REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 60 OF 2023

RITU CHHABARIA … PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

1. The present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

has been filed by the writ petitioner herein seeking the release of her

husband on default bail. The writ petition also raises an issue of grave

importance of personal liberty enshrined under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India.

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 FACTS

2. Briefly, the facts relevant to the present writ petition are that an FIR was

lodged under Section 120(B) read with Section 420 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) along with Sections 7,12 and 13(2) read with

Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein the

writ petitioner’s husband was not named.

3. Subsequently, two supplementary chargesheets were filed, wherein the

writ petitioner’s husband (hereinafter referred to as “accused”) was

made a prosecution witness in the supplementary chargesheet dated

26.05.2020. Multiple other supplementary chargesheets were later filed,

and the accused was not named in any of the said chargesheets.

4. The investigation was then transferred to another investigating officer, and

the accused was then arrested by CBI and was remanded to custody on

28.04.2022. Multiple other supplementary chargesheets were then filed,

wherein the accused herein was named as a suspect, and the remand of the

accused under Section 309(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(for short, ‘Cr.PC’) was renewed and was continued from time to time,

and he was never released on default bail.

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5. Subsequently, vide I.A No. 37424/2023, the petitioner sought to

incorporate additional grounds and prayers for seeking bail in the writ

petition, which was allowed by this Court vide order dated 20.02.2023,

and interim bail was granted.

6. It is against this continuation of custody, and the scuttling of relief of

default bail, the petitioner herein has filed the present writ. Every

Supplementary chargesheet filed, as per the writ petitioner herein, is an

attempt to ensure that her husband is not released on default bail.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE PETITIONER

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that:

I. The Respondent has admitted in writing in the supplementary

chargesheet that the investigation is still pending, and in light of the

same the trial court ought not to have issued process and remanded the

petitioner’s husband under Section 309 Cr.PC.

II. The accused’s fundamental rights are in prejudice due to continued

custody on grounds of investigation not being completed. It was

argued that the provisions of the CrPC do not empower continued

remand to custody beyond 60 days if the investigation is still in

progress. For this, the learned counsel relied on the judgment in the

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 case of M. Ravindran Vs. The Intelligence Officer, Directorate of

Revenue Intelligence.1

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT

8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent contended that:

I. The present writ is not maintainable, and for the grant of bail, the

accused herein should have either approached the High Court against

the order of the Magistrate refusing default bail or filed a Special

Leave Petition against the said order invoking provisions of Article

136 of the Constitution of India.

II. The contention of the petitioner that the accused is not named in the

FIR is not a relevant submission, as the FIR is not a complete

document, and is only the first step to set the criminal procedure in

motion. To support the contention, learned counsel relied on the case

of State Of Bihar & Others Vs. J.A.C Saldanha & Ors.2

III. The supplementary chargesheet filed on 25.06.2022 is a complete

document in respect to the offence committed by the persons arraigned

in the said supplementary chargesheet, therefore no right to default

bail has been accrued in favor of the petitioner’s husband.

1 (2021) 2 SCC 485

2 (1980) 1 SCC 554.

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ISSUES

9. In light of the abovementioned arguments raised by the learned counsel

for the parties, the following three issues arise for our consideration:-

I. Can a chargesheet or a prosecution complaint be filed in piecemeal

without first completing the investigation of the case?

II. Whether the filing of such a chargesheet without completing the

investigation will extinguish the right of an accused for grant of

default bail?

III. Whether the remand of an accused can be continued by the trial court

during the pendency of investigation beyond the stipulated time as

prescribed by the CrPC?

PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

10. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondent stating that the present writ is not maintainable

before this court on grounds that no relief at such an early stage of the

investigation can be granted.

11.We have considered the preliminary objection, however, we are not

inclined to concur with the same. It must be remembered that our

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 Constitution has entrusted the Supreme Court with the most important task

of protecting civil liberties of individuals, and the society at large. These

civil liberties, which manifest themselves in the form of fundamental

rights, are what allow the people of this country to effectively negotiate

with the state and maintain the parity in power in the social contract

between the people and the state. If this Court refuses to exercise its

jurisdiction on technicalities in cases of violations of fundamental rights, it

will lead to a ripple effect that will result in a dysfunctional social

contract, wherein the people of this country would become subject to an

arbitrary and unfettered tyranny of the state.

12. Article 32 of the Constitution of India provides remedies for enforcement

of rights conferred by this Part. The said Article reads as under:-

“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this

Part-(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this
Part is guaranteed.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or

orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the
rights conferred by this Part.

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme

Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower
any other court to exercise within the local limits of its
jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme
Court under clause (2).

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 (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended
except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”

Article 32 falls within Part III of the Constitution which deals with

fundamental rights and thus the right to invoke Article 32 is a fundamental

right in itself, that exists to protect and safeguard the other fundamental

rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. We may usefully refer to

the following observations of a Constitution Bench of this Court made in

the case of K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. vs. Union Of India & Ors.3 :-

“A constitutional democracy can survive when citizens have an

undiluted assurance that the Rule of Law will protect their
rights and liberties against any invasion by the State and that
judicial remedies would be available to ask searching questions
and expect answers when a citizen has been deprived of these,
most precious rights.”

13.Further, another Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of K.K

Kochunni, Moopil Nayar vs. State of Madras & Ors. 4 as early as 1959,

has observed that the Court must exercise its jurisdiction in matters where

there is an abuse of fundamental rights. The relevant paragraphs of the

said judgment are being extracted hereunder:

3 (2017) 10 SCC 1
4 1959 Supp (2) SCR 316

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 “Further, even if the existence of other adequate legal remedy
may be taken into consideration by the High Court in deciding
whether It should issue any of the prerogative writs on an appli-
cation under Article 226 of the Constitution, as to which we say
nothing now - this Court cannot, on a similarground, decline to
entertain a petition under Article 32, for the right to move this
Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the
rights conferred by Part I of the Constitution is itself a guaran-
teed right. It has accordingly been held by this Court in Romesh
Thappar v. State of Madras [1950 SCC 436 1950 SCR 594] that
under the Constitution this Court is constituted the protector
and guarantor of fundamental rights and it cannot, consistently
with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain appli-
cations seeking the protection of this Court against infringement
of such rights, although such applications are made to this
Court in the first instance without resort to a High Court having
concurrent jurisdiction in the matter. The mere existence of an
adequate alternative legal remedy cannot per se be a good and
sufficient ground for throwing out a petition under Article 32, if
the existence of a fundamental right and a breach, actual or
threatened, of such right is alleged and is prima facie estab-
lished on the petition."

14. It is also pertinent to note that the relief of statutory bail under Section

167(2) of the Cr.PC, in our opinion, is a fundamental right directly

flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and the violation of

such a right, as mentioned above, directly attracts consideration under

Article 32 of the Constitution. In such circumstance, we are not inclined to

agree with the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the

respondent regarding the maintainability of this petition under Article 32

of the Constitution and the said objection, therefore, stands rejected.

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 ANALYSIS

15.Before we deal with the issues framed, we find it pertinent to mention that

in the present case, this Court is not dealing with the merits of the case and

as such is not inclined to make any observations regarding the same.

Every court, when invoked to exercise its powers, must be mindful of the

relief sought, and must act as a forum confined to such relief. In the

present case at hand, this Court is not a court of appeal, but a court of writ,

and therefore is inclined to limit its jurisdiction only to the personal liberty

of the writ petitioner’s husband and the impugned points of law.

16.For the purpose of deciding the issues framed by us, we deem it

appropriate to trace the history of the provision of default bail, and the

reasons which led the legislature to incorporate the existing provisions in

the new statute. Under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1898, which was the Act that governed criminal procedure before the

enactment of CrPC presently in force, an accused, either under judicial or

police custody, could be remanded only for a maximum period of 15 days.

For a ready reference Section 167 of the 1898 Code is being reproduced

herein:-

“Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in

twenty-four hours. - (1) Whenever any person is arrested and

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 detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot
be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by
Section 61, and there are grounds for believing that the
accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge
of the police station or the police officer in charge of the police
station or the police officer making the investigation if he is not
below the rank of sub-inspector shall forthwith transmit to the
nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter
prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time
forward the accused to such Magistrate.
(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded
under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to
try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the
accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term
not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. If he has not
jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers
further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be
forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction :
Provided that no Magistrate of the third class, and no
Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered in this
behalf by the State Government shall authorise detention in the
custody of the police.
(3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the
custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing.
(4) If such order is given by a Magistrate other than the District
Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, he shall forward a
copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the
Magistrate to whom he is immediately subordinate.”

17.This period of 15 days, however, more often than not, was inadequate to

conclude investigations, especially in complicated cases which required a

longer and deeper investigation. This lack of time, because of the

abovementioned provision of the 1898 Act, led to a widespread practice

wherein investigating officers would file preliminary chargesheets after

the expiry of the remand period, and subsequently request the magistrate

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 to postpone the commencement of trial and remand the accused under

Section 344 of the 1898 Act for a further time, till the final chargesheet

was filed.

18. This practice of filing preliminary chargesheets was first pointed out by

the Law Commission of India in its Report No. 14 5 on Reforms of the

Judicial Administration, wherein it was stated that in many cases, the

accused persons, without the filing of any detailed reports before the

courts by the investigating authority, were languishing in jail for a

prolonged period of time. It thus recommended that there existed an

urgent need for a provision that provided for an appropriate time frame for

the completion of an investigation while also safeguarding the personal

liberty of the accused.

19.These recommendations made by the abovementioned law commission

report were again emphasized by the Law Commission in its Report No.

416, wherein it was explicitly stated that there was an urgent need to

protect the civil liberties of accused persons against the misuse of Section

344 of the 1898 Act, wherein the accused persons, on grounds of a

preliminary report and pending investigation, were remanded to custody

5 Law Commission of India in Report No. 14, Vol.-I (1958).

6 Law Commission in its Report No. 41 (September,1969), Para. 14.19.

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indefinitely. The relevant paragraphs from the said report are being

reproduced hereunder:-

“Section 167 provides for remands. The total period for which
an arrested person may be remanded to custody-police or
judicial-is 15 days. The assumption is that the investigation
must be completed within 15 days and the final report under
section 173 sent to court by then. In actual practice, however,
this has frequently been found unworkable. Quite often, a
complicated investigation cannot be completed within 15 days,
and if the offence is serious, the police naturally insist that the
accused be kept in custody. A practice of doubtful legal validity
has therefore grown up. The police file before a magistrate a
preliminary or "incomplete" report, and the magistrate,
purporting to act under section 344, adjourns the proceedings
and remands the accused to custody. In the Fourteenth Report,
the Law Commission doubted if such an order could be made
under section 344, as that section is intended to operate only
after a magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence, which
can be properly done only after a final report under section 173
has been received, and not while the investigation is still
proceeding. We are of the same view, and to us also it appears
proper that the law should be clarified in this respect. The use
of section 344 for a remand beyond the statutory period fixed
under section 167 can lead to serious abuse, as an arrested
person can in this manner be kept in custody indefinitely while
the investigation can go on in a leisurely manner. It is,
therefore, desirable, as was observed in the Fourteenth Report
that some time limit should be placed on the power of the police
to obtain a remand, while the investigation is still going on: and
if the present time limit of 15 days is too short, it would be
better to fix a longer period rather than countenance a practice
which violates the spirit of the legal safe-guard. Like the earlier
Law Commission, we feel that 15 days is perhaps too short and
we propose therefore to follow the recommendation in the
Fourteenth Report that the maximum period under section 167
should be fixed at 60 days. We are aware of the danger that
such an extension may result in the maximum period becoming
the rule in every case as a matter of routine: but we trust that

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 proper supervision by the superior courts will prevent that. We
propose accordingly to revise sub-sections (2) and (4) of section
167 as follows :-

"(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded

under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to
try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the
accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term
not exceeding fifteen days at a time and sixty days in the whole.
If he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial,
and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the
accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such
jurisdiction

Provided that-

(a) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody un-

der this section unless the accused is produced before him;

(b) no Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered

in this behalf by the High Court shall authorise detention in the
custody of the police.

(4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate

making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his
reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.”

20. On the recommendation made by the Law Commission through the

aforesaid reports recommending to curtail the abuse of such power,

Section 167(2) as it exists today in the statute was incorporated in the

Cr.PC, 1973, which provides for a longer period of maximum remand, but

also guarantees default bail, to ensure that accused persons are bereft of

arbitrary detention.7 The Statement of Objects and Reasons of CrPC,1973

7 Law Commission in its Report No. 41 (September,1969), Para. 14.19.

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 also refer to the 41st law Commission Report and inter alia reads as

follows:-

"(2).....A comprehensive report for the revision of the Code,

namely, the Forty-first Report, was presented by the Law
Commission in September, 1969. This report took into
consideration the recommendations made in the earlier l
Reports of the Commission dealing with specific matters
namely, the Fourteenth, Twenty-fifth, Thirty-second, Thirty-
third, Thirty-sixth, Thirty-seventh and Fortieth Reports.

(3) The recommendation of the Commission were examined

carefully by the Government, keeping in view, among others, the
following basic considerations-

(i) an accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with

the accepted principles of natural justice;

(ii)every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigation

and trial which is harmful not onlv to individuals involved but
also to society; and

(iii) the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the

utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of
the community.

The occasion has been availed of to consider and adopt where

appropriate suggestions received from other quarters, based on
practical experience of investigation and the working of
criminal courts”

21.A bare perusal of the abovementioned statement of objects strongly

indicates that Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC was enacted to ensure that the

investigating agency completes the investigation within the prescribed

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 time limit, failing which no accused could be detained if they are willing

to avail bail. This position was also laid emphasis on by a three-judge

bench of this Court in the case of M. Ravindran Vs. Directorate Of

Revenue Intelligence (Supra), the relevant paragraphs of the same are

being reproduced hereunder:

“The suggestion made in Report No. 14 was reiterated by the

Law Commission in Report No. 41 on The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (Vol. I, 1969, pp. 76-77). The Law Commission
re-emphasised the need to guard against the misuse of Section
344 of the 1898 Code by filing "preliminary reports" for
remanding the accused beyond the statutory period prescribed
under Section 167. It was pointed out that this could lead to
serious abuse wherein "the arrested person can in this manner
be kept in custody indefinitely while the investigation can go on
in a leisurely manner". Hence the Commission recommended
fixing of a maximum time-limit of 60 days for remand.

It was in this backdrop that Section 167(2) was enacted within

the present day CrPC, providing for time-limits on the period of
remand of the accused, proportionate to the seriousness of the
offence committed, failing which the accused acquires the
indefeasible right to bail.”

22.Further, this legal position was again reiterated in Satendar Kumar Antil

vs CBI & Anr.8, wherein it was held that Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC is a

limb of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, the

investigating authority is under a constitutional duty to expediate the

process of investigation within the stipulated time, failing which, the

8 (2021) 10 SCC 773

15
 accused is entitled to be released on default bail. The relevant observations

made in the said judgment are as under:-

“Section 167(2) was introduced in the year 1978, giving

emphasis to the maximum period of time to complete the
investigation. This provision has got a laudable object behind it,
which is to ensure an expeditious investigation and a fair trial,
and to set down a rationalised procedure that protects the
interests of the indigent sections of society. This is also another
limb of Article 21. Presumption of Innocence is also inbuilt in
this provision. An investigating agency has to expedite the
process of investigation as a suspect is lanquishing under
incarceration. Thus, a duty is enjoined upon the agency to
complete the investigation within the time prescribed and a
failure would enable the release of the accused. The right
enshrined is an absolute and indefeasible one, ensuring to the
benefit of suspect.

As a consequence of the right flowing from the said provision,

courts will have to give due effect to it, and thus any detention
beyond this period would certainly be illegal, being an affront
to the liberty of the person concerned. Therefore, it is not only
the duty of the investigating agency but also the courts to see to
it that an accused gets the benefit of Section 167(2)."

23.It is also to be noted that as per the scheme of Cr.PC, an investigation of a

cognizable case commences with the recording of an FIR under Section

154 Cr.PC. If a person is arrested and the investigation of the case cannot

be completed within 24 hours, he has to be produced before the

magistrate to seek his remand under Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC during

continued investigation. There is a statutory time frame then prescribed

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 for remand of the accused for the purposes of investigation, however, the

same cannot extend beyond 90 days, as provided under Section 167(2)(a)

(i) in cases where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with

death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than

10 years and 60 days, as provided under Section 167(2)(a)(ii), where the

investigation relates to any other offence. The relevant section further

provides that on expiry of the period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case

may be, the accused has a right to be released on default bail in case he is

prepared to and furnishes bail.

24.This right of statutory bail, however, is extinguished, if the charge sheet is

filed within the stipulated period. The question of resorting to a

supplementary chargesheet u/s 173(8) of the Cr.PC only arises after the

main chargesheet has been filed, and as such, a supplementary

chargesheet, wherein it is explicitly stated that the investigation is still

pending, cannot under any circumstance, be used to scuttle the right of

default bail, for then, the entire purpose of default bail is defeated, and the

filing of a chargesheet or a supplementary chargesheet becomes a mere

formality, and a tool, to ensue that the right of default bail is scuttled.

25. It is thus axiomatic that first investigation is to be completed, and only

then can a chargesheet or a complaint be filed within the stipulated period,

17
 and failure to do so would trigger the statutory right of default bail under

Section 167(2) of Cr.PC. In the case of Union Of India vs Thamisharasi

& Ors.9, which was a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985, on finding that the investigation was not complete

and a chargesheet was not filed within the prescribed period, denial of

default bail was held to be in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of

India, and it was further held that even the twin limitation on grant of bail

would not apply.

26.Further, in the case of Ashok Munilal Jain & Anr. Vs. Assistant Director,

Directorate of Enforcement10, it was held that the right of default bail

under section 167(2) CrPC was held to be an indefeasible right of the

accused even in matters under PMLA.

27. Therefore, in light of the abovementioned discussions, it can be seen that

the practice of filing preliminary reports before the enactment of the

present CrPC has now taken the form of filing chargesheets without

actually completing the investigation, only to scuttle the right of default

bail. If we were to hold that chargesheets can be filed without completing

the investigation, and the same can be used for prolonging remand, it

would in effect negate the purpose of introducing section 167(2) of the

9 (1995) 4 SCC 190

10 (2018) 16 SCC 158

18
 CrPC and ensure that the fundamental rights guaranteed to accused

persons is violated.

28.We have carefully perused the judgments relied upon by the learned

counsel for the respondent, however, none of the judgments relied upon

permit the abuse of remand under Section 309(2) of the CrPC by

permitting the filing of incomplete chargesheets only to scuttle the right of

statutory bail.

29.The judgment in State of West Bengal vs. Salap Service Station & Ors. 11

relied upon by the respondent was rendered, not in the context of default

bail, but only in the context of entitlement u/s. 173(8) of the CrPC to place

on record further evidence in support of the chargesheet already filed.

30.Further, the judgment of Dharam Pal vs. State Of Haryana & Ors.12,

relied upon by the respondent, refers to the power of Constitutional Courts

to transfer investigation. In Para 21 of the said judgment, it has been stated

that Section 173 empowers the police officer to conduct an investigation

to file a report on the completion of the investigation and section 173(8)

CrPC allows the conduct of further investigation. However, this judgment

also does not talk about default bail and the misuse of the filing of

11 1994 Supp (3) SCC 318

12 2016 (4) SCC 160

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 supplementary chargesheets. It is also important to note that the judgment

of Ram Narain Popli vs. CBI13 and Rajesh Ranjan Yadav vs. CBI14 have

also not dealt with the issues being considered by us in the present matter.

31.In light of the abovementioned discussion, the judgments relied upon by

the learned counsel for the respondent are clearly distinguishable as issues

being considered herein were not considered therein and reliance placed

by the learned counsel for the respondents on the said pronouncements is

totally misfounded.

32.In view of the above mentioned discussions, the issues framed by us stand

answered as under:-

I. Without completing the investigation of a case, a chargesheet or

prosecution complaint cannot be filed by an investigating agency only

to deprive an arrested accused of his right to default bail under Section

167(2) of the CrPC.

II. Such a chargesheet, if filed by an investigating authority without first

completing the investigation, would not extinguish the right to default

bail under Section 167(2) CrPC.

13 (2003) 3 SCC 641

14 (2007) 1 SCC 70

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 III. The trial court, in such cases, cannot continue to remand an arrested

person beyond the maximum stipulated time without offering the

arrested person default bail.

CONCLUSION

33.In the instant case, it is clear from the facts that during the pendency of the

investigation, supplementary chargesheets were filed by the Investigation

Agency just before the expiry of 60 days, with the purpose of scuttling the

right to default bail accrued in favour the accused. This factual position

was missed by the trial court, and instead of offering default bail to the

accused, the trial court mechanically accepted the incomplete chargesheets

filed by the Investigating Agency, and further continued the remand of the

accused beyond the maximum period specified. The Investigating Agency

and the trial court, thus, failed to observe the mandate of law, and acted in

a manner which was manifestly arbitrary and violative of the fundamental

rights guaranteed to the accused.

34.Even at the cost of repetition, we find it pertinent to mention that the right

of default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC is not merely a statutory

right, but a fundamental right that flows from Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. The reason for such importance being given to a

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 seemingly insignificant procedural formality is to ensure that no accused

person is subject to unfettered and arbitrary power of the state. The

process of remand and custody, in their practical manifestations, create a

huge disparity of power between the investigating authority and the

accused. While there is no doubt in our minds that arrest and remand are

extremely crucial for the smooth functioning of the investigation authority

for the purpose of attaining justice, however, it is also extremely important

to be cognizant of a power imbalance. Therefore, it becomes essential to

place certain checks and balances upon the Investigation Agency in order

to prevent the harassment of accused persons at their hands.

35.With the above findings and conclusions, the interim order of bail passed

in favor of the accused is made absolute, and the present writ petition is,

accordingly, disposed of.

....…......…….................…,J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)

..….......….....................…,J.
(C. T. RAVIKUMAR)

NEW DELHI;
26th APRIL, 2023

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