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THIRD DIVISION

BERTENI CATALUNA G.R. No. 258524

CAUSING,
Petitioner, Present:

CAGUIOA, J., Chairperson,

INTING,
GAERLAN,
versus - DIMAAMPAO, and
SINGH,JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
QUEZON ITY, BRANCH 93,
OFFICE OF
I
THE CITY
PROSECUT(])R OF QUEZON
CITY, AND !REPRESENTATIVE
FERDINANrt LEDESMA
HERNANDE/Z OF THE SECOND
DISTRICT OF SOUTH Promulgated:
COTABATO,
Respondents. October 11, 2023
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - \,X, ~~\.a,..~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

DECISION

INTING, J.:

This resplves the Petition for Certiorari 1 (Petition) filed under Rule
65 of the Ruips of Court, seeking the annulment of the Orders dated
October 5, 20 1, 2 and November 15, 2021 ,3 both issued by Branch 93,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Quezon City in Criminal Cases Nos. R-QZN-
21-04099 and R-QZN-21-04100 (Cyber Libel Cases). The RTC denied

1
Rollo, pp. 7- 57
1
Id. at 195- 198. enned by Presiding Judge Arthur 0 . Malabaguio.
3
/d.atl91-193 .
Decision 2 G.R. No. 258524

· the Motion to Quash 4 filed by pet1t10ner Berteni Catalufia Causing

(Causing) in the Order dated October 5, 2021, and denied his Motion for
Reconsideration5 in the Order dated November 15, 2021.

The Antecedents

On December 16, 2020, respondent Ferdinand L. Hernandez

(Hernandez), a duly elected member of the House of Representatives of
the Second District of South Cotabato, filed his Complaint-Affidavit6 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP Quezon City)
charging Causing with Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4)7 ofRepublic Act
No. (RA) 10175,8 or the "Cybercrime Prevention Act of2012," in relation
to Articles 353 9 and 355 10 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Hernandez narrated his recent

discovery that on February 4, 2019, and April 29, 2019, Causing uploaded
several posts on Facebook, a social media platform, which made it appear
that he stole public funds intended for Marawi siege victims. Hernandez
averred that Causing's Facebook posts in a public profile page maligned
and discredited him by portraying him as a thief unworthy of trust and
public office. 11

Causing submitted his Counter-Affidavit 12 to the OCP Quezon City,

4
Id. at 95-113.
Id. at 62-83.
6 Id. at2!0-219.
7 Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No. IO 175 provides:
SECTION 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(4) Libel. -The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means
which may be devised in the future.
Approved on September 12, 2012.
9 Article 353 of the RPC provides:
ART. 353. Definition oflibei. -A libel is a public and malicious imputation ofa crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natura1 or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
10
Article 355 of the RPC provides:
Art. 355. Libel by means ofwritings or similar means. -A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibitio?,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prisi6n correccional m
its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from Forty thousand pesos (P40,000) to
One million two hundred thousand (P 1,200,000), or both, in addition to the civil action which
may be brought by the offended party.
11 Rollo, pp. 210--212.
12 Id. at 230-263.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 258524

followed by Hernandez's Reply-Affidavit. 13

After a finding of probable cause, the OCP Quezon City filed with
the RTC two separate Informations 14 both dated May 10, 2021, charging
Causing with two (2) counts of Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA
10175 in relation to Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, docketed as Criminal
Case No. R-QZN-21-04099 and Criminal Case No. R-QZN-21-04100,
viz.:

Criminal Case No. R-OZN-21-04099

The undersigned accuses BERTENI CAUSING y

CATALUNA of Violation of Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act No.
10175 in relation to Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on the 4 th day of February 2019 in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, through the use of a computer
system, a device which, pursuant to a program, is capable of automated
processing of data and is connected to a network of other similar
devices, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty and integrity
and reputation of one FERDINAND L. HERNANDEZ, a member of
the House of Representative (sic), representing the Second District of
South Cotabato, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, scandal,
ridicule and disgrace, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and publicly impute on the latter, through posting and
sharing a video of Radyo Inquirer News Report on the personal
Facebook account under the profile name "Berteni Catalufia Causing"
and on a public group Facebook account under the name "Berteni ' Toto'
Catalufia Causing" which is of general circulation, with the following
defamatory remarks directed to said offended party, to wit:

"PLEASE LJKE & SHARE

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

KATARUNGAN

Hindi titigil ang sigaw ng katarungan dahil sa

pagnanakaw ng P226 milyon mula sa relief goods
para sa Marawi evacuees.

Dahil tinanggal ng Radyo Inquirer itong video sa

kanilang website, ini-upload ko ito para patuloy na
mapapanood ng lahat ang pagsampa ng kasong
PLUNDER o HIGANTENG PAGMANAKAW (sic)
laban sa Region 12 DSWD Director Bai Zorahaida
Taha at South Cotabato Co[n]gressman Dinand
HemaRdez.

13
Id. at 289--30+
14 Id. at 204-20~.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 258524

Mabuti na Jang na nai-record ko."

which libelous statements had for its object to impute a defect, real or
imaginary to those who read and watch it of said offended party, that
Congressman Ferdinand L. Hernandez, is a plunderer and a thief of
the Php225 Million allotted for the Marawi victims, to said offended
party's damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 15 (Emphasis in the original)

Criminal Case No. R-OZN-21-04100

The undersigned accuses BERTENI CAUSING y

CATALUNA of Violation of Section 4 (c)(4) of Republic Act No.
10175 in relation to Articles 353 and 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on the 29 th day of April 2019 in Quezon City, Philippines,

the above-named accused, through the use of a computer system, a
device which, pursuant to a program, is capable of automated
processing of data is connected to a network of other similar devices,
with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty and integrity and
reputation of one FERDINAND L. HERNANDEZ, a member of the
House of Representative (sic), representing the Second District of
South Cotabato, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, scandal,
ridicule and disgrace, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and publicly impute on the latter, through re-posting his
February 4, 2019 post on the personal Facebook account under the
profile name "Berteni Catalufia Causing" and on a public group
Facebook account under the name "Berteni 'Toto' Cataluiia Causing"
which is of general circulation, with the following defamatory remarks
directed to said offended party, to wit:

"KAMPON NG MGA MAGNANAKAW

HUWAG KALIMUTAN ANG NAGNAKAW NG

PERA NG BAKWIT MARAWI na sina Dinand
Hernandez, Zorahayday Taha, Maria Virginia
Hernandez-Villaruel, at ang kanilang mga kasama na
kampon ng demonyo.

Ninakaw nila ang P225 million na pera ng mga

Maranao na . biktima ng giyera sa Marawi sa
pamamagitan ng pag-OVERPRICE sa pagkain.

Ang isang pack ng pagkain, ay NIYARI ng Tacurong

Fitmart at DSWD Region XU na emergency bidding.
Pinalabas nila na P515.00 ang halaga ng isang food
pack. Pero kung bilhin mo ang mga items sa nasabing
food pack directa sa Tacurong Fitmart, nagkahalaga

15 Id. at 204-206.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 258524

lamang ng P270.50 kada isang pack at idagdag na

lang dito ang P48 na tuyo o bulad."

which libelous statements had for its object to impute a defect, real or
imaginary to those who read and watched it of said offended party,
that Congressman Ferdinand L. Hernandez, is part of a gang of thieves
who have stolen Php225 Million Pesos (sic) allotted for the Marawi
victims by overpricing the cost of the relief goods and pocketing the
money, to said offended party's damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 16 (Emphasis in the original)

On June 28, 2021, Causing filed his Motion to Quash, 17 praying that
the Informations in the Cyber Libel Cases be quashed on the ground of
prescription. In his motion, Causing argued that Section 4(c )( 4) of RA
10175 did not create any new crime but merely recognized a computer
system as another means of committing Libel as defined and penalized
under Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC. He averred that paragraph 4,
Article 90 18 of the RPC should be applied to determine the prescriptive
period of Cyber Libel, arguing that the crime prescribes in one (1) year,
counted from the date of the publication of the allegedly libelous
statements.

Causing pointed to the fact that, as stated in the Informations, the

purportedly libelous Facebook posts were uploaded on February 4, 2019,
and April 29, 2019. However, the Complaint-Affidavit of Hernandez was
filed with the OCP Quezon City only on December 16, 2020, or more than
one year from the date when the subject Facebook posts were uploaded.
Thus, according to Causing, the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against
him have prescribed.

Causing further challenged the Court's ruling in Tolentino

v. People 19 (Tolentino). While he recognized that Tolentino applied
paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC and held that Cybel Libel prescribes in

16
Id. at 207-209.
17
Id. at 95-113.
18
Article 90 of the RPC provides:
ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. - Crimes punishable by death, reclusi6n perpetua or rec/-usi6n
temporal shall prescribe in twenty years.
Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.
Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.
xxxx
The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.
The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.
Light offenses prescribe in two months.
When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of
the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.
19
G.R. No. 240310 (Notice), August 6, 2018.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 258524

15 years, he argued that Tolentino is not a binding precedent because it is

an unsigned resolution. 20

The Ruling of the RTC

In the assailed Order 21 dated October 5, 2021, the RIC denied

Causing's Motion to Quash for lack of merit. It refused to apply Article
90 of the RPC to determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel because
it only applies suppletorily to special laws such as RA 10175. It pointed
out that because Cyber Libel is penalized by RA 10175, which does not
provide a prescriptive period for the said crime, the period must be
determined based on Section 122 of Act No. 332623 in relation to Section
624 of RA 10175. With these provisions of laws, the RIC concluded that
Cyber Libel prescribes in 12 years. 25

The RIC continued that even if Article 90 of the RPC is applied

suppletorily, Section 6 ofRA 10175 increased the penalty for Cyber Libel
by one degree than that prescribed by the RPC, or to prision correccional
in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, which is
considered afflictive under Article 25 26 of the RPC. Thus, as concluded by
the RIC, assuming that the RPC may be applied suppletorily to Cyber
Libel, paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC is controlling, which makes
Cyber Libel prescribe in 15 years. Because Hernandez filed his

20
Rollo, pp. 101-102.
21
Id. at 195-198.
22
Section 1 of Act No. 3326 states:
SECTION I. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offences punished only by a
fine or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those
punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years
for those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but Jess than six years; and (d) after
twelve years for any other offence punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the
crime of treason, which shall prescribe after twenty years: Provided, however, That all offences
against any law or part oflaw administered by the Bureau oflnternal Revenue shall prescribe after
five years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
Violations of the regulations or conditions of certificates of public convenience issued by the Public
Service Commission, shall prescribe after two months.
23 Entitled "An Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts
And Municipal Ordinances And To Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run," approved on
December 4, 1926.
24
Section 6 of RA 10175 states:
SECTION 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special
laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies
shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special Jaws, as the case may be.
25
Rollo, p. 197.
26 Article 25 of the RPC enumerates afl:lictive penalties, as follows: 1) reclusion perpetua; 2)
reclusion temporal; 3) perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification; 4) perpetual or temporary
special disqualification; and 5) prision mayor.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 258524

Complaint-Affidavit on December 17, 2020, 27 or just a few weeks from

his discovery of the purported crimes, the RTC concluded that the two
counts of Cyber Libel charged against Causing have not prescribed.

The RTC thus denied Causing's Motion to Quash, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Quash

Based on Lack of Jurisdiction over the Offense Charged and that the
Criminal Action has been Extinguished filed by the accused Atty.
Berteni Catalufia Causing is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

Let the arraignment of the accused proceed on 24 November

2021 at 8:30 in the morning through videoconference hearing.

Parties are hereby directed to furnish the court's official e-mail

address ([email protected]) with their email address for
them to be able to join the next hearing through videoconferencing.

SO ORDERED. 28 (Emphasis omitted; italics in the original)

Causing filed his Motion for Reconsideration, 29 but the RTC denied
it in the assailed Order30 dated November 15, 2021.

Thus, the present Petition.

Petitioners Arguments

In his Petition,31 Causing submits that the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying his Motion to Quash by applying Section 1 of Act
No. 3326 and paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC to determine the
prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. He argues that Act No. 3326 cannot
apply to crimes which are defined and penalized by the RPC. Citing the
Decision32 (Disini Decision) in Disini v. Secretary of Justice 33 (Disini),
Causing reiterates his argument in his Motion to Quash that RA 10175 did
not create a new crime but merely created qualifying circumstances and
increased the penalty for the felony of Libel, as defined under Article 353
in relation to Article 355 of the RPC, when committed through a computer

27
It must be noted, however, that the Complaint-Affidavit of Hernandez bears the date of December
16, 2020 and subscribed to under oath before the OCP Quezon City on said date. (Rollo, pp. 210-
219)
28
Id. at 198.
29
Id. at 62-83.
30
Id. at 191-193.
31
Id. at 7-57.
32
Disini v. Secretary ofJustice, 727 Phil. 28 (2014).
33
Disini v. Secretary ofJustice, 733 Phil. 717 (2014).
Decision · 8 G.R. No. 258524

system. 34

Causing further avers that instead of paragraph 2, Article 90 of the

RPC, paragraph 4 thereof should have been applied by the RTC to
determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel. He argues that pursuant
to the said provision of law, Cyber Libel prescribes in one year counted
from the date of publication; thus, the charges against him have already
prescribed. 35 He again poses a challenge against Tolentino, insisting that
it is not a binding precedent for being an unsigned resolution. Hence, the
Tolentino ruling on 15 years as the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel
based on paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC does not apply in his case. 36

On a procedural matter, Causing insists that he filed his Petition

directly with the Court because the issues he raised therein are purely legal,
particularly, the correct interpretation of criminal laws on prescription of
Cyber Libel. He thus prays for the Court to give due course to his Petition
and rule on its merits. 37

Respondents' Arguments

In its Comment, 38 the People, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), argues that: (]) the present Petition is an improper remedy
from the RTC's denial of the Motion to Quash; instead, Causing's remedy
is to enter his plea and proceed to trial on the merits in the Cyber Libel
Cases; 39 (2) the Petition must be dismissed because Causing disregarded
the hierarchy of courts without providing any exceptional circumstance
warranting direct resort to the Court; 40 (3) the RTC correctly applied the
applicable laws on prescription of Cyber Libel as its ruling is consistent
with Tolentino; and (4) Tolentino, though an unsigned resolution, serves
34
Rollo, pp. 11-12.
35
Id. at 36-39.
36
Id. at 12-14.
37
Id. at 10-1 I.
38 In the Court's Resolution dated March 9, 2022, the respondents were directed to file their Comment
on the Petition within 10 days from notice. (Id. at 186-187) The OSG filed its Motion for Extension
of Time to File Comment and prayed that it be given a period ofuntil October 7, 2021 within which
to file its Comment. (Id. at 350-352) Hernandez likewise filed his Motion for Extension of Time
to File Comment, praying that he be granted a period ofuntil August 30, 2022 within which to file
his Comment. (Id. at 369--373) Both motions for extension oftime were granted by the Court. (Id.
at 375-377) However, none of the respondents submitted their Comment within the period of
extension granted by the Court.
The Court subsequently received the OSG's Motion to Admit with Attached Comment, where it
admitted that it was unable to file its Comment within the period of extension allowed but prayed
for the Court to exercise liberality and admit the Comment. (Id. at 378--401) In the interest ofjustice,
the Court admits the OSG's Comment and considers the same in the resolution of the present
Petition.
39
Id. at 388-392.
40 Id. ar 392-394.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 258524

as a binding precedent pursuant to Eizmendi v. Fernandez41 (Eizmendi,

Jr.). 42

Hernandez did not file any comment on the Petition despite his
previous motion 43 for an extension of time to file it which the Court
granted. 44 Hence, the Court deems Hernandez to have waived the
submission of such pleading and now proceeds to resolve the case at hand.

The Issues

The issues before the Court are:

I. Whether the Petition should be dismissed outright for

being an improper remedy against the RTC's denial
of the Motion to Quash and for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts;

II. Whether Article 90 of the RPC or Section 1 of Act No.

3326 determines prescription of Cyber Libel; and

III. Whether the two counts of Cyber Libel charged

against Causing have prescribed.

These issues shall be resolved in seriatim.

The Court's Ruling

The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit. As will be later
discussed at length, prescription is a matter of defense that requires the
presentation of evidence. Hence, the RTC is correct in denying Causing's
Motion to Quash.

I. Exceptional circumstances warrant

the filing of the present Petition
directly with the Court against the
RTC 's denial of the Motion to Quash.

41
839 Phil. 902 (2019).
42
Rollo, pp. 394-398.
43
Id. at 369-373.
44
Id. at 375--377.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 258524

On a procedural matter, the OSG is correct that a certiorari petition

is ordinarily an inappropriate remedy from the denial of a motion to
quash. 45 Nevertheless, the Court may relax the application of this
procedural rule in order to promote public welfare and public policy,
among others. 46 Here, the Court recognizes the utmost importance of
resolving the substantive issues raised by Causing and takes this
opportunity to review and revisit the ruling in Tolentino regarding the
prescriptive period of Cyber Libel and the reckoning date thereof for the
guidance of the bench and the bar.

Causing's direct resort to the Court, too, is warranted under the

circumstances of the case considering that the Petition specifically raises
purely legal matters and calls for the Court's exercise of its power to
overturn binding precedents.

Certainly, regional trial courts, the Court of Appeals (CA), and the
Court share original and concurrent jurisdiction in the issuance of writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. 47
However, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts prevents parties from
randomly selecting which among these forums their actions will be
directed. 48 Thus, as a rule, direct resort to the Court is improper because
the Supreme Court is a court oflast resort and must remain so in order for
it to satisfactorily perform its constitutional functions. 49

Nevertheless, the principle of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad

rule and there are well-recognized exceptions to its application. 50 Thus,

45 Keh v. People, 877 Phil. 76, 83 (2020).

46 In Navaja v. De Castro, 76 I Phil. 142, 160-16 I (2015), the Court enumerated the exceptions to the
prohibition against the filing of a petition for certiorari assailing the denial of a motion to quash,
as follows: (a) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion; (b) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief; (c) in the interest of a more enlightened and
substantial justice; (d) to promote public welfare and public policy; and (e) when the cases have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration
thereof.
47 Governor Villafuerte v. Mayor Cordial, Jr., 876 Phil. 419,426 (2020).
48 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. The local Government ofQ.C., 842 Phil. 864,
877-878 (2018).
49 Palafox, Jr. v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 2095S1, February 15, 2021, citing Dy v. Judge Bibat-Palamos,
717 Phil. 776,782 (2013).
50 In Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. The Local Government ofQ.C., supra, the
exceptions to the principle of hierarchy of courts were enumerated as follows: (1) when genuine
issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves
transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are
better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review
involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public

f)!
Decision 11 G.R. No. 258524

the Court has given due course to petitions for certiorari directly filed
with the Court because the issues raised therein are purely legal, even
though the assailed orders were rendered by the trial courts and the CA is
ordinarily the more appropriate forum for such petitions. 51 Direct resort to
the Court has likewise been recognized when the writ of certiorari prayed
for relates to the Supreme Court's role in promulgating doctrinal devices
and leading the judiciary, by either overturning or reiterating prior rulings,
taking into consideration new circumstances or confusions of bench or
bar. 52

The Petition presents exceptional circumstances that justify its

direct filing with the Court.

First, the Petition raises issues on prescription of a crime that are

purely legal in nature. Relevantly, the Court has held that prescription may
be a question of law ifit involves doubt or controversy as to what the law
is on a given state of facts and there is no need to determine the veracity
of factual matters as regards the date when the period to bring the action
commenced to run. 53

Here, the Petition does not pray for the Court to review factual
matters by re-examining or re-evaluating evidence in the proceedings a
quo. Instead, it raises issues on the correct interpretation of Section 4( c)(4)
of RA 10175 and the law that should apply in setting the prescriptive
period of Cyber Libel - be it paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC where the
prescriptive period is one year, as argued by Causing; Section 1, Act No.
3326 where the prescriptive period is 12 years, as determined by the RTC;
or paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC where the prescriptive period is 15
years, as held in Tolentino. The interpretation and application of these laws
is purely legal. 54

Second, the Petition behooves the Court to either break new ground
or reiterate its ruling in Tolentino. To recall, the Court in Tolentino held
that a criminal complaint for Cyber Libel filed on August 8, 2017 based
on a Facebook post dated April 29, 2015, or more than two (2) years from
publication, was filed within the prescriptive period because Section 6 of

welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the. order
complained of was a patent nullity; and (I 0) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate
remedy.
51
See Governor Villafuerte v. Mayor Cordial, Jr., supra note 47, at 427.
52
The Diocese ofBacolodv. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 329-331 (2015).
53
De Jesus v. Uyloan, G.R. No. 234851, February 15, 2022.
54
See Mangaliag v. Judge Catubig-Pastoral, 510 Phil. 637, 646-{;47 (2005) and Municipality of
Cain/a, Rizal v. Spouses Brana, 870 Phil. I, 9-10, where it was held that the correct application of
law or jurisprudence to a given set of facts, as well as the interpretation and application of the law,
is a pure question of law.
Decision 12 . G.R. No. 258524

RA 10175 made the penalty for Cyber Libel afflictive, making the said
crime prescribe in 15 years under paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC.

Causing argues that Tolentino is not a binding precedent because it

is an unsigned resolution. This is wrong. As pointed out by the OSG,
Eizmendi, Jr. already settles this issue by holding that an unsigned
resolution, like Tolentino, constitutes a binding precedent if it states
clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based and is not a
mere dismissal of a petition for failure to comply with formal and
substantive requirements. 55

Hence, the Court's ruling on the present Petition will resolve with
finality the stream of conflicting opinions of the bench and bar on the
provisions of laws that must be applied in setting the prescriptive period
of Cyber Libel - by ,either reiterating Tolentino or overturning it based on
the Court's evaluation and interpretation of the relevant statutes. Because
it is only the Court that has the power to overturn its prior rulings,
Causing's direct resort to the Court is justified.

The Court now rules on the merits of the Petition.

JJA. RA 10175 did not create a new crime

but merely implements the RPC's
provisions on libel when written
defamatory remarks are published
through a computer system.

The applicable laws on prescription of criminal offenses defined

and penalized under the RPC are found in Articles 90 and 91 of the
same Code; for those penalized by special laws which do not provide their
own prescriptive period, Act No. 3326 applies. 56 Thus, for the Court to
resolve the issue of whether Act No. 3326 or the RPC applies to Cyber
Libel, it must first determine whether Cyber Libel is a crime defined and
penalized by the RPC or by RA 10175, which is a special law.

The RTC concluded that Cyber Libel is penalized by RA IO 175, a

special law, and thus, applied Act No. 3326. Causing disagrees with the
RTC and submits that Cyber Libel is a crime defined by the RPC; hence,
the provisions of the RPC govern its prescriptive period .

" Rollo, pp. 395--398.

56 Atty Salvador i: Hon Desierro, 464 Phil. 988, 994-995 (2004).
Decision 13. G.R. No. 258524

The Court rules in favor of Causing. Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175

merely implements the RPC's provisions on Libel under Articles 353 and
355 thereof when it is committed through a computer system. Thus, in
determining the prescriptive period ofCyber Libel, the RPC, not Act No.
3326, should be applied.

First, a textual analysis of Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 readily

reveals that the special law did not create any new crime. Instead, it merely
enforces Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the RPC on Libel when
committed "through a computer system or any other similar means which
may be devised in the future." Verily, in defining the act to be punished,
RA 10175 itself refers to Article 355 of the RPC, viz.:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. - The following acts

constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. - The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in

Article 355 ofthe Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through
a computer system or any other similar means which may be devised
in the future. (Italics supplied)

Second, the Court could not have been more categorical in its Disini
Decision: Cyber Libel is not a new crime because Article 353, in relation
to Article 355 of the RPC, already punishes it. The offense under Section
4(c)(4) ofRA 10175 and felony under Article 355 of the RPC are one and
the same crime with the same elements. RA 10175 simply recognizes a
computer system as "similar means" of publication and makes the use of
information and communications technology (ICT) in the commission of
Libel as a qualifying circumstance:

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to
Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4( c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
"'similar means" for committing libel.

xxxx
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through
the Internet a qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points
Decision 14 G.R. No. 258524

out, there exists a substantial distinction between crimes committed

through the use of information and communications technoiogy and
similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology
in question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach
far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore,
creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

xxxx

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the

published material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online
or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4)
of R.A. l Ol 75 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one
and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
under Section.4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished
under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer
system as another means of public<\tion. Charging the offender under
both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.57

In resolving the motion for reconsideration of the Disini Decision,58

the Court reiterated that Cyber Libel is not a new' crime for it is
"essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised Penal
Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace."59

Finally, even the lawmakers recognized that RA 10175 did not

create a new crime of cyber or online Libel because it is already defined
by the RPC. In passing Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, they acknowledged
that the RPC is a very old law dating back to the Spanish occupation,
where the legislators could not have contemplated the use of technologies
not yet existing at that time, such as a computer system, to publish libelous
statements. 60 With RA 10175, the law recognizes computer systems and
ICT as novel means of committing Libel. 61 Thus, by including a specific
RPC provision in RA 10175, the legislators intended to implement
existing laws on Libel when the defamatory remarks are made online,
which are "just online versions of actual criminal activities in the real

57 Disini -i'. Secretary of.Justice, supra note 32, at 114-115 and 125--127.
58 Resolution (Disini Resuluiion) of the Court in Disini v. Secretary ofJustice, supra note 33.
59
Id.at741.
60 Minutes of the Bicameral Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 5808 and
Senate Bill No. 2796 (Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012), Committee on Information and
Communications Technology, May 31, 2012, pp. 268--275:
Senator Edgardo J Angara (Chairperson, Senate PaneO. Well, as you know, the Penal Code is
reaHy a very, very old Code. In fact, it dates back in Spanish time and we amend[ed] it through
several congresses. So like child pornography, this is a new crjme, cybersex is a new crime.
Libel through the use of computer system is a /novel] wcry ofslandering and maligning people
xx x. (Italics supplied)
61 Id.
Decision 15 G.R. No. 258524

world." 62

The foregoing irrefragably shows that RA 10175 did not create a

new crime of Cyber Libel but merely enforces the felony of Libel as
already defined and penalized by Articles 353 and 355 of the RPC, when
it is committed with the use of a computer system. Otherwise stated, RA
10175 simply identifies a computer system as a means of publishing
libelous statements and increases the penalty for Libel by one degree
higher than that prescribed by the RPC when the crime is committed with
the use ofICT. Cyber Libel is therefore a crime defined and penalized by
theRPC.

!J.B. Articles 90 and 91 of the RPC, not

Section 1 of Act No. 3326, define the
prescriptive period ofCyber Libel.

Considering that Cyber Libel is a crime defined and penalized by

the RPC, the latter governs in determining the prescriptive period ofCyber
Libel.

Act No. 3326 is not controlling because Section 1,63 in relation to

Section 3 64 thereof, makes the said law applicable only if the offense is
defined and penalized by a special law without its own prescriptive period,
and not when the crime is already defined and penalized by the RPC.

62
Minutes of Second Reading of House Bill No. 5808, "An Act Defining Cybercrime, Providing for
the Prevention, Investigation, Suppression and the Imposition of Penalties Therefor and for Other
Purposes," May 9, 2012, pp. 202v208:
Representative Sigfrido R. Tinga (Tinga). Well, the idea, Madam Speaker, when the law was
being crafted was that we saw all the various anti-cybercrime bills. There wa5 a move to include
this as part of the Anti-Cybercrime Bill. And as we saw that in the physical world, libel is a
crime, why should it not be in the online world? If we were not to include this in the bill, it
would be its own bill at some point in time anyway. We see this as - and all of these can be
abused just like any law in this land.
I understand the concerns of my honorable colleague. But at the end of the day, if you look at
what we are defining as a crime, and that has not been brought out by my honorable colleague,
it ts actually defined as a criminal activity in the real world. Whether it is abused by individuals,
whether it is abused by the State or whether it is abused by the courts remain to be seen. Just as
any bill or law that is filed in this House has the potential for being abused.
So my concern, Madam Speaker, is not whether - does not deal with whether this should be
included or not. It actually deals Yrith the question, "Are these actually laws existing now that
we reported online?" And the answer is "yes." There are exist,ing laws with regards to
det'"amation and libel in the real world. So the fact that it was reported online should not be a
c;ncern because the abuse in the real world and abuse online, it's the same thing. (Italics
supplied.)
o3
Disini v. Secretary of.Justice, supra note 32.
64
Section 3 of Act No. 3326 states:
SECTION 3. Fer the purposes of tl1is Act, special acts shalJ h~ acts dd:ining and penalizing
violations of the law not included in the Penal Code
Decision 16 G.R. No. 258524

Even assuming arguendo that Cyber Libel is considered as an

offense that is defined and penalized by Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, a
special law without its own prescriptive period, the law's direct reference
to Article 355 of the RPC precludes the automatic application of Act No.
3326 to define its prescriptive period. Instead, the Court must examine
both Section 1, Act No. 3326 and Article 90 of the RPC, determine which
statutory provision has the shortest prescriptive period and is most
favorable to the accused, and apply the latter in setting the prescription of
Cyber Libel. This is based on the settled rule that statutory provisions on
the prescription of crimes must be construed in favor of the accused. 65

People v. Terrado 66 (Terrado) is apropos. In that case, the accused

were charged with Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171 of
the RPC because they supposedly submitted false affidavits to the Bureau
of Lands in support of a claim regarding lands of the public domain
sometime in 1952 and 1953. The Informations were filed in 1962, or more
than eight years from the date of the alleged commission of the crimes.
The accused in Terrado argued that the charges against them have
prescribed because they constituted violations of Section 129 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, as amended, which states that any
person who submits such false affidavits "shall be deemed guilty of
perjury and punished as such." They contended that Section 1 of Act No.
3326 must therefore be applied, which would make the charges against
them prescribe in eight years from the alleged commission of the offense.

ln resolving Terrado and holding that the crimes charged against

therein accused have prescribed, the Court was guided by the well-
established rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. Because the charges in Terrado
were covered by both the RPC and Section 129 of CA 141, a special law
without its own prescriptive period for the crimes charged, the Court had
to examine the provisions on prescription of both the RPC and Act No.
3326, identify which provisions of law provided the shortest prescriptive
period, and apply the latter because it was the most favorable to the
accused, viz.:
Falsification of public documents is punishable by prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. Prision mayor is an
afflictive penalty, and hence, prescribes in 15 years. Perjury, upon the

65 People v ..Moran. 44 Phil. 387, 394-401 (1923); People v. Reyes, 256 Phil. 1015, 1027 (1989);
People v. Pacificador. 406 Phil. 774, 784 (200 ]).
66 2ll Phii. l (1983).
67
Sectwn 129 of CA I41 reads:
Sec.. 129. Any person who presents o:r caust:s to be presented, or cooperates in the presentation
ot~ any false aPpiication, declaration, or evidence, or makes or causes to be made or c~operates
1n the n:1.aking of.=:i false affidavit in support of any petition: claim, ur objection respectmg lands
of the puhiic dcimain~ shall be deemed guilty of perjury and punished as such.
Decisfon · 17 G.R. No. 258524

other hand, is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period

to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from four (4) months
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months, which is
correctional in nature, and prescribes in ten (10) years. However,
Public Act No. 3326, as amended by Act 3585 and Act 3763, provides
that "violations penalized by special laws shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:
x x x (c) after eight years for those punished by imprisonment for two
years or more, but less than six years; x x x", so that perjury which is
punishable by imprisonment of from four (4) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months prescribes after eight years.

Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural are, by

c011secrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and
liberally in favor of the accused. As it would be more favorable to the
herein accused to apply Section 129 of Commonwealth Act 141 and Act
3326, as amended, in connection with the p,:escriptive period of the
o.ffenses charged, the same should be applied. Considering, therefore,
that the offenses were alleged to have been committed during the period
from May 15, 1952 to February 2, 1953, with respect to Criminal Case
No. 7613; from May 28, 1952 to August 18, 1952, with respect to
Criminal Case No. 7614; and from November 16, 1951 to February 21,
1952, with respect to Criminal Case No. 7615, and the informations
were filed only on March 13, 1962, or more than eight (8) years after
the said offenses were allegedly committed, the lower court correctly
ruled that the crimes in question had already prescribed. 68 .(Italics ours)

Here, Cyber Libel is penalized under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175,

but the same section of the law also refers to Article 355 of the RPC to
define the prohibited act. Following Terrado, either Section I, Act No.
3326 or Article 90 of the RPC may be applied to determine the prescriptive
period of Cyber Libel; as between the two, the law that sets the shorter
period for prescription and the more favorable to the accused must be
applied. Considering that Article 90 of the RPC provides the shorter
prescriptive period at only one year and is therefore more favorable to the
accused, it should prevail over the· application of Act No. 3326, which
would make Cyber Libel prescribe in 12 years.

!IC. Paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is

controlling, making the crime of Cyber
Libel prescribe in one year; thus, the
ruling in Tolentino must be abandoned.

Article 90 of the RPC provides the prescriptive period for the

crimes covered thereby. It states:

68
People v. /''errado., supra not;;; 66, at 5-6.
Decision rn G.R. No. 258524

ART. 90. Prescription of crimes. - Crimes punishable by

death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall prescribe in
twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in

fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten

years; with the exception of those punishable by arresto mayor, which
shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one

year.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe

in six months.

Light offenses pres~ribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one, the highest

penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained
in the first, second and third paragraphs of this article.

The parties in the present case disagree on which provision of

Article 90 of the RPC must be applied in setting the prescriptive period of
Cyber Libel.

On the one hand, the OSG posits that paragraph 2, Article 90 of the
RPC governs because the penalty for Cyber Libel is afflictive under
Article 25 69 of the RPC in relation to Section 6 of RA 10175, which
increased the penalty for Cyber Libel by one degree tha..1 that prescribed
by the RPC, or to prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period. Significantly, the Court reached the same
conclusion in Tolentino when it declared that Cyber Libel prescribes in 15
years.

On the other hand, Causing argues that paragraph 4, Article 90 of

the RPC must be applied because it clearly states that the "crime of libel
or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year." He insists that Cyber
Libel, being the same crime of Libel under Articles 353 and 355 of the
RPC, is covered by the foregoing provision.

The Court agrees with Causing and abandons the Tolentino doctrine
on the prescriptive period ofCyber Libel. To emphasize, what governs the
prescription of Cyber Libel is paragraph 4, not paragraph 2, of Article 90
of the RPC. Hence, the crime ofCyber Libel prescribes in one year.

{;S' Rollo, pp. 394-395.

Decision 19 G.R. No. 258524

First, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC must be given its literal

and plain meaning: the crime of Libel shall prescribe in one year. This
provision must therefore determine the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel,
consistent with the Court's finding that Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 is the
same crime of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC when it is committed
through a computer system.

Indeed, laws are presumed to have been passed with deliberation

and full knowledge of all statutes existing on the subject. 70 By referencing
Article 355 of the RPC in RA 10175, the lawmakers are presumed to know
all laws bearing on Libel, including the applicable provisions of the RPC
on the period for its prescription. Had it been the intention of the
Legislature to exclude Cyber Libel from the crime of"libel" in paragraph
4, Article 90 of the RPC, it would have used the appropriate language to
do so, but it did not. 71 The absence of any such amendatory or
exclusionary clause warrants the conclusion that the Legislature did not
intend to create a prescriptive period for Cyber Libel that is different from
what is already provided in Article 90 of the RPC for Libel under Article
355 of the same Code. 72

Second, it is an elementary rule in statutory construction that a

special and specific provision of law prevails over a general provision of
the same law irrespective of their relative position in the statute
( Generalia specialibus non derogant). 73 Where there is, in the same
statute, a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most
comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the
particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must
be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not
within the provisions of the particular enactment. 74 This rule has been
applied by the Court in fixing the prescriptive period for an action for
breach of warranty, 75 for a response to be filed in deficiency tax

70
Sps. Recafia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 26, 35 (2001), citing City of Govt of San Pablo,
Laguna v. Hon. Reyes, 364 Phil. 842, 853 (1999).
71
See South African Airways v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 626 Phil. 566, 572-573 (2010).
72
See Gayo v. Verceles, 492 Phil. 592, 601-602 (2005), citing Commission on Audit of the Province
of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, 422 Phil. 519, 529-530 (2001).
73
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Yumex Philippines Corp., G.R. No. 222476, May 5, 2021,
citing Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, 232 Phil. 641, 645-646 (1987).
74 Id.
75 In ANQ Construction Corporation v. Ultra Petronne Interior Supply Corporation, G.R. No. 251944
(Notice), September 30, 2020, the prescriptive period to file an action for breach of warranty in a
contract of sale was fixed by the Court by applying the six-months period under Article 1571 of the
Civil Code instead of the ten-year prescriptive period under Article 1144 of the same Code, since
the former is the specific provision oflaw governing breach of warranty in contracts of sale.

f)l
Decision 20 G.R. No. 258524

assessment cases, 76 and for the duration of a contract.77

In the present case, a perusal of Article 90 of the RPC readily shows

that paragraph 2 thereof is a general provision on prescription of crimes
punishable by afflictive penalties, while paragraph 4 specifically governs
Libel or other similar offenses. Applying the foregoing rule on statutory
construction, paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC indisputably prevails
over paragraph 2 thereof in setting the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

Third, the history of the prescriptive period of Libel under Article

90 of the RPC discloses the Legislature's intent to set it apart from other
crimes punishable with a correctional penalty. When the RPC was passed,
the prescriptive period of Libel was two years. Congress further reduced
the period by passing RA 4661,78 which amended Article 90 of the RPC
to specifically shorten the prescriptive period of Libel and other similar
offenses from two years to one year.

Significantly, the Court has held that the prescription of a crime is

intimately connected with and depends upon the gravity of the offense. 79
Hence, a reduction or shortening of the prescriptive period "implies an
acknowledgment on the part of the sovereign power that the greater
severity of the former statute relative to the substances of the criminal
action is unjust." 80 Excepting Libel from the general 10-year prescriptive
period for other crimes with correctional penalties may therefore be taken
as an acknowledgment by the Legislature that it is "less grave" compared
to other crimes at the same penal scale.81

In addition, as aptly pointed out by Associate Justice Maria

FilomenaD. Singh, RA4661, which originated from House Bill No. 1037
(HB 103 7), was enacted by the Legislature to synchronize the prescriptive
period of Libel with the one-year prescriptive period of civil actions for
defamation under Article 1147 82 of the Civil Code. 83 Apart from this,
Senator Lorenzo Tafiada, who sponsored HB 1037, mentioned that a
76 In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Yumex Philippines Corp., supra note 73, the Court held
that the specific provision of a revenue regulation on the period for a taxpayer to submit its response
to a preliminary assessment notice from receipt thereof prevails over a general provision of the
same regulation on constructive service.
77 In Betts v. Matias, 186 Phil. 292,297 (1980), the Court mentioned that in a lease where a period
has not been fixed, Article 1687 of the Civil Code, being the specific provision on contracts of!ease,
prevails over Article 1197 of the same Code, a general provision on obligations.
78 Entitled "An Act Shortening the Prescriptive Period for Libel and other Similar Offenses,
Amending for the Purpose Article Ninety of the Revised Penal Code," approved on June 18, 1966.
79 People v. Moran, supra note 65. _
80 Id. at 410. See also People v. Maceda, 73 Phil. 679, 681 (1942),_wher~ rt was held that the
prescriptive period for oral defamation was shorter because a verbal msult 1s forgotten as soon as
the heat of passion subsides.
81 People v. Yu Hai, 99 Phil. 725, 727-728 (1956).
82 Article 1147. The following actions must be filed within one year:
(I) For forcible entry and detainer;
(2) For defamation. .
83 Separate Concurring Opinion (Justice Singh), pp. 5--6. See also Congress10nal Records on the
Second Reading of House Bill No. 1037 dated May 12, 1966, Vol. I, No. 66, pp. 2587 and 2591.
Decision 21 G.R. No. 258524

shorter prescriptive period for Libel will especially benefit the members
of the press by allowing them to "discharge their functions better."84 These
very same rationales remain true to this day and equally apply to the
prescriptive period of Cyber Libel.

Given the foregoing, the Court cannot subscribe to the classification

of Cyber Libel as a crime punishable with an afflictive penalty under
paragraph 2, Article 90 of the RPC that would increase its prescriptive
period to 15 years. Such interpretation disregards the clear intent of the
lawmakers to set Libel apart from the general class of crimes punishable
with afflictive or correctional penalties. Absent any amendment of the
statute clearly raising the prescriptive period of Cyber Libel, or an
enactment on the prescription of said crime that is different from that
provided in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC, the Court must apply the
latter.

Finally, it bears repeating that in interpreting statutory provisions

on the prescription of crimes, what is more favorable to the accused must
be adopted. 85 Hence, when there are several conflicting provisions of the
RPC in classifying the penalty for a felony as light, correctional, or
afflictive, in relation to Article 90 of the same Code, the Court must adopt
the interpretation of the law that sets the shortest prescriptive period. 86 In
the present case, consistent with the foregoing principle of liberality in
favor of the accused, there is no doubt that paragraph 4, Article 90 of the
RPC prevails over paragraph 2 thereof as the latter would make Cyber
Libel prescribe in 15 years instead of just one.

11.D. Pursuant to Article 91 of the RPC, the

crime ofCyber Libel prescribes in one
year from its discovery by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents.

In determining when the one-year prescriptive period of Cyber

Libel should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the

84
Congressional Records on the Second Reading of House Bill No. 1037 dated May 12, 1966, Vol. I,
No. 66, p. 2588.
85
People v. Moran, supra note 65; People v. Reyes, supra note 65; People v. Pacificador, supra note
65.
86
In People v. Yu Hai, supra note 81, the accused was charged with a violation of Article 195 of the
RPC, where the prescribed penalty is arresto menor or a fme not exceeding 200 pesos, or both.
Under Article 9 of the RPC, the penalty in relation to arresto menor is light; however, based on the
imposable fine, the penalty is correctional under Article 26 of the RPC. The Court applied Article
9 of the RPC because it is most favorable to the accused, viz.:
Finally, criminal statutes are to be strictly construed against the government and liberally in favor
of the accused. As it would be more favorable to the herein accused to apply the definition of"light
felonies" under Article 9 in connection with the prescriptive period of the offense charged, the same
should be followed. Under Article 90, the offense charged, being a light offense, prescribed in two
months.As it was allegedly commitred on June 26, 1954 and the information filed only on October
22, 1954, the lower court correctly ruled that the crime in question has already prescribed.

fJ!
Decision 22 G.R. No. 258524

RPC, 87 which sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive period
of offenses:
ART. 91. Computation of Prescription of Offenses. - The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted .by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is

absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

Despite the foregoing provision of law, a review of jurisprudence

reveals conflicting decisions on when the prescriptive period of Libel is
to be reckoned. · ·

In earlier cases, the discovery rule was adopted by the Court. In

Alcantara v. Amoranto88 (Alcantara), it was held that the period to file a
civil action for written defamation commences on the date that the crime
is discovered, as provided in the RPC. The Court explained that "the
libelous matter must first be exhibited to the person libeled before the
action could be brought" 89 because the person defamed "could hardly be
expected to institute the proceedings for damages arising from libel when
he has no knowledge of the said libel." 90 In Alcantara, the libelous letter
was published on October 23, 1955, but the contents thereof came to the
knowledge of the offended party only on January 6, 1956. Hence, the
action for Libel therein was timely filed on January 5, 1957, within the
one-year prescriptive period counted from discovery of the crime.

The prescriptive period was also reckoned from discovery in

Inciong v. Tolentino,91 where the criminal action for Libel filed on May 23,
1954 was held to have. been filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period
because the offended party received the purportedly libelous material on
October 8, 1952. 92

Subsequently, several cases were decided by the Court where the

prescriptive period of Libel commenced on the date <Jf the publication of
the libelous remarks. In People v. Hon. Gines 93 (Gines), the period was

87 Brillunte" Court ofAppeals, 483 Phil. 568 (2004).

88 107 Phil 147 (1960).
89 Id. at 150.
'.,0 id.
" 106 Phil. 207,210 (1959).
92 Jd.at210.
93 27 4 Phil. 770, 777 ( i 991 ).
Decision 23 G.R. No. 258524

counted from the date of the publication of the allegedly libelous

newspaper, although the Court ruled that based on Article 91 of the RPC,
"the prescriptive period commences to run from the day following the
commission of the offense or discovery by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents, and is interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information." In Gines, the criminal complaint filed on September 25,
1987 was deemed time-barred as it was filed more than one year from the
date of the publicati<?n of the purportedly libelous newspaper on August 3,
1986.

Similarly, in Syhunliong v. Rivera94 (Syhunliong), prescription was

counted on the date when the allegedly libelous text message was sent to
a third party. In that case, the criminal complaint for libel was dismissed
on the ground of-prescription because it was filed only on April 16, 2007,
or more than one year from the date when the supposed libelous text
message was sent on April 6, 2006.

Other cases decided by the Court counted the one-year prescriptive

period of Libel from the date of publication in holding that the criminal
proceedings therein were not time-barred. In Hon. Calderon-Bargas v.
RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila, Br. 162, 95 prescription was deemed to
commence from the date of the publication of the allegedly libelous
newspaper. In Sr. Arambulo v. Hon. Laqui, 96 the period of prescription for
a criminal action for Libel started to run on the date when the accused
circulated the letter containing the malicious imputations against the
private complainant.

Upon a careful evaluation of the foregoing cases, the Court holds

that the prescriptive period of Libel under Article 355 of the RPC and
Cyber Libel under Section 4(c)(4) of RA 10175, in relation to Article 355
of the RPC, mlist be counted.from the dayon which the crime is discovered
by the. offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The Court affirms
its ruling in Alcantara that prescription is cotmted from discovery of the
published libelous matter by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, because they could hardly be expected to institute criminal
proceedings for Libel without prior knowledge of the same. This is more
in keeping with Article 91 of the RPC. ·

The prescriptive period may be reckoned from the publication of

the libelous matter only when it coincides ,vith the date of discovery by
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Verily, although Gines
and Syhun!iong reckoned prescription from the date of publication, the
94 735 PhiL 349; 362--':\63 (2014).
95
297 Phii. 983 (1993).
16
396 Phil. 914 (2000j
Decision 24 G.R. No. 258524

offended parties in the said cases did not allege a later date of discovery
different from the publication date. It thus appeaxs that in these two cases,
the publication and discovery dates are one and the same, or, at the very
least, have been impliedly admitted to be the same by the offended parties
therein.

III. The prescription of the Cyber Libel

charges against Causing is a question
of fact to be determined by the RTC
ofter hearing the parties thereon.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court holds that despite the
RTC's erroneous application of the laws to determine the period of
prescription of Cyber L1bel, it was nevertheless correct in denying the
Motion to Quash.

The Court's conclusion is based on the rule that prescription is a

matter of defense and the Prosecution need not even anticipate or meet it
in the Informations. 97 Unless prescription is apparent on the face of the
Information, the accused bears the burden to prove that the crime has
prescribed. 98 Thus, the matter of prescription requires the presentation of
evidence and when necessary, the trial court must set a hearing thereon. 99

In the present case, Causing sought the quashal 100 of the

Informations by computing prescription from the date of publication or
posting of the allegedly libelous remarks on Facebook as alleged in the
Informations, i.e., on February 4, 2019 and April 29, 2019, respectively.
Notably, he did not attach any affidavit, document, or other evidence in
support of his allegation that the two counts of Cyber Libel charged
against him have prescribed. Instead, the Motion to Quash relied solely on
the date of publication of the allegedly libelous Facebook posts as
provided in the Informations, in relation to the filing date of the
Complaint-Affidavit of Hernandez with the OCP Quezon City.

However, as earlier discussed, the prescriptive period of Cyber

Libel commences from the dav when the crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, "or their agents. In this regard, the records
bear that tl1e prescription of the two counts of Cyber Libel charged against
Causing is not apparent on the face of the Informations because the dates
of discovery are not stated therein.

Given the situation, Causing bore the burden to prove that the two
97 Peou/ev: Tierro.120PhiL 1461, .1466(1964).
9? PeoPte i; ,),Janf1;_;in\ 270 PhiL 1)65, 670 (1990); Romuaidez v. Hon lvfarcelo 1 507 .Phil. 72 7 (2005).
99 R.onntaldez v. Hon. .Marce!O, supra, at 741.
!OG Rullo, pp. 95-113.
Decision 25 G.R. No. 258524

counts of Cyber Libel charged against him have prescribed. Thus, he

should have attached evidence in support of this defense in his Motion to
Quash to prove prescription. Absent such evidence, the Court must affirm
the RTC's denial of the Motion to Quash, as the trial court could not have
determined the prescription of the crimes charged based only on the
Informations that are bereft of any statement on the date of discovery of
the purportedly libelous Facebook posts. Neither could it have simply
presumed that the dates of discovery coincided with the dates of
publication without any proof thereon. 101

It would have been different had Causing attached the supporting

evidence to his Motion to Quash. In such a case, given that the discovery
date and prescription do not appear of record, the trial court could have
set the Motion to Quash for hearing so that the evidence may be examined
and the parties heard thereon, in accordance with Section 8, 102 Rule 133
of the Rules of Court. 103 Considering that this is not the case, the RTC did
not commit any error in denying the Motion to Quash, setting the Cyber
Libel Cases for arraignment and pre-trial, and proceeding with trial.

Notably, in denying the Motion to Quash, the RTC ruled that

Hernandez filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the OCP Quezon City on
December 17, 2020, 104 Just a few weeks from the alleged date ofdiscovery
ofCausing's defamatory Facebook posts. 105 The RTC's findings are based
on:first, the statements of Hernandez in his Complaint-Affidavit, wherein
he asserted that he only "recently discovered" the purportedly libelous
remarks of Causing in Facebook at the time of filing of the case; 106 and
second, the printouts of the Facebook posts attached to Causing's
Complaint-Affidavit, which were allegedly "last accessed" on October 5,
2020, 107 or a little over two (2) months before the case was filed with the
OCP Quezon City.

Significantly, Causing has been arraigned on November 24,

108
2021. Considering that the accused in a criminal case does not waive
the defense of prescription despite arraignment in light of Article 89 109 of

101
Peopfe v. Monteiro, supra note 98.
102
Section 8, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sectidn 8. Evidence on motion. - When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the
court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the
court r,ay direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
103
Peop;e v. Monteiro, supra note 98, at 669-670.
104
It must be noted, however, that the Complaint-Affidavit of Hernandez bears the date of December
I 6, 2020 and subscribed to under oath before the OCP Quezon City on said date. (Rollo, pp. 210-
219) '
105
Id. at·I98.
106
Id. atl210.
101
108
f1
Id. at I 0-211.
Id. at·l94.
109
Article 89 of the RPC provides:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished ~ Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
xxxx
5. By prescription of the crime[.]

/j

(1/(I
Decision· 26 G.R. No. 258524

the RPC, which ·expressly states that criminal liability is totally

°
extinguished by the prescription of the crime, 11 Causing may continue to
prove that the crimes charged against him have prescribed by presenting
his evidence thereon during trial on the merits with the RTC. To emphasize,
whether the Cyber Libel charges against Causing have prescribed is a
factual matter to be.resolved by RTC and on which, the Court makes no
conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, to resolve this issue, the RTC must
compute the prescriptive period of the charges of Cyber Libel against
Causing based on the Court's pronouncements in the present case by
applying paragraph 4, Article 90 and Article 91 of the RPC, i.e., within
one year from discovery of the allegedly libelous Facebook posts by
Hernandez, the authorities, or their agents.

As a final point, the Court is aware of its earlier dictum in Disini, 111
where it recognized the greater perversity of crimes committed through or
with the use of ICT, given that such technology allows offenders to
perpetrate their crimes across national boundaries, with a larger audience
and far more victims, all with the advantage of anonymity. Because of
substantial distinctions between traditional crimes and cybercrimes, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 6 ofRA 10175, which makes
the use of ICT a qualifying circumstance in the commission of a crime
punished under the RPC, including Libel.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is nothing in RA 10175 or any

other enactment by the Legislature that amends the prescriptive period of
Libel through or with the use of a computer system or ICT. Without the
same, the Court can only apply and interpret t,he existing laws on the
subject. A prescriptive period of Cyber Libel longer than what is provided
in paragraph 4, Article 90 of the RPC is something for the Legislature, not
this Court, to address.

It is also not amiss to point out that the present case has again
brought to the fore the continuing debate against criminal libel vis-a-vis a
basic principle of criminal law, i.e., that a crime is an offense against the State
concerning matters of public - not ofprivate - interests. 112 Indeed, many have
lobbied for the limitation of actions for libel and defamation to civil
actions only, upon the argument that these crimes concen1 only the private
interest of an individual over his or her reputation. Verily, while libel was
initially criminalized due to its tendency to breach the peace, the modem
view has ignored this aspect altogether and made "a libeious publication
criminal if its tendency is to injure the person defamed, regardless of its
effect upon the public." 1 n Changing societal mores have thus forwarded the
decriminalization of libel because penal sanctions must be reserved for
"hannful behavior wl:1ich exceptionally disturbs the community s sense of

110 Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court; See Syhunliongv. Rive.ru, suprt;t note 94; Pe0pie v. Castro,
9.5 PhiL 462, 764 (i 9':i4).
1L Disfni •.: Secr-?.tarv oj'Jusrice, supra note 32. ·
112 Mcrci.:,/cs v. Cou;t i(Appea!s, 429 Phil. 7D (2002); US v. !Ju Cnico, !4 Phii. 128 (1909).
11 ' Pevpiei: Del Rosario, 86 PhiL 163 (1950).
Decision 27 G.R. No. 258524

security," and personal calumny does not fall into this category. 114

In addition, criminal libel is historically rooted in the State's concern

with the prevention of sedition and the avoidance of speech that "engender
hatred of the king or his government." 115 While a monarch indisputably
had the absolute power to suppress political speech for being "libelous,"
many have raised doubts if the same could withstand our present
democratic and liberal system of governance, where power is lodged in the
people and public discussion is not merely encouraged but considered a
political duty of the populace. 116 Certainly, in a democracy, "it is as much
[the people's] duty to criticize as it is the official's duty to administer." 117

Thus, when it comes to political speech and the criticism of those

who occupy public office, repression cannot be justified even when the
utterance may include half-truths and misinformation, unless the
regulation passes the clear and present danger test and the utterer acted
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of
its probable falsity. 118 Also, both criminal and civil actions for libel were
considered impermissible repression, for whether by fear of imprisonment
in a criminal case or fear of pecuniary loss arising from liability for
damages in a civil case, the resulting self-censorship and repression of
political speech is equally achieved. 119 Libertarians further insist that
political speech of the populace must enjoy the same immunities from suit
enjoyed by members of the Congress and the President during their
tenure. 120 To these advocates, withholding a fair equivalent of such
immunity to the political speech of the citizenry would result in an absurd
situation where public servants are granted unjustified preference over the
very public whom they must serve. 121

Still, the Court reiterates its ruling in Disini that "libel is not a
protected speech." 122 While an honest utterance, even when inaccurate,
may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, a lie that is
knowingly and deliberately published about a public official does not
enjoy immunity. 123 Such calculated falsehoods or statements in reckless
disregard of their probable falsity "are no essential part of any exposition
114
See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964), citing the 10th draft of the Model Penal Code,
and Counterman,., Colorado, 600 U.S._ (2023) [Concurring Opinion (J. Sotomayor)].
115
Ashton v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 562, 567-68 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966); State v. Hoskins, 62 N.W.
270, 60 Minn. 168 (1895).
116
See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) [Concurring Opinion (J. Brandeis)] and
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) [Concurring Opinion (J. Douglas)]. See also
Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S. (2023) [Concurring Opinion (J. Sotomayor)], where the
virtual disappearance of criminal prosecutions for libel in the United States was regarded as salutary.
117
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282 (I 964).
118
Id. at 273; See also Counterman v. Colorado, 600 U.S._ (2023). In her Concurring Opinion, in
Counterman v. Colorado, Justice Sotomayor clarified that in civil action for libel, "the defendant
must have made the false publication with a high degree of awareness of probable falsity or must
have entertained serious doubts as to the truth."
119
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277-280 (1964).
120 See Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and De Lima v. Duterte, 865 Phil. 578 (2019).
121 New York Times Co. ,., Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 282-283 (1964).
122
Disini v. Secretary ofJustice, supra note 33, at 739.
123 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1964).

fl/
Decision 28 G.R. No. 258524

of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality." 124

Ultimately, the continuing recognition of criminal libel is a

prerogative of the Legislature. 125 Just like with the prescriptive period of
Libel and Cyber Libel, only Congress can lift the continuing recognition
of criminal libel, and as long as it operates within the bounds of the
Constitution, the Court's duty is to apply it. 126

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Order dated

October 5, 2021, and Order dated November 15, 2021, of Branch 93,
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City in Criminal Cases Nos. R-QZN-21-
04099 andR-QZN-21-04100 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
/

IIEN~JNTING

WE CONCUR:

FRED S. CAGUIOA

SAMU~~
Associate Justice

r: o.
.~~VL'~''-"'N

~ciateJustice
;j 6',,; ,,;~

124
/
Id., citingtdr;;,plinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942). .
125 See Beuharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 ( 1952), where the US Supreme Court recogmzed the power
of a state to enact laws against malicious defamation.
126 See People v. Leachon, Jr., 357 Phil. 165 (1998).
Decision 29 G.R. No. 258524

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the abo e Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assi ed to writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

Chai

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court's Division.

AL