REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
[G.R. NO. 167746: August 28, 2007]
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, Petitioner, v. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying
petitioner's appeal and affirming the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch
143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of
marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage3 was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara
alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license,
went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for
them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro,
a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel.4 They got married on the same day, 8 December
1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose de
Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without
the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite,
appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they
never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways
and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their
marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract 5 and its
entry on file.6
Answering petitioner's petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their
marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from
the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioner's representation, respondent
gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter
named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.7 Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three
children.8 Petitioner only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage.9 Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. 10 Respondent prays that the petition for
annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month
as support for their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; andcralawlibrary
3. To pay the costs.11
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioner's appeal. His
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
2005.12
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued
and petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties'
marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under
Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.13

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for
Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage
license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage
License No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during
the trial, and was not the Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid
down by this Honorable Court in the case of Sy v. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000
[330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance
of procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.14
We deny the petition.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated,
there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt
with a "fixer" who arranged everything for them. 15 The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City
Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage
belongs.16 He and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license.
Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that "Marriage License number
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario" 17 but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of its celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of
which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)18 in relation to Article 58 of the
same Code.19
Article 53 of the Civil Code20 which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties
states:
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; andcralawlibrary
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement
and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.21
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage.
The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering
the marriage void are clear-cut.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,22 the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of
due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of "due search and inability to find" a record
or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative
value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage
license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cariño v. Cariño,23 the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and
the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. The court
held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license
and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of
the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,24 the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year
after the ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion
is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that
no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the
petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. 25 The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto
Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No.
7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8,
1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve. 26
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the
issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.27 The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of
doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.28 Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license
was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.29
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no
sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent's marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a
city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage
license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. 30 An
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.31

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the
same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the
overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or
7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, 32 petitioner cannot
pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took
place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he "initiated it."33 Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by
profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable
to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a
mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.34

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year
utilizing the same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding
ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary
a whimper on the part of the petitioner.ςηαñrοblεš �νιr†υαl �lαω �lιbrαrÿ
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de
Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the
Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioner's testimony as follows'
WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
COURT
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de
Manuguit church.
WITNESS
I don't remember your honor.
COURT
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?cralaw library
WITNESS
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I don't know
if it is good enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.
COURT
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already
a Marriage Contract?cralaw library
WITNESS
Yes your honor.
COURT
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage
Contract issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033.
WITNESS
Yes your honor.35
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place
at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby
cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. 36
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner - - that they appeared before a "fixer" who arranged everything
for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel - - will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or
clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any
showing to the contrary.37 Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether
or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the
solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it
may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.38

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage.39 Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight.

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is Denied for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO,, Petitioner, v. CONSUELO
TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA)[1 in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying reconsideration.
The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal
Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado
of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, [the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of
three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum,
plus accessory penalties provided by law.
Costs against accused.[2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as follows: From the
evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent Mercado and
complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the
parties. As entered in said document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either
that at the time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on
April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued
in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October
10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil
marriage between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991
officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while
a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant through counsel with the
City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of the present case
before this Court against said accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information
dated January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors
Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in
RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code for having contracted
a second marriage with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time
he was previously united in lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present, namely: (a) that the offender has been
previously legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage
ha[d] all the essential requisites for validity. x x x

While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited the defense that his
previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and void and that the private complainant had
knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on
June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action
having yet been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage
with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made
at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a married man when he contracted
such second marriage with complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to
his first wife.[3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
But here, the final judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before the
celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy against accused was already
tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract
a second subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.[4

Hence, this Petition.5

The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
A
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable doubt.[6
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were present. It is
undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu City. While that
marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma.
Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike voidable marriages
which are considered valid until set aside by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all.[8 Thus, he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak
of. Petitioner also quotes the commentaries[9 of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that
if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came only after the Information
had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been consummated. She argues that a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a
subsequent time.

We agree with the respondent.

To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage has been characterized as conflicting.[10 In People v. Mendoza,[11 a bigamy case involving
an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration. In
that case, the accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first. When the
first wife died, he married for the third time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy.
Acquitting him, the Court held that the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been
contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void
and illegal, the Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the
accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the
Court in People v. Aragon,[12 which involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de
Consuegra v. GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the first marriage was still
subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to
the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest
nullity of the second marriage. It held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observes that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,[14 however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death Certificate, his second
wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said entry
in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the first wife, holding that the second marriage
that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from
the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage.

In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15 the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz
Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia Olivia Wiegel on the ground
that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be allowed to present
evidence to prove, among others, that her first husband had previously been married to another
woman. In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise
no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time
they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.

Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16 the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza, holding that
there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was still necessary
for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the
Court declared: The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and
void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was not a criminal
prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the Family Code, which came into effect
several years after the promulgation of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which
provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted being valid in either case until declared null and
void by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance,
and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages.[19

The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and
Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new provision, expressly
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage, as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such marriage void was
necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law
authority and member of the Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that the marriage of a person
may be null and void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact before that person can
marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143
SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where
a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its
validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033). [20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by Article 40 of the Family
Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that
declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,[21 which involved an
administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the lawyers argument that
he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court ruled:
for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted
that the said rule was cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it
observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was void, was bigamous and criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited by petitioner,
changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in 1993 that a
person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a
subsequent marriage:[22
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage before contracting the second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The
Code Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
marriage before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x.

In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage
declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view
effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition
to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question
in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.

Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals
insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees.[23
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain
affirmative relief from this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse or set aside the pertinent
ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the
innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the previous marriage
when she contracted matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove
this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxx
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous marriage does not inspire
belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him. We are convinced
that she took the plunge anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was fully conscious of the
consequences of her act. She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in the event the
truth [would] come out, as it did in this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there
are indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.[25

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124099. October 30, 1997.]

MANUEL G. REYES, MILA G. REYES, DANILO G. REYES, LYN AGAPE, MARITES AGAPE,
ESTEBANA GALOLO, and CELSA AGAPE, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIO
VIVARES, Respondents.

Quimpo Willkom Borja Neri Galejesan Oclarit Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Algarra Mutia and Trinidad Law Offices for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PROBATE COURT; PROCEEDINGS LIMITED TO EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILL;

EXCEPTIONS. — As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely inquires on its due
execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary
capacity of the testator. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy
of the will’s provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually
comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances
wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its
face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical considerations" demanded it as
when there is preterition of heirs or the testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Where the
parties agree that the intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so.
Parenthetically, the rule on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances,
the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the
probate of the will of the late Torcuato Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said
proceeding were: (1) whether or not the testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of
consent attended the execution of the will; and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been
complied with. Thus, the lower court was not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will. As a result, the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oming" Reyes
was his wife did not have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the
institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will’s
intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the probate court.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN NEPOMUCENO v. COURT OF APPEALS (139 SCRA 206) NOT
APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno v.
Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206) in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself,
acknowledged his illicit relationship with the devisee. Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing of the properties to a person with whom he
had been living in concubinage. To remand the case would only be a waste of time and money since
the illegality or defect was already patent. This case is different from the Nepomuceno case. Testator
Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was bequeathing some of his personal and real
properties to his wife, Asuncion "Oning" Reyes. There was never an open admission of any illicit
relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno, the testator admitted that he was already previously married
and that he had an adulterous relationship with the devisee.

4. ID.; EVIDENCE; UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, HEARSAY. — We agree with the

Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence that Asuncion
Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The testimonies
of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or existence of Lupo
Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asunsion.

5. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; WILL, THE TESTATOR SPEAKING AFTER DEATH. — In the elegant
language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said — "A will is the testator speaking after
death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator
stood before the court in full like making the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the
will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will
and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so . . . All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator’s having
meant just what he said." (Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).

6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FAILURE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ALLEGATION

THAT DEVISEE/LEGATEE HAD AN EXISTING MARRIAGE WITH ANOTHER, CONSTITUTES WAIVER.
— Petitioner tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy of
the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to present the said certificate
before that pro- bate court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage
with Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much
less in this petition for review.

7. ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON
APPEAL. — This Court would not try the case anew or settle factual issues since its jurisdiction is
confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the lower courts. The settled
rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary
to the evidence on the record, which petitioners have not shown in this case. Considering the foregoing
premises, we sustain the findings of the appellate court it appearing that it did not commit a reversible
error in issuing the challenged decision.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
DECISION

TORRES, JR., J.:

Unless legally flawed, a testator’s intention in his last will and testament is its "life and soul" which
deserves reverential observance.

The controversy before us deals with such a case.

Petitioners Manuel G. Reyes, Mila G. Reyes, Danilo G. Reyes, Lyn Agape, Marites Agape, Estebana
Galolo and Celsa Agape, the oppositors in Special Proceedings No. 112 for the probate of the will of
Torcuato J. Reyes, assail in this petition for review the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated
November 29, 1995, the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment appealed from allowing or admitting the will of
Torcuato J. Reyes to probate and directing the issuance of Letters Testamentary in favor of petitioner
Julio A. Vivares as executor without bond is AFFIRMED but modified in that the declaration that
paragraph II of the Torcuato Reyes’ last will and testament, including subparagraphs (a) and (b) are
null and void for being contrary to law is hereby SET ASIDE, said paragraph II and subparagraphs
(a) and (b) are declared VALID. Except as above modified, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." 2

The antecedent facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On January 3, 1992, Torcuato J. Reyes executed his last will and testament declaring therein in part,
to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x

II. I give and bequeath to my wife Asuncion "Oning" R. Reyes the following properties to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a. All my shares of our personal properties consisting among others of jewelries, coins, antiques,
statues, tablewares, furnitures, fixtures and the building;

b. All my shares consisting of one half (1/2) or 50% of all the real estates I own in common with my
brother Jose, situated in Municipalities of Mambajao, Mahinog, Guinsiliban, Sagay all in Camiguin;
real estates in Lunao, Gingoog, Caamulan, Sugbongcogon, Boloc-Boloc, Kinoguitan, Balingoan, Sta.
Ines, Caesta, Talisayan, all in the province of Misamis Oriental. 3"

The will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence of three witnesses:
Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan. Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was
designated the executor and in his default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares.

Reyes died on May 12, 1992 and on May 21, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probate of
the will before the Regional Trial Court of Mambajao, Camiguin. The petition was set for hearing and
the order was published in the Mindanao Daily Post, a newspaper of general circulation, once a week
for three consecutive weeks. Notices were likewise sent to all the persons named in the petition.

On July 21, 1992, the recognized natural children of Torcuato Reyes with Estebana Galolo, namely
Manuel, Mila, and Danilo all surnamed Reyes, and the deceased’s natural children with Celsa Agape,
namely Lyn and Marites Agape, filed an opposition with the following allegations: a) that the last will
and testament of Reyes was not executed and attested in accordance with the formalities of law; and
b) that Asuncion Reyes Ebarle exerted undue and improper influence upon the testator at the time of
the execution of the will. The opposition further averred that Reyes was never married to and could
never marry Asuncion Reyes, the woman he claimed to be his wife in the will, because the latter was
already married to Lupo Ebarle who was still then alive and their marriage was never annulled. Thus,
Asuncion can not be a compulsory heir for her open cohabitation with Reyes was violative of public
morals.

On July 22, 1992, the trial court issued an order declaring that it had acquired jurisdiction over the
petition and, therefore, allowed the presentation of evidence. After the presentation of evidence and
submission of the respective memoranda, the trial court issued its decision on April 23, 1993.

The trial court declared that the will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law. It, however, ruled that Asuncion Reyes, based on the testimonies of the witnesses, was never
married to the deceased Reyes and, therefore, their relationship was an adulterous one.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The admission in the will by the testator to the illicit relationship between him and ASUNCION
REYES EBARLE who is somebody else’s wife, is further bolstered, strengthened, and confirmed by
the direct testimonies of the petitioner himself and his two "attesting" witnesses during the trial.
In both cases, the common denominator is the immoral, meretrecious, adulterous and illicit
relationship existing between the testator and the devisee prior to the death of the testator, which
constituted the sole and primary consideration for the devise or legacy, thus making the will
intrinsically invalid." 4

The will of Reyes was admitted to probate except for paragraph II (a) and (b) of the will which was
declared null and void for being contrary to law and morals. Hence, Julio Vivares filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals with the allegation that the oppositors failed to present any competent
evidence that Asuncion Reyes was legally married to another person during the period of her
cohabitation with Torcuato Reyes.

On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision which affirmed the
trial court’s decision admitting the will for probate but with the modification that paragraph II
including subparagraphs (a) and (b) were declared valid. The appellate court
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary or otherwise
during the trial to show that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes’ marriage to the testator was inexistent or void,
either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred in
striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being
contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his
wife." 5

Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the oppositors filed this petition for review.

Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was contrary to law,
public policy and evidence on record. Torcuato Reyes and Asuncion "Oning" Reyes were collateral
relatives up to the fourth civil degree. Witness Gloria Borromeo testified that Oning Reyes was her
cousin as her mother and the latter’s father were sister and brother. They were also nieces of the late
Torcuato Reyes. Thus, the purported marriage of the deceased Reyes and Oning Reyes was void ab
initio as it was against public policy pursuant to Article 38 (1) of the Family Code. Petitioners further
alleged that Oning Reyes was already married to Lupo Ebarle at the time she was cohabiting with the
testator hence, she could never contract any valid marriage with the latter. Petitioners argued that
the testimonies of the witnesses as well as the personal declaration of the testator, himself, were
sufficient to destroy the presumption of marriage. To further support their contention, petitioners
attached a copy of the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle.
6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petition is devoid of merit.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of
the will sought to be probated. 7 Thus, the court merely inquires on its due execution, whether or not
it complies with the formalities prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It
does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will’s provisions. 8
The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration thereof usually comes only after the
will has been proved and allowed. There are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic
validity was first determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate of
the will may become a useless 9 ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The intrinsic validity of a will
may be passed upon because "practical considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of
heirs or the testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. 10 Where the parties agree that the
intrinsic validity be first determined, the probate court may also do so. 11 Parenthetically, the rule
on probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 12

The case at bar arose from the institution of the petition for the probate of the will of the late Torcuato
Reyes. Perforce, the only issues to be settled in the said proceeding were: (1) whether or not the
testator had animus testandi; (2) whether or not vices of consent attended the execution of the will;
and (3) whether or not the formalities of the will had been complied with. Thus, the lower court was
not asked to rule upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the
declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not have to be scrutinized
during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the institution of Oning Reyes as one of the
devisees/legatees already involved inquiry on the will’s intrinsic validity and which need not be
inquired upon by the probate court.

The lower court erroneously invoked the ruling in Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals (139 SCRA 206)
in the instant case. In the case aforesaid, the testator himself, acknowledged his illicit relationship
with the devisee, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. IV. That since 1952, I have been living, as man and wife, with one Sofia J. Nepomuceno, whom
I declare and avow to be entitled to my love and affection, for all the things which she has done for
me, now and in the past; that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent,
did comfort and represent myself as her own husband, in truth and in fact, as well as in the eyes of
the law, I could not bind her to me in the holy bonds of matrimony because of my aforementioned
previous marriage."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, the very tenor of the will invalidates the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing
of the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. 13 To remand the case
would only be a waste of time and money since the illegality or defect was already patent. This case
is different from the Nepomuceno case. Testator Torcuato Reyes merely stated in his will that he was
bequeathing some of his personal and real properties to his wife, Asuncion "Oning" Reyes. There was
never an open admission of any illicit relationship. In the case of Nepomuceno, the testator admitted
that he was already previously married and that he had an adulterous relationship with the devisee.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court relied on uncorroborated testimonial evidence
that Asuncion Reyes was still married to another during the time she cohabited with the testator. The
testimonies of the witnesses were merely hearsay and even uncertain as to the whereabouts or
existence of Lupo Ebarle, the supposed husband of Asuncion. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The foregoing testimony cannot go against the declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning"
Reyes is his wife. In Alvarado v. City Government of Tacloban (supra) the Supreme Court stated that
the declaration of the husband is competent evidence to show the fact of marriage.

Considering that the oppositors never showed any competent evidence, documentary or otherwise
during the trial to show that Asuncion "Oning� Reyes’ marriage to the testator was inexistent or
void, either because of a pre-existing marriage or adulterous relationship, the trial court gravely erred
in striking down paragraph II (a) and (b) of the subject Last Will and Testament, as void for being
contrary to law and morals. Said declarations are not sufficient to destroy the presumption of
marriage. Nor is it enough to overcome the very declaration of the testator that Asuncion Reyes is his
wife." 14

In the elegant language of Justice Moreland written decades ago, he said —

"A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and effect
in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the declarations by
word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the creation of
the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after they were dead and
the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so All doubts must be resolved
in favor of the testator’s having meant just what he said." (Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil. 209).

Petitioners tried to refute this conclusion of the Court of Appeals by presenting belatedly a copy of
the marriage certificate of Asuncion Reyes and Lupo Ebarle. Their failure to present the said certificate
before the probate court to support their position that Asuncion Reyes had an existing marriage with
Ebarle constituted a waiver and the same evidence can no longer be entertained on appeal, much less
in this petition for review. This Court would not try the case anew or settle factual issues since its
jurisdiction is confined to resolving questions of law which have been passed upon by the lower
courts. The settled rule is that the factual findings of the appellate court will not be disturbed unless
shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record, which petitioners have not shown in this case.
15

Considering the foregoing premises, we sustain the findings of the appellate court it appearing that it
did not commit a reversible error in issuing the challenged decision.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ACCORDINGLY, decision appealed from dated November 29, 1995, is hereby AFFIRMED and the
instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.]

CHI MING TSOI, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, Respondents.
Arturo S. Santos for Petitioner.
Prisciliano I. Casis for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; ASSAILED DECISION ON

ANNULMENT NOT BASED THEREON WHERE JUDGMENT WAS RENDERED AFTER TRIAL; CASE
AT BAR. � Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What
said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not
based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the
trial court and was cross- examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented. it became incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their
marriage on May 22 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them. To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner,
the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court
prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19). The case has reached this Court because
petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion
between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never
had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth.

2. ID.; ID.; EITHER SPOUSE MAY PETITION COURT FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE. � Neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between
petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains,
however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question
of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

3. ID.; EVIDENCE; SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL OF ONE OF THE PARTIES TO

FULFILL MARITAL OBLIGATION, EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. � Assuming it
to be so, petitioner would have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and
why she balks and avoids him every time he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never
did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the
problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor’s Medical Report that
there is no evidence of his impotency, and he is capable of erection. Since it is petitioner’ s claim that
the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it
became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim. "If a spouse, although physically capable but
simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to
stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus,
the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity." Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through
sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.

DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court’s decision on November 29,
1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14,
1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals 1 in its decision are as follows:

"From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established:

"Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went
and proceeded to the house defendant’s mother.

"There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.
"It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just
went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and
fourth nights.

"In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their
first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother,
an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey
stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just
sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on
the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband’s private
parts nor did he see hers.

"Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

"The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while
that of her husband’s examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was
prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return
but he never did.

"The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his
penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the
cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino
citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.

"The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile-with her husband.

"On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason
of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

"But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1)
that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can, still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if
there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.
"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March
15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided
him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant
claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she
was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.

"There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against him,
and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother,
and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage.

"The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and
there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

"The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio
Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza
submitted his Doctor’s Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of
impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

"The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an
erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the
penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the
defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable
of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse
with a woman.

"In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and
that the evidence is not fabricated." 2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the
plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate
Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a
copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

"SO ORDERED."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the
parties without making any findings of fact.

II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a
psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with
each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without
fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court’s
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment
of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. � Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent
is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on
the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-
examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it became
incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22,
1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code
provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101 [par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment
without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This
only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his
wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only
telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva
Gonzaga-Reyes, viz.

"The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of
facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic
marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months
of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal
reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality
disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an ‘utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage’ within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code
(See Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R No. 112019, January 4, 1995)." 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity
of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may
not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, �
i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, � why private respondent would
not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private
respondent; that the reason for private respondent’s refusal may not be psychological but physical
disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner would have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him every time he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried
to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor’s Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency, and he is capable of erection. 5
Since it is petitioner’ s claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on
the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity." 6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

"An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband’s plea that the wife did not want
carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he
refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that
he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be
doubted for not having asserted his rights even though she balked (Tompkins v. Tompkins, 111 Atl.
599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering
from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens
his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were
frustrated by her husband’s inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is
hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.

"We are not impressed by defendant’s claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or
lack of intention to perform the sexual act which is not psychological incapacity, and which can be
achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that
the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to
love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is
indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological
incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code." 7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate of court order" (Cuaderno v.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order,
it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and
ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is � a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous
sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An
expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in
deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting
adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing
commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain
the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO
MOLINA, Respondents.
The Solicitor General for Petitioner.
Juanito A. Orallo for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

CONFINED TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDER. — In Leouel Santos v.
Court of Appeals, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A MERE OUTRIGHT REFUSAL OR NEGLECT IN PERFORMANCE OF
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OR INCOMPATIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. — On the other hand, in the present
case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities"
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to
meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence adduced by
respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had
been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility,
not psychological incapacity.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36.
— The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the
nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence
and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

PADILLA, J., Separate Statement:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;

EXISTENCE OF GROUND DEPEND ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE; TRIAL JUDGE MUST TAKE PAINS
IN EXAMINING FACTUAL MILLIEU AND APPELLATE COURT MUST AVOID SUBSTITUTING ITS
JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT. — I concur in the result of the decision penned by
Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case.
The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual millieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; OPPOSING AND CONFLICTING

PERSONALITIES IS NOT EQUIVALENT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY. — The majority opinion,
overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling, upheld
petitioner Solicitor General’s position that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent
to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of
their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them
incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo,
the husband, did not constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons, it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."cralaw
virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INCAPACITY SHOULD NOT BE THE RESULT OF MENTAL ILLNESS. — I would
add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to insanity or
defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect or vice of consent, thus
rendering the marriage annullable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.

VITUG, J., Concurring Opinion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY; OTHER

GROUNDS SHOULD BE READ ALONG WITH IT IN DETERMINING ITS IMPORT. — In determining
the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to
be taken as distinct from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41
that would likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that
would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be
taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, ‘psychological incapacity’ should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TESTS. — In fine, the term psychological incapacity," to be a ground for the nullity
of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz: First,
the incapacity must be psychological or mental not physical, in nature; Second, the psychological
incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand assume and discharge the
basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual
help and support; Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted
although its overt manifestations may occur only thereafter; and Fourth, the mental disorder must
be grave or serious and incurable.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated
in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the
Code’s effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void
based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity
in the recent case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in
applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure
but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in
the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986
the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought
of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple’s best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel’s strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel’s refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridel’s failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie
Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita
Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted
documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared
only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Hence, the
present recourse.

The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase ‘psychological incapacity’ (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which
is anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General’s appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the trial court’s
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights " It concluded that:

"As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives
of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
thus made."

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and
that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences"
and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8
"COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for
the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other, but
they are psychologically fit with other parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions."

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo’s part and of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure
of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love’s
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion
to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral
argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance
of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability, and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our
law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000.]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, Petitioner, v. WILSON G. MARCOS, Respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by
the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July
24, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby
declared valid." 2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.

Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:

"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos,
solemnized on September 6, 1982, in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art.
36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles
126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relatives to the delivery of the
legitime of [the] parties’ children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody
is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent".

"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where
the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of
Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.

"SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacañang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).

"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacañang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee
Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women’s Auxiliary Corps under the Philippine Air
Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service.

"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as
an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through
telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.

"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.

"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe
in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chicken. While she was
still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacañang.
When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she
became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.

"The ‘straw that broke the camel’s back’ took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore.
On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister’s
house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).

"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit
in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.

"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Parañaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.

"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).

"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph. D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand did not.

"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, . . . 3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality
of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse’s psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations
of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-
complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.

"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation.
The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on
the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would
make him or her . . . unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he
[was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in
the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by
an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from
an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental — not physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage
and [was] incurable." 4

Hence, this Petition. 5

Issues
In her Memorandum, 6 petitioner presents for this Court’s consideration the following issues:

"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial
Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.

II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be
the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition." 7

The Court’s Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not
a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence
she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue:

Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent’s psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not
have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those
tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had
no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity
of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.

In Republic v. CA and Molina, 8 the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of
psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code 9 were laid down by this Court
as follows:

"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it ‘as the foundation of the nation.’ It decrees marriage as legally ‘inviolable,’ thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
‘protected’ by the state.

x x x

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ‘the time of the celebration’ of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their ‘I do’s.’ The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against every one of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, ‘mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts’ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

x x x

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case
is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095." 10chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals: 11 "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.

Main Issue:
Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case —
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner’s sister and the social worker
— was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide
material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality
of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are
incurable.

Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.

Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about
to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of
the Family Code.

Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 12 At best, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that
the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines in outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring
personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 155800: March 10, 2006]

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, v. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as
in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the
marital obligations even more.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and
Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm
instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was
36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de
Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was
born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted
that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up
to the present.8

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that

respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about
the boy's parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when
in fact, no such incident occurred.12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company
(Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with
the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village
Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect but petitioner discovered per
certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy
letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker"
in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was
the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when
he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her pay slip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a Sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from
her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he
finally left her for good in November 1991.21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy, and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent's persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or
pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust, and respect.22
They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point
of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair
with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending
to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25

(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent
from David's act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she
had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson
& Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although
she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office
hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel
on 8 December 1979.

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were
not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husband's whereabouts.

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that
the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by
his assistant,33 together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are
signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as
(i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and
(ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can
fake the results of such test.35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's
propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent's
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of
make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving
meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently,
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It declared
that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

Taking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court.
He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity.

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by
the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses
while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided
by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by
petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent.43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45 ), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina
guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme
Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v.
Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically
incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina
and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the
petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper
circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it
raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel
in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.

The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already
married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law
of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration
was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental
capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage
void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the
Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is
not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage."61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family
Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause
for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it
were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66
case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he
evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume."68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability
of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices
of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At
the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a
case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary
understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the
disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize
other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered
opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,
considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of
psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a
solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under
civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the
formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged
that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized
that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even
though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code
and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church
thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this
Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts,
in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State
to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article
36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation
in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected"' by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate,
bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally'subject to our law
on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event,
the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on
his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon
which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2)
expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent
was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner's
evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally
honest with petitioner.80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action
cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State
interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses
in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two
(2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a
couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?cralawlibrary

A - Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You
see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate
are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are
expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen
as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should
be based on love, trust and respect.

Q - Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying
and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

Q - Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him
(sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this,
Mr. witness?cralawlibrary

A - If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another
woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women,
then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q - Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated

to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?cralawlibrary

A - Yes, Ma'am.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held
in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for
the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted
the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented
by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological
incapacity.87

Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious
characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her
natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared
only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that
respondent's psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any
prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order
to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent
to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial
court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of
her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy
and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less
its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting.
One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional
commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at
best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth,
her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates
the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles
45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does
not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent
point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity
under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced
by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on
the part of respondent.90 Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent's psychological
incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation
of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts
that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant,
and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative
component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete
judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was
impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the
Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but
also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial
court, of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent's
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic
Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition
by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged,
as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he
draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses characterized
respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision
on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion
by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98
Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological
incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule
on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its
own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the
time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's decision that required
a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this
case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos
should not apply retroactively

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes
a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert
opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that
respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal
necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily
on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert
medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years
ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing
the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people
in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code,
is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC

G.R. No. 196359. May 11, 2021

ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL, Petitioner, v. MARIO VICTOR M. ANDAL, Respondent.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Given the variability and intensity of intimate human relationships, Article 36 of the Family Code on
psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage was intended to be humane
and evolved on a case-to-case basis, but resilient in its application. However, diametrically opposed
to this intent, this Court's interpretation of the provision beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals1
and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina has proven to be restrictive, rigid, and intrusive on our
rights to liberty, autonomy, and human dignity.

It is time to restate the current doctrine in light of the evolution of science, subsequent cases, and
other contemporary circumstances.

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision4
and Resolution5 The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision6 of the Regional Trial Court
that voided the marriage between Rosanna L. Tan-Andal and Mario Victor M. Andal due to
psychological incapacity. The trial court likewise awarded the sole custody of the parties' daughter,
Ma. Samantha, to Rosanna.

Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) married on December 16, 1995, at the
Saints Peter and Paul Parish in Población, Makati City.7 On July 27, 1996, Rosanna gave birth to
Ma. Samantha, the only child of the parties.8 The family lived in a duplex in Paranaque City, with
Rosanna's parents living in the other half of the duplex.

After four years of marriage, Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000. Rosanna has since kept the sole
custody of Ma. Samantha.

On December 18, 2001, Mario filed a Petition for custody of Ma. Samantha before the Regional Trial
Court. Mario argued that he and his wife had equal rights to the custody of Ma. Samantha, thus
praying that he be allowed to exercise parental authority over his daughter.

On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage, claiming that
Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her.
The Regional Trial Court ordered the prosecutor to report on the parties' possible collusion in filing
the Petition. In a February 18, 2004, Report, Prosecutor Gil V. Savedia declared that he found no
signs of collusion between Mario and Rosanna.

The cases for custody and declaration of nullity were then consolidated in a September 2, 2004,
Order.

According to Rosanna, she first met Mario in 1975 through the Legion of Mary at the Saints Peter
and Paul Parish in Makati.18 They wrote each other letters until 1978, when they lost contact with
each other.

The parties reconnected in 1995 when Mario sought out Rosanna through their childhood friends.
When they finally met again, Mario was in the Philippines for a two-month vacation from his work in
Italy. He then persisted in asking out Rosanna for a date. As Mario was set to leave in June 1995,
Rosanna agreed to have dinner with him.

Mario then courted Rosanna, declaring that he had been in love with her for the past 20 years.
Rosanna eventually fell in love with Mario and agreed to be his girlfriend.
Mario did not leave for Italy in June, giving him more time to spend with Rosanna. On June 17, 1995,
Mario proposed, and Rosanna agreed to marry him in December that year.

While they were together, Rosanna noticed that there were times when Mario "would be unaccounted
for a whole night or an entire day[.]"27 When asked where he went, Mario would allegedly say that he
was working.

Mario also kept postponing his trip back to Italy. When asked why, Mario would either say that he
was with friends or that he was "preparing for [his and Rosanna's] future. "Since Mario was allegedly
affectionate whenever they were together, Rosanna believed him.

According to Rosanna, Mario once told her of a plan to blow up a ship to get back at a Taiwanese
national who had cheated on his friend in a business deal. Rosanna first thought that Mario had been
joking, but when Mario appeared serious about his plan, she said that she did not want to get involved
in any of his "shady deals."

In July 1995, Mario finally left for Italy, promising Rosanna that he would be back by November for
their December wedding. However, Mario was back by September, barely two months after he had
left. It turned out that Mario had quit his job.

After Mario's return, Rosanna noticed that Mario always went out at night and would come back
home at dawn, either alone or with his friends. He also had difficulty in managing his finances, with
his siblings allegedly calling Rosanna and telling her that their brother was financially incapable of
supporting a family. However, Rosanna was already deeply in love with Mario, so she told his sisters
that she accepted Mario for who he was.

Nevertheless, there were times when Mario would allegedly be extremely irritable and moody, causing
Rosanna to have second thoughts about marrying him. However, by November 1995, Rosanna was
already pregnant with their child.39 When Rosanna told Mario about it, he became more eager to
marry her. He even gave Rosanna US$1,000.00, the only money he had, before their wedding.

Instead of spending the US$1,000.00 for their wedding, Rosanna returned the money to Mario and
encouraged him to open a current account for his personal expenses. Mario accepted the money back.
The parties eventually married on December 16, 1995.

Since Mario had no work, Rosanna taught him to run Design and Construction Matrix, the
construction firm she had set up before she married Mario. She also introduced Mario to firm clients
and brought him with her to client meetings.

Mario, however, continued with his "emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, irritability, and
psychological imbalance."He would leave their house for several days without informing Rosanna of
his whereabouts. Once he returned home, he would refuse to go out and would sleep for days. Mario
was also "hyper-active" late at night.

Rosanna confronted Mario about his behavior. To Rosanna's shock, Mario admitted that he was using
marijuana, although he claimed that he was not addicted and that he could stop anytime. He then
promised to stop using it.

Not keeping his promise, Mario continued with his drug use.

The day after Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, Mario allegedly did not assist Rosanna. He left
her in the hospital, knowing that she could not move until the effects of the spinal anesthesia had
worn off. He only returned to the hospital later that evening to sleep.

When Rosanna and Ma. Samantha was discharged from the hospital, Mario showed symptoms of
paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at times, would hide Ma. Samantha from
those he thought were out to hurt them.

Mario would also take large cash advances from Design and Construction Matrix every week. Rosanna
only learned of Mario's numerous cash advances when an accounting personnel informed her that
the firm could no longer pay the construction workers' salaries.
Rosanna eventually got tired of Mario. She left him, brought Ma. Samantha with her and stayed in
an inn. She called up Mario to tell him of her and Ma. Samantha's whereabouts. Mario followed them
to the inn and pleaded Rosanna to give him another chance. After Mario's pleas, Rosanna returned
home with Ma. Samantha.

Later, an employee at the firm handed Rosanna a packet of shabu that the employee allegedly found
among Mario's office belongings. When she checked, Rosanna herself found packets of shabu among
Mario's possessions.

When Rosanna again confronted Mario about his drug use, he explained that it was the only way he
could normally function due to the heavy pressures of work at the firm. In October 1998, Ma.
Samantha had dengue fever and had to be confined at the hospital. Mario was not home and could
not be reached. He arrived at the hospital only later that evening. He would then run around the
different floors of the hospital, checking the medications prescribed to other dengue fever patients.
He would also prevent the nurses from administering the prescribed medications to Ma. Samantha.
When Ma. Samantha vomited, Mario, who was just sleeping by his daughter's side, would not clean
her up. He would instead ignore the ill child, turn to the other side, and continue sleeping.

Having had enough of Mario, Rosanna drove him out of the house. After several days, Mario returned
home and pleaded Rosanna for another chance. Rosanna accepted Mario back but kept a close eye
on him.

Later in November, Mario allegedly asked one of their helpers to prepare some clothes, feeding bottles,
and milk for Ma. Samantha. Ma. Samantha's nanny noticed the helper fixing the bag, so she asked
Rosanna where they would take the child. Rosanna, who was then working in their home office,
rushed to Mario and asked him where he was bringing Ma. Samantha. Mario replied that he would
only bring the child to Manila Memorial Park.

Rosanna prohibited Mario from bringing Ma. Samantha out. She then called up Mario's siblings for
help. Mario got furious, threatened everyone in the house, and left without returning home.

After he had left, Mario made purchases using his supplementary credit card. Rosanna discovered
that Mario used up the P10,000.00 credit limit of his Citibank Mastercard and the P8,000.00 credit
limit of his Bank of the Philippine Islands card. Mario also purchased an P11,000.00 necklace at the
Landmark Department Store in Makati.

Several days after he had left home, Mario tried to return, but Rosanna turned him away. Mario
banged the door, shouting, "Buksan niyo ito kundi sisirain ko ito!" Fearing Mario, Rosanna called her
parents and beeped Mario's sisters for help. When Rosanna's parents and Mario's sisters arrived,
however, Mario had already left.
Later that day, Mario was found loitering near the house. With him were some travel documents,
cash, and a checklist of European countries with the respective visa requirements for entry of a child
for each country.
After the door-banging incident, Mario's siblings brought him to the Medical City for detoxification.
On November 29, 1998, Mario was committed for treatment at the Medical City for 14 days. After
conducting tests on Mario, the doctors found him positive for drug use. Mario's siblings were then
advised to commit him to a drug rehabilitation center for treatment. However, defying the doctor's
orders, they had him discharged from the hospital without bringing him to a drug rehabilitation
facility.

Rosanna eventually closed Design and Construction Matrix due to financial losses. Mario's access to
the company funds for his drug use allegedly used up the funds. To sustain her and her family's
needs, Rosanna searched for a job and eventually worked as an executive assistant at the Government
Service Insurance System Financial Center.

Rosanna decided to have a duplex built on a lot in Paranaque City that her aunt, Rita M. Tan, had
donated on August 25, 1998. Rosanna, Mario, and Ma. Samantha would live in one apartment, and
Rosanna's parents would live in the other apartment.

To save rent on the Makati apartment where they used to live, Mario, Rosanna, and Ma. Samantha
moved into the unfinished Paranaque duplex. At first, Mario hesitated to move in, but he eventually
agreed and asked that a four-square meter room at the back of the duplex be constructed. The small
room would allegedly be Ma. Samantha's playroom. Rosanna opposed Mario as the room would be
too small to be a playroom, but Mario insisted on its construction.

The four-square meter room was eventually constructed, and Mario had an air conditioning unit
installed inside. He also brought in a television set, a computer table, and some personal belongings
into the room. He would then spend days in the room alone and, at times, would even bring Ma.
Samantha with him. He even tinkered with the electrical wires of the duplex.

In July 1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened the door to the small room. He
found Mario and Ma. Samantha inside, with the room filled with smoke that did not quite smell of
cigarettes. The electrician informed Rosanna of what he saw, and Rosanna knew that Mario relapsed
into his drug use.

Rosanna confronted Mario and pleaded with him to get treated. However, Mario got furious and Ma.
Samantha, who saw her parents fighting, started crying. To protect Ma. Samantha, Rosanna brought
the child to her parents on the other side of the duplex.

Mario followed them to his parents-in-laws' house, forcing himself in to get Ma. Samantha. Rosanna
had to call for police assistance to pacify Mario.

Mario eventually calmed down when the police arrived. The police then searched Mario, finding
packets of shabu in his person. They were about to bring Mario to the police station for detention
when Rosanna pleaded with them not to take Mario. The police agreed, but they released Mario to his
sister, Ma. Socorro.

The next day, Rosanna tried to call Ma. Socorro to ask about Mario, but her calls were unanswered.
Rosanna later learned that Mario had escaped from Ma. Socorro's house earlier that morning.

It was after these incidents that Rosanna petitioned the Regional Trial Court to voluntarily commit
Mario for drug rehabilitation at the National Bureau of Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation
Center, and, eventually, at the Seagulls Flight Foundation (Seagulls).

On February 14, 2000, Mario escaped from Seagulls, returning home, and pleading with Rosanna to
take him in again. Rosanna took her husband in, but Mario would again relapse into his drug use.
He was also jobless and could not support his family.

In June 2000, Ma. Samantha had to be rushed to the hospital for frequent vomiting. Mario, who was
at home, did nothing, and Rosanna had to absent herself from work to rush the child to the hospital.
Rosanna, who had no money with her that time, had to borrow money from Ma. Samantha's nanny.
Rosanna's parents and siblings also shared in the child's hospital bills.

In August 2000, Ma. Samantha again had severe upper respiratory tract infection and frequent
vomiting. When her nanny was about to give her medicine, Mario prevented the nanny from doing so,
saying that mangoes would cure Ma. Samantha.

Two days later, Mario insisted on bringing Ma. Samantha to Makati Medical Center. Rosanna
suggested that they instead bring Ma. Samantha together the next day, which was a Saturday. Mario
suddenly yelled out, "Magnanakaw!" Rosanna, already exasperated, drove Mario out of the house.
Mario, however, dashed to the second floor, still yelling, "Magnanakaw! Magnanakaw!"

Police officers later arrived at their home, having been called by Rosanna and Mario's neighbors who
had heard the screams coming from their house. Rosanna explained that it was her husband who
was yelling and that he was a drug dependent who failed to complete his rehabilitation program. The
police then brought Mario to the police station for questioning.

Ma. Samantha saw her father screaming and the police taking him with them. The child cried and
had to be brought to her grandparents' house to be pacified.

Already at a loss with what to do, Rosanna phoned the director of Seagulls, who recommended that
Mario be recommitted to the rehabilitation center to complete his rehabilitation program.
Thus, Rosanna informed the trial court of Mario's relapse, causing the trial court to order Mario's
recommitment to Seagulls. Mario remained confined there until December 24, 2000, when the
rehabilitation center released Mario without completing his rehabilitation program.

Rosanna wrote the trial court as to Mario's premature release from the rehabilitation center. Since
Mario's release on December 24, 2000, Rosanna and Mario had separated and had not lived together.
Mario also failed to give support to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha.

These events, according to Rosanna, showed Mario's psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations to her. Rosanna contended that Mario's drug use was the manifestation
of a grave personality disorder "deeply rooted within [Mario's] adaptive system. "She thus prayed that
the trial court nullify their marriage and that she be declared the sole and absolute owner of the
parcel of land donated to her by her aunt as well as the duplex built on it.

To prove Mario's psychological incapacity, Rosanna presented Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia (Dr.
Garcia), a physician-psychiatrist, as expert witness.

In her Judicial Affidavit, Dr. Garcia declared that she interviewed Rosanna and gathered data on
Rosanna's family, educational, and employment history. She likewise conducted mental status
examinations on Rosanna.

For data on Mario's social, sexual, and marital history, Dr. Garcia interviewed Rosanna, Ma.
Samantha, and Jocelyn Genevieve L. Tan (Jocelyn Genevieve), Rosanna's sister.

After evaluating the data, Dr. Garcia found Rosanna "psychologically capacitated to comply with her
essential marital obligations. "According to Dr. Garcia, Rosanna "has adequate social, interpersonal
and occupational functioning."

As for Mario, Dr. Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder and substance
abuse disorder with psychotic features. Dr. Garcia characterized the disorder as:

... an abnormality in behavior known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity in fantasy or behavior,
need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early childhood. People suffering from this
disorder may have a grandiose sense of self-importance or may be preoccupied with fantasies of
unlimited success and power. They likewise believe that they are special and can be understood or
should associate with high-status people. They also require excessive admiration, have a sense of
entitlement and are envious of others or believe that others envy them.
Mario's narcissistic antisocial personality disorder, which Dr. Garcia found to be grave, with juridical
antecedence, and incurable, allegedly rendered Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with
his essential marital obligations to Rosanna. Dr. Garcia testified that Mario's personality disorder was
grave and "deeply rooted" in his character.98 Dr. Garcia added that persons suffering from personality
disorders are "impermeable to any form of psychiatric therapeutic modality" because of "the presence
of denial and cognizance on the basic pathology of the person [suffering from the disorder]."

As to the juridical antecedence of Mario's personality disorder, Dr. Garcia said that Mario "does not
have enough ego strength to effectively self-regulate and face the marital task and relational stressors"
and "there were substrates in [Mario's] development which made him feel inadequate and bitter."
Mario allegedly "[needed] to have power over others to save face. "Dr. Garcia thus recommended that
the trial court void Mario and Rosanna's marriage due to Mario's psychological incapacity.

On cross-examination, Dr. Garcia admitted that the data she gathered all came from Rosanna, Ma.
Samantha, and Jocelyn Genevieve. She likewise admitted diagnosing Mario without interviewing him,
because, despite several invitations from Dr. Garcia, Mario did not appear for an interview.105

Countering Rosanna, Mario contended that it was she who was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her essential marital obligations.

Mario alleged that he had worked in Switzerland, Germany, and Italy before returning to the
Philippines in April 1995. In May 1995, he was issued a Canadian visa set to expire in September
that year.

While on vacation in the Philippines, he met his childhood friend, Rosanna, whom he had not seen
in 17 years. They then frequently went out, dining and drinking in bars, and would go to Rosanna's
office afterward to "spend the night and share intimate moments[.]"

In August 1995, Mario went back to Italy to resign from his job as he had already decided to work in
Canada.

When Mario returned to the Philippines a month later, Rosanna told him that she was pregnant and
was planning to abort their child. Mario believed her, as Rosanna allegedly had an abortion in 1991.
To prevent Rosanna from undergoing abortion, he proposed to her. They were married on December
16, 1995.109

The spouses then loaned P500,000.00 from the Elena P. Tan Foundation to increase the capital of
Design and Construction Matrix, a one?-year-old construction firm under Rosanna's name. Part of
the loaned amount was used as down payment for a Mitsubishi FB L300 van.110

By January 1996, the spouses were already frequently fighting. According to Mario, Rosanna would
box and kick him whenever they argued. To avoid any untoward incident, Mario would leave the
house to keep his cool.
In 1997, Rosanna allegedly became uncontrollable. She would bang her head on tables, doors,
concrete walls, and closets, and would even inflict corporal punishment on Ma. Samantha.

Opposing Rosanna's claim, Mario said that he worked to support the family. He worked as the
operations manager of Design and Construction Matrix, and his duties included hiring and
supervising firm employees, and procuring construction materials, tools, and equipment. Because of
his hard work at the firm, he and Rosanna were able to pay their P500,000.00 loan and save money
for the construction of their conjugal home.

Mario claimed that he always went home and never slept out, except that one time in December 1998,
when he and Rosanna had a big fight. Mario maintained that he was a good father to Ma. Samantha
such that, when the child was confined in the hospital for dengue fever, he took care of her. One time,
when the nurse on duty failed to replace Ma. Samantha's empty dextrose bottle, Mario voluntarily
asked the nurse to replace it with a new one. He and Ma. Samantha would also spend quality time
together, going to malls and visiting relatives.114

Sometime in 1998, Mario, Rosanna, and Rosanna's parents jointly loaned P2,500,000.00 from 1he
Elena P. Tan Foundation. They deposited the amount in Metrobank-Legaspi Branch in Makati under
the name of Rosanna and her father, Rodolfo M. Tan. The loaned amount would serve as funds for
the construction of the duplex house in Para?aque.115

In December 1998, Mario and Rosanna fought again and this time, Rosanna drove Mario out of the
house. Since he had no cash with him, Mario used up the credit limits of his credit cards totaling
P40,000.00. When he returned home, Mario allegedly returned the P40,000.00 to Rosanna.116

By 1999, when the duplex was semi-finished, Mario, Rosanna, and Ma. Samantha moved in. Since
construction was still ongoing, Mario insisted that a four-square meter room be constructed to protect
Ma. Samantha from construction dust and debris.117

Mario denied that he was ever a threat to Rosanna and Ma. Samantha. He voluntarily committed
himself for detoxification at the Medical City and completed his six-month rehabilitation in Seagulls.
When he returned home, however, Rosanna remained violent and would always drive Mario out of
the house.118

Between him and Rosanna, Mario argued that it was his wife who was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her essential marital obligations to him. Rosanna insisted on living with her parents
despite having her own family, resulting in her parents constantly intruding into their marital life.119

As to the parcel of land allegedly donated by Rita M. Tan, Mario claimed that the donation was a
"manipulative device" to make it appear that Rosanna exclusively owned the lot.120
In sum, Mario prayed that the trial court nullify his marriage to Rosanna due to her psychological
incapacity, and that the properties they had acquired during their cohabitation be divided equally
between them. He, however, prayed that the custody of Ma. Samantha be awarded to him.121

In its May 9, 2007 Decision,122 the Regional Trial Court found that Rosanna discharged the burden
of proving Mario's psychological incapacity:
It was clearly shown from [Mario's] actuations that he never really cared about the well-being of his
family. He never commiserated with [Rosanna] during her difficult times. Despite [Rosanna's efforts]
to keep the marriage intact, [Mario] showed no interest in mending his ways. These acts, to the mind
of the Court, manifested [Mario's] total disregard of the basic tenets of marriage.123
The trial court thus voided Mario and Rosanna's marriage. It awarded the custody of Ma. Samantha
to Rosanna, with Mario having visitation rights. As to the Para?aque duplex, the trial court declared
Rosanna as its sole and absolute owner, including the parcel of land on which it was built. The
dispositive portion of the May 9, 2007 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit to the petition, judgment is hereby rendered:
Declaring null and void ab initio the marriage between ROSANNA L. TAN-ANDAL and MARIO VICTOR
M. ANDAL solemnized on DECEMBER 16, 1995 in Makati City on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent;

Ordering the Local Civil Registrars of Makati City and the National Statistics Office to cancel the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in their respective Registry of
Marriage;

Allowing petitioner to resume the use of her maiden name;

Awarding petitioner the absolute custody of the parties' only child, Ma. Samantha T. Andal, with
visitation rights given to the respondent; and

Declaring the petitioner to be the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land with improvements
covered by TCT No. 139811.
On the matter of suspension of respondent's parental authority over Ma. Samantha T. Andal, the
Court holds that there is no sufficient ground in granting the same.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Makati City and Paranaque City,
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National Statistics Office)
and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Paranaque City.

SO ORDERED.124 (Emphasis in the original)

Mario moved125 for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its August 29, 2007, Order.126
Reversing the trial court's ruling, the Court of Appeals found Dr. Garcia's psychiatric evaluation of
Mario to be "unscientific and unreliable"127 since she diagnosed Mario without interviewing him. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Dr. Garcia "was working on pure suppositions and second-hand
information fed to her by one side."

On the trial court's finding that Rosanna exclusively owned the house and lot in Paranaque, the Court
of Appeals held that the trial court violated Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution, which states
that "[n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based." To the Court of Appeals, the trial court did not state the
facts and the law on which it based its ruling that Rosanna solely owned the house and lot.129

Thus, the Court of Appeals declared Mario and Rosanna's marriage valid and subsisting. The
dispositive portion of its February 25, 2010 Decision130 reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed May 09, 2007 decision is SET ASIDE,
and the marriage between Mario Victor M. Andal and Rosanna L. Tan-Andal is hereby declared as
VALID and SUBSISTING.

SO ORDERED.131 (Emphasis in the original)

Rosanna moved132 for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its April 6, 2011
Resolution.133

On May 25, 2011, Rosanna filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari134 before this Court. Mario filed
his Comment,135 to which Rosanna filed her Reply.136

In the August 20, 2019 Resolution,137 this Court resolved to set the case for oral arguments.
However, the oral arguments were postponed indefinitely,138 and the parties were instead ordered to
file their respective memoranda.139 Further, Dean Sylvia Estrada-Claudio, M.D., Ph.D.,140 Dean
Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr.,141 and Fr. Adolfo Dacanay, S.J.,142 were appointed amici curiae, and
they were all required to submit their amicus curiae briefs.143

The parties144 and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General,145 have all filed the required Memoranda. The amici curiae, to whom this Court is grateful
for their expertise and invaluable insights on the important issues for resolution here, have each
submitted their respective Amicus Curiae Briefs.

The issues for this Court's resolution are:

First, whether or not the marriage between Mario and Rosanna is void due to psychological incapacity.
Subsumed in this issue are the following:
a. Whether or not the guidelines for deciding cases for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity, as laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,146 violate the
right to liberty, personal autonomy, and human dignity of Filipinos;

b. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos v. Court of Appeals,147 psychological incapacity has

juridical antecedence and its root cause medically or clinically identifiable at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. If it is so identifiable, then:

i. should it be grounded on a particular psychological illness;

ii. may it be established without a psychological assessment or clinical diagnosis;

iii. may it be established on the basis of testimonial evidence attesting to the behavioral pattern of
the spouse with the psychological incapacity during the marriage;

c. Whether or not, as characterized in Santos, psychological incapacity is truly incurable. If it is, must
it be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable to warrant a declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code;

d. Whether or not Article 36 of the Family Code is violative of the separation of Church and State;

e. Whether or not the expert opinion on a party's psychological incapacity is competent evidence if it
is solely based on collateral information from the other spouse;

f. Whether or not the existence of grounds for legal separation precludes a finding of psychological
incapacity on the part of one or both of the spouses;

g. Whether or not psychological incapacity may be relative to each couple.

Second, whether or not half of the duplex and the lot on which it is situated are community properties
of Mario and Rosanna; and

Third, whether or not Ma. Samantha's custody was rightfully awarded to Rosanna.

Rosanna maintains that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing the trial court's Decision,
claiming that the totality of evidence she presented was sufficient to prove Mario's psychological
incapacity. With respect to Dr. Garcia's findings, Rosanna claims that they are reliable, having been
subjected to cross-examination by Mario's counsel and were based on documents written by Mario
himself, among others.148 Citing Suazo v. Suazo,149 Rosanna adds that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated need not be personally interviewed by the clinician or psychiatrist for a
court to nullify the marriage. So long as the totality of evidence presented proves that the spouse is
psychologically incapacitated, as in this case, she insists that a decree of nullity of marriage should
be issued.150

Rosanna concedes this Court's good intention behind imposing the Molina guidelines, which was to
prevent parties from filing frivolous or capricious petitions for declaration of nullity. However,
Rosanna argues, the guidelines have unintentionally made "it complicated and burdensome for a
party to be released from a marriage that has legitimately broken down."151 For Rosanna, the State's
protection of the institution of marriage "should not be ruthless nor unjustifiably intrude into a
person's rights to autonomy and human dignity."152

Psychological incapacity need not be grounded on a particular psychological illness, argues Rosanna,
as this is allegedly more consistent with psychological incapacity being a "liberal ground"153 for
nullifying marriages. She cites cases154 where this Court held that competent evidence, not
necessarily expert opinion, may establish psychological incapacity, and that what matters is the
totality of evidence presented.

Rosanna adds that psychological incapacity is incurable, but not necessarily in a medical or clinical
sense. For her, incurability is manifested by ingrained behavior manifested during the marriage by
the psychologically incapacitated spouse.155

As to whether Article 36 violates the Constitution on the separation of Church and State, Rosanna
argues that the provision does not. She cites Molina, where this Court explained that the provision is
meant to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of the majority of Filipinos.156

Rosanna submits that even if solely based on collateral information, expert opinion on a spouse's
psychological incapacity may be considered as competent evidence. An expert "does not accept the
information relayed by a party about his/her spouse 'as is'."157 A psychological evaluation is only
made after a "verification process is conducted by the psychologist/psychiatrist," assuring that the
expert opinion is reliable.158

Rosanna adds that the existence of grounds for legal separation does not preclude a finding of
psychological incapacity on the part of one or both of the spouses. Citing Republic v. Mola Cruz,159
she demonstrates that a ground for legal separation may be considered a symptom or manifestation
of psychological incapacity.160

With respect to psychological incapacity being relative, Rosanna again cites Molina, where this Court
said that the "incurability [of the psychological incapacity] may be absolute or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against every one of the same sex."161
On the duplex that served as the family home, Rosanna argues that the house, though it may be
considered community property, should still be exclusively retained by Rosanna as Mario made no
contribution for its construction. As for the lot on which the duplex was built, Rosanna maintains
that it is her exclusive property, having been donated solely to her.162

Countering Rosanna, Mario maintains that she failed to prove that his past drug use was a
manifestation of a personality disorder which rendered him psychologically incapacitated.163 Mario
argues that his past drug use is, at best, only a ground for legal separation,164 not for nullity of
marriage due to psychological incapacity.165

As to whether Article 36 of the Family Code can be violative of the right of Filipinos to liberty, personal
autonomy, and human dignity, Mario failed to respond to this specific issue. However, echoing this
Court's pronouncement in Molina, Mario argues that psychological incapacity is truly incurable,
which means it is medically or clinically permanent.166

In addition, Mario submits that Article 36 is not violative of the separation of Church and State. For
him, Article 36 is "an example of the government pursuing an important state policy, i.e. protection
of the family."167

Like Rosanna, Mario argues that the expert opm10n on a party's psychological incapacity may be
considered as competent evidence even if based solely on collateral information. Citing Marcos v.
Marcos168 and Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,169 Mario submits that in proving psychological incapacity,
what is essential is the totality of evidence presented.170 Similarly, he argues that the existence of a
ground for legal separation does not preclude a finding of psychological incapacity if the ground is
shown to be a "manifestation of some other serious psychological illness which ... renders the party
unable to comply with his [or her] essential marital obligations."171

Mario contends that psychological incapacity is absolute, consistent with it being incurable. He
submits that "a party's incapacity should relate not only to the present relationship with his [or her]
spouse but should also continue to any relationship he [or she] may subsequently enter into."172

Considering that the Court of Appeals found his marriage to Rosanna valid and subsisting, Mario
argues that the house and lot in Para?aque is community property, having been acquired during the
marriage.173

This Petition must be granted. With clear and convincing evidence, Rosanna proved that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to her. Their marriage
is void ab initio.
I.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for voiding marriages is provided in Article 36 of the Family
Code:
ARTICLE 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Article 36 was first interpreted in Santos v. Court of Appeals,174 a case where the wife, after three
years of marriage, left for the United States, never to return to her husband and son. Despite the
wife's abandonment of the family, this Court in Santos refused to void the marriage after outlining
the history of the provision and defining the term "psychological incapacity."

This Court initially noted how the Family Code Revision Committee (Code Committee) deliberately
refused to define psychological incapacity "to allow some resiliency"175 in applying the provision.
Article 36 provides no examples of psychological incapacity so that "the applicability of the provision
[would not be limited] under the principle of ejusdem generis."176

After reviewing the Code Committee deliberations, this Court determined that psychological
incapacity should mean "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage."177 It added that "psychological incapacity" must refer to "the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage."178

In reference to the Catholic roots of Article 36, it being derived from the New Canon Law, this Court
cited the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso (Dr. Veloso), a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila. Dr. Veloso was of the opinion that
psychological incapacity "must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."179

Building on these three criteria, this Court promulgated Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina180
in 1997. Molina involved a wife who, after five years of marriage, filed a case for declaration of its
nullity due to her husband's psychological incapacity. In her petition, she alleged that her husband
preferred to spend his time and money on his friends, failing to support the family. If the husband
had any money, it was because he allegedly depended on his parents for aid. The husband eventually
left her and their child when she had to resign from work.

It was in Molina where this Court laid down the guidelines for interpreting and applying Article 36.
In formulating the guidelines, this Court invited two amici curiae: Rev. Oscar V. Cruz, Vicar Judicial
or Presiding Judge of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Philippine Catholic Church;
and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Molina
guidelines are as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological ◻ not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses
of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally ◻ subject to our law
on evidence ◻ what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church ◻ while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other ◻ shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.181 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
The Molina guidelines were applied in subsequent cases.182 Since Molina's promulgation in 1997
until 2008, only Antonio v. Reyes183 was found to have satisfied all the requirements of Molina.184
Antonio involved a wife whose pathological lying rendered her psychologically incapacitated to comply
with her essential marital obligations.

Because of the restrictive interpretation resulting from the application of the Molina guidelines, this
Court pronounced in the 2009 case of Ngo Te v. Yu-Te185 that "jurisprudential doctrine has
unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed," a view that
is "totally inconsistent with the way the concept was formulated[.]"186 In Ngo Te, this Court remarked
that the Molina guidelines worked like a "strait-jacket" in which psychological incapacity cases are
forced to fit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one
in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the [Office
of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to
live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites,
consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from
what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit and be
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed
diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.187 (Citations omitted)

In its 2015 Resolution in Kalaw v. Fernandez,188 this Court made a similar statement:
The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article
36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some
resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."189 (Citation omitted)
This Court's statements in Ngo-Te and Kalaw notwithstanding, the tendency to rigidly apply the
Molina guidelines continued. Apart from Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,190 Antonio v. Reyes,191
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,192 and Kalaw v. Fernandez,193 only the parties in Azcueta v. Republic,194 Halili v.
Santos-Halili,195 Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes,196 Aurelio v. Aurelio,197 Tani-De La Fuente v. De La
Fuente,198 Republic v. Javier,199 and Republic v. Mola Cruz200 were granted a decree of nullity by
this Court via a signed decision or resolution since the Family Code was signed into law.201 That
only a few cases were found to have satisfied the Molina guidelines is, supposedly, in accordance with
the Constitution on the inviolability of marriage,202 to the extent that this Court often reversed the
factual findings of psychological incapacity by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.203

II

It is time for a comprehensive but nuanced interpretation of what truly constitutes psychological
incapacity.

II (A)

The first Molina guideline reiterates the fundamental rule in evidence that one who asserts a claim
must prove it Specifically, in psychological incapacity cases, it is the plaintiff-spouse who proves the
existence of psychological incapacity.204

Molina, however, is silent on what quantum of proof is required in nullity cases. While there is opinion
that a nullity case under Article 36 is like any civil case that requires preponderance of evidence,205
we now hold that the plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence.
This is a quantum of proof that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof beyond
reasonable doubt.206

The reason is that this jurisdiction follows the presumption of validity of marriages. As was held in
the 1922 case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:207
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every internment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28.) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio ◻ Always presume marriage.208 (Citation omitted)
As with any presumption◻such as the presumption of regularity in the issuance of public
documents,209 regularity in the performance of duty,210 of good faith,211 or of sufficient
consideration212 ◻it can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence.

In any case, inasmuch as the Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and
the foundation of the family, courts must not hesitate to void marriages that are patently ill-equipped
due to psychic causes inherent in the person of the spouses. In the past, marriages had been upheld
solely for the sake of their permanence when, paradoxically, doing so destroyed the sanctity afforded
to the institution. Courts are reminded of Antonio, where this Court said:
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts,
in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that
"[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family
Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of
nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in
fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what
marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only
constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State
to defend against marriages ill-?equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article
36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.213 (Emphasis supplied)

Reflecting a similar sentiment, this Court in Ngo-Te214 said:

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume
the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the
infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that
in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article will simply provide a decent
burial to a stillborn marriage.215 (Citations omitted)

In the Kalaw Resolution,216 this Court said that "[i]n declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, ...
the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social
institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid."217

Further, as the "basic autonomous social institution,"218 the family should be protected under the
Constitution regardless of its structure. This means that a family can be founded, whether or not the
parents choose to marry or subsequently choose to dissociate, and this arrangement should be
equally entitled to State protection. The right to choose our intimate partners is part of our right to
autonomy and liberty, an inherent part of human dignity. Ultimately, should the State interfere with
these choices, it should do so only when public interest is imperiled:
The Family Code provides that the "nature, consequences, and incidents [of marriage] are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation," but this does not go as far as reaching into the choices of
intimacy inherent in human relations. These choices form part of autonomy, protected by the liberty
and human dignity clauses. Human dignity includes our choices of association, and we are as free to
associate and identify as we are free not to associate or identify.

Our choices of intimate partners define us ◻ inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently,
when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this
refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters
limited to ensuring the stability of society. The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted
intrusions into individual liberties.219 (Citations omitted)
II (B)

To recall, the term "psychological incapacity" was first defined by this Court in Santos as a "mental
(not physical) incapacity"220 to comply with the essential marital obligations. The term was confined
to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."221 This characterization became the basis
of the second Molina guideline, where parties to a nullity case are required to present evidence of the
root cause of the psychological incapacity. In particular, this root cause must be medically or clinically
identified and sufficiently proven by experts.

By equating psychological incapacity to a "mental incapacity" and to "personality disorders," this

Court went against the intent behind Article 36. The Code Committee was clear that psychological
incapacity is not a mental incapacity. Among the earlier wordings of the provision on psychological
incapacity included "mentally incapacitated,"222 and "mentally" is obviously absent in the present
Article 36. This means that for the Code Committee, "mental" is not synonymous with "psychological."

The reason for deleting "mental" was given by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, a member of the Code
Committee. He said that "mental" would give the wrong impression of psychological incapacity being
a vice of consent.223 If psychological incapacity was to be an acceptable alternative to divorce,224 as
was intended by the Code Committee, it cannot be a mere vice of consent. Psychological incapacity
must consist in a lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage, making the marriage
void ab initio.

Psychological incapacity is also not a personality disorder, as explained by amicus curiae Dean Sylvia
Estrada-Claudio (Dean Estrada?-Claudio). Psychological incapacity cannot be found in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V), the
authoritative listing of various mental, including personality, disorders recognized by the scientific
community.225

Yet, to comply with the second Molina guideline, psychologists and psychiatrists, when serving as
expert witnesses, have been forced to assign a personality disorder and pathologize the supposedly
psychologically incapacitated spouse.226 This cruelty could not have been the intent of the Code
Committee.

It took time before this Court, in the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos,227 declared that "a medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."228 Instead, as this Court said, "the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity[.]"229

This pronouncement seemed to do away with the requirement of expert opinion on the root cause of
the psychological incapacity, but this Court was not categorical with this. It even said in Marcos that
the "root cause may be 'medically or clinically identified'"230 ◻implying that although medical opinion
may be done away with, a clinical identification, which is still expert opinion, must nevertheless be
presented.

For this reason, this Court was inconsistent in requiring expert evidence in psychological incapacity
cases. Not all cases promulgated after Marcos required the totality of evidence rule. Even as recent
as 2019, this Court dismissed a nullity case because "[t]he root cause of [the respondent spouse's]
alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts[.]"231

In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline.
Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven
through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a
person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of
dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it
impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential
marital obligations.

Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have
been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors
that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge
will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential
marital obligations.

In this way, the Code Committee's intent to limit the incapacity to "psychic causes" is fulfilled.
Furthermore, there will be no need to label a person as having a mental disorder just to obtain a
decree of nullity. A psychologically incapacitated person need not be shamed and pathologized for
what could have been a simple mistake in one's choice of intimate partner, a mistake too easy to
make as when one sees through rose-colored glasses. A person's psychological incapacity to fulfill his
or her marital obligations should not be at the expense of one's dignity, because it could very well be
that he or she did not know that the incapacity existed in the first place.

II (C)

Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical antecedence
because it is an explicit requirement of the law. Article 36 is clear that the psychological incapacity
must be existing "at the time of the celebration" of the marriage, "even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization." This distinguishes psychological incapacity from divorce.
Divorce severs a marital tie for causes, psychological or otherwise, that may have developed after the
marriage celebration.

According to Dean Estrada-Claudio, "it is an accepted principle of all major and recognized theoretical
schools within psychology that a person's behavior is determined by the interaction of certain genetic
predispositions and by his or her environment, working in iterative loops of influence."232 From this,
proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the
environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular
behavior. For instance, violence against one's spouse and children can be a manifestation of
juridically antecedent psychological incapacity when it is shown that the violent spouse grew up with
domestic violence or had a history of abusive romantic relationships before the marriage.

The same can be said for child abuse. Trauma research shows that our past, if not properly healed,
heavily affects our present.233 As such, evidence of the juridically antecedent psychological
incapacity may consist of testimony on the spouse's past experiences that may have led him or her
to become a child abuser.

Furthermore, not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be
cured. And even if it were a mental disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or
incurable. Dean Estrada-Claudio explained that true mental disorders follow a probable course or
outcome, called "prognosis," that can either be self-limited or remain "stable across time and
consistent in situations."234 If self-limited, the disorder is, in layperson's terms, "curable." If it has
poor long-term prognosis, the disorder is said to be "incurable."235
That psychological incapacity is "incurable," but in a legal sense, is evident in the deliberations of the
Code Committee. This was explained by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, when he said that "'incurable'
has a different meaning in law and medicine."236

Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, in his concurring opinion,237 added that characterizing
psychological incapacity as "incurable"238 is antithetical, because the law does not prohibit a person
whose former marriage had been nullified under Article 36 to remarry. If psychological incapacity
were truly incurable, then remarriage should not be allowed as it would only result in another void
marriage.239

Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina, we
hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not
in the medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This
means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and
contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and
antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of
the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful,
respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a
psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."240

With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological incapacity
must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that "mild characterological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts"241 are excluded. The psychological incapacity
cannot be mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty, much less ill will."242 In other words, it must be
shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

II (D)

Molina provides that the essential marital obligations are "those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221[,] and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children."243 These provisions are reproduced below for
reference:

ARTICLE 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

ARTICLE 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there
are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply
if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such
support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of
said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.

ARTICLE 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The
expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

....

ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in
them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities,
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
ARTICLE 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

....
ARTICLE 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property
of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of
disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent
concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not
less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.

A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the
child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the
property or any part thereof is situated.

The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues
regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall
be heard and resolved.

The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under
substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case
the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (Justice Perlas-Bernabe) makes an enlightening point in her opinion
that the essential marital obligations are limited to those between the spouses, as these are the only
provisions "relevant to the finding of a spouse's psychological incapacity [with respect to] to his or her
specific partner."244 She cites the legal definition of marriage, which is primarily a contract between
a man and a woman. Therefore, according to her, if a marriage is to be declared void "due to
psychological incapacity, it must be so primarily due to the failure to assume the essential marital
obligations as a spouse, and only incidentally, as a father or mother."245

It is true that marriage is a contract primarily between the spouses; but its cause remains to be the
establishment of not just conjugal but also family life. The Constitution treats marriage as the
foundation of the family.246 Furthermore, Article 70 of the Family Code provides that the spouses
are jointly responsible for the support of the family. As such, once the parties decide and do have
children, their obligations to their children become part of their obligations to each other as spouses.

This interpretation is more consistent with the canonical concept of marriage and psychological
incapacity from which Article 36 of the Family Code was drawn. For Article 36 to be a true
accommodation,247 as Justice Perlas-Bernabe submits,248 the State, through this Court, might as
well consider "the theoretical and operational system which ... is inextricably and inherently ... part
of [the concept of psychological incapacity] ◻ the Canon Law on Marriage."249
Under Christian doctrine, specifically the teachings of St. Augustine, marriages embody three
traditional values or bonum matrimonii: (1) bonum fidei, or "the faithful exclusiveness of the marital
commitmment";250 (2) bonum savramenti,251 which refers to the permanence of marriage; and (3)
bonum prolis,252 that is, that marriage is primarily for procreation or, at the very least, openness to
having children. The Family Code definition of marriage reflects all of these Christian values,
specifically, the exclusivity of a marital relation between "a man and a woman," the characterization
of marriage as a "permanent union," and its purpose being "for the establishment of conjugal and
family life."253

Both under canon and secular law, bonum prolis is as essential as bonum fidei. This only shows that
the spouses' obligations to their children, once children are conceived, is as much a part of the
spouses' obligations to each other. Failure to perform these obligations to their children may be a
ground to nullify a spouse's marriage.

But not all kinds of failure to meet their obligations to their children will nullify the vinculum between
the spouses. In each case, it must be clearly shown that it is of such grievous nature that it reflects
on the capacity of one of the spouses for marriage. The easy cases are when one of the spouses
sexually abuses one of their children; or, when unknown to the other spouse, a child is subjected to
domestic violence; or when due to the spouse's refusal to go through counseling or rehabilitation, his
or her substance abuse puts a child through a situation of neglect or outright danger. As in all cases,
the context of the whole case, shown by clear and convincing evidence, should be taken into
consideration.

II (E)

The persuasive effect of the decisions of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church of the Philippines on nullity cases pending before secular courts is retained.254 Without
prejudice to the ponente's view on the separation of Church and State,255 the inescapable reality is
that Article 36 of the Family Code was lifted from canon law, specifically, Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law.256 As such, Canon 1095 should be taken into account in interpreting Article 36
and in deciding psychological incapacity cases.

Canon 1095 provides:

Canon 1095. The following are incapable of contracting marriage:

1) those who lack the sufficient use of reason;

2) those who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial
rights and duties mutually to be handed over and accepted;
3) those who are not able to assume the essential obligations of marriage for causes of a psychic
nature.257
This persuasive effect is especially true in cases where the Catholic Church had already voided the
canonical marriage, because it is the explicit intent of the Code Committee to solve "the problem of
marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law."258 In Antonio,
this Court even reproached the Court of Appeals for failing to consider the prior church annulment
of the parties' marriage as indicative of the void nature of the secular marriage. This Court even called
the error a "deliberate ignorance."259

It is true that the wording of Article 36 of the Family Code was lifted almost verbatim from the third
paragraph of Canon 1095, and there are views that only those decisions on canonical marriages
voided under this paragraph should be considered persuasive by our secular courts.

A review of the deliberations of the Code Committee, however, reveals that lack of due discretion
under the second paragraph of Canon 1095 is actually a part of the concept of psychological
incapacity as envisioned by the Joint Committee. This was the subject of the article, Psychological
Incapacity and the Canon Law on Marriage: An Exegesis on the Psychological Element of Matrimonial
Consent (Exegesis).260

A canonical marriage, like a secular marriage, is special, albeit for a different reason. Under the
teachings of the Catholic Church, a contract of marriage requires a special kind of consent, called
"matrimonial consent," to be valid.261

The New Code of Canon Law characterizes the "matrimonial covenant" as "a partnership of the whole
life."262 Catholics believe that in marriage, the spouses "are no longer two, but one flesh"263 and
"render mutual help and service to each other through an intimate union of their persons and their
actions."264 Hence, it is said that the subject and object of a contract of marriage are one and the
same: the very persons of the spouses.265 It is this concept of mutual self-giving for the establishment
of a conjugal and family life that a party to a canonical marriage consents to.

Matrimonial consent, in turn, consists of three elements: (1) the cognitive element, which corresponds
to truth;266 (2) the volitive element, which corresponds to freedom;267 and (3) the psychosomatic
element, which corresponds to maturity.268 Canon 1095 refers to the psychosomatic or psychological
element of matrimonial consent. The absence of any of these three elements renders a canonical
marriage void.

The first paragraph of Canon 1095 refers to those who lack the sufficient use of reason due to a
mental illness.269 The second paragraph on lack of due discretion refers to "the lack of capacity to
bind oneself to the rights and obligations of marriage."270 A person who lacks due discretion "[gives]
the appearance of enjoying full use of his [or her] faculties, but ... by reason of some psychic defect
he [or she] may not be capable of assuming the obligations of marriage, even if he [or she] may have
a notional and conceptual understanding of them."271 Lastly, the third paragraph on lack of due
competence contemplates a situation where the person, while having intellect and ordinary capacity
to consent, cannot deliver the object of the marital consent◻his or her very person.272 The incapacity,
like in the second paragraph, is due to psychic causes, which is:
... something in the psyche or the psychic constitution of a person which impedes his [or her] capacity
to assume three (3) general obligations of marriage: (1) consortium of whole life between a man and
a woman; (2) a consortium which is directed towards the good of the spouses; and (3) towards the
procreation and upbringing of children.273
From this discussion, the concept under the first paragraph of Canon 1095 is explicitly outside the
realm of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code as envisioned by the Code
Committee. To recall, the Code Committee did not view psychological incapacity as a mental disorder.

However, psychological incapacity under Article 36 is actually closer, concept-wise, to lack of due
discretion under the second paragraph of Canon 1095, rather than lack of due competence
contemplated in the third paragraph. This is strange, because while Article 36 of the Family Code is
similarly worded to the third paragraph of Canon 1095, its meaning is similar to that embraced in
the second paragraph.

To add to the confusion, and as was previously discussed, this Court's conceptualization of
psychological incapacity became medically oriented, discussing psychological incapacity in terms of
mental disorders that have to be medically or clinically identified. This is the concept of lack of
sufficient use of reason under the first, not the third, paragraph of Canon 1095.

Therefore, while Article 36 of the Family Code is similarly worded to the third paragraph of Canon
1095, canonical decisions based on the second paragraph should likewise have a persuasive effect in
secular decisions on psychological incapacity, if we are to avoid anomalous situations where
canonically void marriages remain valid under civil law.

The above discussions notwithstanding, canonical decisions are, to reiterate, merely persuasive and
not binding on secular courts. Canonical decisions are to only serve as evidence of the nullity of the
secular marriage, but ultimately, the elements of declaration of nullity under Article 36 must still be
weighed by the judge.

To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a lack of
understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due to psychic
causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified; hence, expert opinion
is not required.

As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's
personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it must be shown
caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present
clear and convincing evidence of its existence.
III

Considering the foregoing, this Court finds Mario psychologically incapacitated to comply with his
essential marital obligations.

Rosanna discharged the burden of proof required to nullify her marriage to Mario. Clear and
convincing evidence of Mario's psychological incapacity consisted mainly of testimony on Mario's
personality structure and how it was formed primarily through his childhood and adult experiences,
well before he married Rosanna. In addition to Rosanna's testimony, Dr. Garcia recounted how Mario
developed traits exhibiting chronic irresponsibility, impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, lack of
empathy, and sense of entitlement-behaviors manifesting his inherent psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations:

In summary, there is a Partner Relational Problem (code V61.1), which is secondary to the
psychopathology of Mario Victor M. Andal who gravely failed in providing his family the love, support,
dignity, understanding and respect. He has the essential features of a personality disorder as per
criteria set in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV).

His psychopathology has its root causes. There were childhood and adolescent precursors which had
led to the development of his psychological deficits.

Mario, the youngest in a brood of eight was born on December 7, 1961. His sedate father, a known
businessman died when Mario was 6 years old. His mother, (sic) had to take over the family business;
however, she was unable to cope so they had to sell the company. She became a top performer as a
sales executive. She migrated to the U.S. His maternal grandmother, who lived with Mario and his
siblings, played favorites and was very obvious about it.

His eldest brother, Alfonso the favored grandson was dominant and opinionated. Alfonso had to quit
schooling due to his father's death. Alfonso was supposed to take charge of the family business but
he was heavy on alcohol intake. He possessed a temper that would lead to the physical abuse of the
two youngest siblings (Mario and Alberto). Another brother was also physically aggressive like Alfonso,
(sic) was unable to complete college because of his heavy alcohol intake. The intelligent, generous and
the talented Socorro stood as the mother to the younger siblings. Alberto, who was unable to complete
his college degree in UST, is a substance user who is jobless and irresponsible.

The older siblings had difficulty coping with the change from a relatively prosperous life to a life of
near poverty and difficulty coping with major responsibilities like running a company which they were
not prepared for. Mario was their baby. His sisters were extra loving and patient with him. Mario is
athletic and excels in swimming, football/soccer, and basketball. But[,] he is an introvert[,] i.e.[,] he
wasn't vocal about his innermost feelings. He was the obedient son who was made to do errands. He
adores his mother and is demonstrative of his affections towards her.

Mario, (sic) is an "electronics [whiz]" whose intelligence matches the eldest brother's. He completed
his primary and secondary education with the highest honors. But he messed up his third year in
UP. He had very few friends in his college days. He hang (sic) around with a buddy who was heavy
into drugs and alcohol even when he was still in high school. He could not concentrate on his job;
although there were periods when he worked as a technician in a wire company in Switzerland. He
was heart-broken when he returned to Manila in 1995.

To sum up, Mario does not have enough ego strength to effectively self-regulate and face the marital
the (sic) tasks and relational stressors. Indeed, there were substrates in his development which made
him feel inadequate and bitter; thus[,] the need to have power over others to save face.

Mario has a narcissistic-antisocial personality disorder. He exhibits chronic irresponsibility,

impulsivity and lack of genuine remorse, Jack of empathy and a sense of entitlement. In addition, he
has the propensity to be emotionally constricted and evasive. Superimposed on his personality
disorder is substance use disorder with psychotic features (paranoid delusions and bizarre behavior)
and aggression against people in his environ[ment]. While he may have satisfactorily endeared himself
to his lone child, be miserably failed to comply with his vital marital obligations.274 (Emphasis in the
original)
Dr. Garcia reiterated these findings in her Judicial Affidavit,275 with Mario's counsel cross-examining
her on her statements.

It is true that Dr. Garcia gave the expert opinion◻which, we reiterate, is no longer required but is
considered here given that it was offered in evidence◻without having to interview Mario. Even Dr.
Garcia herself admitted during cross-examination that her psychiatric evaluation would have been
more comprehensive had Mario submitted himself for evaluation.276 However, the Court of Appeals
erred in discounting wholesale Dr. Garcia's expert opinion because her methodology was allegedly
"unscientific and unreliable."277

Unlike ordinary witnesses who must have personal knowledge of the matters they testify on,278
expert witnesses do not testify in court because they have personal knowledge of the facts of the case.
The credibility of expert witnesses does not inhere in their person;279 rather, their testimony is
sought because of their special knowledge, skill, experience, or training280 that ordinary persons
and judges do not have.281 Rule 130, Section 49 of the Rules of Court on the opinion of expert
witness provides:
SECTION 49. Opinion of expert witness. ◻ The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
Standards for admitting expert opinion were discussed in Tortona v. Gregorio.282 In Tortona, a parcel
of land was extrajudicially partitioned based on a deed of absolute sale bearing the thumbmark of the
purported seller. The seller's heirs contested the deed for being a forgery because the seller, allegedly
illiterate, could not have executed it without the knowledge and assistance of her children. As
evidence, they presented the expert opinion of fingerprint examiner Eriberto B. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez)
of the National Bureau of Investigation, who testified that the thumbmark on the deed of absolute
sale, indeed, did not belong to the purported seller.

In their attempt to discredit Gomez and his competence, the buyer's heirs contended that the
examiner was "just an ordinary employee"283 in the National Bureau of Investigation who collected
fingerprints from applicants for clearance and took the fingerprints of those involved in crimes. In
other words, Gomez allegedly lacked the necessary skill, experience, or training to be an expert on
fingerprints.284

The trial court nevertheless relied on the expert testimony of Gomez, declaring the deed of absolute
sale a forgery.285 However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding that the seller's heirs
failed to overcome the presumption of regularity accorded to the deed.286 It highlighted that the deed
was a notarized document and, therefore, should be presumed genuine, and its execution due and
voluntary.287

In reinstating the trial court's decision, this Court gave credence to Gomez and his expert opinion.
We first discussed opinions in general. According to this Court, opinions are products of personal
interpretation and belief and, therefore, inherently subjective and generally inadmissible in
evidence.288 Thus, to qualify as an expert and the opinion admitted as expert opinion, the witness
must be shown to possess a special knowledge, skill, or training relevant to the matter they are
testifying on, and that the opinion was rendered on the basis of any of these special criteria.289 This
is apart from the requirement that the testimony, in itself, must be credible; that is, it must be based
on "common experience and observation . . . as probable under the circumstances."290

This Court in Tortona went on to discuss the standards for evaluating expert opinion in the United
States. In Frye v. United States,291 James Alfonso Frye (Frye) was charged with second-degree
murder. During trial, he offered as evidence expert testimony on the results of a systolic blood
pressure deception test, or the polygraph test, to which he was subjected before trial. The prosecution
objected to the offer, and it was sustained by the trial court. On appeal, Frye maintained that the trial
court erred in refusing to admit the expert testimony offered in evidence.

The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the trial court's judgment, ruling that the
systolic blood pressure test was not "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs":292
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.293
For a time, the general acceptance test in Frye had been the standard for admitting expert opinion,
until 1993, when it was overturned in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.294 Daubert
involved minors Jason and Eric Daubert who, assisted by their parents, sued Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, the manufacturer of a prescription anti-nausea drug called Bendectin. According
to them, they were born with serious birth defects caused by the drug, which their mother ingested
while pregnant with them.295

After discovery, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals moved for summary judgment, submitting in evidence
expert opinion saying that Bendectin does not cause malformation in fetuses. The expert, a well-
credentialed epidemiologist specializing in risks from exposure to chemical substances, arrived at his
conclusion by reviewing all the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects.296 The Dauberts
opposed the motion, presenting as evidence the testimony of eight experts who were likewise well?-
credentialed. These experts were of the contrary opinion that Bendectin actually caused human birth
defects, conducting in vitro and in vivo animal studies that showed a link between Bendectin and
malformations.297

The District Court granted summary judgment. Applying the Frye test, it held that in vitro and in vivo
animal studies have not been generally accepted by the scientific community as scientific procedures
for determining causation between the ingestion of Bendectin and birth defects in humans. It thus
rejected the expert opinion offered by the Dauberts.298 The District Court's ruling was affirmed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.299

Reversing the lower courts' judgments, the United States Supreme Court held that the Frye test,
introduced in 1923, has been overturned by the Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted by the legislature
in 1975.300 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.301
The United States Supreme Court noted how Rule 702 does not require general acceptance for
admissibility of expert opinion. Instead, the rule requires the following: first, the "knowledge" testified
on must be "scientific," that is, it must be "more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation";302 second, the specialized knowledge must be of such character that the trial judge is
"able to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue";303 and third, the trial judge, like a
"gatekeeper," must take a firsthand look on "the scientific validity ... [or] the evidentiary relevance and
reliability ... of the principles that underlie"304 the testimony being offered as expert opinion. "The
focus ... must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate."305

On hearsay, Daubert echoed the rule in our jurisdiction that such evidence is generally inadmissible.
However, if "the expert opinion [is] based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay, [it is] to be admitted
only if the facts or date are 'of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.'"306 The United States Supreme Court thus
remanded the case "for further proceedings consistent with [its] opinion"307 in Daubert.

After discussing the standards for admitting expert opinion, this Court in Tortona ultimately held
that Gomez qualified as an expert and his testimony, necessarily, as expert opinion. According to this
Court, his work as a fingerprint examiner at the National Bureau of Investigation qualified him as an
expert on fingerprints. Further, his conclusion◻that the seller's fingerprint in the deed of absolute
sale and that appearing on the specimen documents were different◻was arrived at using a three-part
examination done for determining whether a thumbmark was impressed by the same person.308 The
methodology he used was not shown to be unscientific and unreliable; thus, this Court relied on his
expert opinion that the thumbmark on the deed did not belong to the purported seller.
Applying Tortona here, we find that Dr. Garcia was sufficiently qualified as an expert in psychiatry.
She possesses the special knowledge to practice her profession, holding degrees in medicine and
special education.309 She has been practicing her profession as a physician?psychiatrist since 1990,
including working at the Philippine Mental Health Association as a psychiatrist for 11 years.310

On the principles and methodology Dr. Garcia applied in evaluating Rosanna and Mario, she
conducted a psychiatric clinical interview and mental status examination of Rosanna. She likewise
interviewed Ma. Samantha and Jocelyn Genevieve, Rosanna's sister. The psychiatric clinical interview
and mental status examination remain to be the principal techniques in diagnosing psychiatric
disorders.311 While ideally, the person to be. diagnosed should be personally interviewed, it is
accepted practice in psychiatry to base a person's psychiatric history on collateral information, or
information from sources aside from the person evaluated.312 This is usually done if the patient is
not available, incapable, or otherwise refuses to cooperate, as in this case.

In any case, it cannot be said that the psychiatric evaluation of Mario was exclusively based on
collateral information. Dr. Garcia likewise based her diagnosis on a personal history handwritten by
Mario himself while staying at Seagulls, an "independent evidence."313

At any rate, this Court said in Marcos314 that personal examination of the allegedly psychologically
incapacitated spouse is "not [required] for a declaration of [nullity of marriage due to] psychological
incapacity."315 So long as the totality of evidence, as in this case, sufficiently proves the psychological
incapacity of one or both316 of the spouses, a decree of nullity of marriage may be issued.317

Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in not giving credence to Dr. Garcia's expert opinion just
because Mario did not appear for psychiatric evaluation.

That drug addiction is a ground for legal separation318 will not prevent this Court from voiding the
marriage in this case. A decree of legal separation entitles spouses to live separately from each other
without severing their marriage bond,319 but no legal conclusion is made as to whether the marriage
is valid.320 Therefore, it is possible that the marriage is attended by psychological incapacity of one
or both spouses, with the incapacity manifested in ways that can be considered as grounds for legal
separation. At any rate, so long as a party can demonstrate that the drug abuse is a manifestation of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage, this should be enough to render the
marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Here, the totality of evidence presented by Rosanna clearly and convincingly proved that Mario's drug
abuse was of sufficient durability that antedates the marriage. Admittedly, part of marriage is
accepting a person for who they are, including their addictions. However, in Mario's case, his
persistent failure to have himself rehabilitated, even bringing his child into a room where he did
drugs, indicates a level of dysfunctionality that shows utter disregard of his obligations not only to
his wife, but to his child.
We agree with the trial court that Mario failed to render mutual help and support to his wife, failing
to find gainful employment and even driving to bankruptcy the construction firm founded by Rosanna
by siphoning its funds for his drug use. He failed to exercise his rights and duties as a parent to Ma.
Samantha. In the words of the trial court:
... [Mario] is incapable of performing his marital obligations, particularly to observe love and respect
for his wife and to render mutual help and support. [Mario] had shown utter disregard for his wife.
Throughout their life together, it was [Rosanna] who mostly provided for the needs of the family.
[Mario] hardly contributed to their expenses because he never bothered to look for a job. [Mario] was
also using prohibited drugs. A responsible husband would not commit acts which will bring danger,
dishonor or injury to [his spouse or to his family]. (Art. 72, Family Code of the Philippines). The safety
and security of the family at all times is a primordial duty of the spouse.321

Even assuming that Mario has since lived a drug-free life, he only did so after separating from
Rosanna. This confirms Dr. Garcia's finding that his psychological incapacity was enduring relative
to his long-estranged wife322 and can manifest again if he is forced to stay with her.

All told, we find that Rosanna proved with clear and convincing evidence that Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations. Their marriage,
therefore, is void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

IV

Void marriages are no marriages. Thus, the provisions of the Family Code on property relations
between husband and wife◻the systems of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, and
separation of property◻do not apply in disposing of properties that may have been acquired during
the parties' cohabitation.323 Instead, the property regime of parties to a void marriage is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code, depending on whether the parties have no
legal impediment to marry.324 Article 147 provides:

ARTICLE 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if
the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendant, each vacant share shall belong to their
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

On the other hand, Article 148 provides:

ARTICLE 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The
same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who
acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
On what "capacitated" in Article 147 means, this Court in Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102,
Quezon City325 said:
The term "capacitated" in [Article 147] (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of
a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not
under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.326 (Emphasis in the
original, citation omitted)

Article 37327 refers to incestuous marriages, while Article 38328 refers to void marriages due to
public policy.

Here, Mario and Rosanna are parties to a void marriage due to psychological incapacity. When they
were married in 1995, Mario was 33 years old while Rosanna was 31. There is no showing that the
marriage was incestuous or void due to public policy. They likewise lived exclusively with each other
as husband and wife until they separated in 2000. Being capacitated to marry each other and having
lived exclusively with each other albeit under a void marriage, Article 147 of the Family Code governs
their property relations.

Under Article 147, wages and salaries earned by the parties during their cohabitation shall be equally
divided between them. This is regardless of who worked to earn the wage or salary.

With respect to properties acquired during their cohabitation, the rules on co-ownership under the
Civil Code govern.329 Therefore, a property acquired during the parties' cohabitation shall be
presumed to have been acquired through the parties' joint efforts. For purposes of Article 147, "joint
efforts" includes a party's care and maintenance of the family and of the household. With this
presumption, the parties are deemed to own the property in equal shares.
However, if a piece of property was obtained through only one party's effort, work, or industry, and
there is proof that the other did not contribute through the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household, the property acquired during the cohabitation shall be solely owned by the party
who actually worked to acquire the property.330

In this case, there is proof that the Para?aque lot was not obtained by Mario and Rosanna's joint
efforts, work, or industry. Rita M. Tan, Rosanna's aunt, donated the 315-square meter lot to Rosanna
and her father, Rodolfo M. Tan. The Deed of Donation331 dated August 25, 1998 provides that Rita
M. Tan donated 157.50 square meters to "Rodolfo M. Tan, married to Josefina G. Lea?o"332 and to
"Rosanna L. Tan-Andal, married to Mario Andal"333 each. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 139811
covering 157.50 square meters of the Para?aque lot is under the name of "Rosanna L. Tan?Andal, of
legal age, Filipino, married to Mario Andal."334 In Salas, Jr. v. Aguila,335 this Court held that
"married to" only refers to the civil status of the property's registered owner.336

Thus, Rosanna exclusively owns half of the 315-square meter Para?aque lot. Mario has no share in
this property because he did not care for and maintain the family and the household.

As for the half of the duplex house that served as the parties' family home, there is evidence that the
funds used to construct the house were obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts. In
a promissory note337 dated July 13, 1998, Rosanna and her father jointly loaned P2,400,000.00
from the Elena P. Tan Foundation for the construction of a house on the Para?aque lot. Although
Mario signed the promissory note to give "marital consent" to Rosanna, he has no proof that he
participated in acquiring the funds. He cannot be deemed to have contributed jointly in acquiring the
funds since he did not care for and maintain the family and the household.

As the funds to construct the house were obtained solely through Rosanna and her father's efforts,
and Mario did not care for and maintain the household, he has no share in the duplex.

In resolving issues of custody of minors whose parents have separated, Article 213 of the Family Code
governs.338 It states:
ARTICLE 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
In Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto,339 this Court held that the "separation of parents" contemplated in
Article 213 may either be legal separation or separation in fact.340 In deciding cases involving custody
of a minor, the courts must consider, among others, "the previous care and devotion shown by each
of the parents; their religious background, moral uprightness, home environment and time
availability; [and] the [child's] emotional and educational needs."341

Here, Mario and Rosanna have been separated in fact since 2000. Between them, Rosanna showed
greater care and devotion to Ma. Samantha. Even when they still lived together, Rosanna had been
more available to her child. She raised Ma. Samantha on her own since she and Mario separated.
Mario has not supported both mother and child since he separated from Rosanna, even after he had
claimed that he has been living "drug-free."

With these considerations, the trial court did not err in awarding Ma. Samantha's custody to Rosanna,
without prejudice to Mario's right to visit his daughter.

Nonetheless, Rosanna's parental authority over Ma. Samantha was already terminated in 2014342
when the child reached the age of majority.343 Ma. Samantha is now qualified and responsible for
all acts of civil life344 and, therefore, is at liberty to choose how to relate with her father.

VI

Love is founded on a promise: to seek beyond ourselves in order to enable and ennoble the other to
continue to become the best version of themselves.

Being in love can be carried on the wings of poetry, announced publicly through each other's gazes.
It is made real and felt with every act of unconditional care and comfort that the lover provides. Love
can be beyond labels.

Marriage is not compulsory when in love; neither does it create love. Nonetheless, it remains an
institution designed to provide legal and public recognition that may be well deserved not only for the
couple, but also for their families existing or yet to come.

To be clear, our collective hope is that one who chooses marriage realizes that the other deserves
more caring, more compassion, more kindness in the daily and banal grind of their relationship. It is
in these same values of sacrifice and empathy that we will have the chance to evolve into a society
that is more humane and, eventually, more just.

Yet, we are not blind to the reality that a person may be truly psychologically incapable for the other
from the beginning. Should there be grave need to part for the reasons we have stated, courts can
lead the way to make parting less bitter, minimize animosity, and make lives more forward-looking
for those most affected. Parting is already a sorrow. It need not be more than what it already is.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' February 25,
2010 Decision and April 6, 2011 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 90303 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The May 9, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Para?aque City, Branch 260, in Civil
Cases 01-0228 and 03-0384 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC

G.R. No. 1056

March 13, 1907
AGUEDA BENEDICTO DE LA RAMA, appellee,
vs.
ESTEBAN DE LA RAMA, appellant.

Ledesma, Sumulong & Quintos for appellant.

Coudert Brothers, Aylett R. Cotton & Lionel D. Hargis for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:
On July 5, 1902, the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo entered a final judgment in this
case, decreeing a divorce to the plaintiff on the ground of the husband's adultery, as well as the
payment of 81,042.76 pesos due her as her unpaid share of the property belonging to the conjugal
partnership, as well as the sum of 3,200 pesos as an allowance for their support since the date on
which the action was instituted.

From the judgment the defendant appealed to this court, which, on December 8, 1903, reversed the
decree of the Court of First Instance, incorporated in its opinion certain findings of fact, and ordered
judgment absolute that the complaint be dismissed. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34.)
Thereafter the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which on April 2, 1906,
reversed the judgment of this Court. (De la Rama, vs. De la Rama, 201, U. S., 303.) The opinion of
the supreme court of the United States concludes as follows:

We have reached the conclusion that there is no such preponderance of evidence in favor of the theory
of plaintiff’s guilt as authorized the Supreme Court to set aside the conclusions of the court below
upon the ground that these findings were plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence.
In this connection it is proper to bear in mind that the trial judge had all these witnesses before him
and doubtless formed his conclusions largely from their appearance on the stand, their manner of
giving testimony, and their apparent credibility. Under the circumstances we think the Supreme
Court should have affirmed rather than reversed the action of the lower court.

While the right of the plaintiff to her proportion of the original property, to alimony pending suit, and
to other allowances claimed is the basis of our jurisdiction, the decree of the Supreme Court in
dismissing plaintiff's petition renders it unnecessary to review the action of the Court of First Instance
in fixing the amount that it held plaintiff was entitled to recover. We are, therefore, of the opinion that
the decree of the Supreme Court dismissing the action must be reversed and the cause remanded to
that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

After the case had been remanded to this court, and on the 2nd of November, 1906, the plaintiff made
a motion that the judgment of the Court of First Instance be affirmed an order was made for the
submission of printed briefs upon certain questions of adultery. This court sustained those
assignments and said:

Our conclusion is that neither one of the parties is entitled to a divorce. The result makes in
unnecessary to consider that part of the judgment which relates to the settlement of the conjugal
partnership.

The action of this court upon those four assignments of error relating to adultery was reversed by the
Supreme Court of the United States, and by the decision of that court there were definitely disposed
of. The other assignment of error relates to that part of the decision of the Court of First Instance with
treats of the division of the conjugal property, the allowance of alimony, and the order of the court
below that the case be referred to the fiscal for criminal proceedings against the defendant. As has
been said, these assignments of error were not considered by this court in view of the result which it
reached upon the other assignments. Nor were they discussed by the Supreme Court of the United
States.

The claim of the appellant now is, however, that the whole case was finally disposed of by the decision
of the latter court, and that the only thing remaining for this court as to do is to affirm the judgment
of the Court of First Instance in its entirely.

With this view we cannot agree. The only thing considered by the Supreme Court of the United States
was that part of the decision of the Court of First Instance which related to the right of the plaintiff
to a divorce. It did not pass upon the division of the conjugal property. Its order was that the case be
remanded to this court for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. If the contention of
the plaintiff is true, it seems that the order of that court and affirming that of the Court of First
Instance. By remanding the case to this court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
opinion of the Supreme Court, it seems to have been the intention of that court that this court should
dispose of the assignments of error not already of.

The fifth assignment of error is as follows:

Se ha infringido el articulo 1418 y otros del Codigo Civil al admitir el Juzgado, dentro del presente
juicio, el avaluo y division efectiva de los supuestos bienes gananciales.

It was claimed by this defendant, in his brief in his original appeal to this court in support of this
assignment of error, that it was not proper to settle the affairs of the conjugal partnership in divorce
proceedings, and that no such settlement of a conjugal partnership could ever be made until there
had been a final judgment ordering the divorce, from which no appeal had been taken, or as to which
the time to appeal had expired, and in his argument in this court in the motion presented on the 2ds
of November, 1906, the repeats the same claim.

In our opinion, however, this assignment of error was disposed of by the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States. As was said in that decision, the jurisdiction of that court depended
entirely upon that part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance which directed the payment of
81,000 pesos. If the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to make any order for the payment of
money in a divorce proceeding, that part of the judgment would have to be eliminated. In taking
jurisdiction of the case the Supreme Court of the United States necessarily held that a liquidation of
the affairs of the conjugal partnership could be had in a divorce proceeding. The fifth assignment of
error, therefore, cannot be urged by the defendant.

The sixth assignment of error was as follows:

Ha incurrido en error en cuanto fija la cuantia de la mitad de dichos supuestos bienes gananciales
en 81,042 pesos y 75 centimos, sin haber tenido a la vista los antecedentes y datos necesarios y sin
haber tenido en cuenta ademas las perdidas sufridas y las deudas contraidas por la razon social Hijos
de I. de la Rama.

This assignment of error not having been considered either by the Supreme Court of the United States
or by his court, be sustained. The Civil Code states in detail the manner in which the affairs of a
conjugal partnership shall be settled after the same has been dissolved. Article 1418 provides, except
in certain cases not here important, that an inventory shall at once be made. We have held in the
case of Alfonso vs. Natividad 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 461), that when the partnership is dissolved by the death
of the husband this inventory be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate. And in the
case of Prado vs. Lagera 2 (5 Off. Gaz., 146), that the inventory thus formed must include the bienes
parafernales of the wife. It is very evident from the provisions of the Civil Code that the inventory
includes the capital of the husband, the dowry of the wife, in the second place the bienes parafernales
of the wife, in the third place the debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership, and in the fourth
place the capital of the husband. Articles 1424 and 1426 then provide as follows:

ART. 1424. After the deductions from the inventoried estate specified in the three preceding articles
have been made, the remainder of the same estate shall constitute the assets of the conjugal
partnership.

ART. 1426. The net remainder of the partnership property shall be divided, share, and share alike,
between the husband and wife, or their respective heirs.

It is thus seen that the conjugal property which is to be divided when the partnership is dissolved, is
determined not with reference to the income or profits, which may have been received during the
partnership by the spouses but rather by the amount of the actual property possessed by them at
such dissolution after making the deductions and payments aforesaid. This is positively provided by
article 1424.

An examination of the decision of the Court of First Instance shows that no attempt was made to
comply with any of these statutory provisions. No inventory of the partnership property existing at
the time of the trial, at which the liquidation was made, was ever formed. No provision was made for
paying to the wife the sum of 2,000 pesos, which was either the dowry or bienes parafernales of the
wife. No provision was made for returning to the husband his capital in the partnership, which
amounted to at least one third of the assets of the firm of hijos de I. de la Rama, which assets,
according to the inventory made January 30, 1901, amounted to 1,130,568 pesos. The court below
rejected entirely the method prescribed and in fact liquidated it, as appears from the decision, upon
an entirely different basis. He determined in the first place the income which each person had received
from his or her property, during the partnership, finding that the wife during that time had received
from her property 345 pesos as income and that the husband had received 162,430.53 pesos. He
then says:

The total value therefore of the conjugal partnership existing between the plaintiff and the defendant
in the present case amounts to 162,775,53 pesos. The words of the statute say that the same must
be divided share and share alike. The means that each should have 81,387.76 pesos. The wife already
having in her possession 345 pesos of this sum, she is entitled to receive from the husband 81,042.76
pesos as being the sum necessary to equalize the holdings of the property which, according to the
statute, must be regarded as belonging to the conjugal partnership.

It needs no argument to show that this manner of liquidating the affairs of the conjugal partnership
is entirely unwarranted by the law. The Theory of the Civil Code is that the conjugal property is the
actual property which is left at the dissolution of the partnership. It, can therefore, never be
determined by adding up the profits, which had been made each year during its existence, and then
saying that the result is the conjugal property. The difference between the two systems of liquidation
is well illustrated in this case., The court below found that the profits of the partnership of Hijos de
I. de la Rama from the time of its organization up to June 30, 1901, amounted to 290,101,31 pesos.
The evidence in this case shows, however, that the capital with which the firm started was 1,058.192
pesos, and that on June 30, 1901, the value of its entire property was 1,130,568 pesos, an increase
of only 72,376 pesos. Taking the method adopted by the court below, if the conjugal partnership had
been dissolved on June 30, 1901, it would have had as an asset one fourth of this sum of 290,101.31
pesos, but following the rule laid by the Civil Code it would have only had one fourth of 72,376 pesos,
the difference between the value of the property of said firm when it was organized and its value of
the 39th of June, 1901.

The other assignments of error were not urged in the last brief presented by the appellant and in any
event, we do not think they can be sustained.

The result is that part of the judgment of the Court of First Instance ordering the divorce, ordering
the payment of 3,200 pesos, Mexican currency, by the defendant to the plaintiff, and the costs of the
action, is affirmed. That part of it ordering the payment by the defendant to the plaintiff of 81,042.76
pesos, Mexican currency, is set aside, and the case is remanded to the court below for the purpose of
liquidating in this action the affairs of the conjugal partnership (considering the same to have been
dissolved on the 5th of July, 1902) in accordance with the rules laid down in the Civil Code, and a
judgment will be entered in that court for the amount which appears from such liquidation to be due
from the defendant to the plaintiff. No costs will be allowed to either party in this court.

After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith, and ten days
thereafter the record be remanded to the court from whence it came for execution.

SO ORDERED.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

This cause was originally tried in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo. A judgment was
there rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. The defendant appealed to this
court and the judgment was reversed. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States, were the judgment of this court was reversed, and the cause was remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States.

On the 9th day of November, 1906, the plaintiff presented a motion in this court asking that the
original judgment of the Court of First Instance be affirmed. The attorney for the defendant opposed
this motion, and this court ordered that the respective parties submit briefs. These briefs were duly
submitted and on the 23d day of January 1907, a majority of this court, after an examination of the
evidence adduced during the trial of said cause in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo,
decided that the inventory, made by the Court of First Instance, had not been made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code. We are of the opinion that this court has no right or authority
to examine the evidence adduced during the trial of said cause in the court below for the reason that
the defendant and appellant did not there make a property motion for a new trial, justifying this court
in examining the evidence. We are of the opinion that this court have no authority to examine the
evidence adduced during the trial in the Court of First Instance unless the appellant has made a
motion for a new trial in that court "upon the ground that the findings of fact are plainly and
manifestly against the weight of the evidence" (paragraph 3, section 497 of the Coddfe of Procedure
in Civil Actions), and the judge of the said lower court has overruled said motion, and the defendant
has duly excepted to such ruling.

By reference to the motion for a new trial presented in this cause in the court below, it will be seen
that the same was not based upon these grounds. We are of the opinion that the motion presented
for a new trial comes under the provisions of sections 145 and 146 of said code, and the overruling
of the same does not constitute a ground of exception upon which an appeal can be based for the
purpose of securing a reexamination of the evidence in this court.

Admitting, however, that said motion was sufficient to justify this court in examining the evidence,
we are of the opinion that even then the evidence adduced during the trial upon the question of the
conjugal property is sufficient to justify the conclusions of the said Court of First Instance and that
the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed in this particular. And, moreover, in view of the
fact that the defendant made no appearance in the Supreme Court of the United States when the
case was pending there, and made no defense when the very question was being considered by that
court which is presented to this court now, we are of the opinion that a new trial should not be
granted, and that the plaintiff, who is clearly entitled to the relief granted by the lower court, at the
close of the trial should not be further annoyed or kept out of that portion of the conjugal property to
which she is clearly entitled.

Torres, Mapa and Tracey, JJ., concurs.

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 17014. August 11, 1921]

MARIANO B. ARROYO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DOLORES C. VAZQUEZ DE ARROYO, Defendant-
Appellee.
Fisher & DeWitt for Appellant.
Powell & Hill for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. HUSBAND AND WIFE, SEPARATE MAINTENANCE OF WIFE. — Where the wife is forced to leave
the marital home by ill-treatment from her husband, he can be compelled to provide for her separate
maintenance, without regard to whether a cause for divorce exists or not.

2. ID.; ID.; NECESSITY FOR SEPARATION. — Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of
society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for
the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the anomalous de facto
separation of the spouses. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for
separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the
pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

3. ID.; ACTION BY HUSBAND FOR RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL. RIGHTS; WIFE ADMONISHED TO

RETURN. — In an action by the husband against a wife to obtain a restitution of conjugal rights, the
court entered a judicial declaration to the effect that the wife had absented herself from the marital
home without sufficient cause, and she was admonished that it was her duty to return. The court,
however, refrained from making an order absolute requiring her to return.

DECISION
STREET, J. :
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage
in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together
as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common
home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been made
by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by
him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The
defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband’s home
without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been
compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly, she in turn prayed for
affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership;
(3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause,
the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her
husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should
pay to the defendant’s attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the case.
The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the
husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished
sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of
marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof and are
of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is
afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to this
cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life.
In view of the decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make
the resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the
mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows
neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the
other to suspect illicit relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband
towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly
colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to
time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited
by the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital
home was without sufficient justification in fact.

In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant’s
cross-complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the
wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143
of the Civil Code. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned
upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce.
Accordingly, it has been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and
to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her
separate maintenance (Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252); and he may be required to pay the
expenses, including attorney’s fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation. (Mercado v.
Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.)

Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this
step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and
fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should
not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued
cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the
husband.

In Davidson v. Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent jurist, Judge
Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only
be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is the
only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in
Schindel v. Schindel (12 Md., 294).

In the State of South Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground,
the Supreme Court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance,
where it is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has
more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it appeared that the
husband’s alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife’s own improper conduct. (Rhame
v. Rhame, 1 McCord’s Chan. [S. Car. ], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597; Boyd v. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car. ], 144.)

Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical Court
in a case where cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife,
made use of the following eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding
for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a divorce cannot be obtained except on the
single ground of adultery and this, too, after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal
prosecution for that crime. Said he:

"That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the
question occurs, What is cruelty? . . .

"What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not
accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of
manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies
of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral
offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still, they are
not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for
it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the
consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent
conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence . . .

"The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the second virtue
of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of humanity simply, and of
humanity which confined its views merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a
question easily decided upon first impressions. Everybody must feel a wish to sever those who wish
to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and
consequently with any degree of happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings,
much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married persons shall not be legally
separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together . . .

"To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would
not be difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity
with that true wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For
though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial
cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered
that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people
understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn
to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become
good husbands and good wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is
a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes . . . In this case, as in many others, the
happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good." (Evans v.
Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)

In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded
and none of the relief sought therein can be granted.

The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove that the
plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and
that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit
with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which
may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.

The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in
the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring
the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of
law and morality. Of course, if such a decree were entered, in unqualified terms, the defendant would
be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present
writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for
the court to make such an order.

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts
of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights
to, the other. Of course, where the property-rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for
restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an
order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of those countries where the
courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained
suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts
were found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of contempt
in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal
rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such
orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the
Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of
adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained
by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the
growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured and in case
of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of
a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has
ever attempted to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and
that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed
his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Gahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was
based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It
was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of
the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the
alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects
then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all
income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to
the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would
be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional
and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile which is sought in the petitory
part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has
absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the
crossbill, it is declared that Dolores Vazquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home
without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved
from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.

SO ORDERED.

Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-23482. August 30, 1968.]

ALFONSO LACSON, Petitioner, v. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-23767. August 30, 1968.]

CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALFONSO LACSON, Defendant-Appellee.

[G.R. No. L-24259. August 30, 1968.]

ALFONSO LACSON, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CARMEN SAN JOSE-LACSON, Petitioner-Appellant.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for respondent-appellant Carmen San Jose-Lacson.
Norberto Quisumbing for petitioner-appellee Alfonso Lacson.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; HUSBAND AND WIFE; SEPARATION OF SPOUSES; SEPARATION OF PROPERTY AND
DISSOLUTION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; PROPRIETY OF THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT RELATIVE THERETO IN INSTANT CASE. — The law allows separation of property of
the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured
before hand. In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of
property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appear that they have creditors
who will be prejudiced by the said agreements. It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been
separated in fact for at least five years. Inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened between
them, the propriety of severing their financial and propriety interests is manifest.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF ON DE FACTO SEPARATION OF SPOUSES. — In so approving
the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership,
this Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses,
which — in the language of Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54. 60) — is a "state which is
abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned."

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CUSTODY OF CHILDREN; CHILD BELOW THE AGE OF 7 CANNOT BE SEPARATED
FROM ITS MOTHER; RATIONALE. — The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of
its article 363 that "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The rationale of this new provision was explained
by the Code Commission thus: "The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a
mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
`compelling reasons’ for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart
is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and
the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral
dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation."
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CFI ORDER AWARDING CUSTODY OF TWO CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE
OF 7 TO THEIR FATHER, VOID. — The order dated April 27, 1963, of the CFI, in so far as it awarded
custody of the two older children who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect
sought to separate them from their mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void because it
was clearly violative of Art. 363 of the Civil Code. Neither does the said award of custody fall within
the exception because the record is bereft of any compelling reason to support the lower court’s order
depriving the wife of her minor children’s company.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURTS TO DETERMINE WHICH SPOUSE HAS BETTER RIGHT TO CUSTODY
OF THE CHILDREN; CASE AT BAR. — It is clear that Art. 356 of the Civil Code grants to every child
rights which are not and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and
caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents’ say-so or mutual agreement
alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to
determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The
need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of
the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely
on the mutual agreement of the spouses — parents. To be sure, this was not a sufficient basis to
determine the fitness of each parent to be the custodian of the children.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CHILD OVER 10 CAN CHOOSE PARENT; EXCEPTION. — In the case at bar, at
least one of the children - Enrique, the eldest — is now eleven years of age and should be given the
choice of the parent he wishes to live with. This is the clear mandate of Sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules
of Court which permits a child, in case its mother and lather divorced or are living separately, "to
choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen
be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity,
or poverty . . ."

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPPORT OF P150.00 PER CHILD, INSUFFICIENT. — Although the spouses have
agreed upon the monthly support of P150.00 to be given by the petitioner spouse for each child, still
this Court must speak out its mind on the insufficiency of this amount. We take judicial notice of the
devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady skyrocketing of prices of all commodities, goods, and
services, not to mention the fact that all the children are already of school age. We believe, therefore,
that the CFI may increase this amount of P150.00 according to the needs of each child.
 DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
These three cases (G.R. L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259) involving the same parties pose a common
fundamental issue the resolution of which will necessarily and inescapably resolve all the other
issues. Thus, their joinder in this decision.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Alfonso Lacson (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner spouse) and Carmen San Jose-Lacson
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent spouse) were married on February 14, 1953. To them were
born four children, all alive.

On January 9, 1963, the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara Subdivision,
Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963, a complaint docketed
as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila (hereinafter referred to
as the JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as support for them and herself.

However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective attorneys, succeeded in reaching an
amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of property. On April
27, 1963, they filed a joint petition dated April 21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding 6978 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).

The important and pertinent portions of the petition, embodying their amicable settlement, read as
follows:

"3. Petitioners have separated last January 9, 1963, when petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson left
their conjugal home at the Santa Clara Subdivision, Bacolod City, did not return, and decided to
reside in Manila.

"4. Petitioners have mutually agreed upon the dissolution of their conjugal partnership subject to
judicial approval as required by Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — the particular terms
and conditions of their mutual agreement being as follows:

"(a) There will be separation of property — petitioner Carmen San Jose Lacson hereby waiving any
and all claims for a share in property that may be held by petitioner Alfonso Lacson since they have
acquired no property of any consequence.

"(b) Hereafter, each of them shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy such separate estate
as they may acquire without the consent of the other and all earnings from any profession, business
or industry as may be derived by each petitioner shall belong to that petitioner exclusively.
"(c) The custody of the two elder children named Enrique and Maria Teresa shall be awarded to
petitioner Alfonso Lacson and the custody of the younger children named Gerrard and Ramon shall
be awarded to petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson.

"(d) Petitioner Alfonso Lacson shall pay petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson a monthly allowance of
P300.00 for the support of the children in her custody.

"(e) Each petitioner shall have reciprocal rights of visitation of the children in the custody of the other
at their respective residences and, during the summer months, the two children in the custody of
each petitioner shall be given to the other except that, for this year’s summer months, all four children
shall be delivered to and remain with petitioner Carmen San Jose-Lacson until June 15, 1963 — on
which date, she shall return the two elder children Enrique and Maria Teresa to petitioner Alfonso
Lacson — this judgment of course being subject to enforcement by execution writ and contempt.

"5. Petitioners have no creditors.

"WHEREFORE, they respectfully pray that notice of this petition be given to creditors and third parties
pursuant to Article 191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and thereafter that the Court enter its
judicial approval of the foregoing agreement for the dissolution of then conjugal partnership and for
separation of property, except that the Court shall immediately approve the terms set out in
paragraph 4 above and embody the same in a judgment immediately binding on the parties hereto to
the end that any non-compliance or violation of its terms by one party shall entitle the other to
enforcement by execution writ and contempt even though the proceedings as to creditors have not
been terminated."

Finding the foregoing joint petition to be "conformable to law," the CFI (Judge Jose F. Fernandez,
presiding) issued an order on April 27, 1963, rendering judgment (hereinafter referred to as the
compromise judgment) approving and incorporating in toto their compromise agreement. In
compliance with paragraph 4(e) of their mutual agreement (par. 3[e] of the compromise judgment),
the petitioner spouse delivered all the four children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for
their support.

On May 7, 1963 the respondent spouse filed in the JDRC a motion wherein she alleged that she
"entered into and signed the . . . Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have immediate
custody of the . . . minor children who are all below the age of 7," and thereafter prayed that she "be
considered relieved of the . . . agreement pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children
. . . and that since all the children are now in her custody, the said custody in her favor be confirmed
pendente lite." On May 24, 1963, the petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and moved to dismiss
the complaint based, among other things, on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens. The JDRC,
on May 28, 1963, issued an order which sustained the petitioner spouse’s plea of bar by prior
judgment and lis pendens, and dismissed the case. After the denial of her motion for reconsideration,
the respondent spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-C.R. No. 32608-R) wherein
she raised, among others, the issue of validity or legality of the compromise agreement in connection
only with the custody of their minor children. On October 14, 1964, the Court of Appeals certified the
said appeal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-23767), since "no hearing on the facts was ever held in
the court below — no evidence, testimonial or documentary, presented — only a question of law pends
resolution in the appeal."

The respondent spouse likewise filed a motion dated May 15, 1963 for reconsideration of the
compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 rendered in special proceedings 6978 of the CFI, wherein
she also alleged, among others, that she entered into the joint petition as the only means by which
she could have immediate custody of her minor children, and thereafter prayed the CFI to reconsider
its judgment pertaining to the custody and visitation of her minor children and to relieve her from the
said agreement. The petitioner spouse opposed the said motion and, on June 1, 1963, filed a motion
for execution of the compromise judgment and a charge for contempt. The CFI (Judge Jose R.
Querubin, presiding), in its order dated June 22, 1963, denied the respondent spouse’s motion for
reconsideration, granted the petitioner spouse’s motion for execution, and ordered that upon "failure
on the part of Carmen San Jose-Lacson to deliver the said children [i.e., to return the two older
children Enrique and Maria Teresa in accordance with her agreement with Alfonso Lacson] to the
special sheriff on or before June 29, 1963, she may be held for contempt pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 39 Sections 9 and 10, and Rule 64 Section 7 of the (old) Rules of Court." From the aforesaid
compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963, and execution order dated June 22, 1963, the respondent
spouse interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 32798-R) wherein she likewise
questioned the validity or legality of her agreement with the petitioner spouse respecting custody of
their children. On February 11, 1965, the Court of Appeals also certified the said appeal to the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-24259), since "no evidence of any kind was introduced before the trial
court and . . . appellant did not specifically ask to be allowed to present evidence on her behalf."

The respondent spouse also instituted certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
No. 32384-R), now the subject of an appeal by certiorari to this Court (G.R. No. L-23482). In her
position certiorari dated June 27, 1963, she averred that the CFI (thru Judge Querubin) committed
grave abuse of discretion and acted in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate execution of
the compromise judgment in its order of June 22, 1963, thus in effect depriving her of the right to
appeal. She prayed for (1) the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents
therein and any person acting under them from enforcing, by contempt proceedings and other means,
the writ of execution issued pursuant to the order of the respondent Judge Querubin dated June 22,
1963 in special proceeding 6978 of the CFI, (2) the setting aside, after hearing, of the compromise
judgment dated April 27, 1963 and the order dated June 22, 1963, and (3) the awarding of the custody
of Enrique and Maria Teresa to her, their mother. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals issued ex parte
a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the order dated June 22, 1963, for
execution of the compromise judgment rendered in special proceeding 6978. The petitioner spouse
filed an urgent motion dated July 5, 1963, for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction ex
parte, which urgent motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated July 9, 1963.
The petitioner spouse likewise filed his answer. After hearing, the Court of Appeals on May 11, 1964
promulgated in said certiorari case (CA-G.R. No. 32384-R) its decision granting the petition for
certiorari and declaring null and void both (a) the compromise judgment dated April 27, 1963 in so
far as it relates to the custody and right of visitation over the two children, Enrique and Teresa and
(b) the order dated June 22, 1963 for execution of said judgment. The petitioner spouse moved to
reconsider, but his motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution
dated July 31, 1964. From the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July 31, 1964,
the petitioner spouse interposed an appeal to this Court, as above stated, and assigned the following
errors:
(1) The Court of Appeals erred in annulling thru certiorari the lower court’s order of execution of the
compromise judgment.

(2) The Court of Appeals erred in resolving in the certiorari case the issue of the legality of the
compromise judgment, which is involved in two appeals, instead of the issue of grave abuse of
discretion in ordering its execution.

(3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the compromise agreement upon which the judgment is
based violates Article 363 of the Civil Code.

As heretofore adverted, the a forecited three appeals converge on one focal issue: whether the
compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said
agreement, are conformable to law.

We hold that the compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded on the said agreement
are valid with respect to the separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership.

The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides:

"In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order." (Art. 190,
Italics supplied)

"The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of
the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons." (Art. 191., par.
4, Italics supplied)

In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appear that they have creditors who will be
prejudiced by the said arrangements.

It is likewise undisputed that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years — the wife’s
residence being in Manila, and the husband’s in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore,
inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their
financial and proprietary interests is manifest.
Besides, this Court cannot constrain the spouses to live together, as

" [I]t is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses
to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other . . . At best such an order can be effective for
no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of those
countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married couple
shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable." (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil.
54, 60)

However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership, this Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto
separation of the spouses, which — again in the language of Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, supra is a
"state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned." We would like to douse the
momentary seething emotions of couples who, at the slightest ruffling of domestic tranquillity —
brought about by "mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of
civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion" without more — would be
minded separating from each other. In this jurisdiction, the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (art. 109 New Civil
Code). There is, therefore, virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married couples — impelled
by no better cause than their whims and caprices — to abandon each other’s company.

". . . For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of
matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individuals, yet it must be carefully
remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When
people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they
learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wives from the necessity of remaining husbands and good wives; for
necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes . . .’ (Evans v. Evans, 1 Hag.
Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)" (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, Id., pp. 58-59).

We now come to the question of the custody and support of the children.

It is not disputed that it was the JDRC which first acquired jurisdiction over the matter of custody
and support of the children. The complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the JDRC was filed by
the respondent spouse on March 12, 1963, whereas the joint petition of the parties docketed as
special proceedings 6978 in the CFI was filed on April 27, 1963. However, when the respondent
spouse signed the joint petition on the same matter of custody and support of the children and filed
the same with the CFI of Negros Occidental, she in effect abandoned her action in the JDRC. The
petitioner spouse — who could have raised the issue of lis pendens in abatement of the case filed in
the CFI, but did not do so — had the right, therefore, to cite the decision of the CFI and to ask for the
dismissal of the action filed by the respondent spouse in the JDRC, on the grounds of res judicata
and lis pendens. And the JDRC acted correctly and justifiably in dismissing the case for custody and
support of the children based on those grounds. For it is no defense against the dismissal of the
action that the case before the CFI was filed later than the action before the JDRC, considering:
". . . [T]hat Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint that there is a prior pending
action. They provide only that there is a pending action, not a pending prior action." 1

We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in depriving the mother, the
respondent spouse, of the custody of the two older children (both then below the age of 7).

The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363 that "No mother shall
be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for
such measure." The rationale of this new provision was explained by the Code Commission, thus:

"The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her
child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for ’compelling reasons’ for the good
of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she
has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will
ordinarily be sufficient punishment for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation." (Report of the Code Commission,
p. 12)

The use of the word shall 2 in article 363 of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations made by
the Code Commission in respect to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It
prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless
such a separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court.

The order dated April 27, 1963, of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of the two older children
who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate them from their
mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void because clearly violative of article 363 of the
Civil Code.

Neither does the said award of custody fall within the exception because the record is bereft of any
compelling reason to support the lower court’s order depriving the wife of her minor children’s
company. True, the CFI stated in its order dated June 22, 1963, denying the respondent spouse’s
motion for reconsideration of its order dated April 27, 1963, that

". . . If the parties have agreed to file a joint petition, it was because they wanted to avoid the exposure
of the bitter truths which serve as succulent morsel for scandal mongers and idle gossipers and to
save their children from embarrassment and inferiority complex which may inevitably stain their lives
. . . If the parties agreed to submit the matter of custody of the minor children to the Court for
incorporation in the final judgment, they purposely suppressed the ’compelling reasons for such
measure’ from appearing in the public records. This is for the sake and for the welfare of the minor
children."
But the foregoing statement is at best a mere hint that there were compelling reasons. The lower
court’s order is eloquently silent on what these compelling reasons are. Needless to state, courts
cannot proceed on mere insinuations; they must be confronted with facts before they can properly
adjudicate.

It might be argued — and correctly that since five years have elapsed since the filing of these cases
in 1963, the ages of the four children should now be as follows: Enrique — 11, Maria Teresa — 10,
Gerrard — 9, and Ramon — 5. Therefore, the issue regarding the award of the custody of Enrique
and Maria Teresa to the petitioner spouse has become moot and academic. The passage of time has
removed the prop which supports the respondent spouse’s position.

Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the couple’s agreement regarding the custody of the
children.

Article 356 of the new Civil Code provides;

"Every child:

(1) Is entitled to parental care;

(2) Shall receive at least elementary education;

(3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian;

(4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development."

It is clear that the above quoted legal provision grants to every child right which are not and should
not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare
should not be subject to the parents’ say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the
parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child
can better be assured the rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence
regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such
evidence was introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the
spouses’ parents. To be sure, this was not sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to
be the custodian of the children.

Besides, at least one of the children — Enrique, the eldest — is now eleven years of age and should
be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with. This is the clear mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99
of the Rules of Court which states, inter alia:
". . . When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the
question as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before
a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each child as will be for
its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten
years of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral
depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty . . ." (Italics supplied)

One last point regarding the matter of support for the children — assuming that the custody of any
or more of the children will be finally awarded to the mother. Although the spouses have agreed upon
the monthly support of P150.00 to be given by the petitioner spouse for each child, still this Court
must speak out its mind on the insufficiency of this amount. We take judicial notice of the devaluation
of the peso in 1962 and the steady skyrocketing of prices of all commodities, goods, and services, not
to mention the fact that all the children are already of school age. We believe, therefore, that the CFI
may increase this amount of P150 according to the needs of each child.

With the view that we take of this case, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors assigned
in the three appeals.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision dated May 11, 1964, and the resolution dated July 31, 1964 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. 32384-R (subject-matter of G.R. L-23482), and the orders dated May
28, 1963 and June 24, 1963 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court (subject-matter of G.R.
No. 23767) are affirmed. G.R. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental for further proceedings in accordance with this decision. No pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Sanchez and Fernando, JJ., did not take part.