05-New Sun Valley V Sanguniang Baranggay

G.R. No. 156686. July 27, 2011.
NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner, vs. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, BARANGAY SUN
VALLEY, PARAÑAQUE CITY, ROBERTO GUEVARRA IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PUNONG BARANGAY AND MEMBERS OF
THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY, respondents.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The

thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence.—We have emphasized the importance
of applying this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held: The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial
system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities
within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale
for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the
speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel
courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed.
Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the
party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent.—Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the
burden of proof was on petitioner to show ownership over the subject roads.
This, petitioner failed to do. In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party
making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of
evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.
Local Government Code; Jurisdiction; The local government unit’s
power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the
Local Government Code.—On the other hand, the local
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
439
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 439
New Sun Valley Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Barangay,

Barangay Sun Valley, Parañaque City
government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is
clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.—(a) A local government unit
may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open
any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided,
however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be
approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the sanggunian,
and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure is provided.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Law Firm of Villanueva, Nuñez & Associates for petitioner.
Ceferino Padua for respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court against the Decision1 dated October 16, 2002 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65559 and the Resolution2 dated January 17, 2003,
both of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are as follows:
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the “BSV
Sangguniang Barangay”) issued BSV Resolution No. 98-0963 on
October 13, 1998, entitled “Directing the New Sun Valley
Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to
Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic,” the pertinent portions of which
read as follows:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 39-47; penned by Associate Justice Candido V. Rivera with Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo (now a
member of this Court), concurring.
2 Id., at p. 37.
3 Id., at pp. 53-54.
440
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

New Sun Valley Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. Sangguniang
Barangay, Barangay Sun Valley, Parañaque City
“NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved by the
Sangguniang Barangay in session assembled that—
1. Pursuant to its power and authority under the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160), the New Sun Valley Homeowners
Association (NSVHA) is hereby directed to open Rosemallow and Aster Sts.
to vehicular (private cars only) and pedestrian traffic at all hours daily
except from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. at which time the said streets may be closed
for the sake of the security of the residents therein.
2. The Barangay government take steps to address the security
concerns of the residents of the area concerned, including the possible
assignment of a barangay tanod or traffic enforcer therein, within the limits
of the authority and financial capability of the Barangay.
3. This Resolution shall become executory within 72 hours upon
receipt hereof by the Association or any of its members.”4
The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI),

represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed a Petition5 for a
“Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction with prayer
for issuance of TRO” with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Parañaque City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0420.
NSVHAI claimed therein that the implementation of BSV
Resolution No. 98-096 would “cause grave injustice and irreparable
injury” as “[the] affected homeowners acquired their properties for
strictly residential purposes”;6 that the subdivision is a place that the
homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and “a
peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public places”;7 and
that the passage of the Resolution would destroy the character of the
subdivision. NSVHAI averred that contrary to what was stated in the
BSV Resolution, the opening of the gates of the subdivision would
not in any manner ease the traffic con-
_______________
4 Id., at p. 53.
5 Id., at pp. 55-58.
6 Id., at p. 56.
7 Id.
441
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 441

gestion in the area, and that there were alternative routes available.
According to NSVHAI, the opening of the proposed route to all
kinds of vehicles would result in contributing to the traffic build-up
on Doña Soledad Avenue, and that instead of easing the traffic flow,
it would generate a heavier volume of vehicles in an already
congested choke point. NSVHAI went on to state that a deterioration
of the peace and order condition inside the subdivision would be
inevitable; that the maintenance of peace and order in the residential
area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to the subdivision
was regulated by the Association and why the passing through of
vehicles was controlled and limited; and that criminal elements
would take advantage of the opening to public use of the roads in
question.8
NSVHAI further contested the BSV Resolution by submitting the
following arguments to the RTC:
“12. The road network inside the subdivision and drainage system is
not designed to withstand the entry of a heavy volume of vehicles especially
delivery vans and trucks. Thus, destruction of the roads and drainage system
will result. The safety, health and well-being of the residents will face
continuous danger to their detriment and prejudice;
13. When the residents bought their residential properties, they also
paid proportionately for the roads and the park in then subdivision. They
have therefore an existing equity on these roads. To open the roads to public
use is a violation of the rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and
healthful environment;
14. Aside from the availability of a better route to be opened, there are
other ways to ease traffic flow. The continuous presence of traffic enforcers
on all identified traffic choke points will prevent snarls which impede
smooth travel. The strict enforcement of traffic rules and regulations should
be done;
15. There are a lot of undisciplined drivers of tricycles, jeepneys,
trucks and delivery [vans], which contribute to the traffic
_______________
8 Id., at pp. 56-57.
442

congestion. The barangay should require these drivers to observe road

courtesy and obedience to traffic rules[.]”9
Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a

Temporary Restraining Order10 (TRO) in Civil Case No. 98-
0420 on October 30, 1998. Said Order provides:
“Acting on the Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/

Permanent Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, filed by plaintiff and considering that there is extreme urgency, such
that unless the same is issued, plaintiff would suffer grave injustice and/or
irreparable injury, let a Temporary Restraining Order issue directing the
Sangguniang Barangay as represented by Punong Barangay Roberto
Guevarra to cease and desist from the implementation of Resolution No. 98-
096 or otherwise maintain the status quo until further Orders of this Court.
This Temporary Restraining Order shall be effective for seventy two (72)
hours from issuance hereof, unless extended by another Order of this Court.
Let this case be set for special raffle and conference on November 3,
1998 at 10:30 in the morning.”
On November 3, 1998, the RTC issued another Order11 stating

that, by agreement of the parties, the status quo shall be maintained
for seventeen (17) more days, and that the case was set for hearing
on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on
November 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.
NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition12 on November 13,
1998, at about 11:10 a.m., wherein it claimed that the BSV
Sangguniang Barangay had no jurisdiction over the
_______________
9 Id., at p. 57.
10 Id., at p. 67.
11 Id., at p. 68.
12 Id., at pp. 69-72. The Amended Petition, although stamped received on
November 13, 1998, was dated October 28, 1998. The copy submitted to the court
was marked (SIGNED) by the representative of NSVHAI, but no signature appears
on the document.
443
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 443

opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the “subject roads”).

NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended Petition its Position
Paper13 dated July 21, 1998, which set forth its objection to the
opening of the subject roads for public use and argued that a
Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the
subject roads because under the law, an ordinance is required to
effect such an act.14
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to Dismiss15
likewise on November 13, 1998. The copy provided by petitioner to
the Court indicates the time of receipt by NSVHAI as 11:00 a.m.16
The RTC heard the case on November 20, 1998, as scheduled,
and thereafter submitted the matter for decision.17 On the same date,
the RTC issued the following Order:18
“Acting on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
filed by petitioner, it appearing that petitioner may suffer grave injustice or
irreparable injury, let a writ of preliminary injunction issue prohibiting the
Sangguniang Barangay represented by Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra
from implementing Resolution no. 98-096 until further orders from this
Court.
Petitioner is directed to file a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS (sic) to answer for damages to
defendants in the event the Court finds petitioner is not entitled to said
injunction.”
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed on December 4, 1998 a

Motion for Reconsideration and to Dissolve Preliminary
Injunction (with Memorandum of Authorities).19
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 76-78.
14 Id., at p. 70.
15 Id., at pp. 79-85.
16 Id., at p. 79.
17 Id., at pp. 314-315.
18 Id., at p. 95.
19 Id., at pp. 96-101.
444

NSVHAI then filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Expunge on

December 10, 1998, moving to declare the above motion of the BSV
Sangguniang Barangay as a mere scrap of paper for being filed out
of time and for failure to serve a copy thereof to the counsel of
petitioner.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the case in an Order20 dated
August 17, 1999, stating as follows:
“Defendant Barangay Sun Valley moves to dismiss the instant case on the
grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. In summary, defendant alleges that the subject streets Aster
and Rosemallow inside Sun Valley Subdivision are owned by the local government.
Such streets have long been part of the public domain and beyond the commerce of
man. In support of this, defendant cited the case of White Plains Association, Inc. vs.
Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765 wherein it was held that road lots of subdivisions constitute
a part of the mandatory open space reserved for public use; ownership of which is
automatically vested in the Republic of the Philippines although it is still registered
in the name of the developer/owner, its donation to the government is a mere
formality.” The power or authority to close or open the said streets is vested in the
local government units and not on homeowner’s associations, pursuant to Section 21
of the local Government Code (RA 7160) quoted as follows: “Section 21. Closure
and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,
permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square
falling within its jurisdiction x x x.” In view thereof, Resolution No. 98-096 was
passed by the Sangguniang Barangay. Hence there is no right whatsoever on the
part of Plaintiff NSVHA entitled to the protection of the law. Further, defendant
contends that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as ordained in
Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government Code giving the city mayor the
supervisory power, and the power of review by the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
respectively.
No opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by the Plaintiff.
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 49-50.
445
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 445

Same defendant seeks to reconsider the order granting the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction alleging that there is a pending motion to dismiss and
Plaintiff has not been able to establish an actually existing right.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition thereto, instead it filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to expunge the motion for reconsideration on the ground that its counsel has
not been furnished with a copy of the motion for reconsideration, but the record
shows that Maria Cortez (plaintiff’s representative) has received a copy of said
motion.
After considering the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings, this
court hereby resolves as follows:
1. The “Motion for Reconsideration” and the “Urgent Ex-parte Motion to
Expunge (motion for reconsideration)” are Denied being devoid of merit;
and
2. The “Motion to Dismiss” is hereby Granted for failure of the plaintiff to
exhaust the administrative remedies under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, let this case be as it is hereby ordered Dismissed. The writ of
21
preliminary injunction is hereby lifted.”
NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 of the above-

quoted Order but this was denied by the RTC for lack of merit in an
Order23 dated September 21, 1999.
NSVHAI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals and the case
was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65559. NSVHAI alleged that
“despite the lack of the required hearing”24 and without any order
requiring it to submit its Comment/Opposition to the BSV
Sangguniang Barangay’s Motion to Dismiss or that of submitting
said Motion for resolution, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order
which, to NSVHAI’s complete surprise, granted the Motion.
NSVHAI argued that the RTC gravely erred in taking cognizance of,
and thereafter
_______________
21 Id.
22 Id., at pp. 107-116.
23 Id., at p. 52.
24 Id., at p. 131.
446

ruling on, said Motion and refusing to exercise jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Civil Case No. 98-0420. Petitioner likewise argued
that the RTC committed serious errors which, if not corrected, would
cause grave or irreparable injury to petitioner and cause a violation
of law.25
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay, Roberto Guevarra in his
capacity as Punong Barangay, and members of the Sangguniang
Barangay (hereinafter, “respondents”), in their Appellees’ Brief,
argued as follows:
I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS-
APPELLEES’ MOTION TO DISMISS DUE TO LACK OF CAUSE OF
ACTION AND JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND
APPELLANT’S FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES. AS NOTED BY THE COURT, NO OPPOSITION TO THE
MOTION TO DISMISS WAS EVER FILED BY APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION ASSAILING ITS
SUBJECT-MATTER, BARANGAY RESOLUTION NO. 98-096,
CONSISTING OF A DIRECTIVE OF AN LGU TO A DEFIANT PRIVATE
ORGANIZATION WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, IS JUDICIAL
RECOGNITION OF THE SOLE COMPETENCE AND WISE
DISCRETION OF THE BARANGAY OVER A LOCAL TRAFFIC
PROBLEM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY SERIOUS ERROR,
PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE, AS FOUND BY THE COURT A
QUO. IT IS APPELLANT THAT HAS COMMITTED THE ERROR OF
NOT EXHAUSTING ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. HENCE, NO
GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE INJURY CAN BE CAUSED TO
APPELLANT FOR IT HAS NO RIGHT TO PROTECT.26
_______________
25 Id., at p. 126.
26 Id., at pp. 161-162.
447
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 447

Respondents claimed that Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 was

simply a directive to petitioner, “a private aggrupation of some self-
seeking homeowners,”27 and was just a measure of internal policy
among residents; that the opening of roads for traffic reasons was
“within the sole competence of the barangay to determine”;28 and
the Mayor could have chosen, as it was within his power to do so, to
cause the demolition of the gates, which were illegally built by
petitioner and therefore were obstructions on the road, even without
a Barangay resolution. Respondents likewise claimed that the BSV’s
action could be considered a political question, which should be
essentially withdrawn from judicial cognizance, and constitutional
law doctrine provides that the courts would not interfere with
political issues unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, of which
there was none on the part of the Barangay. Respondents argued that
petitioner did not have any actual legal right entitled to the
protection of the law.29
Respondents attached to their Appellees’ Brief six documents,
labeled as Annexes “2” to “7,” all stamped “Certified True Copy” by
a certain Roman E. Loreto, Legal Officer II of Legal Department.30
The detailed information contained in each of the documents that
comprise respondents’ Annexes “2” to “7” is copied below:
1. 1st Indorsement31 from the Office of the Mayor of
Parañaque dated May 20, 1988, signed by Luzviminda A.
Concepcion, Administrative Officer II, stating as follows:
“Respectfully indorsed to Atty. Antonio G. Cruz, Municipal Attorney, of

this municipality the herein attached “Original Copies of Transfer
Certificate of Title for Sun Valley Open Space and Road
_______________
27 Id., at p. 163.
28 Id., at p. 164.
29 Id., at pp. 163-165.
30 Id., at pp. 179-184.
31 Id., at p. 179.
448

Lots” with TCT Nos. 133552, 119836, and 122443 for your appropriate
actions.”
2. Letter32 dated December 27, 1990 from

Francisco B. Jose, Jr., Municipal Attorney of
Parañaque, addressed to the Municipal Council
Secretary, which reads:
“This has reference to your request dated December 18, 1990 relative to
the letter of inquiry of the Barangay Captain of Barangay Sun Valley dated
December 13, 1990.
We wish to inform you that based on the available records of our office
the open space and road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision is already owned by
the Municipal Government of Parañaque as evidenced by TCT NOS.
133552, 119836, and 122443. Copies of which are hereto attached for your
ready reference.
Considering that the Municipality of Parañaque is the registered owner
of the road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision, we are of the opinion that the
roads become public in use and ownership, and therefore, use of the roads
by persons other than residents of the Subdivision can no longer be
curtailed. However, should the Municipal Government decides to delegate
its right to regulate the use of the said roads to the Sun Valley Homeowner’s
Association or Sun Valley Barangay Council, such right may be exercise[d]
by said association or council.”
3. Certification33 dated October 8, 1990

issued by Francisco B. Jose, Jr. under the
letterhead of the Office of the Municipal Attorney
of Parañaque, which reads:
“This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, the
open space and road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision has been donated and
now owned by the Municipality of Parañaque, as evidenced by TCT Nos.
133552, 119836, and 122443 copies of which are hereto attached.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Mario Cortez,
President of Sun Valley Homeowners Association.”
_______________
32 Id., at p. 180.
33 Id., at p. 181.
449
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 449

4. Certification34 dated June 13, 1994, again

signed by Francisco B. Jose, Jr., of the Office of the
Municipal Attorney, providing as follows:
only road lots in Sun Valley Subdivision titled in the name of the
Municipality of Parañaque are those covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 133552 and 122443.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Coun. Manuel T. De
Guia.”
5. Certification35 dated March 2, 1995 issued

by Rodolfo O. Alora, OIC, Asst. Municipal Legal
Officer, which reads:
open space within Sun Valley Subdivision has already been donated to the
Municipality as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119836, copy
of which is hereto attached.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Atty. Rex G. Rico.”
6. Certification36 dated October 26, 1998

issued by Ma. Riza Pureza Manalese, Legal
Researcher, Office of the Municipal Attorney,
Parañaque City, which reads:
“This is to certify that based on the available records of this Office, road
lots of Sun Valley Subdivision have already been donated to the
Municipality of Parañaque as evidenced by TCT NO. 133552, 119836, and
122443.
This certification is being issued upon the request of MR. WILLIAM
UY.”
The Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated October 16, 2002

denying the appeal and affirming the Orders of the RTC dated
August 17, 1999 and September 21, 1999. The Court of
_______________
34 Id., at p. 182.
35 Id., at p. 183.
36 Id., at p. 184.
450
Appeals likewise denied NSVHAI’s Motion for Partial

Reconsideration in its Resolution promulgated on January 17, 2003,
stating that after a thorough study of the Motion for
Reconsideration, it found no sufficient reason to deviate from its
findings and conclusion reached in its decision.
Thus, NSVHAI (hereinafter, “petitioner”) went to this Court.
Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner alleges that the decision of the Court of Appeals was
based on “facts that [were] outside of the original Petition and
Amended Petition and on supposed findings of facts that are not
even evidence offered before the court a quo.”37 Petitioner likewise
alleges that the facts used by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the
case were contrary to the records of Civil Case No. 98-0420.
Petitioner lists the following as its Questions of Law:
A
In sustaining the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420, the Honorable Court
of Appeals sanctioned the departure of the Regional Trial Court from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
B
Whether or not the issuance of the Resolution promulgated January 17,
2003 and the Decision promulgated October 16, 2002 by the Former 4th
Division and the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals sustaining the validity
of dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420 is not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court
_______________
37 Id., at p. 17.
451
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 451

C
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings by making
findings of fact not supported by evidence of record38
Petitioner avers that the hearing for the respondents’ Motion to

Dismiss was set on November 20, 1998, without indication as to
time and that during the hearing on such date, counsel for
respondents moved that their Motion to Dismiss be heard over the
objection of counsel for petitioner, who explained that there was an
urgency in ruling on the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction in view of the expiration of the temporary
restraining order (TRO).39
Petitioner quotes the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) from
the November 20, 1998 hearing before the RTC in the following
manner:
Atty. Herrera:
Then, Your Honor, I files [sic] a motion petitioning to dismiss this instant
case, which should be resolved first before hearing this case.
Atty. Nuñez:
Your Honor, please, with due respect to the opposing counsel, the
hearing today is supposed to be on the presentation of petitioner’s evidence
in support of its prayer for preliminary injunction. In connection with the
amended complaint, I guess it is a matter of right to amend its pleading.
What happened here, the amended petition was filed before this
Honorable Court on November 13 at 11:10 a.m. but I think the motion
to dismiss was filed by the respondent on November 13 at 11:20 a.m..
Therefore, it is the right of the petitioner insofar as the case is
concerned.
And therefore, this Court should proceed with the hearing on the
preliminary injunction instead of entertaining this
_______________
38 Id., at p. 18.
39 Id., at p. 13.
452

matter. The temporary restraining order will expire today and we have
the right to be heard.
Court:
We will proceed first with the hearing (referring to the scheduled
hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction).
(Transcript of Stenographic Notes, November 20, 1998) (Underscoring and
explanation petitioner’s.)40
Petitioner claims that the RTC proceeded to hear the prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction and no hearing was
conducted on the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner reiterates its earlier
claim that it did not receive an order requiring it to submit its
Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss or informing it that
said Motion had been submitted for resolution.41
Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420
arose from the grant of respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner
claims that it filed its Amended Petition on November 13, 1998 at
11:10 a.m., or before respondents served any responsive pleading, or
before they had filed their Motion to Dismiss on the same date at
about 11:20 a.m.42 Petitioner avers that the filing of said Amended
Petition was a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, and had the effect of superseding the
original petition dated October 28, 1998. Petitioner concludes that
the Motion to Dismiss was therefore directed against a non-existing
Petition.43
Petitioner argues that the RTC’s ruling on the Motion to Dismiss
is contrary to procedural law because no hearing was conducted on
said Motion to Dismiss; that said motion violated Section 5, Rule 10
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
_______________
40 Id., at p. 24.
41 Id., at p. 14.
42 Id., at p. 12.
43 Id., at pp. 22-23.
453
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 453

for failing to set the time of hearing thereof; and that instead of
being resolved, said motion should have been declared as a mere
scrap of worthless paper.44
Petitioner claims that during the proceedings before the RTC on
November 20, 1998, both parties manifested that the Motion to
Dismiss was never set for hearing, and that when Judge Bautista-
Ricafort said, “We will proceed first with the hearing,”45 she was
referring to the scheduled hearing of the prayer for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner claims that it is crystal
clear that it was deprived due process when a ruling was had on the
Motion to Dismiss despite the clear absence of a hearing. Petitioner
concludes that the Court of Appeals was manifestly mistaken when
it ruled that due process was observed in the issuance of the assailed
Orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort, despite the lack of opportunity to
submit a comment or opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and the
lack of issuance of an order submitting said motion for resolution.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals sanctioned the ruling of
the RTC that violated both substantial and procedural law.46
Moreover, petitioner avers that contrary to the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide the
Amended Petition, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not applicable. This is because, according to
petitioner, such doctrine “requires that were a remedy before an
administrative agency is provided, relief must first be sought from
the administrative agencies prior to bringing an action before courts
of justice.”47 Petitioner claims that when it filed Civil Case No. 98-
08420, it did not have the luxury of time to elevate the matter to the
higher authorities under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local
Government
_______________
44 Id., at p. 23.
45 Id., at p. 24.
46 Id., at pp. 26-27.
47 Id., at p. 20; citing De Leon and De Leon, Jr., Administrative Law: Text and
Cases (1993 Edition), p. 320.
454

Code. Petitioner alleges that the tenor of BSV Resolution No. 98-
096 necessitated the immediate filing of the injunction case on
October 29, 1998, to forestall the prejudicial effect of said resolution
that was to take effect two days later. Thus, petitioner claims that it
had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy except to file the
case.48
Anent the question of whether the Sangguniang Barangay should
have passed an ordinance instead of a resolution to open the subject
roads, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals should not have
relied on respondents’ claim of ownership, as this led to the
erroneous conclusion that there was no need to pass an ordinance.
Petitioner insists that the supposed titles to the subject roads were
never submitted to the RTC, and the respondents merely attached
certifications that the ownership of the subject roads was already
vested in the City Government of Parañaque City as Annexes to
their Appellees’ Brief before the Court of Appeals. Those annexes,
according to petitioner, were not formally offered as evidence.49
Petitioner avers that the records of Civil Case No. 98-0420
clearly show that there was no proof or evidence on record to
support the findings of the Court of Appeals. This is because,
allegedly, the dismissal of said case was due to the grant of a motion
to dismiss, and the case did not go to trial to receive evidence.50
Petitioner avers that a motion to dismiss hypothetically admits the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.51 In adopting the annexes
as basis for its findings of fact, the Court of Appeals allegedly
disregarded the rules on Evidence.
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 21-22.
49 Id., at p. 28.
50 Id., at pp. 28-29.
51 Citing Justice Florenz Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1
(Sixth Revised Edition), p. 242.
455
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 455

Petitioner raises the following grounds for the issuance by this

Court of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction:
“Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 is repugnant to the

proprietary rights of the affected homeowners who are members of
petitioner NSVHAI, such rights undoubtedly protected by the Constitution.
As there is no proof otherwise (except the baseless findings of fact by the
Honorable Court of Appeals) that the streets encompassed by the concerned
subdivision, Sun Valley Subdivision, are all private properties. As such, the
residents of Sun Valley Subdivision have all the right to regulate the roads
and open spaces within their territorial jurisdiction.
This Honorable Supreme Court can take judicial knowledge that criminal
activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in
Philippine society. Residents have invested their lifetime’s savings in private
subdivision since subdivision living afford them privacy, exclusivity and
foremost of all, safety. Living in a subdivision has a premium and such
premium translates into a comparatively more expensive lot because of the
safety, among others, that subdivision lifestyle offers.
But, with the enactment and intended implementation of Sangguniang
Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets for
public use, it is indubitable that, instead of promoting the safety of resident
of Sun Valley Subdivision, respondents are endangering the life and
property of the residents of the said subdivision as they will now be exposed
to criminal and lawless elements.
It is respectfully submitted that Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No.
98-096 has a place only in an authoritarian government where proprietary
rights and privacy are alien concepts. Lest it be forgotten, ours is a
democratic society and therefore, it should not be ruled in a manner befitting
of a despotic government.
Petitioner NSVHAI, in protection of the rights and interest of the
residents of Sun Valley Subdivision and in order to ensure that public
officials will not abuse governmental powers and use them in an oppressive
and arbitrary manner, invokes the judicial power of
456

this Honorable Supreme Court and pray that a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued and, after hearing, be declared permanent.”52
A perusal of the documents attached by petitioner as Annexes

revealed to the Court the following, which were not discussed in
the body of the petition:
1. A letter53 dated January 25, 2003 signed by Sonia G. Sison,
President of NSVHAI, to Mayor Joey P. Marquez, the pertinent
portions of which provide:
“We admit that we erred in not going to you directly because at that
time, the NSVHA received the letter-order of Brgy. Capt. Guevara two days
before the effectivity of the order. Aside from this, there was a long holiday
(long weekend prior to November 1). Thus, the Board of Governors had no
other recourse but to seek a TRO and thereafter a permanent injunction.
We now would like to seek your assistance concerning this urgent
problem. For your information there are already two (2) gates in and out of
Sun Valley Subdivision.
Under P.D. 957, the Homeowners Association is mandated to protect the
interest of the homeowners and residents especially in so far as it affects the
security, comfort and the general welfare of the homeowners.
Thank you and because of the urgency of the matter, we anticipate your
prompt and favorable action.” (Emphasis ours.)
2. A letter54 signed by Parañaque City Mayor Joey Marquez dated

January 27, 2003, addressed to Mr. Roberto Guevara, Office of the
Barangay Captain, Barangay Sun Valley, which reads in part:
“This refers to your intended implementation of Barangay Sun Valley Resolution

No. 98-096 entitled, “A RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW SUN VALLEY
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION TO
_______________
52 Rollo, pp. 31-32.
53 Id., at p. 239.
54 Id., at pp. 240-241.
457
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 457

OPEN ROSEMALLOW AND ASTER STREETS TO

VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC.”
In this regard and pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 32 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 which vests upon the city mayor the right to exercise general
supervision over component barangays, to ensure that said barangays act within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions, you are hereby directed to defer your
implementation of the subject ordinance based on the following grounds:
1. The roads subject of your resolution is a municipal road and not a barangay
road;
2. The opening or closure of any local road may be undertaken by a local
government unit pursuant to an ordinance and not through a mere resolution
as provided under Sec. 21 of the Local Government Code of 1991;
3. There is no more need to order the opening of the aforementioned roads in
view of the fact that Gelia and State Ave., have already been opened by the
subdivision to the general public to accommodate vehicular and pedestrian
traffic in the area;
4. There is a need to conduct public hearings, as in fact we shall be conducting
public hearings, on the matter to enable us to arrive at an intelligent
resolution of the issues involved.”
3. A letter55 dated January 31, 2003

addressed to Mayor Joey Marquez, signed by
counsel for respondents, wherein the latter wrote:
“We regret to observe that all the reasons that you have cited in your
letter as grounds for your order of non-implementation of the Barangay
Resolution have been passed upon and decided by the Court of Appeals,
which lately denied the NSVHA Motion for Reconsideration x x x.
xxxx
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is now the subject of an appeal
taken by the NSVHA to the Supreme Court. In deference to
_______________
52 Rollo, pp. 31-32.
458

the high Court, you would do well to reconsider your order to the Barangay
and not pre-empt the high Court on its decision. x x x.”
Arguments of Respondents
Respondents filed their Comment56 on July 17, 2003. They
manifest that the petition is substantially a reproduction of
petitioner’s brief filed with the Court of Appeals, and consists of
almost identical issues which have already been ventilated and
decided upon by the said court.
Respondents claim that the hearing held on November 20, 1998,
as found by the Court of Appeals, covered both the injunction and
dismissal incidents, and that the motion to dismiss on issues of
jurisdiction was a prejudicial matter. Respondents confirm that the
RTC said it will proceed first with the hearing, but the lower court
did not specify if the hearing was going to take up the prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction or the motion to dismiss.
Respondents further claim that by the end of the hearing, after Atty.
Florencio R. Herrera’s manifestation on the donated public roads,
counsels for both parties were asked by the court if they were
submitting, and both of them answered in the affirmative.57
Respondents aver that petitioner’s reply to its charge of misleading
the Court was an admission that counsel had tampered without
authority with the TSN, and that the phrase “referring to the
scheduled hearing of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction”58 was said counsel’s own mere footnote.
Respondents allege that the issuance of the titles in favor of
Parañaque over all the roads in Sun Valley Subdivision was an
official act by the land registration office of the City of Parañaque,
and was perfectly within the judicial notice of the Courts, pursuant
to Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules of
_______________
56 Id., at pp. 294-306.
57 Id., at p. 297.
58 Id.
459
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 459

Court.59 Respondents likewise allege that the gates were earlier

built illegally on the roads by the Association, and while petitioner
may lend a helping hand to the barangay, it cannot control the
latter’s discretion as to the wisdom of its traffic policies within the
barangay. They maintain that petitioner had no business putting up
road blocks in the first place; that this matter is purely a local
government determination; and that it is even doubtful if courts
would encroach upon this autonomous determination for local
constituents of the Barangay in deference to the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Respondents claim that since the subject matter of the case is a
directive of the Barangay to the petitioner, the requirement for an
ordinance would not be necessary, as there was no legislative
determination in the Barangay resolution regarding what class of
roads to open or what to close by way of general policy.60
Respondents contend that the Barangay Resolution was internal
and temporary, passed to solve a traffic problem. They propose a
reason why petitioner allegedly wants to control the subject roads, as
follows:
“The directive of the Barangay is certainly a declaration of an intention

expressed by resolution on complaints of residents for a convenient outlet of
cars and pedestrians during certain hours of the [day] or night. This need not
be the subject of an ordinance. It is addressed to a special group of residents,
and not to the general community. It refers to particular roads and at certain
hours only, not to all the roads and at all hours.
Hence, the Barangay Resolutions (sic) is but temporary in character,
being a solution to a momentary traffic problem then visualized by the
Barangay and encouraged by the MMDA. There is no legal question
involved that is of any concern to the NSVHA. The prevailing reason why
the NSVHA desires to control the roads is the monetary consideration it
gains by its unilateral requirement of car
_______________
59 Id., at p. 300.
60 Id., at p. 301.
460

stickers and of substantial fees exacted from delivery vans and trucks for
bringing in cargo into the subdivision. And yet, the residents who, never
gave their consent to this activities (sic), are busy people and have merely
tolerated this for a long time now. This tolerance did not of course give
legality to the illegal act. x x x.”61
As regards petitioner’s argument that the BSV Sangguniang

Barangay should have passed an ordinance instead of a resolution,
respondents present their counter-argument as follows:
“Hence, even assuming for the sake of argument that a legal question
exists on whether it be a resolution or ordinance that should contain the
Barangay directive, such an issue is of no moment as plaintiff-appellant
failed to exhaust the necessary administrative remedies before resorting to
court action, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Section
32, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides for a remedy
from Barangay actions to the Mayor under the latter’s power of general
supervision.”62
With regard to the Mayor’s involvement in this case, respondents

have this to say:
“The Mayor’s act of interfering in Barangay Sun Valley affairs stemmed

out of a long-standing political feud of the Mayor with the Punong
Barangay. Its general supervision did not extend to pure Barangay matters,
which the Barangay would be x x x in a better position to determine.
Furthermore, the general supervision of the Mayor is limited to the
overseeing authority that the Barangays act within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions. Sadly, there is nothing in this Mayor’s
letter x x x that would as much as show a deviation by the Barangay Sun
Valley from any prescribed powers or function. The Mayor’s directive to the
Barangay is of doubtful legality.
_______________
61 Id., at pp. 302-303.
62 Id., at p. 303.
461
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 461

It was mainly the mounting traffic problem progressively experienced

through the years that prompted the Barangay to resolve to open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets in accordance with its power under Section
21 of R.A. 7160 to “temporarily open or close any local road falling within
its jurisdiction”. This Resolution x x x was decided upon after the Barangay
Council made the necessary investigation and conducted hearings in
consultation with affected residents. In order to maintain some kind of
cordial relationship with the NSVHA, the Barangay by its resolution, opted
to give the NSVHA the chance to open the roads, which it earlier closed by
means of arbitrarily putting up steel gates without any apparent authority.”63
Furthermore, respondents aver that the trial court and the

appellate court have ruled that only a local government unit (LGU),
in this case the Barangay, can open or close roads, whether they be
public or private, in accordance with Section 21 of the Local
Government Code. Respondents contend that Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,64
wherein the Court discussed the power of LGUs to open and close
roads, is substantially in point.65 After the submission of the parties’
respective memoranda,66 this case was submitted for decision.
The issues before us are:
1. Whether or not petitioner has a right to the protection of the
law that would entitle it to injunctive relief against the
implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096; and
2. Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
_______________
63 Id., at pp. 304-305.
64 385 Phil. 586; 328 SCRA 836 (2000).
65 Rollo, p. 305.
66 Id., at pp. 358-403, 415-435.
462

The Ruling of the Court

The Court of Appeals passed upon petitioner’s claims as to the
validity of the dismissal in this wise:
“We do not agree. Although the Motion to Dismiss was filed on the same
day, but after, the Amended Petition was filed, the same cannot be
considered as directed merely against the original petition which Appellant
already considers as non-existing. The records will show that Appellant’s
Amended Petition contained no material amendments to the original
petition. Both allege the same factual circumstances or events that constitute
the Appellant’s cause of action anent the Appellee’s alleged violation of
Appellant’s propriety rights over the subdivision roads in question.
Corollarily, the allegations in Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss, as well as the
grounds therefore predicated on lack of cause of action and jurisdiction,
could very well be considered as likewise addressed to Appellant’s
Amended Petition.
xxxx
It bears stressing that due process simply means giving every contending
party the opportunity to be heard and the court to consider every piece of
evidence presented in their favor (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
versus Benjamin Bitanga, G.R. Nos. 137934 & 137936[)]. In the instant
case, Appellant cannot be said to have been denied of due process. As borne
by the records, while Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss did not set the time for
the hearing of the motion, the day set therefore was the same date set for the
hearing of Appellant’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction—that is, November 20, 1998, with the precise purpose of
presenting evidence in support of the motion to dismiss on the same said
scheduled hearing date and time when Appellant and its counsel would be
present. Moreover, Appellant’s predication of lack of due hearing is belied
by the fact that the hearing held on November 20, 1999 took up not only the
matter of whether or not to grant the injunction, but also tackled the
jurisdictional issue raised in Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss, which issues
were intertwined in both incidents.”67
_______________
67 Id., at pp. 43-44.
463
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 463

We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of

Appeals. Petitioner’s recourse in questioning BSV Resolution No.
98-096 should have been with the Mayor of Parañaque City, as
clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which
provides:
“Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective

Barangays.—The city or municipality, through the city or municipal mayor
concerned, shall exercise general supervision over component barangays to
ensure that said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.”
We do not see how petitioner’s act could qualify as an exception

to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have
emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a recent
case, wherein we held:
“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone

of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow
administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.
The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and
convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the
system of administrative redress has been completed.”68
It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang Barangay’s

actions to see if it acted within the scope of its prescribed powers
and functions. Indeed, this is a local problem to be resolved within
the local government. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly found
that the trial court committed no reversible error in dismissing the
case for petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as
the requirement under the Local Government Code that the closure
and opening of roads be made pursuant to an ordinance, instead of
_______________
68 Universal Robina Corp. (Corn Division) v. Laguna Lake Development
Authority, G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 506.
464

a resolution, is not applicable in this case because the subject roads

belong to the City Government of Parañaque.
Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden
of proof was on petitioner to show ownership over the subject roads.
This, petitioner failed to do.
In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations
has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence.
Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon
the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.69
Petitioner dared to question the barangay’s ownership over the
subject roads when it should have been the one to adduce evidence
to support its broad claims of exclusivity and privacy. Petitioner did
not submit an iota of proof to support its acts of ownership, which,
as pointed out by respondents, consisted of closing the subject roads
that belonged to the then Municipality of Parañaque and were
already being used by the public, limiting their use exclusively to the
subdivision’s homeowners, and collecting fees from delivery vans
that would pass through the gates that they themselves had built. It is
petitioner’s authority to put up the road blocks in the first place that
becomes highly questionable absent any proof of ownership.
On the other hand, the local government unit’s power to close
and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local
Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:
“Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.—(a) A local government

unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or
open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction:
Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must
be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, an ade-
_______________
69 Heirs of Pedro De Guzman v. Perona, G.R. No. 152266, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 653,
661.
465
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 465

quate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.”
We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals in this

regard, as follows:
“Contrary, however, to Appellant’s position, the above-quoted provision,

which requires the passage of an ordinance by a local government unit to
effect the opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the instant
case since the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic
in the area—namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets—have already been
donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already
issued in the name of, the City Government of Parañaque since the year
1964 (Annexes “2” to “7” of Appellees’ Brief). This fact has not even been
denied by the Appellant in the proceedings below nor in the present
recourse. Having been already donated or turned over to the City
Government of Parañaque, the road lots in question have since then taken
the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man,
and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant.
Accordingly, the Appellant was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated
rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to
vehicular traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently, Appellees’
act of passing the disputed barangay resolution, the implementation of
which is sought to be restrained by Appellant, had for its purpose not the
opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or
reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public road which
should rightfully be open for use to the general public.”70
Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of

the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision but it miserably failed to
establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject roads,
which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for. It even wants this
Court to take “judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as
robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in Philippine
society.”71
_______________
70 Rollo, pp. 45-46.
71 Id., at p. 31.
466

This is absurd. The Rules of Court provide which matters constitute
judicial notice, to wit:
Rule 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
“SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.—A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts
of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.(1a)”
The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial

knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not support
its petition for injunctive relief in any way.
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled
to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead of
going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code, the
petition must be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ DECISION dated October 16,
2002 and its RESOLUTION dated January 17, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 65559 are both AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Peralta,** Bersamin and

Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
_______________
** Per Raffle dated July 25, 2011.
467
VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 467

Note.—Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the

court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him; Exceptions.
(Diokno vs. Cacdac, 526 SCRA 440 [2007])
——o0o——
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05-New Sun Valley V Sanguniang Baranggay

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G.R. No. 156686. July 27, 2011.

NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The

New Sun Valley Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Barangay,

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI),

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 441

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

congestion. The barangay should require these drivers to observe road

Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a

“Acting on the Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction/

On November 3, 1998, the RTC issued another Order11 stating

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 443

opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the “subject roads”).

The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed on December 4, 1998 a

444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

NSVHAI then filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Expunge on

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 445

NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration22 of the above-

446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 447

Respondents claimed that Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 was

“Respectfully indorsed to Atty. Antonio G. Cruz, Municipal Attorney, of

448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2. Letter32 dated December 27, 1990 from

3. Certification33 dated October 8, 1990

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 449

4. Certification34 dated June 13, 1994, again

5. Certification35 dated March 2, 1995 issued

6. Certification36 dated October 26, 1998

The Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated October 16, 2002

Appeals likewise denied NSVHAI’s Motion for Partial

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 451

Petitioner avers that the hearing for the respondents’ Motion to

452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 453

454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 455

Petitioner raises the following grounds for the issuance by this

“Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 is repugnant to the

456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

A perusal of the documents attached by petitioner as Annexes

2. A letter54 signed by Parañaque City Mayor Joey Marquez dated

“This refers to your intended implementation of Barangay Sun Valley Resolution

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 457

OPEN ROSEMALLOW AND ASTER STREETS TO

3. A letter55 dated January 31, 2003

458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 459

Court.59 Respondents likewise allege that the gates were earlier

“The directive of the Barangay is certainly a declaration of an intention

460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

As regards petitioner’s argument that the BSV Sangguniang

With regard to the Mayor’s involvement in this case, respondents

“The Mayor’s act of interfering in Barangay Sun Valley affairs stemmed

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 461

It was mainly the mounting traffic problem progressively experienced

Furthermore, respondents aver that the trial court and the

462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Ruling of the Court

VOL. 654, JULY 27, 2011 463