DEATH PENALTY JUDGEMENTS: THE REASONS FOR

ENDORSEMENT/ COMMUTATION ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN RED.

Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 1 SCC 596

Justices U U Lalit, Indu Malhotra, Krishna Murari; Justice Lalit delivered the
judgement

Facts: The victim in the present case was a girl of two-and-a-half years of age. The
complainant was told that ‘Shatrughna Baban Meshram, aged 21 years, has taken away his
daughter and that he would bring her back. The complainant saw his daughter XXX and
Shatrughna Meshram lying in the new, under construction, building of Anganwadi. The girl
was raped and murdered. Both the trail and high courts awarded the death penalty.

The supreme court overturned the sentence. The observations are extracted below:
However, if the case is considered against the second head, we do not find that the option of a
sentence lesser than death penalty is completely foreclosed. However, a definite pointer in
favour of the appellant is the fact that he did not consciously cause any injury with the intent
to extinguish the life of the victim. Though all the injuries are attributable to him and it was
Injury 17 which was the cause of death, his conviction under Section 302 IPC is not under
any of the first three clauses of Section 300 IPC. In matters where the conviction is recorded
with the aid of clause Fourthly under Section 300 IPC, it is very rare that the death sentence
is awarded. We therefore, find that though the appellant is guilty of the offence punishable
under Section 302 IPC, since there was no requisite intent as would bring the case under any
of the first three clauses of Section 300 IPC, the offence in the present case does not deserve
death penalty.

The second count on which death sentence has been imposed is under Section 376-A IPC. As
noted earlier, the offence was committed on 11-2-2013 and just few days before such
commission, Section 376-A was inserted in IPC by the Ordinance. As concluded by us in
para 17 hereinabove, the ex-post facto effect given to Section 376-A inserted by the
Amendment Act would not in any way be inconsistent with clause (1) of Article 20 of the
Constitution. The appellant is thus definitely guilty of the offence punishable under Section
376-A IPC. But the question remains whether punishment lesser than death sentence gets
ruled out or not. As against Section 302 IPC while dealing with cases under Section 376-A
IPC, a wider spectrum is available for consideration by the courts as to the punishment to be
awarded. On the basis of the same aspects that weighed with us while considering the
appropriate punishment for the offence under Section 302 IPC, in view of the fact that
Section 376-A IPC was brought on the statute book just few days before the commission of
the offence, the appellant does not deserve death penalty for the said offence.
 Arvind Singh v State of Maharashtra 2020 SCC OnLine SC 400
Justices U U Lalit, Indu Malhotra, Hemant Gupta; Justice Gupta delivered the
judgement

Facts: the accused had taken the life of a young school going boy of only 8 years of age to
become rich by ransom and to take vengeance against Dr. Chandak.

Observations: The argument is that since the accused are young, aged about 19 years, and
have no criminal antecedents, the sentence of death imposed upon them is not warranted.

The motive of the accused to take life was to become rich by not doing hard work but by
demanding ransom after kidnapping a young, innocent boy of 8 years. Thus, having
considered all the circumstances and facts on record, we are of the considered view that the
present case falls short of the “rarest of rare” cases where a death sentence alone deserves to
be awarded to the appellants. It appears to us in light of all cumulative circumstances that the
cause of justice will be effectively served by invoking the concept of special sentencing as
evolved by this Court in the cases of Swamy Shraddananda ana Sriharan. Thus, the present
appeals succeed in part. The Judgment and Order passed by the learned Trial Court and
confirmed by the High Court convicting the accused for the offences punishable under
Sections 302 and 364A read with Section 34 IPC is hereby confirmed. However,
the death sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court, confirmed by the High Court, is
converted into the life imprisonment. It is further observed and directed that the life means till
the end of the life with the further observation and direction that there shall not be any
remission till the accused completes 25 years of imprisonment.
 Manoj Suryavanshi v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2020) 4 SCC 451
Justices U U Lalit, Indira Banerjee, M R Shah; Justice Shah delivered the opinion of the
court

Facts: The appellant-accused was held guilty for having committed the murder/killing of
three minor children aged about 8 years, 6 years and 4 years, respectively and was convicted
by both the courts below for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 364 IPC. The
learned trial court, after having held the appellant-accused guilty for the aforesaid offences,
imposed the death sentence, which was confirmed by the High Court by the impugned
judgment and order.

Observations: The object and purpose of Section 235(2) CrPC is that the accused must be
given an opportunity to make a representation against the sentence to be imposed on him.
Sub-section (2) of Section 235 satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the rule of natural justice
by affording to the accused an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence and at
the same time helps the court to choose the sentence to be awarded. So, what is required to be
considered is whether at the time of awarding of sentence, sufficient and proper opportunity
has been given to the accused or not and when the capital punishment is awarded, whether
the accused has been given the opportunity to point out the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances or not?

Thus, there is no absolute proposition of law that in no case there can be conviction and
sentence on the same day. There is no absolute proposition of law laid down by this Court in
any of the decisions that if the sentence is awarded on the very same day on which the
conviction was recorded, the sentencing would be vitiated. That the offence was committed
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. The accused was
emotionally disturbed due to the elopement of his wife with the uncle of the deceased and
that his children were suffering in absence of their mother with them. The accused was so
much disturbed and troubled is also borne out from the deposition of one of the witnesses that
on mobile the accused told how Shivlal is feeling without his children.

 There are no criminal antecedents.

 At the time of commission of the offence the accused was 28 years of age and his
conduct in prison is reported to be good.
 That he belongs to a poor family and is the only son of his parents.
 That he has got an old aged mother who is taking care of two daughters of the
accused, out of which one is married now.

On the other hand, the only aggravating circumstance pointed out by the State is that the
manner in which the incident took place and three minors were brutally killed. Except the
above, no other aggravating circumstances are pointed out on behalf of the State. Therefore,
striking the balance between aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances, we are
of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly, the mental
condition of the accused at the time of the commission of the offence and that the accused
was under extreme mental disturbance due to his wife having eloped with the uncle of the
deceased and that his children were deprived of the company of their mother, the mitigating
circumstances are in favour of the accused to convert the death sentence to life imprisonment.
 Manoharan v. State, (2020) 5 SCC 782
Justices R F Nariman, Surya Kant, Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Surya Kant delivered the
judgement

Facts: Case of rape and murder of two children picked from their school by their van driver.

Observations: It has been made clear in the preceding parts of this judgment that the
prosecution case has been established through numerous evidences in addition to there being
a clear confession, which proves the petitioner's guilt beyond any residual doubt. Conflicting
versions have been deposed by the petitioner and the defence witnesses, and no explanation
to discharge the onus under Section 106 has been provided. Hence, it is not a case fit for
application of the theory of “residual doubt” as noted in Ravishankar [Ravishankar v. State
of M.P., (2019) 9 SCC 689 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 768] . Accordingly, even the contention that
death ought not to be awarded considering that the present case is one involving
circumstantial evidence is unfounded. It is no longer res integra that there can be no hard rule
of not awarding death in cases based on circumstantial evidence owing to recent
developments in Medical Science and the possibility of abuse by seasoned criminals.

Furthermore, there is nothing to support the characterisation of the accused as being a

helpless, illiterate young adult who is a victim of his socio-economic circumstances. Far from
being so, it is clear through the version of events that the accused had the presence of mind to
craft his own defence and attempt to retract his confession through an elaborately written
eleven-page letter addressed to the Magistrate and had further received adequate legal
representation. Even observed devoid of any aggravating circumstances, mere young age and
presence of aged parents cannot be grounds for commutation. One may view that such young
age poses a continuous burden on the State and presents a longer risk to society, hence
warranting more serious intervention by courts. Similarly, just because the now deceased co-
accused Mohanakrishnan was the mastermind whose offence was comparatively more
egregious, we cannot commute the otherwise barbarically shocking offences of the petitioner.
We are also not inclined to give leeway of the lack of criminal record, considering that the
current crime was not just one offence, but comprised of multiple offences over the series of
many hours. Even if the cases involving confession merit some leniency and compassion,
however, as was earlier noted in our majority opinion, the attempted retraction of the
statement shows how the petitioner was in fact remorseless. Such belated retractions further
lay rise to the fear that any remorse or repentance being shown by the petitioner now may be
temporary and that he can relapse to his old ways. Irrespective of the underlying reasons
behind such retraction, whether it be the fear of death or feeling that he was not getting any
benefit of his earlier confession, but the possibility of recidivism has only been heightened
and we can no longer look at the initial confession in a vacuum. Rather, the present case is
essentially one where two accused misused societal trust to hold as captive two innocent
school-going children, one of whom was brutally raped and sodomised, and thereupon
administered poison and finally, drowned by throwing them into a canal. It was not on the
spur of the moment or a crime of passion; but craftily planned, meticulously executed and
with multiple opportunities to cease and desist. We are of the view that the present offence(s)
of the petitioner are so grave as to shock the conscience of this Court and of society and
would without doubt amount to the rarest of the rare. Hence, we find that there exist no
grounds to review our judgment upholding conviction and death penalty. The review
petitions are accordingly dismissed. Conviction Upheld
Justice Sanjiv Khanna dissented on sentencing; with same reasoning as put forward in (2019)
7 SCC 716; the original SC judgement.
 Ishwari Lal Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 10 SCC 423
Justices R F Nariman, R Subhash Reddy, Surya Kant; Justice Reddy delivered the
opinion of the court

Facts: The main accused, namely, Ishwari Lal Yadav and Kiran Bai had committed the
murder of the two-year-old child Chirag as a sacrifice to the God. It is to be noticed; they
were having three minor children at that time. In spite of the same, they committed the
murder of the deceased, a child of two years of age brutally.

Observations: The head of the helpless child was severed; his tongue and cheeks were also
cut. Having regard to age of the accused, they were not possessed of the basic humanness,
they completely lacked the psyche or mindset which can be amenable for any reformation. It
is a planned murder committed by the aforesaid two appellants. The appellants herein who
are the main accused, namely, Ishwari Lal Yadav and Kiran Bai were also convicted on an
earlier occasion for the offence under Sections 302/34 and Section 201 IPC in Sessions Trial
No. 98 of 2011 by the learned Sessions Judge, Durg, for similar murder of a 6-year-old girl
for which they were convicted and sentenced to death, but such sentence was modified on
appeal in State of Chhattisgarh v. Ishwari Lal Yadav [State of Chhattisgarh v. Ishwari Lal
Yadav, 2016 SCC OnLine Chh 1539] by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur and they
were sentenced to undergo life imprisonment without any remission or parole. On appeal to
this Court, the order of the High Court was confirmed [Ishwari Lal Yadav v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2019) 10 SCC 437] . Such conviction for similar offence can be considered as
aggravating factor. By following the guidelines as mentioned in Sushil Murmu [Sushil
Murmu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 2 SCC 338 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 529] we are of the view
that this is a case of “rarest of rare cases” where death sentence imposed by the trial court is
rightly confirmed by the High Court. As the case is proved beyond any reasonable doubt so
far as the main accused are concerned, the judgment relied on by the learned counsel for the
appellants in Ronny [Ronny v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 3 SCC 625 : 1998 SCC (Cri)
859] also is not helpful to them.

For the aforesaid reasons, the appeals filed in Criminal Appeals Nos. 300-301 of 2018 and
Criminal Appeals Nos. 298-99 of 2018 are allowed and conviction recorded and sentence
imposed upon the appellants therein is set aside. They shall be released forthwith if their
custody is not required for any other case. Criminal Appeals Nos. 1416-17 of 2017 and
Criminal Appeals Nos. 1418-19 of 2017 filed by Ishwari Lal Yadav and Kiran Bai
respectively are partly allowed, setting aside the conviction recorded and sentence imposed
for the offence under Sections 364/34 and 120-B IPC. However, their conviction under
Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC is confirmed, confirming the death sentence imposed on them
for the offence under Sections 302/34 IPC. The sentence imposed on them under Section 201
IPC is also confirmed.

Death Sentence Confirmed

 Ravi v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 622
Justice R F Nariman, R Subhash Reddy, Surya Kant (J. Surya Kant delivered the
opinion of the court, Reddy J. dissented)

Facts: The informant Iliyas Mohinuddin (PW 9) had been a fruit-seller based in Jalna. On 6-
3-2012 at about 5.00 p.m., while he was as usual busy in selling fruits, his wife informed him
that their daughter (in short “the victim child”), who was 2 years old, was missing. He along
with his relatives started looking for the child. During their search, the informant came to
know from Azbar (PW 2) that the appellant had been spotted drunk and was distributing
chocolates to small children in the lane near Maroti Temple. The police, therefore, came to
the appellant's house which had two doors. They found the appellant in the house; deceased
victim was lying under the bed in a naked and unconscious condition. She was covered in a
blanket and taken to the hospital where the doctor declared her brought dead.

Observations: It may be seen that the victim was barely a two-year-old baby whom the
appellant kidnapped and apparently kept on assaulting over 4-5 hrs till she breathed her last.
The appellant who had no control over his carnal desires surpassed all natural, social and
legal limits just to satiate his sexual hunger. He ruthlessly finished a life which was yet to
bloom. The appellant instead of showing fatherly love, affection and protection to the child
against the evils of the society, rather made her the victim of lust. It is a case where trust has
been betrayed and social values are impaired. The unnatural sex with a two-year-old toddler
exhibits a dirty and perverted mind, showcasing a horrifying tale of brutality. The appellant
meticulously executed his nefarious design by locking one door of his house from the outside
and bolting the other one from the inside so as to deceive people into believing that nobody
was inside. The appellant was thus in his full senses while he indulged in this senseless act.
The appellant has not shown any remorse or repentance for the gory crime, rather he opted to
remain silent in his Section 313 CrPC statement. His deliberate, well-designed silence with a
standard defence of “false” accusation reveals his lack of kindness or compassion and leads
to believe that he can never be reformed. That being so, this Court cannot write off the capital
punishment so long as it is inscribed in the statute book.
AFFIRMED

R. Subhash Reddy, J. (dissenting only on the question of sentence)—

I am clear in my mind that in this case on hand, the mitigating circumstances of the appellant,
dominate over the aggravating circumstances, to modify the death sentence to that of life
imprisonment. Even as per the case of prosecution, the appellant was under influence of
liquor at the time of committing the offence, and there is no evidence on record from the side
of prosecution, to show that there is no possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the
appellant. Further, age of the appellant was 25 years at the relevant time and conviction is
solely based on circumstantial evidence. Taking all such aspects into consideration, the death
penalty imposed on the appellant is to be modified to that of life imprisonment, for the
offence under Section 302 IPC.
 Ravishankar v. State of M.P., (2019) 9 SCC 689
Justice Surya Kant, R Subhash Reddy, Justice Nariman; Justice Surya Kant delivered
the judgement

Facts: the trial court held the appellant guilty of kidnapping a 13-year-old girl, committing
rape on her, killing her by throttling and thereafter destroying the evidence by throwing her
half naked body in a dry well. These crimes were held as being “rarest of the rare” and the
appellant was sentenced to death under Section 376-A of the Penal Code (IPC).

Observations: As noted by the United States Supreme Court

in Herrera v. Collins [Herrera v. Collins, 1993 SCC OnLine US SC 10 : 122 L Ed 2d 203 :
506 US 390 (1993)] , “it is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human beings
who administer it, is fallible”. However, death being irrevocable, there lies a greater degree of
responsibility on the court for an in-depth scrutiny of the entire material on record. Still
further, qualitatively, the penalty imposed by awarding death is much different than in
incarceration, both for the convict and for the State. Hence, a corresponding distinction in
requisite standards of proof by taking note of “residual doubt” during sentencing would not
be unwarranted.

We are thus of the considered view that the present case falls short of the “rarest of rare”
cases where the death sentence alone deserves to be awarded to the appellant. It appears to us
in the light of all the cumulative circumstances that the cause of justice will be effectively
served by invoking the concept of special sentencing theory as evolved by this Court
in Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13
SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113] and approved in Sriharan case [Union of India v. V.
Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 695] .
 Sudam v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 388
Justices N V Raman, Indira Banerjee, M M Shantanagoudar, Justice Shantanagoudar
delivered the judgement

Facts: The investigation revealed that the deceased Anita had been living with the petitioner
as his wife and had come to know about his marriage with PW 6 Muktabai. The deceased was
opposed to this relationship, which led to a serious dispute amongst the three of them. The
petitioner allegedly divorced PW 6, and agreed to pay her a sum of Rs 15,000, which the
deceased Anita promised to bear. Thereafter, PW 6 went to her village, and the petitioner, the
deceased Anita and her four children came to the village of Juna Pani, where, because of the
strained relationship with his wife, the petitioner murdered her and the four children by
strangulating them.

Observations: Evidently, even the fact that the evidence was circumstantial in nature did not
weigh very heavily on the Court's mind, let alone the strength and nature of the circumstantial
evidence. Be that as it may, we find that the material on record is sufficient to convince the
Court of the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt; however, the nature of the
circumstantial evidence in this case amounts to a mitigating circumstance significant enough
to tilt the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the petitioner's favour,
keeping in mind the doctrine of prudence. Moreover, it is also possible that the incorrect
observations pertaining to Anita's facial injuries further led the Court to conclude in favour of
imposing the death sentence on the petitioner. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that
there was a reasonable probability that this Court would have set aside the sentence of death
in appeal, since the only surviving evidence against the petitioner herein pertains to his
motive to commit the crime, the circumstance of “last seen” and a solitary extra-judicial
confession. In other words, it cannot be said that the punishment of life imprisonment is
unquestionably foreclosed in the instant case, in spite of the gravity and barbarity of the
offence.

We are thus compelled to conclude that the award of the death penalty in the instant case,
based on the evidence on record, cannot be upheld.
 ‘X’ v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 7 SCC 1
Justices N V Ramana, M M Shantanagoudar, Indira Banerjee; Justice Ramana
delivered the judgement

Facts: Brief facts giving rise to the present petition are as follows: the two deceased viz.
Victim 1 (studying in the 4th standard) and Victim 2 (studying in the 1st standard) were
cousins staying at Gulumb, Maharashtra, in a locality of homeless people (Beghar Vasti) at
the house of Ramdas Jadhav (PW 13, Victim 1's father). The petitioner lived in the adjacent
house with his family. On 13-12-1999, at about 6 p.m., the petitioner had gone to the grocery
shop run by Sunil (PW 6), with his daughter, Reshma (PW 8), where he met the two deceased
girls, and on the pretext of offering sweets, he led the girls to accompany him. Thereafter, he
committed the rape and murder of both girls, and threw Victim 2's body in a well situated in
the field of the father of Sakharam Bhiku Yadav (PW 11), and concealed the body of Victim
1 in a “kalkache bet” (place where bamboo trees and shrubs grow together thickly).

Observations: Now we need to consider the second issue concerning post-conviction mental
illness as a mitigating factor for converting a death sentence to life imprisonment.

The following directions need to be followed in the future cases in light of the above
discussion:

 That the post-conviction severe mental illness will be a mitigating factor that the
appellate court, in appropriate cases, needs to consider while sentencing an accused to
death penalty.

 The assessment of such disability should be conducted by a multi-disciplinary team of

qualified professionals (experienced medical practitioners, criminologists, etc.),
including professional with expertise in accused's particular mental illness.

 The burden is on the accused to prove by a preponderance of clear evidence that he is

suffering with severe mental illness. The accused has to demonstrate active, residual
or prodromal symptoms, that the severe mental disability was manifesting.

 The State may offer evidence to rebut such claim.

 Court in appropriate cases could set up a panel to submit an expert report.

“Test of severity” envisaged herein predicates that the offender needs to have a severe mental
illness or disability, which simply means that objectively the illness needs to be most serious
that the accused cannot understand or comprehend the nature and purpose behind the
imposition of such punishment. Even though we are not satisfied with such statements made
by the doctors as the assessment seems to be incomplete. However, it is to be noted that the
present accused has been reeling under bouts of some form of mental irritability since 1994,
as apparent from the records placed before us. Moreover, he has suffered long incarceration
as well as a death row convict. In the totality of circumstances, we do not consider it to be
appropriate to constitute a panel for reassessment of his mental condition, in the facts and
circumstances of this case. In light of the above discussion, the petition is allowed to the
extent that the sentence of death awarded to the petitioner is commuted to imprisonment for
the remainder of his life sans any right to remission.
 Khushwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2019) 4 SCC 415
Justices A K Sikri, S Abdul Nazeer, M R Shah; Justice Shah delivered the judgement

Facts: the accused had killed six innocent persons, out of which two were minors — below
10 years of age.

Observations: Almost, all the family members of PW 5 were done to death in a diabolical
and dastardly manner. Fortunately, or unfortunately, only one person of the family of PW 5
could survive. In the present case, the accused has killed six innocent persons in a pre-
planned manner. The convict meticulously planned the time. He first kidnapped three persons
by way of deception and took them to the canal and after drugging them with sleeping tablets,
pushed them in the canal at midnight to ensure that the crime is not detected. That, thereafter
he killed another three persons in the second stage/instalment. Therefore, considering the law
laid down by this Court in Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2017) 6 SCC 1 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 673] , the case would fall in the category of the “rarest
of rare case” warranting death sentence/capital punishment. The aggravating circumstances
are in favour of the prosecution and against the accused. Therefore, striking a balance
between the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, we are of the opinion that the
aggravating circumstance would tilt the balance in favour of capital punishment. In the facts
and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that there is no alternative punishment
suitable, except the death sentence. The crime is committed with extremist brutality and the
collective conscience of the society would be shocked. Therefore, we are of the opinion that
the capital punishment/death sentence imposed by the learned Sessions Court and confirmed
by the High Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. Therefore, we confirm the
death sentence of the accused imposed by the learned Sessions Court and confirmed by the
High Court while convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeals fail. The impugned
judgment and order [State of Punjab v. Khushwinder Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine P&H 26937]
passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and order
passed by the learned Sessions Court convicting the accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 364, 302, 307, 201 and 380 IPC is hereby confirmed. The conviction of the
appellant-accused for the offences punishable under Section 302 IPC and other offences is
hereby confirmed and the capital punishment/death sentence imposed by the learned Sessions
Court and confirmed by the High Court for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC for
having killed six persons is hereby confirmed.

Death Sentence Confirmed

 Jagdish v. State of M.P., (2020) 14 SCC 156
Justices N V Ramana, Deepak Gupta, Indira Banerjee; Justice Gupta delivered the
judgement

Facts:

Observations: As far as the Government of India or the Secretariat of the President of India
is concerned, there is no delay in dealing with the mercy petition and the same has been dealt
with expeditiously. However, the State of Madhya Pradesh has given no explanation for the
delay of more than 4 years in forwarding the mercy petition.

We are constrained to observe that not only was there a long, inordinate and unexplained
delay on the part of the State of Madhya Pradesh but to make matters worse, the State of
Madhya Pradesh has not even cared to file any counter-affidavit in the writ petition even
though notice was issued 4 years back on 18-11-2014 [Jagdish v. State of M.P., 2014 SCC
OnLine SC 1741] and service was effected within a month of issuance of notice.

The delay in forwarding the petition is totally unexplained and this Court cannot countenance
an unexplained delay of more than 4 years. We are dealing here with the case of a person
who has been sentenced to death. The mercy petition is the last hope of a person on death
row. Every dawn will give rise to a new hope that his mercy petition may be accepted. By
nightfall this hope also dies. Inordinate and unexplained delay in deciding the mercy petition
and the consequent delay in execution of death sentence for years on end is another form of
punishment which was awarded by the Court. This Court has repeatedly held that in cases
where death sentence has to be executed the same should be done as early as possible and if
mercy petitions are not forwarded for 4 years and no explanation is submitted we cannot but
hold that the delay is inordinate and unexplained. We are not only dealing with the issue of
delay in disposal of the mercy petition. The petitioner has now been behind bars for almost
about 14 years. This is also a factor which will have to be taken into consideration. Death
sentence is the exception and has to be awarded in the rarest of rare cases. Keeping in view
all the circumstances of the case, including the unexplained delay of 4 years in forwarding the
mercy petition by the State of Madhya Pradesh leading to delay of almost 5 years in deciding
the mercy petition and the fact that the petitioner has been incarcerated for almost 14 years,
we are of the view that regardless of the brutal nature of crime this is not a fit case where
death sentence should be executed and we, accordingly commute the death sentence to that of
life. However, keeping in view the nature of crime and the fact that 6 innocent lives were lost,
we direct that life imprisonment in this case shall mean the entire remaining life of the
petitioner and he shall not be released till his death. The review petition as well as the writ
petition are partly allowed in the aforesaid terms and, accordingly, disposed of. Pending
application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.
 Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 14 SCC 290
Justices N V Ramana, Deepak Gupta, Indira Banerjee; Justice Banerjee delivered the
judgement

Facts: The appellant-accused took the victim to his house, raped her, had unnatural sexual
intercourse with her causing her head injury and smothering her, as a result of which she
died.

Observations: In this case too there is no evidence at all of any diabolic planning to commit
the crime though the crime was undoubtedly cruel and heinous. The circumstances in which
the victim entered the tenement of the appellant-accused are not known. There is no evidence
to show that the appellant-accused took the victim to his tenement. Though unlikely, she
might even have gone to his tenement on her own.

The totality of the injuries support the finding of the trial court and the first appellate court
that the appellant-accused murdered the deceased victim. Though the act of the accused
squarely amounts to rape and murder, there is not a scrap of material to show that the
intention of the appellant-accused was to kill the minor child. The death of the deceased
victim was not caused under any provocation, not to speak of sudden provocation. No such
defence has been taken by the appellant-accused. Nor is it anybody's case that the death was
caused in legitimate exercise in good faith of any right of the appellant-accused, whether of
private defence or otherwise. The death has been caused without any provocation. Being a
man of about 50 years of age, the appellant-accused should have known that repeated sexual
assault could have led to the death of the victim and in fact did lead to the death of the victim,
only five years of age. The appellant-accused has rightly been convicted of murder apart from
child rape. However, there is no evidence at all direct or circumstantial which establishes that
the intention of the appellant-accused was to kill the deceased victim.

Considering the totality of the evidence before us, we uphold the conviction of the appellant-
accused. However, in view of the evidence of the post-mortem report of Dr Bhusan Jain, we
deem it appropriate to modify the sentence by reducing the same to imprisonment for life.
PW 1, Dr Bhusan Jain who had prepared the post-mortem report opined that the cause of
death was asphyxia due to smothering, associated with head injuries and sexual assault. Dr
Bhusan Jain deposed that all the 5 injuries were possible by repeated sexual acts and forceful
penetration. He opined that all the injuries were sufficient to cause instant death in the
ordinary course.

There can be no doubt that rape and murder of a 5-year-old girl shocks the conscience. It is
barbaric. There is, however, no evidence to support the finding that the murder was pre-
meditated. The petitioner did not carry any weapon. The possibility that the appellant-accused
might not have realised that his act could lead to death cannot altogether be ruled out.
Moreover, the trial court has apparently not considered the question of whether the crime is
the rarest of rare crimes as mandated by the Supreme Court in Bachan Singh [Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] .

The appellant-accused neither sought nor was given the opportunity to file any affidavit
placing on record relevant mitigating circumstances. The legal assistance availed by the
appellant-accused was patently not satisfactory and he was not accompanied by a social
worker. No attempt was made to place on record mitigating circumstances. No argument was
advanced to the effect that there was no similar case against the appellant-accused. In the
absence of any arguments, the trial court did not consider the question of whether the
appellant-accused could be reformed.
Dnyaneshwar Suresh Borkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 15 SCC 546
Justices A K Sikri, S Abdul Nazeer, M R Shah; Justice Shah delivered the judgement

Facts: That the appellant herein-original accused was tried by the learned Sessions Court for
the offences under Sections 302, 364 and Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC for having
killed a minor child viz. “Rishikesh”.

Observations: Having heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties on the
sentence, we are of the opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, capital
punishment is not warranted. Striking the balance between the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, we are of the opinion that mitigating circumstances are in favour of the
accused while commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment. The mitigating
circumstances in favour of the accused are that:
(a) The accused at the time of commission of the offence was aged 22 years;
(b) That, by now, he has spent 18 years in the jail;
(c) That, while in jail, his conduct is good;
(d) That, the accused has tried to join the society and has tried to become a civilised man and
has completed his graduation in BA from jail. He has tried to become reformative;
(e) That, from the poems, written by him in the jail, it appears that he has realised his mistake
which was committed by him at the time when he was of young age and that he is
reformative;
(f) Therefore the appellant can be reformed and rehabilitated.

The above details show there is a possibility that accused would not commit similar criminal
acts. That the accused would not be a continuing threat to the society. Considering the
aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and applying the law laid down by this Court
in Sunil [Sunil v. State of M.P., (2017) 4 SCC 393 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 372] , we are of the
opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision of capital punishment is
not warranted. We have considered each of the circumstance and the crime as well as the
facts leading to the commission of the crime by the accused. Though, we acknowledge the
gravity of the offence, we are unable to satisfy ourselves that this case would fall in the
category of “rarest of rare case” warranting the death sentence. The offence committed,
undoubtedly, can be said to be brutal, but does not warrant death sentence. It is required to be
noted that the accused was not a previous convict or a professional killer. At the time of
commission of offence, he was 22 years of age. His jail conduct is also reported to be good.
 Parsuram v. State of M.P., (2019) 8 SCC 382
Justices N V Ramana, M M Shantanagoudar, Indira Banerjee

Facts: The accused was a 22-year-old BSc student at the time of the incident, and used to
impart tuitions in the town of Lahar and in the village where he used to live. He had no prior
criminal history. He raped and murder the victim, whom the accused used to teach.

Observations: All the aforesaid witnesses have consistently and cogently deposed about
seeing the victim last with the accused and about the accused running away from the spot
immediately after the incident. Absolutely no explanation, much less any plausible
explanation, is forthcoming from the accused as to when he parted with the company of the
victim. In the absence of any explanation, adverse inference needs to be drawn against the
accused. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no
need to interfere with the judgment and order of conviction of the trial court as well as the
High Court.

However, in our considered opinion, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the instant
case may not fall under the category of the “rarest of rare” cases. The accused had no
criminal history and he was a BSc student at the time of the incident. The courts below have
not considered the aspect of possibility of reform or rehabilitation of the accused. It is the
duty of the State to show that there is no possibility of reform or rehabilitation of the accused,
to seek for capital punishment. We may hasten to add that the aggravating circumstance in
this case is that the accused took advantage of his position in the victim's family for
committing the offences of rape and murder, inasmuch as the family of the victim had trusted
the accused and sent the child along with him. However, the probability that the accused
would commit criminal acts of violence in the future is not forthcoming from the record.
Undoubtedly, the offence committed by the appellant-accused deserves serious condemnation
and is the most heinous crime, but on considering the cumulative facts and circumstances of
the case, we do not think that the instant case falls in the category of the “rarest of rare”
cases, and we feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. Nevertheless, having
regard to the nature of the crime, the Court strongly feels that the sentence of life
imprisonment subject to remission which normally works out to 16 years (based on the
remission rules framed by Madhya Pradesh) is disproportionate and inadequate for the instant
offence. In our considered opinion, the sentence to be imposed on the appellant-accused
should be between 16 years and imprisonment until death. We have kept in mind the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances of this case while concluding so.

Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly
when the accused has taken advantage of his relationship with the family of the victim as a
tutor, though we find that the instant case does not fall in the category of the “rarest of rare”
cases deserving imposition of the death penalty, the interest of justice would be met if the
appellant herein is sentenced to undergo imprisonment of 30 years (without any remission).
Accordingly, we partly allow the appeals. While confirming the conviction, we modify the
sentence imposed on the appellant from death to life imprisonment of an actual period of 30
years (without any remission).
 Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2019) 16 SCC 584
Justices N V Ramana, M M Shantanagoudar, Indira Banerjee

Facts: It appears that the petitioner, a mason, was engaged at the residence of the deceased
victim's grandfather. On 28-9-2004, at about 2.00 p.m., the petitioner gave money to the
victim to bring betel for him from Hanuman Chowk. A little while later the petitioner also
went to Hanuman Chowk, picked up the victim, an eight-year-old girl, on his bicycle and left
talking with her. The petitioner was convicted for rape and killing the victim.

Observations: In this case, an eight-year-old innocent girl fell prey to the carnal desire and
lust of the petitioner. It is not known whether there was any premeditation on the part of the
petitioner to murder the victim. The circumstances in which he murdered the victim are also
not known. The conviction is based on circumstantial evidence and extra-judicial confession
made by the petitioner to the police in course of investigation. There can be no doubt that the
crime is abhorrent, but it is doubtful as to whether the crime committed by the petitioner can
be termed as “rarest of the rare”. There is also no material at all, not to speak of cogent
material, to establish that the appellant was incapable of being reformed, that he would
remain a threat to society, and that the only punishment that could be given, having regard to
the nature of the crime, is death sentence.

The mere fact that the petitioner and/or his counsel chose to remain silent on the question of
sentence and did not make any submission with regard to the same in the trial court or the
higher appellate courts, does not debar the petitioner from agitating the existence of
mitigating circumstances at this stage, since principles of constructive res judicata can have
no application to matters relating to life and death. It is well recognised worldwide, that
owing to the difficult circumstances prevailing in prisons, such as, enforced solitude,
inadequate health care, loss of livelihood, etc., prisoners often develop mental illness after
their admission into prison. The petitioner has been undergoing prolonged confinement which
is solitary in effect for all practical purposes, though not termed solitary confinement. This
Court, in Shatrughan Chauhan [Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India, (2014) 3 SCC 1 :
(2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] , while strongly relying upon international conventions, has held
“insanity” to be a pertinent supervening factor which must be taken into consideration by the
courts while awarding death penalty. Moreover, this Court had held therein that Article 21
protects such persons from being executed without obtaining further clarification from the
competent authority. Lastly, placing reliance upon laws operating in both international as
well as national arenas, this Court concluded that mental illness is a relevant factor which
warrants commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment.

It is also pertinent to note herein that the relevant Prison Rules also recognise the
phenomenon of post-conviction mental illness and state that the execution of such persons
shall be deferred, pending orders of the Government. [ Bihar Prisons Manual 2012, Rule 642]
In the light of the aforesaid considerations, we conclude that the mental health of the
petitioner at the time of execution is a relevant mitigating factor which must be taken into
consideration in the present case. As observed above, there are materials put forward now, in
the form of medical opinion, which show that the petitioner is not mentally sound. For the
reasons discussed above, we are of the view that it would not be appropriate and/or safe to
affirm the death sentence awarded to the petitioner. Death Penalty Upheld
 Nand Kishore v. State of M.P., (2019) 16 SCC 278
Justices S A Bobde, L Nageswara Rao, R Subhash Reddy; Justice Reddy delivered the
judgement

Facts: a minor girl aged about 8 years, had gone to attend the “mela” along with her younger
brother, namely, Chhunu (PW 4) on 3-2-2013. It is the case of the prosecution that the
appellant who is aged about 50 years then, took away the deceased from the “mela” and
committed rape and murdered her.

Observations: So far as the present case is concerned, it solely rests on circumstantial

evidence. It is the specific case of the appellant that he was denied the proper legal assistance
in the matter and he is a manhole worker. The appellant was aged about 50 years. Further, in
this case there is no finding recorded by the courts below to the effect that there is no
possibility of reformation of the appellant. We are of the view that the reasons assigned by
the trial court as confirmed by the High Court, do not constitute special reasons within the
meaning of Section 354(3) CrPC to impose death penalty on the accused.
 Yogendra v. State of M.P., (2019) 9 SCC 243

Justices S A Bobde, L Nageswara Rao, R Subhash Reddy; Justice Bobde delivered the
opinion of the court
Facts: The brief facts of the case are as follows: the appellant has been convicted for the
murder of one Smt Ruby by pouring acid on her.
Observations: In the case before us, the incident is related to the appellant being
disappointed in his relation with the deceased who he believed deserted him. The
circumstance of the case and particularly the choice of acid do not disclose a cold-blooded
plan to murder the deceased. Like in many cases the intention seems to have been to severely
injure or disfigure the deceased; in this case we think the intention resulted into an attack
more severe than planned which then resulted in the death of the deceased. It is possible that
what was premeditated was an injury and not death. We find that there is no particular
depravity or brutality in the acts of the appellant that warrants a classification of this case as
“rarest of the rare”. Therefore, the sentence of death imposed by the High Court is set aside
and instead the appellant shall undergo imprisonment for life. The appeals are accordingly
allowed.
 Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 12 SCC 460

Justices Madan B Lokur, S Abdul Nazeer, Deepak Gupta; Justice Lokur delivered the
opinion of the court
Facts: The appellant was convicted for the rape and murder of a girl aged 3 years.
Observations: Insofar as the present petition is concerned, we are of opinion that for the
purposes of sentencing, the Sessions Judge, the High Court as well as this Court did not take
into consideration the probability of reformation, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the
appellant into society. Indeed, no material or evidence was placed before the courts to arrive
at any conclusion in this regard one way or the other and for whatever it is worth on the facts
of this case. The prosecution was remiss in not producing the available DNA evidence and
the failure to produce material evidence must lead to an adverse presumption against the
prosecution and in favour of the appellant for the purposes of sentencing. The trial court was
also in error in taking into consideration, for the purposes of sentencing, the pendency of two
similar cases against the appellant which it could not, in law, consider. However, we also
cannot overlook subsequent developments with regard to the two (actually three) similar
cases against the appellant.
For all these reasons, we are of opinion that it would be more appropriate looking to the
crimes committed by the appellant and the material on record including his overall
personality and subsequent events, to commute the sentence of death awarded to the appellant
but direct that he should not be released from custody for the rest of his normal life. We order
accordingly.
 Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1
Justices Dipak Misra, R Banumathi, Ashok Bhushan; Justice Misra Delivered the
judgement; Justice Banumathi separate opinion

Facts: Delhi (Nirbhaya) Gang Rape

Observations: In the present case, there is not even a hint of hesitation in my mind with
respect to the aggravating circumstances outweighing the mitigating circumstances and I do
not find any justification to convert the death sentence imposed by the courts below to “life
imprisonment for the rest of the life”. The gruesome offences were committed with highest
viciousness. Human lust was allowed to take such a demonic form. The accused may not be
hardened criminals; but the cruel manner in which the gang rape was committed in the
moving bus; iron rods were inserted in the private parts of the victim; and the coldness with
which both the victims were thrown naked in cold wintery night of December, shocks the
collective conscience of the society. The present case clearly comes within the category of
“the rarest of rare cases” where the question of any other punishment is “unquestionably
foreclosed”. If at all there is a case warranting award of death sentence, it is the present case.
If the dreadfulness displayed by the accused in committing the gang rape, unnatural sex,
insertion of iron rod in the private parts of the victim does not fall in the “rarest of rare
category”, then one may wonder what else would fall in that category. On these reasonings
recorded by me, I concur with the majority in affirming the death sentence awarded to the
accused persons.
 Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 6 SCC 631
Justices Dipak Misra, R F Nariman, U U Lalit; Justice Lalit delivered the judgement

Facts: The charge against the petitioner was that the victim, a minor girl of four years, was
raped and battered to death by the petitioner. The petitioner allegedly lured the victim by
giving her chocolates, kidnapped her and after satisfying his lust, caused crushing injuries to
her with the help of stones weighing about 8.5 kg and 7.5 kg.

Observations: The material placed on record shows that after the judgment [Vasanta Sampat
Dupare v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 1 SCC 253 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 624] under review,
the petitioner has completed Bachelors Preparatory Programme offered by Indira Gandhi
National Open University enabling him to prepare for Bachelor level study and that he has
also completed the Gandhi Vichar Pariksha and had participated in drawing competition
organised sometime in January 2016. It is asserted that the jail record of the petitioner is
without any blemish. The matter is not contested as regards Conditions (1), (2), (5), (6) and
(7) as stated in para 206 of the decision in Bachan Singh [Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab,
(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] , but what is now being projected is that there is a
possibility of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated. Though these attempts on part of
the petitioner are after the judgment [Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra,
(2015) 1 SCC 253 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 624] under review, we have considered the material
in that behalf to see if those circumstances warrant a different view. We have given anxious
consideration to the material on record but find that the aggravating circumstances, namely,
the extreme depravity and the barbaric manner in which the crime was committed and the
fact that the victim was a helpless girl of four years clearly outweigh the mitigating
circumstances now brought on record. Having taken an overall view of the matter, in our
considered view, no case is made out to take a different view in the matter. We, therefore,
affirm the view taken in the judgment [Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. State of Maharashtra,
(2015) 1 SCC 253 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 624] under review and dismiss the present review
petitions.

Death Penalty Upheld