (2017).
47
Id.
48
Rollo, p. 8.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
People v. Manson, 801 Phil. 130, 140 (2016).
52
Id.
53
Rollo, p. 31.
54
Id. at 33.
55
G.R. Nos. 225642-43, January 17, 2018, 852 SCRA 54.
56
Id. at 66.
57
See People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).
58
Entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," approved on June 24, 2006.
59
Ramilo v. People, supra note 38.
60
Section 31 (c) of RA 7610 provides:
xxxx
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is
an ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 10/11
2/27/24, 7:59 PM G.R. No. 230222
consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to
operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;
61
Supra note 58.
62
Supra note 27.
63
Section 31 (f) of RA 7610 provides:
xxxx
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child
victim, or any immediate member of his family if tlte latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2020/jun2020/gr_230222_2020.html 11/11